

**University of Nairobi**  
**Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies**

**REGIONAL PEACE SUPPORT INITIATIVES IN CAPACITY BUILDING: CASE STUDY  
OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTRE**

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
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## Declaration

I, Mark Tum Richard, declare that this research project is my original work and has not been submitted for the award of a degree in any other university.

Signed 

Date 15/11/2011

Mark Tum Richard.

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

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## **Dedication**

I dedicate this work to my family, my wife Selina, my daughters Sharon and Maureen and sons, Kevin and Brian, my mother Ruth for their love and moral support. May the almighty God bless them all, and to my late courageous dad (may his soul rest in eternal peace) who went out of his way in ensuring that we got quality education.

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## **Abstract**

Modern peace support operations are a response to the shift from inter to intra state conflict encompassing complex mandates in volatile, polarized, distressed and dysfunctional environment. Additionally, the new mandates whether in Darfur or DRC include the protection of civilians as a core tasks under Chapter VII of the UN charter creating new challenges hence the need for capacity building for the personnel engaged in this noble cause. This study investigates the role and contribution of the regional peace support initiatives in capacity building using the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) as a case study. According to liberal thinking, contemporary democracies have reasons to participate in operations with a democratic or humanitarian appeal. Democracies draw legitimacy, in large part, from liberal principles and that democratic leaders can export liberal practices and pursue humanitarian objectives. Liberal theory also supports the assumption that democracies share an interest in creating economic, political, and security conditions in which peace, prosperity, and democracy can thrive hence engage in peacekeeping intervention. The study used interviews and questionnaires. The study established that IPSTC does engage in capacity building for civilians, police and military in preparation for deployment in any peace mission whether sponsored by the United Nations or the African Union but there remains room for enhancing the quality and quantity of participants in the future.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

<b>ACCORD</b>	<b>African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes</b>
<b>ACDS</b>	<b>African Chiefs of Defense Staff</b>
<b>ACOTA</b>	<b>Africa Contingency Training and Assistance Programme</b>
<b>AMIB</b>	<b>African Union Mission to Burundi</b>
<b>AMIS</b>	<b>African Union Mission in Sudan</b>
<b>AMISOM</b>	<b>African Union Mission to Somalia</b>
<b>APSA</b>	<b>African Peace and Security Architecture</b>
<b>APSTA</b>	<b>African Peace Support Trainers' Association</b>
<b>ASF</b>	<b>Africa Standby Force</b>
<b>BPST-EA</b>	<b>British Peace Support Team East Africa</b>
<b>CCCPA</b>	<b>Cairo Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa</b>
<b>CDDP</b>	<b>Post Graduate Certificate in Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration</b>
<b>CEWARN</b>	<b>Conflict Early Warning</b>
<b>CEWS</b>	<b>Continental Early Warning System</b>
<b>CIED</b>	<b>Counter Improvised Explosive Devices</b>
<b>CIPSO</b>	<b>Post Graduate Certificate in Integrated Peace Support Operations</b>
<b>CISS</b>	<b>Chief of Integrated Support Services</b>
<b>CMD</b>	<b>Conflict Management Division</b>
<b>CMS</b>	<b>Chief of Mission Support</b>
<b>CoE</b>	<b>Centers of Excellence</b>
<b>CPRCR</b>	<b>Nigerian National Defence College Centre for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution</b>
<b>CPX</b>	<b>Command Post Exercise</b>

<b>CSSR</b>	<b>Post Graduate Certificate in Security Sector Reforms</b>
<b>DCPS</b>	<b>Post Graduate Diploma in Conflict, Peace and Security</b>
<b>DDDP</b>	<b>Post Graduate Diploma in Development Diplomacy Programme</b>
<b>DDR</b>	<b>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</b>
<b>DGPS</b>	<b>Post Graduate Diploma in Gender, Peace and Security</b>
<b>DMS</b>	<b>Director of Mission Support</b>
<b>DPKO</b>	<b>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</b>
<b>EACDS</b>	<b>Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defence Staff</b>
<b>EAPSA</b>	<b>Eastern African Peace and Security Architecture</b>
<b>EAPSM</b>	<b>East African Peace and Security Mechanism</b>
<b>EASBRICOM</b>	<b>Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordinating Mechanism</b>
<b>EASBRIG</b>	<b>Eastern Africa Standby Brigade</b>
<b>EASF</b>	<b>Eastern Africa Standby Force</b>
<b>EASFCOM</b>	<b>Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordinating Mechanism</b>
<b>ECCAS</b>	<b>Economic Community of Central African States</b>
<b>ECCASBRIG</b>	<b>Economic Community of Central African States Brigade</b>
<b>ECOBRIg</b>	<b>Economic Community of West African States Brigade</b>
<b>ECOMOG</b>	<b>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</b>
<b>ECOWAS</b>	<b>Economic Community of West African States</b>
<b>EOD</b>	<b>Explosive Ordnance Device</b>
<b>EOPs</b>	<b>Emergency Operating Procedures</b>
<b>FBA</b>	<b>Folke Bernadotte Academy</b>
<b>FOMAC</b>	<b>Multinational Force of Central Africa</b>
<b>FTX</b>	<b>Field Training Exercise</b>
<b>GIZ</b>	<b>German Development Cooperation</b>
<b>GPS</b>	<b>Global Positioning System</b>

<b>HNS</b>	<b>Host Nation Support</b>
<b>HPSS</b>	<b>Humanitarian Peace Support School</b>
<b>ICGLR</b>	<b>International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</b>
<b>IAPTC</b>	<b>International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers</b>
<b>ICM</b>	<b>Independent Coordination Mechanism</b>
<b>IDIS</b>	<b>Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies</b>
<b>IED</b>	<b>Improvised Explosive Devices</b>
<b>IGAD</b>	<b>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</b>
<b>IHL</b>	<b>International Humanitarian Law</b>
<b>IMATC</b>	<b>International Mine Action Training Centre</b>
<b>IMSMA</b>	<b>Information Management System for Mine Action</b>
<b>IPBS</b>	<b>Integrated Peace Building Strategy</b>
<b>IPCS</b>	<b>Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies</b>
<b>IPSTC</b>	<b>International Peace Support Training Centre</b>
<b>ISDSC</b>	<b>Interstate Defence and Security Committee</b>
<b>ISS</b>	<b>Integrated Support Services</b>
<b>KAIPTC</b>	<b>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</b>
<b>KENBATT</b>	<b>Kenyan Battalion</b>
<b>KRDC</b>	<b>Kenya Rapid Deployment Capability</b>
<b>LDD</b>	<b>Lessons Learned Design &amp; Development</b>
<b>MCPS</b>	<b>Master of Arts degree in Conflict, Peace and Security</b>
<b>MGPS</b>	<b>Master Degree in Gender, Peace and Security</b>
<b>MOC</b>	<b>Memorandum of Coopeation</b>
<b>MONUSCO</b>	<b>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission to the DRC</b>
<b>MTAP</b>	<b>Military Training Assistance Programme</b>
<b>MTCP</b>	<b>Military Training and Cooperation Programme</b>
<b>NAPKC</b>	<b>Nigeria Army Peacekeeping Centre</b>

<b>NARC</b>	<b>North African Regional Capability Brigade</b>
<b>NASBRIG</b>	<b>North African Standby Brigade</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</b>
<b>OAS</b>	<b>Organization of American States</b>
<b>OAU</b>	<b>Organization of African Unity</b>
<b>ONUMOZ</b>	<b>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</b>
<b>ONUSAL</b>	<b>United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador</b>
<b>OSCE</b>	<b>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</b>
<b>PBC</b>	<b>United Nations Peace Building Commission</b>
<b>PCCs</b>	<b>Police Contributing Countries</b>
<b>PCSS</b>	<b>Peace and Conflict Studies School</b>
<b>PfP</b>	<b>Partnership-for-Peace</b>
<b>PKOs</b>	<b>Peace Keeping Operations</b>
<b>PLANELM</b>	<b>Planning Elements</b>
<b>PoC</b>	<b>Protection of Civilians</b>
<b>PPC</b>	<b>Pearson Peacekeeping Centre</b>
<b>PSC</b>	<b>Peace and Security Council</b>
<b>PSO</b>	<b>Peace Support Operation</b>
<b>PSOD</b>	<b>Peace and Security Operations Department</b>
<b>QIPs</b>	<b>Quick Impact Projects</b>
<b>RECs</b>	<b>Regional Economic Communities</b>
<b>ROE</b>	<b>Rules Of Engagement</b>
<b>RMA</b>	<b>Rwanda Military Academy</b>
<b>RPA</b>	<b>Rwanda Peace Academy</b>
<b>RSOI</b>	<b>Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration</b>
<b>SADC</b>	<b>Southern African Development Community</b>

<b>SADCBRIG</b>	<b>Southern African Development Community Brigade</b>
<b>SADC RPTC</b>	<b>Southern Africa Development Community Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre</b>
<b>SANWC</b>	<b>South African National War College</b>
<b>SDP</b>	<b>Strategic Development Plan</b>
<b>SIPO</b>	<b>Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ</b>
<b>SOFA</b>	<b>Status of Force Agreement</b>
<b>SOMA</b>	<b>Status of Mission Agreement</b>
<b>SOP</b>	<b>Standard Operating Procedures</b>
<b>SSR</b>	<b>Security Sector Reform</b>
<b>TCCs</b>	<b>Troop Contributing Countries</b>
<b>TED</b>	<b>Training Evaluation and Development</b>
<b>TMS</b>	<b>Training Management System</b>
<b>TTPs</b>	<b>Tactics, Techniques and Procedures</b>
<b>UNAMID</b>	<b>United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur</b>
<b>UNAMSIL</b>	<b>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</b>
<b>UNCIVSOC</b>	<b>United Nations Civilian Staff Officer Course</b>
<b>UNDP</b>	<b>United Nations Development Programme</b>
<b>UNEF</b>	<b>United Nations Emergency Force</b>
<b>UNHCR</b>	<b>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</b>
<b>UNMIK</b>	<b>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</b>
<b>UNMOGIP</b>	<b>UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</b>
<b>UNOMIL</b>	<b>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</b>
<b>UNOSOM</b>	<b>United Nations Operation in Somalia</b>
<b>UNPREDEP</b>	<b>United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia</b>
<b>UNPROFOR</b>	<b>United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia</b>
<b>UNSAS</b>	<b>UN Standby Arrangement System</b>

<b>UNSC</b>	<b>UN Security Council</b>
<b>UNSCOB</b>	<b>UN Special Mission on the Balkans</b>
<b>UNTAC</b>	<b>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</b>
<b>UNTAET</b>	<b>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</b>
<b>UNTO</b>	<b>UN Truce Supervision Organization</b>
<b>USAFCOM</b>	<b>United States Africa Command</b>
<b>UXOs</b>	<b>Un-Exploded Ordinances</b>

# **CHAPTER ONE:**

## **INTRODUCTION OF THE STUDY**

### **1.1 Introduction**

Peace support operations (PSOs) are becoming increasingly complex. This is more so after the end of the Cold War which had far reaching global effects in political, socio-economic and security spheres. The end of the Cold War brought new global challenges to a struggling United Nations (UN) security structure affected by among other factors the surge in the demand for PSOs and global recession. Ever since then the United Nations peacekeeping missions are being deployed in countries where the national infrastructure has collapsed or near collapse. Contemporary peacekeeping can be appropriately characterized as multilateral, multi-dimensional and multi-national/multi-cultural. The multi-dimensional angle of contemporary peacekeeping means that they incorporate tasks and responsibilities beyond those associated with traditional peacekeeping. Such expanded roles include security, political, humanitarian and development functions. The increase in the number and complexity of peacekeeping operations in the post Cold War period has been accompanied by a radical change in their very nature as relates to its function, application and composition.

The multi-nationalism/multi-culturalism, shows that such a peacekeeping force is assembled by a multiplicity of many troop contributing nations (TCNs) across the globe with diverse backgrounds, techniques, training, equipments, cultures, approaches and languages. This creates many challenges in operations and even in daily routine tasks. Some of these challenges can be surmounted fully or partially through joint or common training using similar doctrines especially on peace support operations issues. Regional peace support initiatives engaged in capacity building have emerged therefore at international, continental, regional and national

levels to meet the challenge of training the diverse groups involved in a UN or African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission.

## **1.2 Statement of the Research Problem**

With the change in the character of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, military operations in support of peace increased in number, size, scope, and complexity in Bosnia, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Sudan and Somalia. Several challenges and gaps were witnessed by the missions such as in Darfur not least of which was the need to have a well structured and standardized pre-mission and in-mission training streamlined and evaluation undertaken to ensure common level of understanding of vital PSOs concepts such as the mandate, key documents such as Rules of Engagement (ROEs), Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Status Of Mission Agreement (SOMA), Status Of Force Agreement (SOFA) and various agreements and protocols. The lack of proper understanding of such critical concepts meant that achievement of mandate and the accompanying tasks became difficult affecting the credibility of the UN/AU. Credibility is a key principle of UN peacekeeping operations. In such as scenario conflicts continue to persist and may even spread internally or become internationalized sucking in other regional actors to an already complex situation. It became mandatory therefore, for all civilians, police and military personnel that are likely to work in an UN multidimensional or integrated mission to receive training undertaken at a generic level, specialized training, and mission specific, pre-deployment or in-mission training.

Specifically, it was realized that there was a gap in training hence the need to utilize existing regional training initiatives and institutions or centers to address the gap. This led to the close involvement of the regional economic communities (RECs) and the regions in the identification of regional peacekeeping training institutions or 'centres of excellence' which



became central to the success of the African Standby Force (ASF) both conceptually and operationally. Such regional peace support training centers within the five sub-regions were to address the capacity gap that had been identified, harmonize training and allow interoperability. This study will investigate the role and contribution (if any) of the regional peace support initiatives in capacity building using the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) as a case study.

### **1.3 Objectives of the Research**

The objectives of this study are:

- To examine the mandate of regional peace support initiatives.
- To establish the efficacy of regional peace support initiatives in capacity building and the general understanding of the role of regional peace support initiatives in capacity building within the Eastern Africa region.

### **1.4 Literature Review**

This section presents and discusses the literature that informs the study. It is divided into different sections or sub themes namely: peace support initiatives in general, regional peace support initiatives, capacity building and peace support training.

#### **1.4.1 Literature on peace support initiatives in general**

Ever since the UN got involved in peacekeeping in the Middle East after the second World War, a number of initiatives sprang up to address the need for training and capacity building mostly at national levels. The UN and its members therefore, grappled with limited peacekeeping budgets, expressed fears about acquiring new responsibilities, and suffered constraints imposed by security mechanisms that had been improvised for peacekeeping. Yet member states pooled their resources and cobbled together forces under complicated command

arrangements to establish multilateral presences in Bosnia, Cambodia, Kosovo, Somalia, Rwanda, the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Haiti and East Timor. The nature of peacekeeping operations therefore has evolved rapidly in recent years. In the seminal report *Agenda for Peace*, former UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali posits that the established principles and practices of peacekeeping have responded flexibly to new demands of recent years, and the basic conditions for success remain unchanged: a clear and practicable mandate; the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of member states to contribute the military, police and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; effective United Nations command at headquarters and in the field; and adequate financial and logistic support.<sup>1</sup> According to Hill et al, the demands of the 90s resulted in shortage of qualified personnel especially the civilian component in United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) affecting sufficient control over the warring factions

#### **1.4.2 Literature on regional peace support initiatives**

Fetherstone *et al* argue that with the end of the Soviet-U.S. rivalry ushering in what may be termed a new world disorder, international peacekeeping has climbed to the top of the agenda of the UN, AU and many national Governments. He adds that despite the increasing resort to peacekeeping, there is little systematic understanding of its appropriate application.<sup>2</sup> It's imperative therefore to understand what these missions can accomplish and determining the extent to which they have achieved these goals in practice. The protocol on the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU states that the AU Commission shall provide guidelines for

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<sup>1</sup> Boutros, G.B., *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations para. 50

<sup>2</sup> Fetherston, A.B., *et al* "Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions", *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (May, 1997) pp. 151-165:151

the training of the civilian and military personnel of national standby contingents at both operational and tactical levels. Such training is to include training on International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, with particular emphasis on the rights of women and children. The AU Commission also undertook to expedite the development and circulation of appropriate SOPs, support standardization of training doctrines, manuals and programmes for national and regional schools of excellence and to coordinate the ASF training courses, command and staff exercises, as well as field training exercises. The AU Commission was to work in collaboration with the UN to undertake periodic assessment of African peace support capacities given the UNs rich history on PSOs.<sup>3</sup>

The background or evolution of the AU can be traced to March 2000 when OAU assembly of Heads of State and Government met in Lomé, Togo and adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Another OAU Summit in Sirte, Libya established the AU. Upon establishment, emphasis was placed onto peace and security as a pre-condition to growth and development. Specifically, the reasons put forth by the AU for the establishment of ASF was that PSC needed to have a sound mechanism for PSO missions, that conflicts were not attractive to the international community or the UN, AU wanted to play a lead political role in some conflict situations by co-deploying with the UN. The UN Charter devotes Chapter VIII to regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action and consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN.<sup>4</sup> Boutros adds that the Cold War impaired the proper use of Chapter VIII and indeed, in that era, regional arrangements worked on occasion against resolving

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<sup>3</sup> Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union Article 13 (14-15) pp. 20-21

<sup>4</sup> Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (United Nations: New York), Chapter VIII

disputes in the manner foreseen in the Charter.<sup>5</sup> Although regional arrangements were foreseen in the UN Charter, their application is relatively recent. In fact, there have been relatively few cases in which regional arrangements have been used. Mathiason argues that this was largely due to a lack of consensus on the UNSC regarding intervention, or because of a lack of agreement on financing.<sup>6</sup> The Brahimi Report<sup>7</sup> had recommendations for AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and member states to participate in the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) and the need for rapid deployment in case of grave circumstances; genocide, crime against humanity and war crime. To address this challenge of peace and security, the AU decided to create own mechanisms to address the menace. Article 13 of the Peace & Security Committee Protocol states that “.....In order to enable PSC perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, an African Standby Force shall be established.<sup>8</sup> Such a force shall be composed of standby multi-disciplinary components namely civilian, police and military components that shall be on standby in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. Standby means standing in the member states and standing for the region. This force will be available at both sub regional and continental levels. Williams argues that the operational difficulties of both AMIB in Burundi and AMIS in Sudan (Darfur) raise the question of what capacity African states currently possess to conduct complex and multidimensional peace operations and how well the AU is doing in relation to its target of creating an ASF by mid

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<sup>5</sup> Boutros, Op cit, para 60

<sup>6</sup> Mathiason, J.R., "Keeping the Peace: Regional or Global Responsibility?" *International Studies Review*, No.6 (2004) pp 453-456:453

<sup>7</sup> *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) A/55/305 - S/2000/809 (Aug., 2000) pp. 10*

<sup>8</sup> Op cit Protocol on AU PSC pp. 18

2010.<sup>9</sup> He continues to argue that relying on the mantra of 'African solutions to African problems' will fail to save the victims of Africa's wars and give the continent's ethnic cleansers and genocidaires the upper hand and that even if the ASF is fully operational before the Union's 2010 dead-line it should not be seen as a substitute for UN peacekeeping.

### 1.4.3 Literature on capacity building

Fabian and Rikhe contend that preparedness by the UN must involve among other things an ability to mobilize appropriately skilled and politically acceptable manpower that are well resourced.<sup>10</sup> Ramsbotham et al argue that capacity-building process as far as institutional human resource capacity is critical to the success of the new peace and security dispensation. They single out lack of institutional human resource capacity as perhaps the major African problem, both at the AU and within African regional bodies.<sup>11</sup> Building African peace and security capacity therefore calls for prioritization of training needs for future progress in an effort to support building African institutional human capacity. Providing donor staff to fill capacity gaps is not helpful in the medium to long term: it does not help build African capacity, implies African incompetence and fails to take into account existing African expertise. In the long term therefore, donor assistance should be focused on strengthening African ownership.

G8 involvement in African peace and security capacity building began in 2001 with the development of a joint plan in Genoa summit. The joint plan identifies among other aims the following elements as essential to shaping a strategic plan to realize the longer-term vision for

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<sup>9</sup> Williams, P.D., *The African Union: Prospects for Regional Peacekeeping after Burundi & Sudan*, Taylor & Francis, Ltd., *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 33, No. 108, (Jun., 2006), pp. 321-379:355

<sup>10</sup> Fabian, L.I., and Rikhe, I.J., *Some Perspectives on Peacekeeping Institutions: The United Nations: Appraisal at 25 Years*, *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 64, No. 4, (September 1970), pp 1-55:11

<sup>11</sup> Ramsbotham, A., Alhaji M. S., and Bah, F.C., *Enhancing African Peace and Security Capacity: A Useful Role for the UK and the G8?* *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs)*, Blackwell Publishing, Vol. 81, No. 2, (Mar., 2005), pp. 298-348:328

African PSO capabilities: assessing capabilities within African states, determining the remaining gaps or weaknesses requiring focused attention, identifies building blocks in an enhanced African PSO capacity, developing practical options to develop African PSO capacity, establishing multidimensional standby brigade capabilities, including civilian components, at the AU and regional level by 2010, developing continental and regional institutional capacity for conflict prevention, standardizing doctrines and other civilian and military training materials, enhancing capacity of regional peace training centers and undertaking regional joint exercises.<sup>12</sup>

Ramsbotham et al argue that the emphasis on enhancing African peace and security capacity stems from a number of sources namely the increasing determination by Africans to develop their own peace and security capacity, the continuing demand for PSOs in Africa, an understanding that African responses to African crises may be more acceptable/appropriate than external responses and bad operational experiences for non-African states in African PSOs.<sup>13</sup> It's clear therefore that a sub regional force will require, beyond sheer numbers, an effective joint command (a major challenge for multinational forces), strong administrative and intelligence capabilities, and suitable training. Such training and capacity building can only be offered through national or international partnerships. According to Ramsbotham et al ECOMOG generally lacked these capabilities and therefore relied increasingly upon anti-Taylor factions, with resulting problems.<sup>14</sup>

#### **1.4.4 Literature on peace support training**

Ramsbotham *et al* contend that African efforts to develop indigenous PSO capacity have been played out in more than recent African led PSOs throughout the continent especially in the

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid pp. 328

<sup>13</sup> Ibid pp. 326

<sup>14</sup> Howe, H., *Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 168-211:169

post Cold War era as democratization process took root in otherwise one party system in Africa and Asia with minorities championing for more freedoms, rights and challenging the status quo. Most recently, they have culminated in the peace and security components of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the AU - led interventions in Burundi (the AU Mission in Burundi, AMIB) and Darfur (the two AU Missions in Sudan, AMIS I and II).<sup>15</sup> The modern peace support training has been expanded a great deal to deal with all the challenges within a contemporary peacekeeping environment and bring on board all the components namely the civilians, police and the military. This has meant the expansion of the curriculum to fully address the training needs of all these components and move away from an earlier military biased curriculum in traditional peacekeeping. Harbottle observes that in peacekeeping missions there are less experienced contingents operating with inadequacies and lack of preparation. Indeed, some individuals may have little or no idea of the role (mandate) they are required to perform. This calls for pre-education or training, preparation and preparedness to alleviate their deficiencies.<sup>16</sup>

#### **1.4.5 Justification of the Study**

The emerging APSA is a subject of keen interest to many in the post Cold War era given the rise of intra state conflicts. Subsequently, the emerging Eastern Africa Peace and Security Architecture (EAPSA) has attracted a lot of International and local attention resulting from the convergence or the confluence of two conflict systems within the region namely; the Greater Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes conflict systems. This problem is worsened by the piracy along the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. This situation has focused world's attention in the

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid pp. 329

<sup>16</sup> Harbottle, M., Lessons for UN Peacekeeping, Vol. 50, No. 4(October 1974), pp. 544-553: 550.

region bringing together navies and international media. This study will add to the scanty body of knowledge available on the emerging peace and security scenario and by extension gaps in regional peace support initiatives involved in capacity building. On this basis the study will inform future research especially on other emerging regional centers and possibly the need for specialization on conflict prevention, management or post conflict peace building in order to enhance specialization and economies of scale.

### 1.5 Theoretical Framework

According to liberal thinking, contemporary democracies have reasons to participate in operations with a democratic or humanitarian appeal. Doyle argues that given their representative structure and popular responsiveness, democracies draw legitimacy, in large part, from liberal principles and that democratic leaders can export liberal practices and pursue humanitarian objectives because these are not easily separated from self-interest.<sup>17</sup> Bercovitch et al add that liberal theory also supports the assumption that democracies share an interest in creating economic, political, and security conditions in which peace, prosperity, and democracy can thrive hence engage in peacekeeping intervention.<sup>18</sup> Layne avers that liberals see peace, democracy, human dignity, and economic freedom as mutually supportive objectives and is apparent in the rhetoric of democratic leaders.<sup>19</sup> This liberal view fits into the traditional peacekeeping. As peacekeeping evolved over the years, various scholars have attempted to explain the changing and the increasingly complex PSO. Within liberal theory, Ramsbotham *et al* have made the case for a cosmopolitan or transformationist approach which envisages multidimensional UN rapid reaction capability, which combines military robustness with civilian

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<sup>17</sup> Doyle (1996) in Lebovic, H.J., "Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 6 (December 2004) pp. 879-917:912

<sup>18</sup> Bercovitch, J., Kremenyuk, V., and Zartman, I.W., *Conflict Resolution* (London: Sage Publications, 2009) pp. 533

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid* pp. 912



peacebuilding expertise including sophisticated conflict resolution capacity.<sup>20</sup> This idea fits into the ASF concept that envisages the five regions to have multidimensional PSO assets with rapid deployment capabilities. Within the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), Kenya is providing the rapid capability through the Kenya Rapid Deployment Capability (KRDC) that can respond within 30 days to any conflict within the region and beyond .

### **1.6 Methodology of the Research**

This study aims at critically examining the regional peace support initiatives in capacity building. It will rely on mainly on both primary and secondary data so as to exploit the advantages of each of these sources. The methodology will be largely qualitative although certain aspects will have quantitative characteristics. Therefore, more than one method of data collection will be used to benefit from the advantages of triangulating data collection methods. This is because both approaches to research have certain unique advantages but also some inherent limitations. The primary data will be obtained through interviews (face to face interactions) to get first hand information on pertinent issues about IPSTC and the role it plays in regional capacity building. Primary data collection will involve direct interaction of the researcher with the respondent in order to generate data for use in the research. This type of data is considered original in that it is generated from the source and any clarifications or additional comments can be handled effectively by both the researcher and the respondent.

Through purposive sampling, key staff of IPSTC will be interviewed. Those to be interviewed are the Director of IPSTC, the Commandant of Humanitarian Peace Support School (HPSS) or Embakasi campus, the Commandant of Peace and Conflict Studies School (PCSS) or

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<sup>20</sup> Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., and Miall, H., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed (Manchester: Polity Press, 2007) pp. 154-155

Karen campus, the Head of Peace and Security Research Department, and the Head of Plans/Programmes. Self administered questionnaires with unstructured or open-ended questions will also be used. Mugenda and Mugenda argue that such open-ended responses are very useful in qualitative research.<sup>21</sup> The above mentioned key staffs have adequate institutional memory and are in charge of the day to day running of the institution having a clear direction of the way forward for the centre.

The secondary data will gather, utilize, analyze and process data from written or published material, diverse sources of documents from the archives and electronically stored information. The research will be carried out in various libraries, universities, and international organizations. Information will be gathered from textbooks, documents, policy papers, reports, publications, action plans of UN and AU, online journal articles, newsprints and any other available source. To underscore the importance of the regional peace support initiatives in capacity building, the research will be conducted using a case study of the IPSTC. This is to allow concentration on the factors, events and activities in a specific situation that could have been obscured were the research to focus on many other regional mechanisms/initiatives engaged in capacity building. Before the data collection exercise begins, permission will be sought from the University of Nairobi, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), to conduct the interviews and administer the questionnaires. The researcher will then set up appointments and make arrangements with various selected respondents in order to collect data. The interviews will held at sites convenient to the respondents. The responses to the questionnaires will be written down by the researcher as the interview proceeds. Interview guides will be used during

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<sup>21</sup> Mugenda, O.M., and Mugenda, A.G., *Research Methods* (Nairobi: African Centre for Technology Studies, 2003) pp. 73

interviews as well as adhering to necessary guidelines on administering questionnaires. The data analysis will be qualitative and will take place concurrently with data collection since it's an ongoing process.<sup>22</sup> The themes that will emerge from the interviews, questionnaires and from document analysis will form the basis for further collection if need arises and summary. The analysis of the final data will enable themes to be identified and findings presented descriptively.

## **1.7 Chapter Outline**

### **Chapter One**

Chapter one includes the introduction, the statement of the problem, the objectives of the research, literature review and justification of the research, theoretical framework, methodology of the research and chapter outline.

### **Chapter Two**

Chapter two addresses the genealogy of contemporary peace support operations. The chapter also traces the evolution of peacekeeping doctrine since the Second World War to the modern day complex multi dimensional operations, and what it portends to security sector and conflict in general. The genesis and evolution of ASF and the regional and sub regional mechanisms will be examined since the transformation of the Organization of African Union (OAU) to the African Union (AU) and what has been done so far by the regions to operationalize the ASF concept.

### **Chapter Three**

This chapter focuses on post conflict reconstruction especially peace building that is critical to the modern day PSOs and the role of the UN in peace building and conflict resolution.

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22 Nachmias, C.F., and Nachmias, D., *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*, 5th Ed (London: St Martins Press, Inc. 1996) pp. 292

The chapter also looks at human security approach to peace building in an attempt to address some of the root causes of conflicts. This chapter will also interrogate the mandate and the efficacy of peace support initiatives in capacity building various institutions at global, continental and regional level such as The Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) of Canada, The German Armed Forces United Nations Training Centre, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KA IPTC) and Southern African Development Community's Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC RPTC) as a way of comparing the practices in order to create generic knowledge for generalization. This chapter also seeks to interrogate the rationale or the need for training peacekeepers using adult learning principles and practices.

#### **Chapter Four**

This chapter seeks to interrogate the rationale for the establishment and the emergence of the IPSTC as a 'Centre of Excellence' in PSO Training and Education. The chapter goes on to review the mandate and the efficacy of IPSTC as a regional peace support initiative in capacity building within APSA and the emerging EAPSA. Analysis of the data obtained through interviews will be gradually done in the light of other available literature. In primary data analysis, notes from interviews and information received from the questionnaires filled by the respondents will be critically analyzed. The primary and secondary data analysis will guide the findings of the research. The chapter ends with the findings and conclusions and suggests areas for further study. In this chapter the key question to be examined will be whether IPSTC contributes to regional capacity building in PSOs.

#### **Chapter Five**

Chapter five concludes the study.

## CHAPTER TWO

### GENEALOGY OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

#### 2.1 Contemporary Peace Support Operations

The history of the United Nations Peace support operations spans over six decades since World War II. The role and function of PSOs varies in each setting and has evolved over the time. Peace Support Operations (PSOs) is a multidimensional operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building and /or humanitarian operations. Today's peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity and the boundary between these activities is increasingly blurred.<sup>1</sup> PSOs today aim to support parties and comprehensive peace agreements and has complex lines of operation be they political, security, humanitarian and developmental. They are also characterized by complex mandates that often include protection of civilians as one of the key tasks. The contemporary PSOs also integrate civilian and security tasks under one political command and the persistent concern about people means increasing use of Chapter VII (peace enforcement) by the Security Council so as to have mandates that permit the lethal force to protect civilians. They are deployed in the aftermath of serious intrastate conflicts to provide a secure and stable environment and support the establishment of legitimate and effective governance institutions and the rule of law. Peace support operations are becoming increasingly complex. United Nations or Africa Union missions are being deployed into countries where the national infrastructure has collapsed and where international personnel – military, civilian police, UN civilian staff, UN agencies, international

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<sup>1</sup> J M Guehenno, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, New York: 2008, pp. 18

agencies, and non-government organizations – must work closely together in a multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural environment to achieve the overall strategic objective.

The term Peace Support Operations (PSOs) describes organised international assistance initiatives to support the maintenance, monitoring and building of peace and prevention of resurgent violent conflict. Over the past two decades, PSOs have adapted to deal with the changing nature of conflicts in different regions of the world. Mandates range from the traditional monitoring of ceasefire agreements and conducting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, to protecting civilians from fighting factions, to the newer mandates for nation building, through which governing structures and the security sector are totally rebuilt. Peace enforcement operations where multinational forces are permitted to use force to establish peace are relatively recent phenomena, including the operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. PSOs are usually conducted in the context of a larger effort to reform and rebuild a nation, which can include confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law and economic and social development.

Woodhouse et al argue that Peace Support Operations (PSO) was a term first used by the military to cover both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, but is now used more widely to embrace in addition those other peace related operations, which include conflict prevention, peacemaking , peace building, and humanitarian assistance.<sup>2</sup> PSO is defined by the British military as an operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and /or humanitarian operations. Contemporary PSOs

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<sup>2</sup> Woodhouse, T., Duffey, T., and Langholtz, H. J., (Ed) *Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution* (New York: UNITAR POCI, 2000) pp. 128-132.

can be appropriately characterized as multilateral, multidimensional and multinational/multicultural. The multidimensional angle of contemporary peacekeeping means that they incorporate tasks and responsibilities beyond those associated with traditional peacekeeping. Such expanded roles include security, political and humanitarian functions. The increase in the number and complexity of peacekeeping operations in the post Cold War period has been accompanied by a radical change in their very nature as relates to its function, application and composition. Doyle and Sambanis argue that multidimensional peacekeeping includes a mix of strategies to build a self-sustaining peace, ranging from those of traditional Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs) to more multidimensional strategies for capacity expansion such as economic reconstruction and institutional transformation for instance reform of the police, army, judicial system, conduct and monitor elections and civil society rebuilding.<sup>3</sup> This demonstrates that modern missions engage in elements of peace building. In a PSO environment therefore, a wide range of political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, legal, developmental and other considerations are involved and need to be coordinated and harmonized to achieve synergy otherwise the various actors would operate at loggerheads thereby causing unnecessary competition, delays, wastage, inefficiency and ineffectiveness.

Sambanis and Doyle have argued that UN peace operations have had a positive effect on peace building processes after civil war.<sup>4</sup> This ensures that relapse to conflict is minimized as the root causes of the conflict are at least addressed. This is critical for sustainable peace and development. PSOs are usually conducted in the context of a larger effort to reform and rebuild a nation, which can include confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral

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<sup>3</sup> Doyle, M.W., and Sambanis, N., "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis ", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Dec., 2000) pp. 779-801:781.

<sup>4</sup> Sambanis, N., and Doyle, M.W., " No Easy Choice: Estimating the Effects of United Nations Peacekeeping (Response to King and Cheng)", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 51, Issue 1 (Mar., 2007) pp 217-226:217.

support, strengthening rule the of law and economic and social development. This challenge has continued to pose great challenges to UN Secretariat. In 1998, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, wrote, "To stand still while the earth moves forward is to slide helplessly backward. The UN must face challenges which do not fit into a neat peacekeeping package: the volatile so called "grey area" operations. If the organisation fails to do this, as was the case in both Bosnia and Somalia, credibility will be eroded even further, and it will become increasingly difficult to find troop contributors."

Lederach argues that armed conflicts increased in the 1990s following the disintegration of Soviet Union and the surge of non state actors such as guerilla movements pursuing social and political goals against political structures that want to maintain status quo.<sup>5</sup> This events led to the need for a rethink as far the whole concept of peacekeeping was concerned leading to major changes still being witnessed even today two decades down the line. The legitimacy of the United Nations Security Council is increasingly being challenged by other states especially in the post 9/11 era, who see US dominance and interests pursued under UN banner or unilaterally such as the decision to go to war with Iraq by George W Bush in the name of weapons of mass destruction that were never found.

## **2.2 Peace Support Operations and failed States**

The UN PSO missions have been engaged in failed or weak states. According to Miller and King, a failed state refers to the inability of a nation-state to provide its citizens basic necessities because of the effects of war or other destabilizing crises and can be attributable to numerous factors including corruption, mismanagement of institutions, weak political processes, overwhelming security or criminal threats beyond the capacities of a Government and external

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<sup>5</sup> Lederach, J.P., *Building Peace* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2006) pp. 8-9



interventions aimed at destabilization.<sup>6</sup> Weak states therefore portray decay or decline in states capacities to maintain order hence become susceptible to violence of all kinds including ethnic violence. This scenario is common in the post Cold War era after superpowers withdrew their support to their allies leading to degeneration from relatively strong to weak or even failed states especially after the hitherto suppressed groups started championing for more rights and even self determination and secession. Sambanis has demonstrated that such states are prone to ethnic civil wars which are characterized by strong and fixed identities, weak ideological and strong religious overtones, mutual dissemination of tales of atrocities to strengthen mobilization, and by easy recognition of identities and the existence of only limited scope for individual choice.<sup>7</sup> Examples of such states abound in former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia. Fearon points out that at the high water mark in 1994, there were 44 ongoing civil wars in almost one quarter of the states in the international system and partly links it with the collapse of the Soviet Union.<sup>8</sup> However, the fall of the communist regime cannot account totally for the upsurge of civil wars in the early 1990s despite the tendency to over-generalize.

Hill et al argue that before the end of 1991, the UN had established ten new peacekeeping operations distributed globally leading to serious overstretch in terms of resources for planning, deploying and maintaining operations in the field given the number, size, complexity of such operations.<sup>9</sup> This led to the need to invoke more the chapter VIII of the UN charter, which puts emphasis on the importance of engaging regional agencies or arrangements in the maintenance

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<sup>6</sup> Miller, C.E., and King, M.E., (ed) *A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflicts Studies* 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed (Addis Ababa: Roger Le Moyne, 2005) pp. 34

<sup>7</sup> Sambanis, N., "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature", *World Politics*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Jul., 2000) pp. 437-483:439

<sup>8</sup> Fearon, J.D., "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 3, (2004) pp. 275-301:277

<sup>9</sup> Hill, S., and Malik, S.P., *Peacekeeping and the United Nations: Issues in International Security*, Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Aldershot; 1996, pp 60

of international peace and security; an act that was rarely invoked during the Cold War that lasted for over five decades during the standoff between the East and the West which had far reaching politico-military consequences.

Lebovic argues that with ethnic bloodletting in the Balkans, political turmoil in Central America and the Caribbean, and the African continent ravaged by famine and war, the UN was soon engaged worldwide in a variety of roles, from election monitoring, observing of truce, and civil police roles to active participant in aggressive peace operations.<sup>10</sup> This was a radical shift or departure from the traditional or classical peacekeeping missions of the yesteryears. In a press article titled 'Two Concepts of Sovereignty', the former UN Secretary General Koffi Annan, pointed to the dilemma of humanitarian intervention and poses two fundamental questions. One, 'is it legitimate for a regional organization to use force without a UN mandate?' Two, 'is it permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human rights, with grave humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked?' He further notes the terrible consequences of inaction by the international community in Rwanda and the intervention in Kosovo by a group of states without seeking the authority from the UN Security Council, and challenges the traditional notions of sovereignty in the face of grave human rights violations, mass murder, genocide and humanitarian crises.<sup>11</sup> This has led to the expansion of UN mandates to include for instance protection of civilians as a critical task that needs to be undertaken by the UN as is happening in the contemporary missions in Darfur, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and more recently UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya. Dersso observes that in many of these conflicts, the state machinery has collapsed or is very weak. Governance structures such as the parliamentary process, the security apparatus, the justice system, prison administration and

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<sup>10</sup> Lebovic, H.J., 'Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 6, (Dec., 2004) pp. 910-936:910.

<sup>11</sup> Koffi, A., "Two Concepts of Sovereignty", *The Economist*, 18 September, 1999) pp. 1-2.

public administration, as well as local structures, are dysfunctional or non-existent. In other cases these conflicts themselves lead to the collapse of state institutions and law and order.<sup>12</sup> It is evident therefore; that international security climate has changed and peacekeeping operations are increasingly fielded to help implement settlements that have been negotiated by peacemakers with a new array of demands and problems emerging regarding mission logistics, equipment, personnel and finance leading to a serious overstretch of the already overburdened UN system reeling from the surge of missions in the 1990s and early 2000.

It is in this environment where international personnel (military, civilian police, UN civilian staff, UN agencies, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations) must work closely together in a multidisciplinary, multidimensional, multilateral and multi-cultural or multinational environment. Multilateralism refers to the situation within an operation that involves a number of levels of activity undertaken by the military, police and civilian components in a mutually supporting role within a peacekeeping environment. Lebovic argues that multilateral operations spread risks and costs among participants, promise scale and efficiency advantages (that might offset problems of force integration), provide political cover by legitimizing operations, dilute the opposition when opponents must spread their fire among an array of political targets, and permit states to monitor and control the behavior of other intervening countries. He demonstrates further that such operations also allow states to realize shared interests.<sup>13</sup> Most states are members of the UN hence when interventions are effected under the UN banner, it is seen as an international act thereby legitimizing it. Zacher and Matthew contend that liberal institutionalists stress the longer term gains when states resist

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<sup>12</sup> Dersso, S., "The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture", *Institute for Security Studies Paper 2009*, (January, 2010) pp 1-24: 2.

<sup>13</sup> Lebovic, H.J., "Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 6 (Dec., 2004) pp. 910-936: 914.

temptations to compete over short term benefits.<sup>14</sup> Such interests can be in the area of trade, diplomatic relations, military cooperation or good neighborliness.

Examples of places where the UN undertook a large number of "second-generation" operations and multidimensional peace-building efforts are given by Boutros as Angola, Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia and involved the UN in refugee resettlement, election monitoring, disarmament and demobilization, and (in Cambodia) rebuilding the economic, political, and administrative structure of a failed state.<sup>15</sup> Lebovic adds that whereas during the Cold War era, UN peace operations had only occasionally strayed into the domestic affairs of affected countries (such as the Congo), the new operations amounted to nothing less than attempts to remake war-shattered states as liberal democracies.<sup>16</sup> This is because the UN started venturing into areas that in the tradition sense were off-limits such as peace building, conduct and monitoring of elections and general reconstruction by among others UN agencies such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Jeong has made the case that the dramatic increase in the number of violent ethnic and religious conflicts in the 1990s is associated with aspirations for group autonomy and that the collapse of multiethnic states unleashed fights between different ethnic groups as was the case in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.<sup>17</sup> This led the UN to depart further from its prior practices in third-generation peace enforcement missions which are strenuous, high risk and multidimensional operations such as those conducted in the Balkans and Africa.

With these developments in the 1990s, the UNSG decided to put in place certain mechanisms to assess its role in the changing environment and make recommendations on the

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid, pp. 914

<sup>15</sup> Ibid pp. 916-917

<sup>16</sup> Lebovic, Op cit pp. 916-917

<sup>17</sup> Jeong, H-W., *Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2000) p. 62

way forward. One such measure was the constitution of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (commonly known as the Brahimi Report) which made the case that once deployed, UN peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.<sup>18</sup> This document formed the basis for the broad based and wide ranging reforms witnessed from the 1990s until now.

### **2.3 The Evolution of Peacekeeping**

The history of the United Nations peacekeeping missions dates back to 1948 when the first ever mission was deployed in Suez Canal crisis; the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1). Ever since then the United Nations peacekeeping missions are being deployed into countries where the national infrastructure has collapsed or near collapse. Peacekeeping missions have undergone metamorphosis from the classical or traditional/1<sup>st</sup> generation peacekeeping to the present day complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions in the third and fourth generation. Classical or traditional peacekeeping generally operated in permissive environments where they had the consent and support of the host Governments for their presence. However, Miller and King point out that efforts resembling peacekeeping missions were launched by the United Nations prior to 1950, including the UN Special Mission on the Balkans (UNSCOB), the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to oversee the truce in the Middle East, and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) sent to Jammu and Kashmir. They add that it was not until 1956, however, did the term 'peacekeeping' first come into usage;

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<sup>18</sup> *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) A/55/305 - S/2000/809 (Aug., 2000) p. 10.*

it was coined in reference to the UN Emergency Force (UNEF 1) sent to the Suez Canal and that this conceptualization was due largely to Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold.<sup>19</sup>

United Nations peacekeeping is a unique and dynamic instrument developed by the global organization as a way of helping countries torn by conflict create the conditions for lasting peace. Druckman et al argue that peacekeeping mission can be classified based on three criteria namely: the specific function, timing of the intervention and the historical phases that a mission goes through although such classifications lack flexibility and do not provide sufficient distinctions.<sup>20</sup> Since inception of the UN, there have been over sixty UN peacekeeping operations distributed around the world with varying levels of success and durations. Bercovitch et al argue that there is no agreement on conceptual components of peacekeeping by scholars and practitioners owing largely to the metamorphosis of peace operations since the late 1980s.<sup>21</sup> At the UN headquarters, the Secretariat's 'Interagency Framework Team for Coordinating Early Warning and Information Analysis' identifies countries at risk of conflict and the applicable UN preventive measures. In addition to the most active regional mechanisms of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Organization of American States (OAS), all African regional and sub regional organizations have agreed and developed prevention mechanisms/initiatives including the Conflict Early Warning (CEWARN) mechanism under Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Coning observes that the term "peacekeeping" is not found in the United Nations Charter and defies simple definition. Dag Hammarskjold, the second UN Secretary General, referred to it as belonging to "Chapter Six and a Half" of the Charter, placing it between traditional methods

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<sup>19</sup> Miller, C.E., and King, M.E., (ed) *A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflicts Studies* 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed (Addis Ababa: Roger Le Moyne, 2005) p. 62

<sup>20</sup> Druckman, D., Diehl, P.F., and Wall, J., " International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications ", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Feb., 1998) pp. 33-55:35.

<sup>21</sup> Bercovitch, J., Kremenyuk, V., and Zartman, I.W., *Conflict Resolution* (London: Sage Publications, 2009) p. 527

of resolving disputes peacefully, such as negotiation and mediation under Chapter VI, and more forceful action as authorized under Chapter VII in respect to breaches of international peace and security and acts of aggression.<sup>22</sup> Born at the time when the Cold War rivalries frequently paralyzed the Security Council, UN peacekeeping goals were primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on the ground, so that efforts could be made at the political level to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. Those missions consisted of unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops with monitoring, reporting and confidence building roles in support of ceasefires and limited peace agreements. The history of the League of Nations and the UN has mainly been concerned with maintenance of international security from their inception. The Covenant of the League of Nations, in its Article 21, noted the validity of regional understandings for securing the maintenance of peace.<sup>23</sup> Diehl argues that in the traditional peacekeeping or first generation, UN personnel functioned as a neutral, lightly armed force within a clear and accepted buffer zone. Their success hinged on consent of the conflicting parties, impartiality, non use of force except as a last resort, the multinational (thereby neutral) composition of UN forces, a willingness of member states to contribute forces, and non interference in the internal affairs of the host country.<sup>24</sup> In the second and third generation efforts of the 1990s, however, these basic principles frequently seemed moot. Non interference in the internal affairs of the other states was for a longtime the guiding principle of the former OAU and exploited by leaders to pursue selfish interests. Moreover, the notion of neutrality came to connote inactivity even in the face of serious ceasefire or human rights violations by the parties

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<sup>22</sup>Coning, C.D., "Honouring 60 Years of United Nations Peacekeeping", *Institute for Security Studies, Peacekeeping*, (Addis Ababa, (Sep., 21, 2009) pp. 1-7:1.

<sup>23</sup> MacFarlane, S.N., and Weiss, T.G., "The United Nations, Regional Organizations and Human Security: Building Theory in Central America", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Jun., 1994) pp. 277-295:280.

<sup>24</sup> Dehl (1994) in Lebovic, H.J., "Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War" , *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 6 (Dec., 2004) pp. 910-936: 917.

to the conflict. Lebovic argues that UN forces were made to intervene when the identity of parties to the conflict was ambiguous (due to problems distinguishing civilians from combatants or separating combatants along geographical lines); when these forces were seen (often correctly) as hostile to one or more of the parties (for instance the Serbs in the Balkans, the forces of General Aideed in Somalia, and the Vietnam imposed Hun Sen government in Cambodia); when these forces had to impose their will or engage in active defense to realize their mandate (in Somalia and Bosnia); when many UN personnel were ill-trained, ill-prepared, and ill-equipped to assist these operations; and when central governments had lost control (Somalia) or were themselves the problem (Yugoslavia in Kosovo).<sup>25</sup> These new developments in UN peacekeeping brought a staggering increase in the financial cost of global peace operations to an all-time high (over 5 billion US Dollars).

It is generally accepted that peacekeeping could no longer be viewed as a distinct and isolated event, but should be treated instead as an important element of a continuum of responses to increasingly complex contemporary conflicts, stretching from preventive diplomacy to post-conflict peace building. Many observers concur with the view that the scope of peacekeeping had to be multidisciplinary in nature and not solely restricted to military tasks, but also to include civilian police activities, humanitarian assistance, and disarmament and demobilization measures, actions against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and human rights monitoring.

#### **2.4 African Union and emerging security challenges**

Over the last two decades, Africa has been bedeviled by numerous intrastate conflicts. The African Union (AU) opted to address this challenge through among other mechanisms, the creation of African Standby Force (ASF) as part of the wider African Peace and Security

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<sup>25</sup> Lebovic, Op cit pp. 917



Architecture. The continent was divided into five zones; namely the Southern, Eastern, Central, Northern and Western regions each with a brigade size force (about 3000 - 4000 and their equipment) ready to intervene when conflicts arise within their areas of responsibility or jurisdiction.<sup>26</sup>

To meet the challenge of peace and security in various provinces or countries such as Darfur or Burundi, the AU devised a two-prong strategy; first, an operational aspect centered on the deployment of ASF, which constitutes a milestone in the history of the Organization of Africa Unity now AU. Second, a political aspect, aimed at finding a durable political settlement to the various conflicts. The general consensus at the time was that of "African solutions to African problems" hence the world community especially the major powers such as the United States of America (USA), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and UN Security Council (UNSC) turned the responsibility for resolving the crises such as Darfur to the African Union. The AU deployed the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to monitor the ceasefire agreed earlier in 2004, and to assist in the process of confidence building and to contribute to a secure environment in Darfur. Being among its first peace keeping operations, with little or nothing of its own to refer to, AMIS waded through trial and error. AU had never before undertaken such a massive and complex task as Darfur crisis until the UN came in to form the first hybrid mission in 2008; the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Taken together, the above operations provide evidence that Africa is beginning to demonstrate the political will to make its own responses to various security challenges in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Despite structural and political fragilities, AU seemed to define a novel and cosmopolitan continental security agenda in response to African defence and security issues. This has been extended to Somalia under the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) with troops from Uganda and Burundi

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid pp 918

undertaking what is arguably the most challenging and dangerous mission ever undertaken by the continental body.

Ramsbotham *et al* contend that interventions in Africa have largely been due to the rationale for 'African solutions to African problems' through the emphasis on enhancing African peace and security capacity stems hence increasing determination by Africans to develop their own peace and security capacity, continuing demand for peace support operations (PSOs) in Africa, an understanding that African responses to African crises may be more acceptable/appropriate than external responses and bad operational experiences for non-African states in African PSOs.<sup>27</sup> As the UN reviews and reassesses its role in peace operations, changes in regional and sub regional organizations and arrangements offer new opportunities. Different regions and sub-regions are evolving in different ways and their respective capabilities to deal with their problems vary. Regional actions and responses can have both advantages and disadvantages. States in the region and sub regions concerned have national interests in local stability and are more likely to be willing to take part in peace operations that are closer to the homeland. Moreover, they will often be more familiar with regional cultures and attitudes than outsiders. On the other hand, sometimes states in the region and sub regions may be too close to the issues and may have their own agendas. Conflicting interests and lack of mutual trust may undermine the peace process. There may also be inadequate military and other resources available.

## **2.5 Regional and Sub regional security arrangements**

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<sup>27</sup> Ramsbotham, A., Alhaji M. S., and Bah, F.C., *Enhancing African Peace and Security Capacity: A Useful Role for the UK and the G8? International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs)*, Blackwell Publishing, Vol. 81, No. 2, (Mar., 2005), p. 326

The Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), that later came to be known as Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordinating Mechanism (EASBRICOM) and now the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordinating Mechanism (EASFCOM), was formed in implementing the AU Commission's requirements. Since the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was already in existence with several members falling within EASFCOM, it was only natural that the whole concept of sub regional peace and security begin from the known by making use of the agencies or arrangements in place. For this reason, IGAD convened the Jinja meeting of experts followed by a meeting of Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defence Staff (EACDS), in February 2004 which decided on the establishment of EASBRIG. It was also decided that the hierarchy of regional policy decision making system be established comprising of the assembly, council of ministers and committee of chiefs of defence, establishment of the planning elements (PLANELM) initially with 13 military officers. This was done by the council of ministers of defence convened in July 2004 to approve decision making system and establishment of the structures. In September 2005, the council of ministers established the independent coordination mechanism (ICM) to take over from IGAD. In March 2007, ICM was redesignated as EASBRICOM and charged with the conduct of peace support missions as enshrined in the ASF policy framework or as mandated by the regional security. The Eastern Africa faced challenges of what Mwangi calls overlapping sub-regional conflicts systems and non- institutional sub-regional conflict management often personalized and on ad hoc basis.<sup>28</sup>

In a nutshell, the new AU wanted to avoid the pitfalls of its predecessor the OAU especially on conflict prevention, management and post conflict peace building which partly explains some of the endemic crises especially in sub Saharan Africa. Mutume argues that part of

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28 Mwangi, M., *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: CCR Publications, 2006) pp. 157-159

the solution to the continent's intractable conflicts lies in granting the AU significantly more powers than its predecessor, the OAU, which was often criticized as too bureaucratic and ineffective in preventing or settling wars.<sup>29</sup> In the post Cold War era, the peace and security scene of Africa has changed fundamentally. This change relates not only to the changing nature of conflicts and the focus of the discourse on security, but also to various initiatives taken by Africa to institute an effective peace and security regime. In this context, a remarkable development has been the establishment of an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by the continental body, the AU. Dersso argues that one of the most important and probably the most ambitious institutional tools that the AU decided to establish as part of the APSA is the ASF. He adds that the ASF is intended to be one of the mechanisms through which the AU seeks to respond to future conflicts and crisis situations on the continent in a timely and efficient manner.<sup>30</sup>

APSA framework today is a complex interaction of sub-regional, regional, continental actors such the EU, UN, Arab League and non state actors among other actors. The mission of ASF is to provide capabilities to deploy peacekeeping forces and undertake interventions pursuant to article 4 (h) and (i) of the Constitutive Act of the AU.<sup>31</sup> This is achieved through rapid deployment to perform a multiplicity of PSO tasks that may include preventive deployment, peacekeeping, peace building, post conflict disarmament, demobilization, re-integration, and humanitarian assistance, including disaster response. Bellamy and Williams argue that despite the United Nation's long experience in PSOs, a variety of non-UN actors operating unilaterally or as regional or sub regional agencies have conducted such operations in

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<sup>29</sup> Mutume, G., "Africa Seeks Own Solutions to Conflict: Burundi, Central African Republic and Côte d'Ivoire on Peace Agenda", *Africa Recovery*, Vol.17 No.1 (May, 2003) pp. 1-7:3

<sup>30</sup> Dersso, S.A., *Institute of Security Studies Paper 209* (Addis Ababa: January., 2010) pp 1-24:1

<sup>31</sup> The Constitutive Act of the AU, Article 4 (h) and (i)

the 1990s sometimes even without authorization of the UNSC and gives examples of ECOWAS (10 operations), SADC (2 operations), British operations in Sierra Leone, French involvement in Central Africa Republic, Cote d' Ivoire and Rwanda, Russia's incursion in Moldova, Tajikistan and Georgia, and EU in Macedonia.<sup>32</sup> The United States also unilaterally attacked Iraq in Gulf War II only to fall back to the UNSC for a resolution with Ethiopia also going into Somalia and being perceived as invaders. Such unilateral moves have tainted the image of the UN and to some extent the regional/sub regional mechanisms. The ASF brigades were to be formed by the countries within the respective regions. Since these brigades were to reside in the regions that they serve and protect, the standby force, in theory, would be able to quickly organize, deploy, and intervene to stem early violence before it erupts into full-scale war. Denning points out that the development of the ASF was to occur in two phases. Phase I extended to 30 June 2005, by which time the regions were to develop a standby brigade capacity, while the AU develops the capacity to manage monitoring missions, akin to UN observer missions. Phase II extends to 30 June 2010, by which time regions are to refine their standby brigade capabilities, while the AU develops the capacity to manage a complex peacekeeping operation.<sup>33</sup> The AU acknowledges that some regions for various reasons (political & economic) will take more time to develop a standby brigade, and the African Chiefs of Defense Staff (ACDS) recommends that, as a stopgap arrangement, designated lead nations form coalitions of the willing pending the establishment of the regional brigades. This has its own challenges as the lead nation concept is not universally agreed by all regions. The lead nation can advance its own narrow national interests purporting to represent other sub regional members thereby escalating the conflict. As Dersso points out,

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<sup>32</sup> Bellamy, A.J., and Williams, P.D., "Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations", *International Security*, Vol.29, No. 4 (Spring, 2005) pp. 157-195:157

<sup>33</sup> Denning, M. A., "Prayer for Marie: Creating an Effective African Standby Force", *Parameters*, (Winter, 2004) pp 102-117:106.

article 2 of the PSC Protocol defines the components of the APSA that support the works of the PSC. These are the AU Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force (ASF), and a Special Fund.<sup>34</sup> These five components were envisaged to aid PSC to address existing and emerging challenges especially relating to peace and security in the new millennium and beyond.

Most of these organs are still at infancy stage and may take time before their full impact can be assessed fully. Dersso argues that the ASF is organized into five regional brigades: The Southern African Development Community (SADC) brigade (SADCBRIG), The East African Peace and Security Mechanism (EAPSM) brigade, known later as the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) brigade (ECOBRIIG), The North African Regional Capability (NARC) brigade, also known as the North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIG), The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) brigade (ECCASBRIG), or Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC).<sup>35</sup> In addition to the obligatory requirement of having the regions establish the regional standby forces (starting with brigades), they were also supposed to establish management capabilities including operational/mission level headquarters at brigade level, establish permanent planning elements, force support/logistic depots, develop force structure/rapid deployment capability, and develop relevant policy documentation. These noble aims again are still at various stages of development with major variations between the sub-regions. Bellamy argues that collective security under regional organizations as NATO or multinational ones such as UN is the way forward for states in addressing common defence and security concerns.<sup>36</sup> This idea provides economies of scale

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<sup>34</sup> Dersso, Op cit pp. 6

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, pp 7

<sup>36</sup> Bellamy, C., "Soldier of Fortune: Britain's New Military Role", *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Jul., 1992) pp. 443-456:448

since third world economies may not single handedly be able to guarantee its own security in the multibillion defence industry.

## **2.6 Conclusion**

The global shift since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union 1990's transformed conflict from inter to intra states conflicts resulting in an unprecedented need of negotiated agreements globally.<sup>37</sup> As the number of intrastate conflicts has risen, and complex emergencies have worsened in circumstances of failed states or the total breakdown of government institutions, the UN has inevitably found itself engaged in issues of internal insecurity. In implementing the UNSC mandates, the UN has taken on highly complicated peace operations, often with insufficient resources in terms of personnel, materiel and finance. In a word, the UN has become overburdened. Despite the load however, in many respects there is and will continue to be no organization other than the UN able to shoulder some of the burden in terms of peace and security globally. With its global membership, the UN remains the sole world body with the responsibility for international peace and security and as such has a legitimacy that is unique. The UN is the highest international body for the establishment of instruments of law and human rights, and it is the charter that sets the highest standards of peace and justice. Contemporary PSO aim to bring sustainable peace in societies emerging from conflict through conflict resolution which seeks to address the root causes of conflict rather than settlement which tends to address the symptoms leading to resurgence of conflict over time. This has necessitated a rethink in terms of training doctrines, methodology and design in order to encompass broader aspects such as protection of civilians, security sector reform, human rights, gender issues, child rights and protection and the rule of law which were not adequately captured in the earlier mandates.

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<sup>37</sup> Lederach, J.P. *Building Peace* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), pp. 18

## CHAPTER THREE

### CAPACITY BUILDING AT GLOBAL, CONTINENTAL AND REGIONAL LEVEL

#### 3.1 Introduction

In the chapter two the study looked at the genealogy of peace support operations by interrogating the contemporary peace support operations and the evolution of peacekeeping. This chapter will investigate the capacity building at global, continental and regional level in order to understand peace support operations and capacity building at the various levels. Peace building in post conflict societies has assumed greater importance in the last two decades owing to among other factors the realization that for a lasting and sustainable peace there was need to address the root causes of conflict. Peace building according to University for Peace Africa glossary of terms refers to policies, programs and associated efforts to restore stability and the effectiveness of social, political and economic institutions and structures in the wake of a war or some other debilitating or catastrophic events.<sup>1</sup> This definition identifies economic institutions and structures as the one of the three pillars that has bearing on stability in the post conflict phase. The concept of peace building has increased or burgeoned in the last two decades especially with the publication of 'An agenda for Peace' by former United Nations Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali in 1992 and revised in 1995 in which issues of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace keeping and post conflict peace building including capacity building, reconciliation and societal transformation were put forward as critical to sustainable peace in post conflict phase.<sup>2</sup> Peace building measures are aimed at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, by strengthening national capacities for conflict management, and laying the foundations for sustainable peace through an integrated peace building strategy (IPBS).

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<sup>1</sup> Miller, C.E and King, M.E. (ed) *A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflicts Studies 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed* (Addis Ababa: Roger Le Moyne, 2005), p 56

<sup>2</sup> Boutros, G.B., *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations 1992), p 56



Boutros adds that peace building, therefore, became synonymous with post-conflict peace building necessary only after preventive diplomacy had failed to avert armed hostilities, after peacemaking had established the framework of a negotiated settlement and after peacekeeping had monitored an agreed ceasefire and presumably facilitated the restoration of a threshold of order.<sup>3</sup> In August 2000, the Brahimi Panel interjected some intellectual rigour to this growing debate and argued that conflicts, more often than not, are preceded by a breakdown in the rule of law and recognized the challenges for peacekeeping. He defined the need for a team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights, through judicial, penal, human rights and policing experts working together in a coordinated and collegial manner so that peace building makes a direct contribution to public security, law and order including aspects of humanitarian demining to ensure effective peace building.<sup>4</sup>

### **3.2 Peace Support Operations and Peace Building**

Peace operations and post conflict peace building are undergoing a shifting paradigm and focus in the international arena. While the international community, via the United Nations, has intervened in numerous and varied war-ravaged countries and regions of the world since its inception after World War II, keeping and then building the peace has been more complicated and protracted than originally envisaged. As former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan lamented, half of those countries that emerge from war succumb back to violence within five years, emphasizing the depressing fact that it is easier to make the peace than it is to keep it. History has shown us that the transition from internal conflict to sustainable peace is a fraught one. Paradoxically, the number of inter-state warfare and armed conflicts around the globe is in decline, while intra-state and internecine armed conflict is steadily rising. This trend helps in

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid Boutros, p 50

<sup>4</sup> *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report ) A/55/305 - S/2000/809 (Aug., 2000) p. 10*

illustrating a growing trend that those countries and areas affected by post-conflict are prone to a propensity at relapsing back to pre-conflict. As a response to such a structural change and trend in global and regional security is the decision by the United Nations to reinforce and reinvigorate its peace building capacity by recognizing its importance as the key to sustainable and tangible success. Acknowledgement of this double-sided coin of peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building has been gradual and steady. Assisting national governments in strengthening their national justice and security institutions has traditionally been primarily for political considerations. The task of setting up a national and sovereign capability to provide internal capacity was not included in traditional peacekeeping operations.

Since the 1990s, the main reason for post-conflict peace building was restricted to economic and social reconstruction. Then, in the last decade and in today's peacekeeping nexus where operations are multidimensional, complex, and more robust in nature, it has become increasingly accepted and expected that, in order to have sustainability and longevity of a credible sovereign national power and the chance to build upon a peacekeeping contextual environment, both the state and its internal support and capacity institutions must feel that it is not only their socio-economic elements that must be effective and empowering, but also high levels of national ownership via good governance and a credible security sector.<sup>5</sup> This is highlighted very well by the fact that Western governments and other beneficiaries have specifically targeted peace building in their donations and respective foreign relations policy. As to whether this assistance is put into the right use is another story but at least efforts can be seen. Post conflict support of peace accords and rebuilding of war torn societies is critical to sustainable peace. Capacity building includes needs to encompass economic dimension to ensure

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<sup>5</sup> Guehenno, J.M., *Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in 2010*, Edita Vastra Aros AB, Stockholm, p. 12

that people are able to satisfy their basic human needs. According to Oberschall, under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, a four pillar structure for Kosovo peace building was established. Pillar one headed by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was responsible for humanitarian assistance, and became the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) "justice and police pillar" after humanitarian assistance was terminated. Pillar two dealt with civil administration under UNMIK. Institution building headed by Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was pillar three, and economic reconstruction under the European Union (EU) was pillar four.<sup>6</sup> This demonstrates the critical role that economic recovery plays in post conflict societies. The fourth pillar also is long term with short, medium and long-term objectives to ensure meaningful, decent and sustainable livelihoods and avoid relapse to conflict.

### **3.3 The role of the United Nations in Peacebuilding**

The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was set up in December 2005 through UNSC Resolution 1645 to help struggling States avoid slipping back into war and chaos by providing strategic advice and harnessing expertise and finance from around the world to aid with recovery projects. There are currently four countries on its agenda – Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic (CAR). The litmus test of peace building is whether the situation on the ground improves. In addition to support from the PBC, countries can also avail themselves of financial assistance from the Peacebuilding Fund to jump start or rebuilding of projects to address human needs. Over time however, questions have also been raised on how to make its impact more tangible at the country level by strengthening peace building that will better enable keep countries from relapsing into conflict, and sustain peace

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<sup>6</sup> Oberschall, A., *Conflict and Peace Building in Divided Societies: Responses to Ethnic Violence*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), p 195

beyond the life of a peacekeeping mission. It will help ensure that the enormous investments that member states make in peace operations will achieve their intended result. Prior to the establishment of the PBC, the work of peacekeepers in fragile States too often turned out to be in vain because the phase between the end of the peacekeeping mission and the start of development had not been adequately addressed. In the crucial phase between peacekeeping and development, insufficient attention was being paid to issues such as lack of coordination by donors, unrealistic goals and contradicting priorities hence creating serious gap. This explains partly why the PBC was founded. With the PBC having been operational for over five years now, important lessons have been learned, and prerequisites for successful peace building identified. These include national ownership, coordination between donors, realistic objectives, and mutual accountability of countries concerned and donors. The peace building phase is crucial for the future of fragile states. Thus, the PBC should occupy a more central role within the UN architecture, and ideally there should be a more organic relationship between peace operations and peace building, and a closer relationship between the PBC and the Security Council.

### **3.4 Peace Building and Conflict Resolution**

Boutros Ghali argues that despite the fact that the nature of peace-keeping operations has evolved rapidly in recent years, the established principles and practices of peace-keeping have responded flexibly to new demands of recent years, and the basic conditions for success remain unchanged: a clear and practicable mandate; the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of member states to contribute the military, police and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field; and adequate financial and logistic

support.<sup>7</sup> As the international climate has changed and peace-keeping operations are increasingly fielded to help implement settlements that have been negotiated by peacemakers, a new array of demands and problems has emerged regarding logistics, equipment, personnel and finance, all of which could be corrected if Member States so wished and were ready to make the necessary resources available. Moreover, as Henderson<sup>8</sup> argues in his thesis, he suggests that, in the post cold war era violence of ethnic, linguistic and religious nature will be most prevalent form of conflict and that culturally determined issues are relatively indivisible and transcendent hence do not lend themselves to lasting peaceful conflict resolution.

Fabian and Rikhye argue that in its traditional form, peacekeeping involves the deployment of military personnel to monitor or observe a ceasefire between hostile forces, when the opposing sides agree to accept the monitors or the peacekeepers. Traditional peacekeepers may also serve as a buffer between hostile factions. Given their light armaments or no arms at all, such monitors/peacekeepers can do little to maintain peace if hostilities resume. Since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping has assumed a more active role in achieving peace during some deployments. For example, peacekeepers can assist in the transition to democracy by training police, establishing legislative and other democratic institutions, and providing humanitarian relief (for example, Bosnia from 1995 on, Haiti from 1996 on, Kosovo from 1999 on). They describe this fuller role as peace building.<sup>9</sup> Featherston, for example, has argued that peacekeepers should be in the business of conflict transformation and that in the long term a peace operation should transform conflict-ridden societies by fostering conflict resolution

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<sup>7</sup> Boutros, G.B., *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations A/47/277 - S/24111 (17 Jun., 1992) para. 50

<sup>8</sup> Henderson, A.E., Conflict and Conflict Resolution, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 41 No.5 October 1997, pp 640-667: 655

<sup>9</sup> Fabian, L.I., and Rikhye, I.J., Some Perspectives on Peacekeeping Institutions: The United Nations: Appraisal at 25 Years, *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 64, No. 4, (September 1970), pp 10-79: 11.

processes.<sup>10</sup> This means that post conflict period is critical to addressing the root causes of conflict to avoid relapse. Similarly, Diehl argues that long-term strategic priorities should be given greater weight than the short-term tactical goals that dominate much of the analysis of peace operations.<sup>11</sup> In their study of peace building in civil wars since World War II, Doyle and Sambanis "find that multilateral, United Nations peace operations make a positive difference." In particular, they find strong evidence that multidimensional peacekeeping, namely "missions with extensive civilian functions, including economic reconstruction, institutional reform, and election oversight" significantly improve the chances of peace building success (measured two years after the end of the war).<sup>12</sup>

### **3.5 The Human Security Approach to Peace Building**

Security has never been a static concept. Since the end of the Cold War it has been particularly fluid and this will continue in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The increased attention given during the 1990s to aspects of the security of human life and dignity, and the effects this had on more traditional concepts of the military security of the state, have served to complicate the general perceptions of security. At the same time they have provided an opportunity for elaborating broader interpretations of security than in the earlier years. This has called for a more comprehensive and wider definition of the concept of security to include both military and non-military nature. Essential concerns and prominence have now been paid to human security and its universality and relevance to all people in the rich and poor nations, the interdependence of the various components, the benefits of early prevention rather than management and the whole

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<sup>10</sup> Fetherston, A.B., et al "Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions", *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (May, 1997) pp. 151-165:151.

<sup>11</sup> Lebovic, H.J., "Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 6 (Dec., 2004) pp. 910-936: 917.

<sup>12</sup> Doyle, M.W., and Sambanis, N., "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis ", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Dec., 2000) pp. 779-801:781.

question of people-centered nature of human security.<sup>13</sup> Modern and future peace operations therefore, find themselves faced with the many complexities of not only ending conflict but rebuilding societies, re-establishing institutions, promoting good governance, restoring infrastructure and the economy and generally assisting in the promotion of human security and building sustainable peace. This calls for greater North-South cooperation and inclusive rather than exclusive thinking in formulating security concepts.

Following a Security Council resolution of the requirement for an intervention of a peacekeeping force, such an intervention should be seen as a short-term and expedient solution to a seemingly intractable problem. Normally commencing and manifesting in a humanitarian disaster, this is an absolutely critical period when any possible and practical opportunities for consolidating peace are at their highest but, at the same time, when the threat of a relapse into conflict is commensurately high. Unspeakable atrocities and human misery are central drivers to the desire to improve the general lot of the vulnerable peoples on the ground, and efforts to assist and support the afflicted must be aligned with adequate resources and expertise. Politically challenging and harder to establish is the task of what comes next to build upon the good work and effort of the peacekeepers, which has already gone into such a fragile environment that of building national capacity and security.

In security-development nexus, Mudida argues that human security refers to quality of life, governance and economic opportunities or conditions for the fulfillment of human needs. There are certain political and economic conditions that are essential for the fulfillment of human needs.<sup>14</sup> The expansion of the concept of security will call for concerted efforts from all

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<sup>13</sup> *The Challenges Project, Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century – Concluding Report 1997 – 2002*, Elanders Gotab, Stockholm, 2002, pp 12

<sup>14</sup> Mudida, R. *The Security-Development Nexus: A Structural Violence and Human Needs Approach* (New Faces Conference, 2007), pp 19

stakeholders in order to have the populations not only feel respected but also empowered economically with the attendant socio cultural requirements. We must therefore anticipate the challenges to be faced by the peace support operations as it attempts going forward. The biggest challenge to date is the whole question of sustainability of peace for any post-conflict country such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone or the DRC. The functionality of institutions is necessary and paramount since a country must have the resources, the human capital, and capacity to stop the threat of insurgency or avoid relapsing into conflict. This entails serious capacity building that is essential if state institutions are to operate effectively. At the same time empowering state institutions is critical in enabling national government to provide services for its citizens. In any post-conflict setting, maintained international engagement in the institution building stages, beyond military involvement, is necessary for the endurance of peace building efforts. It been shown that in Afghanistan, an additional component of the stabilization process is effective regional cooperation. These partnerships need to remain strong and active so that progress is not at risk.

Democratization in post-conflict countries is a multidimensional challenge. It is argued that democratization process requires sustained security as well as political, and development support.<sup>15</sup> However, as it has been emphasized time and again democracy grows from within and therefore external actors can only support it. The international community and key national stakeholders must work collaboratively, with integrative strategies, to provide effective support for democratization. Any realistic and long-lasting peace will need the consent of its population, and will stand the greatest chances of success when socio-economic and security governance issues are addressed. A government which is not credible or is weak or illegitimate, possibly

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<sup>15</sup> Guehenno, J.M., *Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in 2010*, Edita Vastra Aros AB, Stockholm, p. 43



characterized by human rights violations and a sense of injustice and impunity among its population, where social programmes for the rural community may be disproportionately underfunded and parochial, will adversely affect societal norms and what national and local government can tangibly deliver in the face of a legacy from a past conflict.

For this to be achieved there is need for well trained personnel namely military, civilians and police. The demands of the 1990s as highlighted earlier resulted in shortage of qualified personnel especially the civilian component. This led to emergence or reinvention of peace support initiatives to meet this challenge. There are numerous peace support initiatives globally that offer peace support training mostly under the banner of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC). The IAPTC is an open and voluntary association of individuals, centers, institutions and programmes dealing with peacekeeping research, education and training. The association promotes better understanding of peacekeeping, its goals, objectives and the methods used in training for peacekeeping operations of all types. It aims to broaden contacts between and among various international organizations, peacekeeping training centers and institutions, universities and other interested groups, thus leading to more effective peacekeeping. Some of the objectives of the IAPTC are: to promulgate an understanding of training standards developed by the UN and other relevant organizations and to encourage their adoption; to promote the exchange of experience among training institutions regarding different training methodologies; to create conditions that facilitate effective networking and cooperation (bilateral, regional, etc.) and to promote an understanding of the different institutional perspectives and organizational cultures present among military, police and civilian components

in peace operations.<sup>16</sup> Woodhouse et al aver that modern peacekeeping has had to take unfamiliar roles in prevention such as the UN Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia (UNPREDEP), intervention in active war zones UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) Liberia, UN Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR), UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I & II), as well as post-settlement peace building such as UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), UNTAC, UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).<sup>17</sup> Such centers include the Canadian Forces Centre for Excellence for Peace Support Operations, the German UN Training Centre, Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre of Canada, Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training and Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre. Lebovic argues that in the second and third generation peacekeeping efforts of the 1990s, many UN personnel were ill-trained, ill-prepared, and ill-equipped to assist these operations such as those in the horn of Africa and West Africa conflict systems.<sup>18</sup> It's against this backdrop that peace support initiatives were reevaluated to conform to the new challenges globally. Such interventions improves the prospects for peace, but only if the peace operation is appropriately designed. Enforcement operations alone cannot create the conditions for a self-sustaining democratic peace. In the right circumstances, consent-based peacekeeping operations with civilian functions (multidimensional PKOs) are, by contrast, good not only in ending the violence, but also in assisting with the institutional and political reform that helps secure longer term peace.

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<sup>16</sup> International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC) Articles of Association accessed on 17 July 2011 <http://www.iaptc.org/about.html>

<sup>17</sup> Zacher and Matthew (1995) in Lebovic, H.J., "Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 6 (Dec., 2004) pp. 910-936: 914.

<sup>18</sup> Lebovic, H.J., "Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 6, (Dec., 2004) pp. 910-936:917.

In the continent, peacekeeping centers fall under the banner of the African chapter of the IAPTC, the African Peace Support Trainers' Association (APSTA). The aim of the APSTA initiative is to provide a forum in which representatives from African centers could discuss issues pertaining to their work, explore areas of co-operation, and more importantly develop strategies on how to contribute to the capacity building needs of the African Union and its subsidiary sub-regional organizations. The objective is to facilitate meetings and exchange information and best practices; to facilitate efforts to harmonise doctrine, SOPs and training and to serve as a depository that offers advisory services to the AU on peace support operations issues.<sup>19</sup> Such institutions are found in every region within Africa and include Southern Africa Development Community Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC RPTC) in Harare, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana, Mali Peacekeeping School (Ecole du Maintien de la Paix du Mali), Nigeria Army Peacekeeping Centre (NAPKC), Nigerian National Defence College Centre for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution (CPRCR), South African National War College (SANWC), The Cairo Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) and the African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). Within the Eastern Africa region, the regional centers of excellence (CoEs) include the Rwanda Peace Academy upto recently operating under the Rwandan Military Academy (RMA), Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) in Dar es Salaam and upcoming Centers of Excellencies in Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda.

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<sup>19</sup> African Peace Support Trainers' Association (APSTA) Articles of Association accessed on 16 July 2011 <http://www.apsta-africa.org/>

### **3.6 Peace Support Initiatives undertaking Capacity Building**

There are numerous Peace Support Initiatives undertaking Capacity Building at global, continental, regional and national levels distributed evenly between the continents. These initiatives have varying mandates, backgrounds and history. This study will focus on a few of these in order to shed light on the kind of work they do in training personnel for Peace Support Operations with the UN or other mechanisms.

#### **3.6.1 The Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden**

The Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) is a Swedish government agency dedicated to improving the quality and effectiveness of international conflict and crisis management with a particular focus on peace operations. The Academy functions as a platform for cooperation between Swedish agencies and organizations and their international partners. Its main areas of responsibility are: National cooperation and coordination, Multifunctional education and training, Research, studies and evaluation, Method and doctrine development, Recruitment of Swedish civilian personnel to international peace operations and Funding of civil society peace projects. The establishment of the Academy reflects Sweden's commitment to international peace and security. It is named after Count Folke Bernadotte, who was the first official UN mediator. The Academy also has a preparedness to offer good offices for conflict management initiatives, such as talks between parties to a conflict.<sup>20</sup> Within its mandate, it serves as national point of contact with international organizations, including the UN, EU, OSCE and NATO. The Academy aims for broad international participation in its activities, and cooperates closely with partner institutions throughout the world. It has been entrusted to coordinate the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations and holds the Presidency of the International

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<sup>20</sup> Folke Bernadotte Academy's website [www.folkebernadotteacademy.se](http://www.folkebernadotteacademy.se) accessed 25 July 2011

**Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres. Through the Conflict Prevention in Practice Programme, preventive perspectives and methods are integrated in all relevant activities of the Academy.**

**The main objectives of Folke Bernadotte Academy's Education, Training and Exercise Department are to prepare staff for work in international peace operations as well as to provide advanced training aimed at strengthening the capacity of staff, already on mission, in dealing with complex crisis management. The FBA uses case studies of ongoing conflicts, academic lectures coupled with lifelike scenario based training, involving active participation and role playing, for a more interactive learning experience. To achieve training objectives, training should be as realistic as possible and take place in a multicultural and multifunctional environment. This form of training best reflects the reality in the field of international crisis management, and increases awareness and understanding between the numerous actors who operate in the field, leading to better collaboration in the operational areas.**

**Some of the courses offered at FBA include : Senior and middle management course on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Rule of Law course, Civil – Military Coordination course, Leadership and Gender in Peace Operations, Security Sector Reform (SSR), Facilitation of Dialogue and Mediation Efforts, Information and Intelligence Cooperation in Multifunctional International Operations, Protection against Risks and Threats in Conflict Areas, The Role of Economic Actors in Conflict Prevention and Peace Building, United Nations Civilian Staff Officer course (UNCIVSOC), Reconciliation as Process and Practice, Course in Governance and Democratic Practice and Field Strategies for Protection of Civilians.**

### **3.6.2 Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) of Canada**

The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre was established in 1994 by the Government of Canada to support international peace and security. It is dedicated to improving the effectiveness of peace operations around the world through the following areas of expertise: capacity building programs, training and education activities and military exercises and simulations.<sup>21</sup> The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre offers tailored capacity building programs to help its partnering organizations develop and strengthen their ability to recruit, train and deploy qualified individuals in complex peace operations, Research-led strategic, operational and tactical training courses based on emerging issues and trends as well as best practices and lessons learned. PPC also conducts Exercises that simulate the environment within which peace operations practitioners have the opportunity to rehearse. Military personnel are compelled to work with civilians and police towards achieving a common objective. This is achieved through an active learning methodology that results in deeper learning, increased knowledge retention and stronger application skills. The centre lists four distinct traits that set the Centre apart from other international peace operation training organizations and create a learning experience that is unrivalled in the world today namely: Research-led training and education, an active learning methodology, a comprehensive approach and international community of experts.<sup>22</sup>

Pearson Peacekeeping Centre brings together a team of researchers, retired and active police and military officers, humanitarians, civilians, role players and a pool of subject matter experts with recent field experience work for the Centre which is also led by our Board of Directors and Senior Management team. The centre works with governments and organizations

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<sup>21</sup> Pearson Peacekeeping Centre's website [www.peaceoperations.org](http://www.peaceoperations.org) accessed 25 July 2011

<sup>22</sup> Ibid

from around the world and also member countries of NATO, the African Union and European Union, the UN Department of peacekeeping operations among others

### **3.6.3 The German Armed Forces United Nations Training Centre**

The centre began in 1994 and officially activated on 27 October 1999, the Bundeswehr UN training centre became an independent element of the Infantry School and soon evolved into a national and international hallmark for the training of military and civilian personnel for conflict prevention and crisis management operations. The mission of the Bundeswehr UN training centre is to prepare soldiers and civilian personnel for tasks as part of international conflict prevention and crisis management operations. It conducts a military observer course certified by the United Nations Department of peacekeeping operations (DPKO) and is a partnership-for-peace (PfP) training and education centre as well as a both governmental organization and non governmental organization training facility providing training for civilian personnel from other ministries and humanitarian organisations as well as journalists.<sup>23</sup> It is responsible for mission-oriented/theatre-specific pre-deployment training of German contingent soldiers and for the training of the commanders, gunners and drivers of the DINGO all-protected carrier vehicle. The centre trains approximately 15,000 soldiers and civilian personnel per year for conflict prevention and crisis management operations. Finally, it comprises a policy group concerned with conceptual work, training development and operational advice focusing on force protection as well as an international cooperation element.

With the special training facilities of "Bonnland Training Village" and "Felschental UN Camp" at Hammelburg major training area and the "Housing Area" and the "Hawk Site" at Wildflecken Training Area, as well as the low mountain range character of the training and

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<sup>23</sup> Bundeswehr UN Training Centres website [www.vnausbzgw.de](http://www.vnausbzgw.de) accessed on 25 July 2011

exercise terrain, the infrastructure of the Bundeswehr UN Training Centre is perfectly matched to the training requirements for conflict prevention and crisis management operations.

#### **3.6.4 Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KA IPTC)**

The mission of KA IPTC is to develop and deliver internationally recognized and professional training courses and related programmes to equip personnel with selected skills and competencies required to meet Africa's present and future complex peace and security challenges. Working with its partners, the KA IPTC undertakes and delivers research and training programmes that contribute to global peacekeeping operations. Since 2003, our researchers and training facilitators have delivered over 170 courses in diverse aspects of peacekeeping operations for over 5400 individuals and organizations globally. This site provides useful information about our institution and courses.<sup>24</sup>

Major activities of the training department include: programme identification, design and curriculum development; individual, collective civilian (civil society), police and military peace support operation/ training programmes; police training; simulation training and experience sharing between regional armies. To achieve these activities, the training department at the KA IPTC has three sections: The individual training section which is responsible for all training related activities at the KA IPTC; the collective training section, which oversees the pre-deployment training activities of the Ghana armed forces; and the training evaluation and development (TED) section, which monitors and evaluates training programmes. This section is also listed as the one that develops training programmes/courses and conducts lessons learned design & development (LDD) processes. TED also develops and manages the database of the centre's facilitators and participants. The training department works closely with the research department to ensure that original and innovative thinking underlines the centre's content for

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<sup>24</sup> Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre's website [www.kaiptc.org](http://www.kaiptc.org) accessed on 25 July 2011



training programmes. The centre also runs a master of arts degree in conflict, peace and security (MCPS) other post graduate programmes to be run subsequently include; post graduate diploma in conflict, peace and security (DCPS), master degree in gender, peace and security (MGPS), post graduate diploma in gender, peace and security (DGPS), post graduate diploma in development diplomacy programme (DDDP), post graduate certificate in integrated peace support operations (CIPSO), post graduate certificate in disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (CDDP) and post graduate certificate in security sector reforms (CSSR).<sup>25</sup>

The research department, which is one of the three main departments at the KAIPTC, is mandated to undertake research into international peace and security, conflict prevention and peacekeeping issues. The mandate is achieved through: research, analyses, writing and publications; networking and cooperation at the national, regional and international levels; participation in regional and international debates; and teaching support to KAIPTC and external partners. The research department is the KAIPTC's unique and distinguishing feature from other peacekeeping training centers in the sub region.<sup>26</sup> The department has evolved to become critical to the needs of KAIPTC as it seeks to conduct and facilitate innovative and comprehensive research into the causes, prevention, resolution and management of conflict aimed at contributing to the promotion of peace in the sub-region in particular and Africa as a whole. The department also works closely with the training department in the areas of training content design and course/workshop facilitation.

#### **3.6.5 Southern African Development Community's Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, (SADC RPTC)**

The history of Southern African Development Community's Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, (SADC RPTC) dates back to the early 90's when the SADC Member States

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid

<sup>26</sup> Ibid

began to be active in United Nations peace support operations. Peace Support training then, was conducted by individual countries and Member States realized the requirement for coordinated peace support training that was to ensure harmonization. SADC countries over the time have become very active contributors in UN and AU peace support operations with contributions ranging from military observers, civilian police and the blue helmets. In addition, a significant number of civilians are also serving in AU and UN operations on an individually recruited basis. The region is now at an advance stage of establishing the SADC Brigade, which is one of the pillars of the African Standby Force (ASF). The initiative to establish RPTC started in 1995 when Zimbabwe, jointly with the United Kingdom organized the first peacekeeping seminar and a peacekeeping course for battalion commanders at the Zimbabwe Staff College in Harare.<sup>27</sup> The participants were drawn from the SADC countries and other regions within Africa. Zimbabwe was assigned by SADC interstate defence and security committee (ISDSC) to coordinate peacekeeping training in the region during the 18th ISDSC session held in Lilongwe, Malawi, in October 1996. After construction of its own training facility, the centre moved from Zimbabwe Staff College to its own purpose built location in June 1999. Recognizing the role of RPTC in the training for peace support missions, the SADC Ministerial Committee of the organ at its meeting held in July in Sun City, Republic of South Africa, recommended the mainstreaming of the RPTC under the SADC Secretariat, and this recommendation was endorsed by Summit at its meeting held in August 2004 in Grand Baie, Mauritius. Since May 2009, the Centre has moved to a new location offered by the Government of Zimbabwe.

The mission of the RPTC is to study the theory and practice of peace support operations (PSO) and to coordinate peace support training in the SADC region as mandated by the organ on

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<sup>27</sup> Interview with the Deputy Commandant of SADC RPTC Lt Col Sam Ndlovu in Harare on 17 August 2011

politics, defence and security cooperation.<sup>28</sup> RPTC objectives are in line with the core objective of the strategic indicative plan for the organ (SIPO), which aims at creating a peaceful and politically stable and secure environment. Specifically RPTC objectives are: to promote regional cooperation in peace and security among SADC member states, to built capacity in conflict prevention and conflict management including PSO, to train peacekeeping practitioners and provide training, enabling all SADC member states to take part in PSO, to assist planning for SADC peacekeeping exercises and operations, to develop and deliver peacekeeping training in line with SADC, AU and UN standards and to implement the objectives of the Strategic indicative plan of the organ (SIPO) and the SADC development agenda related to Peace and Security. The courses offered include: SADC peace support course, civil-military coordination course, peacekeeping course for civilians, conflict resolution and management, peace keeping course for senior officers, train the trainers course, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, SADC police commanders and specialist course, SADC foundation course for civilians, international humanitarian law, logistic and mission administration course, military observers course and basic French for peacekeepers. Furthermore, RPTC has participated in the preparation and running of all major peacekeeping exercises conducted in the region. In this vein, some SADC member states have participated in several joint training exercises: Blue Hungwe (1997) in Zimbabwe; Blue Crane (1999) in South Africa; Tulipe (1999); Tanzanite (2002) in Tanzania; THOKGAMO (2005) in Botswana and Golfinho (2009) in Angola, Namibia and South Africa. Such exercises have helped to bring together the various national armed forces in the region and so break down mistrust, as well as promote

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<sup>28</sup> Southern African Development Community's Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre's website [www.sadc.int/rptc](http://www.sadc.int/rptc) accessed on 25 July 2011

regional interoperability. For example, Blue Hungwe, the first regional PSO training exercise hosted by Zimbabwe, incorporated a total of eleven SADC member states: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe - a development that would have been unthinkable in the 1980s given political and social dynamics of the time especially the Cold War that polarized nations into East/West alliances that created deep suspicions thereby hindering economic, political, cultural or social cooperation even between neighbouring states. The Centre is a member of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC) and the African chapter, the African Peace Support Trainer's Association (APSTA) with the Centre holding the Presidency in 2010.

### **3.7 Conclusion**

There are many institutions offering peace support operations worldwide operating mostly at national levels but with some at sub regional or regional levels that aim to build or enhance capacity of the military, police and more recently and fundamentally the civilian component with before underwent ad-hoc training and education if any. It's been realized that in the modern integrated missions there is an increasing need to have all the three components train and work together towards the overall strategic end state or vision. Most of the training, education and capacity building undertaken today brings together these components under one roof but of course specific programmes and courses for the individual components are still offered to meet specific and unique characteristics of each.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **INTERNATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTRE IN CAPACITY BUILDING**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

Chapter three delved in the whole issue of capacity building at various levels from global to regional level. This chapter will investigate the role of the International Peace Support Training Centre – Kenya as a case study. The International Peace Support Training Centre (then Peace Support Training Centre) was established in January 2001 as part of Kenyan Defence Staff College. It initially focused on UN PSO courses and later incorporated the AU related PSO courses.<sup>1</sup> It attracts national, regional, continental and international multidimensional participants namely the military, police and civilians. It became a separate Kenya Ministry of State for Defence establishment in July 2006 and renamed the ‘International Peace Support Training Centre’ at the end of 2007.<sup>2</sup> Its focus then expanded to include regional and international participants as well as international staff and partnerships. In 2008, initially efforts towards “internationalization” were made coupled with the drafting of a strategic plan to guide further developments. In 2009, there was the merger of Karen campus (old Peace Support Training Centre) and Embakasi campus (formerly the International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC) to create the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) with two training and delivery platforms: Peace and Conflict Studies School (PCSS) Karen, handling strategic and operational level training (‘decision maker’ training) for top and middle level PSO practitioners such as the Heads of Missions, Force Commanders or Police Commissioners and the Humanitarian Peace Support School (HPSS) Embakasi, dealing with tactical training (‘enabler’ training). These training platforms are complemented by the peace and security research

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<sup>1</sup> Interview with the Director of the Centre Brigadier Robert Kibochi on 28 July 2011 in Karen

<sup>2</sup> International Peace Support Training Centre Strategic Development Plan (IPSTC SDP) 2009-2011, pp. 3-5 at the Centre’s website at [www.ipstc.org](http://www.ipstc.org) accessed on 7 August 2011

department. The department is divided into two teams: the applied research team and the design and evaluation team. Through the applied research team, the department produces 'demand-led' research products and contributes to Eastern African country profiles. This team focuses on issues across the spectrum of conflict through the conduct of field research and the convening of academic related seminars and symposiums. Through the design and evaluation team the department convenes workshops for the development of products related to the tactical, operational and strategic levels of training and education at IPSTC.<sup>3</sup>

The centre therefore set out certain benchmarks to assess its progress. For instance by 2010, the centre envisaged to have established a solid foundation for this unique organization and that the foundations of a regional peace and conflict 'centre of excellence' will permit the realization of the centre's potential to build capacity in Eastern Africa and attract partners to secure the future of the centre. The centre's vision as spelled out in its strategic plan 2009-2011 is 'to be an independent Eastern African research, training and education centre that is responsive to the peace operations training and education requirements of the African Peace and Security Architecture.'<sup>4</sup> A 'centre of excellence' is an institution that has resident expertise and capability in a particular field that is unparalleled by other institutions in that domain and/or region. Additionally, within that particular field, a 'centre of excellence' is an institution that is capable of assessing the requirements for training and education, designing and developing appropriate training and education models to meet those requirements and has an internal and external feedback mechanism that ensures continuous improvement of products and processes. There are factors which set the centre apart namely; ownership of a comprehensive and broad curriculum developed through a collaborative approach focusing on training needs of the region; not just

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<sup>3</sup> IPSTC Prospectus 2011 accessed in the centre website [www.ipstc.org](http://www.ipstc.org) on 14 August 2011

<sup>4</sup> Op cit, International Peace Support Training Centre Strategic Plan 2009-2011, pp. 11

hosting courses; broad range and unique facilities that enhance realism in training such as PSO training village and simulation capacity both indoor and outdoor achieved through partnership and internal capacity or subject matter expertise able to deliver various trainings coupled with a large pool of mentors/facilitators that can be called upon.<sup>5</sup>

The strategic plan gives the mission of the centre as 'to conduct applied research into and the training and education of military, police and civilian personnel in all aspects of peace operations in order to help improve the effectiveness of the international response to complex emergencies.'<sup>6</sup> This is meant to address the totality of the components found in a field UN/AU mission. The centre's output goals as outlined in its strategic plan include: to provide strategic and operational level decision-making and leadership training to enhance planning and management of multidimensional peace operations, to provide mission focused pre-deployment training at both tactical and operational levels, support the development of African peace operations capacity focusing on the ASF and targeting the EASF, to contribute to the development of an emerging Eastern Africa peace and security architecture, provide a repository of data across the entire spectrum of peace operations and provide peace operations training and advice to all Kenya defence forces and establishments.<sup>7</sup> The centres' main customers or client base therefore remains the Eastern Africa Standby Force member states - Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Seychelles, Somalia and Comoros. This constitutes up to 60 percent of the total participants per course with 30 percent coming from the rest of Africa and the remaining 10 percent from the rest of the world.<sup>8</sup> Although this is good for the Eastern Africa region, it can sometimes limit critical experiences

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<sup>5</sup> Interview with the Director of the Centre Brigadier Robert Kibochi on 28 July 2011 in Karen

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, IPSTC SDP pp.10-11

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, IPSTC SDP pp.13

<sup>8</sup> Interview with the Director of the Centre Brigadier Robert Kibochi on 28 July 2011 in Karen

and worldviews from the rest of Africa and globally. Other clients include regional and continental organizations that have peace and security as part of their mandates including the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and other AU Organs especially the African Standby Force (ASF) in Addis Ababa Ethiopia, East Africa Community (EAC) based in Arusha Tanzania, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) based in Bujumbura Burundi, Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Djibouti and the UN/AU missions within the region including the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the hybrid/joint African union United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and UN Mission (MONUSCO) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).<sup>9</sup> The centre identifies five institutional goals namely: ownership of a comprehensive program addressing conflict in Eastern Africa (Training Strategy), the establishment of IPSTC as a leading research training and education Centre within APSA (Research Strategy), the ability to provide intellectual inputs in to the APSA (Partnership and Networking Strategy), an integrated internal management and support system (Support Strategy) and to become autonomous (Governance Strategy).<sup>10</sup>

#### **4.2 Curriculum in the Training Platforms**

One platform the peace and conflict studies school (PCSS), Karen campus offers three main programmes namely; conflict prevention programme, conflict management programme, post conflict recovery programme. Conflict prevention programme has courses such as conflict analysis and prevention course, dialogue, negotiations and mediation course and early warning and preventive diplomacy course. the conflict management programme comprises such courses as regional senior mission leader course, middle level leadership and management course, peace

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with the Acting PCSS Commandant Lt Col Kombo on 8 August 2011 in Karen

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, IPSTC SDP pp.13-14



operations planning course, peace operations senior staff course, sexual and gender based violence course, peace operations staff course, media in PSO course, peace operations logistics course, civil - military coordination course, protection of civilians course and human rights in peace support operations. The post conflict recovery programme has security sector reform course, regional security studies course, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration course, community policing course and election monitoring course.<sup>11</sup> There are a number of cross-cutting issues that have an impact on the implementation of the mandate of a peacekeeping operation. These issues need to be carefully factored into any PSO training, as they require action in multiple fields, affect many or all components, and are not the responsibility of any single mission element alone, even if one component is usually in the lead.<sup>12</sup> The two training platforms offer some of these cross cutting issues/courses either as stand alone or as part of various courses offered. Such cross cutting issues include rule of law, humanitarianism, HIV/AIDS, the environment, child rights, gender issues, social and economic wellbeing.

The other training platform, the humanitarian peace support school (HPSS), Embakasi campus offers three main programmes too. These are mine action and disarmament programme, pre-deployment programme and disaster management programme. the mine action and disarmament programme has courses such as humanitarian demining course, mine and small arms risk education (awareness), explosive ordinance disposal course, improvised Explosive devices (IED) course, counter improvised explosive devices (CIED) course and disarmament (small arms and light weapons). The pre-deployment programme or wing offers military observer course, UN/AU police course, civilian pre-deployment training and contingent pre-deployment training especially for the Kenya defence forces battalions (KENBATT) for

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<sup>11</sup> Op cit interview with the Acting PCSS Commandant Lt Col Kombo on 8 August 2011 in Karen

<sup>12</sup> Guehenno, J.M., *Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in 2010*, Edita Vastra Aros AB, Stockholm, pp. 31

deployment under UN or AU banner in South Sudan, Darfur or elsewhere. The disaster management programme encompasses incident command system course, advanced incident command system course, incident command course for managers and military disaster response training.<sup>13</sup>

Beside the two training platforms, there is the peace and security research department. The department contributes the production of knowledge for peace operations in Eastern Africa and its primary responsibilities include: the delivery of applied research products; curriculum design and evaluation and library services. In the IPSTC prospectus the main responsibilities of the peace and security research department include: production of applied research products related to peace and security policy in Eastern Africa; enhancement of the IPSTC training and education framework; definition of the training and education standards for all events conducted at IPSTC; conduct of the internal evaluation and external validation of all training and education events; maintenance of institutional linkages with partners for the development and delivery of applied research products and training and education events; management of relevant library collection related to the IPSTC training and education Framework.<sup>14</sup> This is a critical department as far as developing and reviewing the various peace support operations programmes to conform to new challenges and adding an intellectual input into the whole process.

#### **4.2.1 Regional Senior Mission Leaders Course**

This is a two week course targeting leadership at strategic level especially those already working or earmarked for senior leadership positions such as the Heads of mission, Force commanders or Police commissioners among other senior ranks. With contemporary peace support operations becoming increasingly complex, the course aims at preparing and

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<sup>13</sup> Interview with the acting Commandant of HPSS Major Elphaz Kinyua on 2 August 2011 in Embakasi

<sup>14</sup> IPSTC Prospectus 2011 accessed in the centre website [www.ipstc.org](http://www.ipstc.org) on 14 August 2011

strengthening the senior leadership within EASF and the ASF on aspects of leadership and management at the senior levels that are critical to both the planning and conduct of peace operations. The course attracts participants of the rank of Colonel to General (including police and civilian equivalents) with varying degrees of current and previous experience with peace operations and/or experience working within multi-cultural and multi-dimensional environments. The presentations and syndicate work is done by various resident and visiting subject matter experts both academics and practitioners, mentors, as well as by participants briefing on areas of experiences. These presentations are enhanced with exercises followed by presentation of solutions and syndicate discussion.<sup>15</sup>

The course content mainly focuses on leadership and management within the planning and conduct of a peace operation and include such topics as: strategic thinking, leadership and collaborative decision making, the cycle of conflict including identification, prevention, intervention, and resolution and peace building, the emerging African peace and security architecture, ASF vision and concept, UN charter and doctrine, mission planning, military operations ASF training and implementation, EASF vision and concept, UN/AU policing, mission support, partnerships and UN support and legal aspects of peace operations . Moreover, a number of cross cutting topics are also covered especially those issues related to the planning and conduct of a peace operation are such as gender issues in PSO, human rights, media relations, civilian dimension, humanitarian affairs, public information, stabilization and peace building, security sector reform, rule of law, safety and security, conduct and discipline and child rights and protection. All syndicate discussions for case studies use a hypothetical country called Carana found in the '8<sup>th</sup> Continent.

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<sup>15</sup> Interview with the training coordinator of PCSS Florence Oduor on 9 August 2011 in Karen

#### **4.2.2 Pre Deployment Training**

The UN/AU has now made it mandatory for all personnel whether military formed units, the police or civilians to be trained before deployment to the mission area. The UN DPKO has developed the core pre-deployment training materials (CPTMs) which represent the essential knowledge required by all peacekeeping personnel military, police or civilian to function effectively in a United Nations peacekeeping operation. These materials are used as the core resource for any UN pre-deployment training course. The modules in the CPTMs include: introduction to UN peacekeeping, fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping, establishment and operationalization of security council mandates in peacekeeping operations, how UN peacekeeping operations function, international law relevant to peacekeeping operations, human rights protection in UN peacekeeping operations, women, peace and security: the role of UN peacekeeping operations, protection of children: the role of UN peacekeeping operations, working with mission partners, conduct and discipline, HIV/AIDS and UN peacekeeping operations, respect for diversity, safety and security.<sup>16</sup> These materials constitute the basic minimum but troop contributing Nations (TCNs) can add specific modules to gather for their special needs and requirements. The pre-deployment training for the Kenyan Battalions (KENBATT) going for missions abroad apart from the CPTMs encompasses such topics as the status of force/mission agreement (SOFA/SOMA), standard operating procedures (SOPs), rules of engagement (ROEs), stress management, personal and field hygiene, welfare and morale issues such as pay and allowances, policy on leave, rest and recuperation, rotation, repatriation, code of conduct, country profile or study of where the mission is located, local cultures and norms, basic local language, security awareness and hostage survival, communications and negotiation/mediation, public relations and media awareness, mine awareness, civil-military

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<sup>16</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Core Pre-deployment Training Materials, p 3-56

coordination, logistic operations and administration, the tasks of peacekeepers and military observers and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.<sup>17</sup>

However, over time peace support operations actors, practitioners and other stakeholders have often raised issues relating to mismatch between the theoretical training offered in various training institutions and the real conditions in the field. There has been the need therefore to address the question of realism in training so that when trainees are deployed to the actual field missions they are able to relate theory and practice and therefore enhance effectiveness and efficiency in AU/UN operations. Towards this end especially to enhance realism, the International Peace Support Training Centre together with partners (Canada, United Kingdom and United States of America) undertook to develop PSO training village at the Humanitarian Peace Support School (HPSS), Embakasi. This is a realistic training facility that can be used to train and assess a multidimensional company group (120+ personnel) in various aspects of PSO in order to prepare them to deploy on UN or AU peace support missions. Various likely field mission scenarios are played out and participants' reactions monitored for discussion in after action review.<sup>18</sup> This creates uniqueness and sets IPSTC from similar institutions continentally and even globally. This facility is the first in the continent and among the few globally and sets the Centre apart as far as pre-deployment training and education for the military, police and civilians is concerned.<sup>19</sup>

#### **4.2.3 Conflict Analysis and Prevention Course**

This is a 10 day course conducted for multidimensional components (military, police and civilians) at PCSS, Karen. The course aims to enhance participants understanding of the concept of conflict and its foundations, outline and discuss the various theories of conflict, identify and

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<sup>17</sup> Interview with the acting Commandant of HPSS Major Elphaz Kinyua on 2 August 2011 in Embakasi

<sup>18</sup> Interview with the acting Commandant of HPSS Major Elphaz Kinyua on 2 August 2011 in Embakasi

<sup>19</sup> Interview with the Director of the Centre Brigadier Robert Kibochi on 28 July 2011 in Karen

discuss the various conflict analysis tools and demonstrate an enhanced understanding of conflict analysis frameworks and be able to apply the same in their work environment or in a PSO setting. The modules included in this two weeks course include; overview of conflict (what is conflict – concepts and definitions, actors, causes, types of conflict and the nature of conflict-positive and negative aspects of conflicts), conflict responses and management styles (terms associated with responses to conflict, types of responses to conflict and conflict management continuum - negotiations and agreement /peace). The next module is conflicts in Africa to include the state and conflicts in Africa, African international relations, theories of the state in Africa relating to contemporary conflict, and the causes of conflict in Africa. The other module deals with insurgency and threats in Africa which aims to expose the participants to issues surrounding non-state actors in African conflicts as well as understanding of contemporary interventions in Africa. There is also the module on conflict cycle and trends which aims to expose participants to the conflict cycle namely the various stages of conflict or timelines or phases of conflict, thereby allowing them to gain deeper understanding of conflict situations. These include stable peace, unstable peace, open conflict, crisis, and war. After this participants go through conflict analysis interrogating among other things the purpose of the conflict analysis. The conflict context/profile, actors in the conflict, conflict dynamics in terms of the interests, positions and motivations of the actors, levels of conflict and conflict analysis tools such as conflict mapping, peace flower, conflict tree while also identifying capacities for peace. This helps guide participants in identifying actors, issues and relationships. The next module deals with analysis of causes of conflict and underlying issues to include the root/underlying structural causes of conflict, its proximate causes and its trigger. Lastly, participants are engaged in a

practical work in small groups undertaking conflict profiling and scenario building using the hypothetical Carana scenario.<sup>20</sup>

The challenge for some of these courses including conflict analysis and prevention has been the funding. Despite the partnership and networking the centre's sustainability over the long term needs to be founded and grounded on a more reliable, stable and firm relationship with the partners. This has been addressed in the short and medium term through the memorandum of coopeation (MOC) signed with the main partners in June 2011, but the need for a longer term higher level engagement and a more formal relationship between the centre and partners is critical for sustainable success in the future.<sup>21</sup> Donor exigencies may divert funds elsewhere to react to humanitarian disasters such as famine, earthquakes, tsunamis or address domestic issues hence less funding for such initiatives and institutions with far reaching consequences. Moreover, there is the mushrooming of similar institutions regionally implying that they have to compete from the same pool of resources from the partners.

#### **4.2.4 Security Sector Reform Course**

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a concept to reform or rebuild a state's security sector which ironically can be a source of widespread insecurity by itself. In terms of organizations which are making decisions regarding security sector reform (and more specifically in the context of post conflict) peace support operations, and regional governments, institutions and organizations need to have an understanding of the objectives, frameworks and approaches to security sector reform processes. This in essence would inform decisions related to interventions, actions and skills that would otherwise be a hurdle to the promotion of sustainable peace, development, and democracy. In this regard therefore, there is a requirement that staff members

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<sup>20</sup> Interview with the training coordinator of PCSS Florence Oduor on 9 August 2011 in Karen

<sup>21</sup> Interview with the Director of the Centre Brigadier Robert Kibochi on 28 July 2011 in Karen

of the various regional governments, institutions and organizations possess an understanding of security sector reform in general, the post conflict dynamics in Eastern Africa more specifically, and the place of security sector reform in peace support operations. The course aims to enhance participants' understanding of security sector reform objectives, frameworks and processes in order to contribute effectively to security sector reform initiatives in the region.<sup>22</sup> The course duration is 10 training days. The target audience for this course comprises middle level management and practitioners who are working with Governmental institutions, regional and sub-regional organizations and peace support operations. The potential participants should be able to influence policy and decision making processes of their respective organizations and include EASF member states mid level management (Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Security, Ministry of Internal Affairs or equivalent ministries – these include the military, police, intelligence, judiciary, prisons, traditional justice mechanisms, Human Rights Commissions etc, regional and sub-regional peace and security organizations/mechanisms UN/AU Peace Missions - SSR Departments in UN and AU missions, civil society and the academia.<sup>23</sup> The modules covered in this course include introduction to contemporary PSO, concepts of security sector reform, evolution of security sector reform, an overview of security sector reform context, relevance of security sector reform, sectors and actors in security sector reform, UN and AU principles, national ownership and sustainability, gender and security sector reform, police reforms: a case study of the Kenya police, rule of law and governance of security sector, democratic control mechanisms, partnership in security sector reform, planning, assessment and design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, resource mobilization and

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<sup>22</sup> Interview with the training coordinator of PCSS Florence Oduor on 9 August 2011 in Karen

<sup>23</sup> IPSTC Prospectus 2011 accessed in the centre website [www.ipstc.org](http://www.ipstc.org) on 14 August 2011



accountability, SSR communication strategy, Carana SSR context ,design, SSR needs assessment and plan.

However, the delivery of this course among others is affected by the number and variety of staff available. There Centre has both international and Kenyan staff working under the various programmes. The eight international staff comes from USA, UK, Canada and France with no regional or continental representation.<sup>24</sup> However, an institution of such caliber serving mostly the Eastern Africa region needs to have regional representation to enhance and share the varied perspectives/experiences and create ownership. There is an urgent need therefore for applied researchers and trainers from the region because research needs to inform training. Efforts are being made to ensure funding and other modalities are secured for this.<sup>25</sup> This shortage of personnel in research and training affects the normal running of the Centre. Moreover, the retention rate for the uniformed officers has been low due to other military exigencies.<sup>26</sup> This affects training and delivery as the remaining personnel are forced to undertake more than one task or occupy more than one office. Other challenges as far as staffing include the absence of dedicated police officers and few civilian facilitators working full time for the Centre.<sup>27</sup> The police staffs are brought in from the police department on need basis despite the fact that UN/AU police courses constitute an important programme at HPSS with support from the Nordic countries. The need for more civilians cannot be overemphasized especially now that both training and the actual PSO reflect all the three components working side by side to bring peace and stability to war torn environments.

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<sup>24</sup> Interview with the Chief of Staff Lt Col Jean-Benoit Beaudoux on 4 August 2011 in Karen

<sup>25</sup> Interview with the Director of the Centre Brigadier Robert Kibochi on 28 July 2011 in Karen

<sup>26</sup> Ibid interview with the Director

<sup>27</sup> Interview with the Acting PCSS Commandant Lt Col Kombo on 8 August 2011 in Karen

#### **4.2.5 Peace Operations Planning Course**

The AU has recognized that there is a gap in terms of planning processes that exists from the point at which a conflict situation is brought to the attention of the AU Commission to when detailed plans/guidance are issued to a peacekeeping mission. This gap exists between the political/strategic level and the operational/tactical level.<sup>28</sup> There was therefore a training need to address this shortcoming. Peace operations planning course aims to enhance participants' understanding of strategic/operational level planning processes and to equip them with analytical tools and planning skills to produce an integrated mission plan for an African Union peacekeeping operation. The target audience for this course is comprised of "planning practitioners" who are working with peace and security related organizations in general and "Planning Elements" more specifically. Potential participants should be working in this field on a daily basis and occupy positions as "desk officers" that provide input into the overall planning processes of their respective organizations.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, given the multidimensional planning environment, and effort must be made to have adequate representation from the civilian, military and police components. Examples of potential participants are from six areas: Staff of the African Union Commission; AU strategic planning and management unit for AMISOM; selected members of African regional organizations with portfolios dealing with peace and security within the region; International Organizations (UN, AU) conducting peace operations in the Eastern African Region and individual member states.

The modules covered include introduction to contemporary peace operations, African peace and security architecture, the African standby force – AU concept for peace support

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<sup>28</sup> Interview with the Head of Peace and Security Research Department Lt Col Joyce Sitienei on 29 July 2011 in Karen

<sup>29</sup> Interview with the Acting PCSS Commandant Lt Col Kombo on 8 August 2011 in Karen

operations, conflict analysis and management, integrated peace operations, strategic planning principles and tools, outcomes from Amani Africa, conflict analysis, creative thinking and problem solving, drafting of planning documents and team planning dynamics, types of planning, AU planning and decision making process, exercise brief and strategic assessments and options, brief chairperson on strategic assessment, issue chairperson's planning directive and commissioner's planning guidelines to include briefing on initial draft mission plan, develop initial draft mission plan, brief commissioner on initial draft mission plan, technical assessment mission, issue chairman's report AU mandate (issue mandate), convening the integrated mission planning team, ROE and SOMA. The final learning outcome (participation in the African Union planning process) is reinforced with practical sessions which consist of either role playing exercises, case studies or both. These practical sessions are be built upon a common scenario/case study (Carana exercise scenario) and will follow the planning process from the initial indication of a potential conflict to the drafting of a mission plan and subsequent directive to the Head of Mission.

#### **4.2.6 Protection of Civilians (PoC) Course**

In the contemporary PSO protection of civilians (PoC) has become a critical and sensitive task that is included in the mission mandates from DRC to Darfur. It was against this background that IPSTC developed PoC course to address the gap that was being witnessed in the modern PSO mission. Protection of civilians' course aims to enhance the participant's capacity to plan, implement and assess protection of Civilian activities in peacekeeping operation.<sup>30</sup> The target audience for this course is comprised of middle level "practitioners" who are either working in an existing peacekeeping operations or those earmarked for deployment on a peacekeeping operation (this includes personnel associated with stand-by forces such as EASF or on

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<sup>30</sup> Interview with the training coordinator of PCSS Florence Oduor on 9 August 2011 in Karen

peacekeeping rosters). Potential participants should be decision makers on a daily basis and occupy positions at the “team leader” level (in military terms this would be equivalent to the rank of Lieutenant- Colonel to Colonel). The target audience may be roughly divided into three groups: firstly, team leaders on or earmarked for deployment to a peacekeeping operation. This includes an equitable distribution (based on distribution of positions in the field) between the Civilian, Police, and Military components. (Approximately 70 percent of the participants should be drawn from this group), second, personnel involved in the planning of peacekeeping operations either at the international or national level. (Approximately 20 percent of the participants should be drawn from this group) and lastly, personnel from the “protection cluster” in the various countries with existing peacekeeping operations. (Approximately 10 percent of the participants should be drawn from this group).<sup>31</sup> The learning outcomes of the course aims to enable the participants to understand the origins and current state of PoC concepts, be aware of the legal frameworks associated with PoC activities, recognize the factors affecting the conduct of PoC activities within the context of a peacekeeping mission and be able to conduct the planning, implementation and assessment of PoC activities in a peacekeeping mission. This course is conducted in 10 training days at the Peace and Conflict Studies School. Corresponding to the learning outcomes above, this course is structured such that there are a series of theoretical lessons followed by practical sessions. The theoretical portion of the course may be delivered in standard “lecture” format while for practical sessions more active approaches to learning are employed such as activity based learning .

Lieb argues that adult learners are autonomous and self-directed hence they need to be free to direct themselves; adults have accumulated a foundation of life experiences and

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<sup>31</sup> IPSTC Prospectus 2011 accessed in the centre website [www.ipstc.org](http://www.ipstc.org) on 17 September 2011

knowledge that may include work-related activities, family responsibilities, and previous education hence need to connect learning to this knowledge/experience base; adults are also goal-oriented so upon enrolling in a course, they usually know what goal they want to attain hence they, therefore, appreciate an educational program that is organized and has clearly defined elements; adults are relevancy-oriented so they must see a reason for learning something hence learning has to be applicable to their work or other responsibilities to be of value to them. He adds adults are practical, focusing on the aspects of a lesson most useful to them in their work hence they may not be interested in knowledge for its own sake. As do all learners, adults need to be shown respect. Facilitators must acknowledge the wealth of experiences that adult participants bring to the classroom.<sup>32</sup> The International Peace Support Training Centre aims to ensure that these principles are used in delivering the courses as they deal with participants who are adults and indeed practitioners/managers with divergent views, values, opinions and experiences, varying education and training background and of different ages.<sup>33</sup> However, the centre needs to enhance the use of adult learning techniques and shift from PowerPoint slides for more effective delivery. The practical portion of the course consists of continuous exercise and related case studies. These practical sessions are built upon a common Carana scenario and case studies drawn from regional peacekeeping operations are employed to reinforce the teaching points. The fundamental question is Why PoC? The following quote by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan shows the urgent need for such PoC training "The toll of dead and wounded - particularly among innocent civilians - has risen to levels that can be described, without any exaggeration, as appalling."

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<sup>32</sup> Lieb, S., Principles of Adult Learning, South Mountain community college from Vision, Fall 1991, pp 4

<sup>33</sup> Interview with the Head of Peace and Security Research Department Lt Col Joyce Sitienei on 29 July 2011 in Karen

Some of the modules covered include introduction to contemporary PSO, Africa peace and security architecture, background and objectives of protection of civilians, the emergence of protection agenda and linkage with the responsibility to protect, legal framework or basis to include introduction to the ICRC, international humanitarian law, law of armed conflict, political requirements for PoC, national, regional/international communication, cooperation and coordination, protection mandates, resources for PoC mandates, PoC and concepts of operations, PoC and rules of engagement, PoC and status of forces agreements, code of conduct, refugee law on PoC and human rights law, protecting IDPs, child protection, case studies from UN/AU missions with protection of civilians as a core task such as UNAMID in Darfur and the challenges encountered, adapting PoC activities / actors to different contexts, role of various actors such as the military, police, UN and non UN INGOs and agencies, PoC activities and Carana scenario based group work to come up with a PoC plan.<sup>34</sup> There is a need however for engagement of more subject matter experts especially those who can combine both theory and practice on protection of civilians from various regions and institutions globally to inform this critical and important course in future. This will not only enrich this course but also further the discourse on the effectiveness of the current protection of civilians' mandates and what needs to be improved.

#### **4.2.7 UN/AU Police Course**

The role of the police in contemporary PSO cannot be overemphasized as they are critical to the establishment of the rule of law, training, mentoring and reforming/restructuring the national/local police, assist in DDR and SSR processes, work with national/local police in IDPs camps and depending on the mandate apprehending criminals.<sup>35</sup> This is a two weeks course for

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<sup>34</sup> IPSTC Prospectus 2011 accessed in the centre website [www.ipstc.org](http://www.ipstc.org) on 22 September 2011

<sup>35</sup> Interview with the acting Commandant of HPSS Major Elphaz Kinyua on 2 August 2011 in Embakasi

the police especially before deployment as formed police units or as individual police advisors and covers the following modules: introduction to UN peacekeeping , fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping, working with mission partners, establishment of peacekeeping operation, how UN peacekeeping operation function , mentoring and advising, stress management, first aid, safety and security, community based policing, land navigation, report writing, landmines and unexploded ordinances (UXOs), radio communications and land exercises. Other modules included in this course are hostage experiences and survival, cultural awareness, police and different legal systems and human rights protection, women, peace and security, protection of children, negotiation, mediation and use of language assistants, human rights standards in arrest and detention, human rights standards in use of force and firearms, police reform, restructure and rebuilding, AU history and background, international law in peacekeeping operations, conduct and discipline, case studies especially likely deployment areas, health precaution and HIV-AIDS. The course ends with vehicle handling theory and practical field exercise of four wheel vehicles including driving under all conditions.<sup>36</sup> However, the content covered is quite vast and wide and hence may not be covered adequately in two weeks given the varied training backgrounds, doctrines, and divergent experiences, level of education and language challenges. There may be a requirement therefore to increase the time for training to 3-4 weeks in order to ensure all rounded and well trained police officers who play a vital role in today's UN/AU missions especially in re-establishing and maintaining the rule of law in post conflict settings to ensure sustainable peace.

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<sup>36</sup> IPSTC Prospectus 2011 accessed in the centre website [www.ipstc.org](http://www.ipstc.org) on 9 September 2011

#### **4.2.8 Humanitarian Demining Course**

This is a 7 week intensive course aimed at training humanitarian deminers charged with the responsibility of ensuring that areas especially in conflict zones are mine free for human and animal habitation.<sup>37</sup> The modules include not just theory but intense practical sessions. Some of the modules are Ottawa convention, identification of mined areas and mines found in theatre of operations such as Sudan, introduction to demolitions and explosives safety, demining organization structure, responsibilities and planning, F3 metal detector, humanitarian mine action comprising the 5 pillars and the sequence of a minefield clearance, manual demining drill, minefield markings, first aid aims and principles including practical. Later participants go through task site layout and on-site requirements, the 'tool box' approach to demining (integrated operations) and an overview of various equipments ,their use and capability, deminers tool bag, leadership principles and qualities of a leader, simple and electrical initiation sets, communications and briefing, operations room setup and SOPs, procedure for visit to site by visitors, charge placement, principles and identification of booby traps, tripwire detection and vegetation clearance, information management system for mine action (IMSMA), reports and returns, signal phonetic alphabet, equipment husbandry, battery management and chargers, explosives effects demonstration, use of a prodder and pulling drills, emergency operating procedures (EOPs) including demonstration and practice in the minefield and concludes with actions on finding a mine, UXO or a tripwire. The subsequent weeks have the following modules: levels of demining survey and technical survey procedure, introduction and use of global positioning system (GPS), simple initiation sets, revision, excavation drill, practical minefield clearance/EOPs and explosive storage, transport and handling. This is followed by practical minefield deployment demonstration, troop's deployment into minefield and live full

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<sup>37</sup> Interview with the acting Commandant of HPSS Major Elphaz Kinyua on 2 August 2011 in Embakasi



demolition procedure, defensive position and building clearance, route access both in linear feature and steep gradient/hill clearance, overview of explosive ordinance device (EOD) levels and basic explosive theory, non-electrical firing circuits, electrical firing circuits, battle area clearance lecture and demonstration and large loop detector, battlefield area clearance task deployment, manual demining drills in training minefield including inert confidence charge makeup, charge preparation and safety brief, confidence charges, electrical initiation of charges, identification and charge placement. Finally, the course ends with Exercise 'Hodari Warrior' I and II and exercise de-brief to draw lessons learned. In a nutshell the course focuses on the following key areas of study: demining, land service ammunition, demolition, first aid, mine awareness, signal communication, battle area clearance and practical exercise.

#### **4.3 Conclusion**

The objectives of this study were: to examine the mandate of regional peace support initiatives and to establish the efficacy of regional peace support initiatives in capacity building and the general understanding of the role of regional peace support initiatives in capacity building within the Eastern Africa region. The study interrogated and demonstrated the critical role that IPSTC undertakes in capacity building especially within the Eastern Africa region in preparing and enhancing PSO personnel be they military, police or civilians. The study has also demonstrated that on the basis of liberal theory and thinking, contemporary democracies have reasons to participate in operations with a democratic or humanitarian appeal. Liberal theory also supports the assumption that democracies share an interest in creating economic, political, and security conditions in which peace, prosperity, and democracy can thrive hence engage in peacekeeping intervention. This envisages multidimensional UN rapid reaction capability, which combines military robustness with civilian peacebuilding expertise including sophisticated

conflict resolution capacity. Capacity building initiatives in PSO therefore are still critical even as conflicts in the region from Sudan (Darfur and Abyei), Somalia, Northern Uganda and Ethiopia/Eritrea remained unsolved to date. Underpinning all these is the critical need for capacity building especially the civilian component whose training used to be conducted on ad-hoc basis yet their role especially in post conflict phase cannot be overemphasized. Regional peace support initiatives engaged in capacity building play a crucial role today and in the foreseeable future in a volatile region. The case of the International Peace Support Training Centre serves to show this vital role.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

The history of the United Nations peacekeeping missions spans over six decades after the Second World War and has covered most of the main conflicts from Haiti, the Balkans, Africa, Asia and the Middle East with varying degree of successes. Peacekeeping missions have undergone metamorphosis from the classical or traditional/1<sup>st</sup> generation peacekeeping to the present day complex multidimensional in the third and fourth generation. Classical or traditional peacekeeping generally operated in permissive environments where they had the consent and support of the host Governments for their presence. The nature of peacekeeping operations therefore has evolved rapidly in recent years so has the need for training and education to enhance capacity for the personnel participating in various missions. Modern peacekeeping has had to take unfamiliar roles in prevention United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia (UNPREDEP), intervention in active war zones United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) Liberia, United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR), United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I & II), as well as post-settlement peace building United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). In the same vein over the last two decades, Africa has been bedeviled by numerous intrastate conflicts. The African Union (AU) opted to address this challenge through among other mechanisms, the creation of African Standby Force (ASF) under the overall banner of the African Peace and Security Architecture. The continent was divided into five zones; namely the Southern, Eastern, Central, Northern and Western regions each with a brigade size force (about 3000-4000 and their equipment) ready to intervene when conflicts arise within their areas of

responsibility or jurisdiction. This has called for political and operational strategies and measures to address the challenge that threatened to derail the hopes vested in the new look AU. It is worth noting that the AU in its Constitutive Act Article 4 (h) which states... The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity and Article 4 (j) which states... The right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security, represents a radical shift from the non interference in the internal affairs of Member States that was the backbone of the OAU.

Modern PSOs aim to support parties and comprehensive peace agreements and has complex lines of operation be they political, security, humanitarian and developmental. The contemporary PSOs also integrate of civilian and security tasks under one political command and the persistent concern about people means increasing use of Chap VII (peace enforcement) by the Security Council so as to have mandates that permit the lethal force to protect civilians. They are deployed in the aftermath of serious intrastate conflicts to provide a secure and stable environment and support the establishment of legitimate and effective governance institutions and the rule of law. Indeed, peace support operations are becoming increasingly complex. United Nations or Africa Union missions are being deployed into countries where the national infrastructure has collapsed and where international personnel – military, civilian police, UN civilian staff, UN agencies, international agencies, and non-government organizations – must work closely together in a multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural environment to achieve the overall strategic objective. Traditional peacekeeping aimed at supporting ceasefires and buffer zones by inter-positioning of lightly armed troops or unarmed military observers to basically observe, verify, monitor and report ceasefire violations. There was generally consent from the

main warring parties or factions. They principally addressed interstate conflict. This was meant to act as a confidence building measure and support verification mechanisms in a more static manner. There are a number of cross-cutting issues that have an impact on the implementation of the mandate of a peacekeeping operation. These issues need to be carefully factored into any PSO training as they require action in multiple fields, affect many or all components, and are not the responsibility of any single mission element alone, even if one component is usually in the lead.

In a nutshell modern PSOs are a response to the shift from inter to intra state conflict encompassing complex mandates in volatile, polarized, distressed and dysfunctional environment. Additionally, the new mandates whether in Darfur or DRC include the protection of civilians as a core tasks under Chapter VII of the UN charter. This has meant that there are many lines of operation to achieve the desired strategic objective. These lines of operations each has an end state which should as earlier alluded contribute to the overall desired strategic objective which would be a stable, secure and prosperous country that has all the institutions operationally and where human rights and the rule of law are applied. These lines of operation include economic governance, infrastructural investment, gender, information, child protection, education and health, security sector reforms, civil administration, elections, political, stabilization/security, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, rule of law, capacity building and humanitarian assistance. It involves a wide range of internal and external actors with the primacy of political activity since the whole question demands a political solution but the military and police are in supporting role. There are indeed no purely military solutions. In the multi dimensional peace support operations especially after the collapse of Berlin wall and the rise of unipolar system, the UN and its members grappled with limited peacekeeping budgets,

expressed fears about acquiring new responsibilities, and suffered constraints imposed by security mechanisms that had been improvised for peacekeeping. Yet member states pooled their resources and cobbled together forces under complicated command arrangements to establish multilateral presences in Bosnia, Cambodia, Kosovo, Somalia, Rwanda, the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Haiti and East Timor. Post-conflict peace-building seeks to prevent the resurgence of conflict and to create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies. It is a holistic process involving broad-based inter-agency cooperation across a wide range of issues. It encompasses activities as diverse as traditional peacekeeping and electoral assistance. The modern peace support operations have had to not only address the management of conflicts but efforts has also been made to prevent conflict and post conflict reconstruction to address the root causes of conflict and create meaningful sources of livelihoods for the people. For this to be effective there is need for training and education to enhance capacity building for the various actors and stakeholders. Towards this end therefore, the Centre provides programs that cover post conflict period so critical to ensuring lasting and sustainable peace as it seeks to address the root causes of conflict.

To address several challenges and gaps that were witnessed by the peace support missions especially in the new era (1990s and beyond) there was need to have both pre mission and in mission training streamlined and evaluation undertaken to ensure common level by all the participating contingents be they military, police or civilians. The peacekeeping centers that were already in existence began to reevaluate and restructure their curriculums in line with and in the light of new and complex scenarios that were being witnessed in Sierra Leone and Liberia among other conflicts zones, while new peacekeeping centers mushroomed to meet this challenge. It was critical therefore that all the components meant to undertake or participate in

peace support operation demonstrate an understanding of vital PSOs concepts such as the mandate, key documents such as rules of engagements (ROE), standard operating procedures (SOP), status of force/mission agreement (SOFA/SOMA) and various agreements and protocols. It became mandatory therefore for all civilian, police and military personnel that are likely to work in an UN multidimensional or integrated mission to receive training undertaken at a generic level, specialized training, and mission specific, pre-deployment or in-mission training. It was on this basis that such institutions like the International Peace Support Training Centre began to address the challenge. The development of the PSO village at Embakasi campus has enhanced realism in training. This facility enhances hands on training and allows simulation of all scenarios possible in a PSO environment. It therefore allows for training and assessment of a multidimensional company group (120+ personnel) in practical PSO in order to prepare them to deploy on UN & AU Missions in Darfur, DRC, Somalia or other troubled areas.

The International Peace Support Training Centre offers training and education across the entire conflict spectrum from conflict prevention, conflict management and post conflict peace building. Moreover, the training and education offered by the International Peace Support Training Centre addresses all the three levels from strategic (top), operational (middle) and tactical (bottom). The Strategic level refers to the high level political decision-making and management of a UN peacekeeping operation at UN headquarters while operational levels refers to field-based management of a peacekeeping operation at mission headquarters. The tactical level refers to the management of military, police and civilian operations below the level of mission headquarters, supervision of individual personnel and is exercised at various levels by subordinate commanders of specific components and civilian heads at levels below the Mission headquarters. However, to allow for better coordination, efficiency and effectiveness in peace

support operations' training and education, there may be a need for specialization in certain areas or levels so that other centers within the Eastern Africa region find their own niche leading to better use of the meager resources and wad off unnecessary competition which in the final analysis does not augur well for the region and the continent. One such clear delineation would be to subdivide programmes and courses into levels namely; strategic, operational and tactical so that specialization takes root and encourage regional buy in and ownership thereby leading to exchange of directing staff. Each of these centers within the region brings on board certain comparative advantages based on staff, geography, resources and history. This is an idea that the relevant stakeholders may need to consider even as centers continue to grow and new ones are established.

Peace support operations encompass a multidisciplinary approach which entails addressing not only the symptoms of conflicts, but their underlying causes as well, which were often based on socio-economic problems. These components engaged in PSO therefore need capacity building in terms of training and education to be able to meet the challenges posed by the increasingly complex missions especially within the intrastate conflicts which has become the norm. Institutions such as the International Peace Support Training Centre play a critical role in enhancing capacity for the sub region, region and the continent. Specialization in certain key areas and the whole question of sustainability are critical aspects that may need to be considered as is the issue of regional representation in staffing to ensure ownership and sharing of experiences within an integrated system in Eastern Africa.



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**The following people were interviewed at the International Peace Support Training Centre**

1. The Director of the International Peace Support Training Centre Brigadier R K Kibochi
2. The Acting Commandant of Peace and Conflict Studies School (PCSS) Lieutenant Colonel M K Kombo
3. The Acting Commandant of Humanitarian and Peace Support School (HPSS) Major E M Kinyua
4. The Chief of Staff Lieutenant of International Peace Support Training Centre Colonel J Beaudoux
5. The Head of Peace and Security Research Department Lieutenant Colonel J C Sitienei
6. The Training Coordinator at Peace and Conflict Studies School Ms F Oduor

## **QUESTIONS TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRE**

1. What is your name and title Sir?
2. What is your role at the centre?
3. Why was this centre established and which year?
4. What kind of programmes/courses do you offer?
5. Who are your target audience?
6. How many participants do you train per year on average?
7. Do you have partners?
8. If so who are they?
9. Is the relationship with the partners above formal or done on ad-hoc basis?
10. What makes this centre the 'Centre of Excellence' in your view?
11. Do you interact with un/au missions especially regionally?
12. Do you have regional representation in your staffing?
13. Do you undertake training validation to seek feedback?
14. What factors have contributed to your current status as a leading centre offering PSO training?
15. Do you have any challenges sir? If any please enumerate them?
16. Any there plans for expansion in the future?
17. Thank you Sir and wish you the best in your future plans.

**QUESTIONS TO THE COMMANDANT PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES SCHOOL (PCSS)**

1. What is your name and title Sir?
2. What is your role at PCSS?
3. What kind of programmes/courses do you offer?
4. Who are your target audience?
5. How many participants do you train per year on average?
6. How do you evaluate your courses?
7. How do you ensure gender mainstreaming in your courses in line with UNSC resolution 1325?
8. What gives you the upper edge in pso training?
9. What are the challenges facing your school?
10. How can you overcome these challenges?
11. Sir thank you for your time and good luck in your worthwhile endeavor.

## **QUESTIONS TO THE COMMANDANT HUMANITARIAN AND PEACE SUPPORT SCHOOL (HPSS)**

1. What is your name and title Sir?
2. What is your role at HPSS?
3. What kind of programmes do you offer and what are the main courses under each?
4. Please give a brief description of pre-deployment training including target audience, duration, methodology, brief synopsis, gender ratio and number of participants.
5. Please give a brief description of un/au police training including target audience, duration, methodology, brief synopsis, gender ratio and number of participants.
6. Please give a brief description of mine action and disarmament training including target audience, duration, methodology, brief synopsis, gender ratio and number of participants.
7. How many participants do you train per year on average?
8. How do you evaluate your courses?
9. How do you ensure gender mainstreaming in your courses in line with UNSC resolution 1325?
10. What gives you the upper edge in PSO training?
11. What are the challenges facing your school?
12. How can you overcome these challenges?
13. Sir thank you for your time and good luck in your worthwhile endeavor.

## **QUESTIONS TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF AT IPSTC**

1. What is your name and title Sir?
2. What is your role as the COS?
3. What kind of programmes/courses do you offer?
4. How do you disseminate information to the respective clients and partners? Do you have a communication strategy?
5. Who are your target audience?
6. How many participants do you train per calendar year on average?
7. Do you have partners?
8. If so who are they?
9. Do you interact with UN/AU missions especially regionally?
10. Do you have regional representation in your staffing? If so from where?
11. Do you have international representation in your staffing? If so from where and how many?
12. What are the major challenges facing the centre?
13. How can you overcome these challenges?
14. Sir thank you for your time and good luck in your worthwhile endeavor.



## **QUESTIONS TO THE HEAD OF PEACE AND SECURITY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT**

1. What is your name and title madam?
2. What is your role at the peace and security research department?
3. What the role of the peace and security research department?
4. What is the composition of your staff – national, regional or international?
5. Do you evaluate your courses? If yes at what interval?
6. How do you make use of the feedback in question 5 above?
7. Do you review your curriculum? if so after how long?
8. Do you undertake training validation to seek feedback?
9. What challenges face the research department?
10. How can these challenges be overcome?
11. Madam thank you for your time and good luck in your worthwhile endeavor.

**QUESTIONS TO THE TRAINING COORDINATOR AT PCSS**

1. What is your name and title madam?
2. What is your role at PCSS?
3. What kind of programmes do you offer and what main courses appear under each?
4. Kindly fill the following table:

SERIAL	COURSE	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS	TARGET AUDIENCE	DURATION	BRIEF SYNOPSIS	METHODOLOGY	GENDER RATIO	REMARKS
1	CAPC							
2	POPC							
3	SSR							
5	CIV FOUNDATION							
6	PSO LOGISTIC							
7	RSML							
8	CIMIC							
9	DDR							
10	POC							

5. What are the challenges facing your school in terms of training? How can you overcome these challenges?
6. Have you managed to balance gender in tandem with resolution 1325? What challenges still exist?
7. Madam thank you for your time and good luck in your worthwhile endeavor.