

FROM OAU TO AU: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PEACEKEEPING¹¹

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**Submitted in partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of Masters of Arts
in international Studies, in the Institute of Diplomacy and International
Studies, University of Nairobi**

November, 2009

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
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
DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been submitted for any Award in any other University.

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This thesis has been submitted for examination with my permission as University supervisor.

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DR KITHURE KINDIKI

DEDICATION

To my darling wife Ruth and my children Maureen, Marion and Martin Odanga.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This project has been made possible through the generous material support made available in the following libraries; National Defence College, University of Nairobi library and Peace support Training Centre Karen. I therefore want to thank God for the ability to complete the project; to him be all the glory. I want to appreciate the opportunity accorded to me by the Armed forces to undertake this course.

I also appreciate the NDC leadership and the faculty for the inspiration at all times. To my colleagues in course 12/09, who indeed lived to their motto of rational actors, the support was enormous.

I am deeply indebted to my supervisor, Dr. Kindiki, who, despite his busy schedule, was available to discuss my progress and provide guidance. There are many more that I have not mentioned by name but gave me both moral and material support. To all I say thank you.

ABSTRACT

This study is on peacekeeping on the African continent from the 1960s to the present date. In particular it examines the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and later its successor African Union (AU) on how they conducted peacekeeping pointing out their strengths and weaknesses. The study also examines at the correlation between the two Africa organisations and the United Nations in responds to threats that affect the peace and security in Africa. The study examines why the Africa continent has increasingly become the focal point of UN peacekeeping missions and especially in the 1990s after the Cold War.

Five selected conflicts in the five regions of Africa were analysed and some of the factors engendering such conflicts in Africa. The five conflicts were drawn one each from the five regions of Africa as follows; the horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, the West Africa, the southern Africa, and finally the North Africa.

The OAU was examined in the areas of peace and security and in particular peacekeeping, from the time of its formation until the time it was replaced by the AU. The OAU peace and security framework structures are also examined and finally, the shortcomings of the OAU that necessitated the formation of AU, making it more appealing than the OAU. Also examined is its peace and security framework of AU and how it is structured to tackle the peace and security challenges on the continent. It is pointed out how the African leaders came to the realization that the international community and the United Nations cannot be depended upon entirely to stop the

suffering of the African people and therefore more emphasis on peace and security placed in the hands of the regional body

In its close to forty year of existence, OAU only managed to deploy one peacekeeping mission in 1981-82 in Chad and the mission failed to achieve the objectives. This was the only peacekeeping mission the OAU ever attempted. The AU on the other hand has so far deployed three peacekeeping missions in the seven years of its existence; in Burundi, Sudan and now Somalia. The AU is relying on non member states for funding and support when planning for peacekeeping missions as it lacks the capacity to carry out peacekeeping operations independently. The lack of finance complicates the peace process as timelines are interfered with. Currently, the UN and by extension the rest of the world are depending on the AU peacekeepers to test the safety of missions in Africa before launching troops from outside Africa and this trend is likely to continue.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMIB	-	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	-	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	-	African Mission in Somalia
AMU	-	Arab-Maghreb Union
ASF	-	African Standby Force
CONOPS	-	Concept of Operations
DDR	-	Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-Integration
DPA	-	Darfur Peace Agreement
ECCAS	-	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	-	Military Observer Group
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West Africa,
FMG	-	Federal Military Government
FNLA	-	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FROLINAT	-	National Liberation Front
HDI	-	Human Development Index
HSP	-	Heavy Support Package
ICISS	-	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICJ	-	International Court of Justice
IGAD	-	Intergovernmental Authority and Development
LSP	-	Light Support Package
MINURSO	-	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MPLA	-	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NMOG	-	Neutral Military Observer Group
ONUMOZ	-	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
REC	-	Regional Economic Communities
REC	-	Regional Economic Communities
RENAMO	-	Mozambican National Resistance
RUF	-	Revolutionary United Front
SADC	-	Southern Africa Development Community
SADR	-	Sahara Arab Democratic Republic
SHIRBRIG	-	United Nations Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade
SLM	-	Sudan Liberation Movement
TCC	-	Troop Contributing Countries
TFG	-	Transition Federal Government
TFI	-	Transition Federal Institutions
UNAMID	-	United Nations and Africa Union Mission in Darfur
UNAVEM	-	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNITA	-	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNITAF	-	Unified Task Force
UNITAG	-	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNOB	-	United Nations Operations in Burundi
UNOMUR	-	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda Rwanda

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY

This is a study on peacekeeping on the African continent by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and later its successor African Union (AU). In order to examine how peacekeeping operations have been carried out in the past and currently on the continent, it is important to understand what peace keeping operation is in general and in the context of OAU and AU.

The official United Nations (UN) definition of peacekeeping is that it is an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.¹ The essence of peacekeeping operations can be dated to the formation of the UN in 1945. However, since 1945 peacekeeping has been the technique most frequently used by and associated with the UN to terminate conflicts and establish peace, so much so that the Organization was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988².

Peacekeepers are soldiers accepted by all of the belligerents to perform the role of neutral policeman as the negotiators carry on with the conflict management process. Peacekeeping can be seen as a cooperative effort or solidarity by states so as to bring an end to hostilities in other countries and save lives while negotiators help settle the crisis. International and/or regional organizations such as UN and AU, offer an acceptable

¹ Woodhouse T and Duffey T Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution New York UNITAR POCI 2000 p.122.

² Ibid p.123.

framework for states to coordinate their actions in the form of peacekeeping operations. The nature of these operations is such that participating States will sacrifice financial resources and sometimes the lives of their soldiers solely to preserve peace in other countries³.

OAU was formed in 1963 during the political turmoil on the African continent for the struggle for independence. Political manifestation for African independence and self-determination was evident. The ideal of Pan-African unity gave rise to different political groupings of independent African states, two of which predominated; these were the Casablanca Group and Monrovia group. The two groups came together to agree on the formation of the OAU leading to signing of the OAU Charter in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 25, 1963. The Charter emphasized on the independence and sovereignty of each individual state as was advocated by the Monrovia Group⁴. The goals of the OAU were to promote decolonization and independent self-government in African states, to guarantee respect for territorial boundaries of the states, and to promote social, political, and economic development on the African continent⁵.

The principle of the sovereignty of states and that of non-interference embodied in the OAU Charter are similar to those of the UN Charter. The UN Charter and the OAU Charter differed, in at least one important way; the UN Charter explicitly stated that international peace and security were top priorities, whereas the OAU Charter did not. Even though peace and security were necessary to accomplish the OAU goals as was

³ Terry M. Mays. *Africa's First Peacekeeping Operation*, Praeger, Westport, CT. 2002. p.2.

⁴ Ibid p. 3.

⁵ OAU charter

mentioned in Article 2 of the Charter, it was also clear from its inception that it was not a priority for the OAU. More importantly, while both the UN and OAU Charters explicitly call for the organizations to avoid involving themselves in the internal affairs of their members, only the OAU adopted a rigid adherence to this doctrine⁶.

Many African countries have struggled with violent conflicts since their independence from their colonial powers. The formation of OAU did little to reduce the number and/or severity of the conflicts⁷. In its close to forty years of existence, the OAU only managed to deploy one peacekeeping mission in 1981-82 in Chad, besides, the mission failed to achieve the objectives. The failure of OAU to maintain peace was attributed largely to normative boundaries that prevented its involvement in the internal conflicts of its member nations. The OAU was therefore dissolved in 2001 in favor of a new organization, the African Union. The mandate of the African Union is more proactive compared to that of OAU in regard to intervention in internal conflicts. Some of structural and practical weaknesses in OAU were addressed in the formative stage of AU, as article 4 (h) gave the right to the AU to intervene in member state given grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crime against humanity.⁸

Rapid efforts have been made so as to put the foundations of the AU in place since its inauguration in 2002. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was among those organs installed in the same year, this was because peace was considered key to achieving any

⁶ Rechner J D A. Normative Shift with Implications for Peacekeeping and Conflict Management, or Just a Name Change. *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*. Vol 39. Issue: 2 p. 5

⁷ Rechner J D A. *ibid* p. 8.

⁸ Field S. Introduction in Field S (ed) *Peace in Africa. Towards a Collaborative Security Regime* Johannesburg, Institute for Global Dialogue p.19.

meaningful development.⁹ At its launch, it was pointed out that the success of PSC will depend on the commitment of AU member states and that the Regional Economic Communities (REC's) would be the building blocks for creation of an African Standby Force (ASF), and the AU's Early Warning System. The formation of ASF was to be phased in such a manner as to be in place by 2010, ready to undertake peacekeeping operations including military interventions if justified. ASF will among other tasks be used for humanitarian operations and post-conflict reconstruction.¹⁰ This study critically analysed the performance of these two regional organisations; the OAU and later AU in peacekeeping on the continent.

1.1 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM

The OAU during its thirty nine year of existence was involved in one peacekeeping operation and five observer missions within the continent. However, many Africa nations have struggled with violent conflicts since their independence without any intervention from OAU, as they did not want to be involved in internal conflicts of member states. However, OAU managed to plan and launch a peacekeeping operation in Chad even though it was not considered successful. OAU was dissolved in 2001 and in its place AU was established with a more proactive mandate with regard to intervention in internal conflicts. Since the establishment of AU it has deployed three peacekeeping missions. The first peacekeeping operation was in 2003 in Burundi named African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), it was later taken over by the UN and became UNOB, the mission

⁹ Commey P. African Union: So Far So Good; If Anybody Thought the African Union (AU) Was Going to Be Just a Talking Point, Recent Developments Have Proved Otherwise: New African. Issue: 431. July 2004 IC Publications Ltd. Gale Group.

¹⁰ Commey P. Ibid p. 14.

ended successful in 2007. The second mission was in 2004 in Sudan (Darfur), the mission was known as African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), it was later taken over by the UN to become United Nations and Africa Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the mission is still on. The third is the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) launched in 2007 and is still on going.

Currently there are six on-going UN peacekeeping missions in Africa including UNAMID. However, the AU is yet to stand out on its own in carrying out successful peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, AU is still experiencing a number of challenges in the ongoing missions. This study will critically analyse the performance of these two regional organisations the OAU and later AU with a view of making recommendations on the way forward.

1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

Objectives of the study are to:

- a. Examine the Peacekeeping needs in Africa from 1963 to date.
- b. To analyse the strengths and weaknesses of OAU and AU in Peacekeeping Operations.
- c. To analyse the capabilities of OAU and AU in the peacekeeping operations in Africa.
- d. Make recommendations on ways of strengthening the AU in peacekeeping operations.

1.3 HYPOTHESIS

This study is premised on two hypotheses as follows:

- a. AU lacks the capacity to carry out peacekeeping operations without external assistance.
- b. AU is more effective at peacekeeping than the OAU

1.4 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

AU was established in 2001 when its predecessor AOU was dissolved. In spite of the numerous violent conflicts in Africa, OAU only deployed one peacekeeping operation in its forty years of existence. The AU has since been involved and still is in carrying out peacekeeping operations on the African continent. The AU established a Peace and Security Council (PSC) which is charged with the responsibility of assessing a potential crisis situation, sends fact finding missions to troubled spots and to authorize and legitimize the AU's intervention in the crisis as required. Although the organization is still at the infancy stage, it is important that it be assessed to determine the extent it has gone in achieving its peacekeeping objectives and how it can be improved. This study carried out the analysis of the OAU and the AU in their peacekeeping effort. Subsequently there was a comparative analysis in peacekeeping between the two regional organisations. The study also examined the African sub-regional peacekeeping and how the AU can draw its strength from them. This research will therefore contribute academically towards literature in the wide field of peacekeeping.

1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW

To understand the current challenges AU is facing, it will be necessary to look at why OAU and later AU were formed, how they managed conflicts in the past and currently. Peacekeeping will normally involve military and civilian personnel in the field with the consent of the conflicting parties. The purpose of peacekeeping is to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts such as cease-fire, separation of forces and to resolve or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief. There have been a number of peacekeeping operations on the African continent involving UN alone or OAU/AU alone or a combination of both UN and AU. The first and only peacekeeping mission operation staged by the OAU was in Chad civil war in 1982.

In 1982, the OAU fielded the first successfully mandated African peacekeeping operation and it became the second regional international organization to mandate and field a multinational peacekeeping operation after the founding of the UN. In 1981, the OAU lacked the military experience to undertake such operations and displayed a history of not being able to carry out resolutions due to lack of financial resources and political will of its members.¹¹ The fielding of the OAU's peacekeeping operation in Chad resulted from Nigerian, French, and US foreign policy interests in Central Africa. It was possible mainly because of a two year political campaign led by Nigeria as the OAU would never have considered the operation. The political pressure and logistical backing of France and US boosted the operation.¹²

¹¹ Terry M. M. *Africa's First Peacekeeping Operation: The Oau in Chad, 1981-1982*. Westport, Praeger, 2002. p.iii.

¹² Terry M. M. *Ibid* pp. 2-4.

Terry May¹³ analysed the first peacekeeping operation by OAU in 1982 in Chad. African countries banded together to form an intercontinental organization the OAU so as to promote peace and prosperity on the African continent. He argues that, given the history of colonial domination the African countries were extremely reluctant to cede any form of control over their internal affairs. The internal conflicts were therefore prevalent and deadly in Africa and were viewed as being entirely outside of the OAU jurisdiction. However, this resulted into deadly conflicts for many decades and thus giving Africa a reputation of a continent of ceaseless conflict. In Chad, the guerrilla fought and outmaneuvered Government forces beyond the barrier established by the OAU peacekeepers. The guerrilla leader ignored the OAU mandate of the mission in his quest to wrestle power from the Chadian government. Goukouni Weddeye, then Chad president, criticized the OAU and its peacekeepers for not fighting on behalf of his forces as his forces were defeated marking the end of OAU peacekeeping mission. The initial estimated cost of a peacekeeping mission of 5,000 men was \$192 million, which was ten times the annual budget of the OAU at the time¹⁴. The OAU therefore requested France to provide military and logistical aid support for the peacekeeping mission. Terry describes this mission as Africa's first successfully fielded multinational peacekeeping operation that was conceived in anticipation, born with confidence, and died scorned by those it was meant to help.

¹³ Terry M. M Ibid p. 7.

¹⁴ Rechner J D A. Normative Shift with Implications for Peacekeeping and Conflict Management, or Just a Name Change. *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*. Vol. 39. Issue: 2. p 520

Jonathan Rechner¹⁵ in his analysis, views African nations as having struggled with violence since their independence from colonial powers and OAU did little to reduce the number or severity of the conflicts. He argues that the failure by OAU to maintain peace was largely due to normative boundaries that prevented its involvement in the internal conflicts of its member nations. He also points out that some of the failure is due to structural and practical weaknesses that were to be found in the OAU set up. He noted that the power was distributed very unevenly, vesting almost all of its power with one group, the Assembly of Heads of State. The OAU adhered to a strict and rigid interpretation of the doctrine of sovereignty and territorial integrity that prevented it from engaging in many devastating conflicts in the continent. This inflexible approach is attributable to the extreme deference to sovereignty that African leaders incorporated into the OAU Charter. Rencher notes of a former U.N. staffer Yassin El-Ayouty who noted in his assessment of the OAU in 1993, "The world has completely changed, since 1989 at the end of the Cold War; the OAU has not, since 1963."¹⁶ El-Ayouty further noted that to remain relevant and effective, the OAU would have to recognize humanitarian intervention in order to protect human rights as a new rule of customary international law. The failure of the Chad peacekeeping mission according to Rechner can be blamed on multiple causes, including a mandate that was unclear to the Chadian government who thought the OAU would assist in fighting against the rebels, and a lack of logistical and financial resources. Of the six countries that pledged to contribute troops for peacekeeping, only three; Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire eventually did and the troops

¹⁵ Rechner J D A. Ibid. p. 524

¹⁶ Rechner J D A. Ibid.

totaled 3,000 peacekeepers, mostly from Nigeria. The OAU's failed peacekeeping mission in Chad left the future status of OAU peacekeeping forces in serious doubt¹⁷.

AU was established with a mandate that took into account humanitarian intervention in internal conflicts.¹⁸ The AU unlike the OAU has a Peace and Security Council (PSC) that is analogous to the UN Security Council, however, the ability to use force to intervene in an internal conflict without a Member State's permission is vested with the General Assembly instead of the PSC. The Constitutive Act of the AU provides in Article 4(h), the right of the Union to intervene pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.¹⁹ Since its establishment, the AU has been involved in three peacekeeping missions, the first one was AMIB in Burundi in 2003, the second mission was AMIS in Sudan (Darfur) in 2004 and the third AMISOM in Somalia launched in 2007 and is still on going. This part of the literature review will examine the three AU peacekeeping missions on the continent in the chronological order.

Rechner examined the AU peacekeeping in Burundi in April 2003. A force of 3,000 peacekeepers from South African, Mozambique and Ethiopia nations was sent with the understanding that it was a temporary measure awaiting the UN deployment of a peacekeeping mission to the country. The mandate of the force was to monitor and verify the implementation of a ceasefire agreement signed between the Burundian government and rebel forces, he argues that while the ceasefire agreements were not fully

¹⁷ Terry M. Opcit.

¹⁸ Cawthra G. A Conceptual Framework For Regional Security. Peace In Africa Towards a Collaborative Security Regime in Field S (ed) Johannesburg , Institute for Global Dialogue p.34-35.

¹⁹ Charter of the African union.

implemented, the AU peacekeepers stabilized about 95% of the country and created adequate conditions for the deployment of UN peacekeepers. However, a lack of funding and a consequent breakdown of logistics affected the performance of the mission.²⁰

AMIB was the first peacekeeping mission initiated, planned and executed by the AU. It was a milestone in as far as AU is concerned as it was operationalising and implementing the peace building mechanism. The AU mission was mandated to build peace in a fluid and dynamic situation as the country could relapse into violent conflict. The UN later authorised the deployment of UN Operations in Burundi (UNOB) so as to take over from the Africa Mission in Burundi forces²¹. The mission wound up in 2007 after peace and stability was achieved.

Jackson Stephen examined the AU mission in Burundi and he traced the origin of the crisis to the 1993 assassination of Ndadaye the first democratically elected president and leader of party associated with Hutu group. This triggered a wave of inter-ethnic massacres and a very tense period, consequently, ethnicity became the basis for the violence. Following peace talks, a ceasefire agreement was drafted and was signed in Arusha in December 2002, setting a stage for peacekeeping forces. An African Mission in Burundi was deployed in April 2003, with a mandate to oversee the implementation of ceasefire agreements, support demobilization, disarmament and integration, and prepare ground for a fuller UN peacekeeping operation and also promote political and economic stability. This was the first AU mission and as Jackson argues, Africa was signaling

²⁰ Rechner J D A. Ibid p.540.

²¹ Ibid p.543.

willingness to put African lives on line in the cause of peace in a country with no immediate strategic interest for its troop contributing countries.²²

Jackson argues that AMIB's overall success was undercut by the continuing violence and unwillingness of the international community to meet the missions cost. The UN was not willing to send in troops without AMIB achieving what they referred to as a "meaningful security on the ground".²³ Financing of AMIB was difficult as funds were not forthcoming from AU member states and by September 2003, AMIB's financial state was difficult while the international support was minimal. However, at the time of establishing UNUB in June 2004, AMIB had managed to stabilize the situation.²⁴

In 2004, the Darfur region in western Sudan was estimated to have over 30,000 killed and more than 1.5 million displaced persons. In response, On May 25, 2004, the PSC of the AU authorized the Chairperson of the Commission to deploy an AU observer mission in Darfur. The mandate of the mission was to observe and monitor the progress of the N'Djamena Humanitarian Cease-Fire Agreement signed by the government of Sudan and the Darfurian rebels on April 8, 2004, and to ensure compliance. Though the mission was started by the AU, it was later joined by the UN to form a hybrid mission UNAMID and the mission is still on-going.²⁵

Alex de Waal argues that the crisis in Darfur is political, it is a civil war and as such it needs a political settlement. This was a fact agreed at meeting on 16 November 2006, chaired by Kofi Annan at the African Union (AU) headquarters in Addis Ababa. Annan

²² Jackson S. *The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). Political and Strategic Lessons Learned*. Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, New York. 2007.

²³ Jackson S. *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Nevin T. *Exit OAU, Enter AU*. African Business Magazine. September 2001. P.10. IC Publications Ltd. Gale Group.

had promised to bring the government of Sudan and the rebels who are still fighting around the table within weeks, the then outgoing UN secretary general was adopting a simple and correct rationale.²⁶

He argues that the Darfur conflict had been long neglected before it first exploded in February 2003. The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) launched guerrilla raids on government garrisons, and the government of Sudan responded by unleashing its militia, the Janjawiid, drawn from Darfur's indigenous Arabs. It took three years before the tabling of workable peace agreement which nearly succeeded. The Darfur Peace Agreement was finalized and signed by the Sudan government and one of the rebel factions. Alex argues that if only the leader of the main party of the SLM had also signed, then the current crisis may not have happened.

The Inter-Sudanese talks on the Conflict in Darfur began in the Chadian capital, N'djamena, in April 2004, with a ceasefire agreement that was unworkable as argued by Alex. The agreement had no maps attached, and therefore no details indicating who controlled which territory and so the mission was bound to fail from the onset. Progress had been painfully slow, and the AU and its international partners particularly the US had almost lost patience. On 5 May 2006, after a final 20-hour negotiating session, the Sudanese government and the SLM faction led by Minawi signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).

The AU forces were already compromised in Darfur as part of their role had been to provide logistical support to the rebels after the DPA was signed, and they duly

²⁶ Alex De Waal. Darfur: The Inside Story. New African. Issue: 461. Publication. April 2007. IC Publications Ltd.

transported Minawi and his commanders around the region, enabling them to reach areas they could not have reached overland, given their steady loss of territory. This was seen by the groups that were holding out as a partisan move. President Bashir decided to defy UN Security Council Resolution 1706, which authorised a robust UN force for Darfur. Alex argues that the president is preoccupied with preventing the secession of southern Sudan.

Alex concludes his argument by saying that the Military intervention will not stop the killings in Darfur and those who are clamouring for more troops to fight their way into Darfur are not right. The UN troops cannot stop an ongoing war, and their past record at protecting civilians is far from perfect.²⁷

According to Touko Piiparinen, in his analysis of the Darfur crisis, the Janjaweed in cooperation with Sudanese government forces, unleashed a campaign of terror by burning the villages of non-Arab communities, raping and abducting their inhabitants, looting their property, forcing them to abandon their homes, and destroying their livestock, water points, mills, and other assets, he said this was genocide. It was not until late July 2004 that military intervention in Darfur was seriously considered by the African Union (AU), a full year after the outbreak of large-scale violence.²⁸

The AU was faced with a severe shortage of material equipment and logistical capacity with which to conduct any effective military operation. An extensive protection force, the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) was authorized by the AU on 20 October

²⁷Alex De Waal. *Ibid.*

²⁸Piiparinen T. *The Lessons of Darfur for the Future of Humanitarian Intervention*. Global Governance. Vol. 13. Issue: 3. 2007. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

2004 and strengthened on 28 April 2005, though its capacity to halt atrocities remained weak. The AU requested UN support in the areas of finance, logistic and technical. Touko argued that this was division of labour, where AMIS is the embodiment of an increased commitment on the part of African countries to resolve the conflicts afflicting their own continent by providing troops and the Western countries providing hardware in the form of logistical, technical, and financial support. The EU, NATO, and individual western countries provided the support.²⁹

The overthrow of the dictatorial regime of President Siad Barre in January 1991 led to the eventual collapse of central authority in Somalia. The country has since then been in turmoil as there has been no national political formula to bring peace in Somalia, consequently the country entered into a period of intensive civil war and statelessness that disrupted its social, political and economic fabric. Efforts by the United Nations to end the human suffering and foster reconciliation among the warring factions led to one of the most challenging undertakings for the UN since its creation. The UN mounted two peacekeeping operation in Somalia, United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNSOM I & II) and the two missions were separated in between by Unified Task Force (UNITAF).³⁰ However, the missions running between 1993 and 1995, failed to stop the civil war and the UN withdrew its troops in 1995 and from then until 2007, the international community watched the events in Somalia from a distance with minimal involvement.

In 2007, AU deployed nearly 3,000 Ugandan and Burundian AU peacekeepers in Somalia, mainly in city of Mogadishu. The AU has approved another five thousand

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ United Nations. The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996. United Nations Production Section, New York, 1996.p.

troops, but the countries that had pledged to contribute troops to the mission that are Nigeria, Ghana and Malawi have yet to follow through on their pledged. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon raised the possibility of incorporating the AU troops into a larger U.N. peacekeeping force once the UN moves into Somalia. At the planning stage AMISOM was expected to eventually reach 8,000 troops and it was to be modeled after AMIB.³¹

According to Patel and Tripodi³², Intervention in Africa is extremely difficult, but it is by no means impossible, they point at the successful examples of UN missions in Mozambique and Namibia as providing positive evidence that it is worthwhile to give peace a chance. The Dilemma in Africa Humanitarian intervention represented one of the major challenges of the 1990s. The first impact with a harsh outcome was the intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s. Somalia was not only the first real occasion for the Western military to understand the implications of dealing with complex civil wars, but it was also the first opportunity to understand that culture is an important element to address in peace operations. Culture has brought in a new dimension to the conflict making it even more urgent for the Africans to take responsibility of their own issues.

They argue that only in the execution can the AU become a truly effective organization. Africa can no longer rely on the U.N. or the world's major powers to give necessary assistance as the developed world could easily ignore the African conflicts. Nevin on the

³¹Piiparinen T. Ibid.

³² Patel P and Tripodi P. The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Africa Contemporary Review. Volume: 279. Issue: 1628. Publication Date: September 2001. Page Number: 144. 2002 Gale Group.

other hand argues that the mission of AU is to drive Africa into the future with strength, vision and purpose using apparatus trimmed of much of its fat and replaced with battle-ready muscle to meet the challenges of Africa in the 21st century.³³

1.6 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Following the NATO's contentious intervention in Kosovo in the 1990s, Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General reflected on the dilemma of humanitarian intervention. He questioned the legitimacy for a regional organization such as NATO to use force without a UN mandate. He further questioned if it is permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human rights, with grave humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked, such as was the case in Rwanda. In addition to these questions he also challenged the international society to avoid in future, cases similar to that experienced in Kosovo, where the Security Council considers action but is deadlocked about whether to intervene in order to prevent humanitarian crises from worsening. The other case is that of Rwanda; where the Security Council failed to even consider taking decisive action when the country was faced with genocide.³⁴

Annan's challenge was taken up by both the scholars and political leaders, though most notably by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which is an independent panel. In its report, "The responsibility to protect", the ICISS insisted that protecting the civilians is the primary responsibility that lay with the host

³³ Nevin T. Exit OAU, Enter AU African Business Gale Group September 2001.

³⁴ Bellamy A J. Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit

state and that any intervention from outside could only be contemplated if the host proved either unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibilities. For the states to endorse the concept and to adopt it at the 2005 World Summit, the ICISS's commissioners and supporters lobbied hard to persuade them.³⁵ They did succeed as the summit's outcome document had two paragraphs that stated as follows; "Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means." The states accepted that responsibility and they are to act in accordance with it. Further to it, the international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help states to exercise this responsibility and support the UN in establishing an early warning capability. "The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to help protect populations from war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." In this context, the states are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate.³⁶

The clause received a mixed reception among states and commentators. According to Chesterman, this would have two negative consequences. First he doubts whether the principle would operate in the prescribed manner, as there are high chances that some states would use this to license self interested interventionism under the guise of

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

humanitarianism. Secondly he argued that the creation of a new norm is establishing an international rule that is weakening the constraints on the use of force.³⁷

On the other hand Todd Lindberg argued that the declaration now replaced the state with human individuals as the primary focus of security and so gave all states the responsibility to uphold and protect basic human rights irrespective of where they were violated. Simon Chesterman pointed out that it is the political will and not sovereignty considerations that ultimately determine whether or not states intervene. He further argued that Humanitarian intervention is therefore only likely when states feel obliged to act, be it for humanitarian or self-interest reasons.³⁸

The responsibility to protect adopted two strategies both of which attempted to encourage and enable intervention in genuine humanitarian emergencies while at the same time constraining the use of humanitarian arguments to justify other types of force by changing the terms of the debate. Indeed, the importance of language in shaping the way the world responds to humanitarian crises was acknowledged by three of its key progenitors. The first strategy was to come up with the parameters of responsibility by clearly defining the circumstances in which international society should assume responsibility for preventing, halting, and rebuilding. The purpose was also to make it more difficult for Security Council members to shirk their responsibilities as well as limiting the use of veto.³⁹

³⁷ Welsh J M. *From Right to Responsibility: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society*. Oxford University Press.

³⁸ Bellamy A J. *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

The ICISS proposed two just cause thresholds; mass killing and ethnic cleansing, and insisted that when the host state was either unwilling or unable to prevent or halt these wrongs, the responsibility for doing so would fall on international society generally and the Security Council in particular. Security Council members would in such a case be obliged to publicly justify their positions. According to ICISS, when states are confronted with a genuine humanitarian emergency and unable to justify opposition on humanitarian grounds, the chances are that the anti-interventionist states would be reluctant to block collective action.

There were objections to “The responsibility to protect” soon after it was published, some states and commentators were worried about the widened potential that could be open to abuse. They argued that any relaxing of the general prohibition on use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter would merely serve the interests of the powerful by granting them more freedom to intervene in the affairs of the weak states without necessarily increasing global cooperation in response to humanitarian emergencies. But according to the ICISS commissioners, the just cause thresholds and precautionary principles constituted an important barrier to abuse. A common framework was to be established so that interveners would use to justify their action while the rest can use the same to evaluate and judge those claims.⁴⁰

The responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities; first is the responsibility to prevent, this addresses both root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man made crises putting population at risk. The second is the

⁴⁰ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the ICISS* Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001.

responsibility to react, entails responding to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, and that may include coercive measures such as sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention. The third is the responsibility to rebuild, to provide particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.⁴¹

The African Union (AU) was created by the Constitutive Act of 2002 and formally replaced the Organization for African Unity (OAU). The main driving force behind the formation of AU was the belief that the international society had generally neglected African challenges and that the continent must take its own measures especially as pertains to security. As the Declaration of African Heads of State that accompanied the Constitutive Act put it, "The international community has not always accorded due attention to conflict management in Africa, as it has consistently done in other regions, and ... the efforts exerted by Africans themselves in the area of peacekeeping ... are not given adequate financial and logistical support."⁴²

The AU was awarded a right of humanitarian intervention Under the Constitutive Act. Article 4(h) of the act established "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity."⁴³ In 2003, the article was amended to cover other "serious threats to legitimate order," and an additional paragraph Article 4 (j)

⁴¹ Gareth E. The Responsibility to protect. Ending Mass atrocity Crimes Once and for all. Harrisonburg, R R. Donnelley. 2006. p.41.

⁴² Bellamy A J. Ibid.

⁴³ AU charter. Article 4.

formalizing a state's right to request intervention was added. Article 4(g) however still insisted that the member states refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of other members. Together, therefore, these articles reject unilateral intervention in favor of collective action. However, their significance lies in the assertion that the AU need not defer humanitarian emergencies to the UN Security Council. Article 4(h) was adopted so as to enable the AU resolve conflicts more effectively on the continent." The AU created an institutional mechanism through Article 4, which permits the regional arrangements foreseen by the responsibility to protect.⁴⁴ This study will therefore be informed by the concept of the responsibility to protect.

1.7 METHODOLOGY

This is a case study that aimed at examining how OAU and later the AU put to use their structures in performing peacekeeping operations. It was a qualitative analysis looking in depth on the various aspects of peacekeeping operations that prevailed on the continent of Africa as a whole and in particular cases in the carrying out peacekeeping operations. The research made use of primary documents that included; the UN resolutions and the AU summit resolutions. The study also relied on the secondary sources which included; books, journals, newspapers, UN and AU reports, newsletters and other formidable sources and finally the study made use of descriptive analysis.

⁴⁴ Bellamy A J. Ibid.

1.8 PROJECT CHAPTERS

This study is comprised of five chapters and the next four chapters are as follows:

1.8.1 Chapter Two

This chapter is entitled the armed conflicts in Africa. Five selected conflicts in the five regions of Africa were analysed and also some of the factors engendering such conflicts in Africa have been examined. The five conflicts were drawn one each from the five regions of Africa as follows; the horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, the West Africa, the southern Africa, and finally the North Africa.

1.8.2 Chapter Three

This chapter is titled OAU peacekeeping and examines the OAU from the time of its formation until the time it is replaced by the AU. The chapter is concerned with the peace and security dimension and in particular peacekeeping. The OAU peace and security framework structures are also examined and finally, the shortcomings of the OAU that necessitated the formation of AU more appealing.

1.8.3 Chapter Four

The chapter is titled AU peacekeeping and examines at the formation of the AU and how the events of the 1990s helped to accelerate its formation. Also examined is its peace and security framework and how it is structured to tackle the peace and security challenges on the continent. It is pointed out how the African leaders came to the realization that the

international community and the United Nations cannot be depended upon entirely to stop the suffering of Africa and therefore more emphasis on peace and security placed in the hands of the regional body. Also Analysed is the peacekeeping operations AU has launched to date and the outcomes.

1.8.4 Chapter Five

This chapter examines the lessons learnt from the study, best practices in peacekeeping and finally gives a conclusion to the study.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ARMED CONFLICTS IN AFRICA FROM 1963 TO DATE

2.0 INTRODUCTION

The current political environment and the existing threats to peace and stability particularly in Africa are of serious concern to the world. The UN on its part in response to the world peace and security has developed an interrelated system that is both flexible and responsive to deal with such threats. However, security is still elusive and requires constant attendance where traditional concepts must yield to a broader perception of peace and security¹. The United Nations responds to threats that affect the international peace and security while the AU as a regional organization works in conjunction with the UN in responding to some of the threats that affect peace and security on the African continent. Consequently, depending on the prevailing situation, the OAU then, and now AU, either acting on its own or with UN mandate has intervened in various conflicts by sending peacekeepers so as to restore peace.

The African continent has increasingly become the focal point of UN peacekeeping missions and especially in the 1990s after the Cold War.² Peacekeeping are generally praiseworthy from the humanitarian point of view in that they help mitigate human suffering. However, they rarely address the fundamental issues that endanger the viability of many African states and the subsequent human suffering.³ The peace operations in this

¹ Christian H. An Introduction to the UN System: Orientation for Serving on a UN Field Mission. UNITARPOCI 2003 p.36.

² Klingebiel S. Africa's new peace and security architecture, in Africa security review vol. 14 no. 2 march 2005.

³ Malaquias A. Peace Operations in Africa: Preserving the Brittle State. Journal of International Affairs Vol 55 Issue 2. 2002 Gale Group.

case have tended to postpone the domestic struggles that accompany such complex process of state-building.⁴ It is necessary the analysis take into account the three specific responsibilities as outlined in the responsibility to protect.

This chapter will analyse selected conflicts in the five regions of Africa and subsequently examine some factors engendering such conflicts in Africa.

2.1 SELECTED CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

Africa has experienced many conflicts both intra and inter conflicts with varying scales of magnitude. The study will examine five conflicts one each from the five regions of Africa; the horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, the West Africa, the southern Africa, and finally the North Africa.

2.1.1 The Horn of Africa

This is one of the most unstable regions in Africa, with most of the states having experienced one or more violent conflicts. Currently there is an AU peacekeeping in Somalia, tension between Ethiopia and Eretria over border issue, two peacekeeping missions in Sudan one AU and another UN/AU, internal conflict in the northern part of Uganda, and tensions on the Kenya-Somalia border. For the purpose of this study one war that occurred twice in this region will be examined, and this is the Ogaden wars between Somalia and Ethiopia.

⁴ Malaquias A. Ibid

In the nineteenth century, emperor Menelik, the creator of modern Ethiopia, had participated directly with Britain, France and Italy in the dismemberment of the Somali nation and the subsequent division into five colonial territories. And so the formation of a Somali state in 1960, applied only to the former British and Italian Somali territories. This established a state which was inherently incomplete as it left outside the long term goal of Somali nationalist aspirations. The remaining three Somali communities then under foreign rule in the French territory of Djibouti, Ogaden of Ethiopia, and in the northern Eastern province of Kenya (then still British) were left out. The problem was now how the three remaining Somali colonies, through self-determination can extend the frontiers of the state to embrace the whole nation.⁵

From the time the Somalia attained its independence, it was determined to annex part of Kenya the North Eastern Province and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Consequently Somalia did sponsor insurgents in those regions causing tension and military interventions in Kenya and Ethiopia. African states under the OAU opposed the moves by Somalia to separate Ogaden, the Somali ethnic region of Ethiopia and unite it to the Somali Republic in a "Greater Somalia". Somalia was the only African state that consistently called for revision of borders inherited from colonial rule. However, it was isolated in this policy, which also threatened its already established common borders with Kenya.⁶

⁵ Lewis I M. A Modern History of Somalia, Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. Boulder, Westview Press. 1988. P.x.

⁶ The OAU in African Conflicts, New African Magazine, July-August 2002. 2004 Gale Group.

In January 1976 the Ethiopian government distributed a memorandum to African heads of state meeting in Addis Ababa that was entitled "war Clouds on the Horn of Africa." The memorandum charged that Somalia was planning to go to war against Ethiopia, and in 1977 a war eventually erupted following the Somali army invasion of Ethiopia's Somali-inhabited Ogaden region, but at the end of it, Somalia was defeated, the war had lasted until 1978. A second war erupted in 1988 and again Somalia was defeated by Ethiopia. In the second war it is estimated that 50,000 people lost their lives and 500,000 driven from their homes.⁷ In both instances the OAU did not intervene nor did the international community.

This is a conflict that had its roots in the colonial borders as Somalia wanted to have all the Somali nationals in one state, yet the arbitrary partitioned borders could not accommodate that. The superpowers were involved as they fueled by providing the arms to either sides and only pulled out at the end of the cold war, indeed the two countries were involved by the superpowers in the power games. At the end of the war the Somalia president was disposed and there has been no peace in Somalia since, in fact the state is referred to as a failed state.

2.1.2 West Africa

West Africa is another region that has been very unstable since independence. In the initial years, it was faced with the problem of military coups; among them were Nigeria and Ghana. Nigeria was also involved in a civil war in the 1960s while in the 1990s two neighbouring countries; Liberia and Sierra Leone were faced with serious internal

⁷ The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996. New York. United Nations. 1996. p.11.

conflicts necessitating intervention from the regional organisation and eventually the UN. In this study Sierra Leone conflict has been examined in details.

Sierra Leone is a small country on the coast of West Africa. The country is characterised by a production of high proportion of top quality gem diamonds. Siaka Stevens who took over as the president In 1968 encouraged illicit mining of diamonds, which was later to generate a big economic and political problem in the country as only few benefited at the expense of the entire population. The country had dropped to the bottom of the UN Human Development Index (HDI). The country eventually culminated into a civil war.⁸

The Sierra Leone civil war began in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Foday Sankoh launched an attack on the sitting government from the Liberian side. However, the war was directed at civilians not the government and so never attracted populace following. The populace were terrorised into abandoning their homes and fields as they were cutting off their hands and feet as the RUF wrested control of the diamond fields from the corrupt government. With the support of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), the Sierra Leone Army tried defending the government but the eventually took power in 1992. The fighting did not stop and eventually in 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections were held and the Army handed over the power to the elected government. RUF did not participate in the election and so continued with the war. RUF was getting its support from Charles Taylor then a warlord in the neighboring Liberia as they traded diamonds

⁸ United Nations. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. Maintained by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2005.

for arms. In 1997 there was a military coup and this time round they joined hands with the RUF and formed a ruling junta.⁹ UN authorised the ECOWAS to use the ECOMOG to ensure the implementation of the oil and arms embargo by the UN Security Council. In 1998 in respond to an attack by the junta forces, the ECOWAS hit back at the forces and their subsequent collapse. However, the president was returned to office and peace agreement was brokered. A major recommendation was the creation of a United Nations Peacekeeping Force for Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL. On the 22nd October 1999, the Security Council established UNAMSIL to cooperate with the government and the other parties in implementing the peace agreement. UNAMSIL successfully completed its mandate in December 2005.¹⁰

Tens of thousands died and more than 2 million people were displaced during the war that lasted 11 years. Neighboring countries became host to the refugees attempting to escape the civil war Control of Sierra Leone's diamond industry was a main objective for the war. Although endowed with abundant natural resources, Sierra Leone was ranked as the poorest country in the world by 1998. The OAU did not intervene directly, but the ECOMOG did, and eventually the UN deployed peacekeeping troops.

This was one of the many intra state conflicts in Africa; this was mainly as a result of poor governance by the elite, the interests of the leaders were considered as national interests. The country resources were benefiting only a few and so an insurgent group can up to oppose the government at the same time benefit from the illicit mining of the

⁹ Smillie I. Getting to the Heart of the Matter, Sierra Leone, Diamonds, and Human Security. Social Justice. Volume: 27. Issue: 4. P. 24. 2000. Gale Group.

¹⁰ United Nations. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. Maintained by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2005.

diamonds. The country in spite of a wealth of its natural resources, it was very poor coming at the bottom of the UN annual statistics on the HDI. Consequently, it was very weak economically and politically as the government was unable to provide security to its nationals.¹¹

2.1.3 North Africa

The North Africa region is a relatively stable region on the continent. Occasionally it has been drawn in conflicts in the neighbouring states such as Chad and Sudan. However, it has also had conflicts emanating from the border issues such as that of Algeria and Morocco and now the Morocco and the Western Sahara sovereignty. This study will examine the Western Sahara conflict otherwise also referred to as Polisario.

The Western Sahara country is bounded by Morocco to the North, Algeria to the northeast and Mauritania on the east and south. The population is estimated to be just over 200,000, half of whom are either displaced or voluntarily living abroad. They are Muslims and, despite similarities, they are culturally distinct from the nationals of the other Maghreb countries. The country is rich in phosphate deposits and other minerals including natural gas, and its coast abounds in fish life. The territory was conquered by Spain in 1884.

Spain was called upon to take all measures necessary to ensure the decolonization of the territory and to enter into negotiations relating to its future. A resolution passed by UN a year later in its 21st session, expressly urged Spain to arrange for the holding of a referendum so as to ascertain the wishes of the indigenous Western Saharans, including

¹¹ Ibid.

refugees. By the mid-1970s, however, the situation had changed as Spain, was neither willing nor able to remain in the Western Sahara. In 1974 it formally communicated to the UN its agreement with holding a referendum in the following year. But by then, Morocco was claiming sovereignty over the territory.¹²

In 1975 the UN referred the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which found evidence of a tie of allegiance between some, but not all, of the tribal chiefs and the Sultan of Morocco. However, this did not amount to Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and so the ICJ endorsed the right of the population to self-determination. Any hope that removal of the legal hurdle would clear the way for positive action towards settlement was soon blasted by Morocco's obduracy as it continued to oppose the holding of a referendum and argued that the ICJ's opinion was not inconsistent with its claim. On 6 November 1975 King Hassan sent 350,000 volunteers with Koran in hand as they marched across the disputed territory to assert its integration with Morocco at the same time Moroccan forces began their occupation.¹³

On 6 February 1976 Spain conclude agreements whereby it ceded Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania, as Mauritania also claimed sovereignty over the part of the Western Saharan territory adjoining its northern border and went ahead to occupy it at the same time as the Moroccan invasion. Immediately the Polisario declared the establishment of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a sovereign state. The OAU was slow in joining in. It was not until 1978 that it began to take action. A resolution passed by OAU in that year established a committee of widely respected heads

¹² Khalil M. I. Conflict Resolution in Africa. Journal of African Economies. Volume: 9. Issue: 3. 2000. p.295.

¹³ Ibid p.296.

of states, to examine and report on the dispute. The main proposal in its report, called for an immediate ceasefire and the holding of a referendum in order to ascertain the wishes of the population. The referendum was to be held in cooperation with the UN as it had previously called for it and also had the necessary resources and the means to carry it out effectively.¹⁴

Polisario accepted the recommendation insofar as it related to the referendum but refused to be bound by the call for ceasefire as long as Morocco's occupation, military build-up and obstruction of a plebiscite continued. In December 1985 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution similar to the OAU Resolution 104, calling for a ceasefire, recommending the laying down of a plan for holding the referendum, and calling on the parties to engage in direct negotiations and otherwise cooperate in implementation. The Security Council, in its resolution 658 of 1990 took a decisive step towards preparation for the referendum, established the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara called MINURSO. However, lack of trust between Moroccan and the Polisario as well as their failure to cooperate with MINURSO has led to a near-stalemate which has lasted since then to date.¹⁵

Polisario is another case of inter state conflict tracing its roots from the partitioning of the colonial borders. The borders of the African states were based on the colonial borders which did not take into account nation states. It also has a dimension of the strong state interfering with a weak state's right of the population to self-determination.

¹⁴ Ibid p.298.

¹⁵ Ibid p. 301.

2.1.4 The Great Lakes Region

This is a region that draws countries that are in the horn of Africa, Southern Africa and Central Africa. This is a crises region which at one time so most of the DRC neighbours involved in one war that started off first as an internal conflict in DRC in 1996, but was internationalized and drew in the countries in the neighbouring regions. For this study the Rwanda Genocide will be examined.

Rwanda is a little country in the great lakes region, which in April 1994, was propelled to the forefront of the international stage because the genocide it experienced, the greatest genocide in African history. The history of Rwanda dates back from the 10th century when the Bahutu farmers and Batutsi herders moved in Rwanda progressively between the 10th and 15th centuries and settled there. Starting in the 16th century, the region was organized into kingdoms, but was eventually unified under one Tutsi ruler who even put in place a socio-economic and political system based on the exploitation of the peasant masses, mainly Hutus. In 1895, Rwanda officially became a German protectorate, and in 1916 both Germany and Belgian administered the country, and to some extent using customary Tutsi authority to manage the territory. In order to maintain good alliances with the Tutsi chiefs, the colonialists did not alter any of their privileges but rather, they reinforced these privileges by creating schools for the chiefs as they integrated them into the colonial regime.¹⁶

The Hutu intellectuals began to question Tutsi domination and demanded basic reforms in the 1950s, but the King's refused to consider their claims and this ended in the social

¹⁶ Umutesi B M. Is Reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis Possible? *Journal of International Affairs*. Vol 60. Issue: I. Columbia University School of International Public Affairs, 2006. p.157 Gale Group.

revolution of 1959. The revolution by the Hutu peasants of southern Rwanda brought the Hutu to power and resulted in a redistribution of land especially to previously landless people. Many of the Tutsi fled to neighboring countries, particularly to Uganda, from which they launched counter-attacks against the Rwandan regime in the 1960s.¹⁷ The tension between the two ethnic communities has continued to build up and the climax was the 1994 genocide.

The 1994 genocide in Rwandans lasted three months and it is estimated that between 500,000 and 800,000 deaths was recorded. Hutu militias were principally responsible for the massacres. The explosion of violence began on 7 April 1994, following the assassination of President Juvenal Habyarimana who was a Hutu. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was accused of the murder. RPF was a movement of Tutsi exiles fighting against the authority of Habyarimana since October 1990. There was extreme tension between the two principal ethnic groups of the country, the Hutu and the Tutsi, which made it possible for the genocide to take place. Appalling images appeared on television but the international community did not respond quickly to stop the horror; the 2,500 UN peacekeepers stationed in the country since 1993 only watched without moving towards stopping the massacres.¹⁸

As the massacres of Tutsis and moderate Hutus were beginning, the RPF took advantage and resumed the civil war which had been halted by the Arusha Peace Agreement signed in August 1993. The RPF left thousands of dead Hutu men, women and children. However, this was not covered as the RPF prohibited journalist access to the places

¹⁷ Gasana J. Remember Rwanda? World Watch Magazine. Vol 15. Issue: 5. September-October 2002 .p. 24
Worldwatch Institute. Gale Group.

¹⁸ Umutesi B M. Ibid p.158.

where the massacres were being committed. In July 1994, the RPF took power in Kigali and intensified the massacre of the Hutus who remained in Rwanda. When the RPF took power, millions of the Hutus took refuge in neighboring countries. More than a million gathered in camps around the cities of Bukavu, Goma, and Uvira in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). RPF invaded these camps in October 1996, and destroyed refugee the camps. During the invasion, thousands of Hutus were killed others had to re-enter Rwanda, while still others found refuge in the mountains and forests of the Congo. Crimes committed by the RPF are being largely ignored, and the Hutu victims of the genocide and its aftermath have been nearly forgotten.¹⁹

This is a typical case of poor governance where one ethnic group in leadership per time excludes the rest, while the elite in leadership systematically create animosity between the ethnic groups for their own selfish end. The successive leaders in Rwanda deliberately refused to unite the people and instead capitalized on ethnic difference to rule. Consequently the country grew weak economically and politically, eventually it could not guarantee security to its people leading to genocide.²⁰

2.1.5 The Southern Africa

The Southern region has been a relatively stable except for the fact that it is a region that some of the countries got their independence much later than other regions. This is attributed mainly to the natural resources found in the region and the colonialist did not want to let go as they continued extracting the resources. So some of the countries were

¹⁹ Ibid. p.158.

²⁰ The Rwanda Genocide: There's More to the Story. World Watch. Volume: 15. Issue: 6 2002 Gale Group.

in turmoil towards the time of their independence, they included Namibia and Angola. The study will examine the Angola civil war that lasted about sixteen years.

Towards independence in 1975, Angola had three liberation movements; Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) The MPLA, with growing backing from the Portuguese Communist Party, Cuba, and the Soviet Union, defeated FNLA in the capital Luanda and then turned on UNITA, chasing its representatives out of Luanda. UNITA was militarily the weakest movement, though at the time, it claimed the allegiance of about 40 percent of the population. The three movements signed an agreement on 10th January, 1975, setting the independence for November 11, 1975. They were to form a transition government on the 31st January, 1975 headed by a Portuguese high commissioner. The government was set up but there was bickering over power. At this time foreign powers were becoming increasingly involved, with the East-West power struggle coming into play. The west led by the US supported FNLA that was headed by Roberto and also at some later stage funded UNITA. On the other hand, the Soviet and Cuba supported MPLA of Neto. At one point some African countries including Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana and Nigeria also supported UNITA that was headed by Savimbi. The support intensified the war and in August UNITA formerly declared war against MPLA. FNLA and the UNITA forged a common front against the MPLA and withdrew their ministers from the transition government hence its collapse.²¹

²¹ Collelo T (ed). Angola, a Country Study. Washington D.C US Government Printing Office. 1991.p.38

By the time of independence Portugal did not recognize any faction and instead ceded independence to the people of Angola. MPLA who controlled Luanda announced the establishment of its government and called its controlled territory people's republic of Angola. The FMLA and UNITA announced a different regime and called it controlled territory the Democratic People's Republic of Angola, with its headquarters in Huambo in the Southern part of the country. The MPLA government was supported by about 50,000 troops from Cuba, while UNITA was supported by troops from South Africa.²²

In 1977, the MPLA captured the last major stronghold of the UNITA, whose leaders then fled to neighboring Zaire and Zambia, where they regrouped and revived their guerrilla warfare against the MPLA. The United States refused to recognize the government in Angola as long as Cuban troops were in the country. In late 1988 US-mediated talks led to a signed peace accord, after which South Africa removed its troops, but the fighting continued between the MPLA government and the UNITA rebels. Another truce in June 1989, signed by Angola's President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi also failed to end hostilities. Cuba withdrew its troops in May 1991. After a year of negotiations, led by the Soviet Union and the US, the two leaders again signed a peace treaty on 31st May, 1991, officially ending the 16-year civil war. The first United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), later known as UNAVEM I, was mandated by the Security Council to monitor the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The mission started in 1989 and was through in 1991.²³

²² Ibid p. 39.

²³ United Nations. The Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI). http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unavemS.htm

2.2 FACTORS ENGENDERING CONFLICT IN AFRICA

Africa continent is faced with insecurity challenges of various dimensions which is a reflection of combination of threats and vulnerabilities it faces.²⁴ The vulnerabilities are in terms of economic underdevelopment, political instability and indefensible boundaries which were arbitrary drawn. On the other hand, the threats arise from the other strong continents/states with their aggressive actions to extract resources from Africa. The African states therefore have national security policy that is inward seeking to reduce vulnerabilities of the state itself as opposed to outward policy that seeks to reduce external threats. Most of the African states are considered both weak states and weak powers.²⁵ There are a number of factors engendering conflicts in Africa some of the selected factors are discussed as follows; arbitrary borders, the cold war period, weak states and weak powers, the OAU charter, Somalia intervention and the Rwanda genocide factors, and how all these have shaped the world thinking and in particular the African leadership. Some of the factors are external and others internal, though some may be due to both factors. The factors will be discussed under two headings; the external factors then the internal factors.

2.2.1 External factors

During the colonization period in the nineteenth century, Africa was partitioned into arbitrary territorial units. The states that emerged often lacked cohesiveness and the differences and antagonisms among the indigenous groups were exploited by the new leadership. Decolonization therefore created a new set of challenges which the emerging

²⁴ Buzan B. *People States and Fear*. Harlow, Pearson Education Limited p.112.

²⁵ Buzan B. *Ibid* p. 113

leaders were ill-equipped to handle. At its formation in 1963, the OAU accepted the borders under the doctrine of *uti possidetis* (as you hold possession by right). This has created a protracted contention among rival communal groups. The existence of poorly defined borders throughout the continent has contributed to conflicts and will likely pose greater problems as resources diminish in light of the ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity within those preordained borders.²⁶ The rationalization of state borders to achieve more coherent nation-state units, would have appeared to present a solution as did in the Western Europe state making experience. The UN and the OAU operated in such a way as to prevent adjustment and reorganization of the configuration of the African states.²⁷

During the cold war, there existed the bipolar system in which nations were broadly aligned to the two superpowers in Moscow or Washington²⁸. The superpowers courted the African states in spite of many being authoritarian, corrupt, and oppressive, they even supported a number of African conflicts by supplying arms. Between 1960 and 1990, there were a total of eighteen civil wars in Africa which resulted in about seven million deaths and spawned five million refugees.²⁹ Then, the superpower rivalry fueled many African conflicts though their roots were internal due to bad political leadership that manipulated ethnicity to favor or suppress particular groups. Africa like other parts of the world, operated under the influence of the superpowers in a controlled international

²⁶ Berman E G. *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*. Geneva, Nations Institute for Disarmament Research/Institute for Security Studies. 2000 pp. 13-14.

²⁷ Job B L. *The Insecurity Dilemma, National Security of Third World States*. Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers. Inc. 1992 pp. 12-13.

²⁸ Field S. *Ibid* p.25.

²⁹ Adebajo A. *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, Ecomog, and Regional Security in West Africa*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner. 2002. p.2.

system.³⁰ After the cold war, African leaders could no longer depend on the superpowers or colonial masters for political and economic support. It became increasingly difficult for the leaders to sustain their regimes and hence the disgruntled and oppressed groups challenged the legitimacy of these leaders³¹. This led to more ethnic conflicts in Africa and so was the shift from inter-state to intra-state conflicts. Africa therefore witnessed a dramatic increase of intra-state conflicts while there was a decrease in the inter-state conflicts following the end of the cold war.

2.2.2 Internal Factors

The other African security perspective is that they are both weak states and weak powers, and therefore cannot live to the traditional sense of national security. Traditional national security calls for a relationship between a population and its government, state institutions and officeholders, and the capacity for a state to protect against external threats arising from the anarchic international system. In Africa the basic parameters for national security equation or social contract relationship are not satisfied, as they are lacking in both social cohesion and state capacities.³² Conditions of individual security for the third world citizens remain bleak as most regimes seek to secure themselves against opposition by employing tactics that are repressive against their own citizens. Also most of these states do not have the capacity to provide minimal conditions for their personnel well being.³³ About one third of the African states is regarded as unstable and so is unable to exercise full effective control over their own national territory and their

³⁰ Buzan B. *opcit* p.13.

³¹ Berman E G. *Ibid* p.16.

³² Buzan B. *Ibid* p. 113.

³³ Job B L. *opcit*. p.2.

borders.³⁴ This can be related to the general development situation and deficits in a number of African countries as they are unable to provide the basic services. This is more pronounced in the remote/rural areas and leads to a strong influence on territorial integrity.

Third world regimes are seen as benevolent or repressive and their security interests may not be same as those of the state or nation. Whereas there may be a clear distinction between the two interests, the regime interest is normally referred to as national and state security problem. Consequently the regime survival dictates the official perception and definition of what constitutes a threat to national security³⁵, such countries are regime-centric. This is basically the issue of poor leadership in many African states where the elite seek to power at all expense as they extract resources for their own selfish end.

When the OAU was established, the member states sought to protect their independence not only from the west but from one another as well. The purpose and principles as enumerated in the articles II and III of OAU charter placed premium on sovereignty, territorial integrity and non interference in member states internal affairs. The charter did not provide for collective security, consequently the OAU members lacked the enthusiasm for intervention in conflict as was visible in the dispute resolution structures in place that were largely undeveloped³⁶. The OAU charter was conservative and its concern was to protect the organisation as a whole from being manipulated by a faction. It had in place a two-third requirement for a quorum, for a calling of special meetings,

³⁴ Klingebiel S. Africa's new peace and security architecture, in Africa security review vol. 14 no. 2 March 2005.

³⁵ Job B. opcit p.145.

³⁶ Job B. Ibid p. 45.

and for all decisions in the summit meetings. This was a demonstration of protective preference for inaction and more importantly a delay in decisive movement in the absence of general support. The Secretary General was thus given few explicit powers. The bottom line was that the OAU was not a command organisation and was not equipped with independent executive instruments capable of enforcing decisions against either members or non-members.³⁷ Though the charter provided for commission of mediation, conciliation and arbitration, it was never operationalised and so OAU relied on ad hoc committees of member states and eminent personalities to mediate disputes.³⁸

The intervention in the Somalia conflict in 1993 with its catastrophic result was a big shock for the international community and especially for all those countries that suffered fatalities among their military contingents and therefore the thought of intervening in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 became more of a concern. Western states, including Security Council members, balked at sending their soldiers into a situation not within their security interests and the probability of their troops returning home in body bags seemed high. Though they agreed that saving the lives of innocent civilians is a noble cause, the sight of dead soldiers returning from a distant country that most can not even locate on a map was not acceptable. The United States in particular did not desire to involve itself in another situation similar to Somalia. The then, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan referred to the American and European reluctance to participate in a renewed UN mission in Rwanda as “the post-Somalia syndrome.” Even today, deploying UN troops in some areas of the African continent where the level of violence has surpassed

³⁷ Deng F M and Zartman I W. Conflict resolution in Africa. Virginia, Donnelley and sons Co. 1991 p.350.

³⁸ Job B. Ibid p. 46.

what is considered 'normally' acceptable to a Western mentality, is presenting particular difficulties³⁹.

The intervention by the international community in Somalia in 1993 and the subsequent non-intervention in the Rwanda genocide in 1994 marked two major milestones in the global perspective of humanitarian interventions in Africa. The Somalia case acted as a cautionary moment to the western countries as they were forced to take stock of their national interests. It was then apparent that they had little to gain than loss by direct intervention in conflicts in Africa. As for the Africans, they still assumed that they will be assisted as and when need arises and so did little if not nothing to prepare themselves for any interventions. However, it did not take long as the Rwanda genocide of 1994 came too soon only for Africa to realize indeed they had been left on their own to handle their peace and security issues. The genocide was an eye opener to the African community, it was clear now than ever before that they should seek own solutions to their own problems. This was further compounded by the crises in the West Africa and the Great Lakes Region in the same period.

The emerging challenges thus ushered in urgency among African policymakers and scholars in the search for effective mechanisms for resolving the emerging African conflicts. A scholar by the name of Francis Deng put it: "Africans ... are recognizing that the world does not care much about them and that they must take their destinies into their

³⁹ Patel P and Tripodi P. Magazine Title: The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Africa. Contemporary Review. Vol. 279. Issue: 1628. September 2001. p.144. Gale Group.

own hands.”⁴⁰ An influential American scholar and political analyst Edward Luttwak stated that Africa is not worth taking care of as the continent is plagued by complex emergencies representing the greatest challenges of recent years. Therefore, the international community should let African bloody wars follow their course until fighters are exhausted and willing to agree on a peace deal. He wants war to be given a chance. He argued that too many wars nowadays become endemic conflicts that never end because the transformative effects of both decisive victory and exhaustion are blocked by outside intervention.⁴¹ What he is suggesting is that the international community should just ignore the wars and let history take its course so that enemies can exhaust each other and are willing to find a peace deal.

The greater proportions of the world’s civil wars are in Africa and so are the greater proportions of peacekeeping missions. Given the record of the 1990s, when intrastate conflicts have been prevalent, Africa is likely to remain the locus of instability, within the same time frame in Africa, at least 5 million persons, mostly civilians have been killed in the conflicts.⁴² Following the emerging security concerns, a coincidence of interests now seems to have emerged and Africans, freed of the constraints of the Cold War, are searching for ways to put into practice new concepts. Western powers are now urging Africans to keep their own peace as they do not want to suffer more embarrassment by participating in humanitarian interventions in areas where they perceive their interests to

⁴⁰ Christian H. opcit p.42.

⁴¹ Patel P and Tripodi P. opcit.

⁴² Rotberg R I. the effective prevention of war in Rotberg R I(ed) Ibid p.10.

be low.⁴³ This contributed to the paradigm shift and consequently the formation of the AU to succeed OAU. The responsibility to protect its people is with the states and the African countries cannot therefore ignore that fact and live it with the international community.

⁴³ Adebajo A. *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, Ecomog, and Regional Security in West Africa*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner. 2002. p.2.

CHAPTER THREE

OAU PEACEKEEPING

3.0 INTRODUCTION

The OAU was founded in 1963, in part, to protect the fragile and new sovereignties. The charter did not envision intervention in the sort of internal struggles that are seen on the African continent today. The OAU was hamstrung by a structure that allocated all the powers to summits of the Heads of states and /or governments. Subsequently, personal and ideological differences among the heads of states almost tore the organisation apart in the 1980s. The OAU's first attempt at the peacekeeping was in 1980 in Chad, and that happened to be the only peacekeeping mission by the OAU¹. However, the maintenance of international peace and security is the central part of United Nations activities. Over the years, UN has developed a wide range of instruments, which altogether provide a coherent mechanism that responds to the various security challenges the international community may encounter.² Although peacekeeping is one of the means that has proved workable to a certain extent, it is only one fragment of what today is called peace operations. The UN therefore carried many peacekeeping missions in Africa without mention of the OAU input. The OAU and by extension the African states did not seem to realize that the responsibility to protect their citizens was theirs and so were not eager to put such a framework in place.

¹ Metz S. African Peace and American Strategy in Rotberg R I. Peacekeeping and peace Enforcement in Africa Methods of Conflict Prevention. p. 62.

² Christian H. opcit p.35

On the other hand the OAU was very much a product of its time, as the immediate needs and fears of the founding members marked the structure and agenda in the ways that have endured. At its formation, the OAU was a regime of weak and thus more of equal states³. The OAU structures were too weak to enable the organisation run an independent invention. Consequently, they attempted only one peacekeeping mission and the performance was poor, they did not attempt another. However, OAU set up five observer missions starting in 1963 it undertook to observe peace between Algeria and Morocco. In 1981 it had an observer group in Chad and between 1991 and 1993 it maintained a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) in Rwanda. In 1993 set an observer mission in Burundi known as OAU in Burundi (OMIB) and 1997 had a small Military Observer Mission in the Comoros.⁴

In this chapter the following was covered; the OAU security framework and how it was applied in peacekeeping, the weaknesses of the OAU that led to many missed opportunities in peacekeeping, examine the OAU peacekeeping mission in Chad and finally the reforms in OAU.

3.1 OAU FRAMEWORK ON PEACE AND SECURITY

In 1964 the OAU under the article 19 of its charter established a commission of mediation, conciliation and arbitration. Its mandate was to hear and settle disputes between member states by peaceful means. The commission was not a judicial organ and under article 21(1) of the protocol the mediator was to confine his role to that of

³ Deng F M and Zartman I W. Conflict resolution in Africa. Virginia, Donnelley and sons Co. 1991 p.351

⁴ Bonyongwe H M. Employing African Forces in Peace Operations in Africa in Rotberg R I (ed) Ibid P.88.

reconciling the views and claims of the parties. The deficiency of a flexible system made the OAU a remedial and reactive rather than preventive and proactive. In spite of the provision, the commission was never set up and the OAU relied on ad hoc committees.

African countries in their quest to rid the continent of the many security challenges, they adopted common positions on a range of policy areas, which could provide basis for a comprehensive common regional position. A major policy towards this direction was the mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. African leaders came to the realization that the conflicts in Africa constitute a major impediment to Africa's socio-economic development and integration. There was need therefore to promote peace, security and stability, hence the adoption of the Cairo declaration in 1993 by the Heads of State to establish the mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. The mechanism had as its primary objective, the anticipation and prevention of conflicts and the responsibility to undertake peace-building functions in order to facilitate resolution of conflict. The thinking was to develop a continental instrument that could respond swiftly to conflict situations and replace the commission of mediation, conciliation and arbitration which had failed.⁵

The new mechanism provided for a decision making body, the central organ, separate source of funding, the peace fund and a conflict management division. The central organ was modeled on the bureau of assembly of heads of states and governments, there was to be an ad hoc arrangement with 15 member counties elected annually on the basis of

⁵ African Union. Concept Paper on the Establishment of a common African Defence and Security Policy. OAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. P.14.

geographical representation. The peace fund was to support initiatives of the central organ while developing the conflict management division.⁶

The OAU charter was conservative and its concern was to protect the organisation as a whole from being manipulated by a faction. It had in place a two-third requirement for a quorum, for a calling of special meetings, and for all decisions in the summit meetings. This was a demonstration of protective preference for inaction and more importantly a delay in decisive movement in the absence of general support. The secretary general was thus given few explicit powers. The bottom line was that the OAU was not a command organisation and was not equipped with independent executive instruments capable of enforcing decisions against either members or non-members.⁷

Despite the mechanism, there were still a number of difficulties emanating from its composition, mode of operation, lack of clear cut entry into the conflicts, the use of inappropriate rules and procedures, inadequate manpower, technical and financial resources. Subsequent frameworks therefore were to address such issues.⁸

3.2 OAU MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

So far, UN has completed eighteen peacekeeping missions in Africa while OAU was in existence this is in addition to the seven on-going UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. Out of the seven, two started before the formation of the AU while the five were started when the AU was in place. According to the UN charter Article 33 under the Pacific settlement of the disputes, parties shall first of all, seek solution by any of the seven ways

⁶ Nicuwkerk A. The role of the AU and NEPAD in Africa's New Security Regime in Field S (ed). Opcit pp. 42-43.

⁷ Deng F M and Zartman I W. Conflict resolution in Africa. Virginia, Donnelley and sons Co. 1991 p.350

⁸ Afican Union. Ibid p. 15.

given, among them the regional agencies or arrangements. However, it is not quite clear when the regional agency takes up the issue and when UN will, so this leaves a situation where it is not clear at what point in time it can be stated it is UN or the region's responsibility. For the purpose of this study, it will be assumed that any mission carried out by the UN or sub-regional organisation or no action taken in Africa was an opportunity for the OAU or AU, depending on when the mission was initiated. The OAU lost such opportunities prior to taking up the Chad mission, after which it never took up any other opportunity.

3.2.1 Pre-Chad Opportunities

Despite the goal of eliminating interstate conflicts due to border disputes, the first test of the OAU's ability to resolve a crisis between members arose out of such a dispute, when in 1963, hostilities erupted between Morocco and Algeria as a result of a disputed frontier. Eventually it was resolved by a bilateral agreement between the two parties. Then came the Nigerian civil war of 1967 known as the Biafra war, which was political in nature but OAU got passively involved and thus demonstrates a wavering from the strict principle of non-interference in member internal state affairs as advocated by its Charter.⁹ Prior to OAU mission in Chad, there were two other major conflicts, the one in Congo in 1960 which began before the OAU was formed and the first Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia of 1977. The first Ogaden war erupted in 1977 and lasted for about a year, it eventually ended when Somalia was defeated in 1988.

⁹ Rechner J D A. opcit p.7.

Nigeria achieved its independence on October 1, 1960, and Azikiwe was named the governor of the federation. In 1966 there was a coup d'état led by the Ibo Officers who formed a Federal Military Government (FMG), same year there was violence against the Ibo in the north. Same year there was a counter coup and the Ibo officers in power were killed. On May 30, 1967, the military governor of the eastern region, proclaimed the establishment of independent republic of Biafra. In September 1967, attacks on the Ibo in the north began and it is estimated that more than 30,000 deaths were reported and more than 1million Ibos fled to safety. The war was divided along the regional lines and so were the officers in the military. The civil war lasted until January, 1970 when the Biafran resistance collapsed. There was no direct intervention by either the UN or the OAU.

3.2.2 Post-Chad Opportunities

After the Chad mission OAU did not attempt any other mission, yet after the cold war Africa experienced the most intra conflicts, the UN therefore took up the responsibility to protect and some were taken up in the initial stages by the sub-regional organisations and some were left without any attention like the Rwanda genocide. In total UN took up 17 since the Chad missions by the OAU, while the sub-regions, specifically the ECOWAS took up two missions; in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Some of these missions have been discussed as follows:

Angola emerged from its status as a Portuguese colony in 1975 after the guerrilla war for independence that had lasted for almost 15 years. In January 1975, the Portuguese Government sought to establish a programme for transition to independence with the

three separate Angolan liberation movements. However, the agreement forged fell apart, and the three groups with support from various international sources, fought one another. The internationals included Cuba, South Africa, the Soviet Union and the United States. The first United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), later known as UNAVEM I, was mandated by the Security Council to monitor the withdrawal of Cuban forces that numbered 50,000, from Angola. The mission started in 1989 and was through in 1991. The OAU was not involved at any stage.¹⁰

South Africa, despite an ICJ ruling in 1971 to leave Namibia, it refused to comply with the United Nations resolutions, and continued its illegal administration of Namibia, including the imposition of apartheid laws, and the exploitation of its resources. In 1976 the Security Council for the first time demanded that South Africa accept elections for the Territory under United Nations supervision and control. At a special session on Namibia in 1978, the Assembly expressed support for the armed liberation struggle of Namibian people, and stated that any settlement must be arrived at with the agreement of SWAPO and within the framework of United Nations resolutions. In 1978, it was agreed that elections for a Constituent Assembly would be held under United Nations auspices; United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNITAG). UNITAG was put in place in 1988 and completed its mandate in 1991 after successful elections in Namibia.¹¹

¹⁰ United Nations. The Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI). http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unavemS.htm..

¹¹ United Nations. The Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI). http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unitagS.htm.

Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975, but soon after, it plunged into a long and debilitating civil war pitting the Government and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) which was supported by South Africa's apartheid regime. After two years of negotiations, the two parties signed a General Peace Agreement on 4 October 1992. As part of the Agreement, the Security Council established the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) to monitor and support the ceasefire, the demobilization of forces and the eventual holding of national elections. In the beginning of 1993, some 6,500 troops and military observers were deployed. ONUMOZ launched a humanitarian assistance programme to help the 3.7 million people displaced by war to resettle back in the communities. The country's first multiparty elections were held in October 1994, monitored by 2,300 civilian international observers, including some 900 from the United Nations. Its task successfully fulfilled, the mandate of ONUMOZ formally came to an end at midnight on 9 December. However, ONUMOZ continued to carry out residual functions until the Mission was fully liquidated at the end of January 1995.¹²

The downfall of President Siad Barre in 1991 led to a civil war in Somalia between the faction supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and that supporting General Mohamed Farah Aidid. The United Nations, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and other organizations, sought to resolve the conflict. The war had resulted in nearly 1 million refugees and almost 5 million people threatened by hunger and disease. Following an agreement on a ceasefire, United Nations monitor, observe the

¹² United Nations. The Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI). http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/onumozS.htm.

protection of humanitarian convoys by United Nations security personnel. Consequently, the Council established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in April 1992. The relief effort was hampered by the continued fighting and insecurity, which got worse. In November 1992, the United States offered to organize and lead an operation to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance, which was accepted by the Security Council. The offer authorized the use of "all necessary means" to establish a secure environment for the relief effort. The mission was tagged Unified Task Force (UNITAF), but it encountered casualties and the UN made yet another transition from UNITAF to UNISOMII in March 1993, authorizing it to use force if necessary to ensure its mandate. But by 1994 the UN pulled out, as the warring factions stepped up the fight.¹³

The United Nations moved in Liberia to support the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in its efforts to end a civil war that had broken out in late 1989. The Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) after ECOWAS had brokered a peace agreement in Cotonou, Benin, in 1993. UN task was to support ECOMOG in implementing the peace agreement. This was the first UN peacekeeping mission undertaken in cooperation with a peacekeeping operation already established by another organization. Delays in the implementation of the peace agreement and resumed fighting among Liberian factions made it impossible to hold elections in February/March 1994, as scheduled. In the following months, a number of supplementary peace agreements, amending and clarifying the Cotonou agreement, were negotiated. The United Nations successfully observed the conduct of the elections held in July 1997. These led to the effective end of a war in which about 150,000 people were

¹³United Nations. The Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI). http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsom1backgr1.html.

killed, while more than 850,000 became refugees. UNOMIL's principal objective was achieved.¹⁴

Fighting broke out in October 1990 between the Armed Forces of the mainly Hutu Government of Rwanda and the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). In 1993, Rwanda and Uganda requested the deployment of UN military observers along the common border to prevent the military use of the area by RPF. The Security Council in June 1993 established the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda Rwanda (UNOMUR) on the Ugandan side of the common border. This was to verify that no military assistance reached Rwanda. Meanwhile, the Arusha talks, brokered by Tanzania and OAU, reconvened in March 1993 and eventually led to a peace agreement in August 1993. Following an air crash on 6 April 1994, President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi who were on board were killed, plus the rest on board. This triggered off mass murders throughout the country amounting to genocide followed by a brief but violent civil war that swept government forces out of the country, and refugee flows that created a humanitarian and ecological crisis of unprecedented dimensions. UNOMUR would be closed down by 21 September 1994.¹⁵

¹⁴ United Nations. The Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI). http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unomils.htm.

¹⁵ United Nations. The Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI). http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unomurbackgr.html.

The following table is a summary of the UN missions in Africa at the time of the OAU, those completed and the on-going ones.

DATES OF OPERATION	NAME OF OPERATION	LOCATION	CONFLICT	REMARKS
1960 TO 1964	UN Operation in Congo (ONUC)	Congo	Congo Crisis	UN only
1988 to 1991	UN Angola Verification Mission I	Angola	Angola Civil War	“
1989 to 1990	UN Transition Assistance Transition Group (UNTAG)	Namibia	Namibia War of Independence	“
1991 to 1995	UN Angola Verification Mission II. (UNAVEM II)	Angola	Angola Civil War	“
1992 to 1994	UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Mozambique	Mozambique Civil War	“
1992 to 1993	UN Operations in Somalia (UNSOM I)	Somalia	Somalia Civil War	“
1993 to 1997	UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)	Liberia	First Liberia Civil War	“
1993 to 1994	UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)	Uganda, Rwanda	Rwanda Civil War	“
1993 to 1996	UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)	Rwanda	Rwandan Civil War	“
1994 to 1995	UN Operations in Somalia II (UNISOM II)	Somalia	Somalia Civil War	“
1994	UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)	Chad	Aouzou Strip dispute	“
1995 TO 1997	UN Angola Verification Mission III	Angola	Angola Civil War	“

1997 to 1999	UN Observer mission in Angola (MONUA)	Angola	Angola Civil War	“
1998 to 1999	UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)	Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone Civil War	“
1998 to 2000	UN Mission in the Central Africa Republic (MINURCA)	Central Africa Republic	Central Africa Republic mutinies	“
1999 to 2005	UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone civil war	“
2000 to 2008	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	Ethiopia and Eritrea	Ethiopia-Eritrea War	“
MISSIONS STARTED AT THE TIME OF OAU AND ARE STILL ONGOING				
1991	UN Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	Western Sahara	Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara	
1999	UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)	DRC	Second Congo War	

3.2.3 Opportunities taken up by African Sub-regional peacekeeping forces

Although established as the one All-African organisation, the OAU never was to be the only such organisation on the continent. Given the vast geographical extent of Africa there was always bound to be many smaller and more compact groupings which would make it necessary to define the relationship between the fledgling organisation and such groupings in order to prevent duplication or even rivalry. Africa's sheer immensity and the nature of its countries' political, economic, and social relations seemed to favour regional over continental cooperation. Consequently, the cohesion needed to ensure

effective and meaningful cooperation was more likely to be found on a regional level and most initiatives promised greater chances of success if undertaken in smaller groupings. Accelerating regionalism also was the failure of the OAU to provide a true continental framework for cooperative ventures.¹⁶

Although Article XX of the 1963 OAU Charter had established several specialized Commissions that included Defence, the OAU approach was lukewarm to its commitment to coordinate and intensify cooperation. While the position of the OAU in Africa was important, it is the regions that were emerging as the principal actors in peace initiatives and operations on the continent. Subsequently, each of the African regions has an organisation.¹⁷

Africa's regional organisations have made tremendous strides over the past decade in assuming primary responsibility for promoting peace and security. Increasingly, regional nature of conflict in Africa necessitates an increasingly regional response and so most of the continent's regional organisations have added security and conflict management initiatives to their original purpose. The best-known and developed are those of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and now Intergovernmental Authority and Development (IGAD), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and

¹⁶ Franke B F. *Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continent's Emerging Security Architecture*, Center for African Studies. Gale, Cengage Learning Vol. 9. Issue: 3. 2007.

¹⁷ Bonyongwe H M. *Opcit* p.89.

the Arab-Maghreb Union (AMU) have also begun to establish structures for peace and security¹⁸.

ECOWAS entered the security arena in 1990 when it dispatched multinational peacekeepers to Liberia and in 1999 for a seven year intervention it established a mediation and security council, a multinational standby force and several zonal observer bureaus. ECOWAS is built around the major regional power Nigeria, which has the main influence in the region and has accepted the hegemonic burden. The monitoring group is known as ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and Nigeria was able to absorb most of the initial costs, though they were later to be supported by UN. ECOMOG also had a mission in Sierra Leone, and was also later joined by the UN. SADC created a formal organ for defence, politics, and security in 1996 and in 1998 it was used to intervene into Lesotho by troops from South Africa and Botswana. SADC does carry out joint training Exercises.¹⁹ The other regions have never intervened using the peacekeepers. The regions have shown need for the responsibility to protect within the borders.

3.3 CHAD

Chad is a central African country covering a total area of 1,284,000 sq km. it is a landlocked country and borders five countries as follows; Cameroon, Central African Republic, Libya, Nigeria and finally Sudan. It is a country that got its independence in 1960 from France. Chad consists of at least 21 major ethnic groups along with associated clans and sub-clans led by individuals with the ability to sway their loyalties. Two former National Liberation Front (FROLINAT) leaders Hissene Habre and Goukouni Weddeye

¹⁸ Franke B F. Ibid.

¹⁹ Bonyongwe H M. Opcit p.89.

are both northern Moslems of the Toubou ethnic group and have alternated roles as Chad's president. Animosity between the northern political units and the southern peoples in what is now Chad partially originated from slave raids initiated by the north against the south prior to the colonial period. The southern Sara ethnic group saw the French as their “saviors” as they abolished slavery and protected them from the northern sultanates. The northerners viewed the French as “infidels” who were imposing a foreign rule over them and Christianity in the south.²⁰

During the colonial period, The French simply neglected Chad as they found it difficult to govern. In 1921, France operated only one school in Chad, at Fort Lamy (N'Djamena) with less than 50 pupils. The French preference for southerners over the more hostile northerners compounded the situation coupled with lack of development and a long history of conflict. This only helped set the stage for post-independence strife in Chad. At the time Chad attained its independence in 1960, it still consisted of the two regions. The north was predominantly Islamic area with a largely nomadic and semi-nomadic population, while the south was mainly Christian and animist agriculturalists. Northerners resented being ruled by a southerner at independence and so tensions increased in 1962 when President Tombalbaye, himself a southerner abolished all political organizations except his Chadian Progressive Party. The establishment of a Southern controlled single party state, heavy taxation, and harsh government repression is what led to the formation of FROLINAT by Dr. Abba Siddick in 1966. FROLINAT loosely united many of the

²⁰ Terry M. M. *opcit* pp. 17-18.

northern ethnic groups and factions under one organization against a common southern foe.²¹

3.3.1 The Chad Civil War and OAU Response

The conflict in Chad in the early 1980s resulted in the OAU's first attempt at peacekeeping. The Rival factions in Chad had been warring for a considerable period of time, and by then Libyan had decided to militarily intervene in the conflict, prompting the OAU to get involved. The OAU at a Summit Conference in Nairobi in 1981 endorsed an OAU peacekeeping force and gave two preconditions to the deployment of the force. The first condition was that the force must be invited by the Chadian government, in accordance with U.N. principles, and the second was that the Libyan troops had to be withdrawn. The first condition was a clear manifestation of OAU principle of respect of state sovereignty. This principle characterized OAU peacekeeping operations throughout its history. The warring parties' failure to negotiate, however, ultimately led to additional conflict, which resulted in the withdrawal of the OAU forces in mid-1982 without having accomplished their objective. The failure of this mission was blamed on multiple causes, including a mandate that was unclear to the Chadian government as they had thought the OAU would assist in fighting against the rebels.

3.3.2 The peacekeeping Operation in Chad

The OAU after a series of meetings decided to send to Chad a peacekeeping mission. The mandate of the OAU mission included supervision of the ceasefire; demilitarization of N'Djamena and the surrounding district, financial and material assistance to train and

²¹ Terry M. M. Ibid p. 20.

establish an integrated Chadian armed force; and the defense and security of Chad while awaiting the integration of Government forces.²²

OAU encountered problems from the beginning due to lack of logistical and financial resources. Of the six countries that pledged to form peacekeeping units, only three, that is Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire eventually did so. The initial estimated cost of a peacekeeping mission of 5,000 men was US\$192 million, which was estimated to be ten times the annual budget of the OAU at that time. When eventually troops were sent, they were mostly from Nigeria.²³ The transportation and the provision of logistics in general for the Senegalese troops were paid for by France, while the United States committed US \$12 million for logistical help to Zaire and Nigeria. The peacekeeping mission encountered immense logistic and financial difficulties immediately after becoming operational. These problems compelled the then Chairman of the OAU in accordance with the recommendation of African Heads of State, to seek for funding from the U.N. Security Council for material, and technical assistance for the peacekeeping effort. The U.N. Security Council only adopted a consensus resolution calling on the U.N. "Secretary-General to establish a fund for assistance to the peacekeeping force of the OAU in Chad, to be supplied by voluntary contributions."²⁴

The OAU experienced difficulty in trying to secure member states' willingness to contribute troops and equipment for the organization's second attempt at multinational

²² Amoo S G. Frustrations of Regional peacekeeping: The OAU in Chad, 1977-1982. <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ams02/ams02.pdf>.

²³ Terry M. M. Ibid.

²⁴ Amoo S G. Ibid.

peacekeeping in Chad. In the first peacekeeping mission dispatched to Chad, it clearly demonstrated the challenges the organisation could face in the area of contingent deployment. Three countries, that is Benin, Congo, and Guinea pledged troops but only Congo eventually contributed a contingent in 1980. The other two countries officially cited logistical and transportation difficulties in sending troops, even then, Congo withdrew its troops same year.²⁵

The troop contributing states were to provide for their required financial and logistical assets. This contributed to a large extent the elimination of potential troop contributing countries as most countries volunteering to provide soldiers did not have a military force capable of projecting and sustaining itself outside of its borders unless the resources were to be provided. Contingent-contributing states were to absorb the costs associated with the operation or find their own external resources, this attracted international players like France, the United States, and to a lesser extent Great Britain, to have greater influence over the operation. The OAU Secretariat was forced to work very closely with interested member states in order to secure enough contingents to make the peacekeeping operation viable and international in character. Ultimately many states declined to participate, others agreed but never complied, eventually seven countries deployed either peacekeepers or military observers.²⁶

The countries that were requested to contribute troops/observers and their response are as follows; Cameroon was requested to supervise the establishment of a Chadian integrated national army by helping to train a new Chadian national army which was one of the

²⁵ Terry M. M. Ibid. p. 14

²⁶ Rechner J D A. opcit.

objectives designated for the peacekeepers. Cameroon had accepted but eventually failed to do so. Congo fielded the only contingent in the failed 1980 peacekeeping operation in Chad. Initially, the OAU believed that Congo would maintain its pledge and deploy another battalion. However, the Congolese experience in Chad influenced the state decision not to participate in the new operation and at the seconding meeting (Nairobi II), Congo was not considered as a troop contributing nation.²⁷

Egypt when requested had pledged medical support and transportation for the mission but would not contribute troops. Despite the pledge, Egypt neither provided for medical teams nor transportation during the peacekeeping mission. Gabon originally indicated it would dispatch a contingent to the mission, but later President Bongo of Gabon stated that he believed the OAU force would not have a “useful role” in the Chadian conflict, and therefore Gabon would not provide any soldiers. However, he later pledged soldiers to the observer group but did not comply.

Guinea offered one of the three battalions designated for the 1980 failed OAU peacekeeping operation in Chad. During the consultations to field a second peacekeeping mission, Guinea remained as one of the major troop contributing states. However, Guinea failed to provide citing financial and logistical problems. Ivory Coast had initially agreed to supply a contingent for the operation but despite a follow-up request by the then OAU Chairman, Ivory Coast did not contribute. Kenya offered to provide a small group of soldiers for the observer element of the mission in Chad. The Kenyan contingent would be the largest group assigned to the observer team and were sent as pledged. Madagascar,

²⁷Terry M. M. Ibid p.35.

on its part declined an OAU invitation to provide a contingent to the peacekeeping mission to Chad citing unspecified difficulties.²⁸

Nigeria earmarked two battalions for service with the OAU mission in Chad. However, the Nigerian government opted to withhold deployment of its soldiers until verification that the other contingents were ready to move into Chad as they did not want to deploy alone. Nigerian peacekeepers arrived in Chad after the deployment of soldiers from Senegal and Zaire. Eventually, Nigeria would deploy three battalions to Chad. Senegal pledged one battalion to the OAU peacekeeping operation and they complied and eventually occupied one of the six operational zones within Chad. President Zerbo of Upper Volta pledged a contingent for the OAU peacekeeping, but failed to send in troops. President Mobutu of Zaire committed his country to contribute a battalion-sized contingent to the operation which he did. He had offered to field a second battalion if he gets financial support from the US, but he did not get the support and so failed to send the second Battalion. Zambia pledged a detachment of observer group and went ahead and committed the observers.²⁹

The OAU charter did not provide for collective security, consequently the OAU members lacked the enthusiasm for intervention in conflict as was visible in the dispute resolution structures in place that were largely undeveloped³⁰. A large number of military interventions have been conducted in Africa by UN and now Africa has become a point of focus by the international community.³¹ OAU lost many opportunities to the UN,

²⁸ Terry M. M. Ibid.p. 37.

²⁹ Rechner J D A. opcit.

³⁰ Naldi G J The organisation of African Unity; an analysis of its role. London, Mansell 1999 p. 45.

³¹ Klingebiel S. Africa's new peace and security architecture, in Africa security review vol. 14 no. 2 march 2005.

consequently, UN has deployed and completed 18 peacekeeping missions in Africa but with no mention anywhere about any input from the OAU. Any peacekeeping mission on the African continent undertaken by a different organisation other than the OAU is a lost opportunity for the OAU. The missions completed by the UN and those ongoing to date on the African continent are tabulated herein.

3.3.3 Reasons for the Inadequacy of the Chad PKO

In analysing the OAU performance, the organisation only deployed one peacekeeping mission in the thirty nine years of its existence and in the event lost over 20 opportunities. This translates into 5 percent of opportunities used and 95 percent lost. The Chad mission did not achieve the set objective and the troops were forced to withdraw prematurely when the government forces were defeated by the rebels. This section will analyse the concept, the mandate and finally capacity and funding.

The OAU did not carry out a proper analysis to know the concurrent activities that were to be carried out in Chad to bring peace. The conflict situation in Chad was the type where peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace servicing should effectively be integrated if they were to manage the conflict. However, OAU was involved with peacemaking and peacekeeping only. Given the 15 years of internal conflict in Chad, the nation was bankrupt with a starving population. The capital was virtually in ruins with no water and electricity. The OAU effort should therefore have been complemented with a corresponding effort in peacebuilding. But given the financial status of OAU, this was not going to be possible unless funding was forthcoming from outside Africa. The OAU therefore approached the Chad mission with a wrong concept that was not going to work

as it was operationally ineffective. Food security and physical security should have been approached concurrently.

The mandate was unrealistic as the functions given to the troops were neither achievable nor specific. In addition to that, it was also ambiguous and it violated the operational norm of a limited, precise, and clear mandate for an effective peacekeeping mission. The role and functions of the peacekeeping force in the Status of Force Agreement was too vague and hence subject to several interpretations. On the other hand, the belligerents were never made to understand that the peacekeeping forces were neutral forces, and so Weddeye, who was the head of the recognized government and the only signatory to the agreement with the OAU authorizing the peacekeeping intervention thought the forces are to support him to repel the other parties. More so, the other party was not a signatory to the agreement as required in the case of traditional peacekeeping, and so lacked the consent of the other.

The Chad operations as was earlier envisaged were simply beyond the financial capability of the OAU. The budget for 1981-82, which was the critical period of the operations, was US \$19.5 million, while the actual operational budget for the Chad peacekeeping mission for the first year was estimated at US \$192 million. This meant that only 10 percent of the required funding was available, the OAU managed to collect US \$0.5 million through a special fund established for the Chad operation, this was so little that it made no difference. This was therefore a clear indication that the operation was bound to collapse as it was not sustainable, whatever the situation. Troop

contributing countries had to bear the cost of operations and logistics for their respective troops.

The uncertainty in funding impaired command and control and so undermined morale of the troops. These in turn affected the efficiency and effectiveness of the peacekeeping mission. This explains why many countries pulled out even after they had pledged to contribute troops. Out of the 12 countries that had indicated their willingness to contribute troops and/or observers, only 6 eventually did so, the political will was missing, though this was coupled with the lack of finances and logistical support for the part of the countries to deploy.

The mission was not well organized as the countries were required to foot their costs. The OAU should have sourced for funds centrally and then taken up the financial and logistical responsibility. Assuming the countries were able to deploy initially, it would have proved difficult to sustain the troops in case of prolonged periods, and so a workable funding arrangement was necessary. Funding should be available first before deploying. This calls for a need to have funds available well in advance that can at least launch troops into a mission.

In conclusion, the OAU lacked the will and capacity to carry out any peacekeeping operation and so opted to keep off and let the UN and the RECs take charge of peace and security on the Africa continent. This was not going to go on for long as times were changing and Africa was experiencing even more internal conflicts than before. OAU therefore required drastic changes to be effective in the present and the future.

3.4 REFORMS IN OAU

In the post-Cold War era, African states have increasingly become the primary targets of United Nations peacekeeping operations. During the cold war, the ideological tension that existed between the two superpowers the United States and the former Soviet Union informed the UN conduct of peacekeeping and hence the “classic peacekeeping” missions. This type of peacekeeping involved the deployment of small and lightly armed multinational forces to help observe and maintain ceasefire agreements among former combatants. By contrast, in the post-Cold War era, the scope of UN peace operations has expanded considerably. These operations now include functions such as preventive border presence, ceasefire observation and force separation, voluntary weapon control, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants into society, refugee or internally displaced-person relief, post-conflict reconstruction, observing, supervising, conducting certifying elections and human rights monitoring among others. The outcomes of these operations have been uneven especially given their scope and complexity.

Given the history of colonial domination, the African countries were not prepared to cede any form of control over their internal affairs. As a result, internal conflicts proved to be the most prevalent and deadly form in Africa in the existence of the OAU and yet it was considered to be outside of the jurisdiction of the OAU. This was against the spirit of responsibility to protect for both the state and the OAU. These resulted into deadly conflicts that raged unhindered for decades on the continent, giving Africa its reputation for ceaseless conflict.³²

³² Terry M. M. Opcit. P.35.

All the regions of Africa were affected, but West Africa, the great lakes region and the horn of Africa were and are still the most affected. Though the OAU had established a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, the dominant concern as argued by some was that a creation of an elaborate security system would encourage the UN to reduce its involvement in the African conflicts that seem to be increasing with time.³³ It had become obvious that the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states would undermine any attempt at conflict management by the OAU, hence the need to revise the clause. At a meeting of the Chiefs of Defence of the member countries convened in 1996, it was concluded that a new security framework that would include an indigenous standby force was essential if the OAU was to play any meaningful role in peacekeeping.³⁴

Ultimately the OAU was disbanded and in its place came a new intercontinental organization, the African Union. Recognizing the urgent need to prevent and address internal conflict within the African states, the AU was given legal authority to intervene in certain forms of deadly internal conflict. This was now in tandem with the responsibility to protect. The new mandate given to the AU represented a normative change in the approach to African conflict prevention, management, and resolution. As to whether the promise of the new mandate would bring expected change in addressing the deadly conflicts in Africa remained to be seen. The current political climate requires not

³³ Field S. *Opcit* p.20.

³⁴ *Ibid* p.21.

only problem-solving measures, but also a variety of tools for promoting lasting peace and security³⁵.

³⁵ Christian H. Opcit p.37.

CHAPTER FOUR

AFRICAN UNION PEACEKEEPING

4.0 INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the 21st century the African leaders realized that they needed a road map that will define the Africa resolve to solve its conflicts. In 2002, the leaders formed the African Union and subsequently brought to an end the inability of the OAU to deal with conflicts. This new development came at a time when the international community is not keen in involving its troops in the plight of war-torn countries in African. African leaders acknowledged that peace and stability was an essential precondition if social and economic developments are to be achieved. The new body was therefore empowered to deal effectively with the conflicts as opposed to merely working to prevent them.¹ The leaders also recognized that the nature of threats to the states was not only confined to intra-state but there was the inter-state. Subsequently, the leaders agreed that the new African security regime would be predicated on the idea of collective security. The five main tasks of the AU would therefore be to; promote peace, security, and stability in Africa, implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, co-ordinate and harmonise continental efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism, develop a common defence policy and protect human rights². In this chapter the following will be examined; AU Peace and Security framework, AU interventions, and comparative analysis between the AU and the OAU.

¹ Field S. Introduction in Peace in Field S (ed) Africa Towards a Collaborative Security Regime. Johannesburg, Institute of Global Dialogue 2004.p. 19.

² Ibid p.21.

4.1 AU FRAMEWORK

Peace and security framework will be analysed in terms of the PSC protocol of 2003.

4.1.1 Peace and Security Council Protocol (PSC)

The AU unlike the OAU established a PSC whose objective is to react to threat to the peace and security on the continent, its task is therefore to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa. The PSC was established in 2004 and it assesses a potential crisis situation, sends fact finding missions to troubled spots and is empowered to authorize and legitimize the AU's intervention in the crisis as required. Against the grim backdrop of the past decade, African leaders have come to the realization that the international community and the United Nations cannot be depended upon entirely to stop the suffering of Africans. The AU therefore adopted a much more interventionist stance through its legal frameworks and institutions having drawn its lessons from the OAU performance³. One clear and lasting lesson for the continent is that the cost of being dependent on others for intervention is unacceptably high and so the African leaders called for the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF).⁴ This was now a better approach as the leaders had realized with time that it is their responsibility to protect individuals.

The Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union entered into force on 26 December 2003, this was after it was ratified by the required majority of Member States of the AU. Subsequently, the 4th Ordinary Session of the

³ Murithi T. the AU's evolving role in peace operations: the AU's mission in Burundi, Sudan and Somalia in African Security Review. Volume 17 no.1 2008.

⁴ Murithi T. Ibid.

Executive Council that met in Addis Ababa, in March 2004, elected the 15 members to the PSC and adopted the Rules of Procedure of the new Organ. The PSC has since then held several meetings that focused on the conflict situations on the continent.

The PSC was established by the AU as it was realized from the onset that without peace and stability there can be no sustainable socio-economic development yet this was the main driver in the formation of the AU. The aims for the Council are the contribution to reversing the mood of despair and marginalization in Africa and bring more self-esteem and dignity to the people. The protocol on the PSC provides for the creation of the African standby force, the continental Early Warning Systems and also a panel of the wise to assist with peacemaking on the continent.⁵

4.1.2 African Standby Force (ASF)

The AU's constitutive Act defined sovereignty in terms of a state capacity and willingness to protect its citizens. The focus had shifted from regime security to human security and even went further to recognize the AU's right to military intervention in the affairs of its member states, hence the creation of ASF in 2002 during the AU Durban Summit.⁶ ASF was endorsed as part of Protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC of the AU.

The ASF is created to be a multinational armed force comprised solely of African soldiers capable of carrying out peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The conceptual ASF provides for five sub-regional standby brigades, the southern, East,

⁵Terry M M. Ibid.p. 35

⁶ Franke B. The Pan-African Army: The evolution of an Idea and its eventual realization in the African Standby Force. African Security Review. Vol 15 no 4, 2006 p.12.

Central, West and North, which will provide the AU with a combined standby capacity of between 15,000 to 20,000 peacekeepers.⁷ The devolution of the security initiative into regions was a major milestone on the road to the ASF, as many member states seemed to have confidence, stakes and direct control as regional pillars already in existence. It was in this new region-centric spirit that the OAU Chiefs of Defence Staff in 1997 agreed that there be established a brigade-size standby force for each of the five regions.⁸

The ASF is intended to provide PSC with rapid deployment capability for a multiplicity of peace support tasks that will include preventive deployment, swift intervention, classical peacekeeping and peace building. It will also provide AU and other role-players on the continent with a firmer foundation for undertaking peace endeavours and hence less ad hoc way of responding to crises as compared with the past.⁹ The troops will be trained in peace operations ranging from low intensity observer mission to full-blown military interventions.¹⁰ The concept behind the ASF does not entail the establishment of a standing multinational force for military operations, but states will earmark and train specific units for AU operations and ensure they are ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. The five regional headquarters and their planning elements are to ensure their interoperability and common training standards. In this case the regions will be continuously involved in the process of establishing and running the ASF, while on the other hand AU will have to bear the overall strategic and operational responsibility

⁷ Denning M. *ibid* p 8.

⁸ Franke B. *Ibid.* p.13

⁹ Neethling T. *whither peacekeeping in Africa: Revisiting the evolving role of the United Nations. African Security Review Vol 18 No 1 March 2009.*

¹⁰ Franke B. *Ibid.* p.13.

for the force. And by so doing the much-needed resources will be channeled into one direction.¹¹

The various geographical regions are creating the brigades that will form Africa standby force. The ASF is to enable the PSC to fulfill its objective of promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa. The establishment of the standby force is phased and is expected to be operationalised by 2010, ready to undertake peacekeeping operations, including military interventions, if justified. It will also be concerned with humanitarian operations and post-conflict reconstruction¹². There are benefits of strengthening African capacity for regional peace operations in the long-run; the creation of the ASF also aids the consolidation of inter-African security cooperation in two important ways.

First, it epitomizes a much needed common objective which may finally channel the multiplicity of resources, initiatives, and ambitions devoted to African capacity-building into one direction. The development of an ASF system is a significant achievement because it provides Africa with a common policy framework for capacity building. This means that the various capacity building initiatives underway, and any new programmes, can be directed to support this common objective, regardless of whether such initiatives are taking place at the regional, sub-regional or national level.

Second, the regional character of the ASF ensures that the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) feel ownership in the process of establishing continental security architecture, at the same time continue to strengthen their institutional links with the AU. The ASF allows for the incorporate of the RECs into a common framework under its

¹¹ Cawthra G. A conceptual Framework for Regional Security. In Field S (ed) opcit p.35.

¹² Commey P. African Union: So Far So Good. *New African*. Gale Group Issue: 431. 2004.

coordination without infringing on their regional authority or responsibilities. This mutually beneficial symbiosis not only reduces the risk of competition between the continental and regional levels of inter-African cooperation, but also increases the stakes all actors have in the process and thereby reduces the chances of failure.¹³

However, the AU is yet to come up with clear answers to the issue of funding. There is still difficulty in agreeing on a workable funding arrangement so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the ASF dependence on the International financial aid and still ensure the force is highly operational. The forces are expected to be operational by 2010 and in light with the conflicts in Africa; observers will be keen to see how the ASF takes on peacekeeping operations.

4.1.3 Continental Early Warning Systems

The protocol on PSC also provides for the establishment of the Early Warning System (EWS) so as to provide early warning and to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. The continental EWS is established under Article 12 of the AU. It shall consist of; the situation room- an observation and monitoring centre located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the AU, and an Observation and monitoring units of the regional Mechanisms linked directly to the situation room. The AU will collaborate with other relevant organisations.¹⁴ The chair of the commission is to use the information

¹³Franke B. Ibid. p.12.

¹⁴ Nieuwkerk A. Correlating Africa regional and Security Institution initiatives to the emerging global security agenda. In Mwangi M. and Oculi O. (ed) Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective. Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation 2006.p.223.

gathered by the system to advise the PSC on the potential conflicts and threats to peace and security and recommend the best action to be taken.¹⁵

4.1.4 A Panel of the Wise

In order to support the efforts of PSC and the chair of the Commission in the area of conflict prevention, a panel of the wise shall be established as provided for under Article 11(1), as provided for in the PSC protocol. The panel shall consist of five highly respected African personalities from the various sectors of the society and have made an outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent. They shall be selected from by the chair of the commission after the consultation with the member states concerned taking into account the regional representation. They will be appointed by the assembly of heads of states and Government to serve for a period of three years as provided for under article 11(2).

The panel shall advise the council and the chair of the commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security, and stability in Africa as per article 11(3). At the request of the council or the chair, or at its own initiative, the panel shall undertake such action deemed appropriate to support the efforts of the council and the chair for the prevention of conflicts. The panel shall report to the council and through the council to the assembly as per article 11(5). The modalities for the functioning of the modalities shall be worked out by the chair of the commission and approved by the council.¹⁶

¹⁵ Nieuwkerk A. *The Role of the AU and NEPAD in Africa's New Security Regime*. In Field (ed). *Opcit* p.49.

¹⁶ Nathan L. *Mediation and AU's Panel of the Wise* in Fied S (ed) p.64-65.

The panel acts as an arm to the commission and if correctly picked then it is expected that the PSC will draw a lot from them in its endeavor to ensure that peace is maintained on the continent.

4.2 MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

The AU has been in existence now for about seven years. One of the reasons why it was created was so that it can take charge of peace and security on the continent. So far it has intervened in three conflicts though in the same period it also did not take up two other opportunities that came; they were the Second Liberia war and the Civil war in Cote d'voire.

START OF OPERATION	NAME OF OPERATION	LOCATION	CONFLICT	REMARKS
2003	UN Mission in Liberia (UNAMIL)	Liberia	Second Liberia War	Un mission
2004	UN Operations in Cote d'voire (UNOCI)	Cote d'voire	Civil War in Cote d'voire	UN mission
2004 to 2007	UN in Burundi (ONUB)	Burundi	Burundi civil war	Started by AU and taken up by UN
2005	UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	Sudan	Second Sudanese Civil War	UN mission
2007	UN /AU Mission (UNAMID)	Sudan	Darfur conflict	Started by AU in 2004
2007	Central Africa Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)	Central Africa Republic, Chad	Darfur conflict War in Chad 2005 to present	UN mission

4.3 AU PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 2001 to Date

African Union is now 7 years old since it was launched in 2002. Within the timeframe, the AU has intervened in Burundi to build peace through African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) that enabled the eventual establishment of UN peace operation in the country. AU was also involved in promoting peace in Darfur (Sudan) through a peacekeeping mission known as the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Currently the AU is promoting peace through the peacekeeping mission in Somalia, known as the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This section will examine the details on how these three missions were conducted or are being conducted.

4.3.1 African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)

Burundi gained its independence in 1962, and since then, there has been outbreaks of violence which have been manipulated to include an ethnic dimension, hence widening social divisions between Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%) and Twa (1%). Burundi's first democratically elected President was assassinated in 1993, leading to widespread Hutu-Tutsi violence that led to a refugee and IDP crisis. This was further compounded by the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the effects of which reverberated around the Great Lakes region. A peace process was initiated in 2001 and mediated by former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and then by Nelson Mandela, which culminated in 2006 with the signing of peace accords with the last remaining rebel groups.¹⁷

The AU intervened in the Burundi case in 2003 in order to build peace and enable the establishment of a more robust UN force. The peace operation in Burundi was initiated, planned and executed by the AU members, which was a milestone for the AU in terms of

¹⁷ Insight Conflict. www.insightconflict.org/burundi. Accessed 31 August 2009.

self-reliance in operationalising and implementing peace building. The AU mission was basically mandated to build peace in a fluid and dynamic situation so as to avoid the country lapsing back into a violent conflict. The UN was reluctant to enter into Burundi as the feared the situation can easily lapse into conflict.¹⁸

In April 2003, about 3,000 troops from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique were deployed in Burundi under the banner of the AU to monitor the peace process and provide necessary security. The tasks for AMIB included protecting returning politicians who would take part in transitional government, opening secure demobilization centers and trying to reintegrate former militia into society. The demobilization centers were to supervise the Disarmament, Demobilization And Re-Integration (DDR) process. AMIB was also involved in creating conditions that would allow internally displaced persons and refugees living in eight Burundian provinces and three refugee camps in Tanzania to return into their homes. Further AMIB was to establish conditions that would allow for a UN peace operation to enter into the country. The crucial role for AMIB was to create conditions through which peace could be built in the country. AMIB succeeded in de-escalating a potentially volatile situation, DDR was started and the refugees started coming back and so in February 2004, a UN evaluation team concluded that the conditions were suitable for a UN deployment of UN peacekeeping operation. On the 21st May 2004, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1545 allowing the deployment of the UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi. At the time of take over, the outstanding

¹⁸ Murithi T. The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: the AU mission in Burundi, the AU mission in Sudan and AU mission in Somalia. African Security Review vol. 17 no 1 2008.p.74.

challenge was that of reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees into their communities and their access to land for their own livelihood.¹⁹

The former AMIB troops under the AU banner were incorporated into the UN Peace Operations in Burundi (ONUB). By October 2006 about 20,000 military personnel had been demobilized, though they could still pose security threat due to lack of economic opportunities. ONUB completed their mandate in December 2006 and were replaced by UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) that was left to coordinate international assistance and complete the national program for demobilization and integration of former combatants.²⁰ The Burundi case is a pointer to the fact that AU can make useful interventions on the continent.

The question is whether a proper analysis of the AMIB mission was carried out to establish the concurrent activities that were to be carried out in the mission. Was there need for peacebuilding as the peacekeeping process was going on? In the case of AMIB this was what they were deployed to do, as they were to create conditions through which peace could be built in the country and they succeeded in doing so.

The AMIB mandate was precise and achievable within the time frame, it was easy to understand and operationalise. AMIB was in operation for one year and within that time it was able to establish conditions to the extent that the UN was able to now come in and continue with the tasks. This was one of the tasks that were given to AMIB, also being the first AU mission it was well conducted as they were able to carry out the tasks as

¹⁹ Murithi T. Ibid p.75.

²⁰ UN Mission in Burundi. Maintained by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. © United Nations 2006.

given, and especially calming down the volatile situation. This mission ended up in what is known as a hybrid mission whereby the AU mission terminates into an AU-UN mission. The AU personnel just changed the uniform and continue serving in the mission.

AMIB lasted for one year before the UN took over. The force was small but was capable of undertaking the tasks as was given. About 3,000 troops from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique were deployed in Burundi. This was not only the first AU mission but has also remained a model on how to conduct future missions.

4.3.2 African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)

The AMIS was set up by the PSC in order to implement the decisions made in response to the prevailing situation in Darfur. The humanitarian ceasefire agreement was signed on 8 April, 2004 at N'djamena by the Government of Sudan and the two rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement. This was followed by the Addis Ababa Agreement of May 2004 which paved the way for the African Union to play a specific role in Darfur. The AU then deployed Military Observers to monitor the Ceasefire Agreement and were accompanied and supported by a small Protection Force.²¹

The first contingents of AMIS arrived in the Darfur region in June 2004 and by October 2004 AMIS comprised 465 personnel from ten African countries. However, due to worsening situation, PSC on 20 October 2004, expanded AMIS to a force of 3320 including 815 civilian police components and was consequently named AMIS I. A

²¹ Murithi T. Ibid p.76.

further expansion took place in April 2005 to a total of 6171 including 1560 civilian police, and was subsequently named AMIS II.

The African Union Mission mandate has been to support and implement the Darfur Peace Agreement that was signed in Abuja between the government of Sudan and SLM/A, and is encompassing economic, structural and security arrangements for Darfur. The mandate the African Union Mission in the Sudan AMIS was to observe and monitor the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed by the Sudanese Parties to the conflict, and to report alleged violations. AMIS personnel were not permitted to intervene between the parties on the ground, whatever their actions, and were only able to fire in self-defence if directly threatened.

Following the PSC decision of 15 March 2006 and the subsequent UN Security Council Resolution 1679 Of 16 May, 2006, a Joint AU /UN Technical Assessment Mission under the UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations was conducted in June 2006 so as to assess the requirements necessary for the strengthening of AMIS. The team consulted widely in both Khartoum and Darfur with government officials, with other parties to the conflict and stakeholders including tribal leaders, rebel movements, civil society, internally displaced persons, war affected civilians, humanitarian organizations among others. The team also had extensive meetings with AMIS and UN staff in Darfur and met with President Deby of Chad in N'Djamena. On the 22 September 2006, the team leaders presented their findings and recommendations to President Omar El Bashir, who accepted in principle the idea of AMIS receiving additional support and the

continued United Nations humanitarian and recovery activities in Darfur, but did not accept the possibility of a transition from the AU to a UN operation.²²

The AMIS mandate was to observe and monitor the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement as signed by the Parties to the conflict, while giving the report of alleged violations via the CFC. AMIS personnel were not permitted to intervene between the parties on the ground, whatever their actions, and were only able to fire in self-defence if directly threatened.

In light of the additional responsibilities stipulated by the DPA, on 23 June 2006 the AMIS mandate was reviewed and approved on 27th June 2006 and subsequently a new Concept of Operations (CONOPS) was developed within which AMIS components were tasked to; Monitor and verify activities of all parties and the security situation in and around areas where a secure environment has been established. Monitor and verify the provision of security for returning IDPs within the Area of Responsibility of existing IDP camps, through the NGOs and GOS, in coordination with AMIS CIVPOL. Monitor and verify the cessation of hostilities by all parties. Monitor and verify hostile militia activities against the population. Monitor and verify attempts of the GOS to disarm government controlled militias. Investigate and report all allegations of violations of the CFA. Protect AMIS personnel, equipment and installations. Protect Observer patrols on vehicle and helicopter borne deployment as required. Be prepared to protect civilian under imminent threat in the immediate vicinity, within means and capabilities in accordance with ROE. Be prepared to protect both static and mobile humanitarian

²² United Nations .Maintained by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.© United Nations 2008.

operations under imminent threat and immediate vicinity, within capabilities and in accordance with AMIS Rules of Engagement. Provide visible Military presence by patrolling and by the establishment of temporary outpost in order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population. Provide road security patrols along major lines of communication. Carry out preventive deployments as necessary to reduce the incidence of inter party and inter tribal attacks.²³

The AMIS and UN partnership was confirmed on 21 January 2007 with the final arrangements for the Heavy Support Package (HSP), by which time support for AMIS under the Light Support Package (LSP) was reaching the field. Under the HSP the AMIS force was to receive personnel support in the form of assistance to the Political Process, humanitarian and protection officers, HIV/AIDS advisors, Gender officers, Public Information officers, a translation/interpretation unit, and additional security staff, guards, and support. With few exceptions, the AU is still dependent on five donors; the United Kingdom, United States, the EU, Canada and the Netherlands for the bulk of funding for the force.

The AMIS Military component was to be supported with the addition of two hospitals; signals and engineering staff, medium and heavy transport support, logistical support and additional aviation equipment and support. The UN was to also provide Police advisors to be deployed to the Mission Headquarters and in the field, in addition, AMIS CIVPOL was to be assisted by three Formed Police Units. The possibility of further broad based collaboration in peacekeeping between the AU and UN as the third stage of cooperation remained under discussion between the AU, UN and the Government of Sudan.

²³ AU PSC Communiqué 20th October 2004.

The government of Sudan has been under intense pressure after UN Security Council passed resolution calling for 20,000 UN troops to replace the 7,000 AU troops in the region. The Sudan Government has consistently rejected the presence of UN in Darfur as the president says the presence of UN forces would be tantamount to recolonisation. This is in spite of the UN Secretary General having several meetings with the Sudan regime. Currently there is the AU/UN hybrid operation in the region and is known as United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).²⁴

In analysing the AMIS performance, the AU only sent in troops after the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and by then thousands of people had lost their lives. Between the signing of the CFA agreement and the arrival of the first troops numbering about 3320 took six months. It took a complete one year before this number was beefed up to 6170. According to the Technical assessment team comprising UN and AU members, the number of troops required to effectively carry out the stated tasks are 20,000, as the area of responsibility is quite large. Going by this figure, the AU is only operating at about 30 percent. There are many NGOs and other organisations that were already in the mission to take care of the IDPs and the starving population, so the peacekeepers could perform their tasks as mandated without diversions.

AMIS was to observe and monitor the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed by the Parties and to report alleged violations and except in self-defence if directly threatened, AMIS personnel were not permitted to intervene between the parties on the ground, whatever their actions. This was definitely going to render the peacekeepers ineffective

²⁴ United Nations. Maintained by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. © United Nations 2008.

as there is no need for peacekeepers to be present when they cannot intervene to bring peace. This in effect was denying the peacekeepers their responsibility to protect the people they were meant to protect in the first place. However, it can be argued that this was still better than keeping away the peacekeepers completely as their presence reminds the warring factions that someone is watching and one day they may be called upon to answer for their actions. The situation in Darfur is still fluid and the Sudan president still insists that he will not allow the deployment of the UN forces. In the spirit of responsibility to protect the UN could have considered deploying forces without the president's consent so as to stop more killings. The current forces are not able to cover the large area of responsibility. It can be argued that the mandate as it stands was poorly drafted and the forces are not able to carry out their functions effectively.

The AMIS and UN partnered in January 2007 with the arrangements for the Heavy Support Package (HSP), by which time support for AMIS under the Light Support Package (LSP) was reaching the field. In addition the force was to receive personnel support in the form of assistance to the Political Process, humanitarian and protection officers, HIV/AIDS advisors, Gender officers, Public Information officers, a translation/interpretation unit, and additional security staff, guards, and support. The AMIS Military component was to be supported with the addition of two hospitals; signals and engineering staff, medium and heavy transport support, logistical support and additional aviation equipment and support. The UN was to also provide Police advisors and the AMIS CIVPOL was to be assisted by three Formed Police Units. AMIS therefore relied on donors and the UN to boost its capability.

4.3.3 African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

The phenomenon of instability has been synonymous with Somalia since 1998, culminating into civil strife and the collapse of central authority and the eventual overthrow of the dictatorial regime of President Siad Barre in January 1991. since then, the country has been in a turmoil as there has been no a national political formula to bring peace in Somalia, consequently the country entered into a period of intensive civil war and statelessness that disrupted its social, political and economic fabric. A large number of small arms and heavy weapons fell into the hands of civilians and so they formed organized and freelance militias in the place of the national defence and police forces. Atrocities were committed including human rights abuse, indiscriminate killing of civilians, widespread rape and violence against women and children, arbitrary detention, forced recruitment and use of child soldiers among others.²⁵

The international community intervened in order to terminate civil war and in secure a stable environment. Consequently two UN peacekeeping operations and a US-led multinational peacekeeping operation were deployed in Somalia. UNOSOM I was established in April 1992, so as to provide humanitarian relief to the starving citizens. In December 1992, it was accompanied by a US-led coalition force (UNITAF) to restore order to the country. Following heavy casualties on the US forces, UNITAF was replaced in May 1993 by UNOSOM II operating under a peace enforcement mandate. More than 30 nations contributed up to 37,000 troops to the three multinational forces.²⁶

²⁵ Murithi T. Ibid p.80.

²⁶ Woodhouse T and Duffey T. Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution. Langholtz H J (ed) UNITAR. UN Programme.

Following the pull out, the warlords had all the time and freedom to do as they wished and so they ravaged Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia.²⁷

Since the withdrawal of the UNISOM II, there was no any peacekeeping in Somalia until 2007 when the AU deployed forces in the country. In January 2007, the PSC authorized the deployment of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with strength of nine infantry battalions and the support elements troops totaling to 8,000. However, by the end of 2008, only three out of the nine battalions had arrived and deployed, two of the battalions are from Uganda and one from Burundi a total of 3,000 troops. It is expected that Burundi will send in another Battalion to increase the strength of AMISOM to four Battalions. Other countries expected to contribute troops include Nigeria, Ghana and Malawi. PSC has indicated that it will mobilize logistical support for the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and that the TCCs will be reimbursed for the costs incurred during the deployment.²⁸

Some of the AU member states have expressed willingness to deploy but they lack the logistics and financial capacity to do so. AMISOM is getting assistance from various AU partners such as UN and its agencies, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) League of Arab states, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), EU European Union (EU), and United Nations Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). Some individual Africans and non-African countries are providing assistance to AMISOM through bilateral means.²⁹

²⁷ United Nations. The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996. Ibid p. 3.

²⁸ Murithi T. Ibid p.81.

²⁹ Murithi T. Ibid p.82.

The mandate of the AMISOM forces is; to provide support to the Transition Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation. Facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance. Create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia.

AMISOM was/is to be adequately equipped to project the appropriate posture to undertake the following tasks: Support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders. To provide, as appropriate, protection to the TFIs and their key infrastructure, to enable them carry out their functions. To assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan of Somalia, particularly the effective re-establishment and training of all inclusive Somalia security forces, bearing in mind the programs already being implemented by some of Somalia's bilateral and multilateral partners. To provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilization effort. Monitor, in areas of deployment of its forces, the security situation. Facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs, and to protect its personnel, installation and equipment, including the right of self-defence.³⁰

The Somalia case was unique as the multinational forces had intervened in the initial stages of the conflict but the warring parties were not ready then to have a ceasefire and

³⁰ 69th Communique of the AU Peace and Security Council of 19th January 2007.

even went ahead and engaged the UN forces and inflicting casualties. It therefore took long before the international community could think of intervention once again. It was until IGAD had held prolonged talks with the warring factions and had agreed on formation of a Transition Federal Government (TFG) that the international community showed interest and any move towards creating peace was welcome.

The AMISOM mandate was drafted with some specific tasks directed to the TFG which has since been replaced by another government, the new government must therefore cooperate with AMISOM if any meaningful progress is to be achieved. The mandate is quite wide and there is need to review it once again, though clear but it is a tall order to achieve the objectives. Support to the disarmament programme and stabilization effort, is one of the key tasks of AMISOM, yet it is the hardest to achieve as everyone wants to remain armed as a way of survival in Somalia. However, the AU has to some extent secured the Mogadishu airport. The coming in of the new government requires time to build up confidence and work together towards achieving the objectives.

Although time and interest may have changed to some extent, the current AU force of 3,000 troops can not achieve much given that the initial force was expected to go up to 8,000. This in effect means that the AU force is operating at about 38 percent of their initial target. But with the warring factions still fighting, there is a definite need to increase the forces further so as to cover a wider area. UNOSOM and the UNITAF each consisted of troops over 30,000 per time. The AU should therefore be working towards increasing the forces. Given that this is the third year since the deployment of the initial forces, the chances are very slim that Malawi, Nigeria and Ghana are still focused to

contributing troops; the AU must come up with a different strategy to get the required troops. Given the uniqueness of this mission, it may not be fair to benchmark it as the other missions; the fact that AU was able to deploy forces and is still maintaining them in itself is a big step in the right direction. So far 9 Ugandan soldiers have been killed, this coupled with the previous experiences of UNOSOM and UNITAF is enough for a country to change its earlier position of sending in troops.

With few exceptions, the AU is still dependent on five donors; the United Kingdom, United States, the EU, Canada and the Netherlands for the bulk of funding for the force. All the three AU missions have been funded for by donors; this is one major drawback for the organisation as it introduces the element of dependency, for financing, logistics and operations. The level and size of the peacekeeping is determined by the amount contributed, the willingness of the donors to fund and their interests have to be taken into on board.

CHAPTER FIVE

FROM OAU TO AU: THE LESSONS

5.0 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter OAU and AU were examined individually how they performed and the lessons that can be drawn from it. Also examined is what could be referred to as the peacekeeping best practices with the concept of the responsibility to protect. There is a comparative analysis between the two organisations and finally the conclusion to the study.

5.1 OAU PEACEKEEPING

From the analysis of OAU peacekeeping, three lessons can be drawn from it. First, a proper analysis has to be carried out to come up with a clear concept so as to establish and integrate all the concurrent activities that would go along with a peacekeeping mission if a desired end state of peace is to be achieved. The conflict situation in Chad was the type where peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace servicing should have been effectively integrated if they were to manage the conflict, but since such an effort lacked, the mission was bound to fail. The biggest challenge as earlier noted, was that the people were already starving of hunger and so they cared less about an agreement that did not take into account their immediate needs of food. The OAU therefore approached the Chad mission with a concept that could not be implemented.

Secondly, a mandate has to be realistic, unambiguous, and understood by all the parties concerned. The tasks of the troops are drawn from the mandate, and so they must be clear

and achievable. In the case of Chad the functions given to the troops were neither achievable nor specific. They were also ambiguous and it violated the operational norm of a limited, precise, and clear mandate for an effective peacekeeping mission. The role and functions of the peacekeeping force in the Status of Force Agreement was vague and hence subject to several interpretations.

Thirdly, an organisation must have adequate funds that can support both the operations and logistics of a mission if it is to succeed; in addition, it should be centralized so that all the troops are administered from a common source with same terms. OAU lacked funds and so the countries were to cater for their own costs as long as the mission lasted. Further more OAU failed to come up with any strategy to raise adequate funds for the mission. The Chad operations as was earlier envisaged were simply beyond the financial capability of the OAU, yet they went ahead and launched troops, they did not therefore have chances of succeeding.

5.2 AU PEACEKEEPING

Three lessons can be drawn from the AU peacekeeping mission and are follows: First, AU should stop over reliance on the outside world for funding and support when planning for peacekeeping missions. Burundi was waiting for the support from the US government before they could launch their troops into Somalia and so ended up delaying, likewise the US government had promised support to Malawi for same mission and to date they are yet to receive the support and deploy. This makes the planning aspect difficult as the AU cannot forecast peacekeeping activities as milestones are interfered with as well as the entire planning process. Consequently, AMISOM is facing challenges

caused by lack of adequate troops. AU like the OAU lacks funds to run a peacekeeping mission independently. Lack of funds has contributed to the lack of adequate AU troops in AMISOM, the peace fund is not having what it takes to run a peacekeeping mission.

Secondly, the UN and by extension the rest of the world are depending on the AU peacekeepers to test the safety of missions in Africa before launching troops from outside Africa. This was the case in Burundi and now in Sudan where they are now ready to send in UN troops. The UN secretary general has also hinted that the UN is considering launching troops in Somalia subject to the situation. The AU member states have to get the right equipment for their troops as they are subjected to a lot of danger especially in the initial stages when there is no ceasefire agreement. This appears to be a silent policy by the developed countries especially after UNOSOM suffered heavy casualties.

Thirdly, a short and precise mandate is necessary for effective peacekeeping. This was the case for Burundi and the troops completed the mission in the given time having successfully achieved their mandate. The AMIS mandate was also clear, but had a lot of barriers. The one of AMISOM is not clear and they are likely to achieve less.

Fourth, there is no line to determine who intervenes when, between the AU and the UN, there are chances that without such a clear understanding AU can easily fail to intervene hoping that the UN will. AU members are also members of the UN and need to benefit from the UN funds. UN should come up with a workable formula on who should do what in time of crisis, and at what stage. This could include funding the AU for the entire mission, partial funding as may be agreed, logistical support or the current concept of

hybrid peacekeeping. This is because UN through the Security Council is overall in charge of security globally.

Fifth, the emerging AU-UN hybrid partnership is a good move towards reducing the AU financial burden. If such a framework is polished out so that the AU will could still make the initial deployments but the UN funds, and then UN can come in later. This would be a good division of labour; AU provides the manpower while the UN provides the funds. The AU should then train knowing that they will be doing the initial basic work on the ground before the UN sends in more troops if required. It happened in Burundi and Darfur, though the funding was not direct from the UN.

5.3 PEACEKEEPING BEST PRACTICES

Many authors have attempted to identify the factors behind what could be termed as a successful traditional peacekeeping. However, there are no clear factors that can be considered as the standard benchmark to state that a mission is a success; traditional peacekeeping is hinged mainly on what happens before deploying the forces. The mandate and tasks for each mission should act as a guideline, to assess the progress of success. In some instances the mandates are not clear and so one has to ask some questions; why was the mission established in the first place and what have they achieved in terms of stopping the fighting.

Five factors specifically developed for traditional peacekeeping operations mandated by international organizations serve as what could be considered prior to the fielding of peacekeepers. They are; Consent and Acceptance by the Belligerents, Neutrality, Concurrent Peace Negotiations, clear mandate and institutional capacity. However, in

modern day peacekeeping, the responsibility to protect does necessarily call for consent and acceptance by the belligerents

5.3.1 Consent and Acceptance by the Belligerents

Traditional peacekeeping is a political rather than a military tool and so is dependent upon acceptance by all belligerents. Such peacekeeping is intended to support ongoing negotiations and often oversees a cease-fire as agreed upon by the belligerents before the commencement of the operations. If a cease-fire is not in place, the success of the mission will still depend upon the belligerents accepting the mandate and mission of the multinational unit.

However when International missions enter a country without the acceptance of all the belligerents, then that is peace enforcement mission rather than the traditional peacekeeping. Peace enforcements have been undertaken in Liberia by the ECOMOG and NATO in Kosovo, in both instances there was no consent and acceptance by the belligerents. The refusal of belligerents to cooperate with the peacekeepers in the two cases intensified the crisis, dragging the multinational forces into the conflict.¹

Maintaining good relations that is based on consent and legitimacy with the local communities is a prerequisite for a mission to be successful. In order to preserve consent and legitimacy a better and fuller cultural understanding of the conflict and the local population's traditions is required. Consent will best be promoted if the parties feel understood and are made shareholders of the peace process. Intervention will be viewed

¹ Terry M.M. Opcit.

as legitimate if peacekeepers invest time to understand and support the local resources and institutions.²

5.3.2 Neutrality

Neutrality concept is a requirement in the traditional peacekeeping. Under a traditional peacekeeping mandate the soldiers face a situation in which they are performing a neutral political mission as opposed to typical military job of taking sides against a common enemy. Irrespective of personal opinions or provocations in traditional peacekeeping soldiers must maintain an even hand and a neutral stance toward all belligerents. The perception of the belligerents about neutrality is very important for the success of the mission. The loss of neutrality or the perception of it can easily bring to an end a traditional peacekeeping.

Soldiers training in peacekeeping are limited as they are trained for combat situations and so can find peace operations frustrating as these operations are political rather than a military tool. In the OAU peacekeeping in Chad, some countries were not allowed to contribute troops as they were not considered to be neutral.³

5.3.3 Concurrent Peace Negotiations

Civilians should negotiate initial cease-fires and the mandates, it should not be left to the peacekeepers least they loss the perception of neutrality and so a belligerent can eventually accuse them of being biased toward the other side. However, the peacekeepers should be trained as well as prepared to handle minor cease-fire violations and

² Woodhouse T and Duffey T. Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution. Langholtz H J (ed) UNITAR. UN Programme.

³ Terry M.M. Opcit

negotiations on a local level. The negotiations in this case are to secure a general cease-fire between all belligerent forces.⁴

5.3.4 Clear Mandate

Traditional peacekeeping requires a mandate, or at least the endorsement, by an international organization normally the UN or another legal authority. This is so that it is separated from a unilateral or multinational military intervention. Traditional peacekeeping by its very nature requires the mandate of an international organization or another legal authority. Mandates also do provide the specific legal authorization for the peacekeeping operation. UN mandates will normally cite the Security Council resolutions authorizing the establishment and deployment of the force and should clearly define obtainable objectives and the acceptance of the belligerents. A mission should be well defined and should contain a clear plan for reaching peace. In addition, it is important that all the parties are commitment to seeing the mission through.

5.3.5 Institutional Capacity

Institutional capacity could be defined in terms of material, operational, and political resources. Material and operational resources include funds, logistics, trained and disciplined operations and logistics troops and adequate personnel with expertise in complex fields. The timing of peacekeeping intervention is also critical to the success of a peacekeeping mission as it is influenced by the availability of material and operational

⁴ Terry M.M. Ibid

resources. Political resources comprise moral authority, leverage, and the political strength to gain adherence to agreements.⁵

5.4 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: OAU AND AU

The OAU in its 40 years of existence attempted only one peacekeeping mission in Chad and within the same timeframe the UN conducted 20 peacekeeping missions in Africa. The Chad mission lasted less than a year and at the end the rebels had driven away the government forces and taken over, hence the objective of the mission was not achieved. On the other hand, the AU is in its 7th year and has now attempted 3 missions, two of which culminated into hybrid missions where by the UN has been taking the lead role after the AU has stabilized the situation on the ground. AU is definitely making more attempts at peacekeeping compared to what OAU did.

With the exception of the Somalia mission where most of the countries are reluctant to providing peacekeepers, there was a good response in Burundi and Sudan (Darfur) where countries contributed troops in good time. In the earlier case of Chad, up to 12 countries were approached and had indicate that they would be sending troops, but only three eventually did so, which translates to about 25 percent. Not only was the finances and logistic the defining factors, but also the political will power by the potential TCCs was lacking. The performance in Chad was poor; however, it was worth attempting. There is more willingness now by AU member states to contribute troops for peacekeeping.

⁵ Amoo S G. Frustrations of Regional peacekeeping: The OAU in Chad, 1977-1982. <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ams02/ams02.pdf>,

What distinguishes the AU's security architecture from that of OAU is the intensive cooperation between the African Union and regional organisations. The OAU's security efforts were plagued by its uneasy coexistence with the continent's various RECs. On the other hand, the AU does not see the RECs as competitors, but as essential building blocks and implementation agencies for its many programs. The RECs are the pillars and are therefore incorporated into AU's security architecture, by so doing the AU profits from the regions' comparative advantage in military and security matters and their experience with peace operations. Under this approach, the primary responsibility for peace and security remains squarely with the RECs, while the AU serves as authoritative clearinghouse and framework for all initiatives.⁶ The OAU was working with the RECs as competitors and so did not benefit from the regional experience. The complications likely to be encountered is that of overlapping memberships, many African states simultaneously belong to more than one intergovernmental body that aspires to a role in security maintenance and conflict management. This can prove particularly detrimental to the continent's infant security architecture.⁷

The ability to deploy peacekeepers, peace enforcers, and intervene without Member State permission is what differentiates the AU institutional capability to that of OAU. The AU can act to restore or maintain peace in a wide variety of circumstances, and therefore the responsibility to protect as is provided for in Article 4 of the AU constitutive Act. That is why the AU deployed in Somalia even without the consent of all the warring parties. Once the ASF is ready, then it will be easier and faster to deploy forces in conflict area,

⁶ Franke B F. *Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continent's Emerging Security Architecture*. Volume: 9. Issue: 3. 2007 Center for African Studies. Gale Group

⁷ Rechner J D. *Opcit*

unlike the OAU case, where they have to scout around for a willing country to contribute troops.

It is incumbent on troop-contributing countries to commit and deploy units with the required technical capabilities. Capability and therefore firepower should be the determinant of troops being tasked, and should be backed by the necessary logistics. This is still lacking in AU as it did with the OAU, some countries have to depend on developed countries for equipment and logistic assistance before they can deploy, Burundi and Malawi were promised such assistance by the US to enable them deploy in Somalia.

With the emerging AU-UN hybrid partnership, the question now is whether the AU will be doing the initial basic and dangerous work on the ground before the UN sends in troops on the ground. It did happen in Burundi, the same was the case in Darfur, Sudan, and the UN has also been waiting for the AU to stabilize in Somalia before they can send in their troops. This line of action seems to represent a paradigm shift in the relationship between the two organisations. The relationship is more of asymmetric as the flow of resources is from the UN to AU given the fact that the UN is older with much experience and resources.⁸ But given the unwillingness by the non-African states to deploy troops in Africa, the trend is likely to continue.

The right spirit and the right attitude are to be in place for deployment and achievement of objectives. AU seems to have captured that from the onset and is likely to perform even better once the ASF is in place.

⁸ Murithi T. *ibid.*

5.5 CONCLUSION

Peacekeeping can be seen as a cooperative effort or solidarity by states so as to protect or bring an end to hostilities in other countries and save lives while negotiators help settle the crisis. OAU was formed in 1963 during the political turmoil on the African continent for the struggle for independence with the goals of promoting decolonization and independent self-government in African states, to guarantee respect for territorial boundaries of the states, and to promote social, political, and economic development on the African continent. However, many Africa countries have struggled with violent conflicts since they attained their independence and OAU did little to reduce the number and/or severity of the conflicts.

In its close to forty year of existence, OAU only managed to deploy one peacekeeping mission in 1981-82 in Chad and the mission failed to achieve the objectives. The OAU thereafter never attempted to carry out another peacekeeping mission. The OAU was dissolved in 2001 to give way to a new organization, the African Union. The mandate of the African Union is more proactive compared to that of OAU as regard to intervention in internal conflicts. Some of structural and practical weaknesses in OAU were addressed in the formative stage of AU, and especially the responsibility to protect, where the AU can intervene in member states subject to certain circumstances. Rapid efforts have been made so far to put the foundations of the AU in place since its inauguration in 2002. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was among those organs installed in the same year, as peace was considered key to achieving any meaningful development. The protocol on the

PSC does provide for panel of wise men, early warning system and Africa Standby Force.

The AU is better structured to handle peacekeeping operations more the OAU

The Africa continent has increasingly become the focal point of UN peacekeeping missions and especially in the 1990s after the cold war. The AU has so far deployed three peacekeeping missions in the seven years of its existence; in Burundi, Sudan and now Somalia. The AU is relying on the outside world for funding and support when planning for peacekeeping missions as it lacks the capacity to carry out peacekeeping operations independently; this complicates the peace process as timelines are interfered with. the UN and by extension the rest of the world are depending on the AU peacekeepers to test the safety of missions in Africa before launching troops from outside Africa and this trend is likely to continue.

Five factors specifically developed for traditional peacekeeping operations mandated by international organizations could be considered prior to the fielding of peacekeepers. They are Consent and Acceptance by the Belligerents, Neutrality, Concurrent Peace Negotiations, clear mandate and institutional capacity. In the modern day peacekeeping, the responsibility to protect does necessarily call for consent and acceptance by the belligerents.

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