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**// EVALUATION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY ON
COUNTERTERRORISM: THE CASE OF SOMALIA //**

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**A RESEARCH PROPOSAL SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE
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
DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has not been submitted for another Degree in any other University.

Signature  Date..... 7/12/2017

Albert Paul Mbithi

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University Supervisor.

Signature.....  Date..... 07/12/2017

Dr. Martin Atela

DEDICATION

To my late father Albert Sivasi Mutyauvyu and my late mother Rosemary Kathoki Mutyauvyu, you left finger prints of grace in my life. Rest in eternal peace

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My special thanks to God for giving me good health, provision and strength throughout the entire course. I also wish to acknowledge the efforts of my family members especially my wife and children for their moral support and encouragement throughout the entire research period. I also take this opportunity to acknowledge the professional and intellectual support and advice of my supervisor Dr. Martin Atela who guided me in writing this project proposal. Finally, I owe very special thanks to all my M.A. classmates for their encouragement and unflinching support.

List of Abbreviations

AFRICOM- Africa Command

AMISOM- African Union Mission in Somalia

AQ- Al-Qaeda

AQEA- Al-Qaeda East Africa

CJBTF-HOA- Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa

CMO- Civil Military Operations

CT- Counter Terrorism

DOD- Department of Defence

DOS- Department of State

FTO- Foreign Terrorist Organization

HOA- Horn of Africa

ICU- Islamic Courts Union

IR- International Relation

ISIS- Islamic State of Iraq

NGOs- Non-Governmental Organizations

TFG- Transnational Federal Government

USAID- United States Agency for International Development

US- United States

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Abstract

This study explored the United States foreign policy on counterterrorism with a special reference to Somalia and how the interest has affected the Somalia situations. The main objective of this Research Paper was to examine the US counter-terrorism strategy in Somalia. Specifically, the study set out to identify the general actions the US has taken in Somalia and the Greater Horn region in terms of the war on terror; to determine effectiveness of the US counterterrorism policy in the fight against terrorism in Somalia and to investigate alternative approaches of fighting terrorism in Somalia. The study employed qualitative approach and sought to cover the exploratory and descriptive elements of the research process. The first part of the study gives a background of the counterterrorism policy. The second part highlights a brief overview of the history of Somalia together with US involvement in Somalia. In the third part, the paper delves in the analysis of the rise of the War on Terror discourse, the effectiveness and available alternatives to the counterterrorism policy. Lastly, the fourth part of the paper presents a critical analysis of the US counterterrorism policy in Somalia. The findings of the study reveal that the US counterterrorism policy has two distinct approaches, one that is short term and the other long term. The study reveals that in Somalia the US adopted a short term approach that targeted neutralizing terrorist and their sympathizers. It was also revealed that the approach adopted in Somalia is counterproductive and not effective because it enhances the idea that the US is an enemy of Somalia and Islam because of the high number of civilian casualties. The study recommends that alternative approaches of dealing with terrorists in the horn of Africa should be adopted for any sustainable results to be achieved.

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction

This chapter gives a background to the study highlighting the key developments in respect to the US foreign policy in regards to counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa. The chapter also presents the statement of the research problem and the subsequent research question that the study seeks to answer. A thematic literature review in regards of the objectives of the study together with the theory upon which the study will be based is also presented in this chapter.

1.1 Background to the study

In late 2004 a report from the office of the United Nations Secretary General indicated that, terrorism is an act projected to cause death or grave body-harm on civilians or non-combatants with the determination of intimidating a population or coercing the State-government or an international entity to desist or champion from performing any acts or duties.¹ In contemporary times, terrorism is a major risk to societal existence and hence an illegal act under counter terrorism laws of States. Terrorism is also considered a war crime under the laws of war when applied to target non-combatants, such as unprejudiced military personnel or civilians.²The symbolism of terrorism can harness human fear to help achieve certain goals.³

The word "Terrorism" is derived from the French term *terrorisme*, and initially referred to State-terrorism as practiced by the French during the 1793 – 1794 era of terror. The word "*terrorisme*" is a derivative from a Latin verb *terrere* (*e, terreo*) which means "to frighten".⁴ The *Terror Cimbricus* was a state of emergency and panic in Rome, this was a result of the actions of the warriors of the Cimbri tribe in 105 BC that the Jacobins cited as a precedent

¹ UN 2017,

² Ibid

³ Ruby, "The Definition of Terrorism," 2002

⁴ Campbell, 2001.

when imposing an era of terror during the French Revolution. After the Jacobins lost power, the word "terrorist" became a term of abuse.⁵

The Horn of Africa (HOA) has born the greatest brunt of terrorism, the region is in fact considered one of the terror prone region of the world. It is affected by the scourges of chronic political instability, a massive influx of refugees and domestic displaced persons, clandestine migration, humanitarian crisis, and maritime insecurity. All these factors have undermined peace and security in the region, a weakness that terrorist organizations have exploited. Pressures to decisively address these threats are testing the limits of national capabilities and resilience. The State is often incapable to meet the elementary needs of local communities, and additionally the secondary needs complicated by political dynamics and instability.

The Somali tragedy lies at the heart of developments with internal governance systems. 1991 marked the start of an endless murderous civil war, paving way for the emergence of contemporary terrorists. Terror in Somalia have been continually featured in international headlines since the past two decades: *firstly as State terror*, during the civil war that featured clan warfare and humanitarian catastrophe; *secondly as domestic terror*, featured by the failure of the State to prevent the State's geographical boundaries from becoming a terror breeding site and a safe haven terrorists; *and lastly as international terror*, where coordinated attacks can be launched from, as evident in the 1998 US embassy bombing and the subsequent attacks on the Kenyan soil.⁶

Terrorism remained an overseas issue among the US public until the 9/11 attack. Soon after the attack, the US refocused both its national and foreign policy on countering terrorism. The war on terror policy renewed interest from US for countries that it had ignored including the Horn of Africa particularly Somalia. Somalia was particularly the focus because it has been

⁵ Nunberg, 2001.

⁶ Thomson, 2006.

stateless for over ten years yet it is known that fragmented countries are breeding grounds for terrorism.⁷

The United States has historically engaged with the Horn of Africa though in a minor way.⁸ The events of 9/11 drastically changed the way the US engages with the Horn of Africa; the US declaration on the fight against terrorism brought the Horn of Africa to the fore. It was generally believed that weak and failed states like Somalia were home to terrorists.⁹ Earlier on, the US policy to the Horn was more of humanitarian and developmental but from the 9/11 events, the policy towards the region became Counterterrorism. The aim of the Counterterrorism was to prevent the spread of extremism and bring stability to the Horn, albeit with contrast of some of the United States principles such as “human rights and democracy practices”, something that has attracted criticisms with accusations of abandonment of for the spread of diplomacy and good governance.¹⁰

The Horn of Africa is faced with a number of challenges including civil strife, poverty, and famine. Insecurity occasioned by the presence of terrorists exacerbates an already bad situation, the US focus on security would thus not only benefit the US but the Horn of Africa as well. While the security policy takes centre stage, the development agenda is still a focus for the US championed by USAID. It is without a doubt that the US grapples with balancing between achieving Washington’s security interests and promoting the developmental needs of the region.¹¹

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Schraeder, 2010

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Hills, (2006)

¹¹ Ibid

1.2 Problem statement

After George W. Bush, President Obama portrayed himself as an antidote to President Bush's War on terror.¹² It is not clear what the change in the narrative during President Obama's reign influenced the foreign policy on the ground. This study aims at analysing how using or not using the term 'War on Terror' in foreign policy discourse actually impact US actions and behaviour in foreign policy in Somalia. While the War on Terror discourse and its impact on both US foreign policy has attracted much attention, less attention has been given to the foreign policy of the US in Somalia, particularly the impact of the War on Terror discourse on U.S foreign policy in Somalia. The study seeks to fill the gap by exploring the US foreign policy on the Horn of Africa with a bias to counterterrorism in Somalia.

1.3 Research questions

- i. What is the general actions the US has taken in Somalia and the Greater Horn region in terms of the war on terror
- ii. How effective is the US counterterrorism policy in the fight against terrorism in Somalia
- iii. What are the available alternative approaches of fighting terrorism in Somalia

1.4 Objective of the study

The general objective of this study is to examine the US counter-terrorism strategy in Somalia.

1.4.1 Specific objective

- i. To identify the general actions the US has taken in Somalia and the Greater Horn region in terms of the war on terror.
- ii. To determine effectiveness of the US counterterrorism policy in the fight against terrorism in Somalia.

¹²Indyk, & O'Hanlon, 2012

iii. To investigate alternative approaches of fighting terrorism in Somalia.

1.5 Literature review

1.5.1 *Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda*

Al-Shabaab's associations with Al-Qaeda administration were firm from the begin of the association, prompting their assignment as a Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) in 2008. A few of Al-Shabaab's establishing individuals set out to Afghanistan amid the Soviet mediation, and were very essential for the future Al-Shabaab. These early pioneers were ordinarily alluded to as the "Afghanistan veterans." Al-Shabaab's first Emir, Aden Ayro went by Afghanistan in 1998 and met with Osama Bin Laden, and turned out to be profoundly appreciated among more established Somali Afghan veterans.

Al-Qaeda East Africa assumed an imperative part in the ascendance of Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab's insurance of the AQEA pioneers, who took an interest in the 1998 Embassy bombings, were fundamental for Al-Shabaab's initial development as another jihadist arrange. Al-Shabaab increased various advantages from shielding AQEA pioneers. While Al-Qaeda focal regulated Al-Shabaab's belief system, AQEA assumed an imperative operational part, directing sizeable local army contingents and ascending to senior positions inside the gathering. Hansen contends that AQEA were exceedingly regarded by Al-Shabaab and worked as casual leaders.¹³ Al-Qaeda East Africa pioneers held high-positioning positions in Al-Shabaab in the wake of setting up an impressive battling notoriety, and were given vast local armies to order.¹⁴

Al-Qaeda led the pack in preparing Al-Shabaab contenders, and people like AQEA pioneer Saleh Nabhan drove the improvement of strategies.¹⁵ The cluster got specialized preparing in bomb making, building up preparing camps and boosting global enrolling, particularly

¹³ Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia*, 28.

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Ibid

online.¹⁶ At last, the experience diffused to Al-Shabaab's leaders in directing prominent, complex assaults, surreptitious operations, and dodging security powers for long stretches can't be downplayed. In any case, AQEA authority confronted various challenges in Somalia: steady man chasing by both interior and outer security powers, the antagonistic vibe toward nonnatives and a xenophobic culture addresses how well Al-Shabaab esteemed Al-Qaeda's help, particularly right off the bat in its development. Al-Shabaab's formal merger with Al-Qaeda in 2012 everything except ensured the United States would keep on targeting Al-Shabaab in Somalia.¹⁷

1.5.2 The Terror Threat from Al-Shabaab

The many challenges (unguarded coastline and porous borders, historical ineffective government, lack of judicial institutions and law enforcement) that Somalia faces has encouraged impunity in the country.¹⁸ Somalia's proximity to Yemen has seen it serve as a pathway from the Middle East to Africa. As a result, the country has become a refuge for transnational terrorists and has provided an accommodating environment for extremist groups, such as al-Shabaab and East Africa al-Qaeda.¹⁹ Concerns over encroachment of terrorists have been raised over the region.²⁰ The lawlessness of Somalia makes it conducive for the operations of Al-Qaeda. Declassified internal documents of Al-Qaeda reveal that it had interest in Somalia as a possible alternate base of operations to Afghanistan.²¹

While Al-Qaeda had interest in Somalia, it used Kenya as an operation base and Somalia as a trans-shipment point into the region.²² The 2006 Ethiopia intervention in Somalia to oust ICU, Al-Shabaab mobilised and received support and consequently declared allegiance to al-

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Scahill, 2011

¹⁸ Cohn, 2006

¹⁹ Ploch, 2010

²⁰ United Kingdom, MI5 Security Service, 2010.

²¹ Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,

²² Ibid

Qaeda and avowed devotion to al-Qaeda-inspired global jihad against infidels and apostate Muslims.²³

Al-Shabaab today is a mixture of locally-focused Islamist militants and a transnational affiliate of al-Qaeda, with leadership from across clans centralized under a group of radical foreign operatives.²⁴ It has both political and military aims, with a vision of transcending clans to establish a unified Somalia (including the Somali-inhabited areas in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti) under a single Islamic caliphate.²⁵ Al-Shabaab's main sources of income are taxes and extortion on business revenues in areas it controls: commerce, trade and contraband; diaspora support; and external assistance. Its military methods are guerrillawarfare techniques, such as hit-and-run assaults and assassinations, along with adopted terrorist tactics of urban warfare, such as suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices, against the TFG and AMISOM forces.²⁶

Al-Shabaab's main driver is focused on issues around identity, existential threat, perceived humiliation, cultural domination and oppression rather than poverty. The group exploits individuals' sense of humiliation and victimization and the disenfranchisement of people to recruit and obtain support.²⁷ The degree one driver has had influence over the other is and can only be explained by the 'greed versus grievance' debate.²⁸ As of April 2013, Al-Shabaab had been pushed back militarily and weakened by unpopularity and internal strife.²⁹ It has been severely marginalized and has failed to meet its declared objectives.³⁰ In October 2012, it lost the important port city of Kismayo.³¹ As more time passed, the more the contradictions from within Al-Shabaab became self defeating. However, despite Somalia's increasing

²³Library of Congress Federal Research Division, Apr 2012

²⁴CTC.

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶United Nations, 2011

²⁷Ploch,.

²⁸ Collier and AnkeHoeffler, 2000.

²⁹Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2013.

³⁰ Gettleman, 2011

³¹Daveed Gartenstein and Albon, 2012.

stability and Al-Shabaab's marginalization, Al-Shabaab has proven resilient in the past and has the potential for regrouping. This is especially true if the Somali population unifies against another foreign military incursion or becomes tired of outside intervention.³² Islamist extremist and Al-Shabaab can be considered threats in three different ways; the first relates to the Western trained radicalised Somalis that can launch attack in Western countries³³, the second relates to the effect of encroachment of Islamist extremist in Somalia to its neighbouring countries, thirdly, is the transformation of Al-Shabaab held areas into safe havens for jihadists, from where they can plan and execute their agenda.³⁴

Considering the seriousness of these threats it is the interest of the US to attack the terrorists in their safe havens.³⁵ The US strategic policy has thus put emphasis on countering the terrorists by preventing Somalia from becoming safer for terrorists groups.³⁶ Al-Shabaab represent a huge terrorist danger to US interests in East Africa. Al-Shabaab likewise has an authentic capacity and readiness to direct deadly operations outside of Somalia.³⁷ The Director of National Intelligence considered that as Al-Qaeda's center initiative loses impact, territorial members like Al-Shabaab will drive the worldwide plan. Because of proceeded with military weight initiative focusing on and AMISOM offensives, Al-Shabaab was compelled to change its technique. After the fizzled hostile in late 2010, Al-Shabaab was not any more ready to challenge government powers through regular fighting. Thus, Al-Shabaab has moved its concentration to destabilizing the focal government and AMISOM through guerrilla strategies, for example, deaths, ambushes and roadside bombs. Also, since its formal merger with Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab has concentrated on seeking after its worldwide jihadist plan and has moved its assaults to concentrate on "delicate" focuses outside of Somalia.

³²Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2013

³³LoC, 'Somalia's Al-Shabaab: A Profile,' p 67.

³⁴ Ibid

³⁵Ploch,

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ Jones, 2013

Prominent assaults in Uganda, Kenya, and Djibouti additionally show its capacity to design, sort out, and send out fear mongering, a tribute to its strength against initiative focusing on.

Al-Shabaab's administration has additionally cautioned of fear based oppressor assaults on remote targets, including American Embassies and representative focuses in the United States. Al-Shabaab's promulgation arm, Al-Kataib, impacts Western jihadists thoughtful to its motivation and skilfully controls the revealing of gathering's activities toward the Western world.³⁸ Al-Shabaab has additionally capitalised on Anwar al-Awlaqi's compelling sermons went for Western groups of onlookers and Americans like Omar Hammami, who turned into a vital military administrator in Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab draws initiates from American urban communities and since 2007, no less than 40 Somali Americans have battled in Somalia in help of Al-Shabaab, driving other outside contenders and conferring suicide assaults.³⁹

As Al-Qaeda's impact has decreased over the Middle East, ISIS has influenced suggestions to Al-To shabaab to join its positions. Along these lines, far, Al-Shabaab's administration is separated on whether to keep up its long-standing ties with Al-Qaeda or to take after Boko Haram as ISIS' most recent operation.⁴⁰ A partnership with ISIS could additionally raise the profile of the gathering and gave distressfully required money related help to Al-Shabaab. A merger would likewise extend the scope and impact of ISIS and may give a conductor to a convergence of remote contenders into Africa. While Al-Shabaab presently can't seem to execute assaults in the United States, the gathering has shown its capacity to finish its dangers to assault its adversaries. Proclaiming its steadfastness with ISIS may give them a more noteworthy chance to do as such. The presence of Al-Shabaab in Somalia is thus indeed a

³⁸ Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2012

³⁹ Jaffe, "Obama Team Mulls Aims."

⁴⁰ Callimachi, 2015

threat to US and the US is right in rethinking its policy towards the region and Somalia in particular, the US initiated a 3D approach in addressing the Somalia issue.

1.5.3 U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

Al-Qaeda was the biggest counterterrorism danger the US looked in 2011 when the Strategy was composed. The gathering represented a risk from everywhere throughout the world including South Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, Europe, Iraq, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia, which made these districts the Strategy's territories of core interest. The Strategy clarifies the US is at war with Al-Qaeda; be that as it may, the US isn't at war with Islam.⁴¹ The latter distinction is contrary to the basic expression, 'war on dread'.

There are many apparatuses the US needs to counter psychological oppression. The Strategy likewise lays out the different vital devices for this reason. The military, regular citizens and center esteems will be supplemented by improvement, strategy, the energy of the private division and key correspondences. This multinational and multi-departmental exertion enables the US to take part in a managed, wide and incorporated crusade.⁴² A standout amongst the most imperative parts of the Strategy is the command to dependably be in accordance with the US fundamental values . The counterterrorism strategy specific in the Somalia case is the 3D approach that saw the US suspend the normal politics and focus on the threat posed by the terrorist in Somalia.

1.5.4 The 3D Approach and the US policy

US terrorism experiences in the horn of Africa (HOA) including US embassies bombing in Kenya and Tanzania, fatalities of US peacekeeping forces in Somali in 1993, World Trade Center and Pentagon attack among others necessitated implementation of a range of programs by the US to counter terrorism, and to enhance for its citizen.

⁴¹ Thompson, 2006.

⁴² Ibid

The US policy in the HOA is provision of regional stability and reduction violent conflict, with different agencies of the US government employing a different approach reflecting their respective mandates. The DoS,⁴³ United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Defence (DoD),⁴⁴ along with a myriad of other agencies, comprise the complex and comprehensive efforts in the HOA. When integrated into a 3D Diplomatic, Development, and Defence approach, these specific objectives are meant to provide peace and stability. For the purposes of this analysis, 'peace and stability' is defined as: increased security; decreased recruitment of susceptible people and reduced violent conflict by extremist groups; an effective form of governance by way of a capable, transparent, and accountable government; steady tax revenue; and the creation of sustainable job opportunities.

The Western approach to achieving peace and stability in the greater HOA area has been to have one of its main members, Somalia, go from a fragile to stable state. A stable state with functional governance and reasonable security attracts investment from the diaspora and international donors, furthering regional stability and peace. To achieve the intended outcome, the 2010 US National Security Strategy labelled the use of a 3D approach a 'new and more effective means of applying the skills of our military, diplomats, and development experts.'⁴⁵

1.5.6 The US strategic interest

Somalia has never been of primary strategic importance for the US, but it has been on Washington's agenda for many years, mainly for negative reasons: armed conflict, instability, famine, drought, population displacement, piracy, and terrorism.⁴⁶ Overall, US

⁴³Testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa from the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, *DISAM Journal*, Sept 2008, p. 62.

⁴⁴ Losey, '2011

⁴⁵United States National Security Strategy, May 2010

⁴⁶Horn of Africa Steering Committee, 2011.

strategic interest in the continent of Africa includes five main factors: 'oil, global trade, armed conflict, terror, and HIV/AIDS.'⁴⁷

Africa has come to equal the Middle East in exports of crude oil to the United States,⁴⁸ and since 1990, trade between the United States and Africa has tripled.⁴⁹ In order to protect this increased trade, maritime operations in the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea continually protected shipping routes.⁵⁰ The HOA's position at the southwestern flank of the Red Sea gives it particular regional strategic importance.

Since 2001, US policy in the HOA has been dominated by counterterrorism.⁵¹ To render environments inhospitable to terrorist networks, the US merged the capabilities and capacities of DoS, USAID, and numerous agencies in Washington with those of agencies on the ground. This included the US embassies in Eastern Africa, the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), partner nations, NGOs, international organizations, and Muslim communities. Although US strategic interests, such as oil and trade, serve as catalysts for integration, the pressing counterterrorism focus has made Africa Command (AFRICOM) and CJTF-HOA the prominent implementers of US African policy.

1.5.7 AFRICOM & CJTF-HOA Policy and Actions

Prior to AFRICOM, three regional commands – the US European Command, the US Central Command, and the US Pacific Command – dealt with military involvement on the continent of Africa, which resulted in coordination challenges and a non-unified defence strategy.⁵² The AFRICOM mission required a break from conventional doctrinal mentalities within the military as well as in government agencies, notably DoS and USAID.

⁴⁷ Ploch, 2011

⁴⁸ Ibid

⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵¹ Department of Defense Joint Publication, 2009

⁵² Ibid

Military experts had expressed their belief that no African nation posed a direct threat to the US, so AFRICOM did not have to prepare US forces for major combat on the African continent.⁵³ The DoD's focus was on preventing wars, rather than fighting them, through training and assisting local militaries, so that they would ensure stability and security.⁵⁴ The command was a pioneer of sorts, with a new approach for future conflict prevention that decreased the focus on warfighting and increased civilian presence and coordination within the command. AFRICOM saw its role as supporting and enabling through partnerships where it contextually fit the African construct, especially through building the capacity of partner militaries, like AMISOM, to provide greater security and greater stability.⁵⁵

CJTF-HOA was established in October 2002, and moved ashore to Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, in May 2003. It is the only US military enduring base in Africa and therefore leads the military efforts in the HOA. CJTF-HOA was created to defeat violent extremist organizations that posed a threat to the United States and its interests in the region.⁵⁶ This mission expanded in 2006 with more humanitarian tasks, development projects, and partner nation military training, as its strategy grew to encompass more conflict prevention. The CJTF-HOA approach is a self-proclaimed indirect one, achieved by enabling partner nations' militaries and regional security organizations to address East African issues.⁵⁷

In a broader context, there are two centers of gravity that the military tries to address. In military parlance, a center of gravity is 'the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.'⁵⁸ These centers of gravity are the principal obstacles in the way of the US accomplishing its military mission. The first center of gravity is the local military capacity, which needs building; the second is the population, which is

⁵³AFRICOM

⁵⁴Ploch,

⁵⁵ Ibid

⁵⁶ Ibid

⁵⁷Losey,

⁵⁸Department of Defense Joint Publication 2010.

vulnerable to drivers of violent extremism.⁵⁹ CJTF-HOA conducts a range of engagements that fall under five broad lines of operation to address these two centers of gravity. The lines of operation are military-to-military training, civil-military operations (CMO), strategic communication, functional engagements, and key leader engagements. A sixth, and less-touted, line of operation is the effort to kill and capture al-Qaeda key leaders.⁶⁰

Military-to-military training focuses on building military capacity by improving soldiering skills used for regional security operations, like the skills of AMISOM soldiers. The US has 'provided logistics support, equipment, and pre-deployment training for AMISOM troop contributors at the request of the African Union since 2007 totalling to an estimated \$230 million [for the first four years]'.⁶¹ Significantly, the CJTF-HOA trainers provide an example of military professionalism and obedience to the civil mandate, which is inherent in Western militaries and taken for granted by Western nations. This follows the US government's belief that the 'development of capable and professional security forces, entities under civilian control that respect the rule of law and human rights,' is what contributes to peace and security in Africa.⁶²

CMO focus on meeting basic human needs and providing essential services, in order to build trust with vulnerable populations and mitigate their susceptibility to extremist groups and ideologies. The focus is on low-cost, smaller assistance projects, such as infrastructure and essential services development, medical and veterinary civic action programs, and agriculture engagements.⁶³ The US military showing care and concern to vulnerable populations, meeting basic human needs, and understanding what is happening in the environment, especially when done with partner militaries, is a very visible way to extend the Somali government's concern to the people and a major component of the counterradicalization

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ Losey.

⁶¹ Ploch, 4.

⁶² Ibid

⁶³ Losey.

effort.⁶⁴ CMO follow an arc shape that roughly mirrors the Somali border area, extending from the coast of Tanzania across Eastern Kenya, Ethiopia, and the north of Djibouti. ⁶⁵ CJTF-HOA chose the areas for CMO based on the areas' susceptibility to violent extremist influence.⁶⁶

Historically, one of America's most effective weapons of outreach and persuasion has been public diplomacy. Such strategic communication enhances CMO by generating understanding and support of activities; it 'seeks to influence the attitudes and perceptions of foreign populations in support of US policies and interests.'⁶⁷ It also aims to counter the victimization narrative used by al-Shabaab to recruit. Functional engagements include military-to-military engagements in such areas as law, intelligence, logistics, public affairs, and communication systems. These engagements build specific and more intricate capacities in partner militaries. Key leader engagements occur between the CJTF-HOA decision makers and partner nations' militaries, governments, and religious organizations, in order to foster personal relationships and provide opportunities for future cooperation. This provides the US a better understanding of different perspectives and improves the dialogue between the US and differing agents.

The last line of operation is that of counterterrorism using 'direct action,' a military term describing efforts to capture and kill Islamist militant leaders and high-value individuals. Though not necessarily part of CJTF-HOA's current mission statement, the US Special Forces conducting this line of engagement operate out of the CJTF-HOA base in Djibouti. In an Army Times series titled "The Secret War: How US hunted Al-Qaeda in Africa," Naylor exposed covert and clandestine US military activity in the Horn of Africa after the 9/11 attacks. Naylor's source materials included numerous US diplomatic cables leaked through

⁶⁴Ibid

⁶⁵ Ibid

⁶⁶ Ibid

⁶⁷Ploch.

Wikileaks as well as interviews with current and former diplomatic and military leaders and special operators.⁶⁸ According to the article, CJTF-HOA had the important mission of not allowing al-Qaeda to open a third front, separate from the already existing fronts in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁶⁹ CJTF-HOA was to conduct this sensitive mission through engaging the various countries in the HOA, partnering with them, having them perform the kill/capture mission, and preventing the next round of major attacks against the US.⁷⁰ The kill/capture mission, however, was erroneously given the headline of US policy in the HOA, thus shaping anecdotally the Somali narrative of US disregard for Somali rights.

1.6 Theoretical framework

1.6.1 Constructivism theory

The study will be guided by the constructivism theory, constructivism theory relates to the role of collective human consciousness – the role of ideas in IR. It seeks to understand international activity in terms of interaction of actors and intangible ideational structures (group norms in particular). This can be identified as an offshoot of Idealism, stating the collective efforts against Terrorism. The term Constructivism was coined by Nicholas Onuf, to describe the socially constructed characters in IR.⁷¹ This theory was later expanded by Alexander Wendt in his 1992 article: *Anarchy is what states make of it*.⁷² Since 11/9/2001 attacks in the US, traditional IR scholars have been finding it difficult to understand acts of terror. Constructivist theories help to analyse how identities and interests can change overtime, furthermore Constructivism is essential in understanding the ever changing state responses to VE. It further emphasizes the importance of understanding culture, identity,

⁶⁸ Naylor, 2011.

⁶⁹ Ibid

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ Schild, 2011.

⁷²Wendt, 1992.

religion and ideas through IR theories.⁷³The challenge of traditional IR theories in predictions of the post-cold-war craved a spot for the emergence of Constructivism in order to fill such gap. Constructivism is identified as the social theory of International Politics. According to Alexander Wendt, identities expresses who or what actors are and how they have developed, been sustained or have transformed, although interests refer to what actors want and interactions shows the true identities.⁷⁴

More often than not, acts of terror by terrorists were perceived as war against the West due to their militaristic response to terrorism. Terrorism looked at as both a war and a crime. Terrorists use the basic tenets of constructivism such as ideas, identities and norms. For example, Al-Qaeda seeks to promote an Islamic identity, define the interest of all Muslims as necessarily being in confrontation with the West. Here, ideas matter and persuasion is key. The failure of rationalists to understand Constructivists orientation of terrorism led to state-centric policies on War on Terror.⁷⁵

1.7 Methodology

1.7.1 Research Design

The proposed study will use a mixed research methods approach where it will use both primary and secondary data.

1.7.2 Methods of Data Collection Primary data

Primary data will be collected through structured interviews with knowledgeable persons and technocrats from the concerned departments of US embassy in Kenya. The US government largely depends on its officials at the Kenyan embassy to gather intelligence related to terror

⁷³Ibid

⁷⁴Wendt, 1987

⁷⁵ Ibid

activities in Somalia. The embassy officials will be interviewed on the mechanisms put in place for CT as well as on how effective these mechanisms have been.

Secondary data will be drawn from existing literature on U.S foreign policy and the War on Terror discourse, U.S policy documents and speeches from U.S officials in line with the research questions of this study.

1.7.3 Data analysis

Discourse analysis will be employed in this study, the methodology is deemed appropriate because it is assumed that foreign policies rely upon representations and that these representations are articulated in language. Consequently, this leads to a concern with public texts. For this study, both speeches as well as official U.S policy documents will be researched. Speeches from former U.S president George W. Bush, President Obama and other government officials will be included. With regard to U.S policy documents, the U.S has released several documents between 2001 and 2016, which will be introduced and discussed in this study.

1.7.4 Research Ethics

Considerations like professional practice – like ensuring data validity and research instruments reliability, and research ethics will be adhered to by the researcher. The study will observe confidentiality, non-forceful respondent compliance and consent of the respondent. Research approval will be obtained from the University of Nairobi (UoN).

1.8 Chapter outline

Chapter two will highlight a brief overview of the history of Somalia together with US involvement in Somalia

Chapter three will delve in the rise of the War on Terror discourse, the effectiveness and available alternatives to the counterterrorism policy

Chapter four will be an analysis of the war on terror in Somalia

Chapter five will have conclusion of the study

CHAPTER TWO

WAR ON TERROR IN SOMALIA AND THE GREATER HORN REGION

2.0 Introduction

The Horn of Africa does not rhyme with improvement, riches, or peace. Ethiopia is right now gaining quantifiable ground due to its harsh government. Somalia has turned into a run-off-the-process contextual investigation for each potential fizzled state on the planet and is at present more surrendered than any time in recent memory by the universal group. In Eritrea, a huge number of transients are getting away from a merciless tyranny; while Kenya, a relative example of overcoming adversity, has been doing its best to battle psychological oppression. It now turns into an inquiry by savants, regardless of whether these nations are viably endeavouring to battle fear mongering and uphold human rights by all methods conceivable, or their administrations are presently exploiting these local difficulties and provincial clashes for their own political advantage.

In reality, the locale has encountered proceeded and wrecking intra-and between state clashes, prompting shakiness, political confinement and destitution. This makes it helpless against psychological oppressor abuse. Psychological oppression in the HOA is an entangled issue requiring an expansive and proceeded with approach for an answer. Basic information about fear based oppressor's inspirations and targets are essential as it illuminates the premise of counterterror operations. The Al-Shabaab aims to assume control over the administration and organization of Somalia and furthermore replaces the current metro law with strict Islamic laws.

In accordance with the first of goal of this examination, this part begins by catching a review of the moves the US has made in the Greater Horn of Africa in tending to fear based oppression. From that point, it fundamentally looks at the Counter Terrorism instruments in the Somalia.

The Somali tragedy lies at the heart of developments with internal governance systems. 1991 marked the start of an endless murderous civil war, paving way for the emergence of contemporary terrorists. Terror in Somalia have been continually featured in international headlines since the past two decades: *firstly as State terror*, during the civil war that featured clan warfare and humanitarian catastrophe; *secondly as domestic terror*, featured by the failure of the State to prevent the State's geographical boundaries from becoming a terror breeding site and a safe haven terrorists; *and lastly as international terror*, where coordinated attacks can be launched from, as evident in the 1998 US embassy bombing and the subsequent attacks on the Kenyan soil.⁷⁶

Terrorism remained an overseas issue among the US public until the 9/11 attack. Soon after the attack, the US refocused both its national and foreign policy on countering terrorism. The war on terror policy renewed interest from US for countries that it had ignored including the Horn of Africa particularly Somalia. Somalia was particularly the focus because it has been stateless for over ten years yet it is known that fragmented countries are breeding grounds for terrorism.⁷⁷

The United States has historically engaged with the Horn of Africa though in a minor way.⁷⁸ The events of 9/11 drastically changed the way the US engages with the Horn of Africa; the US declaration on the fight against terrorism brought the Horn of Africa to the fore. It was generally believed that weak and failed states like Somalia were home to terrorists.⁷⁹ Earlier on, the US policy to the Horn was more of humanitarian and developmental but from the 9/11 events, the policy towards the region became Counterterrorism. The aim of the Counterterrorism was to prevent the spread of extremism and bring stability to the Horn, albeit with contrast of some of the United States principles such as "human rights and

⁷⁶ Thomson, 2006.

⁷⁷ Ibid

⁷⁸ Schraeder, 2010

⁷⁹ Ibid

democracy practices”, something that has attracted criticisms with accusations of abandonment of for the spread of diplomacy and good governance.⁸⁰

The Horn of Africa is faced with a number of challenges including civil strife, poverty, and famine. Insecurity occasioned by the presence of terrorists exacerbates an already bad situation, the US focus on security would thus not only benefit the US but the Horn of Africa as well. While the security policy takes centre stage, the development agenda is still a focus for the US championed by USAID. It is without a doubt that the US grapples with balancing between achieving Washington’s security interests and promoting the developmental needs of the region.⁸¹

2.1The US War on Terror in the Greater Horn Region

After the 2001 terror attacks in the US, a war on terror was announced by President George Bush junior. The US gave an endeavour that the nation would not yield on the War on Terror until the point that all fear based oppressor bunches are vanquished. The US additionally dedicated to utilize assets inside their charge towards the battle against worldwide dread system.⁸²

Notwithstanding considering the US convention of announcing "wars" against such wonders as medications, wrongdoing, premature birth, and even stoutness, to pronounce war is as yet something extraordinary.⁸³ It implies that "the gloves fall off" and that typical guidelines and behavioural requirements never again apply. It subsequently meets the criteria of "securitisation"— a term imagined by Ole Wæver for the "discourse demonstration" of digressively building an issue as being of existential significance and outrageous direness, consequently justifying a turn to "exceptional measures." It has in this way served to true blue a decrease of common freedoms in the nations of the West and somewhere else for the sake

⁸⁰ Hills, (2006)

⁸¹ Ibid

⁸² Bush, 2001.

⁸³ Brien, 1998

of national security against fear based oppression, yet it has additionally served to genuine military activities.

The central command of CJTF-HOA central command is located at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. It operates in Kenya, Eritrea, Seychelles, Djibouti, Sudan, Ethiopia and Yemen. The central goal is portrayed as ... operations and preparing to help have countries to battle fear mongering to build up a safe domain and empower provincial steadiness. The mission is centered around distinguishing, disturbing and eventually overcoming transnational psychological oppressor bunches working in the locale—denying places of refuge, outer help and material help for fear monger action. CJTF-HOA counters the re-development of transnational fear mongering in the area through common military operations and support of non-administrative association operations, improving the long term strength of the locale.

The exercises it records on its site are for the most part non-military personnel, for example, "giving clean water, practical schools, enhanced roadways and enhanced medicinal offices," i.e. it depicts itself as gave to "winning hearts and psyches" errands. Other than this, be that as it may, it has additionally been engaged with military operations.

Indeed, even before these new activities, be that as it may, fear mongering had affected the US arrangement towards the Horn of Africa; particularly based on Sudan's worries. Under the protection of its "rogue states" ⁸⁴ teaching the US had watched out for particularly Sudan due to its Islamist administration and assumed connections with universal fear based oppression. ⁸⁵

Following the 1998 terror attack on the US embassy in Dar es Salam and Nairobi,⁸⁶ rocket assaults were even propelled by the US against a the a-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan,

⁸⁴ Klare, 1995

⁸⁵ Kushner, 1998

⁸⁶Champagne, 2005

affirmed to be a secretive generation site for substance weapons (counting the feared VX specialist)— a misstep which was later (practically) conceded.⁸⁷ In the wake of 11 September, Sudan vowed its help for the US.⁸⁸ It has not yet, be that as it may, figured out how to be stricken from the US rundown of "state patrons of fear mongering," despite the fact that in the latest issue of the US State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism it is depicted as nothing not as much as "a solid accomplice in the War on Terror" which "forcefully sought after psychological oppressor operations straightforwardly including dangers to U.S. interests and staff in Sudan."⁸⁹

2.2 Terrorism in the HoA

The HoA has been claimed to be a safe haven for terrorists.⁹⁰ The contentions for this view differ: Some assert that it is the states shortcoming in the locale that makes them vulnerable to psychological warfare and that, a fortiori, fallen states, for example, Somalia will fill in as arranging territories, concealing spots or operational bases for fear monger assaults.⁹¹ Others contend that radical adaptations of Islam are making progress in the sub region, having been established in Sudan and now moving likewise to Kenya and Somalia, and this is probably going to deliver more jihadist psychological oppression.⁹²

Nonetheless, the accessible factual information doesn't appear to truly bolster the scaremonger perspective of the danger.⁹³ As per the "Fear based oppression Knowledge Base," which is the legitimate database in any event by the record of the office in the US in charge of Counterterrorism which has set the focus on East Africa uncover that psychological militants occurrences in the HoA isn't disturbing.⁹⁴ 1998 according to the database is the

⁸⁷Daniel & Simon, 2002

⁸⁸ Ibid

⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁰ Morrison, 2002

⁹¹ Takeyh, & Gvosdev, 2002

⁹² 2 Rosenau, 2005

⁹³ Ibid

⁹⁴ MPIT

beginning year, for the straightforward reason this was the main year with information for both global and household fear based oppression. In any case, 1998 was unique in view of two practically synchronous occurrences, i.e. the previously mentioned assaults on the USA international safe havens in Kenya and Tanzania on the seventh of August, which represent around 33% of the aggregate fatalities for the whole time frame and right around 90% of the aggregate recorded wounds.⁹⁵

The main perception is that neither the aggregate number of psychological oppressor episodes in the locale, nor the quantities of passings or wounds from fear based oppressor assaults appear to be especially disturbing. Around eleven occurrences by and large every year with a yearly loss of life of under hundred individuals for the HoA sub-region in general. Besides, as is clear from these database, except for the two episodes on the seventh of August 1998, most fear based oppression has been politically, as opposed to religiously inspired. Besides, when religion has been the main thrust, it has for the most part not been Islam but rather Christianity which has prodded the fear based oppressors vigorously, yet the especially distorted and partisan type of Christianity spoke to by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), working against Uganda from bases in Sudan.⁹⁶

It in this way appears the risk from act of terror, and much more so that acts of terror from Islamists, is made a huge deal about totally to the extent the EA and HoA is concerned. This blame is not exclusively on the West, as it might likewise be in light of a legitimate concern for governments in the district to overstate the danger. Most importantly, placing themselves as the US partners on its global war on terror is probably going to pick up them some truly necessary generosity. Furthermore, they are qualified for the EACTI pool aid. Thirdly, and all

⁹⁵ Ibid

⁹⁶ Ward, 2001

the more hazardously, it might enable governments to mark their adversaries fear mongers, along these lines enabling them to depend on "unprecedented measures" to vanquish them.

Despite the fact that HoA isn't yet a fear based oppressor hotspot—and particularly not one of Islamist terrorism—one can't decide out that it might end up plainly one later on. In this association, questions have been charged spread of specific types of Islam in the sub-region.⁹⁷

2.3 The US involvement in the fight against terrorism in Somalia

The ethnic homogeneity of Somalia greatly explains Somali's strong sense of nationhood.

The Geopolitics of Somalia saw it attract the consideration of both the Arabs ⁹⁸as well as the Westerners. Subsequently the division between the UK, Italy and France and Ethiopia and the three European forces. Considering the strong feeling of nationhood among the Somali, it was practically unavoidable that autonomous Somalia was conceived with an irredentist plan.

Considering Somali's nationhood, it was practically unavoidable that autonomous Somalia was conceived with an hawala plan.⁹⁹ Obviously, this move did not by any stretch of the imagination enhance the officially stressed connection between the United States and the affliction non military personnel populace of Somalia in urgent need of these assets. Luckily, the casual managing an account area in Somalia demonstrated versatile and broadened enough to discover different roads for settlement exchanges, subsequently deflecting the compassionate catastrophe that would some way or another have been inescapable.¹⁰⁰

2.4 The CIA, the ARPCT and the Terrorist Threat from Somalia

The method of reasoning for administration of Bush enables the ARPCT was illuminated by Jenday Frazer. By 2006, the general impression was for sure spreading in the United States that Somalia posed a unique terror threat, yet there was extremely little evidence in support of this view. It additionally claimed that under the protection of the Council of Islamic courts,

⁹⁷ Chande, , 2000

⁹⁸ Wezeman,. 2010

⁹⁹ Patric 1998

¹⁰⁰ Wehr, 2005.

three terrorists were hiding in Somalia.¹⁰¹ The US Treasury additionally recorded four people on its "Terror List" alongside a few organizations and different substances situated in Somalia, i.e. Al Barakaat (a few branches and backups), Al Haramain (a few branches and auxiliaries), Heyatul Ulya and Somali Internet Company and two associations found somewhere else yet giving guide to Somalia.¹⁰² AIAI was incorporated into the US "Terror List," yet not on the US State Department's rundown of assigned "Remote Terrorist Organizations" ¹⁰³

2.5 US Strategy and Its Challenges

Following the 11 September 2001 assaults against the United States, US President Bush broadcasted a "war on dread." The US gave an endeavour that the nation would not yield on the War on Terror until the point that all fear based oppressor bunches are vanquished. The US additionally dedicated to utilize assets inside their charge towards the battle against worldwide dread system.¹⁰⁴

Verifiably, the United Nations gave its endorsement when the Security Council in determination 1368 (twelfth of September 2001) expressly called fear mongering a "danger to worldwide peace and security" and alluded to the "inalienable right of self-preservation" embraced by the UN Charter.¹⁰⁵ This was reverberated by NATO's formal enactment of the article five of the North Atlantic Charter, i.e. its aggregate resistance statement. The famous *opinio juris* additionally is by all accounts in concession to the admissibility of even expectant or pre-emptive self defence against such dangers, as this is by all accounts the main method for repelling them—e.g. by assaulting such referred to bases of fear based oppressors as had been built up in Afghanistan. To wage a "war" on dread hence is by all accounts in congruity with universal law in the feeling of *jus promotion bellum*, from which one can,

¹⁰¹ New York Times. 2012.

¹⁰² Ibid

¹⁰³ Ibid

¹⁰⁴ Bush, 2001.

¹⁰⁵ Boulden, 2007.

then again, neither reason that the real war is pursued in similarity with the *jus in bello* criteria nor that it is astute to wage it.¹⁰⁶

Notwithstanding considering the US convention of announcing "wars" against such wonders as medications, wrongdoing, premature birth, and even stoutness, to pronounce war is as yet something extraordinary.¹⁰⁷ It implies that "the gloves fall off" and that typical guidelines and behavioral requirements never again apply. It subsequently meets the criteria of "securitisation"— a term imagined by Ole Wæver for the "discourse demonstration" of digressively building an issue as being of existential significance and outrageous direness, consequently justifying a turn to "exceptional measures." It has in this way served to true blue a decrease of common freedoms in the nations of the West and somewhere else for the sake of national security against fear based oppression, yet it has additionally served to genuine military activities.

The central command of CJTF-HOA is at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. Its zone of operations includes the regions of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, the Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen, and its central goal is portrayed as ... operations and preparing to help have countries to battle fear mongering to build up a safe domain and empower provincial steadiness. The mission is centered around distinguishing, disturbing and eventually overcoming transnational psychological oppressor bunches working in the locale—denying places of refuge, outer help and material help for fear monger action. CJTF-HOA counters the re-development of transnational fear mongering in the area through common military operations and support of non-administrative association operations, improving the longterm strength of the locale.

¹⁰⁶ Natalino, 2006

¹⁰⁷ Brien, 1998

The exercises it records on its site are for the most part non-military personnel, for example, "giving clean water, practical schools, enhanced roadways and enhanced medicinal offices," i.e. it depicts itself as gave to "winning hearts and psyches" errands. Other than this, be that as it may, it has additionally been engaged with military operations, e.g. in Somalia, to which we might return at the appropriate time.

Indeed, even before these new activities, be that as it may, fear mongering had affected the US arrangement towards the Horn of Africa; particularly to the extent Sudan was concerned. Under the protection of its "rogue states" ¹⁰⁸ teaching the United States had watched out for particularly Sudan due to its Islamist administration and assumed connections with universal fear based oppression,¹⁰⁹ and in 1993 the nation was first set on the US State Department's rundown of nations supporting worldwide psychological warfare.¹¹⁰

Following the terror attack on the US government offices in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998,¹¹¹ the United States even propelled a rocket assault against a the a-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, affirmed to be a secretive generation site for substance weapons (counting the feared VX specialist)— a misstep which was later (practically) conceded.¹¹² In the wake of 11 September, Sudan vowed its help for the US.¹¹³ It has not yet, be that as it may, figured out how to be stricken from the US rundown of "state patrons of fear mongering," despite the fact that in the latest issue of the US State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism it is depicted as nothing not as much as "a solid accomplice in the War on Terror" which "forcefully sought after psychological oppressor operations straightforwardly including dangers to U.S. interests and staff in Sudan."¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁸ Klare, 1995

¹⁰⁹ Kushner, 1998

¹¹⁰ www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm

¹¹¹ Champagne, 2005

¹¹² Daniel & Simon, 2002

¹¹³ Ibid

¹¹⁴ Ibid

CHAPTER THREE

THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR; EFFECTIVENESS AND ALTERNATIVES TO THE COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY

3.1 Introduction

In his first speech after the 9/11 attack, the then US president George W. Bush recognized that the fight against terrorism is a monumental struggle of good versus evil, and that good would prevail.¹¹⁵ The speech dominated news, President Bush hinted that the attacks were not just mere acts of terror but acts of war. The speech suggested that such acts of war required the US to unite in steadfast determination and resolve. He was cognizant that such a resolve would be an immense fight of good versus evil. In the same speech, President Bush reassured America that amidst the struggle, good would prevail.

President Bush's speech marked the beginning of the war on terror discourse, it was actually the only time when the president uttered both 'war' and 'terror' in the same sentence. As a matter of fact, the war on terror discourse has been described as the "the defining discourse of the age". Soon after, the discourse attracted other commentators. The discourse of the War on Terror appeared to be forceful in defining U.S foreign policy.

The War on Terror discourse was used to represent, or 'frame' U.S foreign policy. Framing has been defined by Snow & Benford as "the efforts to define reality by placing the selected idea in a Context that favours certain interpretations". Framing can thus define and construct a political issue, in This case the War on Terror. It is essential for a discourse like the War on Terror to be framed correctly by the correct actors. In 2001, this was former President George W. Bush. Hence, the War on Terror was socially constructed through the public language as expressed by political leaders. Aside from the language used, the War on Terror was co-constituted by its material practices and action. Languages and practice are interdependent:

¹¹⁵ Bush, 2001.

language gives meaning to materials practices, and therefore makes these practices possible¹¹⁶.

Language and practice shape each other and together constitute the War on Terror discourse. In this chapter, the rise of the War on Terror discourse will be described by starting with the Communication strategy the President and the government used to unite the Americans and create support for the War on Terror. In the second part of this chapter, it will be shown how the discourse can be traced back in policy documents released by the government in the years that followed, showing how the War on Terror found its way in U.S foreign policy.

3.2 The Discourse and the President

The main 'actor' promoting the 'idea' was President Bush¹¹⁷. "In our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment," said Bush while speaking to Congress and the public on September 20th, 2001.¹¹⁸ The U.S government immediately attempted to unite the American public after the events of 9/11. Confidence among Americans needed to be restored. Both the U.S government and military leaders used American themes in their communications. This uniting of the American public was needed in order to render support for the War on Terror¹¹⁹.

The above excerpt of Bush's speech is an example of strategic political communication as described in Manheim, where "political leaders communicate with aim of generating, managing, disabusing and using mediated messages as a political resource. According to Hutcheson the enemies were demonized while the teams and values of the US were sanctified. Journalists closely paralleled these themes in their language. They also argue that the national identity of the US was determined by the 9/11 events.

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ Ibid

¹¹⁸ Ibid

¹¹⁹ Ibid

In his 2002 nation speech, for over five times, the word evil was used by Bush while for over 12 times the word war was used. Bush declared on the day of the attacks, that terrorist were enemies of all forms of US freedoms. Equally, the war was described as a global war for civilization and freedom¹²⁰. This is a clear example of what Singer described as moralistic. Bush focuses on how the terrorists attack the moral value of freedom, which is a pro-American theme as well. By repeatedly emphasizing 'our', Bush also unites his American public with these words.

In June 2002, Bush spoke to the U.S Military Academy's Class of 2002: emphasizing that besides taking the war to the enemies territory, all probable threats must be disrupted before they emerge. He further added that in the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act."³⁰ By emphasizing that "the only path of safety is the path of action", Bush makes clear that the War on Terror is the only logical¹²¹

Consequence of the attacks. There is no room to discuss alternatives. This is in line with what Lemann described as well.¹²² The power of the War on Terror discourse allowed Bush to realize foreign policy objectives through the use of military force. The force used in the war was unprecedented in the history of the US.

During his State of the Union address, Bush referred to the War on Terror once more as he addressed the American troops in Afghanistan stated that the war against terror which was to be perpetuated over the long-term had just began. ¹²³ Thus, the War on Terror was a discourse that became institutionalized and normalized by reorienting the national security structure and embedding the ideas of a terrorist threat within American culture. Hutcheson have

¹²⁰ <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2007/index.htm>

¹²¹ Ibid

¹²² Ibid

¹²³ Ibid.

defined four different communication strategies used by government officials: the affirmation of American values and ideals.

3.3 The Discourse in Policy

The War on Terror discourse quickly found its way into U.S foreign policy documents. The first updated U.S foreign policy document was the new National Security Strategy Report (NSSR), published on September 17, 2002¹²⁴. The next NSSR was published on March 16, 2006. A year after the release of the 2002 NSSR, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) was released in February 2003. This chapter elaborates on Section III of the SSR34, and focuses on “identifying and defusing threats before they reach our borders. The NSCT was updated in September 2006, a few months after the updated NSSR of that year.

Lastly, the U.S has published an annual report on “Patterns on Global Terrorism” since 1995. The name changed to “Country Reports on Terrorism” from 2004 onwards. These reports will not be researched because they do not include much information on actual U.S foreign policy, but rather report the threat of terrorism in specific countries in the world. Now, the NSSR of both 2002 and 2006 will be analyzed on the use of the War on Terror discourse, as well as the NSCT of 2003 and 2006 to answer the question how the discourse has impacted U.S foreign policy¹²⁵. Both reports were released again during the Obama administration and will be discussed in the fifth chapter, “The Decline of the War on Terror Discourse”, as well to see whether or not the use of the War on Terror discourse in these documents has declined in later years.

3.4 The National Security Strategy Report-2002

The War on Terror discourse quickly found its way into U.S foreign policy documents. The first updated U.S foreign policy document was the new National Security Strategy Report

¹²⁴ NSSR, 2002

¹²⁵ Under the Goldwater-- <http://www.nssarchive.us>

(NSSR), published on September 17, 2002¹²⁶. The next NSSR was published on March 16, 2006. A year after the release of the 2002 NSSR, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) was released in February 2003. This chapter elaborates on Section III of the SSR34, and focuses on “identifying and defusing threats before they reach our borders. The NSCT was updated in September 2006, a few months after the updated NSSR of that year.

Furthermore, based on the report by the 9/11 commission the president and congress, created the NCTA based on Law 107-306. The commission was directed by the law to investigate matters regarding the September 11.¹²⁷ Lastly, the U.S has published an annual report on “Patterns on Global Terrorism” since 1995. The name changed to “Country Reports on Terrorism” from 2004 onwards. These reports will not be researched because they do not include much information on actual U.S foreign policy, but rather report the threat of terrorism in specific countries in the world. Now, the NSSR of both 2002 and 2006 will be analyzed on the use of the War on Terror discourse, as well as the NSCT of 2003 and 2006 to answer the question how the discourse has impacted U.S foreign policy¹²⁸. Both reports were released again during the Obama administration and will be discussed in the fifth chapter, “The Decline of the War on Terror Discourse”, as well to see whether or not the use of the War on Terror discourse in these documents has declined in later years.

3.5 The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism-2003

The 2003 NSCT was an extension of the third section of the 2002 NSSR that focused on defeating terrorism. Both themes prominent in the 2002 NSSR can be found in the 2003 NSCT as well, and are strikingly consistent and similar. The focus on democratic values and democratization is made clear in the introduction. In the introduction, it suggests that there is

¹²⁶ NSSR, 2002

¹²⁷ Ibid

¹²⁸ Under the Goldwater-- <http://www.nssarchive.us>

a competition between freedom and fear which necessitates the fight against terrorists and their sympathisers by all means. It further reiterates that the fight must be all inclusive and no nation should be left out as the groups threatens the gains made in democracy.¹²⁹The fight would therefore ensure that the interest of US are respected both home and away.¹³⁰ The means of fighting may include force where states are unwilling, to ensure that all those supporting terrorism are neutralised. “

3.6 The National Security Strategy Report-2006

It appears that both the use of the War on Terror discourse as the themes of proactivity and democracy had grown even stronger in the 2006 NSSR, compared to the 2002 NSSR. This was the U.S fourth year in Afghanistan, and its third in Iraq. “America is at war,” are the first words of former President George W. Bush in the introduction of the 2006 NNSR¹³¹. This quote shows how explicitly and leading the War on Terror discourse had become in U.S foreign policy. In the second paragraph of the introduction, Bush mentions the ideals that “have inspired our history” being freedom, democracy and human dignity. The theme of democracy is clearly a recurring one, which is emphasized in section III.

The theme of proactivity is not as evidently endorsed as it was done in the 2002 NSSR, perhaps because the U.S had already followed through on doing this by invading in both Afghanistan and Iraq¹³². When challenges and successes since the 2002 NSSR are discussed, these also seem to focus on democracy and state building. Challenge mentioned, among others, are fragile states, tyranny in “a number of nations” and some governments who “have not delivered the benefits of effective democracy and prosperity to their citizens.

¹²⁹ NSSR 2002

¹³⁰ Under the Goldwater-- <http://www.nssarchive.us>

¹³¹ The National Commission on Terrorist //www.9--11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf

¹³² Ibid.

Remarkably, the 2006 NSCT starts with the same four words as the 2006 NSSR: “America is at war.” In the introduction, it is explained that de NSCT “recognizes that America is at war and protecting the nation is their first interest. The War on Terror is described as “a different kind of war¹³³. It is explained as “both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas.” Also in line with the 2006 NSSR, there is a strong emphasis on the democracy theme. Democracy is presented as “the best long---term answer to al-Qaida’s agenda” and has been promoted “through the freedom agenda” (Ibid.).

Set up of grievances, majority rules system offers the control of law. Set up of a culture of intrigue and deception, majority rule government offers the right to speak freely. Set up of a belief system that legitimizes kill, vote based system offers a regard for human nobility that loathes the consider focusing of honest regular people¹³⁴.

3.7 The discourse in Media and Culture

The War on Terror did not only found its way into speeches of the President or in U.S foreign policy. The War on Terror grew out to be much more than simply a policy discourse; the War on Terror became an integral part of American culture. Study centres and degree programmes arose in the U.S that carried the name or focused on the War on Terror. Sources of research funding were made available specifically to research addressing the topic of the War on Terror. Also, the core narratives of the War on Terror have been collectively re-enacted through public ceremonies and by the American Media. The media played an inescapable role in the rise of the War on Terror discourse as well¹³⁵.

Reese & Lewis discuss in their article how the War on Terror became a “socially shared organizing principle” through its transmission via the US press. For their research, they

¹³³ Ibid

¹³⁴ NSSR 2002.

¹³⁵ Spigel, (2004).

tracked how often the combination of the words 'war' and 'terror (War on Terror, War on Terrorism et cetera) was used in USA Today and the Associated Press between 2001 and 2006. The War on Terror was mostly mentioned in the aftermath of 9/11, then declined and became relatively steady from 2003 through 2006. It peaked significantly around 2004, when the issue played a prominent role during the presidential election.

3.8 Alternatives to counterterrorism

This is in contrast to the current focus, which is emphasizing the short-term punishment of a few terrorist groups at the expense of losing the larger battle for the hearts and minds of their possible supporters. There are, however, persistent calls for long-term strategies that address underlying grievances. Instead of oppressive or violent government tactics that are likely to fuel terrorist activity, there is a call for more of a focus on legal instruments to break the cycle of violence. Finally there is an awareness of the need to 'win the war of ideas'. If the main goal of the 'war' is to lower the levels of fear (terror) around the world, steps need to be taken that clearly work toward this end. The point is that it is better not to confront extremism with extremism but instead with moderation, and it is better to counter intolerance with tolerance and criminals with law.

3.8.1 Addressing underlying causes

There is such a range of motives both within and definitely between the organizations that use terrorist tactics, it is obvious that no one overarching solution can be proposed that would stop all potential terrorist attacks.

There are a myriad of social factors that put stress on different groups and can lead to terrorist activity if not addressed by social institutional processes. Some overarching economic issues that are important, and could be directly addressed, are the relative economic inequalities and resource scarcity.¹³⁶ The large numbers of unemployed youth are also a risk factor for violent conflict in general, as well as terrorism. These are not new ideas, all of them are seen as

¹³⁶ Gofas, (2006).

underlying causes of most violent conflict. In this sense, the UN's many departments have extensive experience in working to resolve problems in all these areas. There is therefore a good argument that the UN should return to its pre-2001 focus on conflict prevention and development as a base for its long-term counter-terrorism strategy.¹³⁷ Bredel argues that many of the policies outlined in past UN documents on the issue of conflict prevention could be directly applied as counter-terrorism strategies. Since many internal conflicts have much in common with terrorism, the UN conflict management practices can help limit their spread.¹³⁸

This is an important position and one that holds great hope for addressing the terrorist issue. The problem of course is getting the political and financial support to seriously address these problems. Funding has always plagued these types of programs at the UN. There is hope that the shift in political interest and the high financial costs of the current ongoing counter-terrorism policies will lead to increased support for these policies.

As discussed in the previous chapter, oppressive government policies directed at political, racial, and religious minorities could lead to rebellion and possibly more terrorist activity.¹³⁹ The main argument is that the military is not well trained to establish law and order in civil society. There must be more of a focus on law enforcement and nation building; the military is seen as ill-suited for this approach. Police and intelligence work, it is argued, would be much more effective in bringing law and order to the communities providing a stable base for economic and social development. Domestically this would mean a move away from the ever increasing use of the military. As a replacement for international military action, it is argued there should be international policing operations under the auspices of the UN.¹⁴⁰ These

¹³⁷ Bredel, (2003)

¹³⁸ Ibid

¹³⁹ Gofas, 2006.

¹⁴⁰ Dower, 2002

would be far less disruptive to the wider society and therefore also be less likely to lead to increased social support for the target organization.

It is also important to strengthen civil society organizations so they can play an oversight role. These organizations and media should be encouraged to debate and scrutinize governments' counter-terrorism strategies. As Rambke points out, "To strengthen transparency and promote public confidence, the media must be encouraged to actively analyze policy and performance of security services without fear of constraint. Public investment in security is greatly enhanced if people can believe that security sector actors are publicly accountable".¹⁴¹ However, these policies would have to promote more media freedom, not less.

As countries claim to understand the need to open a dialogue, they must recognize that such a dialogue cannot be a one-way conversation. Addressing underlying grievances requires that authorities take an active role in listening. Although grouped by the 'war on terror' principles, different 'terrorist' organizations gain support for different reasons. To address 'terrorism' it is important to distinguish between these groups.¹⁴² Treating them all as one large problem oversimplifies the roots of these diverse conflicts and can obscure individual paths to redress. The 'war on terror', as it currently stands, dictates its terms to the world. To be successful, it is necessary to listen in order to find common ground and common understanding. This means taking a hard look at western priorities and the way western countries interact with the world.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Rambke, 2005

¹⁴² Post, (2005).

¹⁴³ Dower, 2002

There are some signs of a move toward a more open dialogue at high levels of the US government. The Iraq study group report by Baker & Hamilton¹⁴⁴ called on the US administration to try to open a dialogue with all insurgent and militia groups in Iraq with the exception of Al Qaeda operatives⁵. They also called for more attempts to involve countries in the region including Iran and Syria. Calls such as these represent an acknowledgment of the need to build real coalitions if the goal is to bring more stability.

Despite resistance from many governments, there is a strong argument for encouraging the legal political participation of 'terrorist organizations'. Since many 'terrorist groups' are connected to political parties this is seen as a realistic goal. The idea is that once groups are given an outlet for legitimate grievances this will undermine that larger social support for groups that argue violence is the only way to effect change.

This of course is not a simple feat. There are inherent difficulties in finding a balance between enforcing western values and respecting others' cultures.¹⁴⁵ Addressing underlying causes and working to solve political and social strife will not stop all terrorist attacks, but it can remove the public support for organizations, which may use terrorist tactics. A large number of active terrorist organizations in the world today also have a political arm. Working with these sections of the organizations is seen as an important first step. Once political objectives are met through representation in government, the idea is that those who are fighting for legitimate causes will have a non-violent outlet for their concerns. This in turn will undermine a large part of the terrorist support base. Finally, in order to be addressed, underlying causes must be understood. This requires listening and negotiation, not simply dictating will.

¹⁴⁴ Baker, (2006)

¹⁴⁵ Osborn, (2005).

3.8.2 The Legal options

There are many possible proposals on how to handle terrorist activity through criminal law.

There are proposals for different types of International tribunals or ways to assure the fairness of domestic prosecution. There are also calls for possibly adding issues of terrorism to the International Criminal Court. Bringing this 'war' into a more legal context is about more than simply punishing those responsible. It is also about promoting the justice that the West argues sets it apart from 'terrorists' they seek to defeat. Legal and humanitarian norms have been established to break the cycle of violence and injustice. By assuring all human beings rights, not only are the innocent more protected but the state also proves to others that justice has been done. Advancing with policies that respect these norms, it is argued, is therefore also important to 'winning the war of ideas'.

There is little doubt that the international community needs to cooperate and build up legal systems to prevent attacks and bring perpetrators to justice. As previously discussed, there has been a focus on international treaties that increase cooperation among states and criminalize terrorist activity. Many of these contain controversial extradition agreements¹⁴⁶ in order for suspects to be tried in the country where they are accused of a crime. International tribunals and courts provide an alternative. By bringing the charges into the international system, it is possible to overcome concerns about disparities between domestic legal systems and laws and assure due process.

In the days and months after the September 2001 attacks, there were official calls for an international ad hoc tribunal to prosecute those responsible.¹⁴⁷ It was proposed that such a tribunal could be designed in a way similar to the tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia¹⁴⁸ or even possibly similar to the Hariri tribunal being set up in Lebanon. These

¹⁴⁶ Rudy, 2003

¹⁴⁷ ODIHR (2001)

¹⁴⁸ Youngs, 2001

tribunals could also possibly be given jurisdiction over future acts of international terrorism.¹⁴⁹

Beyond tribunals it is argued that the International Criminal Court (ICC) could handle the crimes. Although today the ICC is set up to address only a limited number of crimes, seven years after its entry into force it can be amended to add other crimes. Many have recommended that at this point terrorism should be added.¹⁵⁰ Legal actions like those proposed above have the potential to reveal further information on these organizations. It presents an international front and can make countries more willing to extradite suspects. It would also mean that more people are likely to believe that those charged are really guilty of these crimes. Even if a great deal of the information is never released to the public, the system would be able to assure the accused their rights and due process and show them to be guilty.

There are, of course, some difficulties in setting up international tribunals and courts. Countries are wary of sharing their intelligence. There are, however, security options for keeping information secret in the case of tribunals. Although these may not be perfectly airtight, they do provide some protection for sensitive information that otherwise might not be shared.¹⁵¹ There are also concerns about the length of time it would take to set up, the cost involved, and questions over the perceived impartiality of the court.¹⁵² It is also argued that, in the absence of an acceptable definition of terrorism, it would be difficult to design legislation.¹⁵³ These are important considerations but, given the perspective of the past five years, they do not seem as insurmountable.

¹⁴⁹ ODIHR (2001)

¹⁵⁰ Koechler, H. (2002).

¹⁵¹ Scheffer, (2001).

¹⁵² Ibid

¹⁵³ Ibid

The perceived impartiality of the tribunals must also be looked at in the context of the alternative, the current 'war'. Today the US military act as judge, jury and executioner of 'suspected terrorists'. This is done by both direct military action as well as through the US military tribunals. Surely any international tribunal, even one set up by the Security Council, would be considered to have 'more legitimacy' than these policies. Including the crime of 'terrorism' under the mandate of the ICC could remove this concern from the prosecutions of future attacks.¹⁵⁴

3.8.3 Winning the war of ideas

'Winning the war of ideas' means convincing people to support your cause. They must believe in its principles and they must believe in a country's or organization's ability and dedication to put these principles into practice. If human rights, political freedoms and 'freedom from fear' are being promoted as goals, then they must be the practice. Brutal crackdowns by the government will prove the terrorists claim that the government should be challenged. As discussed, these government actions often increase the support base of the organizations and lead to more attacks. If this is to be a 'war of ideas' then the West must present a clear alternative to the enemy they seek to destroy.

The 'war of ideas' requires that western powers take an honest look at the policies being promoted. This does not only mean looking at the recent policies and the way they have limited rights and law, but it also means recognizing the pain and anger these policies have caused. UN and US authorities continuously act surprised at rising levels of support for groups they argue should be simply condemned. This is despite their recognition that many of the policies being implemented around the world fuel support for these organizations.

¹⁵⁴ Youngs, 2001

A possible option is to show visible compassion for the victims of western actions. Recognizing the victims of western counter-terrorism strategies is essential to understanding rising resistance to the 'war'. As the American's outrage at the senseless death of 3,000 of their citizens led them to anger and attack, so to must it be expected in reaction to innocent victims of counter-terrorism strategies. Especially in Iraq, where the US and its' allies have essentially created a failed state, chaos reigns. Estimates of civilian casualties are as high as 654,965 (2.5% of the population).¹⁵⁵

Though Annan's 2006 report argues it is important to focus on the innocent victims of non-state terrorism there must be equal emphasis on the innocent victims of the 'war on terror'. To do anything less shows a lack of respect for the victims and those who grieve for them. Though this may seem like an obvious statement, it is one that is obviously missing from much of the 'war on terror' discourse. It is, however, not a fact lost on those radicalized by these policies.¹⁵⁶

It is therefore argued that it is essential for government to try to heal wounds, not create more. If the goal is a united front, governments around the world must work to counter these divisions, not promote them. For these reasons governments must take special care to design policies that that do not unfairly target minority groups. It is recommended that governments encourage an open dialogue and exchange of cultural values by encouraging exchange programs.¹⁵⁷ It is also recommended that the movement of people not proven to be associated with terrorist organizations must be facilitated so as not to objectify one particular group.¹⁵⁸ Since many charities and NGOs are being accused of being affiliated with terrorist organizations, there is a concern that cutting off their funding creates real hardships for the

¹⁵⁵ Lafta, Doocy, and Roberts, (2006)

¹⁵⁶ Ibid

¹⁵⁷ Cordesman, (2005).

¹⁵⁸ Ibid

people they help. It is therefore argued that there must be a system of checks and balances to assure innocent organizations are not being cut off.¹⁵⁹

3.9 Conclusion

The phrase 'War on Terror' was first used by the president and was quickly taken over by the media, American culture and the American public. The War on Terror became a strong and forceful discourse that influenced and defined U.S foreign policy in the following years¹⁶⁰. The idea of the War on Terror quickly found its way into U.S foreign policy documents in the years that followed. Leading teams where the proactivity of the U.S, as well as the intention of the U.S to preserve values like 'freedom' and human dignity' by striving to bring democracy to the world. Clearly, the U.S was ready to act and did so by invading in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In 2006, Bush declared that America was at war. The focus on bringing democracy as an answer to terrorism had seemingly grown even stronger. Aside from being at war, America thus also aimed at state building. Interestingly, Somalia is never mentioned in each of these strategy documents. Nevertheless, the War on Terror would also impact U.S foreign policy decisions on the ground in Somalia.

¹⁵⁹ Gurr, (2005).

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE US COUNTER TERRORISTS STRATEGY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

4.1 Introduction

A series of policies have been put forth by the United States since 9/11 with an aim of protecting the US citizens. A number of actions taken by the US in Somalia as a response to fight against terrorism, the actions have attracted criticism and support in equal measure. Terrorists are an amorphous body and an elusive body with ability to adapt than any other body that the US has fought in the past. To fight the terrorist, the US have to apply a complex and multi-thronged strategy. This paper set out to analyse the effectiveness of the US counter-terrorism in Somalia. The study was guided by three objectives; identifying the general actions the US has taken in the greater horn region in terms of war on terror, determine effectiveness of the US counterterrorism policy in the fight against terrorism in Somalia, and to investigate alternative approaches of fighting terrorism in Somalia and the greater Horn of Africa. This chapter reports on the findings from field studies and a synthesis of secondary data that have attempted to address issues relating the objectives of the study.

4.2 Attempt to address the root causes of terrorism in the Horn of Africa

The study revealed that the U.S counterterrorism efforts in the HoA are informed by a number scholarly works on radicalization and methodologies for countering such a phenomenon.¹⁶¹ *You must take to account that the efforts of the U.S while aimed at neutralizing terrorists has a lot more to the populace of their areas of operation that one can imagine. The program aims in fact to tackle the very reasons that can push one into becoming a terrorist in the first place. Upon realization that nobody is born a terrorist, and that one must first feel disenfranchised for a road into terrorism to be initiated. The promise to fill the gap causing the disenfranchisement feeling leads to radicalization and hence terrorism. The program is designed to address the issues that causes the feeling of*

¹⁶¹ Guilain and Carter, 2009

*disenfranchisement, the issues addressed include the aim to peace and security, good governance, and social and economic development.*¹⁶² By addressing some of these issues, it is believed that conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism will have been fostered. The idea of countering terrorism through these means follows the recommendation suggested by USAID on a study *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism*,¹⁶³ which emphasized the need to distinguish between drivers that contribute to recruitment into violent extremist organizations. In addition, the report emphasizes the need for designing counter extremism programs that focus on the needs and challenges of each country in terms of radicalization context and its major sources.

4.3 The general actions the U.S has taken in the Greater Horn region in terms of the war on terror

The study sought to establish the strategies the US has taken in Somalia and the Greater Horn region in relation to war on terror. The findings reveal that the US view the threat of terrorism in the HoA to be of an increasing concern. Concerns about terrorism have been highlighted by at least three regimes (the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations) in the history of the US in the recent past. The areas that have attracted the major concern in the HoA is Somalia because of the belief that Al Qaeda affiliates see it as a safe haven. The study also noted that though terrorism in East Africa has been classified as the most serious, there are varied opinions on the severity of these threats to U.S interest. It was pointed out that by 2008, Al Qaeda's footprint in Somalia that it had established since 2006 was waning courtesy of Ethiopian operations and related U.S. efforts.¹⁶⁴

The study revealed that while the U.S has an interest in fighting terrorism in Africa, the Somali being a Muslim country does not fully support such efforts. *It must be noted that while the U.S may be well meaning in the terrorist fight, the Muslim do not trust them, for*

¹⁶² Sentiments from a USAID official

¹⁶³ Denoeux and Carter, 2009

¹⁶⁴ Feedback from a security agent

years, the U.S have oppressed our brothers and so we are not able to tell their intentions. They may not come to us directly..... that, they know, but should we realize any association of even the Somalia neighbours, then they will resist. Take for instance Ethiopia, there was a general feeling that they were advancing U.S agenda, and the people of Somali resisted. As a matter of fact, it strengthened the insurgencies.¹⁶⁵ I can say that the U.S have for a long time despised the spiritual aspect of the fight against terror. This has resulted of profiling of Muslims world over. The result of this has been a greater unison of Muslims and bulging number of sympathizers. The U.S therefore needs to relook their approach if they are to be successful. It does not mean that the Muslim support terrorism, actually Muslim teachings are against acts of terror..... the Muslim are only angered when they are dehumanized by being labeled terrorists even when they are not.¹⁶⁶

The study sought to establish the doctrine upon which the fight against terrorism is based. The study revealed that bases its doctrine of the war against terror on the belief that ideological extremist globally prefer terrorism. A doctrine that has seen the evolvement of the U.S's response from merely law enforcement response to one guided by a broad U.S. strategy that encompass the involvement of international partners aimed at suffocating all the survival and operation assets and resources of violent extremist networks.

The study revealed that in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the war on terror was enhanced by the Bush's administration. The fight continued into the Obama administration even though it was not referred to as war on terror. The Obama administration instead chose to refer to the fight as "taking individual terrorists off the street." Which more less is the same thing. The fight includes the use of direct operations of US based military to deal with Al Qaeda leaders and its affiliates.

¹⁶⁵ Views from a military officer

¹⁶⁶ Ibid

The study sought to establish the extent to which the U.S has conducted direct attacks in Somali against terrorists. The study reveals that at least 7 military attacks have been done in Somalia since 2007 against AQ targets in Somalia.¹⁶⁷ The study further noted that a number of AQ senior members have died from these attacks, in 2008.

Other than military attack, the study revealed that the U.S has shifted their strategy to include a campaign against extremism. This strategy was reached upon on the realization that AQ are not only terrorists but are insurgents as well who also push for political solutions to certain aspects of their demands. Historically, the U.S believes that often, the success or failure of an insurgency must be participatory with the local population being significant players in the process.¹⁶⁸ In light of this it can be deduced that today, the U.S counterterrorism policy encompasses more than the law enforcement, intelligence, and military efforts that thwart” terrorists, by seeking to “shape and constrain the environments where terrorists operate.

The study further revealed that the U.S in attempt to counter terrorism in the HoA has taken a diplomatic approach that aims at influencing the attitudes and perceptions of the populations in the HoA in support of U.S. policies and interests through multiple communication efforts. *Take note that the issue of terrorism is a perception and attitude issue that cannot be successfully fought by military action alone. The U.S has recognized that terrorists are willing to cause harm to her citizen simply because of their perception towards the American people. Therefore, it was necessary that through strategic communication, attempts are made to try and change such attitudes and perception of people who have been brainwashed to believe that America is their enemy.*¹⁶⁹ Similar sentiments were received from U.S embassy staff who opined that the current model of the fight against terrorism has been more effective

¹⁶⁷ U.S embassy official

¹⁶⁸ Ibid

¹⁶⁹ Views from a security agent

because it aims to address terrorism before terrorist acts are experienced by way of changing the mind-set of the would be terrorists.

In the same vein, an interview with a security agent suggested that the U.S is actively involved in counterterror efforts in the HoA through alternative means including stifling the financing and recruiting wing of terrorist groups. These efforts, commonly referred to as “influence operations,” are key strategies that aim to undermine terrorist groups’ credibility among local populations. These efforts mostly target influencers (community and religious leaders, and vulnerable populations). These efforts have been acknowledged by Corey,¹⁷⁰ who has summarized the efforts of the Obama administration. The efforts focused more on diplomacy rather than confrontation with the Islamic world. In his 2009 speech in Egypt, president Obama expresses the desire to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims in a relationship not merely grounded in counterterrorism but one that is broader and all encompassing.¹⁷¹

The study revealed that the U.S has laid strategies towards travel restriction and financial sanctions against those thought to be supporting terrorist activities. The U.S has put in place programs aimed at preventing terrorists, in the HoA for example, the U.S has identified groups and/or individuals they believe to be terrorist or financing terrorist activities including members of Al Shabaab, LRA and Al Ittihad which are in the exclusion list of Terrorist. Also targeted in reference to this region is the Saudi-based AHF. The AHF is charity organization founded on Islam that was spread throughout EA, including Somalia in the 1990s.¹⁷² Besides the blanket restrictions to Al Shabaab group, in 2010, a declaration was made by president

¹⁷⁰ Corey, 2009

¹⁷¹ Ibid

¹⁷² Views from a USAID staff

Obama blocking the assets of persons supporting terrorism.¹⁷³ Most persons targeted by the embargos were also restricted by the UN sanctions.¹⁷⁴

The study revealed that the U.S has had efforts for developing professional capabilities of security forces for regional partners to be able to deal with the terrorism issue. The U.S government created the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) in 2003, to help fight terrorism in the region. The program aimed at improving border and coastal security. The program functioned till 2009 when it was replaced by the EARSII develop more efficient anti-terrorism program in West Africa. The new program aims nature's antiterrorism measures in the region, builds partner capacity, and minimizes violent extremism support. The specific projects undertaken by the program include; provision of funds to support coastal security the HoA; provision of support for the police forces in relation to law enforcement in the HoA; provision of funds toward detection and neutralizing financiers of terrorism activities through providing technical assistance to support the drafting of CTF and money laundering legislation and the development of financial intelligence units (FIUs) in the states in the HoA among others. This only confirms the level of commitment of the U.S in the fight against terrorism in the HoA.¹⁷⁵

The study revealed that the U.S developed a joint task force (CJTF-HOA) focused on detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the HoA. The task force does not directly engage terrorists but its primary effort is to counter violent extremism. Rather, it offers training to regional security forces in counter-terrorism. The body equally serves as military mentors mentors, in addition the task force also provides

¹⁷³ E.O 13536 identified one entity, Al Shabaab, and eleven individuals for sanctions

¹⁷⁴ Security Council Resolution 1844 (2008)

¹⁷⁵ Ibid

military assistance and training to forces deployed in support of AMISOM in coordination with ACOTA.¹⁷⁶

4.4 The general actions the U.S has taken in Somalia

The study sought to establish the specific actions the U.S has taken in Somalia towards the fight against terrorism. Somalia being a failed state it is naturally subjected under intense security by the U.S as it can easily be exploited by terrorists. The U.S has therefore taken a number of actions in the quest to counter terrorism in Somalia as the study revealed. With this classification, the study revealed that military operations were authorized to monitor and assess the situation in Somalia. Surveillance was conducted by military overflights alongside patrol of Somali coast by U.S submarines. I cannot deny that after 9/11, Somalia was put on watch list by the U.S. As a matter of fact, nearly 100 Special Forces operated in Somalia in the early 2002. The country missed military action when it was not clear whether there were direct ties between Al Qaeda and Somalia.¹⁷⁷

You are aware that terrorists are individuals with support from their sympathizers, so to deal with them, the sympathizers must be targeted and that's exactly what the U.S government did. The U.S took financial actions against persons suspected to have links with terrorists.¹⁷⁸ This view is corroborated by International Crisis Group report of 2005¹⁷⁹ which cited a placement of Hassan Dahir Aweys under a terror watch list. The study also revealed that the U.S funded the establishment of a number of counter-terror networks. For example, in the Puntland region, an intelligence service was developed to help in terrorist arrest and surveillance.¹⁸⁰ The U.S even paid militia groups in southern part of Somalia and business persons to help monitor suspected terrorists.

¹⁷⁶ Sentiments from a military personnel

¹⁷⁷ Views from embassy official

¹⁷⁸ Ibid

¹⁷⁹ International Crisis Group 2005a

¹⁸⁰ Ibid

The study revealed that the fight against the Al Shabaab in Somalia has been an African affair through the umbrella of AMISOM, however, that has not been without the hand of the U.S, at the request of AU and the U.S has provided AMISOM troops with, equipment, logistics support and pre-deployment training since 2007. The average amount that the U.S has spent towards that assistance is estimated to be over \$230 million. The study notes that the provision of these funds is not direct to AMISOM but rather through the UN, and other sub agencies including the ACOTA program and by CJTF-HOA.

The U.S-Somali policy has attracted quite a substantial scholarly discourse, with the key issues revolving around humanitarian and security on national issues; especially relating to piracy and terrorism. The discourse has been just about everything including extent of Somalia's perception on the legitimacy of internationally recognised TFG. The study reveal that the U.S has described Somali as a problem categorized into three levels; humanitarian crisis emanating from a collapsed state, as a global challenge that provides an asylum and pirates performance field and violent fundamentalist and as a regional problem that the security of its neighbours.¹⁸¹ As a result of this classification, and the increasing nature of the threats emanating from Somalia, a more aggressive response is advocated.¹⁸²

In an interview with an official from the U.S embassy, it was noted that the U.S had had a lot of interest in the stability of Somalia and would do everything possible to ensure that terrorists are out of Somalia. The official cited the action the U.S took after the collapse of the Islamic Courts Union, in which the U.S offered logistical support to Ugandan troops in the AU peacekeeping force, which were deployed to Mogadishu.¹⁸³ Further, the U.S has worked with other countries like the UK to provide counterterrorism training.

¹⁸¹ Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson, "Briefing on the African Union Summit," July 27, 2010.

¹⁸² Ibid

¹⁸³ Views from U.S embassy official

4.5 Effectiveness of counter-terrorism mechanism in the HoA

The study sought to establish the effectiveness of counter-terrorism mechanism in the HoA.

While the study set out to find out this, it is cognizant of the difficulty of application of metrics to gauge the effectiveness of counterterrorism. However, the study measured the effectiveness by means of establishing reduction or increase of attacks over a period of time, and even absence of attacks. The challenge with this measure the study wishes to declare at this point is the lack of consideration of the possibility of the terrorist to be focusing on other areas or planning at the time of reduction or absence of attacks.

The findings suggest that in reference to Somalia, the war against terrorists may not have been effective. The approach that the US has taken in fighting terrorist in Somalia is one that aims at killing and destabilizing the terrorists' bases in Somalia. In the processes, there have been so many civilian casualties. In turn, the terrorist have wiped the emotions of civilians making them believe that the US are actually their enemies, and that they 'the terrorists' are fighting to liberate them 'civilians' from the US 'the oppressor'. This has meant that more and more civilians are willing to join forces with the terrorists to fight the US. The US has thus failed in its quest to win the ideological weapon that the terrorists use to expand. In effect, it can be said that the US's strategy is not effective in Somalia. The study further revealed that the US's strategy in the horn is not entirely ineffective, where the strategy adopted a humanitarian approach for example, it helped further democracy and that is one of the goals of the US.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁴ Ibid

CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 Summary of findings

The US global war on terror has been revealed to be a dual strategy because it encompasses both short term and long term goals. In the short run the strategies seek to capture and kill the terrorists, and destabilizing their operations. In the long run the study reveals that the goal is focused on non-military approach aimed at defeating the terrorists' ideology.

The findings of this study reveal that while the US's strategy in the fight against terror is dual in nature, in reference to Somalia, the US has adopted mostly the short run approach. As a matter of fact one can comfortably claim the action of the US in Somalia is in contradiction with US's overall strategy. Elsewhere in the HoA, softer strategies aimed at defeating terrorist ideology like provision of humanitarian aid and advancement of democracy have been employed. In Somalia however, the study revealed that the approach has been targeted at neutralization of suspected terrorists at whatever cost. The study further reveal that these actions have hampered the achievement of the US's overall goal. For example, the US air-strikes in 2007 took away with it a number of collateral damage that worn the terrorists more sympathizers and further complicating the issue. The backing of the Ethiopian TFG has indeed had many civilians' casualties and further denting the US image among moderate Somalis.

5.2 Conclusion

In analysing the effectiveness of US's counter-terrorism strategy in the HoA, a number of conclusions can be drawn from this examination. To ensure objectivity in these conclusions understanding the potential for Somalia being a haven of terrorists is imperative. This will enable conclusion on effectiveness easily made when the prevailing circumstances are effectively dealt with. Equally, the outside influences in Somalia must be taken into consideration. The response of civilians in Somalia towards responses made by the US in the fight against terrorism must be rightly contextualized. The study concludes that in the quest

to fight terrorism in the HoA in general and Somalia in particular, a number of efforts have been made by not only the US but other players (particularly AU and IGAD) as well. The difficulties faced in this fight cannot be underestimated.

The study concludes that the use of military actions in the fight against terrorism is counter-productive because in the end, the terrorists get more sympathizers. Obviously, one can see this play out in the US-Ethiopian backed military action in Somalia. Huge setback was observed by this strategy; the Somalia civilians developed low and negative spirit towards the US, more of the Somalis in turn see the US as their enemies. The strategy effectively undermines the US overall goal on war on global terror. In consideration of the actions the US has taken in Somalia, it is imperative that they have not succeeded in the long run.

The study agrees with other scholars like Menkhaus that Somalia is no doubt a promising target for terrorist operations.¹⁸⁵ The unguarded borders and coastline, lack of a central government, and close ties with the Arab world makes it a sound ground for terrorists operations. The study concludes that the lack of homogeneity in Somalia has significantly contributed to the spread of terrorism in the country because of long running divisions that has seen different experiences in the southern and northern parts of the country.

The effectiveness of the US in the fight against terrorist in Somalia and the horn of Africa at large will be realized if the US adopts alternative strategies in Somalia. For example, taking advantage of the diversity in Somalia may hasten the process of destabilizing the terrorists' activities. For example, successful transportation operations from Yemen to northern Kenya will have to traverse multiple areas controlled by different factions, factions possessing of a varying amount of incentives for cooperation. The terrorists' thus risks betrayal from different factions operating in the region and Somalia. The US must thus address the regional differences; an assumption that what works in one country in the horn will work in another is

¹⁸⁵ Menkhaus 2004

misleading, the study concludes therefore, that the US must fully understand the region for their operations to be effective.

Rather than military approach the study concludes that adoption of soft approach that targets ideological change among the Somalis' would be more effective as the civilians would then be willing to work with the terrorist combatants rather than sympathizing with the terrorists. The approach could be designed for example in a way that address social and political conditions good for the spread of terrorists.

The approach adopted by the US make it end up in a circumstance it would have liked to stay away from, that of supporting a government against mounting hatred, which has just added to the interest of universal radical developments. The proceeding with the approach in Somalia 'is effortlessly depicted as one front in a worldwide rebellion against a US plan of commanding the Muslim world'.¹⁸⁶ Al-Qa'eda's Ayman al-Zawahiri put forth that very defence in a discourse in January 2007, associating the protection in Somalia to that in Afghanistan and Iraq. A few Internet recordings enlist outside warriors for Somalia by summoning the part of the US in the contention.¹⁸⁷ The nearness of outside warriors would extraordinarily change the progression on the ground, likely activating more US strikes and maintained inclusion. Up 'til now, there has been no confirmation of remote cooperation, yet agitators have embraced strategies from Iraq.¹⁸⁸ Kagwanja¹⁸⁹ contends that incomprehensibly, US military contribution gives an enticing focus to Al-Qa'eda, yet it prompts a more noteworthy surge in Washington 'to keep up stricter observation'. As it were, the two bolster off each other.

¹⁸⁶ Mohammed 2007

¹⁸⁷ Black 2007:13– 15

¹⁸⁸ Moss and Mekhennet 2007

¹⁸⁹ Kagwanja (2006:82)

Another dynamic of US operations is absence of open data and, therefore, absence of open responsibility. Effectively, the effectiveness of the US strategy becomes difficult to ascertain; Chandler¹⁹⁰ contends that Western states are progressively trying to 'deny the power they employ' in the non-Western world, in what he marks 'realm willfully ignorant'. By concentrating on 'association' and by utilizing surrogates, the US makes light of its political part. Chandler¹⁹¹ calls this technique 'the legislative issues of the avoidance of duty'. The issue for Somalia's situation is that this avoidance propagates doubt, and fierce fanatics can without much of a stretch control the following disarray. For instance, Somalis completely connect the US with the Ethiopian intrusion. Nonetheless, trusted US camouflage may really actuate outrage since responsibility has hence been evacuated. On the other hand, straightforwardness would at any rate undercut perplexity about US aims. In particular, it could better position the US to demonstrate clear initiative, extending the International Contact Group for Somalia and joining provincial performers.¹⁹²

5.3 Further study

Based on the findings of this study, the study recommends that alternative counterterrorism approaches should be employed in Somalia if success is to be realised.

The study also recommends that in future, studies should adopt specific objectives in trying to understand issues relating to terrorism in the Horn of Africa, unlike the current study that was fairly broad by focusing on three objectives.

¹⁹⁰ Chandler (2006b)

¹⁹¹ Ibid

¹⁹² Cooke and Henek 2007:5

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