UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY

FACTORS WHICH MADE EASTLEIGH, NAIROBI A HAVEN OF PEACE IN THE MIDST OF THE 2007-2008 POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KENYA

BY

HAWA EDDLE IBRAHIM

C50/62251/2010

A RESEARCH PROJECT PAPER SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF A MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN ARMED CONFLICT AND PEACE STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

NOVEMBER, 2013

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DECLARATION

I declare that this is my original work and has not been presented to any University.

HAWA EDDLE IBRAHIM ..... 25/11/13.....

Signature Date

SUPERVISORS:

PROF. GODFREY MURIUKI 25.11.2013

Signature Date

PROF. MILCAH AMOLO ACHOLA ..... 26th Nov 2013

Signature Date

DEDICATION

This project paper is dedicated to my parents Eddle Mohamed and Amina Farah. They were instrumental in the course of this great academic journey.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The success of this work was a joint effort of many people. I am grateful to God for His love and grace upon my life. To the entire staff of the Department of History and Archaeology, University of Nairobi, I say thank you all for your support. My greatest and overwhelming appreciations go to my project supervisors, Professor G. Muriuki and Professor Milcah Amolo Achola. They both played a major role and provided positive criticisms that helped in the completion of this study. To friends and colleagues thank you for the emotional support and encouragement that you offered me when things seemed untenable.

ABSTRACT

Violence in Kenya has been a common characteristic of general elections since independence leading to clashes and conflicts in many parts of the country. However, the post-election violence of 2007 to 2008 that rocked the country immediately after the presidential results remains one of the memorable moments in the Kenya's history. This study set out to achieve three research objectives. These were firstly, to find out why there was peace in Eastleigh, Nairobi during the 2007 to 2008 post- election violence in Kenya, secondly to assess the nature of the security apparatus employed by the communities living in Eastleigh and lastly to examine the existing structures for conflict resolution in Eastleigh.

The study used a qualitative approach. Primary and secondary data was utilized in this study to establish the factors that contributed to calmness in Eastleigh while most parts of Nairobi were engulfed in conflict. The process of data collection involved various types of interviews in which the researcher obtained the primary data. Secondary data were obtained from books, journals, articles, working papers and discussion papers.

The study revealed that, first, Somali people living in Eastleigh did not have strong political alignment, hence did not really matter who won the presidential ticket. Second, land issue that was at the centre of conflict in most areas of Kenya was of little concern to different ethnic groups living in Eastleigh.

Third, the study also showed that post-election violence in Nairobi was due to politics, having been generated by political party alignments or affiliations. The two main rival parties were; Orange Democratic Party (ODM) and Party of National Unity (PNU). Kenya had been divided along ethnic lines on the basis of these two competing parties. As a result, post-election conflicts were characterized by issues such as ethnic identities, land and differences in political alignments in Kenya. Further, it was found that Somali inhabitants in Eastleigh were not concerned with political wars because they believe only in holy war. Their religion strongly played part to influence their non-participation.

Moreover, findings proved that the existence of a well coordinated security system in the area also enhanced peace in the area. There was evidence of organized community groups (NGOs such as Eastleigh Business Community, Muslim Youth Association and FBOs) that kept members from neighbouring estates at bay. At the same time, the perceived fallacy that people in Eastleigh possess guns greatly contributed to peace during post-election violence. The residents in the neighbouring estates feared that they would be shot if they involved in violence. This scared away potential criminals who could take advantage of the election violence to loot property.

The study revealed that other organizations existed in the area. They included United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) and some local agencies that were deeply engaged in dispute resolution strategies in the area, hence the existence of peace.

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ACRONYMS

G.O.K	-	Government of Kenya
NGO	-	Non Governmental Organization
SNM	-	Somalia National Movement
SPM	-	Somali Patriotic Movement
UN	-	United Nations
UNHCR	-	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
UNOSOM	–	United Nations Operation in Somalia
USC	-	United Somali Congress

WORKING DEFINITIONS

Refugee – A person seeking asylum in a foreign country on the likelihood of persecution or imminent harm in his or her home country. Persecution or threat of it may be based on race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, social status, famine, political opinion or knowledge.

Mandate refugee – An individual living in his own country, or in a third country, who has been granted refugee status by United Nation High Commission for Refugees.

Integration – A long term process through which refugees and host communities learn to communicate effectively, function together and enrich each other, expand employment options, create economic opportunities, and have mutual respect and understanding despite different cultures or homes of origin.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background Information

Violence is a disorder and situation in which people engage in conflicts that interfere or disorient a peaceful coexistence. It may force people to leave their homes to become refugees. For example, according to a study conducted in the early 1980's, refugee numbers in Somalia had risen to 750,000 persons in Mogadishu alone and at least 380,000 Somalis were living outside Somalia[1]. By 1981, the numbers had increased to more than 1.3 million refugees in the camps in Kenya and Ethiopia. There are social problems, such as ethnic conflicts and inter-clan rivalry that are inherent in Somali society. These and other external factors can combine to become some of the causes of human displacement that led to disruption of the lives of a great number of families in Somalia. Somalia became unstable, affecting the neighbouring countries, such as Ethiopia and Kenya. Refugees fleeing in Somalia ended in far off countries, such as Europe and America, as well as in neighbouring countries.[2]

Generally in some parts of the world, lives of innocent citizens have been lost through inter-clan conflicts based on religious differences and cultural beliefs. At the same, time neighbouring countries, such as Kenya and Ethiopia, have faced economic, social and political challenges due to the surging numbers of Somali refugees in their territories. They have come with alien culture as well as new methods of investment.

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[1]Lilian Aluanga, "*The time that Kenyans Swam in Sea of Chaos*", in the Standard newspaper of 6/12008 pp16-17
[2]Waldman and Hasci, *Somali Refugees in the Horn of Africa: State of Art Review, Studies on Emergency and Disaster Relief*, UN publication, Geneva. 2007.

A study conducted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in 1989 noted that Kenya was hosting about 360,000 refugees of Somali origin.[3] It further observes that conflicts had also begun to interfere with the peace in Ethiopia, thereby raising tension among some ethnic communities. The political upheavals in Somalia in the early years of 1989 and 1990s, coupled with eventual collapse of the Somali state in January 1991, aggravated the refugee problem. However, Somali land was equally affected and refugee camps were built in the Gedo and Shabeellaha regions in the northwest. In Kenya, the first refugee camp was built in Dadaab. Humanitarian organizations/agencies led by UNHCR played a leading role in securing livelihoods for the refugees in the camps. However, as the wars became persistent in Somalia, the facilities in the camp became overstretched and Kakuma camp was built to decongest the Dadaab Camp.[4]The refugees were forced to move out of the war- torn Somalia.

Merkhause adds that rampant corruption and competition for state resources became a common feature in Somalia. In spite of these problems, there were efforts from ruling regimes to unite Somali communities both living in Somalia and in the neighbouring Ethiopia.[5] This strategy led to a new twist of events in which inter-state wars began between Ethiopia and Somalia. Several coup attempts were experienced during different periods, thereby leaving Somalia more vulnerable in terms of security.

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[3] Loren, Landau, *Urban Refugees, Forced Migration Research*, Geneva: UNHCR, 1999: pg18
[4] UNHCR, *Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solution*, Geneva: UN publications, 2008.
5 *Ibid*

In the north eastern part of Kenya, there were pockets of Kenya- Somali ethnic groups. They hosted some of the refugees, and helped them to acquire the national identity cards and Kenyan citizenship. The document enabled them to operate as bona-fide citizens of Kenya. According to UNHCR, this marked the beginning of the movement of well-to-do Somali refugees into most urban areas of Kenya.[6] It is claimed in the UNHCR report that those who opted out of the camps had been prominent businessmen in most towns of Somalia before their country was ravaged by wars.

The Somali immigrants from Somalia, therefore, sought opportunities to continue with business in Kenya.[7] In Nairobi, they found people of their ethnic origin, mostly Kenyan Somalis, who had established themselves in towns during the colonial period. They settled in Eastleigh, an estate in the eastern part of Nairobi city. Business competition began with the other groups, like Indians, who had also established themselves in the area. However, it was not a smooth ride for some Somali refugees to venture fully into business.[8]

1.2 Ethnicity and Religion in Kenya

When assessing the origin of violence in Kenya, it is important first to examine the problem of "ethnicity/tribalism" in Kenya. Kenyans are extraordinarily fortunate that no ethnic group can ordinarily dominate other groups in terms of resource distribution; though at district and constituency levels, some groups are dominant.[9] Most groups live in their 'homeland', where

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[6]UNHCR, *Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solution,* Geneva: UN publications, 2008
[7]Elizabeth, Campbell, *"Formalizing the Informal Economy: Somali Refugee and Migrant Trade Networks in Nairobi, Global Migration Perspectives,"* No. 47, Global Commission on International Migration, 2005
[8]Elizabeth, Campbell, *'Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of Survival and Possibilities for Integration,* Oxford University press, 2006.
[9] Ibid

they enjoy a measure, albeit declining, of security and self-government. There are disparities in distribution of resources, but not beyond amelioration by sensible policies.

Kenyans are able and content to communicate with others, and conduct the business of state in Swahili and English, and are spared divisive language politics. Though there are several religions, and there have not been serious conflicts based on belief at least not until recently in 2012 in Eastleigh. Critically religion, transcends ethnic groups and territory, it also brings Kenyans closer to one another. Kenyans share common colonial experience and legacy that have shaped their educational system, ideas and moral standards. And so there are few differences in our perceptions and values. Urbanization has mixed cultures and tribes, with which for the most part Kenyans have coped well. Kenyans are able to work amicably in professional, business and social organizations, overcoming the colonial divide and rule legacy. People marry across racial and tribal lines, and live happily[10].

1.3 Ethnicity in Kenya: Kenya's Crisis and its Conventional Explanation

It is in public domain that Kenyan policies are replete with ethnicity, due to the style of leaders and politicians who ignore real issues that face the country. In most cases these leaders spur ethnic emotions during their political campaigns. Prevalence of ethnicity in public life is a major political and social problem facing Kenya. Immediately after Independence, Kenya's political leaders embarked on divisive politics thereby perpetuating ethnic rivalry among the populace.[11] Normally the Kenyan politicians find that an easy way to build support by playing with ethnic

[10] Yash Pal Ghai, *"Ethnic Diversity and Economic Instability in Africa: Policies for Harmonious Development" Nairobi,* 2010.
[11] Ibid

numbers, by stirring up ethnic loyalties on one hand, and ethnic animosities on the other[12]. Waki Commission report notes that ethnic groups in Kenya are in constant conflicts with each other due to unequal distribution of resources.

The extensive commentaries on Kenya's post-electoral violence in 2007-08 tended, typically, to offer the three "explanations," which Africa's outside observers commonly rely upon when looking for the causes of its troubles. These are ancient ethnic rivalry, political corruption and manipulation and finally the colonial legacy of 'divide and rule'. The disputed and corrupted electoral process was simply the catalyst that awoke a latent ethnic hostility prepared by either pre-colonial or colonial African history, or some combination of the two.

All such explanation has some merit and need careful consideration. But they may also mislead the unwary, since they say too little about the always slippery relations between ethnicity as a universal human attribute, politicized tribalism as a contingent process, and the institutions of the state. Many people respond to ethnic appeals because of their vulnerability, brought about by the market and the state, which have fundamentally disrupted the rhythm of their traditional life, and exposed them to the vagaries of mechanisms they neither control nor understand. Negative ethnic feelings then spill over into other spheres of lives[13].

The Kenyan government has paid a heavy price for the politicization of ethnicity. Ethnic politics is based on patronage which is one cause of corruption in the form of money transfers, grants of land, contracts, or jobs for relatives and friends. It has led to the abuse of the electoral process,

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[12] *Ibid*

[13]Frances Stewart, (editor), *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multi Ethnic societies,* Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

bussing in voters from outside, using state agencies to rig elections or declare fraudulent 'results'. The obsession with ethnicity means that it becomes the sole criterion for judging people. Very little attention is paid to social, economic and environment policies (other than on how they impact on one's ethnic background). Some people are all too eager to defend their ethnic "leaders" against even well founded allegations of corruption or violence; and in this way the whole question of illegality is transformed into an issue of "harassment or guilt of tribes", and weakens the whole concept of guilt and accountability.[14]

Ethnic politics has influenced people's attitude to state institutions: either they are "ours" or they are the "enemy". The lack of trust in government is pervasive. Many communities, often justifiably, feel they have been deliberately marginalized, denied opportunities of education, ignored in recruitment to public service jobs and their land illegally taken. All these unequal policies and practices lead to ethnic tensions and conflicts. As was seen during the 2007 elections and the subsequent election violence, they have become a major threat to human security, and ultimately to national unity.

According to John Lonsdale, Kenya's ethnicities are not inherently hostile to each other. There is no "ancient tribal rivalry." Such rivalry was not possible before the last century; there was no power structure to provoke it, no single competitive arena to contain the set rules of competition or targets of ambition. The colonial and post-colonial states made such rivalry likely because that is the nature of states[15].

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[14] Oucho J *"Under-currents of Ethnic Conflict in Kenya" Leiden, Netherlands:* Brill Academic Publishers, 2002.
[15] John, Lonsdale, *Ethnic Antagonism in Kenya: Historical Perspectives. Nairobi*: Japan International Corporation Agency, 2010.

But states do not make political tribalism inevitable. Constitutions can always be made to change the rules under which people compete to exercise power, and are then held responsible. Kenya's states have often been reformed at past moments of crisis.

1.4 Colonial Rule and Tribalism: The Cause of Ethnic Violence in Kenya

Both settlers and Africans colonized the country and its resources. Where there had once been a fragmented, multi-polar, mosaic of ethnically complementary nodes of socially productive energy there arose within Kenya's new borders, a hierarchical pyramid of profit and power. According to Frances Stewart, there have been two causes of ethnic antagonism: internal dispute or social inequalities and economic inequalities. The entanglements of these two forces have become the most explosive in Kenya's modern history. And this has been caused by the interaction between Kenya's two economic growth points the Rift Valley and Central Province[16].

White settlers got one fifth of Kenya's high-potential farmland, mostly in the highland margins of the Rift. As these settlers both failed to provide the expected economic growth and at the same time blocked African market opportunities, the British had to encourage African farming on the other eighty per cent. So Kikuyuland in Central province became the second economic center. It had a well-watered land with highly productive agricultural performance. There was plenty of wattle and supply of charcoal to settler kitchens, which was close to the capital city of Nairobi. The environment became attractive to missionaries and the place also had more schools than elsewhere.

[16] Karuti, Kanyinga, *Land Redistribution in Kenya: Towards greater Consumers*. Washington DC: The World Bank, 2009.

By geographical coincidence, therefore, not by British design, some Kikuyu got a head start in making money, essential for politics, and in acquiring marginal skills. Most nationalisms start among those subjects who do best out of, and are most useful to, an alien regime; their frustrations are many but plenty of opportunities. If the British divided, it was not so much to rule as, unwittingly, to promote the interest of those subjects who would do most to get rid of colonial rule.[17]

Other ethnic groups, not so well placed, made the most of what they had, often driven by a local patriotism inspired by vernacular, and the need to translate to the missionaries. Mission Christianity was a social process at least as powerful as colonial rule and in many ways cut against the grain of colonial hegemony[18].

Chain-migrations out of pauper's peripheries also led them, like the Scots or Irish throughout the empire, to colonize particular niches of employment, on the railway; on white farms and plantations; in domestic services; or in the police and army. The Luo became "the railway tribe," Kamba and Kalenjin often became soldiers and policemen, Kikuyu were ubiquitous administrative clerks (which meant that Mau Mau's intelligence network was better than that of British, at least in the early months of the Mau Mau war).[19]

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[17] John, Lonsdale, *"Ethnic Antagonism in Kenya: Historical Perspective". Nairobi:* Japan International Corporation Agency. 2010.

[18] Ann, Lindley *"Protracted Displacement and Remittances. The View from Eastleigh, Nairobi,* UNHCR Paper No. 143, 2007

[19] Karuti, Kanyinga *"Governance, Institutions and Inequality in Kenya"* Society for International Development. 2006.

Unequal opportunities for social mobility widened ethnic divisions. Regional inequalities emerged amid the social changes made possible by colonialism[20]. Nonetheless, it would be difficult to say that there was much evidence of ethnic antagonism before the Second World War. Rather each ethnic group was preoccupied in arguing out the bases of their own patriotism, between Christian 'readers' and their parents' generation, especially when the issue was the relation between rural homestead and the towns[21]. These were places of strangers, where young men and women were exposed to all the demoralizing temptations of 'detribalization was portrayed to be a threat to African elders as well as the British rulers'. Such inter-ethnic hostility was thought to be the origin of social and political action that caused human sufferings. Other social evils included one's young women being seduced by ethnic strangers in the urban workforce.

Lonsdale observes that Mau Mau, the consequence not only of white settler land expropriation but also of the vertical inequalities of Kikuyu prosperity, the growing rift between Kikuyu 'gentry' and their dependants among the poor and young who felt that the attractions of a sole right to prosperity had become a threat to the survival of dependent clients. He notes that abuse of power by power holders and their closest allies were the major source of hatred among the common citizenry. In Kenya this was as the result of colonial powers who treated Africans as subjects of state power. In 1997 to 2002 political rivalry set in and the nation was turned into an arena of individual accumulation through politics. In addition, states did not make political tribalism inevitable. The Constitution was changed to suit interests of the incumbent leaders and

[20] Samuel, Kobia, "Foreword," in NCCK Demolitions, what next? Nairobi. Pg 26.1991
[21] Johann, Kriegler *"Independent Review Commission"*, Nairobi. Government Printers. 2008

this was the epitome of ethnic rivalry. According to Lonsdale ethnicity is a by-product of the colonial legacy. Kenya has done very little to minimize its effects.

According to Kanyinga, Mau Mau raised a cadre of battle-hardened Kikuyu elites, well educated, with a habit of command, backed by the rapid growth of coffee and tea incomes, the 'second prong' of British counter-insurgency. Mau Mau caused not so much decolonization as the emergence of a post-colonial elite who made it safe for the British to decolonize – and on whom Jomo Kenyatta relied to keep himself safe from the Mau Mau hooligans who wrongly supposed him to be their leader and therefore their chief betrayer. The long-term consequence of Mau Mau was to divide along ethnic lines the post-colonial ruling elite, elite with power at last, with the power to divide still further[22].

1.5 Post Colonial/Regional Economic Differentiation

The Kenyan modern society is rooted in a competitive society which is a colonial legacy. This has been the sole agony by which many African states could aspire to climb the commanding heights of the economy against racially entrenched interests – in land, commerce and finance. But it was not so much Jomo Kenyatta and the Kikuyu elites partisan use of power as the inheritance of Central Province's long economic advantage, accentuated by the British need to buy with agricultural reform the loyalty of 'loyalists'. That meant that Kikuyuland would advance rapidly as Kenya's new economic power-house. The most serious consequence was to

[22] Ibid

break the Kikuyu- Luo alliance that had been fundamental to independent Kenya's first few years of post-colonial stability.[23]

Further, Lonsdale notes that it was at independence that the first President Jomo Kenyatta and his 'Kiambu clique took advantage of power to narrow the boundaries of ruling trust. This group of oligarchs became increasingly defensive and 'tribally' to each successive crisis. It led to a silent agreement with some leaders from Rift Valley thereby settling of the Kikuyu poor, alongside plutocrats in the settlers' old manor houses. This has later on turned to the perpetual land clashes experienced in Rift Valley region.

1.6 Problem Statement

The influx of refugees displaced from other countries often leads to refugee related problems in neighbouring countries. A host nation's facilities can be overstretched and the security of the host country may be compromised. According to UNHCR, only forty percent of Kenya's displaced persons were living in refugee camps in 2008.[24] Thirteen percent were in urban areas and the remaining forty seven percent were dispersed in rural areas or unspecified locations. Refugees moved to urban areas hoping to have a much better life than they had in the camps or in their destabilized home countries. Yet in most cases, they do not realize their dreams. For instance, in Kenya people of Somali origin are treated with suspicion and are associated with criminal activities. Perceptions are therefore, that refugees bring more of social and economic loss than gains to the hosting countries.[25]

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[23] Donald, Barnett and Karari, Njama *" Mau Mau from Within": An analysis of Kenya's Peasant Revolt*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966.
[24] UNHCR, *Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solution,* Geneva: UN publications, 2008
[25] World Bank, *The Impacts of Refugee on Neighboring Countries*, San Francisco: World Bank, 2009.

The post-election violence that rocked Kenya after the December 2007 General Elections to 2008 invites research into the real causes of the violence and its effects on livelihoods of different ethnic communities. In Nairobi, several areas were adversely affected. However, there were a few isolated cases where violence was not witnessed despite the fact that they were close to areas of severe violence.[26] The presence of Somali people in Eastleigh has not only created employment for people in the neighbourhoods, but has also brought new ways of investment to the country. The area harbours many thriving businesses, ranging from supermarkets to transport services. It also serves as the destination of items from Dubai. In Eastleigh, other ethnic groups also live in the area thereby forming small enclaves of unique culture. In the wake of post-election violence however, Eastleigh remained calm. This research hopes to establish why it was exceptional when there was conflict in other Eastland areas bordering Eastleigh estate.

1.7 Research Objectives

The study was guided by three research objectives:

1. To establish the factors that made Eastleigh peaceful during the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya.
2. To assess the nature of the security apparatus employed by the communities living in Eastleigh.
3. To examine the existing structures for conflict resolution in Eastleigh.

[26] Ibid

1.8 Research Hypotheses

The research had set out the following hypothesis:

1. Inhabitants of Eastleigh did not participate in post-election violence due to the presence of Somali migrants.
2. Security apparatus in Eastleigh were well coordinated and all inclusive.
3. Community policing is very comprehensive in Eastleigh.

1.9 Significance of the Study

Research into the security situation in relation to the post-election violence in Kenya has enormous potential for the establishment of enduring peace among communities living in Kenya, regardless of ethnic and social background. A number of lessons can be learnt from the events that led to the security situation in most urban areas in 2007-2008 for. This study will, therefore, be of great help to policy makers and other stakeholders who are charged with ensuring of peace in the country. It will further broaden our understanding of how people from different ethnic backgrounds could be encouraged to peacefully coexist in spite of differences in culture and political orientations. From the recommendations, appropriate policy interventions can be designed to suit emerging situations.

The study will furthermore enhance understanding of the status of refugees in relation to the Kenya Somali and other people in Eastleigh and the benefits they have brought to the Eastleigh community. This may help refugees worldwide because they tend to be viewed as contributing negatively to the security system of the host countries. Acknowledging their positive contribution to host nations is important particularly in terms of economic development.

1.10 Scope and Limitation of the Study

This study was conducted in Eastleigh, it is an area located in the eastern part of Nairobi city. Eastleigh was chosen because of the several reasons. First, it is a relatively busy area where different types of businesses are conducted almost throughout the night. Secondly, it is one of the densely populated estates being inhabited by mixture of different races, such as Asians, Kenyan Somalis, Somali refugees and other Kenyan ethnic groups of all backgrounds.

This heterogeneity makes it an interesting site for the study, especially in terms of human interaction amidst heightened political temperatures that characterize Kenya during general elections. Moreover, Eastleigh has the highest number of refugees from Somalia compared to other capital cities in East Africa and hence it is conceived as insecure by other ethnic groups. Yet peace prevailed in the area amidst post-election violence of 2007 to 2008. Many studies have focused on areas that were adversely affected by violence, such as Kibera, Kawangware, Huruma and Mathare. The study topic required the researcher to investigate aspects of ethnic heterogeneity and security in order to collect relevant data. The study covered areas such as the type of ethnic groups living in Eastleigh, their main occupations and the community policing groups that exist in the area.

The issue of Somali and refugee identity, which has been likened to fraudulent acquisition of national identity cards, constrained the collection of information since some Somali respondents felt insecure of being asked questions on their nationality. The knowledge that there were illegal arms in the hands of individuals from Somali origin was widespread and it was during that time that the arms could be used in order to protect people and their property. However this was not

the case in Eastleigh. These barriers constrained the researcher to a few areas and respondents. The study touched on matters of personal security in a context of by political distrust. Therefore, free participation was not guaranteed during the study period. The study also limited itself to the period 2007 to 2008, when Kenya experienced the post-election violence.

1.11 Literature Review

The integration or accommodation of urban refugees is one of the poorly understood and under-researched topics in forced migration[27]. The author notes that much of the challenge of social integration and accommodation is linked to urban areas' heterogeneity and dynamism. The interactions of such a heterogeneous population also raise the possibility of new identities and novel forms of social organization simultaneously incorporating values, practices, and activities from multiple social and geographic origins. Heterogeneity may bring with it xenophobia against new-comers and one of the most common responses in the interactions of refugees and host populations in urban populations. Refugees and other migrants are often met with hostility and accusations leveled against them as being the cause of crime.[28] They are also seen as carriers or vectors of diseases. Xenophobia has meant that refugees are an isolated lot among the host countries. The urban migrants' typical reliance on sharing existing markets and public services with local people makes them more particularly vulnerable to the effects of xenophobia.

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[27] Lindley, Bascom, *"Protracted Displacement and Remittances: the view from Eastleigh," Nairobi,* Research Paper No. 143 (2007)
[28] *Ibid*

Warner in the article "*We are all refugees*" argues that in areas of rapid urbanization, structural change, or urban renewal, it may be difficult to determine who is integrating with whom.[29] In many parts of the world, urban areas and especially neighboring estates within cities may serve as temporary destinations for nationals from a country seeking new experiences, economic advancement, transit to another location, or simply adventure. Such people may only temporarily stay in the city or may quickly move to other neighboring areas where they will settle more permanently. Bascom concludes that because of the different reasons causing refugees to migrate to urban centres, it is necessary to take into account the attempts to integrate urban refugees. Bascom further argues that individuals' characteristics are of importance to the ways in which they integrate or assimilate, and establish livelihoods.[30] The pre-migration character of particular cities, their level of diversity, demographic dynamism, and physical infrastructure, the values and resources of those who live in them also play significant roles in structuring emerging behavioural patterns. All these are determining factors on how refugees become integrated in urban areas. This research will try to determine if factors that Bascom discusses contributed to peace in Eastleigh during post-election violence.

The World Bank report indicates that developing countries that host refugees for protracted periods, generally experience long-term economic, social, political, and environmental impacts. From the moment of arrival, refugees may compete with local citizens for scarce resources, such as water, food, housing, and medical services. Their presence exerts pressure on facilities such as education, health services and infrastructure (water supply, sanitation, and transportation) which in most cases lead to conflict with the host community. In several occasions some host

[29] Daniel, Warner, *"We are all Refugees"* International Journal of Refugees Law, 1992.
[30] *Ibid*

communities have been forced to unleash anger on refugees thereby causing unrest.[31] This research investigated why in Eastleigh had peace in the area even when unrest was experienced in most parts of Kenya. It will further examine how the security and peace building systems in Eastleigh played and ensured peaceful coexistence.

Ramesh Tiwari argues that the nature of living patterns in terms of ethnic combinations is a major contributing factor to some of the problems that occur in Nairobi.[32] He observes that the understanding of peace in Eastleigh is complex and varies depending on many factors. These include the effect on political economy of the hosting countries, on urban-rural interactions, and the nature of host-refugee relations. Furthermore, even when a refugee situation creates economic opportunities for both the displaced and their hosts, there can be winners and losers in each group.[33] In reviewing the literature, a thorough understanding is necessary in terms of social, political and economic impacts on different ethnic groups in Eastleigh. More specifically how their security mechanisms and peace building systems contributed to the peace that existed in the area during 2007 to 2008 post-election violence in comparison to other areas that experienced violence in Nairobi.

The refugee presence in host countries has a potential impact on the ethnic balance of hosting areas, by overstretched resources leading to social conflict. Thus, if traditional animosities exist between cultural or ethnic groups, may cause problems for example between Kenyan Somali and

[31] World Bank, *The Impacts of Refugees on Neighboring Countries*, San Francisco: World Bank, 2009.
[32] Ramesh, Tiwari, *"Some Aspects on the Social Geography of Nairobi.*
[33] Susan, Banki, and Burmese Refugees in Tokyo: *Livelihood in Urban Environment, Journal of Refugees Studies* Tokyo, 2006.

Somali immigrants.[34] For example, in the late 1990s the mere presence of Kosovo-Albanian refugees in Macedonia generated tension between ethnic Albanians and Serbs in Macedonia. However, UNHCR has also found that when refugees are from the same cultural and linguistic group as the local population, there are greater opportunities for peaceful co-existence and interaction among them because they share a lot in terms of peace building mechanisms and systems.[35] This work will help in the study of cultural practices that exist in Eastleigh and how they contributed to the peaceful co-existence of local communities in the area.

Banki posits that challenges abound for all refugees. According to the findings of her study in Tokyo's problems facing refugees settled in urban centres can be eased if they have their siblings, relatives, and clan or community members living with them.[36] Her study underscores the importance of security systems and peace building mechanism put in place by relatives, family members and clan members to refugees in a host country. This study will examine whether the same applied in Eastleigh.

According to Yash Pal Ghai, Kenya's disputed general elections of 2007 were a result of tribal politics, corruption and poor leadership.[37] These phenomena have led to the abuse of electoral process through rigging and fraud as was experienced across Kenya in 2007 general elections. Research into Kenya's post-election violence of 2007- 2008 reveals certain causes and explanations. These include: ancient tribal rivalry; political corruption; manipulation and finally

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[34] Loren, Landau, *"Urban Refugees, Forced Migration Research,"* Geneva: UNHCR, 1999.
[35] UNHCR Report, *"Resettlement Handbook,"* Geneva: UN Publication, 2004.
[36] Susan, Banki, *"Burmese Refugees in Tokyo: Livelihood in Urban Environment"*, Journal of Refugees Studies, Vol 19. No 3. 2006.
[37] Yash Pal, Ghai, *"Ethnic Diversity and Economic Instability in Africa: Policies for Harmonious Development, International Development Series.* Nairobi. 2010.

the colonial legacy of "divide and rule." Although Ghai gives a good insight on the causes of violence, he left out the question of security mechanisms and peace-building measures that saw some areas including Eastleigh which experienced peace even when there was conflict in the neighborhoods.

1.12 Theoretical Framework

This study was anchored on three theories, namely conflict, peace and ethnic identity theories. The three theories help in the understanding of issues of peace, conflict and ethnicity that exist in society. Further the three theories serve to fill the gaps that exist in the study area.

1.12.1 The Conflict Theory

The conflict theory gives more recognition to the fact that within any sizeable society there are groups with conflicting needs and values. These groups have competing interests which may lead to physical violence. Borrowed from the earlier works of Dahrendorf, the theory suggests that struggles may arise over power, status and the desirable, but often scarce, resources of the society.[38] Conflict may arise between individuals/or groups when power differences determine the distribution of authority and resources allocation.[39] The 2007- 2008 post-election violence that rocked Kenya can be attributed to certain groups or individuals in society, who were in positions of influence over the majority. The masses may feel deprived by circumstances beyond their control and, therefore, resort to violence to remedy the situation. This can also be associated with what Marx referred to as economic determinism. This views societies as strongly embedded in economic structures which ideally define the destiny of humankind.

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[38] Ralf, Dahrendorf, *"Class and Class Conflict in industrial Society."* Stanford University Press, Stanford. 1959.
[39] Katherine, Williams, *"Criminology"*. Oxford University Press, New York. 2001.

In this study, the conflict theory can also be viewed as a feature of consensus in which different ethnic groups living together (for instance in Eastleigh) chose to live in harmony with each other. This study, therefore adopted the framework of social solidarity as the glue that holds society together. Moreover, in everyday life people construct and reconstruct their interactions to suit the prevailing circumstances, such as the one that prevailed during the post-election violence. Eastleigh experienced peace in its environs than any other neighbouring parts such as Mathare, Huruma, Dandora and Kariobangi.[40]

In looking at these events, it was therefore acknowledged through this study that conflict has positive aspects that are also important. Somali living in Eastleigh share a background of conflict or war especially the Somali refugees. They are, therefore, cautious on security issues. These aspects informed the platform for this study. Overall, a thorough understanding of the precedents of violence can be explained first by looking at the contentions that exist in societies.

1.12.2 Peace Theory

Conflict occurs when there is diversity in interests specifically on resource sharing, divided opinions and a feeling of dissatisfaction. Proponents of this theory contend that peace exists as freedom to explain some important relationships between security and development. It does this by critically examining and then synthesizing Johan Galtung's theory of peace as the absence of violence and Amartya Sen's theory of development as freedom. Galtung's theory of peace is clear on the meaning and causes of direct violence, but vague on the details of structural violence. Sen's theory helps overcome many of the problems associated with structural violence, although

[40] Philip, Waki, Report, *The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence.* Nairobi: Government Printer. 2008.

its focus on agents and the state tends to downplay the importance of larger-scale political and economic processes. In the theory of peace as freedom, peace is defined as, and in praxis is enlarged through, the equitable distribution of economic opportunities, political freedoms, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, protective security and freedom from direct violence. The institutions required for peace as freedom are considered, and it is suggested that the pluralist state is the best model for providing and maintaining peace as freedom. The exceptions of peace that existed in Eastleigh can be explained by the basic tenets of peace paradigm.

1.12.3 Ethnic Identity Theory

Phinney and Alipuria in their article "Ethnic identity" define ethnic identity as an individual's sense of self as a member of an ethnic group and the attitudes and behaviour associated with that sense. They further state that ethnic identity development is the process of development from an unexamined ethnic identity through a period of exploration, to arrive at an achieved ethnic identity.[41] According to Sotomayor, ethnic identification refers to identification or feeling of membership with others regarding the character, the spirit of a culture or the cultural ethos based on a sense of commonality of origin, beliefs, values, customs or practices of a specific group of people.[42] Phinney adds that unlike the concept of race which pertains to specific physical traits, the concept of ethnicity connotes cultural group membership.

Ethnic identity is usually contextual and situational because it derives from social negotiations where one declares an ethnic identity and then demonstrates acceptable and acknowledged ethnic group markers to others. One's ethnic declaration is often open to the scrutiny by others who

[41] Brian, Barry, *Culture and Equality,* Manchester: Polity press, 2003.
[42] Marc, Sommers, *"Young male and Pentecostal Urban Refugees in Dar salaam. Journal of Refugee Studies.* UNHCR. 2001.

may validate or invalidate the declaration. Ethnic declarations embody an ethnic consciousness that is closely aligned with the cultural elements of the ethnic group with which they affiliate. The ultimate form of one's ethnic consciousness is the genuine association of one's personal identification with a communal one. Ethnic identity may therefore be important as a cementing factor in society especially in times of violence.[43]

According to Anne Philips, ethnic identity may occur in the following forms: assimilation, constructivism and multiculturalism. The theory therefore helps to define how people from different cultures, families and backgrounds may still come to share a common culture of human identity.[44] This shows the idea of a universal public sphere and, even more, assertively, co-existence to accommodate differences in the public sphere. The latter involves, at the very least, the creation of a facilitating framework that could allow individuals to bring in their cultural identity into the public arena, and more substantively, to create space for the public recognition and accommodation of different cultures. Philips further notes that the single most important message from multiculturalism is the need to accommodate differences.

Peaceful refugee settlement in any host country is determined by how the host country and community accept them. Their acceptance is determined by, among other things, beliefs, tradition, culture and laws. Ethnic identity theory provides a background that facilitates the understanding of how the Somali refugees have been integrated with other communities living in Eastleigh. The study further recognized that Eastleigh is a cosmopolitan region and is inhabited by people from different ethnic backgrounds and races. There is existence of different cultural

[43] John, Lonsdale, *Ethnic Antagonism in Kenya: Historical Perspectives.* Trinity College. Cambridge, 2010.
[44] Anne, Phillips, *Multiculturalism without Culture*, Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 2007.

identities which are equally important aspects that play a role in fostering peace and hence security.[45] In order to understand the differences in behaviour among communities, ethnic identities shape group behaviour within societies but can also be destructive to peace in a region.

1.13 Research Methodology

This section covers the methodology that was used in carrying out this study. It discusses the study site, research design, study population and sampling, methods of data collection and data analysis.

The study used a qualitative approach. Secondary data of Somali Refugees in Eastleigh were obtained by reading scholarly works published or unpublished as captured in the internet, Jstor, books, journals and articles drawn from private libraries, the University of Nairobi main library, United Nations High Commission for Refugees' library in Westlands and the United Nations library in Gigiri. Other sources included the United Nations websites, UNHCR and the United Nations itself. The area's UNHCR regional office in Shauri-Moyo also provided the register of refugees residing in the area during the period under study. Relevant literature was obtained from these documents. In order to obtain relevant information, a sample size of 30 respondents, comprising of prominent businessmen and women of Somali ethnic group, were selected for interviews. The justification for the sample size is that the time constraints and resources at the researcher's disposal confined the sample to a manageable one to compile the report in time.

Primary data was collected through face-to-face interviews with respondents. In-depth interviews were guided by a semi-structured interview guide. The researcher listened and noted

[45] *Ibid.*

the responses from various key informants such as businessmen, security leaders, as well as leaders of different faith-based organizations in the area. At the same time, observation method was employed by the researcher to complement non-verbal expressions.

Oral interviews were used to gather in depth information from elders and leaders in the area. These were in form of narratives and stories. Only valuable information was recorded down. Key informants were purposively selected based on certain characteristics, such as ethnic group, status (refugee) and employer (businessman) or worker in business. Further primary data was obtained from interviewing representatives of the local groupings and the Muslim Rights Movement in the area. A questionnaire was used in which the researcher filled the answers.

The area provincial security team was approached as part of the protocol. The area administrators helped to identify leaders of various groups for interviews. The first respondent was requested to suggest other persons who were involved in the same activity and who would be willing to provide information on the subject. Non-Somalis in the area were also interviewed to enrich data for the study.

The researcher gathered diverse data, hence the study employed both qualitative and quantitative data analysis methods were used. Qualitative data from key informant interviews were first edited and cleaned for inconsistencies, then segmented and summarized for better understanding. Outlier cases were also identified in order to provide insights about the divergence.

CHAPTER TWO

THE BIRTH OF EASTLEIGH IN NAIROBI

2.1 Introduction

The researcher investigated a history of Eastleigh, in terms of the social, cultural and economic issues surrounding the people living in Eastleigh.[46] The history of these people affects how they relate to each other in times of conflict. The study focused specifically on Eastleigh, tracing the communities in the area and indicating how the Somali people moved into the region and the co existence mechanisms they had with the Kenyan Somali and other ethnic groups in the area. Similarly, this shows how the Somali migrants have affected the economy of the region which in return benefited the host communities in Eastleigh. The Somali refugees and immigrants turned Eastleigh into a relatively new urban settlement where they stimulated economic growth and prosperity.

2.2 Origin of Nairobi

Since its founding in 1899, Nairobi has remained a transnational city, linking Europe, Africa, and Asia together socially, culturally, and economically. Extensive trade networks reaching throughout these continents and the rest of the world have deepened over the decades. Somalis as a particular group built upon these trade networks expanded long before colonization. The networks increased during the building of the Uganda Railway, and were intensified after the collapse of the Somali State with the subsequent influx of wealthy Somali refugee businessmen into Nairobi. According to White, prior to British colonial rule in the nineteenth century, Nairobi

[46] Herbert, Misigo "History of Kenya 1900", Nairobi, University of Nairobi.2006.

did not exist as an urban centre. It was only when the Uganda Railway reached Nairobi in 1899 that the town began to develop.[47]

By 1906 there were seven, albeit small, separate sections developing in the city, namely the railway centre, the Indian bazaar, the European business and administration centre, the railway quarters, the Dhobi or (Washermen) quarter, the European residential suburbs and coffee estates and the military barracks outside of town.[48] Nairobi was formally designated as the capital in 1907. The British further accelerated their development efforts, turning the area into a rapidly emerging commercial centre. At the time, there were no locations in Nairobi where Africans were allowed to live independently of their employment.[49] Large areas of African land continued to be appropriated for settlers, and the indigenous Africans were given specific locations or "reserves" in which to live.[50] But with all the restrictions, the African population in Nairobi always outnumbered the white settler population. As a means of controlling this pass-laws for Africans were introduced in 1901. In addition, the 1922 Vagrancy Ordinance, which allowed police to pick up Africans who appeared to be loitering and unemployed and return him/her to the rural home, further entrenched the "illegality" of African presence in Nairobi. In 1919 permission was granted to create native areas in Nairobi, and in 1928 the Municipal Native Affairs Office was established for Nairobi to accept responsibility for native affairs within its

[47] Clarie, Robertson, Trouble Showed the Way: *Women, Men, and Trade in the Nairobi Area*, 1890-1990, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997.
[48] Thornton, White, and Anderson, Nairobi: *Master Plan for a Colonial Capital*. London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1948.
[49] Donald Barnett, and Karari Njama, Mau Mau from within: *An Analysis of Kenya's Peasant Revolt*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966.
[50] Tabitha, Kanogo. "Kikuyu Women and the Politics of Protest: Mau Mau." Pp. 78-99 *in Images of Women in Peace and War: Cross-Cultural and Historical Perspectives* edited by Sharon MacDonald, Pat Holden and Shirley Ardener. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Education in association with the Oxford University Women's Studies Committee. 1987.

boundaries, thereby formerly acknowledging for the first time the presence of Africans in Nairobi.[51]

2.3 History of Eastleigh

Eastleigh in Nairobi owes its birth and growth to the Kenya Uganda Railway (hereafter KUR) which reached Nairobi in May 1899 enroute to the present day Kisumu by then part of what is now Uganda. The moving of the government and railway headquarters from Mombasa to Nairobi by the British colonial administration resulted in the subsequent growth of Nairobi as a commercial and business city of the then British East Africa Protectorate.[52]The origins of Eastleigh thus can be traced back to 1902 when European settlers arrived in Kenya and alienated large tracts of land in Kiambu, Kikuyu, Limuru, Mbagathi, Ruiru, around Nairobi, and beyond.[53]

The alienation laid the ground for squatting and informal settlements around Nairobi as the consequence of the British colonial capitalist development. Local people who lost ownership and their control over land ended up providing surplus labour for the settlers' farms and for the emerging urban centres. African settlements consequently developed on the outskirts of Nairobi and around high income residential areas, thereby enabling the inhabitants to work on European investments. At this time all the natives in Nairobi lived in informal settlements.[54]

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[51]Clarie, Robertson, Trouble Showed the Way: Women, Men, and Trade in the Nairobi Area, 1890-1990, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997.

[52] Francis, Situma, "*The Environmental Problems in the City of Nairobi*" African Urban Quarterly, Vol 7 Nos 1 and 2, February, 1992, p. 167.

[53]Samwel, Kobia, "Foreword in NCCK (The National Council of Churches of Kenya) "Nairobi Demolitions: What Next?" 1991.

[54] Peter, Ngau; Informal Settlements in Nairobi: *A Baseline Survey of Slums and Informal Settlements and Inventory of NGOs and CBO Activities*, Technical Report No. 2.Nairobi, 1995.

Indian and Arab traders played an essential part in the construction of the train line and were moving with it to Nairobi, especially to Eastleigh. By then Eastleigh, located in the dusty east of the city, was laid out in a chessboard like street pattern, with six avenues in north-south orientation, intersected by 15 streets in east-west orientation. The Indians settled and developed efficient trading structures and quickly dominated most of the trade in the city. A policy change in the 1940s allowed African families to join their male relations in Nairobi. This showed how Eastleigh was gradually occupied by different ethnic groups from Kenya and other countries

The earliest settlements included Mji wa Mombasa, Maskini, Kaburini, Kileleshwa, and Pangani. As the need to settle European and Indians increased, most of these settlements were demolished, and the indigenous landlords and tenants compelled to live in demarcated native locations. In 1923, Pumwani become the first site to be declared an African Location. Most of the initial inhabitants were Africans from all ethnic backgrounds, the Somali included.[55] Although intensive settlement in Eastleigh was noticed in 1923 after demolitions of African settlements within Nairobi, Eastleigh's origin can be traced earlier to 1910.

A member of the Municipal Council, G.P. Stevens, with three other Nairobi residents and backers from South Africa, bought land that is now Eastleigh and began construction of seven miles of frontage streets.[56] In 1930, the investors later disposed of their unfinished interests to an Indian businessman, Allidina Visram after he completed the construction of houses in Eastleigh

[55]Mike, Majale, Settlement Upgrading: *Towards Solving the Housing Problem of the Lower Income Groups in Nairobi*: A Case Study of Pumwani Estate, Nairobi, unpublished M.A. Thesis,1985 (University of Nairobi).
[56] Andrew, Hake, African Metropolis: Nairobi's Self-Help City, London: Sussex University Press, 1977, p. 38.

and attracted a large number of Asians. Before long the area was dominated by a largely Asian residential community, which also established small shops and other businesses in the area.[57]

During the colonial period, Nairobi experienced a large-scale government sanctioned spatial segregation based on race and reinforced by planning laws as well as exclusionary zoning regulations. The segregation divided the city into four distinct sectors, namely; North and East defined as the Asian Sector (Parklands, Pangani and Eastleigh), East and South East defined as the African Sector (Pumwani, Kariokor, Donholm), South East to South marked another small Asian enclave before it was bounded by the Game Park (Nairobi South, Nairobi West). Finally, a line North and West marked the European area.[58]

The physical development of Nairobi was supposed to be based on a British conceived model known as the garden city plan. Therefore the colonial government had a policy of controlling the African urban population. Failing this, effort was made to segregate the African living quarters from the European residential areas. This led to the need to ensure that a reasonable standard of public health among the African population was realized in order to prevent the spread of infectious diseases to the Europeans.[59] This was realized through the stratification of human settlements along both racial and income status.

Moreover, when the number of African immigrants increased in Nairobi the Asian settlements in Eastleigh were greatly affected. In 1950, the colonial government discouraged the provision of

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[57] Ramesh, Tiwari, "*Some Aspects on the Social Geography of Nairobi, Kenya.*" African Urban Notes 7,1, Winter, 1972, pp. 36-61.1972.
[58] Richard, Stren, Housing the Urban Poor in Africa: *Policy, Political and Bureaucracy in Mombasa*, Los Angeles, University of California, 1978.
[59] Ibid.

the large-scale public housing in order to curtail the excessive influx of the Africans into the city. Indeed, although the Asians were also segregated by the Europeans, they supported the idea of keeping Africans away from their own settlements. But they soon felt the impact of racial integration in Nairobi.[60] From 1940 to 1950s Africans encroached areas neighbouring Eastleigh, which forced the Asians to move out to other areas of the city. After independence in 1963, the Asians were the first to feel the effects of the independence policy which was known as racial integration, and they quickly fled from Eastlands to wealthier more isolated communities in Parklands and Lavington. By 1970 Eastleigh like and the Eastlands, was generally occupied by Africans, with predominantly Kikuyu landlords and tenants.[61] 30%t of Kenyan Somali were in Nairobi long before the massive influx of Somali refugees in 1991-1992.

In the early 1990s, Eastleigh experienced rapid economic development, shaped by its growing population of rural Kenyans, Sudanese, Eritreans, Ethiopians, who engaged in economic activities for better living standards.[62] As a result, Eastleigh has since become a major economic hub not only in Nairobi but with traders coming from the entire East and Central Africa region. Refugees as well as local established businessmen and women invested in import and export businesses. Retail outlets from small-scale hawking and street stalls also flourished. Large shopping malls run by members of the Somali community, pharmaceutical outlets, and real estate development agencies, hotels, lodges, *miraa* (khat / *qaad*) outlets, cafés and restaurants,

[60] Ibid.
[61] Ramesh,Tiwari, "*Some Aspects on the Social Geography of Nairobi, Kenya,*" African Urban Notes 7,1, Winter, 1972, p. 36-61.
[62] Anna, Lindley, New Issues in Refugee Research; Protracted *Displacement and Remittances: The View from Eastleigh, Nairobi*, UNHCR Research Paper No. 143, 2007.

long-distance transport companies, telephone and internet bureaux, and international money transfer and exchange services.[63]

Eastleigh also became host to a large number of clients from other parts of Nairobi, other parts of the country and even from other East African countries such as Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. The influx of Somali refugees into Eastleigh was contrary to the Kenyan government's ban of refugees in the urban areas[64]. Eastleigh therefore became openly informal while others were formal. Nevertheless, Eastleigh has managed to become an integral part of the service economy of Nairobi and its three-million-plus residents.[65]

Despite its thriving business, in spite of being a place of great opportunities and a home to many refugees, legal or illegal, Eastleigh is plagued by the largely unregulated expansion of business and the rapidly increasing population that has outpaced maintenance and improvements to housing and public infrastructure. Indeed, Eastleigh is popularly known as "Little Mogadishu," a reference to Somalia's capital. Among the Somalis as well as the non somalis, this is a name that captures the fact that the Somali refugees, whether legal or illegal, are the dominant traders, investors and entrepreneurs running Eastleigh's economy.

[63]Ibid.
[64] Ibid.
[65]Joselyne Chebichi, The *Legality of Illegal Somali Migrants in Eastleigh State in Nairobi, Kenya,* A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, of the University of the Witwatersrand in Partial Fulfillment of Degree of Master of Arts in Forced Migration, March 2009

2.4 Ethnic Groups in Eastleigh

According to Elizabeth Campbell, the largest groups of refugees in Eastleigh Nairobi are of Somali origin. [66]Refugees of Somali origin started arriving in large numbers in the early 1990s, following the collapse of Siad Barre's regime in 1991 and the subsequent humanitarian crisis in Somalia. According to UNHCR, there are 20,111 registered refugees and asylum seekers of Somali origin in Nairobi. Thus they make majority ethnic group in Eastleigh.[67] This figure does not include many thousands of unregistered refugees. Some estimates put the number of Somali refugees in Eastleigh at 100,000 compared to over 400, 000 currently living in refugee camps.[68] Ethiopians are the second largest nationality.

According to UNHCR, 12,257 refugees and asylum seekers of Ethiopian origin have taken up residence in Nairobi.[69] They belong to various ethnic groups, primarily Oromos and Amhara, and a small number of Anuak. The great majority of Oromos and Amhara live in Eastleigh, while the majority of the Anuak families living in Nairobi are found in Ruiru, a peri-urban settlement 35 Km from Nairobi. Eastleigh has also attracted refugees from Eritrea and Sudan, as well as from countries in the Horn of Africa and from Central and Southern Africa.[70] Other noticable groups include thousands of refugees from the Great Lakes region. Nairobi officially hosts 4,598 Congolese, 2,266 Rwandan and 1,202 Burundian refugees and asylum seekers. In contrast to Somalis and Ethiopians, who tend to concentrate in Eastleigh, these groups are spread out across

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[66] Elizabeth, Campbell. E.H. Formalizing the informal Economy: *Somali Refugees and Migrant Trade Networks in Nairobi*: Global Migration Perspectives, No. 47, Global Commission on International Migration, 2005.
[67] UNHCR Report, Global Trends: *Refugees, Asylum seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons*, 2009.
[68] Anne, Lindley. *Protracted Displacement and Remittances: The View from Eastleigh*, Nairobi, Research Paper No. 143, New Issues in Refugee Research, 2007.
[69] UNHCR, Global Trends: *Refugees, Asylum seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons*, 2009.
[70] Elizabeth, Campbell, Urban Refugees in Nairobi: *Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of Survival, and Possibilities for Integration*, Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 19, No. 3, 2006

several neighbourhoods, including Satellite, Kawangware and Kangemi, and are often dispersed among Kenyan nationals. Sudanese refugees tend to be found scattered in several locations, including Githurai, Ruiru apart from Eastleigh.

2.5 Economic Life in Eastleigh

The socio-economic scenery of Eastleigh in Nairobi is largely determined by the Somali people, who are currently the majority of residents there.[71] According to Campbell, most Somalis in Eastleigh who are of Kenyan origin were poor. However, there came wealthy immigrants from Somalia with cash either in hand or in foreign bank accounts, readily available for large investments. They were welcomed by their Somali kinsmen who had been born and who lived in Kenya. Kenyan Somali hosted them and assisted them to become citizens through acquisition of national identity cards. In most cases, they stood as their parents or guardians at the registration of births certificates centers and posing as their parents. This was a way of joining hands with them to involve in businesses that thrive in Eastleigh.

There are different types of businesses that dominate Eastleigh. Among the Somali owned businesses, two dominant characteristics are: First, they operate largely outside the formal economy of the country.[72] Secondly, they rely heavily, but not exclusively, on clan or kinship networks of trust in their business dealings. The limited business activities that occur in the formal sector are in hotels, real estate and transport industries. Most of this investments and businesses run by Somali in Kenya appear to be vulnerable because of their informal nature and

[71] Ibid.
[72] Oral interview, Emanuel Mutiso, Mathare Resident, 11/07/2012, Eastleigh.

situation in a largely unregulated and uninsured market.[73] The Somali simply brought to Eastleigh their unregulated parallel economy that prevailed in Somalia after the formal economy crumbled.

The Somalis took over all the business in Eastleigh to the extent that by 2005 they appeared to own the majority of the properties in the Eastleigh and comprised the majority of the tenants.[74] Somali refugees bought up residential blocks and rapidly converted them into modern retail outlets. Indeed, many Somali in Western and Middle Eastern countries were attracted by the business opportunities in Kenya. Most of the activity centres are family-owned businesses. There has been funding from the wider Somali diaspora which has been crucial to the expansion of Eastleigh. The capital investments also grew from small enterprises into commercial malls.[75]

These discount malls eventually attracted customers from different areas of Nairobi and beyond. Apart from the large-scale shopping malls, there are also several Somali owned hotels, e.g Nomad palace, Royal Hotel, Ainu Shamsi among others. This process of legitimization is evident across Somali-run enterprises. The economic transformation of Eastleigh brought tremendous competition to the marketplace, driving down the cost of goods and services.[76]

The prices of goods were cheaper in Eastleigh compared to other areas in Nairobi. For instance, laptops were found to be about 30 per cent lower than in the city centre and identical imported furniture was about 20 per cent cheaper. Somali businesses are able to offer lower prices since

[73] Oral interview, Mohamed Guled, chairman Eastleigh Business Community Association, 18/07/2012
[74] Elizabeth, Campbell, "Formalizing the Informal Economy: *Somali Refugees and Migrant Trade Networks in Nairobi*" Binghamton University. New York. 2005.
[75] Oral interview, Abednego, Mwashumbe, Businessman, Gikomba, 18/07/2012
[76] Oral interview, Laban Njunge, Gikomba, Nairobi, 21/07/2012.

shops are often used for storage and accommodation as well as for business. Indeed some businesses sell direct from shipping containers. Many individual consumers as well as large commercial and medium sized traders within and without Nairobi rely on retailers in Eastleigh. Everything from hardware to fruit and vegetables were increasingly made available in Eastleigh. On any given day, Tanzanians, Ugandans, Rwandans and other traders can be found purchasing materials to sell in their countries.[77] The Somali business community became the common thread linking a large region of traders and investors from all walks of life. This was probably important in the explaining of peace experienced in the area during post election violence in 2008-2009.

2.6 Social Life in Eastleigh Area

According to Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), Nairobi's Eastleigh district has a population ranging from 400,000 to 500,000. As argued above, during the colonial period it was a lower middle class dominated by people of Asian origin but over the years prior to the Somali civil war, Kenyan Kikuyu landlords bought up property and rented them out to small Somali communities. Eastleigh is currently estimated to have attracted over 200,000 displaced Somali. The population of this area has dramatically increased since the refugee influx of 1990 and now composes of Kenyans, Sudanese, Eritreans, and Ethiopians with the majority of foreigners being the Somalis.

Although the area was formally known for crime and dilapidated infrastructure, it important to note that the people of Eastleigh also created social networks that assisted them to live in harmony. They came up with policies and programmes that contributed to the development of the life of the people living in the area. For example, free trade enabled importation of items into

[77] Oral interview, Abdala Omar (Eastleigh wholesaler) and Amina Ali (retailer) on 23/07/2012.

the country. The social relations in Eastleigh were also shaped by the economic changes, structures and public sector reforms in Kenya. Such reforms spearheaded by government moderated behaviour of people in Eastleigh. A common future of communities living in Eastleigh is the bonding relationships which are strong, and connect people from the same immediate group: family members, neighbours, close friends and business associates sharing similar socio demographic characteristics.[78]

Most of the refugees often lingering for months before finishing their administrative affairs opted for shortcuts, such as buying citizenship by bribing officers in the government. Gradually, they started spending their time doing business and trading in Eastleigh. As they could not set up their own infrastructure, they initially started running business from their hotel rooms. Garissa Lodge slowly transformed from an accommodation space to a trading place. This nucleus of Somali trading centres in Eastleigh quickly multiplied and replicated with many variations constructed along Eastleigh's central road. Trading became a pull factor for the large number of Somali refugees in Eastleigh, thereby rising quickly to an estimated number of 100.000 people living in the streets of Eastleigh.

The bonding has made the people of Eastleigh to link their relationships vertically between people from different socio-economic groups and positions of power, such as the links between poor people and actors in positions of influence in formal organizations, such as political parties, banks, schools, hospitals, housing authorities or the police. This has enabled the people of Eastleigh to live in harmony when other regions were on fire.

[78]Robert, Draper, '*Shattered Somalia*', National Geographic Magazine (September 2009), http://ngm.national geographic.com/2009/09/somalia/draper-text

2.7 Conclusion

The chapter has shown that Nairobi started off as an Asian city. A few years after Nairobi was founded 1899 as a station of the East African Railway. At that time hardly any local Kenyan population was living in Nairobi. Kenyans were only allowed to live within the boundary of the city as bachelors and if they had a formal job employed by one of the white settlers or by one of the companies of the young city. Their families had to reside beyond the city limits in other parts of the country.

The composition of the population living in Eastleigh changed with the toppling of the Somali President Siad Barre in 1991 and the subsequent outbreak of the civil war in the country. The war led further led to famine, lack of basic needs, the destruction of its infrastructure, and slides into a condition of anarchy and lawlessness. Within a short period of time hundred thousands of Somalis fled into Kenya. They were placed into refugee camps near the Kenyan remote town of Dadaab, and eked out a dismal existence in this disconnected part of the country. The Kenyan government, which during the 1980s and 90s had practiced liberal and generous refugee policies and had granted refugees full mobility within the whole country, now opted for much more restricted regulations, when facing the increase of the refugee flow. From now on all refugees had to reside in the camps and were not allowed to take on work. The refugee camps in the east of the country become like virtual prisons.

Considerable numbers of the people that fled from Somalia were well off traders from Mogadishu. They come from an urban background and were not used to the rural way of life in the camps. Having sold off their goods and real estate before their escape to Kenya, they arrived

with gold and money. With the lack of trading possibilities in the refugee camps, they started moving to Nairobi. Based on the preexisting contacts with the Somalis that lived in Kenya's capital for a longer time, they moved into Eastleigh. Thus, for the third time, Eastleigh become an immigrants' quarter, this time for Somali refugees who were settling the area illegally. Initially Somali refugees travelled to Nairobi with the aim of settling administrative affairs to quickly move on to London, Dubai or the United States. Guesthouses and other kinds of lodgings were constructed where they passed the time waiting to receive their exit visas.

The presence of many people of Somali origin in Eastleigh has transformed the social and economic life of the area. Infrastructures such as housing, roads and transport have been overstretched due to high population. The results have been the many skyscrapers coming up due to lack of space while some people of Somali origin are moving to other parts of Nairobi. Criminal activities are also becoming rampant in Eastleigh which are characteristic of terrorism and largely associated with Somali religion.

CHAPTER THREE

POLITICAL SITUATION IN NAIROBI 2007 – 2008

3.1 Introduction

Politics in Nairobi had been dominated by two main ethnic groups, the Kikuyu and the Luo. At the time of the 2007 general election, Kenyans aligned themselves with two main political parties. According to Kriegler these were Party of National Union (hereafter PNU) which was dominated by the Kikuyu and Orange Democratic Movement (hereafter ODM) which drew support mainly from the Luo, Kalenjin and other western ethnic groups not leaving out the coastal area too.[79]

After the declaration of the PNU candidate as a winner in the December 2007, presidential elections, Nairobi city among other localities in Kenya became polarized. Skirmishes occurred between the PNU and ODM supporters for nearly three months. Many people were displaced to IDP camps in Nairobi e.g the Luos in Mathare and Kikuyus in Kibera.[80] In Nairobi the bulk of the violence was in the slums. The conflict affected the image of Kenya on the international scene. This was because for decades, Kenya had been considered as the "haven of peace" in the conflict ridded East African region. Despite serious societal tensions and sporadic flare ups in Nairobi, some areas which were inhabited by the Somali enjoyed peace during this period of conflict. Although the Somali are traditionally ethnically fragmented along their clans, they never expressed the divide during the violent period.

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[79] Kenya National Commission On Human Rights, On the Brink Precipice: *A human Rights Account of Kenya's Post 2007-2008* Nairobi, 2008.

[80] Yash Pal Ghai and McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya: *A study of legal framework of Government from colonial times to the present.* Nairobi. Oxford University Press 1970.

The majority of the Somali live in Eastleigh. It is surrounded by areas that experienced violent confrontations that broke out between supporters of Raila Odinga, the leader of the ODM, and the police forces associated with the regime of the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki and his (PNU). In order to understand the origin of violence in Nairobi there is need to make an overview of political environment within Nairobi, at the time of the campaigns leading to the elections that ended in the violence that rocked Kenya in 2007 to 2008.

3.2 Nairobi in the Pre-election Period

Before the elections of 2007 in Kenya, there were important issues which were instrumental to understanding why the conflict erupted. These issues are characteristics of the nature of Kenyan political scene since independence. This led to grievances and hatred against some ethnic groups which were seen to be using their influential positions to exploit others. The 2007 elections were therefore seen as the only way of ending exploitation advanced by the politics of exclusion. People had been rendered landless through land grabbing by powerful individuals in the government, while jobs favored those whose kinsmen were in the government. When the tide turned against such people's wish, they opted to resort to violence as a way of expressing their anger towards the system which was seen as having betrayed the cause of democracy.

Secondly was the role of the public opinion polls, which were practically omnipresent in the pre-election period. Together, they promoted the dominant attitude that one's own political party/ethnic group could by no means risk an electoral defeat.[81] In the pre-election period 2006, both the leading candidates, namely Raila Odinga and Kibaki in their campaigns, engaged in speeches that were indicating that neither of them was willing to accept any other outcome rather

[81]Silas, Nthiga, "Three Cars burnt in Poll Chase", in *Daily Nation*, 19/12/2007.

than their own victory. Ethnic talks were wide spread in the streets of Nairobi where people engaged in heated debates between supporters of the two top candidates, contributing to an ethnic polarization of support.[82]

Apart from the role of opinion polls, *majimboism* provided ground for violence in Nairobi. Although communities in Nairobi were not calling for *majimbo* in the Nairobi context, the residents of Nairobi come from various parts of Kenya and hence were directly affected by the political environment in their local districts. For instance, during the campaigning period, Raila Odinga charged Kibaki with helping the rich and ignoring Kenya's poor, and promised to decentralize the country through constitutional revision based on *majimbo* (regions). According to this system of leadership, different parts of the country would be given opportunities to utilize their resources for their own development without necessarily having to draw support from other resource-rich regions.

Ethnic divisions, according to Yash Pal Ghai, were brought by highly centralized rule in which certain powerful individuals took opportunity to amass wealth at the expense of others. According to him, such people were those who either came from the same tribe with the president or those who supported the president of the day. These disparities created wide gaps among different regions and communities. The gaps were in form of land ownership, employment opportunities and level of education. These injustices according to Kanyinga were the major causes of conflicts in Kenya. The general elections of 2007 provided an opportunity for the aggrieved communities to vent their anger through violence.

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[82] Andreas, Jacobs, Nairobi Burning, *Kenya's Post-election Violence from the Perspective of the Urban Poor*, PRIF Report No. 110, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) 2011

At the political level, two ideologies were competing with each other and the two leaders, their followers and their political parties had taken different stands. For example, Raila Odinga stood against the Kenya's highly centralized constitutional design and advocated for a federal system of government which according to him would ensure equity in the distribution of resources. *Majimboism,* therefore, became a key agenda for his campaign. To the Kikuyu elite and most supporters of Kabaki's PNU, *majimbo* had an intrinsically ethnic dimension and opportunities for ethnic bias in some non kikuyu areas with high numbers of Kikuyu concentration. Even amongst Nairobi residents, there was a strong belief that central Kenya is the home of the Kikuyu, while Nyanza Province is home for the Luo people.[83] Nthiga says that those misconceptions heightened the feelings of ethnic intolerance among many communities which had lived together in peace for a long time e.g the Kalenjin and Kikuyu in the Rift Valley, the Luo and Kikuyu in Kisumu. Mistrust between individuals and neighbours crept in and gossips were the order of the day. Eventually, the results of the general elections, which had been delayed, were the trigger for the violence that spread across the country. Thus ethnic feeling which was dormant turned out to be the genesis of ethnic animosity in the city leading to the outbreak of the post-election violence which affected most parts of the city.

3.3 Post-Election Violence in Nairobi

The Waki commission observed that on 27th December, 2007, Kenyan elections were peaceful, although the tensions were high. The situation changed to total disorder when the Electoral Commission of Kenya was widely seen to be poorly managing the elections, particularly the handling and tallying of presidential votes. On the 30th of December 2007, after Raila Odinga, the ODM leader sensed that there was a problem in presidential vote tallying; He called on to his

[83] *Ibid.*

supporters for mass action. In Nairobi, the declared aim of many demonstrations was to storm the Kenyatta International Conference Centre (hereafter KICC) which stands in the middle of Nairobi, and it was the venue of vote tallying. All media stations had pitched tents at KICC to inform the country of the political developments that were unfolding. Large-scale violence erupted on December 30th and 31st of December in Eldoret, Kisumu, Kisii and some parts of Nairobi following the hastily organized, inauguration of incumbent President Mwai Kibaki of PNU.[84]

After the inauguration the new president disappeared from the public scene as violence escalated in various parts of Kenya. The eruption of violence was triggered by the general belief among the ODM supporters who alleged that ECK had changed tally figures and announced dubious results. The situation was worsened by the government when it used repressive measures to contain the demonstrators. The media took it upon itself not air live reports on the areas that were experiencing sporadic violence. The government decision was interpreted by the ODM supporters as proof that the PNU government had rigged the elections.[85] In the Rift Valley, the conflict was between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu, who had long standing issues surrounding land allocation from the Kenyatta regime.

In Nairobi, the ODM supporters clashed with PNU supporter in the slums of Nairobi namely, Huruma, Mathare and Kibera among others. Nairobi's slum areas were inter-ethnic attacks as

[84]Human Rights Watch, Ballots to Bullets: *Organized Political Violence and Kenya's Crisis of Governance,* Washington DC. Human Rights Watch, 2008
[85]Patrick, Nzioka, *"Poll won't be Rigged"*, in the Daily Nation, 4/12/2007,

well as political acts of violence during mass rallies erupted.[86] A writer for the Daily Nation wrote that there were violent confrontations between demonstrators and police forces as unfolded spiral of gruesome acts of inter-ethnic violence. All the major roads, such as the Uganda railway linking Mombasa to the interiors of Uganda and passing through Nairobi's slum of Kibera, were under siege and transport in Kenya was violently interrupted. In response, police and military convoys were set up during periods of heavy hostilities in order to safeguard the basic functioning of Kenya's transport networks. The two months of post-election violence in Kenya left 1,500 people dead countrywide, while between 300,000 and 500,000 were internally displaced.

In Nairobi about 124 people died from different causes. For instance there were 23 deaths and 61 injuries from gun shots, 29 deaths caused by sharp pointed objects while 9 deaths caused by blunt objects. The remaining 21 deaths were classified as mob-justice and other 42 deaths were caused by unknown circumstances. The overall number of injuries in Nairobi during the post-election violence was not clearly known.[87] In Nairobi alone over 72,000 people were reported as displaced from the city's informal settlements. The real number is believed being much higher, keeping in mind that many slum dwellers shifted to more friendly neighbourhoods in other parts of the city and in some cases, to rural areas.[88]

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[86] Ibid.

[87] Philip,Waki, Final Report. *The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, (CIPEV), Nairobi:* Government Printer, 2008.

[88] *ibid*

Nairobi killings were also marked by a brutality that had been seen in other African countries e.g Rwanda, Darfur, and Sierra Leon[89]. Soon after violence started, the media and civil rights reports indicated intense emotions, horrifying atrocities and mutilations of civilians as groups supporting the opposing camps butchered each other. The types of violence prominent in the slums included the destruction of property through arson, the forced expulsion by youth and ethnic based militia group that belonged to the opposite camps.[90] Similarly, there was widespread use of systematic rape of members from opposing ethnic groups. Reports also indicated sexual abuse and brutal mutilation by members of the disciplined police forces, groups of youths and sect gang groups, such as the Mungiki and Taliban.[91] The impact of the 2007/8 post-election violence on Nairobi was dramatically altered, by means of forceful homogenization of the ethnic makeup of many parts of Kenya.[92] Different estates of Nairobi, and particularly the slum areas, were carved into enclaves where vigilantes from one ethnic group or another patrol or maintain control.[93]

3.4 Patterns of Violence in Nairobi

The areas which were much affected, some were are very close to the Eastleigh e.g Huruma and Mathare. This is critical in understanding the main focus of this research which is why Eastleigh was not affected while its neighbours were all on fire. The section also discloses how violence unfolded in the city from the perspective of Nairobi as a means of laying ground on understanding peace that existed in Eastleigh. Factors, such as the role of rumours, joint behaviour of the slum-dwellers in Nairobi before and during the post-election violence and

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[89] Ibid

[90] Johann, Kriegler, Final Report: *Independent Review Commission*, Nairobi: Government Printer, 2008.

[91] Human Rights Watch, Ballots to Bullets: HRW 2008, p. 44.

[92] Michela, Wong, It's our Turn to Eat. *The Story of a Kenyan Whistleblower, Forth Estate*, London, 2009 and Gibson, Clark and James, Long, 2008: *The Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Kenya. December 2007 in Electoral Studies*, No. 28, 492-517

[93] Ibid.

shared perception of the rigged elections, played up as a trigger and justification for violent action that was experienced in the city.[94]

As Kenyans prepared to go to vote on 27th December 2007, rumours were spreading in Nairobi about the Kibaki governments' plans to rig the election and maintain power. This had earlier been seen in the calls by the members of ODM Party to the government to renew the contract of the chairman of ECK, Samuel Kivuitu.[95] The government did renew the chairman's contract but still rumour circulated in the slums that the government was planning to rig the elections and maintain the incumbent president in office. The slum areas became very polarized as mistrust flared up between the ethnic based-support of the two camps. The rumours already indicated that it would be very difficult to convince any of the two groups that their candidate had lost. For instance, the Kibera residents who are represented by Raila Odinga had coined a slogan that, "no Raila no Peace". This was a clear indication that Nairobi was preparing to become a theatre of violence between the Raila and the Kibaki supporters.

When the election results were announced the ODM supporters had already lost faith in the ECK, meaning they would not buy the idea of a Kibaki victory. Soon, violence broke out in Nairobi. After the outbreak of violence, rumours became markedly important to the slum residents. The people lost faith in the media which had also been ethnicized. In the midst of increasing isolation of the slums and a loss in trust in the media, rumours became vital sources of information. In Kibera and Mathare, for example, people spread news of the coming of the Mungiki and other militia groups to attack their opponents. Such rumours on militia groups

[94]Oral interview, Abdi Abdallah, Businessman Eastleigh, 12/07/2012.
[95] KNCHR, Still Behaving Badly: *Second Periodic Report of the Election-Monitoring Project*, Nairobi, 2007, see also EU EOM, *Kenya General Elections 27 December 2007*: Final report, 2008.

prompted local people to mobilize their own vigilante groups who assembled on the streets at night to keep watch against an eminent attack.[96]

Apart from rumours about local militia groups planning to attack members from different camps, there were another set of rumour which spread information that Uganda was sending their "brutal" soldiers into Kenya to suppress the anti-Kibaki demonstration. Rumours were all over in Nairobi of soldiers from Uganda crossing the border and killing "innocent" Kenyans. In Kibera rumours were even more specific that the Ugandan soldiers were killing people in Kisumu. Most of the Kibera residents are from Luo Nyanza and the mention of attacks in Kisumu was a clear indication that their kin were in danger. Other rumours indicated that Kibaki had requested his old friend and president of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, to send troops into Kenya to assist him crush the opposition.[97]

Furthermore, rumours were spread about suspicious government vehicles moving towards Kibera and Mathare and that no other vehicles were being allowed to go to or leave these areas. Similarly SMS messages were being spread in Nairobi indicating how certain communities were being targeted. They were also giving unconfirmed reports of deaths incurred by certain communities. These messages incited people to violence.[98] The defining characteristic of these rumours was that their origins were unknown. Their primary function in Nairobi was in no doubt to arouse local communities to violent action against each other depending on their party

[96] UNOSAT, Overview of the Damage in Kibera & Huruma Estates. *Following Post-Election Violence, Nairobi, Kenya*, in: www.unitar.org/unosat/node/44/1046 (25.5.2011).
[97] Daily Nation Reporter, "*No Uganda troops in Kenya: Mutua says*", in Daily Nation, 15/1/2008, p. 2 see also Makabila Stephen and Nyaboke Jessica, "*Rumours persist on Ugandan soldiers*", in the Standard News paper, 19/1/2008, p. 5.
[98] NUP, Narratives of the Urban Poor: *Collection of transcribed interviews from Nairobi's slums* by the author (April – July 2009).

affiliations. They were also delivering warnings of impending attacks by members of opposing ethnic groups. By depicting gruesome scenarios, they also justified offensive violent actions in the city.[99] The Nairobi residents soon swang into violent action as a response towards self-defence. From this account, rumours were at a core cause of violence witnessed in Nairobi.

The most important trigger was delay in releasing of election results, then followed by rumours that the elections had been rigged.[100] Before the declaration of presidential results, the media houses had previously shown that the ODM leader was leading in the tally by about one million votes. His supporters in Nairobi had already started celebrating his victory regardless of the final tally from all the constituencies when the situation changed as a result of incoming votes from the Mt. Kenya region. According to Tom Wolf director of Synovate Polls Mt. Kenya region was heavily populated. The opposition felt that they had been short changed. Soon there were frequent heated exchanges at the tallying centre making the situation even worse. ODM and PNU supporters started flocking into the city centre in large numbers and stormed the ECK tallying centre at KICC.[101]

The ODM supporters were convinced that there had been actual acts of election rigging. They felt that the delay in tallying votes from Central Kenya, which is Kikuyu dominated and a well-established PNU area, was a plan to know how many votes would be rigged.[102] The ODM party leaders organized protest marches on the city's roads towards the city centre. The police soon swung into action so as to stop the violence and restore order in the country. The police action

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[99] Frank, Oriare, "*I accuse the Press for Igniting Post Election Violence*: Fact or Scapegoat?" in *Nation*, 29/2/2008, p. 33

[100] *Ibid.*

[101] *Ibid.*

[102] Daily Nation Reporter, "*Young People speak out on Election Fighting*", in the Daily Nation, 12/1/2008, p. 3

provoked more mass action. As the clashes with the police erupted, rumour again spread that the Kikuyu were selectively targeted for rigging the elections.[103]

Life during the counting period seemed to have stood still, not only in the impoverished areas but indeed all across the city of Nairobi.[104] As election results were announced the already limited trust in state institutions and government authorities deteriorated rapidly. There was information vacuum and even after the swearing of President Kibaki for the second term there was a leadership vacuum because Mwai Kibaki simply held himself custody at the State House and never took control of the country.

Ethnic division in the country were deepened and worsened in the Rift Valley. Kibera for instance, although it was the multiethnic, it was considered an ODM stronghold.[105] Members of the Luo community considered Kibera to be their exclusive ethnic domain to the exclusion of other ethnic communities. Kibera is part of Langata Constituency the long term electoral constituency of Raila Odinga the ODM presidential candidate and a Luo. The Luo ethnic dominance in Kibera involved victimization of the ethnic others. For instance, the Kikuyu dominated Laini Saba area for decades. This explains why during the post-election violence, Laini Saba was turned into an ethnic skirmishing zone.[106]

In January 2012 the Luo soon took control of Laini Saba by setting up vigilante groups and forcibly evicted members of Kikuyu community. They equally conducted large-scale looting of

[103] Oral interview, Amina Abdi Swalleh, resident Eastleigh, 13/07/2012
[104] Lillian, Aluanga, "*The Time that Kenyans Swam in Sea of Chaos*", in the Standard, 6/1/2008, pp. 16-17
[105] UNIC 2008, Snr. Superintendent of Police Joseph M Nthenge with his 2008 UN in Kenya Person of the Year Award, United Nations Information Centre, Nairobi, Available from: www.unicnairobi.org/UNPOY08.
[106] Oral interview, Rose Mugendi, Resident Laini Saba, 09/07/2012

the Kikuyu property e.g household electronics. Looting extended to outside places, specifically targeting supermarkets along Ngong Road which they did not succeed. Inner-slum looting took place mainly along the slum's main road like Kibera Drive.[107] Businesses along Kibera Drive and Toi Market, which are located along Ngong Road, were destroyed by burning during post-election violence. Clashes also involved members of the police forces who incited violence.

The story of Kibera was not unique. The situation was quite different in Mathare Valley. However, no specific ethnic group claimed ownership of Mathare.[108] Zoning was limited to the neighbourhood level and to Mathare's administrative areas, where the main concern was security from ethnic gangs. For instance, the Kikuyu dominated Mathare Area 2 and the Luo dominated Mathare Area 4A. A similar scenario is depicted in the neighbouring slums of Kariobangi and Korogocho.[109]

In Mathare which is not very far from Eastleigh, looting associated with post election violence was generally done by people from outside the area often from the neighbouring areas of Kariobangi and Korogocho. Looters seemingly left the Kikuyu dominated areas of Kariobangi and went to areas where they were unknown by the local residents. In other words in Mathare, neighbours who knew one another did not attack each other. They went for unknown targets or selected targets who they knew would not recognize them[110] properties in Huruma area suffered

[107] UNOSAT 2008, *Overview of the Damage in Kibera & Huruma Estates, Following Post-Election Violence – Nairobi, Kenya,* in: www.unitar.org/unosat/node/44/1046 (25.5.2011)
[108] Taibl, Agnes 2009, *Kikuyu Problem and Luo Agenda,* Zur Politisierung von Ethnizität in Kenia 2007, in: Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien, 9: 16, 143-163,
[109] Oral interview, James Mwai, resident Korogocho, 20/07/2012.
[110] Gibson, Clark., and James, Long., *The Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Kenya:* December 2007, in *Electoral Studies*, No. 28, 2008, pp. 492-517.

heavy destruction during the violence.[111] The area is commonly considered to be inhabited by the Kikuyu, although they do not dominate, neither does any single community dominate the area.

The police were deployed in the surroundings of Mathare to contain the situation, but they did not find it an easy task. Clashes with police forces in Mathare were all over just as was in Kibera. The police personnel were overwhelmed by the numbers who were demonstrating. The streets were full of mass demonstrators particularly the upper side of Juja Road which passes through the Somali dominated residential estate of Eastleigh. But Eastleigh was not destroyed.[112] All the occasions of violence in Nairobi were spontaneous. It was clear that politics had played a very significant role. Although no politicians in Nairobi were publicly seen telling his followers to kill their opponent, the public behaviour of numerous Kenyan politicians had suggested that they indirectly were involved in the violence.

3.5 Conclusion

In March 2008 the post-election violence came to an end in Nairobi when the mediation led by Koffi Annan finally succeeded in persuading the PNU and ODM leaders to sign a Peace Accord. The chapter indicated that in Nairobi, though multi-ethnic, ethnic identity mirror the residents' political affiliation. Thus candidates choose specific areas in their bid for political positions. During the elections, the residents of Nairobi, especially in the informal settlements, were affiliated to two major ethno-political alliances led by Mwai Kibaki of PNU and Raila Odinga of ODM[113]. The two leaders engaged in endless wars of political supremacy. There political

[111] UNOSAT, Overview of the Damage in Kibera & Huruma Estates: *Following Post-Election Violence Nairobi, Kenya*, in: www.unitar.org/unosat/node/44/1046 (25.5.2011).
[112] Oral interview, Amina Ahmed, Eastleigh Resident, 13/07/2012.
[113] Ibid.

supporters also tried to outdo each other both in public and in secrecy. This had serious consequences.

Violence was common in the informal dwellings of Nairobi. In Eastleigh, however, there was no violence although the neighbourhoods and other areas of residence were affected. The section that follows will try to explain why Eastleigh remained calm though sandwiched between areas that were badly affected by violence. The dominant Somali residents in the area have a long history of clan conflicts both in Kenya and Somalia. The study examined whether the conflict was informed by political process and the role of Somali residents in the conflicts. Several inter-ethnic preconditions were necessary for the outbreak of violence[114].

[114] Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR

"PEACE" IN EASTLEIGH DURING THE POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE, 2007-2008

4.1 Introduction

At the end of the widespread post election violence in Kenya, official figures stated that over 1200 people were killed, that there had been massive destruction of property in some areas, and that several hundred thousand Kenyans were displaced from their communities. The most affected areas included the poorest sections of Nairobi, Burnt Forest, Eldoret, Endebess, Kericho, Kitale, Kikuyu, Kisii, Limuru, Naivasha, Nakuru, Nyamira, Mau Summit, Molo, and Tigoni. In Nairobi, areas surrounding Eastleighlike huruma and Mathare recorded some of the worst incidences. This chapter discusses the reasons as to why Eastleigh was not affected by the post-election violence.

4.2 Ethnic and Political Alignments

The question of culture and ethnic identity among Kenyan people was viewed in regard to conflict. It was, therefore, very important in understanding why the Somali in Eastleigh did not engage in the post-election violence. The 2007-2008 political violence experienced in Kenya had its roots in the ethnic identity and systems of power control. Within Kenya, the five largest ethnic groups according to Kenya Population and Housing Census of 2009 were the Kikuyu (22%), the Luhya (14%), the Luo (13%), the Kalenjin (12%), and the Kamba (11%).

Political parties as at 2007-2008 Kenya typically are a reflection of ethnic affiliations and not ideological orientations. Some are also based on patron-clientelism and not policy. This is due to the perception that a party offers the best hope if someone within the ethnic group assumes

power and then he or she will share state resources with members of his or her ethnic group.[115] The result of this view has historically been ethnicity or prejudice and favouritism along ethnic lines. Ethnic prejudice in Kenya is seen clearly when talking to people A Luo would openly say while referring to Kibaki, "this Kikuyu man is responsible for the vote stealing and violence". But while referring to the ODM candidate he had this to say, "The winner of elections was Hon. Raila Amolo Odinga."[116]A Kikuyu, had this to say, "These Jaluos just know how to drive big cars but their people are saddled with poverty and they should know that they will never rule Kenya".[117] Such utterances clearly demonstrate that the culture and identity of ethnic alignment was clearly responsible for the conflict.

The average person identifies with the ethnic group and cultural orientations of the surrounding in which he/she lives. In addition to this, Kenyans come from an inherently agrarian society.[118] This means that land is therefore very important. Indeed, the topic of land has been a crucial issue in the majority of conflicts since Kenya's independence. The main contestation has always been between the Bantu communities that moved to the Rift Valley and those Nilotic communities that claim ownership of the land in the Rift Valley. In these contestations, the Somali people are not an aggrieved party because the Somali did not move into the Rift Valley to acquire land. Often the members of the ethnic group in power were unethically given land or allowed to use land irregularly, frequently at the expense of other ethnic groups.[119] During the

[115]Makau, Mutua, *Kenya's Quest for Democracy*: taming the leviathan. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008, p. 22.
[116] Oral interview, John Rakwara (not real name), Mechanic in Nairobi, 13/8/2012.
[117] Oral interview, Reuben Kimani (not true name) businessman in Nairobi, 13/8/2012.
[118] Calas, B. "*From rigging to violence*", in Lafargue, J. (Ed.), The general elections in Kenya, 2007, Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, Ltd, 2008, pp. 165-185.
[119] Maupeu, H. "*Revisiting post-election violence*", in Lafargue, J. (Ed.), The general elections in Kenya, 2007, Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, Ltd, 2008, pp. 187-223

2007 post-election violence, the historic land issues between the Kikuyu and Kalenjins was a major cause of conflict.[120]

Many landless members of the Kikuyu community travelled north during the colonial period to settle in the Rift Valley as squatters. After Kenya became independent from Britain, even more people from the Kikuyu ethnic group settled in the Rift Valley, protected by Kenyatta's government.[121] Some would argue that Kenyatta "gave" the rich land belonging to the Kalenjin to the Kikuyu to the Kikuyu.[122] Similar to what Kenyatta did with the Kikuyu in the Rift Valley during his Presidency (1963-1978), Moi (1978-2002) alienated Mau Forest, the most lush part of the Rift Valley. Although the forest was government trust land, Moi used his position to grant executive permission for occupation by members from his ethnic group. Kenya's third President Kibaki, using his executive power, expelled Kalenjins from the Mau Forest in 2003. Most of them returned arguing that they had a right to the land that Moi gave them.[123]

In all these land struggles, there was no conflict on the nature of activities that were being carried out in Eastleigh. This idea of expulsion, along with the promise of future expulsion attempts, played a large part in the Kalenjin bands militantly evicting the Kikuyu from their homes, destroying their dwellings, and occasionally murdering those resisting these actions after the election results were announced. Since the Somali were not part of the land politics, they simply kept a low profile.

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[120] *Ibid*
[121] Cussac, A. (2008). *"Kibaki tena?" The challenges of a campaign"*, in Lafargue, J. (Ed.), The general elections in Kenya, 2007, Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, Ltd, 2008, pp. 55-104.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Ibid.

Similarly, the Somali were not the main stakeholders in the 2007 general election. The Somali did not have any key figure running for any higher seat in the country apart from those seats which they were already promised. For instance, the main stake holders were dissidents who, due to the failure of the NARC party to honour the power-sharing MOU in 2002 formed the ODM. The ODM was largely comprised of an ethnic alliance between the Kalenjin, Luhya and Luos while Kibaki and the Kikuyu in power formed the PNU.[124] This therefore would mean that the three main ethnic groups involved in the 2007 post-election violence were the Kikuyus, Luos and Kalenjins and not the Somalis. Therefore, Eastleigh remained calm. The Luhyas were a part of the ODM, yet although not much is written about their involvement. As Mutua puts it that, "The reality on the ground is that most African political parties are not communities of political ideology or philosophy; rather they are vehicles of ethnic nativism".[125]

Another factor that explains why the Somali were not involved in the post-election violence was their spread across all the parties that were contesting. Some Somali were members of ODM, while others were members of PNU. The Somali were, therefore, on the win-win platform. Attempts by ODM to stage public, peaceful protests in Nairobi and other cities were squashed by the police after Kibaki made them illegal through an executive order. Kibaki, on the other hand, was legally certified as the president and had the legal right to ban the protests, especially if the protests could compromise the stability of the government.[126]

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[124] *Ibid*

[125] Makau, Mutua, *Kenya's quest for democracy: taming the leviathan.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008, p. 22

[126] Lafargue, J. and Katumanga, Musambai "*Post-election Violence and Precarious Pacification*", in Lafargue, J. (Ed.), General Elections in Kenya, 2007, Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, Ltd, 2008, pp. 13-34.

The post-election violence resulting from the anomalies seen in the 2007 election in Kenya involved many facets of society. Perhaps the most volatile of these were youth with little opportunity within the previous Kibaki government for jobs and had even less hope for the future. The ODM understood this and harnessed the youth vote by organizing them, for the first time in a Kenyan election, into voting blocks.[127] This vehicle of organization, combined with Kibaki making peaceful demonstrations illegal, is thought to have been why most the youth across all ethnic groups violently reacted after the announcement of a Kibaki victory.[128] While the youth unemployment factor helps explain why the post-election violence erupted in Kenya, it also explains why Eastleigh remained calm. The Majority of the Somali people are businessmen and women and have no interest in employment in the formal sector. This meant that they had no attachment to employment promises, but the business which they had in Eastleigh. To the Somali, therefore, peace was important as it created a conducive environment for business.

Another historical factor which caused violence, but excluded the Somalis, is cultural differences that engendered ethno-cultural animosity, and unnecessary stereotyping between ethnic groups, which often ended up in ethnic strife, conflict and violence. There were also social, political, economic structures, religion, language and psychology as aspects that contributed the conflicts that were experienced. In Kenya, different key players the in cultural stereotyping included vernacular FM radio stations which relayed news and played offensive music aimed at perceived enemy groups.[129] Towards the 2007 general election, Kenya had implicitly become divided into ethno-cultural zones namely the GEMA zone in Mount Kenya region, the Kalenjin enclave in

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[127] *Ibid*
[128] *Ibid*
[129] Prunier, G. (2008) "*Kenya: Roots of Crisis*", Open Democracy News Analysis Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.

Rift Valley Province, the Luhya zone in Western Province with the exception of a part of Bukusu area, the Luo and Gusii enclaves in Nyanza and the Muslim backyard in Mombasa.[130] The Somalis did not have an enclave and to them life was normal. Communities were forming vigilant groups as a way of self-protection. Such groups included, the Baghdad boys, Angola Musimbiji and Jeshi la Mzee, the Somalis did not have any.[131]

4.3 The Refugee Question in Eastleigh

As refugees, the Somali wish to maintain a low profile lives while in the city. Hence their choice not to be actively involved in public life or politics.[132]Somali/urban refugees in Nairobi try to sustain a livelihood through business, petty trade, wage employment or simply subsisting on transfer earnings from various sources, including remittances from relatives at home or in rare instances, being supported by charitable, civil society and faith-based organizations. In fact, the majority of them are economically self-sufficient with different levels of income. Remembering where they came from, they did not wish to be part of more problems and that is why in areas the dominant group settled, there was no post-election violence.[133]

Having been victims of police harassment, because of their uncertain status the Somali refugees did not wish to be harassed more by taking part in the post-election violence.[134] To a great extent, their participation in the country's politics and economy was dependent upon legalization

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[130] Wa-Mungai, M., "*Tusker Project Fame: Ethnic States, Popular Flows*", Journal of Eastern African Studies 1 (3), 2007, p. 338

[131] Ngotho, K., "*Big Money Games That Run Kenya's Politics: Exclusive*", MARS Group Kenya, 14 February, 2008.

[132] Kibreab, G, Refugeesin Somalia: Lessons *from One of the World's Longest Relief Operations*, Department of Economic History, Uppsala University, 1991

[133] Ndege, Kagwanja and Odiyo, Refugees in Law and Fact: *A Review of the Literature and Research Agenda in Kenya*, Occasional Series Vol. 1 No. 1, 2002.

[134] Simone, A. M "Moving *Towards Uncertainty: Migration and the Turbulence of African Urban Life*", 2003 – http://pum.princeton.edu/pumconference/papers/2-Simone.pdf

of their refugee status, registration of their businesses and the requisite micro-finance support that enabled them to invest in viable economic ventures to sustain themselves.

Since refugees living in urban areas do so unaided by government and UNHCR, those in the lower income groups are largely unable to access basic welfare services, which included education for their children. This group included the majority of those living in Eastleigh. These refugees face more hurdles compared with members of their host community. Conditions relating to the Government's style of addressing refugee affairs make it impossible for them to register their business or even acquire properties to improve their economic status. This leaves the lower income group vulnerable to all kinds of abuse and hence they did not wish to involve in violence that would have invited government scrutiny.[135]

Similarly, Somali refugees living in Eastleigh are faced with challenges in terms of identity documents. Identity documents are a key element of refugee protection and participation in the host countries domestic affairs, as they are the first line of defence against arbitrary arrest and deportation and the first step towards accessing social services.[136] A major inhibiting factor for the Somali refugee community in Eastleigh to take part in the political violence experienced in Kenya after the disputed presidential election results in 2007/8 appears to be tension with the local population. In cases where refugees are seen to be doing economically better than locals, xenophobia and discrimination are common.[137]

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[135] Ndege, Kagwanja and Odiyo, *Refugees in Law and Fact*: A Review of the Literature and Research Agenda in Kenya, Occasional Series Vol. 1 No. 1, 2002.
[136] Loren, Landau, "Protection *and Dignity in Johannesburg: Shortcomings of South Africa's Urban Refugee Policy,*" Journal of Refugee Studies 19(3), 2006.
[137] Alexander, Amy, "*Without Refuge: Chin Refugees in India and Malaysia.*" Forced Migration Review, 2008, see also; Campbell, Elizabeth H. "*Formalizing the Informal Economy: Somali Refugee and Migrant Trade Networks in Nairobi,*" Global Commission on International Migration 47, 2005.

Discrimination is a central form of insecurity for urban refugees, who feel that they are being mistreated by the local population. To the Somali population living in Eastleigh, this mistreatment takes various forms, including xenophobic attitudes, discrimination and harassment.[138] Ethnicity influences the levels of discrimination in relation to peace that exists among people. In Nairobi conflicts among neighbouring ethnic groups have been reported in different areas.[139] Most Somalis had a feeling of being superior to Africans with dark skin. This attitude led to a type of racial discrimination where Kenyan society, particularly of darker skinned Africans marginalizes, the Somalis. Even sharing a religious identity with Muslim refugees from Somalia does not offset the racist and xenophobic attitudes of locals.[140]

Much of the literature documents the frequency with which refugees are victims of physical violence at the hands of local populations. The Somali urban population also has a feeling that they are exploited economically or viewed as competition. Local populations often take advantage of refugees' vulnerability by offering them exploitative and dangerous conditions of employment in the informal sector or by charging them vastly higher fees for rent and housing.[141] In some cases, locals see Somalis as rich, and local business owners perceive them as competition for clients and resources and take steps to shut down or hinder their businesses.[142] Such actions made the Somalis to have a feeling that although they are part of Kenya, they are

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[138]Elizabeth, Campbell., Jean Kakusu, and Iddi Musyemi, *"Congolese Refugee Livelihoods in Nairobi and the Prospects of Legal, Local Integration"* Refugee Survey Quarterly Vol. 25, Issue 2, 2006, see also; Grabska, Katarzyna, *"Marginalization in Urban Spaces of the Global South: Urban Refugees in Cairo."* Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 19, No. 3, 2006; Jacobsen, Karen, *"Just Enough for the City: Urban Refugees Make their Own Way,"* World Refugee Survey 2004.

[139] Briant, Natalie, and Andrew Kennedy, "Priorities *of African Refugees in an Urban Setting,*" Journal of Refugee Studies 17(4), 2004, pp. 437-459.

[140] *Ibid*

[141] Crisp, Jeff. Jane Janz, Jose Riera, and Shahira Samy, *Surviving in the City*: A review of UNHCR's operation for Iraqi refugees in urban areas of Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, United Nations High Commissioner for refugees Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 2009.

[142]Elizabeth, Campbell, *"Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of Survival, and Possibilities for Integration,"* Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 19, No. 3, 2006.

discriminated against and hence are not freely identified with the rest of Kenya. This partly explains why they took a low profile when it came to Kenyan political affairs.

Although the police, immigration officials, city officials and other public servants are absolutely essential to refugee protection, by far they are the most commonly reported source of insecurity to the Somali population in Nairobi. The most common form of abuse is arrest or harassment as a means to extort bribes from the Somalis living in Nairobi any time there is a security threat. This is often coupled with detention and the threat of deportation to Somalia even if the subject is of Kenyan Somali origin.[143]In Nairobi, bribery is particularly rampant, and poses a significant challenge for low-income or unemployed urban Somali population who cannot afford both bribes and daily staples. The Somalis claim that sometimes the police confiscate or destroy identity documents to pressure them into paying bribes to avoid deportation.[144]

In some instances, the Somalis had been detained in prison facilities which are overcrowded and unhygienic. There is inadequate food or access to basic amenities, and the detained are subjected to harassment, physical and sexual abuse, and torture.[145] In addition, even when the police are not the perpetrators, the Somalis may still be unable to turn to them for protection. This has made the Somalis to feel alienated from the ordinary Kenyan community. Hence they feel that they had no reason to fight for political alliances that did not value them. This made Eastleigh to be free from the post-election violence witnessed in other parts of Nairobi in 2007/8. Xenophobia, discrimination, resentment, ignorance, and threats for deportation explain why most Somalis

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[143] Horst, Cindy, *"Vital Links in Social Security: Somali Refugees In the Dadaab Camps, Kenya."* Refugee Survey Quarterly Vol 21, No. 1 and 2, 2002, see also, Hovil, Lucy, *"Self-settled Refugees in Uganda: An Alternative Approach to Displacement"* Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 20, No. 4, 2007.
[144] Oral interview, Mohamed Abdi Ali, Eastleigh, 15/8/2012.
[145] Ibid.

particularly those living in non-Somali dominated areas have low participation in Kenyan politics.[146]

Another contributing factor is that, the Somali population, not only in Nairobi but country wide did not take part in post-election violence is the question of education. Education is a challenge for any society which wants to know their political rights. Lack of education makes the population uninterested in fighting for what is rightly theirs. Most Somalis are ill-educated, do not understand their political rights and, therefore, did not see the reason why they should take part in the political violence that rocked Kenya.

4.4 The Question of Somali Identity and Peace in Eastleigh

For decades, the relationship between people, place and identity has been the subject of much debate among social and cultural anthropologists. They focus on the notion of the territorialisation of identity and is polarized between those who argue that people and place have a deep and lasting natural bond. A large proportion of the Somali population are nomadic pastoralists with a long history of mobility and involvement in ancient trading links and routes that have historically extended across the region that covers Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Arab world. Mobility has therefore played a major role in forming the identity of the Somali people. Traditionally, nomadic pastoralist movements have mainly depended on clan and kinship ties.[147] The identity of the Somali nomadic pastoralist has never truly been linked to a fixed locality but rather to a vast region.

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[146] Marc, Sommers, "*Urbanization and its discontents: urban refugees in Tanzania,*" Forced Migration Review (4), 1999, pp. 22-24.

[147] Thomas, Allen, *In Search of Cool Ground: war flight and homecoming in northeast Africa*, Geneva: UNRISD, London: James Currey, 1996.

The Somali in Eastleigh managed to preserve their Somali identity both individually and collectively. For example, North Eastern parts of Nairobi, Somali language is dominant on the street and in shops, the style of dress, particularly among women, and the cafes, hotels, and restaurants that serve Somali food. The presence of so many Somalis in a relatively small geographical space of Eastleigh has ultimately resulted in a collective preservation of Somali identity. By living and socializing predominantly in this Somali community, Somalis have not been forced to adapt to a different social way of life. Hence, they could not take part in the post-election violence. Furthermore, the notion of the Somali as 'the other' aided not only in the preservation and reinforcement of a Somali identity among Somalis, but also in keeping away from conflict which to the Somali involved the "others".[148]Somali ethnic group also confesses the Islamic religion which does not conform to political orientations. They believe in spiritual wars that go beyond the earthly things.

Apart from preserving their identity, the Somali living in Eastleigh did not take part in the post-election violence because they have a stronger identity with Somalia than with Kenya. This made them to be more interested in what was going on in Somalia than in Kenya. Although some Somalis living in Eastleigh are Kenyans, others are refugees who feel that their identity had not changed whilst in exile.[149] A good example can be seen in Ahmed's view during the researcher's interview with him. He said;

> "I am a Somali. I am still Somali and I am still a Muslim. Even if I got to another country, I will always be Somali. I am bringing up my children as Somalis and making sure that they know and understand where they come from. It doesn't matter where my children were born or where they live. I will make sure that they know that they are

[148] Oral interview, Farah Aden, Eastleigh, 10/8/2012.
[149] Oral interview, Ahmed Abdalla, Eastleigh, Nairobi, 10/8/2010.

Somali and that they feel Somali. I will ensure that they know their culture, their language and understand that both of their parents are Somali".[150]

It is clear that the Somali sense of identity is linked to the existence of a social network within a Somali community and not by the fact that they were or were not in Somalia. The question of identity and peace in Eastleigh during the post-election violence leads to the question of apart from the Kenyan Somali who also constitute the population, and the Somali living in Eastleigh felt Kenyan in any way. Many had, after all, lived most, if not all, of their lives in Kenya, not Somalia. But it came out clearly from our discussions that the Somali immigrants felt that they are not Kenyan and that they were just in Kenya for the time being while the Kenyan Somali opted to stay out of violence and expressed fears[151] It became apparent from these discussions that many Somali who are living in Eastleigh were challenging the common sense understandings of the relationship between person and place. This factor is crucial to the understanding of why the Somali in Eastleigh did not take part in the post-election violence.

The fact that the refugees in Eastleigh identify themselves as Somali and not Kenyan and made them not to be involved in conflict in Eastleigh. Their Somali identity was formed and reinforced due to their place within a strong Somali community and not by their presence in a specific place or land. Being born into a Somali family and raised in a Somali community was enough for them to identify themselves as Somali.[152] Shamsa, a Kenyan Somali student at the University of Nairobi who was born and raised in Kenya, explained that her cultural identity had always been and would remain Somali. She was been born in a Somali home, in a Somali- speaking region of Kenya, and upon moving to Nairobi, had settled in a Somali neighbourhood, Eastleigh.

[150] *Ibid.*
[151] Oral interview, Mariam Osman, Eastleigh, Nairobi, 10/8/2012.
[152] Ibid.

Therefore had nothing to do with Kenyan politics.[153] Her English and Kiswahili were poor and she felt more comfortable conversing in Somali. Her identity had clearly been formed as a Somali girl despite never having been to Somalia. She even asserted that acquiring a new nationality in the future could never affect her link to Somalia and that her identity as a Somali would always remain because she had been raised as one and her family's history is linked to Somalia and not Kenya. In fact, many of the refugees interviewed expressed similar views on how they would always remain Somali, despite their location. Another young adult male explained that wherever life may take him, whether to South Africa, the USA, or Europe, and whatever nationality he may acquire in the future, he and his 'nature' will always remain Somali.[154] Mohamed said;

"Your identity never changes. Your identity should always remain with you. Wherever one goes, one's identity remains the same. The Somali community wherever they are, will never forget their culture or identity."[155]

When discussing the reasons why there was peace in Eastleigh, it is important to look at the main ethnic composition. Somalis never took part in the post-election violence, the thoughts of the Somalis on the preservation of their identity can therefore not be neglected because Somali identity comes first despite having lived in Kenya for most, if not all, of their lives. According to one elder in Eastleigh, even Somali families which have raised their children abroad want to send their children back to Africa, and particularly Eastleigh, to learn more about Somali culture. Deep down, every Somali wants his or her children to be part of the Somali culture. To the Somalis, Eastleigh is a very important centre for their culture and they would do everything at

[153] Oral interview, Shamsa Omar, Eastleigh, 11/8/2012.
[154] Oral interview, Mohamed Ahmed Diis, 11/8/2012.
[155] Ibid.

their disposal to save it from any political damage.[156] In the other words Somalis did not want to lose Eastleigh to violence.

The case of Somali in Eastleigh shows that people, rather than place, are the bearers of a cultural identity. Somali are perhaps masters at being of the ability to re-territorialize their identity. Their history as a people has always been linked to mobility. If place was the single most important factor in the construction and preservation of a cultural identity, there would be no Somali identity today.

4.5 Belonging in Eastleigh Versus in Kenya

Actors in any conflict have opposing interests. They, therefore, stand to either win or lose at the end of the conflict. Conflict is therefore, a continuous strife to outdo each other for domination. In this section, the study examines the topic of belonging and touches on the Somali people's relationships with Kenya. It answers the fundamental question on the nature of relationship between the Somali living in Eastleigh and other sections of Kenya that were actively involved in post-election violence. In looking into these issues, the study viewed Somali identity as remaining fixed despite living in the Kenyan urban areas with mixed ethnic and racial composition. Furthermore, it investigated the reasons as to why the Somali living in Kenya strongly identify themselves with Somali and not Kenya. An analysis of Somali informants' accounts on where they believe they belong to gives some insight into the reasons why Somalis living in Eastleigh did not take part in the post-election violence.

[156] Oral interview, Yarrow Maryam, Eastleigh, 11/8/2012.

The territorialisation of identity is always reinforced by the fact that rights are determined by one's national identity.[157] This can also be extended to the sense of belonging among Somalis living not only in Eastleigh, but the entire Kenya. They have a strong belief that their identity as Somali has been preserved due to the harsh conditions and strict policies under which they live. They also have a strong cultural identity that cannot be changed by other cultures. A territorialized claim on identity, Eastleigh therefore, exists in Kenya, whereby the rights of people are determined by some other factors such as their national identity and the nature of their presence in the country.[158] As a bustling and overcrowded suburb of Nairobi, Eastleigh is home to numerous small and large-scale businesses and commercial enterprises, mainly owned by Kenyan Somalis, economic migrants and refugees.[159]

On the surface, it is not unreasonable to assume that a Somali refugee living in Kenya for the last decade or more feels an attachment to Kenya's identity as his or her country. Although the Somali community living in Eastleigh has lived, died, and given birth to new life all on Kenyan soil, they still look not at Kenya, but to the Somali community that they live in and Somalia as their place of belonging.[160] Most of those interviewed felt that they belonged to Somalia and that they had little or no sense of belonging to Kenya. Hence, lack of reason to take part in the post-election violence. Their world in Kenya revolved around Eastleigh and other Somalis in the community and not non-Somali communities that were battling each other.[161]Little integration with Kenyans was observed, even among the younger generation who had grown up in Kenya.

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[157] Kibreab, G., '*Revisiting the Debate on People, Place, Identity and Displacement*', in Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 12(4), 1999, pp. 384-410.
[158]Ibid.
[159]Ibid.
[160] Oral interview, Ibrahim Fatuma Aden, Eastleigh, Nairobi, 13/8/2012.
[161] Oral interview, Billow Idiris Abdi, Eastleigh, Nairobi, 14/8/2012.

There is a strong belief among the Somali living in Eastleigh that the local population in Nairobi and Kenya, in general, perceived them as 'the other' and "the Somali". This perception had aided in the construction of a socially distinct and separate group or community that saw no need of taking part in the post-election violence.[162] As the term indicates, being identified as 'the other' is synonymous with not belonging to a particular group, community, or society. If this is what is perceived and felt among the Somali community in Eastleigh, then it is no wonder that their sense of belonging has strongly remained with Somalia and not Kenya and therefore they could not take part in post-election violence which was seen as a Kenyan affair. This was confirmed by Wario Hawo Diramwho said;

> "I cannot call Kenya my country. Even though I was born and brought up here, I am still treated like a foreigner, as a refugee, and the police constantly ask me for my ID and papers. This is a sign that Kenya is not my country."[163]

This simple statement gives enormous weight to an argument that can be applied to explain why the Somalis living in Eastleigh did not take part in the post-election violence. If one is treated as "significant other" and constantly reminded that one is important, one's sense of belonging tore is mutual coexistence in that particular society. For the Somalis to have taken part in the political violence they need to feel welcome in order to develop an attachment to their host society. In Eastleigh, the host community's perception of the Somali as 'the other' has no doubt affected the way Somalis feel towards their host society, leading them to strengthen and reinforce their cultural identity and sometimes keep off political issues of Kenya. This has the effect of marginalizing the Somali on the part of the host community because their original belief that Somalis are different and foreign has now been strengthened by the actions of the Somali, which

[162] Oral interview, Issack Hussein Maalim, Eastleigh, Nairobi, 13/8/2012.
[163] Oral interview, Wario Hawo Diram, Eastleigh, Nairobi, 20/8/2012.

actually had only been strengthened due to the host community's initial perception.[164] This perception is strengthened by Mohamed Abdirisak by saying; "No, I am not a Kenyan, so how can I feel that it is home. I am not a part of this Country because I am not a citizen and I am not a resident. We Somalis only remain as others and no one cares for us here. Even if we wanted to be Kenyan and take part in political grievances, we couldn't be because we are seen as different."[165]

The assertion confirms the general feeling of most Somali who live in Kenya as citizens. They perpetually talk of discrimination in most places. Life in Kenya for the average Somali has presented many challenges. Somalis in Eastleigh live in difficult conditions and the inability for most, including the youth, to access employment and education is an unfortunate reality.

Although Eastleigh thrives with businesses, ranging from shopping centres to big hotels, the majority of Somalis struggle to negotiate a meaningful place for themselves in Nairobi. Their sense of marginalization seems to have grown in the aftermath of the insecurity that affected Kenya. In the wake of such insecurity, Nairobi heightened its security in public places and residents were told to be vigilant. In effect, much of the attention turned to Eastleigh.[166] Many Somalis believe that Kenya's renewed focus on security was another reason for Somalis to be labeled and discriminated against.

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[164] Oral interview, Mohamed Abdirisak, Eastleigh, Nairobi, 13/8/2012.
[165] Ibid.
[166] Elizabeth, Campbell, '*Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of Survival, and Possibilities for Integration*', Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 19(3), 2006, p. 396-413

4.6 Somali and the Land Question

One of the most disturbing issues affecting the communities which engaged in violence is the controversial land question. Land has been at the core of Kenya's political evolution since the colonial period. Starting from the onset of the colonial rule, land became the main African grievance that sometimes degenerated into hostile resistance as seen in the claims during the Kenya Land Commission of 1932-33, commonly known as the Carter Land Commission. The findings of the commission were that Africans needed their land back, but the commission's recommendations that Africans had no land rights, planted seeds of discord among the Africans.[167]

The land grievances which were at the centre of post-election conflict did not affect the Somali. The conflict started from resettled areas from where it influenced the urban populations, some of whom had settled in the city because they earlier lost their land to the colonialists. This partially explains why conflict first started from rural areas then spilled over to the city. In Nairobi, areas such as Kibera and Mathare were greatly affected by the violence. The conflict revolved around tenancy in which most of the houses belong to Kikuyu while the occupants were Luo and Luhya. There had been discontent before on rent payment between the landlords and tenants. The post-elections violence created an opportunity for violence. Unlike in Kibera, there had not been any struggles over rent payment and hence Kikuyus and Luos peacefully co-existed with other communities.[168] Eastleigh remained calm during the post-election violence becaise Somali

[167] Hetz, P. and Myers, G., *Land Tenure and Property Policies in East Africa, Environmental Change and Security Program*, USAID, 2008

[168] Karuki Kanyinga, *The Legacy of White Highlands: Land Rights, Ethnicity and Post Election Violence in Kenya.* Nairobi, journal of contemporary African Studies, 27(3) 325-344. 2009.

communities in Kenya share a different feeling. They view conflict as the worst thing because it has pushed them into marginalization and discrimination.

4.7 Memories of the Past Experience with the Conflicts in Somalia

The North Eastern Province where the Kenyan Somali live is one the most marginalized areas of Kenya. It has a long history of conflict, dating from the European scramble for Africa, and still suffers the tragic consequences of the Shifta war between the Government and the Somali secessionists after independence.[169] The region became practically a police state during the following decades, and the application of emergency laws led to gross violations of human rights. Although the situation is seen to have changed, the consequences of discrimination, such as the issuing of screening cards against Somali Kenyans, still lingers and the fear makes them to keep off some activities that remind them what they went through.

During the Kenyatta regime, the Somali were subjected to violations that still hang around their memory. Kenyatta let loose the army on the people of North Eastern Kenya. He declared a state of emergency and ruled Northern Kenya by decree until his death. Somalis believe that Kenyatta prepared the stage for the woes that of the Somali people face. Although Kenyatta died in 1978, the emergency law stayed on until the Kibaki regime. The army involved in shooting Somali camel, the highly prized animals among the Somalis. The soldiers also used to rape daughters in front of their parents and brothers and wives in full view of their husbands. Killing, maiming and torturing was a common practice in North Eastern during Kenyatta's regime.[170]

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[169] Said Abdi Sheikh, *Blood on the Runway: The Wagalla Massacre of 1984,* Nairobi: Northern Publishing House, 2007

[170] *Ibid*

When Moi took power in 1978 and perfected further the practice of torturing the Somalis. For instance, Moi committed atrocious actions in Garissa in 1981, Mandera in 1982 and Wajir in 1984. The British and Kenyatta usurped the democratic right of the inhabitants and forced them to be annexed into Kenya. There were armed skirmishes between the government and the Somali people. The Shifta war was used as an excuse to crush the rebellion. Kenya National Defence Forces never achieved its dream.[171] Wagalla was a climax of the crush of the Somali voice. In the Wagalla massacre, the government forces targeted members of the Degodia clan. The result was devastating.

The Wagalla massacre left people as major victims while some became herdsmen, others turned to be businessmen and even some were civil servants. The effect of killing all the men in a community was a major setback in all sectors of the social order in that community. After Wagalla, thousands of widows and tens of thousands of orphans were left without bread winners. The ghost of what happened still remains fresh to many Somalis. Those living in Eastleigh still feared that if they took part in the post-election violence, the government might have responded in a similar way as if at Wagalla.

4.8 Availability of Small-arms in Eastleigh

The Government of Kenya has been faced by insecurity issues that spring from the proliferation of small illicit arms. This has greatly increased insecurity problems in most urban areas in Kenya. Nairobi has seriously been affected by rampant cases of individuals having illegal weapons in their possession. Specifically in Eastleigh, trade in small arms has been associated

[171] *Ibid*

with people of Somali origin living in the area. This has also been associated with the types of trade that take place in Eastleigh.

Oral interviews with one of the security agents in Eastleigh who sought anonymity due to the nature of information and his work, confided to the researcher that, small arms trade in Eastleigh is a common business being carried out by prominent businessmen in Nairobi. These individuals also enjoy strong protection from highly placed officials in positions of power in government. The circulation of small arms enables crime rate to be kept at a bare minimum due to the fear by criminals being victims of gunshots.

However, weapons such as hand grenades and small arms trade is a common trade in this Eastleigh. These weapons are sneaked into Kenya through our porous border points which later find their way to Eastleigh to be sold to different groups of people with different uses e.g. other people use the weapons for robbery, terrorist activities or for self protection.[172]

The study established that Eastleigh is a business hub not only for people of Somali origin but also other big investors who don't live in Eastleigh but operate large businesses in the area. These investors commute to Eastleigh during daytime to operate their businesses but reside on the peripheries of Eastleigh. These businessmen also employ many people from the neighbouring areas such as Mathare, Shauri Moyo and Huruma. Eastleigh was therefore seen as the focal point for many people given the kind of businesses many people engage in. This idea contributed to the existence of peace in the area.

[172] Oral Interview. Anonymous respondent police officer, Eastleigh, 13/7/2012.

Further oral interviews, revealed that prominent businessmen in the area have guns for self-protection. The study further found out that most of the Somali in Eastleigh engage in illegal businesses including sale of guns. This according to Chebichi is due to the foreigners residing in Easltleigh, most of who have taken advantage to involve in illegal trade, which includes trafficking weapons. The findings showed that the circulation of small illicit arms in Eastleigh contributed to peace that existed in the region. Hence, people feared that persons had guns and could use them for their protection.

4.9 Conclusion

This chapter has revealed that the violence that was experienced in 2007/8 was triggered by many factors. However, the Somali living in Eastleigh did not participate in the violence that was experienced in almost every part of Nairobi. The study found out that issues beyond politics were responsible for the post-election violence in Nairobi. The issues included the longstanding conflict over land rights, prevailing associated with human rights violations and the highly unsatisfactory fulfillment of economic and social rights. Another factor that exacerbated the post-election violence, yet did not exist among the Somalis of Eastleigh, is the question of vigilante groups. While the Government banned 18 of such groups in March 2002, many of them remained active and operated behind the scenes and waited for triggering situations such as post-election-election violence. The most notorious are the Mungiki, originally a quasi-religious sect, claiming thousands of followers and renowned for its brutality even among the Kikuyu community from whom it recruits. Operating from Nairobi's Kibera and Mathare slums, the Mungiki also recruit urban youths in the Rift Valley and Central, but with no roots in Eastleigh.

The study, therefore, concludes that Eastleigh became peaceful because there was suspicion among different ethnic groups in which the refugees, who are mostly of Somali origin, might have been armed with firearms. The majority of those who live in Eastleigh are prominent businessmen of Somali origin whose interests extend beyond politics. The Somali community in Eastleigh has experience in wars and might have had little interest in political issues in Kenya. The refugees in the area are those who had fled Somalia because of conflict, they therefore preferred peace to violence.

Non-alignment to political parties was also found to be a recipe for the violence. The Somali community living in Eastleigh was not politically interested in the two contesting political parties. The study concludes that refugees of Somali origin in Eastleigh were not interested in any of the political parties but wanted peace to prevail in the country for their safe living.

Strong cultural orientation was also found to have contributed to the peace in Eastleigh. The Somali ethnic group views itself as a distinct group with a unique culture. The post-election violence that rocked Kenya was seen to be a typical Kenyan affaire and hence could not break the solid culture of Muslims along political alignments. It is concluded that loss of cultural identity brought feelings of individualism particularly among many Kenyan ethnic communities has been heightened by ethnic divisions which also entail a drift into violence.

Further, the study found out that, the Somali ethnic community perceive themselves as strongly attached to Somalia. It is concluded that the experience of conflicts in Somalia had created an

atmosphere of tranquility especially among people of Somali origin who reside in live in Kenya. They were like visitors who saw no point in involving in the politics of the host country. The presence of small guns in the area scared individuals who engaged in violence.

CHAPTER FIVE

SECURITY STRUCTURES AND EXISTING MECHANISMS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN EASTLEIGH

5.1 Introduction

Security is a fundamental aspect in human life. This chapter examines the security situation during the general election of 2007-2008 in Kenya. Security is an important aspect in human life, however, there must be mechanisms in place to ensure the existence of peace, for peace to prevail. Peace has several attributes, in Eastleigh, there were several apparatus that helped bolstered peace in the area. Among the well established organs of security are government agencies like the provincial administration and chiefs, Community organizations or groups women, youth and businessmen and security firms. These agencies played a major role in ensuring the existence of peace in Eastleigh[173]. This was exceptionally because of the nature of investments in the area.

5.2 Security Situation and Structures in Eastleigh

In Eastleigh, the presence of different security organs was very important for the existence of peace in Eastleigh. Most of the respondents from Eastleigh suggested that the security situation was good although some suggested it to be bad.[174] The study established that some few respondents could not clearly explain the security situation because they were not residing in the area at the time of the violence. Generally, the neighbouring estates are equally crowded, however the presence of people of Somali origin has always been a critical aspect for the perceived existence of security in the area.

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[173] Ibid.
[174] Ibid.

5.3 Common Types of Crimes in the Area

There are different types of crimes common in Eastleigh. Most of the crimes witnessed, or known by the respondents include carjacking, theft and murder. Other crimes that exist but at minimal levels as suggested by the respondents include: robbery, kidnapping and drug trafficking. In times of conflict, like in the Kenya's case of the post-election violence of 2007-2008, crimes of different manner thrive because criminals take advantage of the chaos to involve in criminal activities. As suggested, it is likely that such crimes were on the rise during the post-election era in Kenya. The study further identified that the main perpetrators of the crimes were mainly youths and organized gangs who were living in the nearby estates. The youths were on the spotlight in this case because they have the highest unemployment rate in the country and they could also form gangs to terrorize the residents of the area under study. One standing feature for the existence of peace in Eastleigh was that these youths had been employed before by those who had businesses in Eastleigh. Eastleigh was their source of income and employment.

Enhanced security ensures minimum criminal activities, such as violence, robbery or conflict. Such criminal activities are not likely to thrive in situations where police surveillance is common. Criminals are put in check by law enforcement agencies. Among the issues that threatened security situation in the area included the possession of illegal firearms as a form of self-protection. There were different types of security structures in Eastleigh. They included the following:

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5.4.1. Role of the Provincial Administration

Kenya's Provincial Administration is structured in such a way that it operates from the Office of the President to the villages. Different government officers are charged with the responsibility of ensuring there is maximum security and hence peace in their areas of jurisdiction.[176] At the village level, there are periodic briefings, called the *Barazas,* where the village elders give updates of the happenings in their respective villages. The Chief then gives directions on these issues.

During the 2007-08 post-election violence period in Kenya more specifically in Eastleigh, it was reported by some respondents that Somali elders played a major role in ensuring peace. Oral interviews with Sharawe, one of the residents of the area, revealed that they were in contact with their area chief who also relayed the same information to the district security team in the area.

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[175] *Ibid*
[176] *Ibid*

The result was the presence of strict surveillance throughout Eastleigh, thereby keeping looters away.[177].

The presence of the Provincial Administration in Eastleigh has a special feature in that they have been allocated an office space at Sunshine Shopping Mall for free by the Eastleigh Business Community so as to offer maximum security in Eastleigh. Furthermore, it was revealed that the security officers are given incentives in form of "bribes" by the Eastleigh Business Owners Association.[178]

It was also reported that the Provincial Administration in Eastleigh was very friendly to the inhabitants of Eastleigh to the extent of discussing in small groups and in whispers the probable areas that could be prone to violence. The police patrols were very frequent in the area to the extent that nobody could dare involve in violence for fear of reprisal. At the same time, close interaction was seen as a form of community policing that the provincial administration employed in the area to boost security in the area.[179] It was a more informal way of ensuring that peace existed in Eastleigh unlike in other estates such as Mathare and Githurai where the provincial administration was detached from the members of the public.

5.4.2 Eastleigh Business Community and Peace Building

The Eastleigh business community is a registered group operating in the area to guard their interests. It is particularly meant to be growth point of the Somali businessmen who own large-

[177] Karuti, Kanyinga (2009), Land Redistribution in Kenya: in Mkhize, Hans (ed) Agricultural land redistribution; Towards greater Consensus.Washington DC: The World Bank.
[178] Oral Interview, Hassan Guled, Eastleigh, 13/7/2012.
[179] Robyn Dixon and Nicholas Soi. Police Corruption Rampant in Kenya despite reforms. California, Loss Angeles Times, California. 2004.

scale premises. This group was also involved in ensuring peace in Eastleigh. They employed their own securities who were generally youths.[180] The businessmen donate money to pay the youths who guard their businesses. The youths also report any suspicious individuals in the area so that proactive measures can be taken by the security agencies in the area. According to one of the respondents, this has led to the perception that Somalis in Eastleigh had guns. The respondent confided to the researcher that the youth are a private security outfit that very few people know about. It is a security arrangement in Eastleigh that has kept the area more secure compared to other estates in Nairobi.[181]

At the height of the post-election violence of 2007-2008, the business community doubled its efforts by increasing incentives to the youths, so that security could be enhanced. There were very few cases of insecurity reported in the area thereafter. The businesses were also safe since there was no violence in the area. It was noted that the women in Eastleigh were the brain-child of such arrangements. Therefore, the study established that business women in the area greatly contributed to the peace that existed in Eastleigh. There have been Muslim women movements in the area which started as a campaign to liberate the Somali woman from domination by men. Later, it metamorphosed into a strong movement that actively participates in the public advocacy for Muslim women's rights in Eastleigh. It played a significant role in ensuring peace existed in the area. These groups prompted the formation of peace marches that were later seen in Mathare villages after the 2007-2008 post-election violence[182].

[180] Keneth Oduor, Kenya/Somali: Somali community doing booming business in the Country: Garowe, Nowregian Council for Africa, 2008.
[181] Oral interview, Amina Abdi, Eastleigh, 13/7/2012.
[182] Oral interview, Farah Aden, Eastleigh, 10/8/2012.

The business community to date is a strong organization that is helping the government to ensure there is security in the area, even though it has been going through problems in which certain individuals are taking advantage of the frequent attacks related to terrorism in the country[183]. More recently the Muslim group is reorganizing itself to help stem out issues of terrorism in the area because it is interfering with their businesses.

5.4.3 The Role of Non-Governmental Organization and Faith-Based Organizations in Peace Building

There are external actors in peace-building initiatives. Such actors use different approaches to educate members of a community to engage in constructive activities that foster development. In Kenya, community based organizations have come up to engage the residents in local level projects that enhance unity. During the post-election violence of 2007-2008, religious groups, such as the Muslim Brothers of Eastleigh, engaged members of the area in sending reconciliatory messages.[184] They mobilized the youth, who were then very prone to violence into social groups that preached peace in the Mosques. Non-governmental organizations were also actively involved in peace initiatives in Eastleigh. They preached messages of peace that extended to the neighbourhoods, such as Mathare and Kayole.

[183] Manaseh Wapundi and Eluid Nthiga, Availability of Small arms, perceptions of Security in Kenya, Small Arms Survey graduation Geveva, International Development Studies, 2012.
[184] Philip Waki Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election violence 2007/8 Nairobi, Government Printer. 2008.

Muslim groups believe in the holy war, not political war. This inspiration kept peace among the residents of Eastleigh who kept wondering why Kenyan ethnic groups were fighting each other. "Sisi napiga vita vya jihad, si vita vya dunia hii ya uongozi," one of the respondents remarked. The Somali ethnic group in Eastleigh had really distanced themselves from ethnic wars that were politically instigated. Through such religious teachings, it was evident that there was no justification to engage in conflict at all[185].

5.4.4 Security Firms in Eastleigh

In ordinary circumstances, private security firms have played a crucial role in providing security to premises in many towns and urban areas. In Eastleigh, businessmen have engaged the services of uniformed security guards, who oversee the security situation in the area. Such security groups include the Cobra Security Company Limited, owned by Kenya Security Industry Association hereafter (KSIA) and the KK Security group. During post-election violence, these groups too were not left behind. They were a sign that people were vigilant and that any slightest provocation would be met with full force of the law. The security guards reinforced the security situation in the area because they were a sign that peace existed in the area. At the same time, they ensured that ordinary activities were carried out without any interruptions.

The study revealed that due to the presence of thriving businesses in Eastleigh, more financial institution have come up to benefit from the investments. For instance, there are five conventional banks and two Islamic banks. Each of these banks is manned by two private

[185] Oral Interview, Shamsa Omar, Eastleigh, 11/82012

security officers and two police officers such that in any situation of insecurity there would be maximum protection for the banks.[186]

5.4.5 Community Policing in Eastleigh

Members of the Muslim community are in themselves a strong group that helps in enhancing security in the area. These Muslim groups comprise of business women selling jewellery and clothes, individuals engaged in transport industry, shopkeepers and restaurant/hotel business in Eastleigh. The study also revealed that there are security briefings after every two days among the groups where they update the local security.[187] This was important during the post-election violence. Members of the Muslim community form themselves as one strong group that has a unique identity. They therefore played a critical role in ensuring that the intelligence agency was adequately briefed on the happenings in the area.[188]

This strategy was first achieved through the provincial administration and later the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Muslims in Eastleigh identified that they were going through similar problems after being treated as 'outsiders.' They were, therefore, very vulnerable to criminal activities. They, therefore, sought for solutions to their problem. This coincided with the police open-door policy in which members of the public would be involved in providing security through providing voluntary information to the police. During the post-election violence of 2007-2008 in Kenya, Eastleigh residents had adequately utilized this mechanism to the extent

[186] Ibid.
[187] Mohamed Bare Muhumed, *National Security and Community Policing, Nairobi,* University of Nairobi, 2013.
[188] Graham Elison and Preeti, Nijhar, *Community Policing International Models and Approaches.* UK. Taylor and Francis, 2005.

that all the loopholes of insecurity had been identified by the police. In some instances, the police had the records of potential criminals.

Muslim leaders were also significant in ensuring the existence of peace in the area. The study found out that all Muslim leaders of different groups were holding security meetings on security situation in Eastleigh. The mechanism was elaborate to the extent that every member within the household had his or her details recorded. Anyone who was not in the records was summoned by the leaders to identify themselves.[189] Through such measures all individuals were tracked in terms of their movement and actions. It was, therefore, not possible to engage in violence because of such close surveillance from the leaders. The strategy kept residents of Eastleigh much aware that criminal activities would have dire consequences.

5.5 Other Existing Structures for Conflict Resolution Among Muslims in Eastleigh

The study findings show that the some of the methods used in conflict resolution among the Muslims in Eastleigh, are coordinated by government agencies such as the police and chiefs. The elders of the community and also the Khadhi courts resolve conflicts among the Somali living in Eastleigh. The elders are individuals within the Somali clan who are mandated to mediate between parties involved in disputes in the area. This depicts the conflict management apparatus in the area under study and how they manage their conflicts. Probably the existence of these mechanisms did contribute a lot in the existence of peace in Eastleigh. Other factors that can also be cited to have contributed to the peace were that the government understands that Muslims in the area were a vulnerable group and hence required protection.

[189] Oral interview, Munyadeen Roble, Eastleigh, 13/8/2012.

The study further showed that the relationship between communities in the area and the Muslims is quite peaceful and good implying that there has been proper integration among the communities. Thus peace and not violence thrives. The refugees in the community are treated well as brothers and sisters and they are mandated to have the same rights as other members of the local community, resulting in peaceful co-existence in the society. The result of the general elections was, therefore, a non-issue to the Muslim community living in Eastleigh.

5.6 Organizations Involved in Conflict Resolution in Eastleigh

The study found out that different organizations respond to and are engaged in conflict resolution in the study area. For instance, UNHCR and KNHRC, being the organizations that were common in the area, resolve conflicts, implying that there are indeed mechanisms in place handling conflict resolution in the study area.

The two organizations are concerned with the human rights under the Vienna Convention. They provide basic needs, such as food, clothing and legal services. UNHCR ensures that refugees living in the area are protected under the law and necessary assistance given to them.[190] The Somalis in Eastleigh, therefore, live as one community and that might have contributed to the peace that prevailed.

Interviews revealed that the frequency of police patrols in the area under study whether day or night, varied depending on how each respondent viewed the situation. A majority said it is done often but sometimes the police were not within the vicinity. Patrols are known worldwide in any

[190] Karen Jacobsen, *The Economic life of Refugees.* Bloomfield CT: Kumerian Press, 2005.

country to reduce the potential of instant or planned crimes. As per the responses, the suggestion is that the area under study is well patrolled, thus reducing cases of crime and conflict.

5.7 Effectiveness of Government Security in the Area

Government is at the centre of offering security to its citizens. Eastleigh, like all other estates in Nairobi, suffers from insecurity. According to the research findings, security in the area looked effective because of many factors. However, it was found that this was a joint effort by many players.

Questions were also asked about the effectiveness of government security in the area. And the majority of the respondents stated that it was ineffective. From the findings it is clear that the respondents do not lean or depend on the government wholly for their security since the police were unreliable in offering adequate security to the residents in Eastleigh. However, they considered government security as an effective tool to security problems.

Interviews with informants revealed that among the challenges that are experienced by the security personnel deployed in the area include: the poor transport and communication networks, the high population of people as compared to the security personnel available and finally lack of cooperation between the residents and security agencies[191].

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the security structures that existed in Eastleigh during post-election violence of 2007-2008 in Kenya. It has established that there were several mechanisms that

[191] Oral interview, Munyadeen Roble, 13/8/2012

existed in Eastleigh and each had a specific role to accomplish in ensuring that peace existed in the area. It has also shown that the activities of one agency were complemented with the others that existed then. Peace in Eastleigh was, therefore, a joint effort of many organizations and agencies. The findings have shown that the mutual co-existence of such factors contributed to the unique peace in Eastleigh at the time of the post-election violence in Kenya.

Peace in Eastleigh was largely due to the close relationship between the community itself and the level of self-initiative to provide information to the government through organised structures. Security therefore was not only the preserve of the members of the community alone, but also the government and its related organs.

Furthermore, religion plays a major role in bringing peace in the society. It pacifies the political undertones that are heightened and common in Kenya. Political antagonism among different Kenyan ethnic groups was a major drive for violence in Kenya. It is, therefore, important that conflict resolution strategies be effectively utilized in Kenya so that people can be enlightened on mutual coexistence.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The findings have indicated that violence is a social disorder and situation in which people engage in conflicts that interfere or disorient a peaceful coexistence. The study describes how violence in Kenya's neighbouring countries has spilled over to Kenya by sending a large number of foreigners to the country including Somali refugees who have moved to Eastleigh due to the presence of Somali community living in Eastleigh. Some of these include refugees who live in Eastleigh.

It is revealed that some insecurity problems cannot be blamed wholly on the Somali migrants in Eastleigh. Some security personnel were aware of the criminal activities such as sale of weapons in the area. This explains the sensitivity of Eastleigh in terms of an attack from criminals. However, a few isolated cases stand to inform the basis of this study. One of these areas is Eastleigh. Eastleigh is a home to Kenyan Somali, refugees from different countries and other Kenyans from different ethnic backgrounds. The Somali refugees found their way to Nairobi in the early 1990s. They became successful businessmen who brought with them entrepreneurial skills to the Kenyan economy. This has not only improved peoples' livelihoods, but has also created employment to people in the city. The area thrives on different businesses, ranging from supermarkets to transport services. Other ethnic groups also live in the area, forming small enclaves of businessmen.

In reviewing the factors that made Eastleigh peaceful, the study found out that political alignments played a part in the violence. The Somalis and refugees in Eastleigh were not strongly associated with any of the two parties- ODM and PNU. The ethnic alignments played a big role in the violence that affected the other areas. Eastleigh, being an area dominated by the Somalis, could not be affected to the same magnitude. The land question which was at the centre of post-election violence was of little importance to the Somali inhabitants of Eastleigh. Many ethnic groups in Kenya have had clashes that revolve around land injustices. Many The communities engaged in conflicts that revolved around land as the population increases.

The other factor included the refugee question in Eastleigh. Most Somali urban refugees in Kenya are self-settled and have lived in the country for a minimum of five years, residing in various parts of Nairobi city, mainly in Eastleigh. They originate largely from the immediate neighbouring countries and while most come directly from fleeing their countries and settle in urban areas, very few have previously lived in the camps. Such refugees wish to maintain low profiles while in the city and hence do not choose to be actively involved in public life, such as politics, because of fearing the violence and impact on their livelihood. The chapter observed that, refugees did not want to engage in violence given their past experiences in war back in their home country- Somalia.

Generally, findings on the security apparatus and existing structures for conflict resolution in Eastleigh revealed that there were several mechanisms or systems of ensuring security in Eastleigh. They included police patrols and community policing. There were other individuals who involved self-protection in which it was believed that they had firearms in their possession.

In addition, the findings revealed that among the Somali groups, organizations such as UNHCR and other government agencies were involved in conflict resolution in the area. It was established that the Somalis and the refugees in the area had well developed mechanisms for handling conflicts among themselves. Such local arrangements include; Muslim group and council of elders.

The study found out that factors which made Eastleigh peaceful during post-election violence were diverse and included non political alignment to political parties, availability of a well coordinated community policing network, provision of incentives to members of the provincial administration, a well established group of businessmen in charge of security of investments and a perception that there are weapons in the hands of civilians residing in EastleighHow appropriate policy interventions can be designed to suit emerging situations and enhance scholarship understanding of the status of refugees in Eastleigh and the benefits they have brought to the Eastleigh community in terms of peace.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE

My name is Hawa Ibrahim. I am a student at the University of Nairobi, Department of History and Archaeology. I am conducting a study on factors which made Eastleigh a heaven of peace in the midst of post election violence in Kenya. You are among a large group of people purposively selected for the study. I would highly appreciate your patience and time spent on answering the following questions. The information you give will be treated with utmost confidence and will only be useful in informing this study.

Questionnaire No.....

Date of interview.....

Respondent.....

SECTION 1

Background Information

No.	Question	Response	Code
1.	Gender of respondent	1. Male	
		2. Female	

2. Age in years .....

3. Occupation.....

4. Level of Education .....

5. Ethnic group.....

SECTION 2

Security situation in Eastleigh

1. How do you see security situation in Eastleigh generally?

.....

.....

2. What are the common types of crimes in the area?

.....

.....

3. Who are the main perpetrators of the crimes?

.....

.....

4. What often do you see police officers patrolling the area both day and night?

.....

.....

5. How would you describe the effectiveness of the government security in the area?

.....

.....

6. How would you describe the effectiveness of the government security in the area?

.....

.....

7. What are the challenges experienced by the security personnel deployed in the area?

.....

.....

8. How peaceful is Eastleigh and why?

.....

.....

SECTION 3:

Political Participation

1. What was the political affiliation of people living in Eastleigh during 2007 general election?

Somali.....

Kikuyu.....

Luo.....

Indians.....

Asians.....

Other.....

2. Which three political parties were in stiff competition during 2007 general elections?

1.....

2.....

3.....

4. Who was the aspirant then?

.....

.....

5. What do Somalis living in Eastleigh feel?

.....

.....

6. Owing to the disputed elections of 2007, how did Somalis in Eastleigh react?

.....

.....

7. Did other communities living in Eastleigh involve themselves in violence?

.....

.....

8. What happened in Eastleigh and other areas?

.....

.....

9. What businesses do people in Eastleigh engage in?

.....

.....

10. Where do you save the money from these businesses?

.....

.....

11. Why do you choose to save in that place?

.....

.....

12. What are the investment patterns of Somalis in Eastleigh?

.....

SECTION CONFLICT RESOLUTION STRATEGIES

1. How do you solve conflicts among Muslims in Eastleigh?

.....

.....

2. Are there some organizations mandated with conflict resolution in Eastleigh?

.....

.....

3. What is the relationship between Muslims living in Eastleigh and the local community?

.....

.....

4. How do Somalis living in Kenya treat refugees?

.....

.....

5. What right do Refugees living in Eastleigh have?

.....

.....

6. Who are the inhabitants of Eastleigh, and where do they come from?

.....

.....

7. In your opinion why do criminals fear Eastleigh?

.....

.....

8. How peaceful is Eastleigh and why?

.....

EASTLEIGH AREA AND ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD



APPENDIX II

MAP OF EASTLEIGH