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Colonial Borders and National Security: Case Study Horn of Africa from 1956 to 2005

BY

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Dissertation Submitted in Partial fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of Masters of Arts in International Studies at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi.

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DECLARATION

This dissertation is my own original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

David Bukweya Kiplel




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9 June 2008

Date

This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as university Supervisor

Macharia Munene. PhD.



Signature

June 7, 21

Date

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Abstract

This study sets to examine the colonial borders in the Horn of Africa and the implications on National Security. It explores the border formation in pre-colonial times and the conflicts over the borders after independence.

The Study finds that the borders divided some ethnic groups into different countries, making it difficult to manage and control movements along these borders because of the kin-country phenomena. The social economic and political situations have an impact on the security situations along the borders due to neglected social developments and lack of economic empowerment of pastoral communities. The borderlanders smuggle contraband goods and arms across the porous borders because of weak government structures in these areas. The borders left by the colonialists shall remain contentious and no country shall cede its inherited borders in the near future. The porous borders will present a security challenge because it is not practical to position security forces along these borders, however if poverty alleviation strategies are implemented the insecurity can be minimized. The Human security has a bearing on the overall national security and governments must make policies which ensure safety of its citizens in order to achieve national security objectives.

LIST OF ACRONYMS.

AIDS	Acquired Immuno- Deficiency Syndrome
BP	Border Point
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
ELM	Eritrean Liberation movement
EPLF	Eritrean Popular Liberation Forces
FRUD	Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KAR	Kings African Rifles
KPR	Kenya Police Reserve
LCDs	Less Developed Countries
NFD	Northern Frontier District
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
RPP	Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progres
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SNM	Somali National Movement
SYL	Somali Youth League
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UN	United Nations
UPDF	Uganda Peoples Defence Force
USA	United States of America
USC	United Somali Congress SPM Somali Patriotic movement
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Introduction and Background to the Study

Postcolonial conflict in Africa is closely linked to the artificial borders and the Westphalian modelled states created by European colonialists. Prior to colonialism the African states, as are defined today, did not exist. Indeed, one of the most distinctive African contributions to human history was the civilized art of living fairly and peacefully together not in state¹. In this arrangement, the problem of security was vested in the chieftdom and localised to protect the ethnic or clan against invasion by stronger groups. This changed from 1880 when European powers, through the use of imperialistic treaties, subdivided the continent among themselves².

A critical assessment of the two key maps on European possessions in Africa and their accompanying treaties shows that their importance did not reflect the wishes of African communities.³ The treaties did, in fact, fix the borders of the European possessions, and these borders, with all their consequences, have remained the borders of the African states to this day. It is therefore, these treaties and not the actual conquest of Africa or the colonial epoch that are the most permanent feature of European imperialism in Africa.⁴

¹Lonsdale, J., "States and Social Processes in Africa: A historiographical survey," African Studies Review, Vol 24 nos 2-3, 1981, p. 139.

²Wesseling, H. L., Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa, 1880-1914. (Westport CT: Praeger, 1996), p. 5.

³Robert O. Collins, editor, The Partition of Africa: Illusion or Necessity? (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1969), p. 106.

⁴Wesseling, Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa, 1880-1914, p. 4.

Upon independence, African Heads of States first conceived the idea of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and sought to maintain the artificial borders that had been created by the colonial powers⁵. They did this by adopting the OAU charter in 1963, and enacting Article III which stated that, "Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence,"⁶ was to be observed. This in effect implied that the colonial borders were to be sacrosanct⁷. It gave rise to sovereignty and state security as pillars for foreign policy and as such, any interference with the borders of the sovereign African states was viewed as a threat to state security. The notion of state security and national security was alien to the newly independent African states and was used to protect regimes rather than prevent external threats and guard state sovereignty⁸.

Contemporary Africa, with all its territorial problems and crises emerged during the post independence period and on the basis of those treaties. Several wars have been fought over the disputed borders all over Africa. They range from Nigeria and Cameroon⁹, Sudan and Egypt¹⁰, Chad and Libya¹¹ as well as Morocco and Western Sahara.¹²

⁵Edmond J. Keller, and Donald Rothchild, editors., Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 5.

⁶ John Ravenhill, " Redrawing the Map of Africa," in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, editors, The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), p. 28.

⁷ Keller and Rothchild, Africa in the New International Order, p. 40.

⁸ John Hatchard, Individual Freedoms & State Security in the African Context: The Case of Zimbabwe (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1993) , p. 1.

⁹ Stephen Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability and Status (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), p. 141.

¹⁰ Abdel Salam Sidahmed, and Alsir Sidahmed, Sudan (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. xvi.

¹¹ Brian Taylor Sumner, "Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice," Duke Law Journal Vol 53.6 (2004), pp.1-12.

¹² Antony G. Pazzanita, " The Proposed Referendum in the Western Sahara: Background, Developments, and Prospects," in Yahia H. Zoubir and Daniel Volman, editors. International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict. (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993), p. 192.

The Horn of Africa, comprising of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan as well as Kenya and Uganda due to the spill over of conflicts in Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia,¹³ has had the largest share of border conflicts. Most of the conflicts are started and fuelled by issues that revolve around the use of historical and ethnic factors to dispute the colonial boundaries. Somalia has on several occasions agitated for self-determination of the Kenyan Northern Frontier District (NFD) and Ogaden region of Ethiopia¹⁴. Eritrea, for several years, fought to secede from Ethiopia¹⁵ while the Anya-Nya movement in Southern Sudan challenged Khartoum on the status of Southern Sudan when the British left.¹⁶ Furthermore, Kenya changed its map to include the contested Elemi Triangle, which lies between the Kenyan, Sudanese and Ethiopian borders¹⁷ while under Idi Amin, Uganda made claims to some parts of Kenya¹⁸. In addition, rivalry over watering points, grazing areas, clanism, unstable governments, refugees, conflict over pasture and poverty¹⁹ have contributed to the proliferation of illegal arms and the continuity of the conflicts.²⁰ The focus of this study is to analyse how the colonial borders have contributed to insecurity in the region, and consider a way forward.

¹³Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁴ Malvern Lumsden, "Evolution of the Problem-Solving Workshop: an Introduction to Social-Psychological Approaches to Conflict Resolution," Journal of Peace and Conflict, Vol 2.1, 1996, p. 37.

¹⁵George A. Lipsky, Wendell Blanchard, Abraham M. Hirsch and Bela C Maday, Ethiopia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven, CT: HRAF Press, 1962), p. 221.

¹⁶Edgar O'Ballance, Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99 (Houndmills, England: Macmillan Press, 2000), pp. 38-40.

¹⁷ O. Norman Anderson, Sudan in Crisis: The Failure of Democracy (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1999), p. 211.

¹⁸ Chweya, Lundeki, "Sources of African Security Condition and Agenda Setting", in Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective? (Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, Wordalve Publishers, 2006), p. 261.

¹⁹ I. M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa (New York: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1961), pp. 34- 35.

²⁰ Keith Krause, "Multilateral Diplomacy, Norm Building, and UN Conferences: The Case of Small Arms and Light Weapons," Global Governance Journal 8.2, 2002, p. 1.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

The extent to which national security issues in the Horn of Africa are affected by borders inherited from colonial times are of interest in tackling regional conflicts. In the past, conflict management in the Horn has been studied from a global and historical perspective. Research has concentrated on how to prevent the conflicts through regional security. It has not looked deeper into the national security concerns within the Third World context and especially in the post-Cold War era and the role of inherited borders as left by the colonialists. The reasons for the insecurity in the Horn have not been explained in depth especially the issue of human security, economic security and many of these challenges cannot be resolved by military focused security policies²¹. This study will provide recommendations which can be used in policy making and the enhancement of security in line with the changing paradigm of security in the post Cold War era.

1.3 The Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are as follows:

1. To explore border disputes in the Horn of Africa.
2. To provide an insight into the understanding of insecurity in the Horn of Africa.
3. To gain knowledge for academic purposes about the Horn of Africa.
4. To recommend strategies, to government policy makers, that will enhance security in the Horn of Africa.

²¹ Renner, Michael, "State of the World 2005: Redefining Security", in Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective? (Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi: 2006), p 2.

1.4 Literature Review

The literature review is divided into three parts. The first part examines national security studies; the second part focuses on borders conflicts; and the third, reviews literature on conflict management in the Horn of Africa.

1.4.1 Security Studies, Concepts and Theoretical Frameworks

Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams in the book, Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, argue that the emergence of the Third World challenged the dominant understanding of security in three important aspects. These are its focus on the interstate level as the point of origin of security threats, its exclusion of non-military phenomena from the security studies agenda and its belief in the global balance of power as the legitimate and effective instruments of international order. They argue that resource scarcity; overpopulation, underdevelopment, and environmental degradation are at the heart of insecurity in the Third World.

In the book, Balance of Power: History and Theory, Michael Sheehan provides a theoretical background on alliances necessary to assess questions about state security. Sheehan's book gives more than ten variations of the definition of balance of power, but the main premise of this concept area is as follows: "the international system is anarchic, with each state seeking to maximize its power potential by constantly making decisions based on increasing its own relative power while undermining the power of its competitors." Because every state is assumed to follow this model, a balance of power is

maintained, and if any change occurs to the status quo, every state will attempt to ensure that they gain from it.

The countries in the Horn during the Cold War practiced this form of behaviour. Somalia and Ethiopia engaged in an arms race by being aligned to the United States and the Soviet Union. Because of the popularity of this concept, it is crucial to gain a comprehensive understanding of the factors and variables involved in today's international system. The first essential element related to alliances is Sheehan's statement that alliances may be formed on the basis of ideological preference in times of strategic stability, but in times of danger, alliances are formed based on availability, willingness, and strategic value with ecological compatibility becoming relatively dispensable. This statement may pertain to Ethiopia and Kenya who concluded a mutual defence pact in 1964 in response to what both countries perceived as a continuing threat from Somalia over border claims.

But do alliances guarantee security?

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A book by Robert Mandel, The changing Face of National Security: A Conceptual Analysis, argues that national security is emerging as a multifaceted concept and because of this, there are considerable disagreements about its meaning. This definition obviously carried great weight during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union and the United States posed mutual military threats, and its continuance rests at least partially on the assumption that expanding the concept of security beyond military force would "destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions" to global problems.

Barry Buzan in his book, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Studies in the Post Cold War Era, argues that national security remains a "weakly conceptualized, ambiguously defined, but politically powerful concept" because "an undefined notion of national security offers scope for power-maximizing strategies to political and military elites." He contends that human security is affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental.

Joseph J Romm in the book, Defining National Security: The Non-military Aspects, argues that the concept of national security needs broadening to cope with the diversity of challenges in today's world. Advocates of this position should either incorporate a wider range of the social sciences in the study of national security, including economics, psychology, and sociology/anthropology; or incorporate a wider range of international problems under the rubric of security studies, including domestic violence, subnational and transnational threats, the AIDS epidemic, drug trafficking, international debt and economic recession, exponential population growth, environmental pollution, and the widening rich-poor gap. Similar differences of opinion exist about the appropriate levels of analysis for considering national security.

Hans J. Morgenthau in his book, Politics Among Nations, argues that politicians control people by taking advantage of their psychological and physical safety needs. He links this behaviour to states and further argues that nations have sought increasingly to use power "to control the minds of men" rather than simply to take over territory.

Joseph S. Nye in his book, Understanding International Conflicts, argues that national governments seem to be the only actors in the new world order with an intrinsic vested

interest in giving the highest priority to the safety and survival of their societies. He further argues that although governments are less in control than before, people still look to them as the primary source of national security; Nye explains that physical security is one of the three items along with economic well-being and community identity that people have expected most from their political institutions. It is indeed ironic that although national governments now lack self-sufficiency in any significant aspect of their operation, the millstone of providing protection for their citizens rests as heavily as ever around their necks. Thus, recognizing the recent revolutionary global transformation does not equate with discarding completely the traditional state centric essence of national security.

Abdul-Monem al-Mashat in the book, National Security in the Third World, has argued that in the Third World, national security poses dilemmas. Unlike Western nations Less Developed Countries (LDCs) must balance the complex and often contradictory requirements of socio-economic and political development with problems of internal instability and the requirement of national defence. He contends that for the Third World, a concept of national security that focuses primarily on the international threat system and its overt manifestations of wars and violence, ignoring domestic well-being, is inadequate on theoretical and pragmatic grounds. As a result, new ways of defining and measuring national security should be developed so that the concept may be appropriately applied to the needs of developing countries. In addition, Al-Mashat argues that the “tranquillity” of a state, a concept traditionally linked with national security, cannot necessarily be associated with quality of life as measured by conventional means. He constructs a tranquillity index for ninety-five developing nations and tests its relationship

with the physical quality-of-life index to demonstrate this point. Attempts to improve quality of life, he suggests, may not lead to a reduction in security unless simultaneous attempts are made to democratize the regime.

1.4.2 Literature on Borders

Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson in their book, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State, argue that while the negotiation of state power is a central pattern in any narrative or image of the world's borderlands, it is certainly not the only one. In this book, they explore some of the powerful entities within the state, which the latter must compete with, and in some cases accommodate. They examine how an anthropological focus on international borders can illuminate the role of border identities and regions in the strengthening or weakening of the nation-state, an institution synonymous with the creation and exercise of political power, but one experiencing the twin threats of supranationalism from above, and ethnonationalism and regionalism from below. Through this review, they place the anthropology of borders firmly within the anthropological analysis of the relations of power between and among nations and states. They argue that it has become increasingly apparent over the years that as some states cease to exist, others come into being, and that allegedly new forms of nationalism are creating and destroying traditional borders, thereby, setting in motion the forces of war, racism and the mass movement of refugees. The case of Eritrea seceding from Ethiopia is a case in point. The book explores some of these debates in ways that make them more relevant to anthropological concerns, and it presents arguments regarding the role which culture plays in the social construction and negotiation of these borders.

In their subsequent chapters, Donnan and Wilson consider how the state is subverted in its borderlands, how borderlanders are often victims of the abuse of power, and sometimes agents or the sources of state power, and how the state's borders may be strengthened in the face of the so-called processes of globalisation, internationalisation and supranationalisation. They argue that even in Western Europe, the home of the ideal homogeneous nation-state, ethnic divisions are readily apparent in regional and nationalist political activity. Conflicts whose origins stem from the multi-ethnic compositions of the state are the most difficult for governments to contend with and their severity can be great enough to threaten the territorial integrity of the state. Donnan and Wilson define nations as communities of people tied together through common culture, who have as their pre- eminent political goal the attainment of some form of independence, autonomy or devolution. The study will attempt to find out whether what Donnan and Wilson assert is applicable in the Horn of Africa which has border ethnic groups that have common cultures and languages and if the dream of a Greater Somalia, Southern Sudan self-determination and Eritrea's border conflict with Ethiopia bears semblance to this assertion.

A book by Francis M. Deng, and I. William Zartman, Conflict Resolution in African, argues that African states have initiated border negotiations with their neighbours to readjust geometric lines to take trans-human migrations into account, so that migratory groups need not cross international frontiers in search of traditional watering holes and seasonal pastures. They give an example that in 1962, Mauritania sought a resolution of its trans-border problems with Mali and the next year finally arrived at a settlement based

on a more manageable border, buying good relations and an uncontested border with the cession of small pieces of territory to its neighbour.

Deng and Williams further argue that, Egypt, under the colonial protection of Great Britain, readjusted its administrative border with Sudan so as to coincide with traditional grazing habits on either side of the frontier in 1902; a politically motivated flare-up in 1958 between the two now-independent neighbours brought them to the verge of open conflict, but since then, under the impetus of solving additional border problems raised by the creation of Lake Nasir behind the Aswan High Dam, Egypt has come to regard the administrative line as the international boundary. Should we then encourage the ceding of territory to reduce conflict? What about the Eritrea –Ethiopian border war over Badme?

I. M. Lewis in his book, Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa, argues the border conflicts between Somalia and its neighbours are primarily because the creation of the Somalia Republic still left outside the fold those Somali nationals living in French Somaliland, in the contiguous eastern regions of Ethiopia, and in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. The situation that confronted the newly formed Republic of Somalia in 1960 was that Somalia's neighbours were Somali kinsmen whose citizenship had been falsified by indiscriminate boundary "arrangements". He further argues that the further extension of Somali unification to embrace French Somaliland, the Ethiopian Haud and Ogaden, and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, although boldly enshrined in the Somalia Republic's constitution, was altogether a different matter. Both the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, and the Haud and Ogaden, were part of neighbouring states, which had shown no enthusiasm for the

Somali cause and could hardly be expected to agree readily to territorial changes, which would diminish their size and prestige. He does not offer an alternative cause to the conflict.

A.I. Asiwaju and Paul Nugent in the book, African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities, argue that boundaries are inherently artificial, interpose barriers between peoples and do not exist by virtue of any fundamental law of human organization. They argue that those living within the borders often subvert, destroy or simply ignore them. In Africa, the paradoxes were accentuated, as colonial powers constructed new boundaries for their own purposes, which altered the pre-colonial conceptions of boundary and its functions.

Ogot, A Bethwell and William Ochieng, in their book, Kenya the Making of a Nation: A hundred Years of Kenya's History, 1895-1995, argue that the exact boundaries of the British East African protectorate, now Kenya, were arbitrary and in many areas vague. It followed the Anglo-German frontier of 1886 from Vanga in the South to the Uganda border, which at that time was at Guaso Masai River. From there it followed the Kedong River and the Laikipia escarpment up to the northern shores of Lake Turkana. They argue that in so doing, many border ethnic groups were separated by the arbitrary lines.

1.4.3 Literature on Conflict Management in the Horn

A book edited by Makumi Mwagiru, African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation, argues that weak administration is responsible for cross-border banditry and cattle rustling in the borders of Kenya-Uganda, Kenya-Somali, Kenya-Ethiopia, and

Kenya-Sudan. In this book Eric Masinde Aseka in an article, "Globalisation Intellectuals and Security in Africa", argues that intellectuals in the Horn of Africa should investigate the construction of security in Africa rather than in European cities.

In Conflict: Theory Processes and Institutions of Management, Makumi Mwangiru argue that conflicts are internationalised by the division of an ethnic group by international borders, and the media. He argues that what is domestic is internationalised because of interdependence, human rights and domestic sources which have international connections. He argues that the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia although internationalised lies in the economic interdependence of the two states.

Katsuyoshi Fukui, and John Markakis, in their book, Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa, argue that competition for resources is the process that shapes the confrontation between groups and individuals in the Horn of Africa. The mediating role the state plays in the conflict renders this process intrinsically political, and this means only groups can compete. Competition takes place not in the economic but in the political realm, and the immediate objective is access to power, the key to the acquisition of material and social resources. Consequently, there is a manifold sense of commonality among members of an ethnic group, a sense of sharing the same material and social prospects. Moreover, ethnicity is not always the basis upon which ethnic groups mobilize. They argue that the sense of commonality mentioned above may exceed the bounds of ethnicity, and a wider framework may be used for purposes of political mobilization, as was the case with the regional movements. They observe that the future prospects of the inhabitants of southern

Sudan seemed common to all, regardless of ethnic identity, and mobilization there occurred on a regional basis, as was the case in Eritrea for the same reasons. Furthermore, concern for future prospects can lead to the abandonment of what are usually considered primary symbols of ethnicity. For example, Eritrea's Muslims chose Arabic as the language of education for their children, even though it is not the native tongue of any ethnic group there.

John O. Oucho in, Undercurrents of Ethnic Conflicts in Kenya, argues that the Horn of Africa has perhaps been the most volatile sub-region where civil wars, ethnic and clan rivalries and natural disaster mainly droughts and famines have caused deaths and produced some of the largest numbers of Internal Displaced People (IDPs) and refugees. The refugees cross over to Kenya and contribute to insecurity. In this sub-region, both Eritrea and Ethiopia began by overthrowing, in 1974, the fascist regime of Emperor Haile Selassie and bringing to a halt the longstanding Ethiopian monarchy. As Ethiopia went through a repressive regime from the seventies to the early nineties, Eritrea became an effective collaborator envisioning independence once the common enemy (the Ethiopian Socialist Mengistu Haile Mariam) was defeated. That took place in 1991 and Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993. Border war between the two ensued over a boundary dispute. As for Somalia, rebel attacks on the military regime of Siad Barre created many factions along clan lines, factions that managed to overthrow the regime in 1991 but subsequently failed to enter into a durable truce thereby, plunging the country in such difficulties that have rendered it ungovernable. For Sudan, protracted dispute between the ruling Arab population in the north and the blacks in the reputedly rich

southern region has taken on ethno-religious dimensions, killed many southerners and made them perennial IDPs and refugees. The refugees have been accommodated in Kenya and the conflict has given rise to proliferation of small arms along the porous borders.

Ludeki Chweya's article, "Sources of African Security Condition and Agenda Setting," a chapter in a book by Heinrich Boll Foundation, Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective? argues that Africa's nation states are a product of the historical process by which the Europeans partitioned Africa for their own security but when they left, the same borders became a source of insecurity. He argues that the Westphalia model of the state system was not suitable for the African states due to the weak states which were not democratic and thus, illegitimate. As a result, leaders used the notion of national security as a tool for the suppression of the opposition and this fuelled intra-state conflicts. The study will attempt to investigate whether the Westphalian notion of state security as applicable to Third World countries is problematic and why Somalia as a nation state is a failed state despite the homogeneity of the people.

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A book by William I Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa. argues that the Horn of Africa is dominated by Ethiopia's attempts to break its isolation, hold its varied population together, and prevent encirclement by hostile neighbouring forces. He argues that the region is also marked by endemic, violent internal opposition to the governments of a number of authoritarian and brutal governments. Some of the states, he argues, have not found a means of incorporating their populations into a stable and democratic order in which each government responds to the needs of its people. In

many cases, particularly in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, resistance to central authority has taken the form of ethnic and regionally based rebellions.

In Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa, Bercket Habte Selassie argues that Britain had tried to enlist the support of the Eritreans against Fascists Italy even before World War II. They pledged to push for Eritrean self-determination if the Eritreans would turn against their colonial masters the Italians. He argues that upon the Fascist occupation of the Horn, the British further raised hopes for a changed situation by bombarding the region with leaflets that appeared to support self-determination for Eritrea. Once the fighting was over, it was quickly apparent that Eritrean self-determination was a foregone conclusion.

Thomas Ambrosio in his book, Irredentism: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, argues that since independence, successive Somali governments had sought to reincorporate those Somalis living in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti into Greater Somalia. He argues that between 1960 and 1964, for example, guerrillas supported by the Somali government battled local security forces in Kenya and Ethiopia on behalf of Somalia's territorial claims.

A book edited by Emmanuel Hansen, Africa Perspectives on Peace and Development, argues that Africa is awash with conflicts, which threaten not only the social order but also prospects for development and sovereignty of states. In this book, Michael Chege in his article titled, "Conflict in the Horn of Africa", argues that the current crisis in the Horn is because of the competing ambitions of European imperialism in the closing years

of the 19th century. He argues that the imperial agreements on partitions in the region set the Somalis into French, British, Italian and Ethiopian rule. Chege argues that the question of nationalism and political autonomy should be sacrificed so that the governments of the region can develop policies towards dissident nationalities based on democratic practices and some form of federal autonomy.

A book edited by George Klay Kieh and Ida Rousseau Mukenge, Zones of Conflicts in Africa, Theories and Cases, argues that the civil war in Somalia during the 1990s was a struggle against the corrupt regime of Siad Barre, which was supported by the Soviet Union and the United States. They argue that there were starving children and poverty in Somalia when the super power rivalry provided arms but not food to the starving Somalis. They argue that the first state building project failed because of exploitation economic deprivation, social malaise, and manipulation of primordial identities visited on Somalia by dictatorial regime of Barre.

A book by O. Ojo, D.K. Orwa and C.M.B. Utete, African International Relations, argues that sources of intra-state conflicts are due to territorial or boundary disputes and have their origins in colonialism. They argue that the Somali speaking peoples of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia were ignored in the partitioning of the boundaries. The treaties establishing the boundaries of these states were signed in European cities and should not bind the countries claiming territory. Nevertheless, they also point out that the independent African leaders agreed to the OAU resolution in 1964, which regards the status of colonial boundaries as sacrosanct.

1.5 Justification of the Study

This study can be justified on both policy and academic grounds. The policy justification is derived from the fact that the proliferation of the internal conflicts in Africa since the end of Cold War has not only threatened international peace and security but has also affected human development in countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and most arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya which border these countries. It has also led to the loss of many lives and cross-borders refugees who have fled with arms thus, contributing to insecurity in the region. With the increased humanitarian refugees problem there is increasing demand that policy makers should device methods that will curb the conflicts especially across their common borders. On academic grounds, the study will contribute to the understanding of human security as a new security approach to security studies.

1.6 Hypotheses

National Security in the Horn of Africa is a social, political and economic problem.

Colonial borders are not the source of conflict in the Horn of Africa

Colonial borders are the source of conflict in the Horn of Africa

1.7 Theoretical Framework:

Theory is useful in explaining phenomena and accumulating facts about a particular field of practice. Through theories, researchers are able to amalgamate bits and pieces of ideas

that explain phenomena in real life. A theory is set of interrelated concepts that explain some aspects of a field in a prudent manner²².

1.7.1 Balance of Power

In national security studies, a lot of suggestions have been floated as theoretical approaches to analyzing security chief amongst them is the balance of power theory. The two key proponents of the Balance of Power theory are Hans Morgenthau and E. H. Carr. According to Morgenthau in his book, Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and peace, powerful states exert pressure on weak states so that their policies prevail over them and thus, weak states try to increase their power to balance the strong states²³. According to Morgenthau the world is anarchical and states are to maximize power to survive.

E. H. Carr expounds on Morgenthau's argument in his book, The Twenty Years Crisis, by arguing that the anarchical environment in international politics leads to focus on external rather than internal security threats. Hence, states are engaged in an arms race whereby, they are preoccupied with building strong military forces at the expense of putting in place security measures that would enhance internal security.

1.7.2 Democratic Peace Theory

The democratic peace theory revolves around issues that are related to human security. Barry Buzan in his book, People, States and Fear, argues that the human security is

²²Viotti, Paul R. & Kauppi, Mark. International Relations theory. "Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond" (London: Allyn & Bacon., 1999),pp. 3-4.

²³ Morgenthau, Hans and Thompson w. Keneth., Politics Among Nations. The struggle for Power. (New Delhi, Kalyan Publishers, 2001) ,pp. 192-193.

affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental.²⁴ In this context Buzan argues that military security concerns armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states' perception of threats from the neighbouring state. Political security concerns how the stability of the state is organized in terms of systems of government ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability of evolution of culture, language, religious and national identity and custom, whereas environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all human enterprise depend. Buzan argues that these sectors do not operate in isolation from each other but are woven together to give security to the individual and the state.

Another key proponent of the democratic peace approach is Immanuel Kant. In his book Perpetual Peace.²⁵ Kant argues that democracies almost never go to war with one another. In this book Kant listed several articles which aimed to address the mistrust between nations and to bring about the environment within which perpetual peace could arise. Although the Horn of African has been characterised by undemocratic regimes, Kant's theory does not fully explain the border conflicts in the region. Kant is too idealistic and bases his arguments on the power of reason and morality.

²⁴ Buzan, Barry, Peoples, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (London: Pearson Longman, 1991), p. 19.

²⁵ Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939). pp-10-27

1.7.3 Pluralism

Paul R. Votti and Mark V. Kauppi in the book, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond, have argued about theoretical alternatives of explaining international relations especially the issue of national security. They have argued that pluralism has a multiple agenda in socio-economic and welfare issues²⁶.

Because of the presence of numerous non-state actors such as cattle rustlers, bandits, smugglers, terrorists (using porous borders), common ethnic groups along the border, arms and drug traffickers who defy the borders in the Horn of Africa, the tenets of realism are not adequate. In addition, contemporary forces such as economic globalization and the impact of communication revolutions are making boundaries increasingly porous therefore; a state does not have absolute control over what happens within its jurisdiction. As sovereignty erodes, so does the salience of some of the operating principles of the traditional paradigm such as realism and its emphasis on the use of force²⁷. Realism therefore, which recognizes the state as the only actor, is inadequate in predicting some of the occurrences in the Horn due to the plurality of states and non-state actors.

The Pluralist theory seems attractive since its image in International Relations consists of different sets of assumptions.²⁸ First, non-state actors are important entities in international relations and cannot be ignored. Similarly, other nongovernmental actors, such as environmental organizations and multinational corporations cannot be dismissed

²⁶ Viotti, & Kauppi, International Relations Theory, pp . 7-10.

²⁷ Snow, M. Donald, National Security for a New Era. Globalisation and Geo-Politics.(New York: Pearson Longman, 2004), p. 61.

²⁸ Viotti, & Kauppi, International Relations Theory, pp. 7-8.

given the economic importance they wield. Second, for the pluralists, the state is not a unitary actor and the main issues are multiple agenda with socioeconomic or welfare issues being more important than national security. In addition, a state may be free of aggression of different kinds from other states in the international system and face more devastating threats from non-state actors. Therefore, since the Horn of Africa is a region with many non-state actors this paper will strongly rely on the pluralists approach.

1.8 Methodology

Within the social sciences, secondary data have rich intellectual tradition. This thesis is based on case studies, which relied on secondary sources regarding border conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Sources such as books, journals, published and unpublished academic papers, and on-line sources were critically examined. These materials were gathered from various libraries from the National Defence College, Defence Staff College, United States International University, Nairobi University and Daystar University. Visits to Addis Abba and the African Union provided some print materials which focused on conflict in the Horn of Africa. The data focused on non-quantitative and comparative case studies, historical data and reasoned arguments to test the hypotheses. No sampling or questionnaire was administered because the study depended on available secondary data on border conflict and security in the Horn of Africa.

1.9 Chapter Outline

Chapter one contains an introduction and background to the study, a statement of the problem, objectives of the study, justification of the study, literature review, a theoretical framework, hypotheses, and the research methodology. Chapter two will be on the evolution of colonies. Chapter three and four will analyse events that took place between 1960-1990 and 1990- 2005 respectively. Chapter five will be the conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

2.1 A Historical Overview of the Horn of Africa and Border Conflicts

The Horn of Africa consists of Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, Eritrea, Djibouti and Uganda. These seven states form a regional system of relations, which compels them to interact by the nature of their contiguity, their common and contentious borders with common ethnic groups, and their contrasting political structures, state goals, and historic mutual perceptions¹. As a result, their primary security concerns link them together in such a way that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another².

Ethiopia is the centre of this system³. Each of the member states except Uganda shares a border with it, and the system is organized around a series of bilateral relationships between the core state and its neighbours. The character of these dyads ranges from antagonistic Somalia and, often, Sudan to cooperative Djibouti and strategically allied Kenya. Although Addis Ababa has important security relationships with most of the member states, the other states have weaker links with one another. Somalia and Sudan, for instance, despite their mutual fear of Ethiopia, have not collaborated on security.

In spite of being linked by their security concerns, the states of the Horn of Africa are currently disjointed and underdeveloped and lack a common economic integration

¹ Wiggins, W. Howard, F. Gause Gregory, Terrence P. Lyons and Evelyn Colbert, Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 155

² Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), p. 106.

³ Francis M. Deng, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996), p. 136.

policy⁴. The pastoral mode of production in the southeast is dependent upon pastures on both sides of the Ethiopia-Somalia border. Somalia is potentially Ethiopia's outlet to the sea, and Ethiopia represents Somalia's natural hinterland. The opportunities for economic cooperation have been hampered by incessant warfare. With peace, however, an important productive unit could emerge⁵. The extensive cross-border black market that currently operates indicates that strong economic incentives for trade exist. Ethiopia, which is functionally the centre, is not a focus of cohesion or common identity. Instead, the region is characterized by tensions between the central Ethiopian highlands and the Islamic lowland and coastal areas⁶. Ethiopia does not unify the Horn; rather, it represents an isolated state in the middle of a hostile region.

Endemic and violent internal opposition to the governments of a number of the states also characterizes the region. Some authoritarian and brutal governments of the region have driven many inhabitants to resist them and insurgents are found in a number of states⁷. Some of the states have not found the means to incorporate their populations into a stable and democratic order in which respective governments respond to the needs of their people. In many cases, particularly in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, resistance to central authority has taken the form of ethnic and regionally based rebellions.

Several international conventions formulated during the 20th century, from the United Nations (UN) Charter to regional international documents, stipulate directly or indirectly

⁴ Economic Commission for Africa, *Assessing Regional Intergration in Africa II: Rationalizing the Regional Economic communities* (Addis Ababa: ECA, 2006), pp. 1-7.

⁵ Mesfin Wolde-Mariam, *The Horn of Africa: Ethnoconflict Versus Development*. Paper presented at the International Symposium on the African Horn, University of Cairo, January 1985.

⁶ Christopher Clapham, "The Horn of Africa" in Michael Crowder, editor., *The Cambridge History of Africa*. vol. 8 (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 458.

⁷ Mulatu, Wubneh and Yohannis Abate. *Transition and Development in the Horn of Africa*(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), p. 29.

that changes of inter-state boundaries are acceptable only through peaceful means. But crisis situations where boundaries or boundary-related issues are at stake are frequent in the international system. Some boundary problems are settled before they escalate into serious crises. Others seem irreconcilable and involve frequent military exchanges. Regulated or not, boundary and border relations have remained a potential source of conflict in the Horn of Africa. Eritrea was created in the Horn, having been carved from Ethiopia. The trend of boundary disputes increased after the Cold War, not the least for economic purposes, but because of historical reasons.⁸

The creation of the modern African states disrupted the lives and political organisation of pre-colonial African societies and sowed seeds for future conflicts. For instance Somalia was divided between British East Africa, Italian Somaliland, and French Somaliland. Furthermore, Italians created Eritrea⁹ out of Ethiopia and some Somalis were also carved into Ethiopia towards the de-colonisation period. The Kenya-Sudan conflict over the Elemi Triangle is a product of colonialism where traditional grazing ground for Kenyan Turkana was carved into Sudan but placed under Kenya for administration.

⁸Paul Nugent and A I Asiwaju, editors. African Boundaries, Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities. (Guildford & King's Lyn: Biddles Ltd., 1996).pp.5-6.

⁹Edmond J. Keller, " CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF ERITREA," in Marina Ottaway, editor, The Political Economy of Ethiopia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990) , p. 95.

2.2 Ethiopia- Eritrea Border Conflict

Eritrea formed part of the ancient Ethiopian kingdom of Aksum until the 7th century¹⁰. Thereafter, Ethiopian emperors maintained an intermittent presence in the area until the mid-16th century when the Ottoman Empire gained control of much of the coastal region¹¹. Beginning in the mid-19th century, Ethiopia struggled against Egypt and Italy for control of Eritrea. In the 1880s, Italy occupied the coastal areas around Asseb and Massawa, and by 1890 had extended its territory enough to proclaim the colony of Eritrea. The name Eritrea is named after the Roman term for the Red Sea, *Mare Erythraeum*. The colony was later the main base for Italy's conquest of Ethiopia between 1935 and 1936¹².

During World War II, Eritrea was captured by the British in 1941. Ethiopia had long demanded control of Eritrea on the grounds of ethnic affinity, but Britain occupied Eritrea after the war and, beginning in 1949, administered it as a UN trust territory¹³. In 1950 the UN decided that Eritrea was to be made independent as a federated part of Ethiopia, and in late 1952 this decision became effective¹⁴.

¹⁰ Stuart Munro-Hay, Aksum: An African Civilisation of Late Antiquity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991), p.70.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹² Brian R. Sullivan, "The Italian-Ethiopian War, October 1935-November 1941: Causes, Conduct, and Consequences," in A. Hamish Ion and E. J. Errington, editors, Great Powers and Little Wars: The Limits of Power (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993), p. 170.

¹³ Marina Ottaway, "Eritrea and Ethiopia: Negotiations in a Transitional Conflict," in I. William Zartman, editor, Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 104.

¹⁴ Sandra Fullerton Joireman, Property Rights & Political Development in Ethiopia and Eritrea. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), p. 72.

2.2.1 Colonial 'divide and rule' Case of Ethiopia- Eritrea Conflict

There was no Eritrean state per se until the territory was colonized by Italy in the late 1800s¹⁵. Ethiopia claimed to have a historic right to the region, at the time of the "scramble for Africa", and it had some control of Eritrea. Emperor Menelik II conceded Italian hegemony over the region later. Any effort to hold the territory would have been costly in military terms and would almost certainly have jeopardized the security of the highland core as well as the newly incorporated areas of the South and East¹⁶.

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The Italian defeat at Adowa at the hands of Menelik's forces in 1896 and the subsequent signing of the Treaty of Addis Ababa clearly established the boundaries of the colony of Eritrea. From this point on, the Italians set about building Eritrea into a viable economic entity that could serve the interest of the Italian metropole. Italian settlers were encouraged to take up residence in the colony and to develop its agricultural and industrial potential. As a matter of administrative convenience, the colony was divided into governmental units based on ethnic considerations. These acts would later foment feeling of nationalism among Eritreans and a demand to statehood¹⁷.

By the 1930s, Italy was ruled by the Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, who considered avenging the humiliating defeat of the Italians at Adowa as his sacred duty. His troops succeeded in subduing Ethiopia in 1936 and driving Emperor Haile Selassie into exile. This was a brief period of control as the Italians were routed in 1941, by British-led Commonwealth forces along with Ethiopian and Eritrean guerrillas already operating

¹⁵Joireman, Property Rights & Political Development in Ethiopia and Eritrea , p.7.3

¹⁶Keller, "CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF ERITREA," p. 100.

¹⁷Joireman, Property Rights & Political Development in Ethiopia and Eritrea , p. 72.

inside the country. The emperor was reinstated, but the British maintained administrative control over Eritrea¹⁸.

The British had tried to enlist the support of the Eritreans against the Fascists even before World War II. They pledged to push for Eritrean self-determination if the Eritreans would turn against their colonial masters. During the Fascist occupation of the Horn, the British further raised hopes for a changed situation by bombarding the region with leaflets that appeared to support self-determination for Eritrea¹⁹. Once the fighting was over, it was quickly apparent that Eritrean self-determination was a foregone conclusion.

At the Paris Peace Conference between 1946 and 1947, a formula was worked out for the disposal of former Italian colonies in Africa. Italy renounced all right and title to Italian Somaliland, Libya, and Eritrea. The Big Four - France, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union accepted the responsibility for determining the ultimate fate of these territories. If the matter was not settled within a year of the peace treaty, it was agreed that the problem would be referred to the UN General Assembly for a binding resolution. Subsequently, the Big Four appointed the Four Power Commission, which journeyed to Eritrea to study the situation in September 1947. The commission proved to be ineffective, as members could not work together. It was unable to resolve the Eritrean issue and referred the matter to the UN General Assembly on September 15, 1948. On June 28, 1949, the UN Commission submitted its findings. The majority supported some

¹⁸ Harold Marcus, Ethiopia, Great Britain and the United States, 1941-74: The Politics of Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp.21-30.

¹⁹ Bereket Habte Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980), pp. 3-6.

sort of union between Ethiopia and Eritrea²⁰. The role of Italian interference in Eritrean politics can thus, be seen right after World War II because of its strong lobbying for immediate independence.

Eritrean political organizations on one side of the issue or the other emerged as early as 1944 when the Unionist Party was established. The Muslim League and several smaller Islamic parties favouring independence appeared between 1946 and 1947; and in early 1948 the Liberal Progressive Party, a predominantly Christian group, was established. Splinter groups from each of these initial parties, joined together to form the Independence Bloc²¹. These groups engaged in a vigorous campaign to see who would dominate the legislative assembly. Sixty-eight seats were contested in the election of March 1952. The Unionists won 32 seats, the Democratic Bloc 18, and the Muslim League 15. Three seats went to splinter groups²². Subsequently, a ruling coalition involving the Unionists and the Muslim League was agreed upon. On the assumption that Eritrean autonomy was protected, the assembly ratified a new federal constitution. In addition to having the authority to govern themselves, the Eritreans were allowed to fly their own flag and to retain Tigrinya and Arabic as their national languages. Haile Selassie's regime later replaced Arabic and Tigrinya with Amharic as the language of instruction in schools²³. The final act in the de facto dissolution of the federation occurred in 1960, when the Assembly voted to change the name of the government from the Eritrean Government to the Eritrean Administration.

²⁰ Mulatu, and Abate. Transition and Development). p. 30.

²¹ Lloyd Ellingson, "The Emergence of Political Parties in Eritrea, 1940-50," Journal of African History, Vol 18, 1977, pp. 261-281.

²² Richard Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 26-28.

²³ Joireman, Property Rights & Political Development in Ethiopia and Eritrea ,p. 72.

Haile Selassie used a combination of political acumen and coercion to consolidate his claim over Eritrea and to incorporate it in the modern Ethiopian empire.²⁴ The cultural identity of Tigrinya's language and its preference of Arabic language was a source of conflict. Furthermore, the fact that Eritrea had existed as a state during the colonial period had helped to raise a sense of nationalism to some in the Eritrean society and therefore, the federation with Ethiopia undermined their aspirations²⁵.

Radical Eritrean opposition to the incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia had begun as early as 1958, with the founding of the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM). This was an organization made up mainly of students, intellectuals, and urban wage labourers. The group engaged in clandestine political activities intended to cultivate resistance against the centralizing policies of the Haile Selassie regime. It collected money and published and disseminated literature directed at raising the sense of national consciousness among Eritreans. By 1962, however, the movement had been discovered and destroyed by Ethiopian authorities²⁶.

2.2.2 Ethiopia's Perspective of the Colonial Boundary

Fascist Italy violated the treaties and obliterated previous Ethiopia-Eritrea borders, which were operational between colonial Italy and Ethiopia rendering them null and void as of 1936.²⁷ To date, these have been considered valid international instruments, and the borders of successor states in the Horn including French (Djibouti), Anglo-Egyptian

²⁴ Bereket Habte Selassie, and Tesfatsion Medhanie. Eritrea. Dynamics of National Question. (Amsterdam.: B.R. Gruner, 1986), pp. 62-63.

²⁵ Buzan, People, States and Fear. pp. 44-45.

²⁶ Bereket and Medhanie. Eritrea. Dynamics. p 61.

²⁷ Keller, " CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF ERITREA," p. 99.

(Sudan) and British East African territories in the region such as (Kenya) and (Somaliland), have been generally mutually respected. In the event of disputes on delimitation and demarcation of boundaries between Ethiopia and the said polities, those colonial treaties can be invoked for clarification. Likewise, to the extent needed, the 1964 OAU declaration on African borders can be cited as a guideline for resolution of disputes, with respect to the borders between Ethiopia and its neighbours²⁸. Thus, Ethiopia during this historical period argued on the basis of having inherited these borders making them valid within international law.

When Italian invading forces entered Addis Ababa in May of 1936, they altered the geopolitical landscape of the Horn. They merged Ethiopia with their colonial possessions of Eritrea and Somalia to create Italian East Africa. The boundaries between Ethiopia and the Italian colonial entities of Eritrea and Somalia were contested when the Italians left. The British decided to keep the Eritrean coastal region under their control and later transferred to Ethiopian control under UN agreement²⁹.

The Ethiopians argued that the eviction of the Italians from the Horn in 1941, Ethiopian resumption of independence and British administration of Italian colonies in the Horn of Africa legitimized their possession of colonial boundaries³⁰. They further reinforce their arguments that no international body raised any question or objection about the borders between 1941 and 1952 and no one invoked the colonial "treaties" on the borders.

²⁸ Christopher Clapham, "Boundary and Territory in the Horn of Africa", in Paul Nugent and A.I. Asiwaju, editors, African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities. (Guidford & King's Lyn: Biddles Ltd, 1996), p.239.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 242.

³⁰ Mulatu, and Abate. Transition and Development. pp. 29-30.

In spite of the fact that Eritrea had been a territory with a history separate from Ethiopia's since the decline of the Axumite kingdom after the 6th century A.D, upon independence from Italy, the Addis Ababa government argued that the area colonized by Italy, including Eritrea, was an integral part of the Ethiopian empire. The Eritrean contention that ties between Ethiopia and Eritrea were severed many centuries ago is also belied by the language, religion, and other cultural traits shared by the highland populations North and South of the Ethiopian-Eritrean boundary line. Clapham has argued that Tigirinya is spoken in both Eritrea and among Ethiopian Christian highlanders³¹. Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic society threatened by fragmentation of sectarianism such as Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) vying for secession from Ethiopia³².

2.2.3 Consequences of Ethiopian, British and Italian rule in Eritrea

The British were mandated by the UN to administer Eritrea after the Italians were defeated in 1941. The action by the UN reinforced Eritrea's quest for independence. The leadership in Addis Ababa failed to keep the federation terms and fuelled nationalism for Eritreans' demand for secession. The centralised system of government of Emperor Haile Selassie alienated Eritreans who felt marginalised and sought independence³³.

2.3 Ethiopia- Somalia Border Conflict Pre-colonial History.

The border conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia has two factors. The first regards the historical disagreement between Ethiopia and Italy and hinges on whether the northern

³¹ Clapham, "Boundary and Territory in the Horn of Africa", p. 243.

³² Wriggins, Howard, Gause, Lyons, and Colbert, Dynamics of Regional Politics p 176

³³ Mulatu, and Abate. Transition and Development. p. 31

trip-point between British, Italian, and Ethiopian possessions was located at 47⁰ or 48⁰ East Longitude. The second problem regards the location in the North where the official frontier is agreed upon but contested by Somalia as unfairly placed thus, excluding the herdsmen residing in Somalia from accessing grazing in Haud now in Ethiopia³⁴. After the Italians were defeated by Ethiopians in the battle of Adowa a peace treaty was signed in 1896, and an agreement was reached in 1897, but never published, drawing the line between Italian and Ethiopian territory 180 miles parallel to the coast of the Indian Ocean. Menelik II disputed the line and called for one to average between 100 and 130 miles from the coast. A convention of May 16, 1908, uses geographical points of reference to establish about 80 kilometres of the frontier and reference to tribal territories³⁵.

The treaty signed on May 14, 1897 between Ethiopia and Britain established a boundary between Ethiopia and British Somaliland, which was subsequently demarcated by an Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission in 1932-35.³⁶ The boundary was in existence at the time of Somalia's independence in 1960. Its alignment explicitly accepted that certain Somali tribes people would come under Ethiopian jurisdiction; thus in annex 1 of the 1897 treaty, the British envoy required and obtained from the Ethiopian Emperor an assurance that, "in the event of a possible occupation by Ethiopia of territories inhabited by tribes who have formerly accepted and enjoyed British protection in the districts excluded from the British protectorate, it would be your special care that these tribes

³⁴ Irving Kaplan, Area Handbook for Somalia, p. 176.

³⁵ George A. Lipsky, Windell Blanchard, Abraham M. Hirsch, and Bela C. Maday, Ethiopia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven, CT: HRAF Press, 1962), p. 222.

³⁶ Day, A Alan, editor. Border and Territorial Disputes, 2nd Ed. (Longman UK: Keesing's Reference Publication, 1987), p. 126.

receive equitable treatment and are thus no losers by this transfers of suzerainty³⁷”. In this treaty, base-grazing rights were in existence until Somalia’s independence in 1960, at which time the Ethiopian government took the position that they would cease to exist³⁸.

The boundary between Ethiopia and the Italian Somaliland was rather more complex. The 26th October 1896 treaty stated that the frontier should be settled within one year, but it was not done until 1908, when a further treaty was concluded³⁹. The fact that the two sides gave different interpretations to this agreement, as to the line of frontier, made it impossible for the joint boundary commission to complete its work of delimitation and demarcation, and the precise alignment intended by the 1908 treaty, which was still in dispute at the time of Somali independence in 1960. Essentially, the Ethiopians maintained that a frontier line agreed upon during the negotiations in 1897 between Emperor Menelek and Italian representative, Maj. Nerazzin, ran more or less parallel with the coast and 225km from it, to a tripoint with British Somaliland⁴⁰. This region called Ogaden inhabited by Somalis would present a conflict later on.

Ogaden is inhabited by the Somali in Ethiopia. The inhabitants are predominantly ethnic Somali and Muslim. The region, which is around 200,000 square kilometers, borders Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia⁴¹. The region was incorporated into Ethiopia by Menelik II during the last quarter of the 19th century, and its boundary with British Somaliland was

³⁷ Day, Border and Territorial Disputes , p.27.

³⁸ Ibid. , p. 127.

³⁹ Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy (London: Haan Publishing ,1996), p.15.

⁴⁰ Irving Kaplan , Area Handbook for Somalia. (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 23.

⁴¹ Gerbu Tereke, “The Ethiopian –Somalia War of 1977 Revisited”, in Board of Trustees, Boston University, The international Journal of African Historical Studies. Boston University Studies Centre, 2000, p. 636.

one of the first boundaries of Ethiopia to be fixed by a treaty in June, 1897⁴². Ethiopia exerted little administrative control east of Jijiga, except for occasional raids on the inhabitants, until 1934 when an Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission attempted to demarcate the treaty boundary, an act which at last alerted the local inhabitants to what had happened⁴³.

Following their conquest of Italian East Africa, the British sought to partition the Ogaden from Ethiopia, intending to add it to "British Somaliland and the former Italian Somaliland, to form what was ominously christened Greater Somalia."⁴⁴ Ethiopia unsuccessfully pleaded before the London Conference of the Allied Powers for the return of the Ogaden and Eritrea in 1945. Their persistent negotiations at last forced the British, in 1948, to evacuate all of the Ogaden except for the northeastern part (called the Haud), and a corridor (called the Reserved Area) stretching from the Haud to French Somaliland (modern Djibouti)⁴⁵. The British returned these last parts to Ethiopia in 1954.⁴⁶ Thus, the British through this action had ignited the future conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia over this region.

Boundary disputes over the Ogaden region date to the 1948 settlement when the land was granted to Ethiopia. Somali disgruntlement with this decision led to repeated attempts to invade Ethiopia with the hopes of taking control of the Ogaden to create a Greater Somalia. This plan would have reunited the Somali people of the Ethiopian-controlled Ogaden with those living in the Republic of Somalia. Somali's internal disputes were

⁴² Bahru Zewde, History of Modern Ethiopia. (London: James Currey, 1991), p. 113.

⁴³ Ibid. , p. 61.

⁴⁴ Bahru , History of Mordern Ethiopia, p. 180.

⁴⁵ Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy. p.51.

⁴⁶ Bahru. History of Mordern Ethiopia, p. 181.

manifested outwards in hostility to Ethiopia and Kenya, which they felt were standing in the way of 'Greater Somalia'. The idea of dividing Somalis into five states of Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, Kenya, Ethiopia and French Somaliland (Djibouti) was not in the interest of the Somalis but rather the colonizers. Although the problem was foreseen by the early colonial administration, it was not addressed and thus, set a stage for conflict immediately the British left.

2.4 Kenya -Somalia Border Conflict

2.4.1 Historical Background

The Kenya-Somalia dispute has not been about land, but rather about the unification of all Somalis within the Somali Republic and the neighbouring countries. The disputed frontier, the Northern Frontier District, was an historical accident dating back to Britain's treaty with Italy, which partitioned the Sudan and East Africa from Ethiopia and placed the Somalia plateau into British and Italian zones of influence for administrative purposes⁴⁷. In 1909, the Somalis' Westward migration had reached the Tana River and had driven the Boran Galla out of Wajir, as well as many other small tribes in the area⁴⁸. In 1912, Wajir was occupied by the British constabulary, but had to be hastily evacuated four years later after 80 people were killed in a surprise attack by Somalis against Lieutenant Elliot's constabulary at Serenli in the upper Juba⁴⁹. However, the Northern Frontier District came under effective British administration for the first time when

⁴⁷Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy. p.51.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 15-20.

⁴⁹ E. R. Turton, "The Impact of Mohammad Abdille Hassan in the East Africa Protectorate," The Journal of African History, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1969, pp. 641-657.

Moyale and Wajir were garrisoned by regular British troops in 1920⁵⁰. The Somalis' westward movement was interrupted by the British colonial administration between 1895 and 1912. After the First World War, the British government came to a secret agreement with Italy to transfer 94,050 square kilometres of its East African protectorate to Italian Somaliland. This was Italy's reward for allying with Britain during its war with Germany. The treaty was honoured, and Jubaland was ceded in 1924⁵¹. Many ethnic Somalis, however, were still left living on Kenyan territory, even after this boundary change⁵².

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The Greater Somali phenomenon emerged in the year 1956, when the Somali Trust Territory moved closer to possible unification. This move alarmed Ethiopia, which feared the emergence of Greater Somali authoritative influence in the Horn of Africa. The Greater Somalia concept had developed deep roots and later in July 1960 the two Somalia territories (Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland) were united into one Republic⁵³. To thwart any speculations by the Ethiopian regime, Britain clarified its position regarding the Greater Somalia phenomenon by reiterating that it was not going to support any claim affecting the integrity of French Somaliland, North Eastern Kenya the Ogaden and the Haud in Ethiopia. Any existing dispute was to be left to the parties concerned to resolve. Until 1963, when Kenya attained her independence, the North Eastern region had been isolated from the rest of Kenya by the British colonialist laws passed in 1902 and in 1934, which restricted the movement of all persons entering or leaving the district⁵⁴.

⁵⁰ Charles Carrington, Exploits of a Nation of Shopkeepers (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1950), p. 819.

⁵¹ USAID report by Menkhaus, Ken . Kenya – Somalia Border Conflict Analysis (Nairobi, Development Alternatives, Inc. Aug 31,2005) p 4.

⁵² Alex Thomson, An Introduction to African Politics (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 25.

⁵³ Kaplan , Area Handbook for Somalia. p. 37.

⁵⁴ Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy. p. 61.

Following the achievement of independence by Kenya and Somalia, Kenya found it appropriate to encourage participation in the political arena by the Kenyan Somalis. As a result, political parties were formed such as the North Eastern Peoples Progressive Party (NPPP) and others⁵⁵. The political parties campaigned vigorously for secession, instead of joining hands with pro-Kenyan independence parties such as Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). Following the continuing political pro-secessionist campaign, Britain found it necessary to establish an independent Commission to carry out a form of referendum to verify the desire of the people of the North Eastern region. The people, who are predominantly Somali, were unanimous in favour of secession and union with Somalia⁵⁶. Local Somali chiefs made clear their demand for secession from Kenya at a meeting on November 1961 with Reginald Maudling, then British Colonial secretary⁵⁷.

2.4.2 Border Conflict

The Kenya - Somalia boundary is about 424 miles long. In the North, the tripoint with Ethiopia is located on the Thalweg of the Daua, and in the South, the boundary extends to the Indian Ocean. Initially, the Kenya - Somalia boundary delimited British and Italian spheres of influence in East Africa between the Indian Ocean and the Daua (Daua Parma, Dawa). In 1887, the British East Africa Association was formed for the development of the British sphere of influence, and it obtained a concession from the Sultan of Zanzibar

⁵⁵ Touval Saadia, Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 150.

⁵⁶ Neggussay Ayele, "Somalia's Relations with Her Neighbours: From 'Greater Somalia' to Western Somalia' to 'Somalia Refugees'", in Sven Rubenson, editor, Proceedings of the seventh International conference of Ethiopian Studies (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African studies, 1984), pp .659-660

⁵⁷ Wriggins, Howard, Gause, Lyons, and Colbert, Dynamics of Regional Politics. p .171.

for part of his mainland territories⁵⁸. In 1925, Britain transferred, from Kenya to Italy, the border that was going up to River Juba, which was known as Jubaland⁵⁹. Since independence, successive Somali governments had sought to reincorporate those Somalis living in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti into Greater Somalia. Between 1960 and 1964, for example, guerrillas supported by the Somali government battled local security forces in Kenya and Ethiopia on behalf of Somalia's territorial claims⁶⁰.

By late 1964, it had become obvious that the initial campaign to unify all Somalis had failed. In Kenya, the government carried out counterinsurgency operations to control Somali guerrillas in what was then the Northern Frontier District⁶¹. In late 1964, Kenya's president Jomo Kenyatta and Ethiopia's emperor Haile Selassie signed a mutual defence agreement aimed at containing Somali aggression and irredentism⁶². This however, did not solve the problem of Somali unification agenda.

2.5 Kenya- Sudan Border Conflict

The Kenya- Sudan border dispute is at the Ilemi Triangle. During the partition of Africa, there was no urgency to delimit the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda boundaries, as they were part of the British Empire. The need to demarcate the borders of British territories in Africa before the First World War raised several issues that were core to future border rectification between Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan in Ilemi. Following this, Royal

⁵⁸ Okoth, Assa, A History of Africa 1885-1914. (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1979) , p. 99.

⁵⁹ Odhiambo, Otieno ES , T. I. Ouso and J. F Williams, A History of East Africa. (Nairobi: Longman, 1991), p. 119.

⁶⁰ Thomas Ambrosio. Irredentism: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), p. 193.

⁶¹ Wriggins, Howard, Gause , Lyons, and Colbert, Dynamics of Regional Politics . p .172.

⁶² Ibid. , p. 182.

engineers were asked to demarcate Uganda's borders under the Uganda-Sudan Boundary Commission that was formed in 1914⁶³.

In 1931, the administrators of Mongalla (Sudan) and Turkana (Kenya) agreed that the northern limits of Turkana pastures were within the area defined by the Red Line. The Red Line now stretched the Ilemi eastwards to include more watering and protective terrain shared by all pastoral communities⁶⁴. It was regarded as a temporary measure in that proper demarcation would take place during Sudan's exchange of eastern Ilemi with Ethiopia's Baro salient.

The Anglo-Ethiopia Treaty of 1907 delayed determining the future of Ilemi. At the same time, British officials in Kenya and Sudan proposed a covert adjustment of the Kenya-Ethiopia boundary point using the original surveyors without the knowledge of Ethiopia. This 'cowboy' solution was later rejected after it leaked out⁶⁵.

2.5.1 Colonial implications in Kenyan – Sudan Border

The British Colonialists in administering Sudan had instituted a north-south cleavage and uncertainty about southern Sudan and thus, left a distinct South from the North⁶⁶. This suspicion was underpinned by Britain's lack of socioeconomic development of the South and its reliance on missionaries and philanthropic organizations to open the region for

⁶³ Collins, Robert, "Sudan-Uganda boundary rectification and the Sudanese occupation Of Madial, 1914", *The Uganda Journal* 26, no. 2, 1962 , pp. 140-153.

⁶⁴ [http://www.undp.org/drylands/docs/marketaccess/Baselines-conflict and markets – Report](http://www.undp.org/drylands/docs/marketaccess/Baselines-conflict%20and%20markets%20-%20Report.pdf). do. 13Aug, 2007.

⁶⁵ Mburu Nene, "Delimitation of the Ilemi Triangle. A History of Abrogation of Responsibility," in *African Studies Quarterly* 6, no.4 (Online) URL: <http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7ila2.htm>, pp. 6-10.

⁶⁶ Wriggins, Howard, Gause , Lyons, and Colbert *Dynamics of Regional Politics*. p. 164.

commerce and education⁶⁷. Therefore, the post-colonial governments of Sudan inherited a legacy of negative attitudes that the Ilemi was troublesome, undesirable, and its economic development costly in human and financial resources. This approach left the Ilemi boundary dispute unresolved after the independence of Sudan and Kenya. Furthermore, the frontiers that existed in the pre-colonial period ended up being contested especially in the traditional grazing areas by the Turkana. The system of closing the South from the North by the British administration in the 1920s prohibited the northern Sudanese from access to the south⁶⁸. This region was left under the administration of Kenya without a defined border and with the discovery of oil in Southern Sudan; conflict is likely to shift from grazing rights to the territorial integrity of Sudan. Due to the raids and cattle rustling, the area was generally neglected and no infrastructure was developed during the colonial period. This culture of warlike ethnic groups raiding across porous borders continues to date.

2.6 Kenya- Uganda border

Kenya and Uganda were under the British sphere of influence and therefore, the borders were not drawn until in the 1895⁶⁹. The East African Protectorate (Kenya) was established on 1 July 1895 over the territory between Uganda and the East Coast. The exact boundaries of the new protectorate were arbitrary and in many areas vague. It followed the Anglo-German frontier of 1886 from Vanga in the South to the Uganda

⁶⁷Daly M.W., Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1991) , p.235.

⁶⁸ Woodward, Peter, Sudan 1898- 1989: the Unstable State (London: Leister Crook Academic Publishing, 1990), pp. 115- 117.

⁶⁹ Bethwell A. Ogot and W R Ochieng, Kenya. The Making of a Nation. A Hundred Years of Kenya's History 1895-1995. (Maseno: Desk Publishing Unit Maseno University, 2000) , p. 20.

border, which at that time was at Guaso Masai River. From there, it followed the Kedong River and the Laikipia escarpment up to the northern shores of Lake Turkana⁷⁰. The border between the East Africa Protectorate and Ethiopia remained undefined, with the boundary extending from Lake Turkana eastward to the River Juba which marked the eastern limit of the Protectorate as well as the border between the British and Italian spheres. The colonizers' knowledge of the people enclosed within these borders was rudimentary and the former were unaware or unconcerned about the effect these borders were likely to have on the African societies. The Maasai, for example, were arbitrarily divided within each of the three Protectorates; German East Africa, the East Africa Protectorate and the Uganda Protectorate. In the same way, the Oromo were divided between Ethiopia and East Africa Protectorate and the Somali between the Italian and British spheres. In the meantime the Uganda Order in Council of 1902 transferred Uganda's Eastern Province (Rudolf Province) to British East African Protectorate (Kenya) thereby, reducing Uganda to 2/3 of its size before this order⁷¹. The territory transferred from Uganda to Kenya included the area inhabited by the Turkana and vaguely encompassed the pastures of their Ngwatela section, whose inhabitants also lived in southern Sudan.⁷² The task of demarcating the boundary between the two Protectorates was entrusted to C.W. Hobley, one of the senior Administrators. He selected the River Sio as the natural boundary from the Lake Victoria.

⁷⁰ Ogot and Ochieng, The Making of a Nation , p. 21.

⁷¹ Ibid. , pp.20-21.

⁷² Ogot and Ochieng, The Making of a Nation , p. 20.

There has not been a serious border conflict problem between Kenya and Uganda except for a brief period when Idi Amin claimed some parts of Kenya⁷³. However, the persistent cross border cattle rustling between the Karamoja, Pokot and Turkana poses a security threat across the borders of Kenya and Uganda.

2.7 Somalia- Djibouti Border

It was Rochet d'Hericourt's exploration into Shoa (1839-42) that marked the beginning of French interest in the African shores of the Red Sea. Further exploration by Henri Lambert, French Consular Agent at Aden, and Captain Fleuriot de Langle led to a treaty of friendship and assistance between France and the sultans of Raheita, Tadjoura, and Gobaad, from whom the French purchased the anchorage of Obock in 1862⁷⁴.

Growing French interest in the area took place against a backdrop of British activity in Egypt and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Between 1884 and 1885, France expanded its protectorate to include the shores of the Gulf of Tadjoura and Somaliland, installing Léonce Lagarde as governor of this protectorate. Boundaries of the protectorate, marked out in 1897 by France and Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia, were reaffirmed by agreements with Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia in 1945 and 1954.

The administrative capital was moved from Obock in 1896⁷⁵. Djibouti, which had a harbor with good access acts as an outlet to sea for Ethiopia⁷⁶. The Franco-Ethiopian

⁷³ Chweya, "Sources of African Security Condition and Agenda Setting," p .261.

⁷⁴ Thomas F. Power, Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism (New York: King's crown press, 1944), p.152.

⁷⁵ Jacques Stern, The French Colonies: Past and Future (New York: Didier, 1944), p. 177.

⁷⁶ Wriggins, Howard, Gause , Lyons, and Colbert, Dynamics of Regional Politics, p. 171.

railway, linking Djibouti to the heart of Ethiopia, began in 1897 and reached Addis Ababa in June 1917, increasing the volume of trade passing through the port.⁷⁷

On July 22, 1957, the colony was reorganized to give the people considerable self-government. On the same day, a decree applying the Overseas Reform Act (Loi Cadre) of June 23, 1956, established a territorial assembly that elected eight of its members to an executive council. Members of the executive council were responsible for one or more of the territorial services and carried the title of minister. The council advised the French-appointed governor general. In a September 1958 constitutional referendum, French Somaliland opted to join the French community as an overseas territory. This act entitled the region to representation by one deputy and one senator in the French Parliament, and one counselor in the French Union Assembly. The first elections to the territorial assembly were held on November 23, 1958, under a system of proportional representation.

2.7.1 Conflict with Somalia

The delineation between British Somaliland and French Somaliland may correspond roughly to an internal boundary among Issa clans, with the territory of the Mamasan clan in the Issa group of clans being in British Somaliland and other Issa clans being in French Somaliland. The Issa are Somalis and comprise about 60 percent of Djibouti population⁷⁸. At the end of the 19th century, the dominant port of the Isas was the old port city of Zeila and a large fraction of all Isas were engaged in trade and transport between Zeila, across

⁷⁷Charles W. Koburger, Naval Strategy East of Suez: The Role of Djibouti (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), p. 99.

⁷⁸Keith Krause, and Michael Williams, editors, Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (London: Routledge, 2003),p. 328.

barren and dry lowlands, to Harar on the fertile Harar plateau, which was the economic, cultural, and political capital of this region.

The other 40 percent of the population of Djibouti today are Gadabuursi and Isaqs. By contrast, the border from the coast inwards between British Somaliland and Italian Somalia reflects the clear clan boundaries that existed then and have been preserved until today. This border represents the general nomadic grazing border between the Warsangeli and Dhulbahante clans on the side of British Somaliland and the Majerteen clan on the side of Italian Somalia.

Colonial rule until 1960 also served to cement this division into two separate economic zones under different colonial cultural influence. When France granted independence to French Somaliland, their government decided to retain their independence and not to join the Republic of Somalia⁷⁹.

This division of the Somalis against their will laid the basis for much of the tension and conflict in the Horn-of-Africa during the post-colonial period. This is seen by the fact that Somalia laid claim to Djibouti as one of the provinces of the Greater Somalia ideology but did not manage to invade or cause a major destabilisation. The main reason for claiming Djibouti is based on ethnic Somalis. The French were only interested in a strategic port to use en-route to their colonies in the Far East and they carved a territory without considering the interests of the local ethnic groups who were inhabitants of the region⁸⁰. They created a small enclave, which has little economic activity and a small population but managed to create some form of nationalism by the time of independence.

⁷⁹Wriggins, Howard, Gause, Lyons, and Colbert, Dynamics of Regional Politics, p. 180.

⁸⁰ Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of Somali State:, p.59.

The artificiality of the borders erected by the colonial powers and the coexistence of similar nationalities across the borders of the countries of the Horn including the Oromo, Somali, Nuer, Ben Amir, Afar and many more only magnifies the difficulty in national conflicts⁸¹. The crisis of state formation and identity can be clearly seen in this case and “the severity of the crisis of the African nation-state calls for drastic solutions, possibly including redrafting frontiers according to principle of self-determination”⁸², because some of these states are unviable and ‘quasi-states’.

2.8 Conclusion

The partition of Africa among European powers was the sole way of accomplishing what they desired. Most African countries became independent in the early 1960s amidst considerable optimism for their political and economic future however; civil unrest and conflict have permeated the continent. The causes are numerous and sometimes complex, even within a single dispute. They include ethnic, language, religious, ideological, regional, national identity crisis and cultural differences. Some conflicts have been exacerbated by competition for resources such as land, pasturage and water. Arbitrary boundaries, the unequal sharing of resources controlled by the state and the sheer desire for power on the part of elected leaders have added to the problem.

Few African states since independence have escaped either serious internal civil strife or conflict with a neighbour. Conflict and civil disorder divert precious state resources to

⁸¹ Mohammed A Ahmed Salih , “The Horn of Africa: Security in the New World Order”, in Keith Krause, and Michael Williams, editors, Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (London: Routledge, 2003), p.129.

⁸² Martin, Guy, Africa in World Politics. A Pan-African Perspective. (Asmara: Africa World Press, Inc. 2002), p. 258.

nonproductive activities, discourage private and foreign investment, reduce the willingness of donors to provide assistance and lead to refugees, internally displaced persons and destroyed infrastructure. The national security of the states has been threatened by ethnicity and resource competition rather than border issues.

CHAPTER THREE

3.1 The Great Horn of Africa's Borders after Independence: 1960-1990

The period between 1960 and 1990 saw major political changes in the Horn of Africa. The first generation of leaders in the post-colonial era were faced with major problems of state building. This period was also characterised by a series of African peoples and states' conferences, mostly initiated and organized by the prominent Pan Africanist leader Kwame Nkurumah of Ghana¹. Furthermore, the Cold- War era ideology made it easy for the leaders to govern with massive support from the two super-powers².

The defining item in the international politics of the Cold War was the geo-strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union³. The superpower alignment and realignment following the Ethiopian revolution of 1977 magnified the conflict in the Horn of Africa⁴. In that milieu, no issue was more salient than military prowess, reach and influence in the calculations for global hegemony. Consequently, every piece of real estate was deemed relevant and significant.

During the Cold War period, corrupt leadership was often preserved under the protective watch of the international community because of the super power rivalry. The consequences of regimes built on personal rule became numerous and they started to face

¹ Martin, Guy, Africa in World Politics. A Pan –African Perspective. (Asmara: Africa World Press, Inc. 2002), p. xii.

² Karen A. Feste. Expanding Frontiers: Super Power Intervention in Cold War. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), p. 133.

³ The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section, 1996), p.11.

⁴ Mulatu Wubneh and Yohannis Abate, Ethiopia: Transition and Development in the Horn of Africa.(Boulder, CO: West View Press, 1988), p. 197.

challenges. Personal rule is an elitist political system that favours the ruler, his allies and clients.⁵ It is a form of patrimonialism that arises when rulers lack constitutional or traditional legitimacy to govern.⁶ It is maintained chiefly through loyalties to the party and its ruler, maintained by 'patron- client relationships'.⁷ Rulers reward loyalties by material gains and prestigious positions within the hierarchy. Oftentimes, to maintain weak legitimacy, leaders establish a strong coercive force.

During his tenure as the president of Somalia, Siyyad Barre used this style of leadership. When domestic pressure mounted on his leadership, Barre revisited the agenda of 'Greater Somalia' and supported irredentist insurgents in Kenya and Ethiopia. In addition, despite its peripherality and underdevelopment, Somalia was considered a prime attraction. This is because it is located close to the oil fields of the Arabian mainland, the Gulf area and the vulnerable sea-lanes of the western Indian Ocean. As a result, the United States and the Soviet Union began to court the Somalis once independence had arrived⁸.

But the superpowers' involvement in Somali life was not a one-way street. The Somalis, much like their neighbours, were also pursuing their own national priorities, of which the acquisition of military hardware and financial aid were uppermost. The first objective was tied to the quest for the reunification of all Somali-inhabited territories in the Horn of

⁵ Jackson, Robert and Carl Rosberg. Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change. (London: Westview Press, 1998), p. 20.

⁶ Sandbrook, Richard. The Politics of Economic Stagnation. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 89.

⁷ Ibid. , p. 93.

⁸ Ahmed I. Samatar, "The Somali Catastrophe: Explanation and Implications," in Einar Braathen, Morten BΦås, and Gjermund Sæther, editors, The Politics of War, Peace, and Ethnicity in Subsaharan Africa (Houndmills, England: Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 46.

Africa; the latter was necessary to supplement the very limited domestic resources for state operations and urgent development plans. This mutuality of interest catapulted the region into a globalised and dangerous strategic calculus.

3.1.1 Challenges to State Building

After independence, public political interest and cohesion shifted from efforts to fight against colonialism to efforts of national building. For many Africans, attention reverted to the local levels in which their lives were rooted, and where the complex battle between the modern and older established values would continue to be fought⁹. In many states, the local and traditional leaders who remained significant to most Africans also represented an incipient threat to the would-be builders of the new nation and their tentative political legitimacy. Accordingly, the old traditional institutions, such as the Buganda kingdoms as was the case in Uganda, were incorporated by the state, reduced in terms of their formal powers or summarily abolished. Sometimes the kings, chiefs and headmen were also derided as part of a backward tribal past, essentially ethnically divisive and often tainted by collaboration with the old colonial system¹⁰. This approach gave rise to opposition and ethnic identity to some segments in the newly independent states. The question of colonial borders arose including the question of whether these borders were sacrosanct¹¹. Borders and their adjacent regions constituted gateways and opportunities as well as barriers; state controls over entry and exit were linked to territorial borders¹².

⁹ E.S. Atieno, Odhiambo, "Democracy and Ideology of Order in Kenya," in Michael G. Schatzberg, editor, *The Political Economy of Kenya*. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987), p. 59.

¹⁰ Richard Hodder-Williams, *An introduction to the Politics of Tropical Africa* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 88-112.

¹¹ Odhiambo, "Democracy and Ideology", p. 194.

¹² Anderson, J. and O'Dowd, L, "Borders, border regions and territoriality: Contradictory meanings, Changing significance," *Regional Studies – Special Issue on , State Borders and Border Regions*, Vol 33,7, (1999a) , pp. 593-604.

In spite of the state's efforts to demonize ethnic identity, from the perspective of a largely rural population, the idea of a common tribes created by colonial boundaries have hindered the evolution of a nation state¹³. This trend was responsible for conflict in Ethiopia where Emperor Hailie Sellaisie faced challenges to his rule due to perceived marginalisation of the Tigreans resulting in an escalation of the Eritrean conflict¹⁴.

Strategies by the African leaders to impose ideas of unity together with the ideologies that underpinned them served increasingly to distinguish the state from society and to prevent any meaningful confrontation between the ruling elites and the masses¹⁵. The character of the bureaucracy inherited by post-colonial state agencies and the persistence of the language of colonial governance exacerbated this cultural distance between the governors and the governed. It also strengthened the position of those in power at the expense of the populace over whom they ruled and to whom, increasingly, they failed to account.¹⁶ Thus, as the state failed to provide proper leadership, the rural masses, especially in the frontier areas, started to ignore the borders and engage in survival activity with their kin on the other side of the border. Certainly it seems evident that such feelings of belonging were pursued because most African peoples have remained rooted in their local communities with their familiar bases of kinship and allegiance. No parallel

¹³Ogot and Ochieng, Kenya The Making of a Nation, p. 30.

¹⁴Gebru Tareke, "Peasant Resistance in Ethiopia: The Case of Weyane", Journal of African History Vol 25:1, 1984, pp. 77-92.

¹⁵Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 35-37.

¹⁶Lisa Laakso & Adebayo Olukoshi, "The Crisis of the Post-Colonial nation-state Project in Africa", in Adebayo O Olukoshi & Liisa Laakso ,editors, Challenges to the nation-state in Africa (Uppsala: Nordiska Affikainstitutet, 1997), pp. 14-15.

community has been created at national level, and the unity of the nationalist movements evaporated soon after independence.

3.2 Somalia – Ethiopia Border Conflict 1960-1990

As a result of colonialism, ethnic Somalis were split into five groups that are spread across the Horn of Africa. The border with Ethiopia lopped off much of the Ogaden and Haud deserts to the west; tiny Djibouti was excluded in the northwest and given to France¹⁷. The border with Kenya divided southern Somalia. Aspirations of one day unifying Greater Somalia, and of “liberating” those Somalis forced to live under foreign banners, were evident in the national flag unfurled at independence in 1960: five points of a white star, set on a blue background.¹⁸

This led to a series of individual Somali militiamen conducting hit and run raids across both borders from 1960 to 1964, when open conflict erupted between Ethiopia and Somalia¹⁹. By 1967, the Somali democracy that had been enthusiastically started just ten years before was beginning to crumble. During the 1967 presidential election, due to a complicated web of clan loyalties, the winner was not properly recognized and instead a new secret vote was taken by already elected National Assemblymen (senators). The central election issue was whether or not to use military force to bring about the long dream of pan-Somalism, which would mean war with Ethiopia and Kenya and possibly Djibouti.

¹⁷John W. Harbeson, and Donald Rothchild, editors, Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges. 2nd ed (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1995), p. 136.

¹⁸Scott Peterson, Me against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda : a Journalist Reports from the Battlefields of Africa (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 11.

¹⁹Nugent and Asiwaju., African Boundaries, Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities, p. 241.

3.2.1 Ogaden War

During the eve of the Ogaden war, the Soviet Union concluded that the revolution in Ethiopia would lead to the establishment of an authentic Marxist-Leninist state and that, for geopolitical purposes, it was wise to transfer Soviet interests to Ethiopia. Moscow secretly promised the Derg military aid on condition that it renounced the alliance with the United States. Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile Mariam, believing that the Soviet Union's revolutionary history of national reconstruction was in keeping with Ethiopia's political goals, closed down the U.S. military mission and the communications centre in April 1977²⁰. Moscow suspended all military aid to Somalia, and began arming Addis Ababa, and reassigned military advisers from Somalia to Ethiopia. This Soviet volte-face also gained Ethiopia important support from North Korea, which trained a People's Militia, and from Cuba and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, which provided infantry, pilots, and armoured units²¹. Somalia reacted by renouncing the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. It also expelled all Soviet advisers, broke diplomatic relations with Cuba, and ejected all Soviet personnel from Somalia

In 1977 the Somali president, Siad Barre, invaded Ogaden²² and by September 1977, Mogadishu controlled 90 percent of the Ogaden and had followed retreating Ethiopian forces into the non-Somali regions of Harerge, Bale, and Sidamo. In spite of Somalia's

²⁰ Mark Huband, The Skull beneath the Skin: Africa after the Cold War. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), p. 280.

²¹ Raymond W. Copson, Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 128.

²² Peter J. Schraeder, "From Ally to Orphan: Understanding U.S. Policy toward Somalia after the Cold War," in James A. Scott, editor, After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), p. 331.

gains in the battlefield, they found themselves without a major military patron or a steady re-supply of arms. This was because of the strained relations between the Soviets and Somalia. Consequently, the Soviets had little choice but to support Ethiopia.²³

In addition, the Ogaden War exacerbated relations with Kenya, which viewed the Somali invasion of the Ogaden as proof of recidivist irredentism. This also set off alarm bells in other OAU member-states, which still opposed any threats to the idea of territorial sovereignty in Africa²⁴. Thus, Somalia found itself increasingly isolated on the international front. The defeat in Ogaden added to problems already simmering internally with the population suffering from the effects of the war and the 1974-1975 droughts²⁵.

Although Somali forces withdrew from Ethiopian territory and Siad Barre's government conceded defeat in 1978, by early 1980, Somali and Ethiopian troops were again involved in cross-border fighting. Somalia lost this second round of skirmishes, too, which forced a second withdrawal. Siad Barre's second involvement was as the result of domestic political pressures. In order for Siad Barre's regime to survive, he responded by reconsolidating his grip under the one-party rule. The north was agitated with a number of opposition groups being founded, but their establishment only served to justify further government repression²⁶.

Criticism grew and among initial reasons for disgruntlement was Siad Barre's handling of the war and the opposition readily gained momentum following Somalia's 1978 defeat.

²³ Huband. The Skull beneath the Skin: p, 280.

²⁴ Harbeson & Rothchild, editors, Africa in World Politics, p. 136.

²⁵ Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, "The U.S. Military intervention in Somalia: Hidden Agenda"?, The Middle East Policy Journal Vol 2.1, 1993, p 46

²⁶ Gjermund Sæther, "The Political Economy of State Collapse in Somalia and Liberia," in Einar Braathen, Morten BØås, and Gjermund Sæther, editors, The Politics of War, Peace, and Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa (Houndmills, England: Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 131.

To counter the growing antagonism to his rule, Siad Barre met with Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam in Djibouti under the cover of an international meeting of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD)²⁷. Their series of talks in Djibouti subsequently led to the signing of an historic agreement re-establishing diplomatic links between the two countries, securing their mutual border, and ending support for one another's opposition groups. Not surprisingly, while the initial talks were taking place the Somalia National Movement (SNM) renewed activities in the north, in part to embarrass Siad Barre. More significantly, although Siad Barre made peace as part of his strategy to dislocate the SNM, this agreement between the two heads of state also sent a clear message to Ogadeni Somalis. The government was renunciation the irredentist title to the Ogaden. Of course, the Ogaden viewed this as a *Marehan* renunciation. Meanwhile, the peace agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia also led to turmoil in the army, with its preponderance of Ogadenis.

The Somali government's official renunciation of Somalia's claims to the Ogaden and lack of discussion about the fate of the hundreds of thousands of Ogadeni refugees still in camps in Somalia were especially disturbing not only because the army was manned by so many Ogadeni but more specifically because many of them were refugees from the 1977-1978 Ogaden War who themselves had been recruited into the army from refugee camps. Ogadeni refugees in camps in the North were still receiving arms and inducements from the government to continue fighting against the Isaq²⁸. In 1980, the United States agreed to supply limited defensive weapons to Somalia and did so until

²⁷ Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy. (London: Haan Publishing 1996), p.117.

²⁸ Anna Simons, Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p .70.

1988²⁹. Once again, the political development of the region forced Somalia to change its external political alliances, and thus, its economic system. Somalia abandoned its socialist-oriented policies and announced its advocacy of a free-market strategy.

Though Somalia's arms imports decreased because of lack of foreign exchange and suppliers, the number of troops expanded. In 1960, the army comprised only about 5,000 troops.³⁰ By 1977, it had reached 22,000 well-equipped regular troops and 20,000 reserves. By 1981, it reached 50,000, draining the country's human resources. New recruits were obtained through forced conscription. By 1990, the number of troops reached 60,000. Somalia's poor base of human capital and financial resources could not possibly sustain this burden. After the fall of Siad Barre in 1991 and the subsequent disintegration of the central government in Somalia, the idea of "Greater Somalia" and border problems did feature prominently. The Ogaden Liberation Front became active in the Ogaden region but without central support from Mogadishu.³¹

3.3 Kenya- Somalia Border: 1960- 1990

During the British colonial period, the Northern Frontier District (NFD) was given a special status and Somali political parties were allowed to operate in it. On the eve of independence, the British government sent a special committee to Kenya to investigate the situation in the NFD³². In its report of December 1962, the committee emphasized

²⁹ Jamil Abdalla Mubarak, From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia: How an Economy Fell Apart (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), p .40.

³⁰ Helen Chapin, editor., Somalia: A Country Study, Fourth Edition (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, prepared by Foreign Area Studies of American University, 1993).

³¹ Anderson, J. and Hamilton, D, "Territoriality, democracy and national conflict resolution in Ireland," Geography Research Forum-Special Issue on Geography and Nationalism, Vol 19, 1999, pp. 98-121.

³² Alan J. Day, editor. Border and Territorial Disputes: A Keesing's Reference Publication. (London: Longman, 1987), p. 145.

that most of the area's residents, especially the Somali Muslims, wanted to break away from Kenya after independence and unite with Somalia³³. After the British decided to include the area in independent Kenya, the Somalis boycotted the 1963 general elections that set the stage for independence. There was unrest in the region, including violent clashes between Somali guerrillas, known as Shifta, and the Kenyan security forces³⁴.

The boundaries of the former British colony of Kenya at independence on December 12, 1963, encompassed an area of approximately 50,000 square miles or 130,000 square kilometers, defined as the country's North-Eastern province whose population was predominantly Somali-speaking. The number of ethnic Somalis was estimated at approximately 200,000. Somalis have regarded this population as one of the five elements of the historic Somali nation, and from 1960, when the Republic of Somalia became independent, its successive governments espoused the goal of unification of the Somaliland Protectorate and Italian administered Somalia which was under the UN trust territory. Somali irredentism was expressed as a demand for the right of self-determination for the three categories of Somali-speaking people under foreign administration.

The demand for self-determination for Somalis within Kenya, as expressed by leaders of the local population and supported by the Government of Somalia, was addressed in the first instant to Britain as the colonial authority prior to Kenya's independence and subsequently pursued in the form of a dispute between Somalia and Kenya³⁵. The

³³ Arye Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 79.

³⁴ Simons, *Network of Dissolutions:*, p. 46.

³⁵ Wriggins, Howard, Gause, Lyons, and Colbert, *Dynamics of Regional Politics:*, p. 171.

position adapted by the government of Somalia was that this did not constitute a territorial dispute as such since Somalia did not desire to annex the territory in question, although if the population desired union with Somali having once achieved self-determination, such a union could be encouraged by Somalia.

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From its foundation in 1963, and indeed from its antecedents in the pan African movement, the OAU had generally been associated with the doctrine that independent African States should adhere to the boundaries existing at the time of their independent. This was aimed at irredentists' states such as Somalia³⁶. The principle of mutual respect for the territorial integrity of African states was expressly reaffirmed by a resolution adapted in Cairo on July 21, 1964, at the first ordinary session of then OAU assembly of heads of states or government³⁷. The resolutions included a solemn declaration that all member states pledged themselves "to respect the borders existing in the achievement of national independent". The representatives of Somalia had been absent for the vote on this resolution, however, and made it clear in a statement in July 23, 1964 that its government did not consider itself bound by its terms. Moreover, Somalia opposed the perpetuation in independent Africa of what was described as "the uncorrected mistake which still existed" with regard to state borders inherited from the colonial era³⁸.

The substantive issue of the Kenya - Somali border hostilities was removed from the agenda of the OAU 1964 Cairo summit meeting and referred to bilateral talks. Such attempts as were made at mediation "notably talks arranged in Tanzania in December

³⁶ Lefebvre, "The U.S. Military intervention in Somalia: A Hidden Agenda?", p. 46.

³⁷ Day, Border and Territorial Disputes, p. 146.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

1965” failed to resolve the matter, and violent border incidents continued, accompanied by further deterioration in relations between the two countries and the imposition of restriction of trade between them in July 1966³⁹.

The following month, a memorandum of agreement, the Arusha Agreement, was signed by President Kenyatta of Kenya and Prime Minister Egal of Somalia⁴⁰. The agreement was concluded at a meeting held in Arusha (Tanzania) on October 8th 1967 under the OAU auspices with the mediation of President Kaunda of Zambia⁴¹. It called for the ending of clashes, the resumption of normal relations, the gradual suspension of emergency measures on both sides, the ending of hostile propaganda and the formation of a joint committee (with Zambia mediation) to supervise the implementation of this process and to seek solutions to outstanding differences⁴². The agreement formed the basis of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Somalia and Kenya in January 1968, when trade restrictions were also lifted⁴³. In the same month, Somalis re-established diplomatic relations with Britain, broken over the NFD issue at the time of Kenya’s independence⁴⁴.

The essence of Kenya – Somali accommodation was not that their disagreement had moved towards being resolved, but rather that it had been allowed to become dormant

³⁹ Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of Somali State, p.62.

⁴⁰ Day, Border and Territorial Disputes, p.147.

⁴¹ John E.Jessup, An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 1945-1996 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), p. 677.

⁴² Odhiambo, The Political Economy of Kenya, p. 194.

⁴³ I. William Zartman, “The foreign and Military Politics of African Boundary Problems,” in Carl Gosta Widstrand, editor, African Boundary Problems (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1969), p.94.

⁴⁴ Jessup, An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict, pp. 667-668.

under the mutually convenient ambiguity of the Arusha formula. The Somalis could interpret the call for a working committee “to examine ways and means of bringing about a satisfactory solution to major and minor differences between Kenya-Somali” as an acceptance that what they continued to call the NFD question remained on the agenda to be settled by future negotiations.

3.3.1 Course of Kenyan – Somali relations, 1967-79

The Somalia government’s acceptance of the Arusha formula did not pass without domestic criticism. Indeed, hostile demonstrations had met Prime Minister Hugal on his return to Mogadishu after the talks⁴⁵. In addition, former Prime Minister Adirizak Hadji Hussein denounced the agreements and the government responded by closing down the Mogadishu branch Somali youth league, of which Abdirizak Hussein was the Secretary General. This policy approach continued essentially unchanged under the military government of Siad Barre, installed after a coup in Somalia in October 1969⁴⁶.

In November 1980, violent incidents occurred near the Kenya-Somali border, and the provincial commissioner of the North Eastern Province of Kenya announced that a curfew could be imposed throughout the province and all Kenyan citizens of Somali origin would be confined in security villages⁴⁷. The violence at the Kenya-Somali border was part of the wider issue of Somali nationalist aspirations and was intimately connected with the territorial dispute with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region.

⁴⁵ Day, Border and Territorial Disputes:. p. 148.

⁴⁶ Jessup, An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict , p. 677.

⁴⁷Day, Border and Territorial Disputes: , p .149.

Ethiopia and Kenya have a an agreement of mutual friendship and co-operation signed in 1964 which includes a pledge to maintain the inviolability of their frontiers and to mutual defense to resist the expansionist policies of any country or group of countries⁴⁸. An Ethiopia- Kenyan communiqué issued called on Somali “to renounce publicly and unconditionally all claim to the territories of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti”. The communiqué set out a series of conditions which Somalis had to fulfill, including the renunciation of territorial claims as well as the acceptance of the inviolability of existing state frontiers and withdrawal of Somali reservations entered when this principal had been retreated at the OAU in 1964. With regard to the former colonial boundaries, Somalia upholds its 1964 principles which it terms as, “uncorrected mistakes which still existed⁴⁹”.

3.3.2 1984 Borders Security Agreement

Bilateral talks on June 29, 1981, between Presidents Moi and Barre after an OAU assembly meeting in Nairobi led to an improvement in Kenyan-Somali relations. A joint communiqué referred to a commitment to promote better understanding and collaboration in the interest and welfare of the two states. The continuing problem of violent incidences involving ethnic Somalis in Northern Kenya nevertheless, remained a potential source of friction. In the Wajir area in 1984, many members of the Somali speaking Degodia were killed as Kenyan forces moved in to disarm them after they had been involved in clashes with another local Somali speaking group⁵⁰. However, the absence of Somali government support for local irredentism was illustrated in mid

⁴⁸ Wubneh, Ethiopia: Transition and Development , p. 168.

⁴⁹Day, Border and Territorial Disputes , p .150.

⁵⁰Arye Oded, Islam and Politics in Kenya (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 141.

September 1984 by the announcement of the closure of the headquarters in Somalia of the Northern Frontier District Liberation Front (NFDLF), a group whose existence had first been reported in April 1981 and the return to Kenya of 331 NFDLF members under the terms of an amnesty announced by the Kenyan authorities in December 1983⁵¹.

3.4 Djibouti- Somalia Border 1960-1990

Djibouti was claimed by Somalia on the basis of the majority Somali speaking peoples. Djibouti held assembly elections in 1963, where a new electoral law was enacted. Representation was abolished in exchange for a system of straight plurality vote based on lists submitted by political parties in seven designated districts⁵². Ali Aref Bourhan, allegedly of Turkish origin, was selected to be the president of the executive council. French President Charles de Gaulle's in August 1966 visit to Djibouti was marked by two days of public demonstrations by Somalis demanding independence⁵³. On September 21, 1966, Louis Saget, who was appointed as the Governor General of the territory after the demonstrations, announced that the French government would hold a referendum to determine whether the people would remain within the French Republic or become independent⁵⁴. In March 1967, 60 percent chose to continue the territory's association with France.

In July of that year, a directive from Paris formally changed the name of the region to the French Territory of the Afars and Issas. The directive also reorganized the governmental structure of the territory, making the senior French representative, formerly the Governor

⁵¹ Day, Border and Territorial Disputes: . p.149.

⁵² David Lea, editor, A Political Chronology of Africa (London: Europa Publications, 2001), p. 137.

⁵³ Lea, A Political Chronology of Africa, p. 137.

⁵⁴ Kaplan, Area Handbook for Somalia, p. 182.

General a High Commissioner. In addition, the executive council was redesignated as the council of government, with nine members.

3.4.1 Djibouti's Independence

In 1975, the French Government began to accommodate increasingly insistent demands for independence. In June 1976, the territory's citizenship law, which favored the Afar minority, was revised to reflect more closely the weight of the Issa Somali. The electorate voted for independence in a May 1977 referendum, and the Republic of Djibouti was established in June that same year⁵⁵. Hassan Gouled Aptidon became the country's first president.

In 1981, Hassan Gouled Aptidon turned the country into a one party state by declaring that his party, the Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès (RPP) (People's Rally for Progress), was the sole legal party⁵⁶. A civil war broke out in 1991 between the government and a predominantly Afar rebel group, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD). The group, which comprised mainly the Afars who opposed the domination of the Issas in government, began an armed insurrection against the government and took control of the northern part of the country.⁵⁷ The problem of Greater Somalia did not feature because Somalia was on the verge of collapse and the

⁵⁵Wubneh , Ethiopia: Transition and Development , p. 169.

⁵⁶Lea., A Political Chronology of Africa, p .138.

⁵⁷ Mohamed A. Mohamed Salih, "The Horn of Africa: Security in the New World Order," in. Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin, editors, Globalization.Human Security and the African Experience. (Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner, 1999), p. 130.

Issas who supported re-unification with Somalia were no longer motivated by the events in Mogadishu⁵⁸.

Thus, in this period, the conflict over territorial claims was not raised. Djibouti has been plagued by political rivalry between two nationalities, a situation directly affected by its geographical position and ethnic makeup. The Afar insurgency in the northern part of the country has been influenced by historical ties with the Eritrean and Ethiopian Afar⁵⁹. Djibouti's colonial borders thus, divided the Afars into Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti. The collapse of the Somali state and the declaration of independence by the Republic of Somaliland means that Djibouti is less threatened by the territorial claims of the Republic of Somalia over Djibouti as part of Greater Somalia⁶⁰. Furthermore, Djibouti opted for independence from France and in July 1976 summit meeting of OAU heads of state, Somalia asserted that it would honour the territory's freedom⁶¹.

⁵⁸ Ibid. , p. 133.

⁵⁹ Salih, "The Horn of Africa: Security in the New World Order", p. 130.

⁶⁰ Ibid. , p. 134.

⁶¹ Kaplan, Area Handbook for Somalia, p. 183.

3.5 Ethiopia- Eritrea Border: 1960-1990

In late 1962, the Eritrean assembly voted to end the federal status and to unify Eritrea with Ethiopia⁶². After 1962, Eritreans who opposed the federation founded the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) which carried out sporadic guerrilla warfare against Ethiopia. The Ethiopian position on Eritrea remained unchanged from the collapse of the Italian empire in 1941 to 1991: Eritrea was part of Ethiopia. The Eritrean position, if anything, hardened⁶³. The EPFL originally claimed that Eritrea had the right to self-determination because it had been a colony, but later argued that in any case Eritrea had nothing in common with Ethiopia⁶⁴. On a continent where efforts to reconstruct the past and occasionally to invent one of dubious authenticity abound, Eritrea represented the paradoxical case of a territory denying parts of its recorded history and culture because they did not fit present political requirements.

Both the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean nationalists found it convenient to consider the problem of Eritrea unique. The overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 set in motion a process of change, which focused, in the 1970s, on the transformation of the socioeconomic system and ignored the Eritrean question. As a result, during the 1980s, the "problem of the nationalities" and historic competition for control over the Amharics and Tigreans flared up⁶⁵. In this second period, the Eritrean problem appeared to be part of the overall process of the metamorphosis of Ethiopia from an empire into a state.

²Mulatu and Abate, Transition and Development in the Horn of Africa, p. 30.

³Wriggins, Howard, Gause, Lyons, and Colbert, Dynamics of Regional Politics, p. 163.

⁴Keller, "Constitutionalism and the National Question in Africa: The Case of Eritrea", p. 99.

⁵Ibid., p. 101.

The conflicting claims of Ethiopia and the Eritrean nationalists began after Italy lost its East African territories. In 1952, the UN which was responsible for the former Italian colonies, decided to give Eritrea to Ethiopia, but in the context of a federal structure under which Eritrea had its own elected parliament and executive⁶⁶. This arrangement did not fit at all with Emperor Haile Selassie's views, and in 1962 he succeeded in causing the Eritrean parliament to vote for the complete reincorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia⁶⁷. The vote probably did not reflect the real sentiment of the parliament as it was called in the absence of many of the representatives who were opposed to reintegration⁶⁸.

An armed conflict between Eritrean nationalists and the government had started a year before the dissolution of the federation. It escalated slowly through the 1960s, and then much more rapidly after Haile Selassie was overthrown. Between 1978 and 1990 there were no successful talks though neither side gave up the hope of breaking the impasse. Two major factors sustained the conflict for such a duration, preventing serious negotiations: first, the Eritrean nationalists, like all liberation movements, could only survive by fighting, and second, rapid political change in the rest of Ethiopia after 1974 gave hope to each party in turn that the stalemate could be broken and victory achieved.

Initially, the imperial government believed it could easily defeat the new nationalist movement. This conviction was strengthened by a schism in the Eritrean ranks, with the new Eritrean People's Liberation Front splitting off from the original ELF⁶⁹. After 1978, it was the turn of the Ethiopian government to believe again in the possibility of a

⁶⁶ Wriggins, Howard, Gause, Lyons, and Colbert, Dynamics of Regional Politics; , p .15.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 163

⁶⁸ Keller, "Constitutionalism and the National Question in Africa: The Case of Eritrea," p. 103.

⁶⁹ Ibid. , p. 104.

military victory. Large supplies of Soviet arms allowed the government to increase the size and strength of the military⁷⁰. Somalia had been defeated in 1978 after the initial success, and 15,000 Cuban troops were helping to protect that border. The government was also slowly making progress in reorganizing the country internally, creating a political party and thus, establishing more effective control in most areas.

In 1982, the Ethiopian government was confident enough of its new position to launch the so-called Red Star campaign in Eritrea. This campaign was initially conceived as a "multifaceted approach to the Eritrean problem, including recognition of the guerrilla movements, a search for a non-military solution, and attention to the economic and social problems of the region."⁷¹ It eventually degenerated into a purely military exercise that failed to break the stalemate⁷².

Despite the 1982 failure, the government still believed that it could settle the Eritrean problem on its own terms through a new territorial arrangement created by the constitution of 1987. Largely inspired by the Soviet model, the constitution envisaged the division of Ethiopia into regions and sub-regions, some of them autonomous. Eritrea was divided into two autonomous regions, Eritrea and Asab. The new Eritrea in turn was divided into three subregions. The government's ploy was simple enough. It hoped to separate from Eritrea most of the coast and especially the port of Asab, which serves Addis Ababa. The new Asab region corresponded roughly to the territory occupied by the Afars; the government hoped the Afars would welcome the creation of their own

⁷⁰ Keller, "Constitutionalism and the National Question in Africa: The Case of Eritrea," p. 105.

⁷¹ Edmond J. Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to Republic (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1988), pp. 239-43.

⁷² Keller, "Constitutionalism and the National Question in Africa: The Case of Eritrea," p. 106.

autonomous region and strive to keep the EPFL from operating there. However, this did not succeed because Eritrea argued that it had well defined and demarcated colonial borders⁷³.

3.6 Kenya- Sudan Border 1960-1990

Any rectification of regional boundaries after 1960 tended to be half-hearted measures and evaded the most important issue of the delimitation and administration of the disputed pastures. The Ilemi Triangle of conflict should be seen in the context of a wider problem affecting peoples of the region. Each party to the dispute has either ignored the problem of Ilemi or exploited the uncertainty for short-term political goals. The long-term however, may present challenges especially with rumours of oil deposit in the region of Ilemi triangle⁷⁴. The position of Ilemi has not featured in Uganda's rapprochement with Sudan despite having been a safe haven for various insurgent movements such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)⁷⁵. Since 2001, the authorities in Kampala have concentrated on disarming the Karamojong ethnic group⁷⁶. But the leaders may soon realize that the establishment of law and order today in southern Sudan generally and Ilemi in particular is crucial for Uganda's future security.

Ethiopia has allowed the problem to remain dormant and has been derelict in its responsibility of securing the needs of pastoral Dassanech. In the 1990s, the Ethiopian

⁷³ Ibid, p. 107.

⁷⁴ Atieno Odhiambo, "The Economics of Conflict among marginalized Peoples of Eastern Africa", in Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman, editors, Conflict Resolution in Africa, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991) ,p. 294.

⁷⁵ 'Kampala, Khartoum ready to exchange ambassadors' New Vision, 29 July 2002; also 'Khartoum moves to avert Sudan partition' The Monitor, 29 July 2002.

⁷⁶ Kennedy Mkutu, Pastoral conflict and small arms: Kenya- Uganda border region. Saferworld report November 2003, p .13.

government armed the Dassanech with new Kalashnikov automatics in recognition of their vulnerability from the Kenyan Turkana and Sudanese cattle raiders, but failed to seek a firm border settlement that could safeguard their grazing interests in the disputed Triangle⁷⁷. Arguably, Sudan has more leverage over other disputants because the colonial maps and treaty indicate Ilemi as part of Sudan despite abrogating its responsibility and consistently destabilizing the area controlled by the SPLA⁷⁸. From the 1980s to the early 1990s, it is estimated that the Toposa received 50,000 firearms from the government excluding landmines⁷⁹. Overall, it is estimated that the government of Sudan gave more than 250,000 firearms to border communities in southern Sudan as a strategy to destabilize the SPLA. Sudan's action has made the Ilemi more costly to administer and more 'unwanted' by any future government despite its significance to the lives of the local pastoral people. Despite manning a frontier post in Ilemi today, Kenya's future linkage to the disputed territory is difficult to establish due to official secrecy and security implications. After 1978, Kenyan maps omit the straight Maud Line and draw the triangle in a continuous line. The Kenya-Sudan dispute over the Ilemi Triangle makes participation in collective security by Sudan and Kenya very difficult⁸⁰.

⁷⁷Turton, David, "Mursi Political Identity & Warfare: The Survival of an Idea," In Fukui & Markakis , editors, Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa (London: James Currey, 1994), p.15.

⁷⁸Odhiambo, Conflict Resolution in Africa, p. 294.

⁷⁹ "Illicit firearms proliferation and the implications for security and peace in the Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda border region: report of the research carried out on the Sudan side of the common border" in AFRICANEWS 68, November 2001.

⁸⁰ Mburu Nene, "Contemporary Banditry in the Horn of Africa: Causes, History and Political Implications", Nordic Journal of African Studies vol 8 (2): 89-107, 1999, pp. 97- 99.

3.6.1 Colonial Implications on Borders

Whereas colonial surveyors ignored local peoples in their demarcations, bilateral rectification of the international boundaries by regional governments in the post-colonial period have short-changed the pastoral nomads and failed to show a keen interest in resolving the dispute. The Kenya-Ethiopia boundary agreement, which exchanged Gaddaduma wells for Godoma and Namuruputh, did not reinforce Kenya's claim to the contested territory and put a case for the customary pastures of the Turkana in the hills north of the disputed Triangle. By excluding Sudan, the bilateral boundary negotiations restricted their achievements to an exchange of territories without long-term significance. Similarly, the Sudan-Ethiopia boundary rectification of 1972 fell short of a viable long-term solution in as much as it did not redefine where the boundary should run over the Baro salient. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement there has been relative peace in southern Sudan and the problem of Ilemi is likely to arise. The border still presents a national security issue to Kenya. The Turkana do not regard the boundary as a separation because traditionally, they have been grazing in Ilemi. Any attempt to stop Turkanas from grazing in Ilemi will present a conflict because they have no other economic livelihood apart from pastoralism. In spite of this, little infrastructure exists in the region and the presence of government in this part of the region is hardly noticeable⁸¹. As a result those living in this area suffer from an identity crisis and have no national affinity to Kenya or Sudan because of the isolation and marginalization of the region⁸².

⁸¹ Mkutu, Pastoral conflict and small arms: Kenya- Uganda border region, pp. 9-11.

⁸² Stella M. Sabiiti, "The case of Karamoja", in Georgina Mbugua, editor, Natural Resource Based Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa: Experiences and Strategies for Intervention. (Forest Action Network Nairobi, Mortif Creative Arts, 2001), p. 113.

3.7 Kenya- Uganda Border 1960-1990

Like all colonial borders, the Kenya- Uganda partitioning never took into account the fact that communities along the border share some pastures and grazing areas. The marginalisation by both the colonial and subsequent African governments has led to a trend of cattle rustling as a means of both commercial and cultural survival⁸³. Since the early 1990s, vigilante groups have mushroomed in Northern Uganda. These vigilantes, who do not receive a salary and are given only minimal training, have been organized into reservists⁸⁴. Their knowledge of the areas in which they are operating contributes towards efforts to combat cattle raiding and they appear to have significant community support. However, as is the case in Uganda, these personnel sometimes misuse their arms for example, by selling or bartering them and, in some cases, taking part in banditry and cattle raiding. Those in authority have often failed to agree on a unified response to conflict and have regularly been split over whether or not they should support vigilante groups. Since the mid 1990s, cattle raiding have been driven by commercial considerations. There is a lot of evidence linking businessmen and politicians to cattle raiding⁸⁵. The increasingly organised and militarised nature of commercialized cattle raiding in the Kenya-Uganda border area and its links to wider trading networks, many of them criminal in character, means that the authorities face an uphill struggle to combat it.

The border between Kenyan and Uganda has been the battle front for cattle rustling during the period of 1960 to 1990 and many attempts to stop the practice have failed

⁸³ Baraza N, "Land reforms and agrarian structures in Uganda: Retrospect and Prospect", in Simon Coldham, editor, Land Reform and Customary Rights: The Case of Uganda: Journal of African Law, vol.44 no.1, 1994, pp. 34-35.

⁸⁴ Mkutu, Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: Kenya- Uganda border region, p.14.

⁸⁵ Ibid. , p .15.

because the strategies have not addressed the causes of the cattle rustling. The approach of using force since the pre-colonial and post colonial has not yielded desired results. The question of marginalization, provision of basic services and economic empowerment has not been given a higher priority⁸⁶.

3.8 Conclusion

In the period between 1960 and 1990, the countries in the Horn of Africa went through a period of de-colonization with an exception of Ethiopia. Each of the countries went through a national identity crisis with Somalia trying to unify all the Somali speaking people. Sudan faced resistance in the South and thus, did not pay much attention to the Ilemi Triangle problem with Kenya. The fall of the Amin regime in Uganda released many small arms to the Karamoja who engaged in cattle rustling along the Kenya-Sudan borders. The SPLA in Southern Sudan crossed into Kenya occasionally and small arms found their way into Turkana and Pokot. This contributed immensely to insecurity along the borders. The fall of the Ethiopian Monarchy and the Eritrean insurgency also contributed to instability in the Horn. The much anticipated independence prosperity was not realized as the new African leaders were faced with corruption and governance problems.

Superpower rivalry also played a role in arming the region with weaponry which later became a problem as governments in the region started to weaken. The porous borders could not be controlled and poverty and marginalization of pastoral communities continued. The governments lacked the capacity to impose authority in the borders and

⁸⁶ Ken Mkutu, "Improving Human Security through the Control and Management of Small Arms," (Paper presented in a Workshop, on Mar23- 25, 2000 in Arusha, Tanzania)

banditry and cattle rustling increased. This period saw the introduction of IMF policies which tied financial aid to democracy and governance thus, worsening the states' capacity to manage domestic pressures.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.1 Borders from 1990- 2005

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War in 1990, many African states started going through the process of democratization¹. In the early 1990s, for the first time since independence, domestic support became more important than foreign patrons, and African leaders had to confront the inherent weaknesses of their regimes because of gradual abandonment by the superpowers². The end of Cold War made Africa irrelevant in international diplomacy and security³.

The early 1990s were uncomfortable times for Africa's rulers, for it was characterized by deep and structural economic crisis. In addition to this, international pressure was mounting for more democratic systems of governance⁴. On the domestic front, the politically-conscious, urbanized, professionals and student bodies began to rail against the continued failure of their rulers to match rhetoric to promises of economic progress⁵. Consequently, the real-politik of border issues was replaced by problems that arose as a result of many years of economic mismanagement. In the case of Somalia, the regime collapsed in 1991 and the economy could not sustain the military adventurism. In

¹Godfrey Muriuki, "Some Reflections on Cold War Africa and After," in G. Macharia Munene, J.D. Olewe Nyunya and Korwa G. Adar, editors, THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA: From Independence to the End of the Cold War. (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers Ltd, 1995), p.5.

²Peter J. Schraeder . "Ally to Orphan: Understanding U.S. Policy toward Somalia after the Cold War", in James A. Scott, editor, After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), p. 331.

³G. Macharia Munene, " Cold War Dissillusionment and Africa", in G. Macharia Munene, , J.D. Olewe Nyunya and Korwa G. Adar, editors, THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA: From Independence to the End of the Cold War (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers Ltd, 1995), p.21.

⁴John W.Harbeson, and Donald Rotchild, editors, Africa in World Politics: Post Cold War Challenges, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 145.

⁵Clapham, Christopher, Africa and the International System: The Politics of state survival, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.193.

Ethiopia, the Marxist government was overthrown and Eritrea ceded from Ethiopia.

4.1.2. Economic conditions and National Security

National Security is a complex problem in the developing countries because political and economic resources are scarce and competition over them is high. Such complexity can be approached by concentrating on two basic elements of national security in these countries namely, tranquillity and well-being.⁶ The distribution of social, economic, and political resources determines how the state behaves. A major military build up does not guarantee national security and tranquillity⁷. Thus, national security depends not only on military strength but also on economic strength and national unity⁸. As a result, national interests and security can be guaranteed only if development is attained⁹.

For their part, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other bilateral aid donors also made it clear that if further financial assistance was to be forthcoming, Africa's governments had to give urgent attention to economic and democratic practices¹⁰. More specifically, they had to become politically accountable to their people, and curb corruption¹¹. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were introduced and they entailed a number of things: the reduction of public expenditure, balanced budgets,

⁶ Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p.50.

⁷ Ibid., p.51.

⁸ P.M. Kamath, "Human Rights and National Security: US Experience in Africa During the Cold War Era", in G. Macharia Munene, J.D. Olewe Nyunya and Korwa G. Adar, editors, THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA: From Independence to the End of the Cold War, (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers Ltd, 1995), p.52.

⁹ The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (Addis Abba: Ministry of Information Press, November 2002), p. 28.

¹⁰ Muriuki, "Some Reflections on Cold War Africa and After", p. 16.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 17.

economic liberalization and currency devaluation. The effect was a sharp decline in living standards for most and a steep rise in the price of food and social services, especially in the towns.¹²

At the same time SAPs undermined the basis of the social contract underpinning the foundation of the post-colonial state structures, depriving the state simultaneously of its capacity and of the last vestiges of legitimacy.¹³ Africa's states were dependent on foreign aid, and some relied on expatriate and donor personnel as in colonial days. The national security architecture of the Horn of Africa which was depending on this foreign aid was deprived off the funds for maintaining security apparatus. A new form of colonialism was ushered in the name of globalisation which ignores borders and uses other agencies to control governments¹⁴. By weakening the states economically the competition for power was reduced to its bare essentials, where personality and local/ethnic considerations became paramount, and the remnants of the state were likely to fall prey to the competition for power. Somalia and Ethiopia became the early casualties to this phenomenon as regimes started to collapse. The border issues although still important did not take centre stage but were only brought to fore in time of political crisis to trump up national support for political survival.

The borders became irrelevant as the borderlanders crisscrossed with their livestock and

¹²Clark A. Murdock, "Economic Factors as Objects of Security: Economics, Security Vulnerability", in Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, editors, Economic Issues and National Security (Kansas: University of Kansas, 1982), p.68.

¹³Laakso and Olukoshi, "The Crisis of the Post-Colonial nation-state Project in Africa", pp. 9-10.

¹⁴Macharia Munene, "Leadership Challenges in the African Diaspora", in Kimani Njogu, editor, Governance and Development: Towards Quality Leadership in Kenya (Nairobi: Twaweza Communications Ltd, 2007), pp. 112-113.

traditional grazing areas became arenas of conflict over scarce resources¹⁵. Since the state had failed to provide the basic livelihood, the pastoralists devised survival means along the porous borders. The trade in illicit small arms, smuggling and cattle rustling took shape¹⁶. The absence of the state authority in the border areas made it easy for these activities to thrive. The end result is that small arms ended up in the urban areas and internal security was threatened.

4.2 Ethiopia- Eritrea Border 1990-2005

The Derg regime in Ethiopia ended in 1991¹⁷, and the Eritrean insurgents succeeded in capturing Asmara and the ports, giving them control of the province. That same year, the UN scheduled a referendum on Eritrean independence¹⁸. In 1993, after 30 years of warfare and the death of an estimated 200,000 people, Eritreans overwhelmingly voted for independence and Isaias Afwerki, formerly the principal leader of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF), became the new nation's first president.

A border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea broke out in 1998 when Eritrean forces occupied disputed territory in Badme¹⁹. Fighting was largely inconclusive, with thousands killed on both sides, until May, 2000, when Ethiopian forces launched a major offensive, securing the disputed territory and driving further into Eritrea. A cease-fire

¹⁵ Cirino Hiteng Ofuho, Forest Action Network, Natural Resource Based Conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa: Experiences and Strategies for Intervention, (Workshop proceedings on Reflections on the future policies on Natural Resource based Conflict Management, 27-30th March 2000 Addis Abba, Ethiopia), p. 5.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

¹⁷ Siegfried Pausewang, "Democratisation in Ethiopia", in Siegfried Pausewang, editor, Ethiopia since the Derg, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 2002), pp. 1-25.

¹⁸ Eritrean- Ethiopian War, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eritrean-Ethiopian_War, 13th March, 2008.

¹⁹ Terrence Lyons, Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: US Policy Toward Ethiopia and Eritrea, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, CSR.NO.21, December 2006.), p. 6.

agreement was signed and a 9.6 km UN-patrolled buffer zone and the demarcation of the border by UN cartographers was settled upon. The Algiers agreement tasked Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission (EEBC) to follow the African tradition of confirming colonial borders²⁰ and peacekeeping forces arrived in significant numbers by December 2000. In April 2002, the Hague Tribunal issued a complex ruling on the disputed border that favoured Eritrea in some locations and Ethiopia in others²¹. Ethiopian resistance subsequently delayed the finalization of the border agreement, and Eritrea refused to enter into discussions with Ethiopia.

Tensions with Ethiopia escalated in 2005 as both states bolstered their forces along the disputed border. Eritrea became frustrated due to lack of progress on the border issue and restricted the UN peacekeepers movements. In November 2005, the UN called for Eritrea and Ethiopia to reduce their forces along the border and for Eritrea to end restrictions on UN forces, and expressed concern over Ethiopia's failure to finalize the border; the UN threatened to impose sanctions for non-compliance²². Eritrea rejected the ultimatum and in December 2005, forced those UN forces from the United States, Canada, Europe, and Russia to withdraw.

This border conflict presents a challenge to the national security of both Eritrea and Ethiopia. This conflict is rooted in the colonial legacy where Italian occupation of Eritrea influenced the future separation of these two states²³. Ethiopia and Eritrea need each

²⁰ Lyons, Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: , p. 7.

²¹ <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0858026.html>

²² Lyons, Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: p.8.

²³ Fuller, Property Rights & Political Developments in Ethiopia & Eritrea: , p. 72

other for national survival because although the conflict has been manifested through border clashes, the reality lies in economic relationship of the two countries²⁴.

4.3 Kenya-Somalia border 1990-2005

The government of President Siad Barre was overthrown in January 1991²⁵. Several guerrilla groups that fought against Siad Barre's regime gained control over different parts of the country²⁶. In subsequent months, factionalism within these groups, lack of control by these groups over armed forces within their regions and the emergence of new military and political groups challenging existing spheres of influence have created a situation in which few, if any, regions of Somalia are free from ethnic and political hostility. As a result of the fighting and the subsequent hostilities, there are an estimated 1.5 million Somali refugees in the Horn of Africa, many of them in Kenya²⁷.

Since the January 1991 coup, the United Somali Congress (USC) had maintained primary control over central Somalia, including the capital, Mogadishu. However, in November 1991, a series of cease-fire agreements between two factions of the USC, one led by USC President General Mahamed Farah Aideed and one by interim Somali President Ali Mahdi Mohammed, degenerated into widespread factional fighting in Mogadishu²⁸. Between November 1991 and March 1992, an estimated 14,000 people died in

²⁴ Makumi Mwangi, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institution of Management, (Nairobi: Watersmark Printers, 2000), p.63.

²⁵ The United Nations and Somalia-1992-1996, p. 11.

²⁶ Wriggins, Howard, Gause, Lyons, and Colbert Dynamics of Regional Politics, p. 171

²⁷ Moyiga Nduru, "Somalia: Relief Aid Urgently Needed for Refugees," Inter-Press Service, 23 August 1991

²⁸ The United Nations and Somalia-1992-1996, p. 12.

Mogadishu²⁹. These effects have dented the credibility of the Greater Somalia phenomenon. While a July 1991 conference in the neighbouring country of Djibouti brought a shaky truce between the USC and its main rival in southern Somali, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the Somali National Front - a coalition of forces loyal to deposed President Siad Barre, continued fighting in south-western Somalia³⁰. Moreover, the SPM subsequently repudiated the July 1991 agreement, while General Aideed's faction of the USC never fully supported the agreement³¹. In northern Somalia, the Somali National Movement (SNM), which wrested control of the region from Siad Barre after years of fighting, announced its secession from the Republic of Somalia³². In the months following the fall of the Siad Barre government, three groups emerged in opposition to the SNM's plans for secession: the United Somali Front and the Somali Democratic Association in the northeast of Somalia, and the United Somali Party on the internal border between Somaliland and Somalia³³.

The effects of the civil war in Somalia to Kenya's national security are manifested in the flow of arms and refugees through the porous border³⁴. In addition, small cells of radical Islamists who are probably linked to international terrorist groups maintained a presence on the Kenya-Somalia border resulting in the attacks of the US Embassy in Kenya in

²⁹Africa Watch, Physicians for Human Rights, "Somalia: No Mercy in Mogadishu" (New York: The Africa Watch Committee, 26 March 1992), p. 3

³⁰The United Nations and Somalia-1992-1996, p. 12.

³¹"U.N. Envoy Discounts Prompt Somali Truce," Washington Post, 6 January 1992, p. A15. Jane Perlez, "As Fighting in Somalia Rages On, African Neighbor Seeks a Truce," New York Times, 6 January 1991, p. A2.

³²Clapham, Christopher, Africa and the International System: The Politics of state survival, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.158.

³³"Part of Somalia Declares its Independence," Washington Post, 20 May 1991. "The North Declares Independence," New African, July 1991, (as reported in the IRBDC Indexed Media Review, Vol. II, No. 5, Week of July 30 - August 5, 1991). "Drifting Apart," Africa Events, June 1991

³⁴Ken Menkhous. Kenya-Somalia Border Conflict Analysis. (Nairobi: Development Alternatives, Inc., USAID, 31 August 2005), p.12.

1998 and the Paradise Beach hotel in Mombasa.³⁵ The issue of containing international terrorism has become more imperative in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Since then, there has been international pressure on the Kenyan government to increase its presence on policing the border³⁶.

The Kenyan government has also taken interest in addressing the needs of the region through community projects such as drilling of boreholes and providing free health care and free primary education. Although there has been no renunciation of the self-determination of the region from Somalia, there is little chance of territorial claim in the future, although future conflict can still occur. It can also be argued that the Kenyan Somalis have had better opportunities than their kin in Somalia and therefore, conflict has been minimized. If continued development and integration of this region continues at the present pace, there is little chance of resurgence of conflict in the future. Kenya should take advantage of the instability in Somalia and improve the economic and social services in the region as a strategy to nullify any future irredentism. The major problem faced at the Kenya –Somalia border is the absence of state authority on both sides. Hundreds of armed criminals can terrorize a village for hours without the intervention of state security forces thus, indicating that the government has little or no authority³⁷.

³⁵ Menkhaus, Kenya-Somalia Border Conflict Analysis, p. 13.

³⁶ Ibid, pp. 19-20.

³⁷ Menkhaus, Kenya- Somalia Border Conflict Analysis, p.2.

4.4 Ethiopia- Somalia Border 1990-2005

When Mengistu and Barre were ousted in 1991, the problem of the Ogaden region was sidetracked as each country tried to consolidate its position. The constitution of 1995, which established federal regions, did not adequately gain acceptance³⁸. The Ogaden region is still contested and thought to have commercial quantities of gas and oil. The local fighters in the region fall under the auspices of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). Needless to say, throughout this region, there are religious, ethnic, and clan tensions. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) launched a political conference in Nairobi (Kenya) in October 2002 whose aim was to restore peace in Somalia. In the course of 2004, the participants agreed on a Transitional Federal Charter, appointed a Parliament based on clan representation and elected Abdullahi Yusuf as Somalia's transitional President. A Prime Minister, Ali Mohamed Gedhi, was appointed and a government was finalised in January 2005. But the new government team quickly showed signs of fragmenting. Abdullahi Yusuf left Nairobi and established his part of the government in Baidoa. The regime is still weak and threatened by Islamists and therefore, internal political struggles preoccupy the new government and the irredentist's demands are remote. Ethiopia was among the first states in the region to recognise the transitional government in order to pre-empt any irredentist regime in Somalia. Ethiopia argues that the disintegration of Somalia has posed dangers for peace and stability in Ethiopia and the Horn due to the perception as a conflict prone region³⁹.

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³⁸ Clapham, Christopher, Ethiopia since the Derg: A Decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 2002), p. xv.

³⁹ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (Addis Ababa: November 2002), p. 76.

4.4.1. Somali Nationalism

Somali nationalism can be traced to Mohammed Abdullah who opposed the foreign influence brought by the colonial powers⁴⁰. He considered Ethiopia as a foreign colonial power. He tried to unify all Somali speaking people of the Horn. Nationalism is one of the most hotly contested concepts in the social sciences where its definition has myriad forms.⁴¹ It is however, possible to develop a definition that encompasses nearly all varieties of nationalism, while leaving its forms for further discussion. At its most basic and broadest level, nationalism can be defined as a political ideology or movement with two characteristics. It locates the source of individual identity within a 'people', which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity.⁴² It also promotes the rights and interests of that group vis-à-vis other groups. These rights and interests can be cultural, political, economic, or social, and they can unfold in several ways and be expressed through many different policies. Despite the fact that nationalism can take different forms, it is fundamentally “a form of remedial political action that addresses an allegedly deficient or 'pathological' condition. It proposes to remedy this 'pathological' condition and can be conceived as a set of variations on a single core lament; that the identity and interests of a putative nation are not properly expressed or realized⁴³.” For nationalism to arise there must be a perception that some

⁴⁰ Kaplan, Irving, Area Handbook for Somalia. (Washington: The American University, 1977), pp.24-25.

⁴¹ John A. Hall, “Nationalisms: Classified and Explained,” Daedalus Vol 122, no. 3 Summer, 1993, pp. 1-26.

⁴² Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 3.

⁴³ Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996). p .79.

rights or interests are not adequately fulfilled under the status quo⁴⁴. This can best be seen in the case of Somalia, which started resistance during the colonial era and demands for a separate, unified, Islamic Somali nation. Furthermore, the Somalis are bonded by culture, religion and common geography. Hence, although Ethiopia has a sizeable Muslim community, the Somalis as a nation are a minority and therefore, the struggle for secession from Ethiopia becomes an identity motivation.

This strong link between the nation and the state is the basis for a particular manifestation of nationalism based upon the premise that “the political and national unit should be congruent⁴⁵.” Prior to the achievement of independent statehood, nationalism may be directed toward this goal. Once statehood is achieved, the nationalist debate may shift toward nationalizing the polity or ‘homeland nationalism.’ For the purposes of the current situation in Somalia, the rivalry among different clans’ has taken centre stage. The concept of ‘Greater Somalia’ is losing ground as Ethiopia consolidates its economy⁴⁶. The Ogaden Somalis appear to be better off in Ethiopia than in Mogadishu nevertheless, the situation is unpredictable since Somalis have not renounced their claim over Ogaden. The crisis in Somalia has given Ethiopia an opportunity to support the transitional government given its historical border problems; Ethiopia discourages a hostile Somali government⁴⁷. Ethiopia’s policy is to assist the regions of Somaliland and Puntland

⁴⁴ Thomas Ambrosio, *Irredentism: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), p. 16.

⁴⁵ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 1.

⁴⁶ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (Addis Ababa: November 2002), p. 78.

⁴⁷ Daniel G. Ogbaharya, “The Elusive Quest for Peace in the Horn of Africa: The Regional Attributes of Civil War in Somalia”, *International Journal of Humanities and Peace* vol 22.1, 2006, pp.1-10.

which are relatively safe and reduce the possibility of extremists using these territories to attack it⁴⁸.

4.5 Djibouti- Somalia Border 1990-2005

During this period, the Djibouti-Somalia border did not attract much attention because of the failing state of Somalia. The internal political problems were between the traditional rivalry of Afars and Isas in power sharing. The Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) signed a peace accord with the Djibouti government in December 1994, ending the conflict. Two FRUD members were made cabinet members, and in the presidential elections of 1999, the FRUD campaigned in support of the People's Rally for Progress (RPP)⁴⁹.

On May 12, 2001, President Ismail Omar Guelleh presided over the signing of what was termed the final peace accord officially ending the decade-long civil war between the government and the armed faction of the FRUD. The border issues and territorial claims between Somalia and Djibouti are not tenable and not likely because the former British Somaliland broke away from Somalia and declared its independence in 1992. Although it has not been recognized internationally, it is more peaceful than the former Italian Somaliland. The French domination of Djibouti affairs has been overwhelmed by the presence of the US' Counter Terrorism Center at Djibouti and the increased role of the US in the Horn of Africa. The fight against terrorism has given Djibouti new

⁴⁸ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy(Addis Ababa, November 2002) , p. 81.

⁴⁹ Lea, A Political Chronology of Africa , p. 141.

international standing as the sole superpower is on its side. There is no likelihood of interference on Djibouti's sovereignty at the moment.

4.6 Kenya- Sudan Border 1990-2005

In July and August 2002, the US sponsored a series of talks in Machakos, Kenya, to end the war in southern Sudan⁵⁰. With the future of oil supplies from the Middle East being uncertain, the US realized the importance of stabilizing oil-rich southern Sudan⁵¹. Nevertheless, the security issues of Ilemi did not feature in this consideration and it is inconceivable how enduring peace and international cooperation can be achieved without embracing the 'people of the periphery' in the economic, social and political rhythm of the mainstream society. There is renewed thinking about the potential of oil in this region of Ilemi and this will pose a national security problem for Kenya. Although Kenya actively steered the Sudan peace process, it is not certain what the future holds for the Ilemi Triangle. The border is still conflict prone because of disputes over the grazing rights of the Turkanas. Poverty persists in this region and backwardness and culture is hard to remove. Pastoralism is the only means of survival and competition over scarce resources abounds.

⁵⁰ Stele, Jonathan, "Oil is key to peace in Sudan," *The Guardian*, (London) 6 August 2002; "Sudan says it fights to secure oil areas," News article by *AFP* <http://www.sudan.net/news/news.html> posted on 1 August 2002.

⁵¹ Dowden, Richard, "How to secure peace in Africa," *The Observer*, (London) 1 August 2002; "Egyptian Press accuses U.S. of seeking to split Sudan," *Tehran Times*, 4 August 2002; 'Peace in Sudan opens oil of opportunities' *Mena Reports*, 29 July 2002, <http://www.sudan.net/news/news.html>

4.7 Kenya- Uganda Border 1990-2005

The Kenya-Uganda border conflict has shifted from political causes to local pastoralists' competition for resources due to increased demographic and environmental pressures⁵². War and instability in southern Sudan and northern Uganda from the 1980s onwards exponentially increased the volume of small arms available. The relative ease of acquisition and low cost of these small arms enabled the pastoral communities to guarantee a sustained market. Some sources estimate that there are as many as 150,000–200,000 firearms in the Karamoja region of Uganda alone. While the exact number of small arms in the hands of pastoral communities is difficult to assess, it is clear that the threat posed by them is enormous.

Pastoral communities seem to have been arming themselves for several reasons. First, they need to protect themselves against being plundered by hostile groups. Second, the weapons are used to defend their animals against other armed pastoral communities. Third, arms are used forcefully to steal stock from other pastoral communities, often for revenge⁵³.

The problem of small arms has been made more complex by the commercialization of cattle raiding, whereby wealthy businessmen, many of them based in towns, fund raids in the pastoral communities. Accordingly, the economic benefits derived from obtaining a

⁵²Mwaura, Ciru, Human Development Report 2005 (UNDP) Human Development Report Office Occasional Paper: Kenya and Uganda Pastoral Conflict Case Study, pp. 1-5.

⁵³ Ibid. , pp. 5-9.

gun have significantly increased⁵⁴. According to human needs theory, structural violence occurs when economic and political structures systematically deprive the need satisfaction for certain segments of society. The need for security is constant and becomes apparent when the environment is perceived to pose a threat to security. There is no state security in the border areas and thus the absence of state in these marginal areas encourages the small arms trade for self-protection and property.⁵⁵

The Kenyan and Ugandan authorities have often used force against pastoral communities, sometimes in the context of efforts at disarmament⁵⁶. Since 1979, there have been twelve operations by the Kenyan army to try and retrieve unlicensed arms from the Pokot. According to local community representatives, these operations have often targeted innocent people. Disarmament efforts regularly prompt resistance and things can spiral out of control, as the most recent effort to disarm the Sabaot Land Defence Force in Mount Elgon shows⁵⁷. In May 2002, Karimojong fighters resisting a disarmament programme killed 19 soldiers of the Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF). The UPDF retaliated by setting on fire several Karimojong homesteads in a fierce fight. At least 13 warriors were killed and the UPDF recovered several weapons⁵⁸.

⁵⁴ Abdurahaman, Ame, Cross-border livestock Trade and Small Arms and Conflict in Pastoral Areas of the Horn of Africa: Case study from Southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya (Paper presented in a Conference on 19th April, 2006 in Arusha, Tanzania)

⁵⁵ Daniel J.Christie, "Reducing Direct and Structural Violence: The Human Needs Theory". in Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 3(4), (1997), pp. 315-332

⁵⁶ Mwaura, Ciru, Human Development Report 2005 (UNDP) Human Development Report Office Occasional Paper: Kenya and Uganda Pastoral Conflict Case Study, pp. 1-10.

⁵⁷ Daily Nation, 25 March 2008, Residents rejoice as bombs smoke out Mt. Elgon's terrorist militia, pp. 4-5.

⁵⁸ Saferworld · Small Arms and Security in The Great Lakes Region And The Horn of Africa pp 13- 20

The situation in the Kenya-Uganda border area is far from being beyond repair. Strategies to restore peace and security will have to be based on a frank acknowledgement that there are many in the area whose survival and livelihood has come to depend on a state of 'durable disorder'. Some of these people are politicians, businessmen, local officials and traditional leaders. It is crucial that the authorities take effective action to combat the influence and activities of these emerging warlords without delay. Difficult as this may be, it will be far harder in future years if these warlords are given time to consolidate and expand their operations. People from the same ethnic group compound the cross-border problem across the border. According to Captain Obo of Uganda's People Defence Forces (UPDF) the guns are the source of cross-border conflict and UPDF cannot stop people from, say Mount Elgon, from crossing over to Uganda because they have relatives there⁵⁹.

4.7.1 Resource Security Issues

The Kenya-Uganda border area is a largely arid and semi-arid area and is well suited to pastoralism. Traditionally, pastoralism was a labour-intensive process that kept children and young men actively engaged on a full-time basis⁶⁰. Whenever scarcity or disease depleted a community's livestock, it often sought to replenish numbers through alternative coping mechanisms such as trading, handcrafts, smuggling and transporting. Out of all these activities, cattle raiding have long been central to both the cultural identity and the social, political and economic organisation of pastoral communities in

⁵⁹The Standard Newspaper, "Uganda Army combs border to root out militia in Mt Elgon". 25 March, 2008, p. 10.

⁶⁰Kennedy Mkutu. Saferworld Report: Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms Kenya- Uganda border region. Nov 2003.

this area. In the past, cattle raiding, while often involving some violence, tended to be small-scale. With the availability of automatic small arms, the trend has become more lethal and poses security challenges. More lives are being lost including heavy casualties on security forces who in turn use excessive force to restore order. The nature of national security in the Third World is thus, challenged by the realist image of the state as the provider of the security. The state rather than being the provider of security as in the conventional way is a primary source of insecurity due to human rights violations⁶¹.

4.7.2 Economic Survival

All aspects of pastoral social and economic life are ordered in relation to livestock and the environment in which they live. In pastoral societies, cattle hold central value within society and are the basis of association in a complex of social, political and religious institutions. The system depends largely on the availability of water and the distribution, quality of, and access to, pasture. However, pastoralism is under threat. This is due to a range of factors including: weak governance; inadequate land and resource management policies; political and economic marginalisation of pastoral groups; and increasing insecurity, resulting from cattle raiding fuelled by growing access by all sides to small arms and light weapons. There is the problem of cultural security because ethnocentrism and xenophobia results in perceptions of constant security threats even where none exists, whereas a society devoid of these threats traits may not sense security threats even when major danger exists⁶².

⁶¹ Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, editors, Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 328.

⁶² Mandel, The changing Face of National Security: A Conceptual Analysis p, 90.

Thus, the disarmament efforts in the 1980s were heavily dependent upon the use of force and the affected armed people felt threatened. Despite this, relatively few arms were seized and relations with pastoral communities were badly damaged in the process. This led to a revised strategy in 1995 whereby, the Kenyan Government decided to offer amnesty to anybody who handed over guns. This approach has been supplemented by attempts to engage communities in dialogue and continued threats of force.

Offers of amnesty however, have not led to dramatically improved outcomes due to cultural traits and sense of feeling insecure. A public education campaign was launched to persuade the Pokot to surrender their weapons. Local leaders, in particular the chiefs, were used to educate their communities on the importance of giving up their arms. This strategy however, may fail if there are no plans to develop the infrastructure in these regions and provide alternative economic activity and provide adequate security in these marginal border areas. The borders are still porous and the traditional grazing areas transcend the boundaries.

4.8 Conclusion

The limited ability of external powers to force regional states to take actions contrary to the local leaders' perceptions of their interests eroded in the 1990s. With the end of Cold War, neither the United States nor Russia has had compelling strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. In the early 1990s, Washington suspended or drastically reduced military support to Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan. Moscow ended its support for Ethiopia, indicating its desire to disengage from the contentious region.

The withdrawal of the superpowers, anxious to concentrate on Central Europe, the Gulf, and the global economic restructuring, may not reduce conflict in the region. An arms embargo on Somalia has not reduced the level of combat, because the region is currently awash in military equipment and considerable fighting is still continuing. Furthermore, the weak state in Somalia has given way to illegal arms trade through the porous border with Kenya. This trend may heighten conflict if the political struggles of the interested parties outside the regions fight by proxy in the Horn. According to Ethiopia, Egypt pursues a policy of preventing Ethiopia from utilising the waters of the Nile River by promotion of instability in the Horn⁶³. The complex, intertwined, and enduring disputes are rooted firmly in the nature of the states in the region and their contradictory security needs and aspirations. Thus, border problems can be fuelled by other actors and prevent the Horn from achieving peace.

Enduring resolution of the conflicts has eluded the leaders of the Horn. Nevertheless, temporary solutions appear to be the first step towards sustainable peace. In Djibouti, the presence of French troops, and of late the Americans, has preserved a peaceful status quo. In northern Kenya, conflict has been avoided because of declining Somali interest and Kenyan policies designed to Kenyanize ethnic Somalis.

The Horn of Africa is a system marked by endemic conflict in which the most vulnerable individuals are refugees, small farmers, pastoralists, and workers. The geographic, social, and political ties among the members of the system prevent any one of the major actors from opting out of the system. The borders will continue to present challenges but as

⁶³ Ministry of Information. Ethiopia. Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy. (Addis Ababa: .Nov 2002), p. 120.

discussed, the social conditions of the pastoralists will require improvement in terms of social amenities and economic empowerment through good governance and provision of security at the remote areas along the borders.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 Conclusion

5.1.1. The border Problems

The border problems of the Horn of Africa are based on the colonial partitioning of Africa and disregarding of the ethnic groups along the borders. In spite of the conflicts that are as a result of the artificial colonial borders, these borders are likely to remain for several reasons. First, the political elites in the Horn of Africa are determined to hold onto their colonial inheritance. Second, the African Union still holds the inherited colonial borders as sacrosanct and there is no likelihood of a policy shift in the near future. Third, the border populations themselves exhibit minimal interest in the redrawing of the borders. Indeed, the frontier is often a source of opportunity due to its ambiguity. Members of one family may chose to leave on either side of border line in order to exploit the benefits of both sides whether through smuggling or to move in search of better pasture on either side. Nevertheless, with globalisation and regional integration, sovereignty is being diminished and the border conflict may be a thing of the past if the regional groupings can succeed.

The most pressing problem on the Kenya-Uganda border has been cattle rustling, through the use of small arms, between the Karamoja of Uganda and Pokot and Turkana of Kenya. The weapons are threatening security by being sold cheaply to gangs and bandits who engage in criminal activities. Due to the porosity of the borders, small arms from war torn areas within the Horn of Africa find an available market among the pastoralist communities. The pastoralists buy the small arms for the protection of their livestock and

raiding purposes. The lack of effective government policing in these marginalised areas motivates the pastoralists to arm themselves for their protection against other raiding groups.

An impending conflict looms at the Kenya –Sudan border. This potential dispute is based on an historical legacy. Although the Ilemi Triangle technically belongs to Sudan, it is currently under the administration of Kenyan as was the case during the colonial era. The discovery of oil in this region would make it a potential conflict area. The Turkanas of Kenya have historically grazed in the Ilemi and attempts to deny them this right will cause a conflict.

The Kenya – Somalia border does not present a major conflict at the present due to the clan fighting in Somalia. However, in future, the Greater Somalia ideology may re-emerge in spite of efforts by the Kenyan government to integrate the northern region into the mainstream Kenyan society. Currently, the major security threat on this border is the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons from war torn Somalia. There is also the possibility of contraband goods and terrorists using this border due to the kin country phenomenon. Kenya has had two terrorists' attacks in the recent past and it is suspected that this border has been used for smuggling of explosives materials.

The Ethiopia- Somalia border, especially the Ogaden, will continue to have conflict since the ONLF is still active in the region. The ONLF is likely to receive external support because it has unexploited deposits of gas and oil. Such external support would

destabilize Ethiopia.

The Somalia –Djibouti border is not likely to change because Djibouti is not interested in merging with Somalia and there seems to be no motivation given the events in Mogadishu. The idea of a Greater Somalia is not appealing to Djibouti because the Issas who are Somalis are the majority and are in government in Djibouti.

The Ethiopia –Eritrea border is still a problem despite the ruling in The Hague. The UN troops will continue to monitor the cease fire until the parties agree on the border line. Although Eritrea was carved from Ethiopia, there seems to be bitterness between the two neighbours who were allies during the liberation struggle against Megintu's regime. Ethiopia suspects interference from outside powers especially traditional enemies who Ethiopia alleges do not want it to have peace and develop the use of the Blue Nile waters. This may be viewed as resource scarcity especially water in the upper riparian states.

5.2 Border Security Implication

The borders in the Horn of Africa do not pose any significant security implications. This study has seen that there are more intra-state conflicts than inter-state conflict in the region. The policy issues with regard to marginalisation of the border population if addressed can reduce the cross-border illicit trade. Human Security is the major issue affecting the borderlanders and non-state actors have tried to provide some basic amenities to the borderlanders. If the borderlanders can feel secure and their Human Security issues addressed, the borders will not have any security implications on the

states. The lack of opportunity has driven the borderlanders to engage in smuggling and banditry. Resource scarcity especially pastures, water and population pressures have increased conflict because of pastoralism being a main economic activity in the region.

5.3 Recommendations

The Horn of Africa needs to engage in serious economic programs that target the marginalised areas. The region, which is 70 percent semi-arid, is endowed with enough livestock to start a meat processing plant and tannery factory. The program can be started as a regional project that will provide a market for the vast livestock found in the region. This will not only empower the communities economically but will also foster nationalism and reduce banditry and cattle rustling. The region is also endowed with good soils and massive irrigation projects can be started to produce food for both domestic consumption and export. There is need to build good infrastructure in the region in order to attract investments. Security should be provided in the region so that the state authority is appreciated and the pastoralists dissuaded from arming themselves. More research is still required in this study over border conflicts, national security and the impact of globalisation.

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