

University of Nairobi

Department of Diplomacy and International Studies

**Public Diplomacy and the Cultivation of National Image: The Case of China's
Image in Kenya**

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Award of A Doctor of Philosophy in International Studies of the Department of
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AUGUST 2024

DECLARATION

Declaration by Candidate

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any university. No part of this project may be produced without prior permission from the author and/or the University of Nairobi.



August 13, 2024

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
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DEDICATION

To God almighty for his grace upon my life.

To my late mum, Mrs. Anne Kimaiyo who went to be with the Lord 2020. You always wanted the best for me. I will always treasure the time I shared with you. May your soul rest in peace.

To my loving family, my dad Mr. William Manyim, my brothers and sisters, thank you for your support.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AA	Anadolu Agency
AACS	American's Attitude towards China Survey
AFE	French Education Agency
AFP	Agence France-Presse
AJE	Al-Jazeera English
ALA	American Library Association
AP	Associated Press
BAFT	Britain Abroad Task Force
BAT	Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BTA	British Tourist Authority
CCGA	Chicago Council on Global Affairs
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCPRO	China Central Policy Research Office
CCTV	China Central Television
CGS	Chinese Government Scholarships
CGTN	China Global Television Network
CGP	Centre for Global Partnership
CI	Confucius Institute
CLIC	Canada Learning Initiative in China
CMFA	Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
CMOE	Chinese Ministry of Education
CNN	Cable News Network
CNY	Chinese Yuan Renminbi
COVID-19	Corona Virus – 2019
CPC	Central Party Committee
CPD	Centre on Public Diplomacy
CRI	China Radio International
CSC	China Scholarship Council
CSR	Centre for Survey Research
DAAD	German Academic Exchange Service

DStv	Digital Satellite Television Services
DW	Deutsche Welle
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EUCI	Egerton University Confucius Centre
EXIM-Bank	Export-Import Bank
FARA	Foreign Government Act
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FFM	French Foreign Ministry
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
FP	Foreign Policy
GCM	Guoguang Century Media
GHOA	Greater Horn of Africa
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IIE	Institute of International Education
IPTV	Internet Protocol Television
IRD	Information Research Department
KBC	Kenya Broadcasting Corporation
IR	International Relations
KUCI	Kenyatta University Confucius Institute
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MUCI	Moi University Confucius Centre
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	National Broadcasting Corporation
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NOCFL	National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language
NOMLERD	National Outline for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development
NYT	New York Times
OCLCI	Chinese Office of Chinese Language Council International
OECD	Organization of European Economic Development
OIA	Office of Inter-American Affairs
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPD	Overseas Publicity Department

OWI	Office of War Information
PD	Public Diplomacy
PDSB	Public Diplomacy Strategy Board
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
RCT	Rational Choice Theory
ROC	Republic of China on Taiwan
SAFC	Sino-African Cooperation Forum
SANEF	South African National Editor's Forum
SGR	Standard Gauge Railway Line
SMDs	Smart Mobile Devices
SMG	Shanghai Media Group
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Scientists
TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
UFWD	United Front Work Department
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
TRT	Turkish Radio and Television Corporation
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
The U.S.	United States
UONCI	University of Nairobi Confucius Centre
USIA	U.S Information Agency
USIS	United States Information Service
VCDR	Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
VHF	Very High Frequency
VOA	Voice of America
XNA	<i>Xinhua</i> News Agency
YTB	Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWI	First World War
WWII	World War Two
XUAR	Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
ZNBC	Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation
ZBH	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings

ABSTRACT

China's public diplomacy has been proactive and reactive aimed at communicating China's soft power to global audiences and counteracting a negative portrayal of China's image. It is this context that provides the platform for understanding China's public diplomacy in Kenya. China has used several tools to communicate its soft power and its national image in Kenya, the focus of which has been to shape Kenyans' public opinion in its favour. These tools include the Chinese international media, the Confucius Institutes, the educational exchange and Chinese government scholarships. Nonetheless, the impact of these on Kenyans' perception of China's national image is still less understood. This study's overall objective was to examine the role of Chinese public diplomacy in pursuit of China's positive image in Kenya. It focused on four specific objectives, namely; to examine the influence of public diplomacy on national image, to investigate the role of Chinese media on the perception of China's image in Kenya, to explore the role of Chinese Cultural Institutes and Centres on the image of China in Kenya, and to analyse the role of Chinese educational exchanges on China's image in Kenya. It was grounded on Liberalism and used the soft Power model developed by Joseph S. Nye Junior. It applied a mixed methods research design that combined elements of positivism and interpretivism. The positivist approach involved the use of a quantitative approach including the collection of primary data from research respondents and applying statistical methods of data analysis. This study sampled 400 participants from different cohorts representing the Kenyan public residing in Nairobi city. Data was collected using semi-structured questionnaires and the researcher interviewed 10 per cent of the participants; 40 respondents, 4 from each of the ten cohorts. The quantitative data were analysed statistically using the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). The qualitative data was collected through document reviews and interviews and was analyzed using content analysis. This study found that public diplomacy has permitted China to expose foreign audiences to China's intangible power assets including culture, policies and political values. This study found that China has a formidable presence in Kenya's media space perhaps more than elsewhere on the African continent. However, it determined that despite China's efforts to project its soft power in Kenya through the Chinese media few Kenyans obtain their information about China from Chinese media sources. This study established that in terms of CI numbers it hosts, Kenya has more than the African average, of two. Nonetheless, despite China's intensification of its 'charm offensive' in Kenya through the CI, the CI has not had the desired results for influencing the Kenyan public to adopt a positive and favourable image of China's national image. It found that China's educational exchange with Kenya and its award of CGS to Kenyan students is aimed at allowing Kenyan students to experience China's education, culture, political values and policies so that they can develop a favourable view of China. A significant number of students returning from China had a favourable view of China's political system and its cultural value. This study concludes that China's PD has influenced if not transformed the market of ideas and information about China's image. Despite the PRC's intensified Chinese media activity, and cultural diplomacy via the CIs and CGS in Kenya, its influence on the Kenyan public's perception of China is limited. This study recommends that scholars should conduct longitudinal studies to trace the influence of PD on the national image in the long term. Moreover, there is a need for scholars to conduct cross-sectional studies comparing the influence of at least two instruments of China's PD on its national image.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION OF THE STUDY

1.1 Background of the Study

The international system is composed of a group of behaviour units that interact with one another called countries or states.¹ The goal of these interactions is to realize what is called the national interest. The neo-realist and institutionalist scholars define national interests as centred around a state's pursuit of security, wealth and power in its international relations. According to Hans Morgenthau² one of the leading neo-realists, national interest is survival that incorporates the protection of political, physical, and cultural identity from other states' encroachment while V.V Dyke considers them as values that a country seeks to achieve or safeguard about each other.³

More broadly, national interest is shaped by a spectrum of factors including the promotion of national values such as culture, human rights, democracy and economic considerations. The interactions between and among these units occur through diplomacy the purpose of which, is to enhance the realization of the national interest. In the age of mediatization and globalization, the global public and media increasingly scrutinize countries, rating and comparing them according to political stability, economic development, the attractiveness of their culture, and foreign policies.⁴ Under these circumstances, the "favourable reputation and image" of that country in the world has become more important than tangible resources such as raw materials and territory access.⁵ But what is the image?

The basic definition of national image is the image created in one's head regarding a foreign nation⁶. National image as a concept is well-studied in the social-psychological field. Kunczik defines national image as the cognitive representation that a person holds of a certain nation, that which a person considers truthful of a given country and its

¹ K. E. Boulding "National Images and International Systems" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1959), p. 120

² Cornelia Navari. "Hans Morgenthau and the National Interest. *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 1, (2016), 47-54. doi:10.1017/S089267941500060X

³ Vernon Van Dyke, "Values and Interests". *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56, No. 3(1962), pp.567 - 8

⁴ Michael Kunczik, "Transnational Public Relations by Foreign Governments", In Krishnamurthy Sriramesh and Dejan Vercic, (Eds), *Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research and Practice*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003), p.412

⁵ Eytan Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): 56.

⁶ Walter Lipmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1922).

citizens.⁷ It deals with the opinions created by the foreign public's judgment and perceptions.⁸

This means that the concept of national image as well as the notion of national interest are both socially constructed and as such grounded in the philosophy of constructivism. Constructivism, first conceptualized by Nicholas G. Onuf in 1989 conceives the world and what is known about it as socially constructed.⁹ According to constructivists, agency and structure are reciprocally constructed implying that agency shape structures and structures influence agency. In this sense, agency suggests someone's ability to act while structure implies the international system consisting of ideational and material elements.¹⁰

Thus, the central issue in constructivism which underlies its link with the national image is interest and identities. According to the constructivists, states can have multiple identities, which are socially constructed through their interactions with other actors. Identities are representations of what a state is to other actors which in turn depicts or conveys their interests. The act of presenting these identities to others is considered diplomacy. The nexus between public diplomacy and a state's national image is a growing field of scrutiny by both policymakers and scholars of diplomacy. A negative or positive national image can affect a state's foreign influence, national interest and global power. National image is linked to a nation's capacity to create and sustain ties with other foreign states, as well as foreign publics. This open communication is critical for the success of public diplomacy.

Is the national image of any importance? National image has an effect on an individual point of view towards a nation, its products and persons.¹¹ A favourable image affects a nation's capability to form alliances, and as a consequence broadens the nation's foreign power like soft power. National image is crucial for countries not only because

⁷ Michael Kunczik, *Image of Nations and International Public Relations* (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), 47.

⁸ Jian Wang, "The Power and Limits of Branding in National Image Communication in Global Society," *International Political Communication* 14, no. 2 (2008): 9-24.

⁹ Sarina Theys, "Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory." *E-International Relations*, February 23, 2018 < <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/23/introducing-constructivism-in-international-relations-theory/>>

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Simon Anholt, *Competitive Identity: The New Brand Management for Nations, Cities and Regions* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

it communicates the basic information about the state in question but also because it represents that country's picture to a global audience. Under the conditions of globalization and modern mass media societies, the national image is considered important. This has resulted in the institutionalization of national image in diplomacy, especially public diplomacy. Consequently, communication management practices are increasingly being applied at the nation-state system level in public diplomacy.

Diplomacy's pedigree or history is robust and can be traced back to human antiquity. The practice of diplomacy in ancient times is recorded in the Old Testament of the Bible and the medieval Roman and Greek Empires of antiquity. Reymond Cohen¹² and Bertrand Lafont¹³ trace the history of diplomacy to the third millennium B.C. particularly, from c. 700 B.C. in ancient Asia and Chinese antiquity. Further evidence of diplomacy in the statecraft of ancient Asia is found in the ancient Near East, particularly towards the end of the fourth millennium B.C with instances of diplomatic activities being found in the ancient Sumerian city-states namely; Elamite, Sumer and Akkad, up to the establishment of an empire by Sargon of Akkad.¹⁴

Brian Campbell has traced diplomacy back to the Roman world, circa 500 B.C. to A.D 235.¹⁵ Polybius, the ancient Greek historian chronicles the practice of diplomacy in ancient Greece.¹⁶ Another important account that implies that diplomacy was a craft embedded in the ancient world is provided by General Thucydides, son of Olorus and the chronicler of the *Peloponnesian War*.¹⁷ His account of the *Melian dialogue* shows the conduct of diplomacy between the Athenian emissaries and the Melian representatives.

Nonetheless, a more recent account of diplomacy in statecraft can be traced back to Renaissance Italy, especially during the period of the Italian city-states including,

¹² Reymon Cohen, "The Great Tradition: The Spread of Diplomacy in the Ancient World". In Christopher Jonsson and Richard Langhorne, editors, *Diplomacy Vo. 1* (London, UK: Sage Publications, 2004). p. 45.

¹³ Bertrend Lafont, "International Relations in the Ancient Near East: The Birth of A Complete Diplomatic System", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2009, p.39.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p.40.

¹⁵ Brian Campbell, "Diplomacy in the Roman World (c.500 – AD 235)." In Christer Jonsson and Richard Langhorne, "Introduction: Vol. II", In Christer Jonsson and Richard Langhorne, editors, *Diplomacy Vo. 1* (London, UK: Sage Publications, 2004) 175.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 175.

¹⁷ Thucydides, The "Melian Dialogue", In Richard K. Betts, editor, *The History of the Peloponnesian War Conflict After the Cold War*, 2nd Edition (New York: Longman, 2002) pp. 60.

Milan, Venice and Naples in the second half of the 15th Century.¹⁸ The Milanese dispatches from the courts of Lorenzo the Magnificent, Burgundy and France attest to the robustness of diplomatic practice in the statecraft of Renaissance Italy.¹⁹ The voice of Niccolo Machiavelli, the Italian Renaissance thinker in *The Prince* is replete with the craft of diplomacy among the city-states.²⁰

In the present world, the pervasive spread of democracy and globalization has established a novel international environment. Captivating the foreign public is a central concern of governments.²¹ When interviewed by a Time Magazine editor, Hillary Clinton opined that one of her goals as the Secretary of State was to bring diplomacy into the streets and the media, and in so doing remove it from government offices and move to city streets.²² Clinton was dubbed the champion of public diplomacy and was lauded for advancing the use of soft power through her interactions with foreign publics, especially in social media.²³

The need to understand how public diplomacy strategies influence international image can be examined from the perspective of liberalism. Central to this is the liberal idea of soft power is inherent in their shared emphasis on the role of norms, ideas and identities in international relations. The liberal idea of ‘soft power’, which holds that international relations cannot be managed effectively through economic manipulation and coercion.²⁴ Joseph Nye advanced the soft power theory. This perspective holds that proof of power resides not in the possession of material resources but in the state’s ability to shape other states’ behaviour.²⁵ The soft power theory provides a means of conceptualizing public diplomacy practices.

¹⁸ Jonsson and Langhorne, “Introduction” p. xiii

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 61.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 61.

²¹ Melissen, Jan, ed. (2007) *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

²² Stengel, R. (2011, October 27). Q&A: Hillary Clinton on Libya, China, the Middle East and Barack Obama. *TIME*. Retrieved from <http://swampland.time.com/2011/10/27/qa-hillary-clinton-on-libya-china-the-middle-east-and-barack-obama/>

²³ Seib, P. (2013, May 12). Hillary Clinton was a Champion of Public Diplomacy. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/judging-hillary-clinton-as-secretary-of-state/hillary-clinton-was-a-champion-of-public-diplomacy>

²⁴ Stephanie Lawson, *Theories of International Relations: Contending Approaches to World Politics*. (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2015), p. 188.

²⁵ Ibid. p. 165

Diplomacy has been defined as the controlling or managing of international or foreign relations through negotiating by envoys and ambassadors; that is, the art or business of diplomatists, and the skill in the performance of international relations. According to Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham,²⁶ diplomacy is construed as entailing the formulation and execution of a state or an entity's foreign policy, the technique for directing foreign politics and essentially as a professional activity of foreign negotiation. According to Jan Mellisen, diplomacy relates to a country's communication and interaction with people in other countries.²⁷ According to Geoff R. Berridge, diplomacy is an integral ingredient of power.²⁸ These conceptualizations imply the capacity of a state actor and non-state entity to engage in diplomacy.

Diplomacy is a multi-track undertaking conducted through multiple channels and involving multiple players. Through these, scholars have identified three types of diplomacy; track one (or Track 1) diplomacy, Track 1.5 diplomacy, and track two (Track 2) diplomacy.²⁹ Track one diplomacy, also called 'first track' or 'first tier' diplomacy refers to the official or formal diplomatic efforts channelled through mostly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or its equivalent.³⁰ Track one and a half also called Track 1.5 or Track 1 1/2 diplomacy seeks to address the misgivings of Track 1 diplomacy. It refers to the hybrid or the quasi-official processes engaged in by state official representatives but in a private capacity.³¹

The third form of diplomacy, and one within which public diplomacy is rooted is Track 2' diplomacy. The term was coined by Joseph Montville³², an American diplomat in 1981 about unofficial or informal interactions occurring between members of antagonistic nations to establish strategies, shape public opinion, and manage material and human resources in a manner that resolves the conflict. As opposed to conventional diplomacy, which involves the formal agents of the state including presidents, kings,

²⁶ Evans and, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*. p. 129.

²⁷ Wang, *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication*, p. 2.

²⁸ Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* (London, UK, 1998) 128-29.

²⁹ Jeffrey Mapendere, 'Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Contemporary Tracks.' *COPOJ – Culture of Peace Online Journal*, Volume 2, Number 1 (2006), p. 66

³⁰ Gupta, R. & Choudhary, N. (2013). Unofficial Diplomacy at Work: A SAARC Perspective. *American International Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences*, 3(1), 50 – 65

³¹ Mapendere, 'Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Contemporary Tracks' p. 67

³² Joseph V. Montville, 'Track Two Diplomacy: The Work of Healing History' *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, (2006), p. 15

diplomats or envoys, public diplomacy involves direct engagement with the foreign public to appeal to them, attracting them and transforming their perceptions favourably.³³

Public diplomacy is conceptualized as the endeavours of a nation to shape another country's elite or public for foreign policy goals. Governments habitually endeavour to connect with other countries' public and thereby disseminate their institutions, culture, values and ideas, and national policies.³⁴ Edmund Gullion devised the phrase public diplomacy in the mid-1990s to define the sway of public attitudes on foreign policy formulation and execution.³⁵ The Murrow Centre brochure summarized Gullion's definition and conceived public diplomacy as comprising dimensions of foreign relations transcending those of conventional diplomacy. Public diplomacy occurs in multiple forms such as dialogue, monologue and cooperation and is aimed at boosting a state's image and reputation.³⁶ The key objective of public diplomacy is to favourably impact foreign nationals' perception of the values, actions and social policies of their governments. It is a state's main approach to maintaining and maximizing its 'soft power'.

A nation's image may be defined as the environment of views formed by a shared expression of judgements and expressions of a state by its foreign public. Image cultivation and propaganda activities aimed at foreign publics are almost as old as diplomacy. Countries, be they small or large, powerful or weak recognize the importance of their reputation and image as tactical resources in global politics.³⁷ Consequently, there is consensus that how a country is viewed overseas is a very

³³ David Coopeland, *Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations*. (London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), p. 162.

³⁴ Smith, P.H. Public diplomacy, by Minister-Counsellor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy, London. Retrieved on 26/04/2010. From: <http://www.diplomact.edu/books/mdiplomacy-book/smith/p.h.%20smith.htm>

³⁵ Gyorgy Szondi, 'Public Diplomacy and National Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences.' Discussion Papers in Diplomacy. (Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2008), p. 2.

³⁶ Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault, 'Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy.' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 616 (2008), pp. 10 - 11

³⁷ Jian Wang. *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication*. 1st Ed. (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), p. 2.

important aspect in the emblematic realm of national power.³⁸ Robert Jervis³⁹ argued that a good reputation and image were much more important than military and economic power increments. Consequently, countries habitually endeavour to maintain and maximize their soft power by adopting strategies aimed at appealing to the foreign public.

China is not precluded from the drive by countries to project and establish a positive image and reputation.⁴⁰ Globally, and particularly in the West, China is perceived, on the one hand as a country that has made great economic progress lifting nearly a billion people from abject poverty and as an emergent dominant military power in the Asia Pacific region, and on the contrary, it is a country criticized for its human rights observance.⁴¹ China has also been accused of pursuing world domination and its foreign engagements in the developing world have often been viewed with apprehension.⁴²

Whether China can rise peacefully is the key question that dominates the perception of China overseas, especially given that mainstream public opinion does not expect that the Chinese will behave responsibly in the world, particularly in the area of politics. PRC's pursuit of huge amounts of energy resources and raw materials to grow its economy is often portrayed as being inimical to the development of the remainder of the world.⁴³ Fantu and Obi⁴⁴ argue that the product of China's African engagement could result in 'decolonization by invitation'. Three perspectives dominate the perception of China in Africa; that is, as a development companion, as an economic contestant and as a colonist.⁴⁵

Perhaps to better communicate itself and to enhance how it is perceived by the foreign public, particularly in Africa, China has adopted several public diplomacy strategies. The PRC has embraced the notion of 'soft power', perhaps more than any other state in

³⁸ Wang, *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication*, p. 2.

³⁹ Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 6

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 2.

⁴¹ Ibid. p. 32

⁴² Fantu Cheru & Cyril Obi Ed., 'The Rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Critical Interventions. (New York, NY: Zed Books, 2010), pp. 1-2

⁴³ Wang, *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication*, p. 2.

⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 2

⁴⁵ Chris Alden, 'China in Africa', *Survival*, Volume 47, Number 3, (2005), p. 5

the world. According to Wang⁴⁶, China has explored a spectrum of tactics and programs of public diplomacy in its endeavour to establish a novel and enriched global image.

In Kenya, China has been involved and is visible not only through its economic assistance, infrastructure projects like the Standard Gauge Railway and financial direct investment but also in terms of attempts to foster cultural exchanges and appreciation. PRC's public diplomacy enterprises in Kenya such as the relocation of Xinhua's overseas news service to Nairobi from Paris in 2006, and the formation of China Central Television (CCTV) Africa-specific programming in 2012 with Nairobi as its base of operation signify the growing centrality of soft power in China's approach to foreign relations. Other such strategies include the establishment of the pioneer foreign-centred radio station in Nairobi in 2006 - China Radio International (CRI), the establishment of cultural centres (Confucius institutes and classrooms) and the initiation of educational exchanges. Confucius Institute at the University of Nairobi was the first in sub-Saharan Africa in 2005. Others in Kenya are based at Kenyatta, Moi, and Egerton universities.⁴⁷

1.2 Statement of the Problem

China is viewed with indifference and apprehension by the international public and its rise is considered by some members of the international community a threat to international peace. According to Ingrid d'Hooghe,⁴⁸ more than 40 per cent of Western media coverage of China is negative. Meanwhile, another survey by BBC World exposed that 70% of participants listed the rise in population, bureaucracy, limited democratic space and bribery as China's greatest barrier to change, while its huge population and cheap labour, as China's greatest development advantage.⁴⁹

China seeks to increase the understanding and appreciation of China and Chinese cultural values to change or improve its image. Over the decade, China has heightened its public diplomacy engagements in Africa. It has used a spectrum of soft power resources including Chinese media, the Confucius Institute and educational exchange

⁴⁶ Ingrid d'Hooghe, *The Rise of China's Public Diplomacy*. p. 2.

⁴⁷ S. Baillard. China in Africa: An Analysis of the Effect of Chinese Media Expansion on African Public Opinion the *International Journal of Press/Politics*, 2016 - journals. sage/p5

⁴⁸ d'Hooghe, *The Rise of China's Public Diplomacy*. p. 18.

⁴⁹ The report can be found at <http://www.gmi-mr.com/gmipoll/release.php?p=20060522> and http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/bbcworld/worldstories/pressreleases/2006/05_may/emerging_giants.shtm

programs strategically to attempt to influence international audiences' perception of China and to address what Chinese officials consider the false presentation of China by the international public including the Kenyan public.

Kenya is arguably the epicentre of Chinese public diplomacy activities in Africa since out of the 48 CIs in the continent 16.7 per cent (8 CIs) are located in Kenya.⁵⁰ In terms of media diplomacy, Kenya has also been the regional focal point of Chinese media presence in Africa with key Chinese media houses including CRI, Xinhua, CGTN, and CCTV operating in Nairobi.⁵¹ Similarly, China has facilitated educational exchange programs for Kenyan students to attend Chinese universities in China, and has sponsored thousands of Kenyan students to study in China. These efforts are aimed at serving some strategic goals for China.

Ideally, the tools of PD China has deployed are supposed to promote Chinese culture and communicate its rise positively to the rest of the world. The ultimate goal is not only to eliminate the existing misunderstanding of China's goals and objectives as a participant in the international economic and socio-political space but also to enhance the appreciation and trust of China.

Nonetheless, questions have emerged concerning the veracity or effectiveness of China's PD in Kenya. According to a 2018 survey by Ipsos Synovate on perceptions of Kenyans towards China, the majority of Kenyans think China is a threat to the Kenyan economy and 38% of Kenyans perceived China as unfavourable, perceiving China as a source of threat from cheap goods, corruption and loss of jobs.⁵² The fundamental question that this raises concerns whether China's PD has had any (positive) influence on Kenyan's perception of China.

It is less understood whether or how these strategies have been successful in influencing China's international image. Hence, there is a need to find out how effective these strategies have been by looking at the Kenyan case. This study sought to explore this

⁵⁰ Ibid. 65

⁵¹ Yu-Shan Wu, "The Rise of China's State-Led Media Dynasty in Africa." China Africa Project. Occasional Paper Number 117 (2012), 2

⁵² <https://nation.africa/kenya/news/china-a-threat-to-kenya-s-economy-new-survey-shows-84152> accessed 10sep2020.

issue by asking the fundamental question; has China's public diplomacy strategies in Kenya positively influenced how the Kenyan public perceives China?

1.3 Research Questions

This study strives to answer the following research questions;

1. How does public diplomacy influence national image?
2. In what ways has the Chinese media in Kenya influenced the perception of China's image in Kenya?
3. What is the effect of Chinese Cultural Institutes and Centres on the image of China in Kenya?
4. What is the effect of Chinese scholarship on China's image in Kenya?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of this study is to examine the role of Chinese public diplomacy in pursuit of China's positive image in Kenya.

The specific objectives are:

1. To examine the influence of public diplomacy on national image
2. To investigate the role of Chinese media on perception of China's image in Kenya
3. To explore the role of Chinese Cultural Institutes and Centres on the image of China in Kenya
4. To analyze the role of Chinese educational exchanges on China's image in Kenya

1.5 Literature Review

In light of the specific objectives of this study, the literature review is organized into two parts; the first part centres on the examination of the theoretical literature and examines public diplomacy from the perspective of three theories. The second part provides the empirical review of existing literature with the focus being on previous scholarship on public diplomatic strategies and their influence on national image.

1.5.1 Theoretical Literature Review

A theory, or *theoria*, as derived from Greek refers to a conjecture or a contemplation. More critically, it refers to an ordered system of ideas, which is directed at observing and explaining a situation or issue.⁵³ The study of any issue in international relations takes a wide range of theoretical slants. Within this study, the theories of soft power, rational choice as well and constructivism are utilized.

1.5.1.1 Liberalism

In this study, liberalism's "Soft Power" model developed by Joseph Nye Jr. is used. At the core of soft power is liberal democratic politics, fundamental values like human rights and free market economics.⁵⁴ Liberalism refers to a political doctrine focused on protecting and enhancing individual freedom. For liberals, these two are the ultimate political problems and the government exists to safeguard individuals from harm.⁵⁵ International norms are a key element of liberalism. Liberal norms are the basis of human rights, the rule of law, democracy and international cooperation.

As a dominant mainstream theory of international relations, liberalism accentuates the significance of cooperation and international institutions. Neo-liberals like Robert Keohane stress that outcomes of international outcomes cannot be accounted for adequately through hard power but concerning such concepts as liberal values, democratic interests, and international institutions. Robert Keohane and Nye's postulations are grounded in the early Enlightenment liberals such as Immanuel Kant and Thomas Paine.⁵⁶ Liberals hypothesize that under the anticipation of repeated interactions, cooperation can emerge. They do conceive of a wider temporal scope compared to realists; however, they consider a short enough time horizon for conventional power resources to lack fungibility. It is within this understanding of power that the soft power model emerged.

⁵³ Lawson, *Theories of International Relations: Contending Approaches to World Politics*. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015), p. 15.

⁵⁴ Eric Li, "The Rise and Fall of Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*, <
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/20/the-rise-and-fall-of-soft-power/#cookie_message_anchor>

⁵⁵
⁵⁶ Thoma C. Walker, "A Circumspect Revival of Liberalism: Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye's Power and Interdependence."

Joseph Nye presents soft power as an indirect means of exercising power, in *Bound to Lead* published in 1990⁵⁷ differing with the commanding form of exercising power, which is based on inducing carrots or threatening sticks.⁵⁸ It aims at winning over via seduction in preference to intimidation. Strong control of power is intended to get people to do whatever they want. The aim of soft power is more subtle; it is to make people desire what you also aspire to. In this context, it reverberates with the concept of 'conditioned power' which contrasts with condign and compensatory forms of power, expressed in *The Anatomy of Power* by Galbraith.⁵⁹ Therefore, soft power is a less tangible, barely coercive form of power, whose effects might be less verifiable, but for all these reasons, it is potentially much more effective if it is successful, because it does not bear the shame of intimidation and coercion.

Hard power depends on tangible conventional tools such as economic inducements and military threats, but soft power relies on a much larger, more elusive, variety of assets within its reach. Nye argues that soft power lies in three assets of the nation; political values (if it lives to its principles both at home and internationally), foreign policy (where it is considered authentic and has ethical standing) and culture (if it is appealing to others).⁶⁰ As Nye sees it, the premise of soft power resides, therefore, in persuasive communication skills, the use of multilateral organizations, and the successful exercise of interdependence.⁶¹

The nexus with PD is thus between the conjectural content of global interrelations in different levels of power and the functional rudiments of how countries develop or extend their soft power capability, therefore; Nye's theory is used to co-opt by attraction and appeal.⁶² According to Nye⁶³, Soft power should be applied by states to resolve serious internal issues that call for multilateral cooperation and unity among states. In

⁵⁷ Nye. (1990) p.31

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ See Galbraith. (1983)

⁶⁰ Nye. (2004) p. 11

⁶¹ Nye. (1990) p. 180

⁶² Joseph, Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. Cambridge: Perseus Books, (2004), p. 57

⁶³ Joseph, Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p.57

doing so, public diplomacy is becoming the pursuit of states that require extensive efforts to convert people globally, through cultural promotion.⁶⁴

Media assessments constitute the immense profound evaluations of China's soft power. The PRC has invested huge amounts of money in the endeavour to expand *Xinhua News Agency*, which is its formal news channel CCTV (China Central Television), among other sources used by the Chinese government for global audiences.⁶⁵ More than US\$ 10 billion is spent on propaganda every year by China's State Council of Information.⁶⁶ Consequently, in the typical analysis, China seeks to counter-weigh the Western media's projection of China, through *Xinhua*, particularly in the global south.⁶⁷ As such, China's media campaigns can be directly linked to its goal of enhancing its image.

1.5.1.2 Rational Choice Theory (RCT)

Rational Choice Theory (RCT) is associated with the works of the faculty at the Chicago School of Economics. One of the early proponents of the RCT was Gary Becker who advocated for the application of actor models more broadly. The RCT is increasingly applicable to various social science disciplines other than economics including political science, sociology, and evolutionary theory. It is within the latter that rational choice has found its application in diplomacy and ultimately in public diplomacy.

The perspective of the rational choice model relating to public diplomacy holds that there's an extant continuum of benefits and costs that create the basis for the states' calculus to practice diplomacy.⁶⁸ This means that the rational theory would find that the national interests of states underlie their practice of public diplomacy; that is, the intricate assessment of immediate gains and future gains. According to Ivan, such interests could range from prestige to tangible economic benefits.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 58

⁶⁵ Joseph S. Nye Jr., "China Power: Unpacking the Complexity of China's Rise." *Is China's Soft Power Strategy Working?* Center for Strategic and International Studies. Video.

⁶⁶ Richard Heydarian, "Is China's Soft Power Bubble About to Burst?"

⁶⁷ David Shambaugh, "China's Soft Power Push: The Search for Respect," *Foreign Affairs* 94, no. 4 (July/August 2015),

⁶⁸ Ivan Willis Rasmussen, 'Towards a Theory of Public Diplomacy: A Quantitative Study of Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.' [Unpublished PhD Thesis]. (The Fletcher School, 2009), p. 9.

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 10.

The apparent benefit of public diplomacy and enhancing the international image of a state contradicts the more impervious interests of convincing another state to that national narrative of the state.⁷⁰ The motivations for practising public diplomacy include preserving international prestige, fighting negative international impressions, improving the state's financial situation and being in charge of the information flowing in and out of the country.

The costs and benefits continuum implicit in the rational choice model also implies that public diplomacy involves incurring relevant costs: capacity and wealth. As such, despite practising diplomacy informed by national interests, the state's possibility in public diplomacy practice is limited by capacity. This means that the evaluation of the rational drive underpinning public diplomacy is central to comprehending antecedents such as wealth and prestige.

However, despite the relevance of RCT for the scholarship of an inquiry into public diplomacy, there are criticisms against the rational choice model's perspective. One such criticism is grounded in the concept of 'credible public diplomacy'.⁷¹ This means that if the motivations underpinning PD are manifestly rational and egotistic then there is a particular likelihood that public diplomacy's perceived credibility is diminished. Edward R. Murrow intimated that public diplomacy must be necessarily truthful and credible for it to be effective.

China's practice of public diplomacy can therefore be understood from the perspective of the RCT. From the standpoint of the RCT China's engagement in public diplomacy strategies derives from the cost-benefit analysis paradigm in which it anticipates more gains than costs. However, the rational choice model is problematic when applied to deliberate actions by China, which cannot be conclusively established with the cost-benefit paradigm.

1.5.1.3 Theory of Constructivism

Constructivism is the idea that the factors of reality are both material and ideational in origin. This implies that non-material factors have not only normative but also

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 10.

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 10.

instrumental dimensions, which manifest both collectively and individually. Constructivists posit that the meaning and significance of ideational elements are geographically and spatially interdependent.⁷² Cesar posits that connecting PD to constructivism depends on a subjective human exchange; which means that the capacity and will of humans to intentionally towards a situation and accord it meaning.⁷³

Therefore, public diplomacy is based on the hypothesis that norms, values, and identities are defined not by material resources but by social constructs. In this sense, public diplomacy can be used to shape these social constructs by inspiring and persuading discussions and hence a tool to influence the public perception abroad.⁷⁴ Advocates of constructivism quarry the importance of material power in the outcome, and provide a dissimilar outline of practice that conceives that normative or ideational structures exert influence and support audiences through the collective deliberations of thing subjective aspects constituent by collaboration and interaction.

Public diplomacy presents a vehicle for actualizing constructivist approaches by addressing the very currencies, which form the centre of constructivism.⁷⁵ The realization by states that compassionate media reporting is a necessary condition for political sway, the struggle to obtain media coverage has become a key element of public diplomacy. Shaefer and Gabay (2009) argue that media usage is important to creating a favourable news agenda and underscores several public diplomacy efforts.⁷⁶ In this manner, news media are tailored to a state's calculated objectives and establish new communication that bolsters a nation's agenda.

⁷² John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*. (New York, NY: Routledge, 1998), p. 33.

⁷³ César Villanueva Rivas, 'Cosmopolitan Constructivism: Mapping a Road to the Future of Cultural and Public Diplomacy', *Public Diplomacy Magazine*, (2010), p. 47

⁷⁴ Efe Sevin, "Public Relations Review Pathways of Connection: An Analytical Approach to the Impacts of Public Diplomacy." *Public Relations Review*, Volume 41, Number 4 (2015), pp. 562–68.

⁷⁵ Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*. p. 33.

⁷⁶ Sheaffer, Tamir, and Itay Gabay. "Mediated Public Diplomacy: A Strategic Contest over International Agenda Building and Frame Building Mediated Public Diplomacy". *Political Communication*, Volume 1, Number (2009), p. 447.

1.5.2 Empirical Review

The empirical review implies the methodical examination, documentation, assessment and analysis, of the literature containing the relevant information for the research problem being investigated.

1.5.2.1 Public Diplomacy and National Image

Building from the works of E.H. Carr, Joseph Nye conceived the concept of “soft power” in 1990. Nye conceptualised soft power as the capacity to obtain what you desire by appeal other than coercion or sticks.⁷⁷ He posits that it is acquired through the allure of a nation’s policies, political ideals and culture. On one hand, a positive national image can be a country’s asset, more precious than raw materials or territory.⁷⁸ On the other hand, an unfavourable national image has the potential for future conflict.⁷⁹

Challenged by globalization, this role of national image is further significant in the present-day world as countries wish to participate more actively in world affairs and strengthen their rank on the international stage.⁸⁰ This gives explanations into why responsible administrations place significant resources and efforts into unearthing perceptions of foreign publics about their nation and developing more successful strategies for their national image. These strategies are all part of public diplomacy.

Public diplomacy is conceptualized as the exercise of unlocking doors of communication with foreign publics and forging favourable global relationships. The goal of PD is to enhance the perception of a given nation,⁸¹ build an attractive national image,⁸² and eventually shape the blueprint overseas of governments by influencing

⁷⁷ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

⁷⁸ Eytan Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): 55-77.

⁷⁹ Kunczik, *Image of Nations and International Public Relations*.

⁸⁰ Xiufang Li and Chitty Naren, “Reframing National Image: A Methodological Framework,” *Conflict & Communication Online* 8, no. 2 (2009): 1-11.

⁸¹ Nicholas Cull, “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories.” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): 31-54; Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy”; Li and Chitty, “Reframing National Image”.

⁸² Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): 94-109; Jian Wang, “Managing National Reputation and International Relations in the Global Era: Public Diplomacy Revisited.” *Public Relations Review* 32 (2006): 91-96.

their people's perception towards the country.⁸³ In sum, PD seeks to win “the hearts and minds” of persons around the globe.⁸⁴ Bernays⁸⁵ opines that “the demands of the public to be incorporated to the complexities of international issues are beginning to be felt.” As such, states' primary goal in public diplomacy is to affect or influence public opinion and per se is focused on transforming attitudes and perceptions of its image.

The Chinese government is well aware of its negative or unfavourable image by the international public. Ingrid d'Hooghe points out that few nations in the globe are as responsive as China to its international image. Chinese officials are concerned about what they consider as the false presentation of China by the international community and ultimately a misunderstanding of China's goals and objectives as a participant in the international economic and socio-political space. It is within this backdrop of China's perception of itself in the global arena and the international audience (mis)understanding of China that Chinese officials have found the appeal of soft power irresistible. Former Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi noted that public diplomacy instruments strengthen the political structure of nations and provide a solid base for national growth and foreign affairs.⁸⁶

According to Wang⁸⁷ in line with its positive image cultivation objectives, China has adopted multiple strategies to sway the foreign publics' opinion of it. Soft power projections of China in the world including in Kenya have involved a combination of strategies including the establishment of education exchanges with students from foreign countries, the establishment of cultural centres of which the CI is most famous and the use of Chinese media. For instance, in 2006 it relocated Xinhua's overseas news service to Nairobi from Paris. Media analyses constitute the mainstream of the more profound analysis of the PRC's soft power. In line with its public diplomacy goals, China has embarked on setting up institutions, which act as instruments of public

⁸³ Howard H. Frederick, *Global Communication and International Relations* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1993); Gifford D. Malone, *Political Advocacy and Cultural Communication: Organizing the Nation's Public Diplomacy* (Lanham, MD, London: University Press of America, 1988); Hans N. Tuch, *Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Institute for the Study of Public Diplomacy, 1990).

⁸⁴ Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy”, 55.

⁸⁵ Edward Bernays, *Crystallizing Public Opinion*. (New York, NY: Liveright, 1923) p. 37

⁸⁶ Former Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, quoted in Ding Ying, “Public Diplomacy Mission,” *Beijing Review*, No.8 (February 21, 2013)

⁸⁷ Wang. *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication*. p. 2

diplomacy to promote language and culture.⁸⁸ China has established cultural centres such as the Confucius institutes to cultivate amiable relationships with other nations and improve the knowledge of Chinese values, culture and language among the learners registered at the institutes worldwide.⁸⁹ The CI at the University of Nairobi was the first to be founded in sub-Saharan Africa in 2005. Others are based at Moi, Kenyatta, and Egerton universities.⁹⁰

The establishment of modelled institutions to advance public diplomacy is common among states, especially the powerful states – the French Alliance Française, the UK British Council, and Goethe Institutes for the Germans. However, the Chinese Confucius Institute is one of the most significant developments among these modelled institutions in the 21st century.⁹¹ PRC, in a span of 8 years, (2004-2012), established more than 900 Confucius Classrooms and institutes in over 108 nations globally. These institutes and classrooms are to promote its culture, values, and language. Presently, the Chinese have the third largest number of such national cultural centres in operation in other countries, after the UK and France.⁹²

1.5.2.2 The Role of Chinese Media on China's National Image in Kenya

Joseph Nye's conception of soft power identifies, in addition to social policies, culture and language; media as a resource for soft power.⁹³ In their seminal work, Walter Lipmann and Kenneth Boulding opines convincingly the significant role of mass media in crafting national image and moving forward the goals of foreign policy. The Chinese have devoted billions of dollars to transforming *Xinhua News Agency* which is the official news channel, CCTV (China Central Television), among other state broadcasters. These Chinese media outlets now have a global reach and attract international audiences.⁹⁴

⁸⁸ Wang, *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication*, pp. 1 - 4.

⁸⁹ 'Introduction to the "Confucius Institute" Project', website of Hanban, <http://english.hanban.edu.cn/market/HanBanE/412360>, accessed 6th May 2020

⁹⁰ S. Baillard. China in Africa: An Analysis of the Effect of Chinese Media Expansion on African Public Opinion *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 2016 - journals. sage/p5

⁹¹ Ibid. p. 2

⁹² Ibid. p. 2.

⁹³ Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*.

⁹⁴ Joseph S. Nye Jr., "China Power: Unpacking the Complexity of China's Rise." *Is China's Soft Power Strategy Working?* Center for Strategic and International Studies. Video.

The State Council Information Office singly spends US\$10 billion per annum on propaganda outside of China.⁹⁵ Subsequently, in the emblematic analysis, China endeavours to counter the Western media's image of the PRC, particularly in the developing world, and principally through *Xinhua*.⁹⁶ The policy has encouraged the formation of large and competitive domestic media aggregated in China, ready for international rivalry. The reasoning was that without media outlets commensurate to international rivalry, it would be problematic for China to shape foreign audiences' perceptions.⁹⁷

As such, if all Chinese media has sway over public perception, then Kenya forms a crucible for examining the effect of Chinese media on its national image. The various Chinese media are operating in Kenya with the ultimate goal of bringing another perspective of China and Chinese culture to the Kenyan public. In the past decade, Chinese government-sponsored media has established FM radio channels in Kenya and established the first Chinese overseas television production and broadcasting in Nairobi.⁹⁸ The fundamental question that follows relates to whether and in what manner China's media has affected or influenced public perception in Kenya. Has China's media influenced the public opinions of Kenyans?

According to Wasserman,⁹⁹ a recent study on the influence of Chinese media on African journalists including those in Kenya found that Chinese media had a marginal influence on the attitudes and routines of media personnel in Africa. It is argued that while Chinese is used as a source of information, the audience largely remained critical of the content of the Chinese media. The Chinese media is also largely considered the mouthpiece of the government. These findings are in line with and do echo findings that there is very little consumption of Chinese news media among the general public in Kenya.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ Richard Heydarian, "Is China's Soft Power Bubble About to Burst?"

⁹⁶ David Shambaugh, "China's Soft Power Push: The Search for Respect," *Foreign Affairs* 94, no. 4 (July/August 2015),

⁹⁷ David Bandurski, "Propaganda Head Liu Yunshan Promotes Commercialization of Media to Strengthen China's "Cultural Soft Power", China Media Project, 10 April 2007.

⁹⁸ Herman Wasserman and Dani Madrid-Morales, "How Influential Are Chinese Media in Africa? An Audience Analysis in Kenya and South Africa. *International Journal of Communication*, Volume 12, (2018), p. 2212.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 2215.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* p. 2216.

With Kenya as a case study, Yanqiu and Mwangi analyzed the attitudes of Kenyans toward Chinese media engagement in Africa and found that Africa Weekly, CCTV Africa and China Daily have less influence on the understanding of China among the Kenyan public.¹⁰¹ Kenya is the only African country that plays host to four Chinese media organizations including; China Radio International, CCTV, Xinhua News Agency and China Daily.¹⁰² On the contrary, according to Michael Leslie,¹⁰³ a recent survey by the American Research Centre, PEW, dubbed Global Attitudes and Trends 2015, Kenya among other African countries reported positive opinions about Chinese media in Africa.

1.5.2.3 The Effect of Chinese Cultural Centres on China's National Image in Kenya

The potential of cultural diplomacy conducted through cultural centres to shape the foreign public's perception has been acknowledged by scholars including Joseph Nye¹⁰⁴, and Zhang Meng¹⁰⁵ and Joseph R. Johnson.¹⁰⁶ Cultural diplomacy implies the exchange of ideas, art and information as well as other facets of culture among countries and their public to enhance reciprocal understanding.¹⁰⁷ Johnson argues that cultural centres can educate foreigners concerning different aspects of national values, culture and language.¹⁰⁸ Jenkins on the other hand argues that cultural centres are not as effective in shaping public opinion as pop culture products. He perceives that people establish stronger emotional bonds to pop culture as compared to cultural centres and the functions they perform.¹⁰⁹ According to d'Hooghe¹¹⁰, cultural centres are intrinsically apolitical tending to focus on conventional as opposed to popular culture.

¹⁰¹ Zhang, Yanqiu, and Jane Muthoni Mwangi. "A perception study on China's media engagement in Kenya: from media presence to power influence?" *Chinese Journal of Communication*, Volume 9, Number 1(2016), pp. 71-80.

¹⁰² Ibid. p. 73.

¹⁰³ Michael Leslie, 'The Dragon Shapes its Image: A Study of Chinese Media Influence Strategies in Africa. *African Studies Quarterly*, Volume 16, Issue 3 – 4, (2016), p. 168.

¹⁰⁴ Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2004).

¹⁰⁵ Meng, *The Concept of Soft Power: Propose Development and Criticism*. p. 273

¹⁰⁶ Joseph R. Johnson, 'The Effect of Cultural Diplomacy on Public Perception of Asia.' *All Graduate Theses and Dissertations*, Number 7257 (2018), p. 1.

¹⁰⁷ Milton C. Cummings, *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: Survey* (Washington, DC: Center for Arts and Culture, 2003), p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 28

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 28.

¹¹⁰ Ingrid d'Hooghe, *The Rise of China's Public Diplomacy*. p. 2.

According to Johnson, China has perhaps the most well-coordinated, ambitious and expansive cultural centre program in East Asia if not the world.¹¹¹ The Confucius Institutes, which were initiated in 2004 as a culmination of China's cultural diplomacy has since spread to 81 countries including Kenya.¹¹² Established in the Office of Chinese Language Centres International, Confucius institutes are supposed to spread Chinese language abroad and teach and train students on Chinese values and culture.¹¹³ Today, 541 of these Institutes operate globally, 135 across Asia, Europe has 187, and America has 138, 61 in Africa and 20 across Oceania. In Kenya, they are 4 in number. The founding one at the University of Nairobi and others at Kenyatta, Moi and Egerton Universities presented China's cultural offensive in Kenya.¹¹⁴

Despite their rapid growth around the world, there has been little or detailed scrutiny of the functions and roles of China's cultural centres on the foreign public's perception of China. Nonetheless, this does mean that commentators and analysts have failed to point to the potential of the cultural centres, especially the CI to function as a tool for Chinese public diplomacy. Published articles on Confucius Institutes such as that by Brady¹¹⁵ labeled them foreign propagandist tools for the Chinese government. For Niquet¹¹⁶ the institutes are part of China's endeavour to innovate its propaganda systems.

According to Wheeler,¹¹⁷ Chinese cultural centres in Kenya, specifically the CI were expected to produce a new group of Kenyans competent in Mandarin language skills and having full knowledge and appreciation of China, Chinese values and culture. The extent to which this has been the case is uncertain owing to limited studies that have examined the CI.

¹¹¹ Jonson, 'The Effect of Cultural Diplomacy on Public Perception of Asia.' p. 28.

¹¹² Baillard. China in Africa: An Analysis of the Effect of Chinese Media Expansion on African Public Opinion.

¹¹³ David M. Lampton, *The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money and Minds*. (Berkeley, CA: UCP, 2008), p. 157.

¹¹⁴ About Confucius Institute/Classroom , http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm, accessed 6th May 2020

¹¹⁵ Anne-Marie Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), p. 19

¹¹⁶ Valarie Niquet, "Confu-talk": The Use of Confucian Concepts in Contemporary Chinese Foreign Policy. In A – M. Brady, (Ed.), *China's Thought Management*. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), pp. 76 – 98.

¹¹⁷ Anita Wheeler, 'Cultural Diplomacy, Language Planning, and the Case of the University of Nairobi Confucius Institute. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Volume 49, Number 1, (2014), p. 49

Nonetheless, the few such as Wheeler, who have studied the CI in Kenya, observe that these institutions were supposed to equip Kenyan students with the requisite language skills and knowledge of Chinese culture that would enable them to interact with the growing number of Chinese tourists and business persons in Kenya. The study by Wheeler revealed that while students enrolled in the CI sought to learn Mandarin and Chinese culture, others stigmatized them within the campus for learning Mandarin. It was established that students enrolled in the CI had a somewhat favourable view of China compared to those who were not enrolled in the CI.¹¹⁸ Most students at the CI in Kenya reported a favourable perception of the institutes with significant attachment to China's economic interests in the region. On the contrary, some students argued that the institutes were set up for the sole reason that China appeared to care about teaching Africans.¹¹⁹

1.5.2.4 The Influence of Chinese Scholarship and Educational Exchanges on China's National Image in Kenya

The development of international educational exchange programs is traced to the Middle Ages¹²⁰ but its modern use is attributed to the immediate post-war period, from 1945. According to McAllister-Grande, the idea was pivoted on national security, defence and the notion of world peace.¹²¹ Since then, international educational exchange programs have gained traction within public diplomacy and the programs have in essence become part of the strategies of public diplomacy for many countries including China.¹²² Mitchel views international educational and cultural affairs as the third dimension in international relations.¹²³

The fundamental question therefore is, as Antonio F. de Limar Jr.,¹²⁴ asks, what makes educational exchanges politically instrumental to diplomats that they form part of

¹¹⁸ Ibid. p. 56

¹¹⁹ Ibid. p. 56.

¹²⁰ Antonio F. de Lima Jr., 'The Role of International Educational Exchanges in Public Diplomacy. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, Volume 3, Number 3 (2007), p. 237.

¹²¹ McAllister-Grande, B. 'The Historical Roots of Internationalization in U.S. Higher Education: Mapping Theories and Rationales of International Education and Cultural Diplomacy in the Post World War II Period (1945-1970), [Unpublished Paper.]

<http://www.nafsa.org/_/File/_/ac08sessions/GS089.pdf> [Accessed: 13/07/2020]

¹²² Ane Bisley, 'Student-to-Student Diplomacy: Chinese International Students as Soft Power Tool.' *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, Volume 46, Number 2, (2017), p. 81.

¹²³ de Lima Jr., 'The Role of International Educational Exchanges in Public Diplomacy, p. 237.

¹²⁴ Ibid. p. 237.

public diplomacy? The various activities of international education exchanges including the academic exchange programs and workshops affect the perspectives of the participants and shape their worldviews. In this regard, the students, teachers and professors selected to participate in the educational exchange programs are better placed to understand the host country and in so doing sympathize with its political system, values and culture.¹²⁵

Jesse Lutabingwa and Arshard Bashir¹²⁶ argue that people-to-people direct public diplomacy as takes place through educational exchanges is a strong tool to influence and change an individual's insight into another nation and its culture. Further, they stress the significance of student exchanges as playing an important role in public diplomacy especially since person-to-person contact among people of diverse cultures and regions helps to reduce stereotypes and eventually facilitate intercultural understanding. According to Ann Stock, one time under Secretary at the Department of State in the US, educational exchanges are crucial to public diplomacy efforts and are vital in increasing mutual understanding.¹²⁷ The educational exchanges fuel cooperation to address common challenges. Through exchanges, governments can develop stable and durable relationships with foreign publics.¹²⁸ The effect of international education exchange on public opinion is captured in the theory of the international student, opined by Ingrid Eide, which considered exchange students as 'culture carriers.'¹²⁹

According to Ane Bisley,¹³⁰ the near-ubiquitous presence of Chinese international students around the world evidences the place of the students as soft-power tools for China. Increasingly, the educational exchange program has become a crucial tool in Chinese public diplomacy. In 2005, more than 141,000 foreigners were educated in China, 28% more than in the previous year. 75% came from Asia, 9% from the

¹²⁵ Hans de Wit, *Internationalization of Higher Education in the United States of America and Europe: A Historical, Comparative, and Conceptual Analysis*. (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 2002), p. 85.

¹²⁶ Jesse Lutabingwa and Arshard Bashir, 'Cultural Diplomacy Through Educational and Cultural Exchanges: The Caase of North Carolina-Pakistan School Exchange Project. (New York, NY: Routlege, 2012), p. 1

¹²⁷ Ann Stock "International Educational Exchange: A High-Dividend Investment in the Future," (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 2010).

¹²⁸ de Lima Jr., 'The Role of International Educational Exchanges in Public Diplomacy, p. 239.

¹²⁹ Ingrid Eide, 'Students as culture carriers,' in Eide, I. (Ed) 'Students as Links Between Cultures. (Oslo, NOR: Universitetsforlaget, 1970), pp.166 -195.

¹³⁰ Ibid. p. 81.

Americas, 2% from Africa, 1% from Oceania and 12 per cent from Europe.¹³¹ The Great Beijing Summit 2006 on Education made new commitments to training and education scholarships. Part of the commitment, China was to double up its scholarship to African students from 2000 every year in 2006 to 4000 per year in 2009. In Kenya, as Kenneth King¹³² opines, the provision of scholarships has been a dominant mode of educational support to the Kenya Government by the Chinese since 1983, but in recent there are been considerably diverse longer-term scholarships by other Chinese institutions.

Mukesh Williams¹³³ posits that international education exchange programs are among the best means of globalizing education and according to students a life-changing experience. Such exchange programs help educational institutions to raise their academic standards and also to impart to students the skills they cannot get at their home universities.¹³⁴ However, educational exchanges also have great importance for cultural diplomacy.

1.5.3 Conceptual Model




Figure 1.1: Conceptual Model
Source; Author 2020

¹³¹Xinhua News Agency, 'More Foreigners Studying in China', 2006,

<<http://www.china.org.cn/english/GS-e/170530.htm>> [Accessed: 15/5/2020].

¹³² Kenneth King, China's Cooperation in Education and Training with Kenya: A Different Model? *International Journal of Educational Development*, Volume 30, Number 5, (2010), p. 488.

¹³³ Mukesh Williams, 'Globalizing Education Through Exchange Programs. *Japan Sportlight*, Volume 1, Number I, (2014), p. 46.

¹³⁴ Ibid. p. 46

1.6 Gap in Literature

The literature review reveals certain gaps. The first relates to the conceptualization of the underpinnings and tenets of public diplomacy, national image and soft power. Ontologically, scholars are divided on what public diplomacy entails and on what elements underscore national image. However, there is a consensus that public diplomacy and national image are intertwined.

The lack of understanding of a universal conception of public diplomacy, national image and soft power creates the epistemological gap in that the referent essentials or units of analysis are not defined. Second, while studies have been conducted examining China's soft power projections in Kenya, the existing literature reveals that no focused analysis has been made to single out how China's media, its cultural centers in Kenya and its educational exchanges with Kenya have influenced Chinese image in Kenya.

1.7 Justification and Rationale of the Study

Investigating China's public diplomacy in Kenya and the impacts on its image is relevant not only for academic and policy purposes but also for understanding broader geopolitical dynamics and their implications for international relations in the 21st century. This study is significant for the following reasons;

1.7.1 Academic Justification

This study is of potential importance to students and analysts of public diplomacy particularly Chinese soft power projection through PD. It contributes to the existing literature relating to the concept and practice of public diplomacy and provides a pool of information on the nexus between public diplomacy and national image and the success of public diplomacy strategies that China has used to influence public perceptions. More specifically, it contributes to the literature on how the Chinese media, Chinese Cultural centers and Chinese educational exchanges have shaped its perception among the Kenyan public. This study also deepens our understanding on how soft power operates in international relations particularly in the context of China's engagement in Africa.

1.7.2 Policy Justification

This study is of great significance to the government of China and particularly to the policymakers in the Department of Foreign Affairs. It not only adds to their current understanding of China's PD programs and strategies but also the extent to which the various strategies of public diplomacy adopted have facilitated the attainment of China's public diplomacy goal. The Chinese government and the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi, more so the public diplomacy policy makers may use the study findings as a benchmark for evaluating the role of PD in pursuit of its national interests in Kenya and Africa at large. Evaluation may lead to better allocation of resources, justification of budget requests and reveal best practices as well as moderate inflated expectations of what public diplomacy can achieve.

1.7.3 Geo Political Implications

Kenya holds strategic significance in Africa due to its regional influence, economic potential and diplomatic ties with major powers. Also, Kenya has been significant recipient of Chinese investment in infrastructure, media and development providing a tangible context for examining the impact of Chinese involvement on local communities and perceptions. Understanding China's Image in Kenya provides insights into broader geopolitical dynamics including China's competition with other global powers for influence in Africa and implications for regional stability and development.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

Liberalism is one of the dominant theories of international relations. According to liberalism, at the core of international politics, is the problem of war. To solve this problem, it proposes three solutions, democracy, economic interdependence and international institutions.¹³⁵ Thus, implicit in the liberal theory is the soft power model. In opposing the notion of hard power, associated with realism, soft power accentuates, the possibility of cooperation among and between states. Accordingly, soft power is in line with liberalism's three solutions to war. A successful public policy, political values, and economic model may inspire a desire in other countries to implement this model.

¹³⁵ Maxime Gomichon, "Joseph Nye Soft Power" *E-International Relations*. (2013) < <https://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/08/joseph-nye-on-soft-power/>>

The soft power model was first conceived by Carr when he propounded the value of power over opinion in his synthesis of soft power.¹³⁶ Lin and Hongtao posit that Nye conceived soft power as the force that directs the capabilities, social system, ideology and culture of others. This implies that Nye's soft power is a nation's resolve to achieve its goal through allure and charm over foreign publics.¹³⁷ This theory is grounded in the dissatisfaction with the illuminating power of global relations patterns. Therefore, the theory of soft power emerged from a critique of realism with its overemphasis on hard power.¹³⁸ Soft power theory points to foreign policy, political values and culture as soft power's main resources.

According to Morgenthau¹³⁹, culture is the behaviour pattern of passing values and knowledge and entails a set of practices that create meaning. Political values according to Nye imply a set of systems and rules that are self-interested and capable of dominating global relations.¹⁴⁰ Foreign policies are significant for public diplomacy if they are perceived as legitimate, in which sense policies considered as legalistic and sharing moral authorizes are resources of soft power.¹⁴¹ In the *Bound to Lead* publication of 1990, Joseph Nye presents soft power as an indirect means of exercising power,¹⁴² differing from the commanding form of exercising power, which is based on inducing carrots or threatening sticks.¹⁴³ The core objective of soft power is to convert through seduction as opposed to intimidation and coercion. Soft power, in addition to being able to persuade and convince, also possesses charming power. However, contributors such as Shin-Wha Lee¹⁴⁴ and G. John Ikenberry found soft power to be resident in ideational attractiveness and comprise over and above cultural power alone

¹³⁶ Joseph, S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2004).

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Lin & Hongtao, 'Joseph Nye's Soft Power Theory and Its Revelation Towards Ideological and Political Education.' p. 69.

¹³⁹ Hans Morgenthau, *The Politics between Countries: The Power Conflict and Peace*. (Beijing, CHN: Renmin Publishing House, 2012), p. 74.

¹⁴⁰ Lin & Hongtao, 'Joseph Nye's Soft Power Theory and Its Revelation Towards Ideological and Political Education.' p. 70.

¹⁴¹ Ibid. p. 70.

¹⁴² Nye. (1990) p.31

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Shin-Wha Lee, 'The Theory and Reality of Soft Power: Practical Approaches in East Asia. n: Lee S.J., Melissen J. (eds) *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia*. Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

as it incorporates educational and political principles, legitimate national policies and socioeconomic systems.

An effective management of soft power can enhance a country's image abroad.¹⁴⁵ Soft power aims to influence others to desire what you aspire to. As such, it resonates closely with the idea of 'conditioned power' and contrasts with the compensatory form of power, which was advanced by John Kenneth Galbraith in his *The Anatomy of Power*.¹⁴⁶ Zhang Meng¹⁴⁷ argues that soft power can affect, attract, and even persuade others to trust and acknowledge the social system, rules, lifestyle, and sense of value through morality and spiritual requirements. According to Hans Morgenthau,¹⁴⁸ attractiveness resides in a nation's political values, foreign policies and culture. Soft power is enhanced when the public perceives the ideals, culture, values and foreign policies as legitimate,

The soft power theory suffices for this study as it permits an in-depth analysis of Chinese soft power projections through various strategies. Its major trappings, sources and resources including cultural attractiveness, ideational appeal, educational imperatives and values can be explored about China's PD. Chinese public diplomacy projections through cultural centers, educational exchanges and Chinese media must be construed within the framework of the soft power theory as this study seeks to do.

1.9 Research Hypotheses

1. Effective public diplomacy strategies account for a positive international image
2. Despite concerted media efforts, the Chinese national image in Kenya remains negative
3. Increased Chinese cultural institutes and centers in Kenya have enhanced positive perception of China in Kenya

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. P. 43

¹⁴⁶ John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Anatomy of Power*. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1983).

¹⁴⁷ Zhang Meng, *The Concept of Soft Power: Propose Development and Criticism*. Vol. 7. (Oxford, UK: Field of Vision, 2008), p. 273.

¹⁴⁸ Morgenthau, *The Politics between Countries: The Power Conflict and Peace*. p. 74.

4. The increased number of Kenyan students in China and high-quality training by Chinese educational institutions has contributed to a positive perception of China in Kenya

1.10 Research Methodology

This part presents the research method and methodology used in this study. This study's philosophical orientation, research design, target population, sample and sampling design, discussion on data collection, data analysis and ethical considerations are highlighted here.

1.10.1 Philosophical Orientation

Philosophical leaning or orientation is the underpinning assumptions and beliefs that guide research methods, procedures and approaches to knowledge, and evaluation or interpretation of findings. This study's philosophical leaning was pragmatism. It took the leaning of both positivist and constructivist ontological views. Concerning, epistemology, that is; how knowledge is acquired, this study adopted both empiricism and rationalism approaches

The pragmatic approach to research accentuates real-world application as a criteria for assessing the truth. It was applied in this study because it uses multiple methods and approaches to research. Pragmatism emphasizes flexibility of methods depending on the research question and the context of study. In this study, it permitted the researcher to collate and evaluate empirical evidence and test ideas through observation. This philosophical grounding also permitted the researcher to consider situation and context in which this research was conducted to facilitate understanding and interpretation of findings obtained.

In line with this philosophical grounding, this study used a mixed-methods methodology that combined the elements of qualitative and quantitative approaches to develop understanding of the influence of PD on China's national image in Kenya.

1.10.2 Research Design

Research design is defined as the blueprint chosen to integrate the study's separate elements logically and coherently, ensuring that a researcher effectively addresses the research problem; it incorporates the strategy for data collection, measurement, and

analysis.¹⁴⁹ This research adopted a mixed-method design, employing both qualitative and quantitative data. It employed descriptive and explanatory design.

The use of the mixed methods research design was mainly due to its practical application. A mixed method design offers a comprehensive understanding of the research problem, allows for the triangulation which enhances validity and reliability of the research findings and it offers synergy by giving more insights than what each method can achieve in isolation. More specifically, in this study, this design enabled the researcher to address not only what (quantitative data) but also why and how (qualitative data). The researcher was able to determine what the Kenyan public thought of China's national image but also why. In addition, the design enabled the researcher to gain a deeper and more exhaustive understanding of the research problem by incorporating previous knowledge and understanding with present or exiting insight as provided by the research participants including the interviewees. As such, it permitted a more complete and synergetic utilization of data compared to separate qualitative or quantitative approaches.

Linked to the practicality justification, the mixed methods design enabled the researcher to achieve complementarity in the collated data. For instance, while the quantitative methods enabled the researcher to provide numerical trends and produce statistical generalization, the qualitative data from secondary sources and unstructured interviews enabled the development of greater insights into interactions, contexts, perceptions and behaviours of the Kenyan public.

Lastly, the mixed methods approach provided methodological flexibility in that the researcher was able to deploy aspects of qualitative and qualitative methodological approaches to the specific needs of the research objectives. Furthermore, this design allowed the researcher to triangulate the findings by integrating different data types (surveys and interviews), verify and corroborate the results across different sources including the secondary sources.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ De Vaus, D. A. *Research Design in Social Research*. (London: SAGE, 2001).

¹⁵⁰ D. R. Cooper and P. S. Schindler, *Research Methods* (7th Ed. New York: Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 2000) p. 112.

1.10.3 Research Site

This research was conducted in the city of Nairobi in Kenya. Nairobi city has been chosen because its population has different clusters that permit the correct prediction of the Chinese national image in Kenya.

1.10.4 Target Population

Population is the absolute set of individuals, cases or objects with similar observable characteristics.¹⁵¹ The target population used in this research comprised all residents of Nairobi city. According to the 2019 census by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Nairobi has a total population of 4.4 million people.

1.10.5 Sampling Technique and Sample Size

Sampling pertains to choosing a sub-unit of a population and drawing conclusions from that subgroup. How sampling is done and who you sample affects what conclusions you can draw.¹⁵² This study employed both probability and nonprobability sampling.

Purposive sampling is used for qualitative design while cluster sampling and random sampling were used for quantitative research design. Purposive sampling enabled the selection of elements from the target population with attributes desired by the researcher. With random sampling, all the elements in the sampling frame had the same opportunity of being picked for inclusion in the study. This allowed for generalizability when the findings of the study were generated.¹⁵³

For the sample size, the sampling procedure employed the Taro Yamane formula.

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where: **n**, stands for the sample size

N stands for the population

e represents the margin error

$$n = \frac{4,400,000}{1 + 4,400,000(0.05)^2}$$

$$n = 399.9636396691$$

¹⁵¹ Mugenda (2003)

¹⁵² Cooper and Schindler, *Research Methods*. p. 112.

¹⁵³ DeCarlo, M. (2018). *Scientific Inquiry in Social Work*. <<https://scientificinquiryinsocialwork.pressbooks.com>> [Accessed: 13/6/2020]

From the method, a population of 4.4m people (Nairobi city population) at a 95 per cent confidence level, the sample size is 400 respondents. To ensure different groups of the population are incorporated in the sample, cluster sampling was conducted by classification of the population into different groupings as shown in Table 1.1 below. Cluster sampling permitted the researcher to conduct probability sampling in instances where the list of target populations was not available or not practical to create. It was also useful in making claims about larger populations such as was targeted in this study.

Table 1.1 Study Population

Serial	Category/Classification	Target Population
1.	Government Ministries	40
2.	Media	40
3.	Private Sector Informal Business	40
4.	Private Sector Formal Business	40
5.	Universities and Colleges	40
6.	Religious Groups	40
7.	Civil Society	40
8.	County Government	40
9.	Security sector	40
10.	Political parties	40
	Total	400

1.10.6 Data Collection Methods

This study utilized both primary and secondary data. Secondary data sources included libraries, published journal articles, internet sources, foreign affairs published articles, published books, newspaper articles and magazines specifically related to the study field. Primary data was collected using questionnaires and interview guides for key informants. A questionnaire is suitable as data collection of choice as it is not difficult to compose and dispense, saves time, is confidential and gives a much easier and manageable method to study attitudes, motives, values and beliefs.¹⁵⁴ The questionnaire included both open and closed-ended questions to elicit specific responses for qualitative and quantitative analysis.

¹⁵⁴ Donald, Cooper and Schindler, Pamela. *Business Research Methods*, 9th edition. McGraw-Hill Publishing, Co..Ltd. New Delhi India, 2003

Likert scale was used to measure the constructs of variables under study, whereby one (1) represented a weak response and five (5) represented a strong positive response. The questionnaire had three sections. The first section covered the demographic information of respondents. The second section identified the various public diplomacy programmes influencing China's public perception, while the last section covered statements regarding China's image in Kenya.

1.10.7 Validity and Reliability of Data Collection Instruments

To evaluate the measurements used in this study, the researcher checked for the validity and reliability of the Likert scale and the questionnaire. Validity refers to the precision of the research instrument or the degree to which the scores truly characterize the variables they are intended to. Reliability is the extent to which the research instrument is consistent across time, across items and researchers.¹⁵⁵ To achieve content validity, the researcher conducted a thorough literature review so that indicators of the variables are constructed to reflect all the possible meanings of the concept. A pilot study was carried out to enable the researcher to familiarize with the research instrument, study area as well and administration to identify items that need adjustment. The first draft of the questionnaire was distributed to 30 postgraduate students. Based on the participant's feedback, the questionnaire was subsequently refined to improve understanding.

1.10.8 Data Analysis and Presentation

Being a mixed method research, quantitative and qualitative data were analyzed separately. Qualitative data was analyzed using content analysis and inferences made thereof. Content analysis entails scrutiny and elaborate explanation of phenomena that include the object of study. This analysis is selected because the data gathered is qualitative which requires analytical understanding.¹⁵⁶ Quantitative data was analyzed using regression analysis with the help of SPSS. First, the findings were profiled by socio-demographic characteristics. Secondly, to determine the affiliation between public diplomacy efforts and China's public perception, Pearson correlation analysis was applied. Finally, a multi-variable linear regression analysis was used to determine the effect of public diplomacy on China's image in Kenya.

¹⁵⁵ DeCarlo, M. (2018) *Scientific Inquiry in Social Work*.

¹⁵⁶ Holsti, O.R., "*Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*", (MA: Addison-Wesley 1980) pp. 7

The relationship is represented by below equation:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \varepsilon$$

In which,

Y stands for Chinese Image in Kenya

β_0 represents the Constant (Co-efficient of intercept)

X_1 represents the Chinese media

X_2 represents the Chinese Cultural programs

X_3 represents student scholarships

ε . Is the Error Term

$\beta_1 \dots \beta_3$ = Regression co-efficient of three variables

The F- test was used to determine the significance of the regression while the coefficient of determination, R^2 was used to determine how much variation in Y is explained by X.

Data presentation was by the use of frequency tables, percentages, pie charts and bar graphs

1.10.9 Ethical Considerations

Permission to collect data was sought from NACOST and other relevant bodies where data was collected. The information collected was held with the highest confidentiality and solely for academic purposes. The purpose of the study and, the existence or absence of accumulated benefits were explicitly specified to the participants before data collection for accountability. The researcher made a concerted effort to avoid plagiarism and fraud by ensuring that all sources of unoriginal materials and ideas were properly cited using the Chicago Referencing Style. Generally, the researcher ensured that the plagiarism does not exceed the accepted 15 per cent for the entire research report.

1.11 Scope and Limitations

The objective of this study was to identify the public diplomacy strategies employed by China in Kenya and to examine their effect on China's national image in Kenya. It focused on the link between public diplomacy and national image, then narrowed down to three strategies of media, cultural centers and educational exchange programmes and how they affect China's image in Kenya. The study covered one year, between August 2020 and August 2021. The researcher adopted a mixed method design collecting both primary and secondary data.

The population used in the study comprised of all the 4.4 million residents of Nairobi City, Kenya. A questionnaire and interview guide were used as data collection instruments applied to 400 Nairobi residents as a sample size. This study was limited in that it addressed itself to public diplomacy strategies of China in Kenya only. This study also encountered the limitation of respondents' exaggerating the influence of the strategies on the Kenyan public's perception of China. To address this limitation, the researcher used a mixed methods approach in which both secondary and primary data were utilized to ensure consistency in the information obtained and reporting of the findings. Secondly, the use of questionnaires with mostly close-ended answer options may limit the amount or range of responses that can be obtained. To address this limitation, the researcher ensured that the questions were as clear and precise as possible and that enough open-ended response options were provided to document all the relevant qualitative information that the respondents could give.

1.12 Chapter Outline

The study consists of seven chapters

The first chapter presented background information, problem statement, objectives, research questions, literature review, study justification and hypotheses of the study. Theoretical review plus the methodology that was used to collect and analyze the data was also covered.

Chapter two explores the influence of public diplomacy on national image.

The third chapter examines the role of Chinese media in influencing China's image in Kenya.

Chapter four discusses the effect of Chinese cultural centers on China's image in Kenya.

The fifth chapter analyzes the role of Chinese educational exchange programmes in influencing China's image in Kenya.

Chapter six presents overall data gathered throughout the study, as well as an analysis of the same data.

Finally, chapter seven presents summary and overall conclusions that bind together and synthesize data findings, besides making specific recommendations aimed at specific policies, academic actors as well and areas for future research.

CHAPTER TWO: INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON NATIONAL IMAGE

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter presented the introduction of this study. It provided the blueprint of the study as it highlighted the background of this investigation, stated the research problem, outlined the research questions, listed the research objectives, examined the literature review, and underlined the gaps in the literature. It also justified this study, discussed its theoretical framework, defined the research hypotheses and examined the research methodology that was deployed.

This chapter examines the influence of public diplomacy on national image. It then centers on how public diplomacy has shaped the perception of the national image of China with particular attention to the Kenyan public. The fulcrum of this chapter hinges on the premise that there is a link between public diplomacy and perceptions of national image. Hence, China's engagement in public diplomacy in Kenya is found to be an attempt by the PRC to strategically influence how the Kenyan public views China.

The organization of the chapter is as follows; the first part examines the etymological basis of 'public' diplomacy as both a concept and a practice. The second part examines a national image, to explain why the national image is important to countries including China. The third part examines the influence of public diplomacy on the projection of national image and answers the question, what does public diplomacy do to the national image? The fourth part focuses on examining the influence of public diplomacy on China's national image. In so doing, it seeks to illustrate whether, and how China's public diplomacy has shaped its national image. This is then followed with a summary of the chapter, which outlines the major findings made about the influence of public diplomacy on national image.

2.2 Conceptualizing Public Diplomacy

2.2.1 Etymology and Development of Public Diplomacy

The term public diplomacy comprises two component concepts, public and diplomacy. The modern concept of the public can be chronologically attributed to the Ancient Greeks and Romans in their attempt to delineate what is private from what is public.¹⁵⁷ While the Romans differentiated *res publica* from *res priva*, the Ancient Greeks distinguished *Idion* (private) from *Koinion* (public) in their *polis*.¹⁵⁸ What is critical here is that in both understandings, what is public is conceived as that which touches on the majority of the people and what is private is that which touches on isolated individuals. It is this conception that is taken up by the concept of diplomacy and which brings it within the purview of public diplomacy, with the implication that public opinion of a state can be influenced in a specific manner that results in the attainment of the interests of the influencing state.¹⁵⁹

However, from the perspective of traditional state-centred diplomacy, the use of the term public diplomacy was problematic. This was because, drawing from the Westphalian system, ‘diplomacy’ and ‘public’ were two terms that could not be put together; diplomacy was deemed to concern formal inter-governmental relations with states being the only actors within non-state actors being inconsequential.¹⁶⁰ This was the view held by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), which confirmed that the ordinary public was precluded from diplomacy.¹⁶¹ Nonetheless, owing to the changes in the conduct of diplomacy, coupled with socio-political and technological changes, it is conceivable to speak of public diplomacy.

The first usage of the phrase ‘public diplomacy’ is traceable to *The London Times* edition of 1857, when it was employed as being synonymous with “civility” relative to

¹⁵⁷ Wayne Parsons, *Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis*. (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc, 1996), p. 3.

¹⁵⁸ Caroline Ashcroft, *The Polis and The Res Publica: Two Arendtian Models of Violence*, *History of European Ideas*, Volume 44, Issue 1 (2018), pp. 128 -129

¹⁵⁹ Cho Yun Young, *Public Diplomacy and South Korea’s Strategies*. *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Volume 10, Number 2, (2013), p. 279.

¹⁶⁰ Baylis *Op cit.* p. 281

¹⁶¹ United Nations, “Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961”, *Treaty Series*,

the pomposity of President Franklin considered uncivil.¹⁶² In 1918, the then President of the United States (US), President Woodrow Wilson, in his address on “Four Principles” to the US Congress referred to public diplomacy.¹⁶³ In 1928, public diplomacy reoccurred in the *Christian Science Monitor* when the newspaper referred to a *new era of public diplomacy* and argued for the need for international reporting to take a moral approach in covering world politics to assuage tension. In 1936, a news article by the *Associated Press* (AP) welcomed French Prime Minister Sarraut Albert’s position of using public diplomacy to conduct foreign affairs.¹⁶⁴

Public diplomacy is a term, a notion, an exercise and a multidisciplinary ground of investigation. Nonetheless, it is a term whose understanding is both wide and elusive. David Welch defines public diplomacy as the deliberate endeavour to influence target audiences’ opinions through the transmission of values and ideas for specific goals, consciously designed to advance the interest of the propagandist and their political masters.¹⁶⁵ Efe *et al.* consider public diplomacy as a type of diplomacy, whose main target is public opinion.¹⁶⁶ Edward E. Murrow defined public diplomacy by contrasting it against outmoded diplomacy as the diplomatic goings-on that combined exchanges, principally with non-governmental organizations and individuals, not just governments.¹⁶⁷

Christopher Ross¹⁶⁸ speaking at the Brookings/Harvard Forum on 16 January 2002 opined that public diplomacy was the face of conventional diplomacy. According to the U.S Information Agency (USIA), public diplomacy is a two-track process; both declaratory and one-way informational in purpose, and two-way mutual and educational in the outcome. Its objective is to promote the national interest and the

¹⁶² Nicolas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase. (London, UK: Routledge, 2008), p. 20.

¹⁶³ Cull *Op cit.* pp. 19 – 24.

¹⁶⁴ Saliu *Op cit.* p. 72.

¹⁶⁵ David Welch, “Power of Persuasion.” *History Today*, Volume 49, Number 1 (1999), p. 24

¹⁶⁶ Efe Sevin, Emily T. Metzgar & Craig Hayden, “The Scholarship of Public Diplomacy: Analysis of a Growing Field.” *International Journal of Communication*, Volume 13, Number 1(2019), p. 4815.

¹⁶⁷ Edward R. Murrow, speaking as USIA director, 1963. See. Nancy Snow, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: Its History, Problems, and Promise.” In Jowett and O’Donnell, *Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays.* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005) p. 228.

¹⁶⁸ Mark Leonard, *Public Diplomacy* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), p.1.

security of the country by grasping, enlightening and persuading foreign publics.¹⁶⁹ Sharp¹⁷⁰ conceptualizes public diplomacy as a process of pursuing direct relations with foreign publics to advance the national interests and the values of the state being presented.

This expansion of the definition permits Kranc¹⁷¹ to present a more precise definition. He theorizes public diplomacy as a kind of diplomacy in groups, private individuals, and governments unswervingly or tortuously assist to impact, the public sentiments and positions of a second state and in so doing directly influence the foreign policy and political decisions of that state.¹⁷²

It is however, generally accepted that public diplomacy is practice or endeavours through which nation-states (the predominant international actors) engage in targeted and purposive communication with foreign publics to realize their foreign policy objectives or cultivate conditions among the foreign publics that advance diplomatic relations.¹⁷³ It is also accepted that public diplomacy allows nation-states to influence foreign publics without resorting to the use of force. This is in line with the current scholarship, which borrows from the understanding of public diplomacy as coined by Dean Edmund A. Gullion of Tufts University's Fletcher School in 1965.¹⁷⁴

According to Gullion, (considered the originator and main proponent of the concept) public diplomacy is concerned with the shaping of public attitudes on foreign policy formulation and execution.¹⁷⁵ As a diplomatic practice, its scholarly and conceptual foundations underpin it; public diplomacy focuses on diplomatic communication between political entities and the public, particularly the foreign public, but also the

¹⁶⁹ Nancy Snow, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Its History, Problems, and Promise." In Jowett and O'Donnell, *Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays*. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005) p. 227.

¹⁷⁰ Paul Sharp, Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and The Techniques of Public Diplomacy. In J. Melissen (Ed.). *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations* (106-123). (Leiden, NED: Martinus Nijhoff/Brill, 2005), p.106.

¹⁷¹ Kristina Plavsak Kranc, Public Diplomacy: Basic Concepts and Trends. *Journal Theory and Practice*, Volume 41, Number 3–4, (2004), 643–665.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid. p.4815

¹⁷⁴ Cull *Op cit.* pp. 19 – 24.

¹⁷⁵ Young, *Op cit.* p. 279.

domestic public.¹⁷⁶ In the latter context, it is controversially argued that there exists a domestic dimension to public diplomacy, in which sense public diplomacy activities are directed at domestic actors, partners and civil society.¹⁷⁷ This latter conception, which is a more comprehensive approach, considers the international and domestic dimensions of public diplomacy as milestones in public participation, a key element in public policymaking.

Perhaps for this reason, the concept and practice of public diplomacy lacks a coherent and precise universal definition.¹⁷⁸ Nonetheless, still, the widely used definition conceptualizes public diplomacy as the government's technique of communicating with the foreign public to facilitate an understanding of its institutions, national goals, ideology, ideals, culture and national policies.¹⁷⁹ This definition portrays public diplomacy as an official engagement (at least on the part of the state that engages in it) and one in which the public, either as private individuals or groups, play no role. This is perhaps why others have defined it loosely as a process of communicating with foreign publics to influence their perception of international policies and attitudes.¹⁸⁰

It transcends traditional diplomacy as it entails governments' cultivation of public opinion in other states, the interaction of private interests and groups between countries and the reporting of foreign affairs.¹⁸¹ This understanding is critical as it implies that diplomacy is not an exclusive engagement of professional diplomats alone.¹⁸² It further implies that the public can be diplomatic. They are capable of performing diplomatic functions officially mandated for Presidents and their selected envoys through the MFA.

Emerging in the mid-1960s, the term "public diplomacy" is a novel extension to the political lexicon. It can be argued that public diplomacy, by its very nature, is a very

¹⁷⁶ Ellen Huijgh, "Public Diplomacy", In Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr and Paul Sharp, Eds. *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy*. (London, UK: SAGE, 2016), p. 438

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 438

¹⁷⁸ Kathy Fitzpatrick, Jami Fullerton and Alice Kendrick, Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: A Conceptual and Practical Connections. *Public Relations Journal*, Volume. 7, Number 4, (2013), p. 2.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 2.

¹⁸⁰ J. Michael Waller, (Ed.), *The Public Diplomacy Reader*. (Washington, D. C: The Institute for World Politics Press, 2007), p. 19.

¹⁸¹ Huijgh *Op cit.* p. 438.

¹⁸² G. R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. 2nd Ed. (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2015), p. 126.

old concept. In any case, public diplomacy as it is construed even today is akin to the proverbial “old wine” – communicating with foreign publics in novel bottles. Etymologically, the roots of diplomacy are grounded in antiquity and are traceable to the period before the founding of the modern state. In any case, the genesis of public diplomacy is traceable back to God and his envoys, messengers and angles. Within this ‘mytho-diplomacy’ is the notion that angles were the first diplomats sent by God from heaven to earth. In this sense, diplomacy and public diplomacy in particular is as old as human civilization.

For instance, as early as 2500 B.C. in the Middle East, diplomatic messages and treaties have been found denoting “city diplomacy”. The practice of diplomacy had punctuated the geopolitics of the primordial world as indicated by advanced civilization in ancient Africa, China and India. By the 4th millennium B.C., ancient Mesopotamia had been sending messengers to deliver messages to other rulers as is depicted in the 'Enmerkar and the Lord of Aratta', a Sumerian poem written circa 2,750 B.C. ‘*Mar shipri*’ an Akkadian term referring to an ‘envoy’, ‘agent’, ‘messenger’ or ‘diplomat’ appeared in a 3rd millennium B.C. text.

In 18th century Babylon, during Hammurabi’s rule, a very effective system of messengers and envoys some of which were ambassador plenipotentiary was functional. In Ancient Egypt, the ‘Amarna diplomacy’ had been grounded this is according to the Amarna Tablets found in Egypt in 1878 provides perhaps the oldest known account of the international system in antiquity. The Amarna diplomacy occurred during the reigns of Pharaoh Amenhotep II, Akhenaten, and Tutankhamun. The diplomatic letters or Amarna letters that were written in cuneiforms in Akkadian provide an account of diplomatic communication between the Egyptian pharaohs and kings of Babylonia, Syria-Palestine, Canaan, Assyria, Mittani and Hatti thousands of years before the founding of the modern state after the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.¹⁸³

¹⁸³ John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 281

Diplomacy in the ancient world is also evident in the ‘foreign’ engagements of the Assyrian state, which had emerged as a powerful empire after the collapse of Egyptian and Assyrian diplomacy. During this era of the Sargonid Dynasty, which included the reigns of Sargon, Sennacherib and Ashurbanipal, Assyria engaged in diplomacy and communication in an attempt to maintain its hegemony in the Middle East. Ancient Persia had also developed an advanced diplomatic communication system. This was most noticeable during the reign of King Cyrus the Great (Circa 599 B.C. to 530 B.C.). An account is provided when King Darius III of Persia engaged Alexander the Great of Macedonia by offering peace based on “ancient friendship and alliance”.¹⁸⁴

The communicative endeavours between the 5th-century warring city-states of ancient Greece are also examples of public diplomacy in antiquity. In ancient Greece, in the Melian Dialogue, Thucydides the chronicler of the *Peloponnesian War* and son of Olorus provides an account of Athenian envoy's desire to speak directly to the citizens of the Isle of Melos.¹⁸⁵ Upon their arrival on the Isle of Melos on their expedition of rampage and plunder of the lesser state systems, Athenian generals, Tisias, son of Tisimachus and Cleomedes son of Lycomedes decided to pursue a diplomatic option rather than see to Melian submission through the use of force and plunder.¹⁸⁶

The two Athenian generals sent envoys (diplomats) to convince the Melian people that they had no option but to submit and jump on the Athenian bandwagon (Lawson, 2015, p.3). Rather than permit the Athenian representatives to speak directly with the Melian public, the Melian leaders decided to select a few leaders and magistrates to represent the Melians, thereby denying the Athenians a chance at public diplomacy.¹⁸⁷

Their view was that the public lacked proper knowledge of statecraft and thus was diplomatically inept. The Athenians were not amused. In another account that is manifest of public diplomacy in ancient Greece, Herodotus recounts an episode in

¹⁸⁴ Raymond Cohen, “Diplomacy through the Ages”, In Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (Eds.). *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices*. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 19, 23.

¹⁸⁵ Thucydides, The “Melian Dialogue”, In Richard K. Betts, editor, *The History of the Peloponnesian War Conflict After the Cold War*, 2nd Edition (New York: Longman, 2002), p. 60.

¹⁸⁶ Thucydides *Op cit.* p. 60.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p. 60

which Croesus (c.560 – 540 B.C), the King of Lydia, sent messages bearing gifts to ancient Sparta in an entreaty of an alliance with the powerful Greek city-state.¹⁸⁸

In Asia, city-state relations in Chinese antiquity are equally replete with instances of diplomatic practices that meet the threshold of public diplomacy. By the 8th century B.C., ancient Chinese had developed missions, leagues and an organized system of polite dialogue for managing relations between their many conflicting kingdoms or city-states. At the basis of these was an emphasis on the practical virtues of ethical behaviour. By circa 700, China was made up of 200 loosely recognizable state systems, temporarily enjoying independence.¹⁸⁹ The conduct of diplomatic relations between and among the state systems of ancient China was largely formal.

The analysis of diplomacy in pre-modern civilizations suggests that the practice of public diplomacy had started even before the founding of the term and the modern state. It can be argued that the crystallization of public diplomacy became manifest with the founding of the United States (US). The pedigree of public diplomacy in the US's statecraft can be traced back to the founding of the country when Benjamin Franklin disregarded the French and British governments and courts and travelled to Paris and London to present the US to French and British citizens respectively.¹⁹⁰ Benjamin published articles and documents to create an impression that many people sympathized with the American colonies.

More recently, in 1819 the US engaged in public diplomacy when the Connecticut American Board of Commission for Foreign Mission deployed two missionaries to the city of Smyrna (Izmir) in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹¹ These diplomats were tasked, in the first year of their stay in Izmir, with the task of learning the local language, traversing the Empire and gathering information about the local people before they began their

¹⁸⁸ Raymond Cohen, "The Great Tradition: The Spread of Diplomacy in the Ancient World". In Christer Jonsson and Richard Langhorne, editors, *Diplomacy Vo. 1* (London, UK: Sage Publications, 2004), p.51.

¹⁸⁹ Roswell Britton, "Chinese Interstate Intercourse Before 700 B.C. In Christer Jonsson and Richard Langhorne, editors, *Diplomacy Volume. 1* (London, UK: Sage Publications, 2004), p.93.

¹⁹⁰ Arthur A. Bardos, Public Diplomacy: An Old Art, A New Profession. *Virginia Quarterly Review*, Volume 77, Number 3 (2001), p. 428

¹⁹¹ Hasan Saliu, "The Evolution of the Concept of Public Diplomacy from the Perspective of Communication Stakeholders." *Mejid. Istraz*, Volume 26, Number 1 (2020), p. 71

mission work.¹⁹² The US established an important precedence in laying out the foundation of public diplomacy in the twentieth century.

A significant paradigm shift in the US's appreciation and use of public diplomacy occurred during World War Two (WWII) when the US sought to counter Nazi Germany's psychological warfare and propaganda. In line with this aim, President Woodrow established a Committee on Public Information and mandated it with the task of publishing articles associated with the war on papers, publications, advertisements and outdoor posts.

2.2.2 Dimensions of Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy, whether traditional or contemporary is capable of being better understood when broken down into its components and underpinning inter-relationships. In this regard, at least five components of public diplomacy are discernible; listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange and international broadcasting.¹⁹³ It is necessary to unpack each of these components to ensure a proper understanding of public diplomacy to aid subsequent analysis that would later enable further consideration of the nexus between public diplomacy and national image management.

Listening is the fundamental basis of public diplomacy as it precedes all successful public diplomacy engagements.¹⁹⁴ Listening pertains to an actor's endeavour to manage the international environment through the collection and collation of information concerning foreign publics and their opinions, and then utilizing the information to redirect its foreign policy or its broad approach strategically.¹⁹⁵ This component of public diplomacy presupposes that listening and feedback are necessary for effective engagement with foreign publics as well as for defining and shaping policies. Therefore, listening is the deliberate approach by the actor to order the international

¹⁹²Ibid. p. 71

¹⁹³ Nicolas J. Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Volume 616, p. 31.

¹⁹⁴ Nicholas J. Cull, *Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past*. (Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press, 2009), p.10

¹⁹⁵ Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories." p.32.

environment and to change policy approaches based on the perceptions of the target foreign public.

Advocacy, more precisely, political advocacy relates to an actor's endeavour to manage the international environment through an international communication activity.¹⁹⁶ The actor tries to promote or advance a given idea, policy, or the actor's overall interests in the foreign public's minds.¹⁹⁷ The elements underpinning advocacy include social ties, a communication grid (network), actors, a clear vision of what is to be achieved and a feedback mechanism. The elements of advocacy in public diplomacy underscore all its dimensions. Historically, the short-term utility of advocacy has resulted in a bias towards political advocacy and a propensity to place it at the core of public diplomacy architecture.¹⁹⁸

Public diplomacy advocacy actors today do political advocacy through informational work and embassy press relations. Furthermore, advocacy also means the more intricate promotion of national interest through strategic partnerships.¹⁹⁹ Advocacy has a long history going back to antiquity as its usage is evident in Herodotus where the envoys of King Xerxes of Persia enticed the citizens of Argos for their neutrality in Persia's invasion of Greece in 480 B.C.²⁰⁰ Modern applications of advocacy in public diplomacy are evident in the conduct of almost all countries. However, America's usage of this approach stands out as advocacy underscores congressional supervision of the US's contributions to the notion of selling America to the rest of the world.

Cultural diplomacy as a component of diplomacy involves an actor attempting to manage the international environment by creating awareness of its cultural resources and accomplishments overseas and enhancing cultural transmission abroad.²⁰¹ In this sense, cultural diplomacy is a citizen-oriented diplomatic engagement in which the target audiences are diverse publics including national and global audiences. Cultural

¹⁹⁶ Elena Gurgu and Aristide Cociuban, "New Public Diplomacy and Its Effects on International Level." *Journal of Economic Development, Environment and People*, Volume 5, Issue 3 (2016), p. 51.

¹⁹⁷ Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories." p.32.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. p.32.

¹⁹⁹ Constantinou *et al.*, *Op cit.* p.98.

²⁰⁰ Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories." p.32.

²⁰¹ Gurgu and Cociuban *Op cit.* p. 51.

²⁰¹ Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories." p.32.

diplomacy is considered the linchpin of public diplomacy mainly because it is through cultural activities that a nation's idea of itself is manifested.²⁰²

Conventionally, cultural diplomacy involves a governmental policy of facilitating the exports of at least some aspects of national culture. A case in point is the Roman Empire's policy of hosting sons of "friendly kings" from Rome's borders to be educated in Rome. It is also manifest in ancient Greece's construction in ancient Egypt of the Great Library in Alexandria.²⁰³

Modern examples of cultural diplomacy are seen in the works of state-sponsored Western and Asian organizations such as the *Alliance Francaise*, Germany's *Goethe Institut*, the British Council²⁰⁴ and the Italian Cultural Institute among others. China's establishment of Confucius Institutes in countries around the world is perhaps the most manifest example of cultural diplomacy.²⁰⁵ However, undertones of political advocacy and overt diplomatic goals associated with cultural diplomatic organizations have resulted in the rejection of some of the terms. For instance, the British Council likes to be referred to as a "cultural relations" agency despite its core tools of trade being cultural exchanges.²⁰⁶

Exchange diplomacy refers to a situation in which an actor attempts to manage the international sphere by sending its citizens abroad and reciprocally accepting citizens from overseas for studies or acculturation.²⁰⁷ This has been a historical practice examples such as those in ancient Europe concerning child-fostering practices in Celtic and Nordic Europe can be cited.²⁰⁸ During the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the US established a precedent of receiving exchange students from much of the developing world to be educated in their universities and become socialized into their respective

²⁰² Ien Ang, Yudhishtir Raj and Philip Mar, "Cultural Diplomacy: Beyond the National Interest?" *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, Volume 21, Number 4 (2015), p. 368

²⁰³ Ibid. p.33.

²⁰⁴ Huijgh *Op cit.* p. 440.

²⁰⁵ Su-Yan Pan, "Confucius Institute Project: China's Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power Projection." *Asian Education and Development Studies*, Volume 2, Number 1 (2013), p. 23.

²⁰⁶ Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories." p.33.

²⁰⁷ Cull, *Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past.* p.10

²⁰⁸ Gurgu and Cociuban *Op cit.* p. 51.

political and cultural values.²⁰⁹ In Africa, the “airlift” of hundreds of African students and the awards of university scholarships to universities in the US and Soviet Union and to some extent western and Eastern European universities remains an important example of exchange diplomacy in practice.

The conventional practice of exchange diplomacy was one-way engagement with the underlying argument being that the visiting students from a given country will tell the receiving country the positive attributes of their homeland. Modern conceptions of exchange diplomacy nonetheless deem it as a process of reciprocal exchange for people and students between nations.²¹⁰ In this sense, as opposed to conventional exchange diplomacy, the underpinning idea is; ‘as your students tell us how wonderful your country is, let my students also visit you and tell you how amazing our country is’. Cull argues that the reciprocity element inherent in exchange diplomacy makes this component of public diplomacy a bastion of the notion of ‘mutuality’; that is, a vision of an international learning experience where both parties not only benefit but are also transformed.²¹¹

Conversely, exchange diplomacy has been viewed in negative terms especially when the aspects of two-way communication and mutuality implicit in the process are subordinated to the drive to project and even impart the national culture.²¹² In practical terms, especially in the context of the Cold War, the exchange students had little to present about their countries but a lot to learn about the countries visited. In this sense, the exchange student during the Cold War period was imparted with ideas on why communism was good as a political system and not liberal capitalism and vice-versa. It is inconceivable that this has been exchanged in the modern practice of exchange diplomacy; that is, it is hard to determine whether exchange diplomacy in the twenty-first century is one-way information dissemination and whether it is a two-way engagement aimed at establishing lasting relationships between states.

²⁰⁹ Liping Bu, “Educational Exchange and Cultural Diplomacy in the Cold War.” *Journal of American Studies*, Volume 33, Number 3 -1, (1999), p.394.

²¹⁰ Terry Flew, “Confucius Institutes and the Network: Communication Approach to Public Diplomacy.” *The IAFOR Journal of Asian Studies*, Volume 1, Issue 1(2014), p. 4

²¹¹ Cull, “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories.” p.33.

²¹² *Ibid.* pp. 33 – 34.

Powerful states such as the US, Britain, Japan, France and China have invested heavily in exchange diplomacy relative to weaker states to the extent that their students are almost present in every country and large numbers. For the US exchange programs have greatly facilitated the adoption of some of the distinctive American national cultures such as the observance of Black History Month and the practice of prom ceremonies by schools in some countries hosting huge numbers of American exchange students.

International news broadcasting (IB) is yet another component of public diplomacy which has become especially important in the projection of the image of the homeland. IB denotes an actor's endeavour to shape the international environment through the use of communications technologies including, radio, television, print media and the internet to engage foreign publics.²¹³ The technological prerequisites of IB distinguish it from the other four components. However, in practical terms, IB overlaps with all the other components of public diplomacy including listening (audience research), advocacy (policy broadcasts), cultural diplomacy (essentially the dissemination of cultural contents through mass media) and exchange diplomacy (exchanges of personnel and programming with other broadcasters).²¹⁴

The conventional distinguishing and potent aspect of IB is its use of news as the primary means of managing the national image. Through news, IB can tap into the ethical culture of journalism and transform itself into a potent tool for cultural diffusion. The role of the Cable News Networks (CCN) in shaping foreign and domestic perceptions of the US has been noted and the so-called "CNN effect" continues to be debated within the confines of public diplomacy.²¹⁵ Similarly, the value of the BBC World Service for the BPO and to British public diplomacy has been widely known.

2.2.3 Debates on Public Diplomacy

Several debates have surrounded the issue of public diplomacy since it became a standard and popular practice in diplomacy. The debates are rife among scholars and

²¹³ Gurgu and Cociuban *Op cit.* p. 52.

²¹⁴ Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories." p.34.

²¹⁵ Piers Robinson, "The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?" *Review of International Studies*, Volume 25 (1999), p.301.

practitioners of international politics and diplomacy regarding what is considered as conventional public diplomacy and its more recent upshot, new public diplomacy. Also at the core of the debate is the concept of soft power, which relates to a state's ability to attract other states and the public using intangible assets including, but not limited to, its culture, policies and political values.²¹⁶ The debates on whether public diplomacy and propaganda are the same or separate concepts, the linkage between diplomacy and nation branding, as well as the debates concerning the linkages between public diplomacy and 'soft' power. This part delves into the analysis of these debates to deepen the understanding of public diplomacy.

2.2.3.1 Conventional Public Diplomacy versus New Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy has been addressed by several names including media diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, international broadcasting, public information, political action, education and cultural programs.²¹⁷ In this sense, it is conceivable that as a practice of diplomacy, public policy is non-static but rather evolves in tandem with societal transformations such as globalization, democratization and revolutions in communication. It is within this understanding that it has become possible to conceive of public diplomacy through several conceptually interlinked stages: conventional (traditional) public diplomacy and new public diplomacy.²¹⁸

Traditional public diplomacy developed through several stages and within the first half of the twentieth century, it was conceived that public diplomacy was not only an offshoot of diplomacy but also a less biased type of "propaganda".²¹⁹ At the time of the two world wars, public diplomacy involved one-way information dissemination aimed at shaping domestic and foreign publics with indifference to relationship-building or dialogue.²²⁰

²¹⁶ Falk Hartig, "How China Understands Public Diplomacy: The Importance of National Image for National Interests." *International Studies Review*, Volume 18 (2016), pp.655 – 680.

²¹⁷ Trajkov and Trajkov *Op cit.* p. 70.

²¹⁸ Huijgh *Op cit.* p. 438.

²¹⁹ Jan Mellisen, 'Introduction'. In Jan Melissen, Ed. *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. (New York, NY: Palgrave McMillan, 2005), p.16.

²²⁰ Huijgh *Op cit.* p. 438.

Throughout the world, ‘public diplomats are increasing in number. Newcomers and new actors in the diplomatic space including supranational institutions such as the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as sub-state actors challenge conventional practices.²²¹ The ability of sub-state actors such as civil society to force the state outside of their traditional comfort zone and build different perceptions abroad is conceivable. For instance, the Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia (DIPLOCAT), established by the government of Catalonia as a public-private consortium, has been instrumental in promoting not only international awareness of Catalonia but also Catalonia’s distinctiveness from Spain.²²²

Consequently, and according to Ellen Huijgh,²²³ two features define contemporary public diplomacy – a multi-actor approach and the formation of relations. In terms of the multi-actor approach, it is conceivable that many actors below and above the level of government, and various local and international actors are engaged in the conduct of public diplomacy. It is equally conceivable, about the creation of relations, that the new public diplomacy rather than being a one-way communication to foreign publics now emphasized two-way dialogue or communicative exchange aimed at establishing relationships.²²⁴

The revolutions in communication technology particularly about digital applications in public diplomacy have become a defining element of contemporary public diplomacy. The incorporation of new digital applications has led to what has been termed digital diplomacy in which statecraft in the twenty-first century has involved the use of online (internet-based) platforms including the social media networks (SMNs) as platforms through which perceptions and attitudes of foreign publics can be transformed towards a more favourable one.²²⁵ Therefore, if conventional public diplomacy was underlined

²²¹ Ibid. p. 441.

²²² Jordi Xifra, “Catalan Public Diplomacy, Soft Power and Noopolitik: A Public Relations Approach to Catalonia’s Governance.” *Catalan Journal of Communications & Cultural Studies*, Volume 1, Number 1 (2009), pp. 67 – 85.

²²³ Huijgh *Op cit.* p. 443.

²²⁴ Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr and Paul Sharp, Eds. *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy*. (London, UK: SAGE, 2016), p. 443.

²²⁵ Valentin Costa, “Shaping Public Diplomacy through Social Media Networks in the 21st Century.” *RJHIS*, Volume 4, Number 1 (2017), pp. 139 - 154

with monologue and neutrality, contemporary public diplomacy has the ability for two-way real-time dialogue and active communication through SMNs.²²⁶

In this sense, perhaps for the first time not only can public diplomacy foster one-on-one dialogue, but can also realize discussion between more than one participant or between one entity and the targeted foreign public. More importantly, it is possible to reach the public and civil society in foreign countries directly through the social media accounts of embassies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of individuals. While twentieth-century public diplomacy had centred on using a broadcasting model, public diplomacy in the twenty-first-century has centred on the dialogue model. However, in practical terms, the new public diplomacy is not entirely distinct from traditional public diplomacy, as it has integrated certain elements of traditional public diplomacy including elements of the broadcasting model.

For instance, the US has used Twitter Feeds and Facebook accounts as well as other offline platforms including news media in statecraft in an attempt to engage and to favourably shape foreign public opinions and attitudes towards it and its foreign policies.²²⁷ It should be noted that while emergent digital diplomacy has great potential for public diplomacy, it also has its flip side for the public diplomacy. There exists a dark side to the use of digital public diplomacy as has been witnessed in the use of online platforms by extremist groups such as the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) to influence or radicalize and recruit foreign publics to advance their terroristic agendas.

2.2.3.2 Public Diplomacy and Propaganda

Following the analysis of the etymology of public diplomacy and the examination of dimensions of public diplomacy, two attendant concepts (implicit in the conception of traditional public diplomacy) arise, which must be addressed in any assessment of public diplomacy; these are propaganda and national branding. A better understanding of public diplomacy must delink its two epistemological distractors and establish it as an emergent subset of diplomacy.

²²⁶ Ibid. p. 140.

²²⁷ Constantinou *et al.*, *Op cit.* p. 444.

Propaganda concerns the communication of ideas and information to foreign publics with the underlying aim of ‘covertly’ reinforcing extant beliefs or transforming recipients’ attitudes vis-à-vis the originating country.²²⁸ Propaganda is often confused with public diplomacy (traditionally conceived) and at best, public diplomacy is sometimes deemed an outgrowth of propaganda owing to its historical roots and character.²²⁹ This confusion emerges from a wider definition of propaganda provided by David Welch, as the intentional endeavour to directly or indirectly shape the opinions of foreign publics through the transmission of values and ideas for giving reasons to serve the propagandists’ interests.²³⁰

Defined as Welch has done, it is hard to distinguish public diplomacy from propaganda since even public diplomacy seeks to shape the foreign public’s perception to the benefit of the public diplomat’.²³¹ It is for this reason that it has been seen as a subset of propaganda. Nevertheless, two attendant aspects of propaganda set it aside, these are, its historical baggage and the popular conception of its deceit and manipulation of the foreign public. Historically, propaganda is lauded with negative connotations and linkages with Nazi, Cold War tactics and communist publicity.²³² In terms of understanding, propaganda is also conceived in negative terms as deceit and manipulation of foreign publics²³³, often through the application of ‘covert’ tactics.

These two attributes (deceit and manipulation) show that propaganda and public diplomacy are separate concepts since the intention of public diplomacy is not to use clandestine means including misinformation to mislead or manipulate foreign publics, but rather to influence their understanding and attitude towards the state in question. Public diplomacy or more appropriately, diplomacy to the public establishes human interactions at the centre of the relationship.²³⁴ It is through diplomacy and particularly

²²⁸ Mellisen *Op cit.* p. 16.

²²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 16.

²³⁰ David Welch *Op cit.* pp. 24–6.

²³¹ Rawnsley *Op cit.* p. 43.

²³² Mellisen *Op cit.* p. 16.

²³³ *Ibid.* p. 17.

²³⁴ *Ibid.* p.17

public diplomacy that foreign publics are influenced without the use of intimidation or use of force.

The answer to whether diplomacy can be public is informed by the very definition of diplomacy which disposes of it as a means of advancing foreign policy goals of a given state²³⁵ and public diplomacy is the shaping of public opinion of foreign nationals by one state to advance its national interest in that state.²³⁶ Indeed, while in its conventional understanding, diplomacy is intergovernmental communication, it is increasingly becoming a communicative exchange between either the government of one state and the foreign public or its public with the foreign public.²³⁷ However, it is debatable whether the latter constitutes diplomacy.

It is a fact that diplomacy is witnessing a transformation especially given that, as Cho²³⁸ observes, conventional closed-door or private diplomacy is proving increasingly ineffective to guarantee the maximization of national interest. This paradigmatic shift implies that diplomacy is becoming public.²³⁹ This is especially so owing to the recent improvements in information technology which has permitted greater interactivity between diplomats and states with foreign public of other states.²⁴⁰ This case is also well presented by Khatib, Dutton and Thelwall²⁴¹ in their article, *Public Diplomacy 2.0*. Increasingly, public attitudes and opinions are being influenced through new information and information channels, and this is in turn impacting states' ability to realize or achieve diplomatic gains.²⁴²

Furthermore, an increasing number of states are relying on information generated by the public to propagate their ideologies and policies to transform public opinion and

²³⁵ Graham Evans and Richard Newham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*. (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1998), p.129.

²³⁶ Kranc, *Op cit.* pp. 643 - 4

²³⁷ Cho, *Op cit.* p. 277.

²³⁸ Ibid. p. 277.

²³⁹ Daryl Copeland, *Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations*. (London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), p.163.

²⁴⁰ Hyunjin Seo, How the Internet Changes Public Diplomacy: A Case Study of Online Community Run by U.S. Embassy in South Korea. Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association. (Chicago, IL, 2009), p.1.

²⁴¹ Lina Khatib, William Dutton and Michael Thelwall, "Public Diplomacy 2.0: A Case Study of the US Digital Outreach Team." *The Middle East Journal*, Volume 66, Number 3, (2012), pp. 453 – 472.

²⁴² Cho, *Op cit.* p. 277.

attitudes in other countries.²⁴³ Berridge²⁴⁴ contends that states are currently engaged in “news management” to give trending issues the “best possible spin” to shape the opinions of the foreign public. This is indeed quite indicative of diplomacy going public. Certainly, if states’ use of electronic and online platforms to supply information to foreign nationals is not diplomacy, then how can such acts be conceived?

However, Berridge²⁴⁵ considers such activities instigated by a foreign government to influence the public in another state as propaganda. He strongly advances the view that direct engagement of the foreign public is not public diplomacy but propaganda and hence should not be considered diplomacy. The jury is still out on such a conception.

Regardless of that what is agreeable and what does indeed imply that diplomacy can be public is the fact that diplomacy is essentially a communicative engagement.²⁴⁶ What distinguishes public diplomacy from conventional diplomacy is perhaps the fact that is more communicative and that the recipient of the communication is the foreign public rather than the state officials of a foreign state.²⁴⁷ Being intrinsically communicative engagement, diplomacy cannot be restrained to just private quarters or channels, it is public.

The indicators that diplomacy can be public are further evidenced by a proper understanding of the five taxonomies of public diplomacy provided by Nicholas J. Cull.²⁴⁸ In this understanding, the five approaches to public diplomacy are; advocacy, listening, cultural diplomacy, international news broadcasting and exchange diplomacy. From these, a case can be made that in virtually all these approaches, the process is conducted openly and as such if these are not diplomatic engagements then what are they?

²⁴³ Fitzpatrick *et al.*, *Op cit.* p. 7.

²⁴⁴ Berridge, *Op cit.* p. 17.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.* p. 125

²⁴⁶ Christer Jonsson and Richard Langhorne, editors, *Diplomacy Vo. 1* (London, UK: Sage Publications, 2004), p. 3.

²⁴⁷ Copeland *Op cit.* p. 163.

²⁴⁸ Cull *Op cit.* 616 - 17

Perceptibly, there are transformations in the practice of diplomacy.²⁴⁹ This is certain and not a matter of contestation, and as such the traditional conception of diplomacy as a closed-door intergovernmental communication needs redefinition. There are those like Hall²⁵⁰ who have argued that diplomacy includes propaganda and this is problematic concerning Berridge's rejection of propaganda as an attribute of diplomacy.

2.2.3.3 Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding

Nation branding has been conceived as shorthand for governments' coordinated efforts aimed at managing the image of a country with a view of improving investment, tourism or more importantly foreign relations.²⁵¹ Nadia Kadeva²⁵² defines nation branding as a compendium of discourses and practices intended at restructuring nationhood through branding campaigns and marketing. It is aimed at addressing a spectrum of issues associated with economic development but also public diplomacy.²⁵³

Awareness creation is the initial step in nation branding and seeks to create foreign awareness of the country's existence as a prerequisite in developing a positive attitude towards the country among the foreign public.²⁵⁴ The activities of nation branding range from "cosmetic" operations like the design of national slogans and logos, to endeavours to institutionalize branding with the structure of the state by establishing quasi-governmental and governmental bodies to oversee enduring efforts of nation branding.²⁵⁵

However, nation branding is often conceived in economic terms of commercial nationalism in which its expected outcomes as noted by Peter van Ham have long-term

²⁴⁹ Copeland *Op cit.* p. 163.

²⁵⁰ Ian Hall, India's New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power and the Limits of Government Action. *Asian Survey*, Volume 52, Number 6, (2012), p. 1091.

²⁵¹ Zala Volcic and Mark Andrejevic, "Nation Branding in the Era of Commercial Nationalism." *International Journal of Communication*, Volume 5, Number 1 (211), p. 598.

²⁵² Nadia Kadeva, "Nation Branding: Toward an Agenda for Critical Research." *International Journal of Communications*, Volume 5, (2011), p.118.

²⁵³ Gyorgy Szondi, "Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences." In Virginie Duthoit and Ellen Huijgh, Eds. *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*. (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 'Clingendael'), p.5.

²⁵⁴ Hakala, *et al. Op cit.* p. 539.

²⁵⁵ Kadeva *Op cit.* p..118.

influence on foreign direct investments (FDI) and the country's market capitalization.²⁵⁶ For instance, the branding dictums such as “Made in the U.S.A” and brand Kenya - “Buy Kenya, Build Kenya”, are manifest of an underlying commercial agenda that has nothing to do with the national image. Nevertheless, the audiences of national branding campaigns can be both domestic and foreign publics. National image is a key aspect of nation branding, in which sense, nation-branding attempts to reconstitute the nation both at the ideological and praxis levels by transforming nationhood's very meaning and experiential reality.²⁵⁷

It can be argued that public diplomacy and national branding share a lot in common. This is in line with Simon Anholt's notion of “policy-based” and “communication-based” nation branding as constituting an inclusive strategy of national image management.²⁵⁸ Conceptualizations of national branding and public diplomacy reveal how national branding and public diplomacy are distinct yet intricately related. Within the scholarship that sees the two as separate in *praxis*, nation branding and public diplomacy operate separately only intersecting at some quarters.²⁵⁹

In any case, the purpose of national branding is to promote the national image and seek to make it more attractive. Thus, creating a national brand is not only economically desirable for the country; but also has significant strategic and political implications for the country abroad.²⁶⁰ That said, it must be noted, however, that national image exists with or without branding.²⁶¹ Nation branding fundamentally concerns the articulation and projection of an identity; therefore, as opposed to public diplomacy it rarely has, as its main objective, relationship building.²⁶² Being largely grounded on a marketing

²⁵⁶ Peter van Ham, “The Rise of the Brand State: The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation.” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 80, Number 5 (2001), p. 1.

²⁵⁷ Kadeva *Op cit.* p.118.

²⁵⁸ Simon Anholt, “From Nation Branding to Competitive Identity – The Role of Brand Management as A Component of National Policy. In K. Dinnie (Ed.), *Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice* (Oxford, UK: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008), p.23.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p.23.

²⁶⁰ van Ham, *Op cit.*, p. 4

²⁶¹ Hakala, *et al. Op cit.* p. 542.

²⁶² Ashvin Gonesh and Jan Melissen, *Public Diplomacy: Improving Practice.* (The Hague, NET: Institute of International Relations *Clingendael*, 2005), p. 18.

perspective nation branding wrongly equates countries to companies and because countries are different to firms, their messages differ.

It is held, therefore, that public diplomacy entails the overall strategy of national image management aimed at influencing strategic decisions attendant to national policies about international economic, political and cultural relations. It is further implicit that theoretically, national branding is an impossible endeavour since it will demand an overhaul or drastic reform of the political, social, cultural, economic, and policy environment.²⁶³ For this reason, this study approaches public diplomacy from the standpoint of national image cultivation rather than national branding placing greater emphasis on relationship building through the projected and perceived image by countries.

2.2.3.4 Public Diplomacy and ‘Soft’ Power

Public diplomacy is a major instrument of “soft power” and has been defined as the act of promoting the national security and national interest of the state by understanding, enlightening and shaping foreign publics’ perception and extending the dialogue between citizens and institutions, and their counterparts abroad.²⁶⁴

Aksoy explains that public diplomacy is centered on the association between soft power and public opinion.²⁶⁵ In recent years, concepts of ‘soft power’ have gained traction in scholarly and public deliberations.²⁶⁶ The term has had a pervasive presence in leading popular magazines, newspapers and articles like *Foreign Affairs*. For this reason, understanding ‘soft power’ is an essential tool for scholars, experts and analysts of world politics and diplomacy. Power is conceptualized according to the capabilities of a nation-state.

²⁶³ Ibid. p.18

²⁶⁴ Victoria Trajkov and Goran Trajkov, “The influence of Public Diplomacy on the States Visibility in the International Relations.” *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs*, Volume 1, Number 2, (2015), p.70.

²⁶⁵ Aksoy *Op cit.* p. 2.

²⁶⁶ Giulio M. Gallarotti, "Soft Power: What it is, why it's Important, and the Conditions Under Which it Can Be Effectively Used". *Journal of Political Power*, Volume 4, Number 1, (2011), pp. 25-47

In conventional understanding, such capabilities included such antecedents as the size of the population, the size of the territory of a sovereign state, the level by which a nation-state is endowed with natural resources, military strength, economic capability, competence and political stability.²⁶⁷ Kenneth Waltz²⁶⁸ in his *Theory of International Politics*, John Mearsheimer²⁶⁹ in his *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* and Robert Gilpin²⁷⁰ in his *War and Change in World Politics* all hold this view of power.’ The material capabilities implicit in Waltz, Mearsheimer and Gilpin’s conception of power are ‘tangible assets’ that underpin military strength or hard power.²⁷¹

What is understood within the conception of power in terms of tangible assets or hard power is that national influence is contingent on the military-industrial complex, which can be deployed to marshal force or issue threats. As Giulio M. Gallarotti²⁷² has argued, the fundamental dependence on purely hard power assets is rooted in the purity of realists’ conception of the international system in terms of anarchy, which in turn is grounded in the thesis of Thomas Hobbes.²⁷³

However, breaking with this traditional understanding of power, a realization of the significance and potential of intangible assets such as culture, values, arts, cultural diversity, geography, political system, civil society, science and technology started to be conceived. Steven Luke²⁷⁴ in *The Power: A Radical View* and Jeffrey C. Isaac²⁷⁵ in his work *Beyond the Three Faces of Power; A Critique* pointed to aspects of this.

Luke advanced the idea of a three-dimensional power while Isaac advanced the notion of structural power. In line with these, Joseph Nye in his idea of co-optation suggested

²⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 7.

²⁶⁸ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. (Reading, UK: Addison Wesley, 1979), p. 131.

²⁶⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. (New York, NY: Norton, 2001), p. 55

²⁷⁰ Robert Gilpin, *War and Changes in World Politics*. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 13.

²⁷¹ Gallarotti, *Op. cit.*, p. 27

²⁷² Ibid. p. 28

²⁷³ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*. Edwin Curley, Ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1668)

²⁷⁴ Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 23 - 23

²⁷⁵ Jeffrey C. Isaac, “Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique.” *Polity*, Volume 20, Number 1 (1987), pp. 4 - 31

that influence was possible through the molding of interest and preferences of other actors with a view of converging closer to an actor's interest and preferences.²⁷⁶

Joseph Nye highlighted the significance of intangible 'capabilities' such as political values (if they live to its principles both at home and internationally), foreign policy (where it is considered authentic and has ethical standing) and culture (if it appeals to others).²⁷⁷ These intangible assets are considered to accord the states that have them a more relative advantage over the state that does not have such intangible assets. Therefore, in these intangible assets resides a state's 'soft power'.

Nye explained that soft power consists of such things as a country's economic strength, cultural diversity, geography, political system, civil society, science and technology, as well as values, sports and arts. In this view, soft power is defined as "co-option power" a country's ability to influence others, which is not resident in its direct military force.²⁷⁸ The concern of soft power is the non-coercive ability to transform others' preferences, to make them desire what one wants entirely by persuasion and attraction.²⁷⁹

Alexander Wendt²⁸⁰ argued that social structure could be understood as being held together by three distinct means; calculation, coercion and belief. Among the three beliefs generates perhaps the most efficient and stable social structures.²⁸¹ Social structures held together by hard power are not only inefficient but also temporary. Soft power works through calculation and belief. Related to the notion of soft power advanced by Nye, belief and calculation are at the core of soft power, which aims to convert its audiences through shrewdness and creating trust. In this sense, it is arguable that soft power habitually eschews an inflexible conflict of interest and this is evident in Nye's application of the idea about the Bretton Woods in which he perceives liberal principle as truly beneficial for all nations.

²⁷⁶ Nye, *Op. cit.* pp. 8 – 15.

²⁷⁷ Nye, *Op. cit.* p. 11

²⁷⁸ Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu, "The Conception of Soft Power and Its Policy Implications: A Comparative Study of China and Taiwan." *Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 17, Number 56 (2008), p. 425.

²⁷⁹ Nye, *Op. cit.* p. 11

²⁸⁰ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 23

²⁸¹ Buzzan *Op cit.* p.2

2.2.4 The Practice of Public Diplomacy in Different Countries

Despite its uptake in the years following the First World War (WWI), the term public diplomacy was rarely used during the Second World War (WWII). The concept only gained some limited usage after the end of WWII, when in 1946 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Paul-Henri Spaak, while speaking at the United Nations General Assembly's (UNGA) inaugural session opined "*These were the times of public diplomacy.*"²⁸² Therefore, despite having earlier applications dating back to antiquity, the modern use of the phrase 'public diplomacy' is, has been alluded to, associated with the mid-nineteenth-century United States (US).²⁸³

The British Propaganda Office (BPO) and the US Committee on Public Information (CPI) were established with the express intention of influencing and mobilizing the domestic and foreign public in response to the propaganda machines of Nazi Germany and the communist Soviet Union.²⁸⁴ In the second half of the twentieth century, especially during the Cold War epoch (1949 – 1991), public diplomacy flourished as a tool for both the United States and the Soviet Union influence to mobilize foreign publics and their proxies, especially in the developing world. The aim was to convince foreign publics of their ideological, political and economic convictions and it was during this time that public diplomacy adopted new forms of media such as broadcasting activities, and cultural exchanges among others.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the Voice of America (VOA), Germany's *Deutsche Welle*, (English version of Russia's Pravada), Radio Mosco and *Radio France Internationale* became instrumental in spreading information about their respective countries to foreign publics.²⁸⁵ Similarly, non-government actors including scholars and former practitioners became influential in the conduct of diplomacy facilitating

²⁸² Cull *Op cit.* p. 17.

²⁸³ Huijgh *Op cit.* p. 438.

²⁸⁴ Ibid. p.440

²⁸⁵ Gary D. Rawnsley, "Introduction to "International Broadcasting and Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century." *Media and Communication*, Volume 4, Number 2 (2016), p. 43.

overseas information programs intended to promote mutual understanding by conducting education and cultural activities.²⁸⁶

Consequently, at least by the end of the twentieth century, traditional public diplomacy involved a wide range of practices including information management and cultural promotion. European cultural institutes were established and rapidly spread around the world. These included France's *Alliance Francaise*, Germany's *Goethe Institut* and the United Kingdom's (UK) British Council all of which organized exchange programs and cultural events with the view of influencing foreign publics' understanding and attitude towards the respective states. It was within this context that in the 1980s Joseph Nye conceived the concept of "Soft power" contrasting with "hard power" or the use of economic sanctions, the threat of military intervention and coercive diplomacy to advance the national interest.²⁸⁷ Since Nye conceived of Soft power, the practice and scholarship of public diplomacy have been greatly influenced by the connections between public diplomacy and soft power, with public diplomacy being seen as one of the major tools of soft power.²⁸⁸

The practice and conduct of public diplomacy have obtained wide acceptance by countries around the world. This is perhaps owing to the value to the countries in terms of increasing visibility and/or enhancing national image, which is perceived to be inherent in public diplomacy.²⁸⁹ The US, which is deemed (albeit controversially) as the global archetype champion of democratic governance provides a crucible for assessing the adoption and practice of public diplomacy.

The US's attempt to influence foreign publics through public diplomacy is well documented. It has been insinuated (herein) under the etymological basis of public diplomacy that the US had engaged in public diplomacy as far back as the early 19th century in its dealings with the Ottoman Empire.²⁹⁰ After the Cold War, particularly in the early 1950s and as it pivoted against the Soviet Union, the US Information Agency

²⁸⁶ Huijgh *Op cit.* p. 438

²⁸⁷ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2004), p. X.

²⁸⁸ Huijgh *Op cit.* p. 440.

²⁸⁹ Viktorija Trajkov and Goran Trajkov, "*Op cit.* pp. 70 – 78.

²⁹⁰ Saliu *Op cit.* p. 71

(USIA) engaged in non-military international broadcasting. In line with this, it deployed entities including Radio Free Europe, the Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Liberty.²⁹¹

The Voice of America (VOA) started to spread the idea of democracy in Europe in 1942 and acted as a surrogate source for information and news to people then under dictatorial and authoritarian governments.²⁹² In June of that year, the US established the Office of War Information (OWI), which was the first attempt at institutionalizing public diplomacy and, of course, propaganda since its main responsibility was psychological warfare.²⁹³ These kinds of engagements were crucial in the development of public diplomacy, not only American public diplomacy but also public diplomacy for other states, which deemed it an instrumental element of statecraft.

Fearing similar strategies being deployed by the Nazis through its ‘Ministry of Truth’ in the US, the US Congress enacted the Smith Lundt Act of 1948 by which the US prohibited the dissemination of material deemed propagandist within the US. The 1948 Act, which is also referred to as the U.S Information and Educational Exchange Act, is one of the US’s linchpins for public diplomacy as it established a two-way communication strategy, inherent in public diplomatic practice. It provided the blueprint for the US’s attempt to correct the misunderstanding of the US by the foreign public.

The practice of public diplomacy was passed to the newly created State Department after the dissolution of the USIA in 1999. The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent US invasions of and combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq presented a renewed interest in public diplomacy as a tool for both foreign policy and national security. The ensuing events in the Middle East in the wake of the US’s operations resulted in the proliferation of anti-American sentiments in the Muslim and Arab world, and elsewhere in the world.²⁹⁴ Discontent with America’s operations in the Middle East and its

²⁹¹ Viktorija Trajkov and Goran Trajkov, “*Op cit.* p. 73.

²⁹² Bardos *Op cit.* 426.

²⁹³ *Ibid.* 426

²⁹⁴ Nancy Snow, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: Its History, Problems, and Promise.” In Jowett and O’Donnell, *Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays.* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005) p. 226.

unilateralism were and remain widespread around the world including in Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa.

This created the need among American foreign policymakers to develop a well-resourced and sound public diplomacy program. Concerns over the need for a robust PD program were informed by a growing worldwide decline in the perception of the US; the country was increasingly distrusted and deemed dangerous by the global public especially those in the Middle East.²⁹⁵ Arguably, the US's public diplomacy program in the post 9/11 epoch has been aimed at informing, engaging and influencing foreign publics about US policies and values through the use of multimedia assets including international radio and television broadcasting, state-sponsored cultural and education exchanges and society to VIP visits. The notion of the "battle for hearts and minds" became a cornerstone for the US's engagement after the 9/11 attacks especially following the US-led coalition's invasion of Iraq.²⁹⁶

The US has engaged in public diplomacy characterized by a strong representation of the country's culture, values and policies to foreign publics to influence the attitudes and perceptions of those target audiences. This is in response to a tarnished reputation over the past years. The public diplomacy of the U.S. addresses ongoing questions related to its national image and credibility in the world. The country's public diplomacy is routed in its foreign policy and communication upshots from elites to street-level foreign publics instead of just conventional elite-elite communication akin to formal diplomatic communiqués.²⁹⁷

In Europe, Britain is among the European states that have strongly applied public diplomacy in their attempt to realize their foreign objectives by appealing to the foreign public. Britain applies a different, British-centric understanding of public diplomacy from the US.²⁹⁸ While the US version of public diplomacy is mostly linked to appeals to foreign publics during wartime or national crisis, the British ideation of public diplomacy presents public diplomacy as activities aimed at influencing the opinions of

²⁹⁵ Ibid. p. 73.

²⁹⁶ Leonard *Op cit.* p.1.

²⁹⁷ Snow *Op cit.* p. 226.

²⁹⁸ Ibid. p. 230.

the public in target countries to enable the British government, companies and organizations to realize their objectives during times of war, and of peace.²⁹⁹

Lord Carter, one of the leading figures in British diplomatic circles and foreign policymaking conceptualized public diplomacy as attempts to seek, inform and engage foreign publics and organizations and whose ultimate goal is to influence how the United Kingdom is understood in a manner amenable to the British government's medium and long-term foreign policy goals.³⁰⁰ The most crucial British public diplomacy actors include the British Council, the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO), the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service, the British Tourist Authority (BTA), and the United Kingdom Trade and Investment

Since 1997, the government of the United Kingdom (UK) has worked to create a novel atmosphere of trust with its European neighbours and around the world, particularly the developing world.³⁰¹ Issues surrounding the European Union (EU) especially Britain's perceived indifference to the body, Britain's silence and indifference to apartheid in South Africa, Britain's unresponsiveness to the Rwandan genocide, and the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Kosovo had made Britain increasingly unpopular among world publics. To create the trust needed, Britain found public diplomacy to be an instrumental tool. Following its support and participation in the Iraq war under the US-led *Operation Iraqi Freedom* (OIF) that began on 20 March 2003, Britain found itself with a badly damaged international reputation.³⁰² There was a highly negative perception of Britain's national image among the Arab countries, the Muslim world and the developing world in general.

In 1998, the British Council launched an initiative dubbed "Through Other Eyes" to assess how young professionals perceived Britain. The initiative established that there was a generally positive perception of Britain concerning business and education but a

²⁹⁹ Sir Michael Butler, quoted in Mark Leonard, *Public Diplomacy* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), p.1.

³⁰⁰ Lord Carter of Coles, *Public Diplomacy Review*. (London, UK: British Council, 2005). p. 4.

³⁰¹ Mark Leonard and Andrew Small, *British Public Diplomacy in the 'Age of Schisms'*. (London, UK: The Foreign Policy Center, 2005), p. 2.

³⁰² Ipsos MORI, "Iraq War Damaged Britain's Reputation in the World." *Ipsos* 19 March 2013 <<https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/iraq-war-damaged-britains-reputation-world>> Accessed 31 May 2021.

generally negative one in political aspects. Consequently, the Britain Abroad Task Force (BAFT) launched an initiative to help enhance perceptions of Britain among foreign audiences.³⁰³

In 2002, the British advanced their public diplomacy program by creating the Public Diplomacy Strategy Board (PDSB) mandated to coordinate the government's work of establishing and building communication with foreign publics. Through the PDSB, Britain harmonized the activities of the British Council, the FCO, the British Tourist Authority (BTA), and the United Kingdom Trade and Investment.³⁰⁴ The United Kingdom (UK) found public diplomacy as being strategically important in (re)communicating Britain to the world and establishing a positive image of Britain in response to the increasingly negative perception of the country.

As such, international broadcasting, and cultural and educational exchanges became crucial in Britain's attempt to 'connect' with the world and to tell its own story. In this regard, international broadcasting became a strong aspect of Britain's public diplomacy. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service, The BBC played a critical role as Britain's tool for public diplomacy during WWII. Britain's Prime Minister at the time, Sir Winston Churchill used the station to persuade the Americans to abandon their policy of neutrality and join the British bandwagon in fighting the Nazis.

It was also through the BBC that General Charles de Gaulle after fleeing Nazi-occupied France for asylum in Britain was able to communicate with and rally the French masses from BBC's Broadcasting House Studio B2.³⁰⁵ Similarly, cinemas also became a crucial aspect of Britain's 'soft' power projection and public diplomacy during WWII. After the outbreak of WWII and particularly by the end of 1939, Britain had produced close to 4000 cinemas to spread British 'propaganda'. These two instances represented Britain's most public way of practising public diplomacy.

³⁰³ James Pamment and Palgrave Macmillan, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Diplomatic Influence and the Digital Revolution*. (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 48–49.

³⁰⁴ Ibid. p. 2.

³⁰⁵ Rajesh Mirchandani and Abdullahi Tasiu Abubakar, "Britain's International Broadcasting." (Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press, 2014), p. 11.

Another key component or dimension of British public diplomacy has been in the area of educational and cultural exchanges. The British Council has enabled British schools to find exchange partners around the world. This has enabled young people to learn, not only about Britain and for British exchange students to spread the British values, culture, and language, but also for foreign students to learn about Britain and to perceive global issues from a British perspective.³⁰⁶ UK's global education program began in the 1970s with the launch of the World Studies Project and the implementation of the Development Education Centres. This program was expanded in the 1980s.

In the Middle East, countries including Turkey and Israel have deployed several public diplomacy techniques with the intent of shaping global audiences' perceptions of their image. Israel's public diplomacy or *Hasbara* is robust and has been aimed at creating a positive perception of the Jewish state among foreign audiences ever since the founding of Israel in 1948.³⁰⁷ *Hasbara*, which is the Jewish term for propaganda and diplomacy implies to 'explanation' of foreign policies.³⁰⁸

However, Israel's *Hasbara* policy was seen largely as underdeveloped and lacking in response to the growing criticism that the Jewish state attracted in light of its response to the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. Public diplomacy had not been institutionalized, Israel lacked a strategic vision for its PD and its PD actions were not attuned to the challenges that Israel encountered.³⁰⁹ Nonetheless, in 2007, there was a paradigm shift in Israel's public diplomacy. Following the Second Lebanon War of 2006, Israel re-examined its *Hasbara* policy and realized its inability to attend to the demands and challenges relating to the perception of Israel abroad.

Among the key events that the *Hasbara* policy failed to attend to include the international backlash of the 2009 *Operation Cast Lead*, the 2010 *Marmara Incident*

³⁰⁶ Eleanor J. Brown, W. John Morgan and Simon McGrath, "Education, Citizenship and New Public Diplomacy in the UK: What is Their Relationship?" *Education and New Public Diplomacy*, Volume 1 (2008), p. 76.

³⁰⁷ Karolina Zuzanna Jedrzejewska, "Hasbara: Public Diplomacy with Israeli Characteristics." *Torun International Studies*, Volume 1, Number 13 (2020), p. 107.

³⁰⁸ Fatemeh Shafiee Sarvestani, Saied Reza Ameli and Foad Izadi, "Israeli Public Diplomacy toward the United States: A Network and Narrative Approach." *Asian Journal of Communication*, (2018), p. 1

³⁰⁹ Avner Golov, *The Israeli Community in the United States: A Public Diplomacy Asset for Israel.* (Ramat Aviv, ISR; Institute for National Security Studies, 2018), p. 31.

and the numerous fatal encounters between Palestinian rioters and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).³¹⁰ In 2009 Israeli foreign policy actors deemed the ‘revitalization’ of the *Hasbara*, and its ‘replacement with *Hasbara 2.0* as being of strategic importance by then. The key aim of *Hasbara 2.0* would be “Presenting Israel” through a combination of strategies including digital diplomacy, engaging the Israeli diaspora through the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, and educational exchanges in which select delegations of Israeli students were sent to North American universities.³¹¹ The extent to which these efforts have shaped the perception of Israel by the foreign public is worth examining but is beyond the scope of this study.

Turkey is another country in the Middle East, which has sought to explore the values of public diplomacy. Turkey’s challenge has always been that it is at the crossroads of whether to identify with Western Europe or with the Arab world. In 1951, following the end of WWII, Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in its attempt to disentangle itself from the “Middle East swamp”.³¹² Ultimately, the Arab world treated Turkey as a pariah state, especially following its recognition of Israel.

Therefore, the demand for Turkey to explain itself to the rest of the world even as it identified with Arab nationalism and Islamic identity was strong. Turkey's adoption of public diplomacy must be construed within this context and seen as Turkey's aim of getting its voice heard not only by regional audiences in the Middle East but also elsewhere in the world including the West and the Muslim world.

It sought to break misconceptions and prejudices and to correct the growing negative image around the world.³¹³ To do so, it has used a combination of actors and tools. The main actors in Turkish PD include the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), the Anadolu Agency (AA), the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), the Yunus

³¹⁰ Ibid. pp. 34 – 36.

³¹¹ Ibid. pp. 37 – 38.

³¹² Meliha Benli Altunisik, “The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft Power in the Middle East.” *Insight Turkey Spring*, Volume 10, Number 2 (2008), p. 42.

³¹³ Ibid. pp. 42 - 43

Emre Institute, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the Turkish TV Series.³¹⁴ TIKA was created in 1992 and although the public diplomacy role was not explicitly addressed among its key roles, it has advanced Turkish public diplomacy by engaging in development and humanitarian aid since its creation. The TRT has been influential in reaching foreign publics with targeted communication that seeks to advance audiences' views of Turkey.

The TRT has allowed Turkey to explain itself to the foreign public by broadcasting to audiences in different countries.³¹⁵ Through the TRT, Turkey has been able to tell its story to its international listeners and viewers from Turkish own perspective. The Anadolu Agency (AA) has also played a crucial role in advancing Turkey's public diplomacy. Created in the 1920's, the agency was pivotal in publicizing the National Struggle or War of Independence. Since the early 2000s, it has constituted a powerful strategic media actor as it directly explains Turkey's national issues to the world. By 2017, the AA was broadcasting in 9 languages including English, French, Persian, Kurdish, Arabic, Bosnian, Russian, Croatian and Bosnian.³¹⁶

2.2.5 China's Public Diplomacy

China represents one of the oldest cases of the practice of public diplomacy. This part examines the conduct of public diplomacy in China drawing from antiquity.

2.2.5.1 The Pedigree and Development of China's Public Diplomacy

Several accounts are found of formal diplomatic encounters in Chinese antiquity. Roswell S. Britton³¹⁷ relying only on *Zuozhuan* recorded at least eight different modes of diplomatic encounters among ancient Chinese kingdoms. Between circa 722 B.C. and 703 B.C., there were not less than fifteen *hui* or conferences that dealt with matters of war and peace, were aimed at arranging marriages between ruling families and were

³¹⁴ Vildan Aksoy, "Global Public Diplomacy." [Unpublished] M.A Thesis. (Middle East Technical University, 2019), pp. 98 – 113.

³¹⁵ Aksoy *Op cit.* p. 101.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.* 102.

³¹⁷ Roswell Britton, "Chinese Interstate Intercourse Before B.C." *American Journal of International Law*, Volume 29, Number 4 (1935), p. 616.

aimed at reaffirming friendly relations.³¹⁸ Similarly, during this period, audiences or court visits (*chao*), envoys, missions (*pin*), transfer of territory, mediation, asylum, and treaties or covenants (*meng*) were all fairly established as means of conducting international relations. For example, in the 8th Year of the rule of Prince Yin of *Lu*, the Prince of Sung and the Prince of Wei met in *Ch'ui* to formalize relations between the two territories.³¹⁹

In 716 B.C., the Princes of Hsieh and T'eng visited the courts of the Prince of *Lu* for arbitration over a dispute over precedence.³²⁰ The state systems also had several *ping* or simply a discrete class of courtesy missions. The Prince of *Lu*, for instance, had hosted about seven *p'ing between* c.716 and c.704. Other examples of formal diplomatic relations in ancient China are found in the relations of other state systems existing at the time. For instance, in c.716, the states of *Ch'en* and *Cheng*, conducted duplicate covenanting in which a minister of the former went to negotiate and covenant with the prince of the latter and nine days later an envoy of the Prince of *Cheng* repeated the act with the Prince of *Ch'en*.³²¹ In circa.562 B.C. Wei Chiang of *Chin* persuaded the Prince of Jung to join a covenant to conquer the state of *Cheng* and Chou state sought a diplomatic alliance with *Lu* and *Ch'i*.³²²

While the conduct of diplomacy was mainly formal at this time, the conduct of relations between and among these states took the form of public diplomacy. During the Spring and Autumn era (circa. 771 B.C – 476 B.C), which is also known as the Hundred Schools of Thought, presented a culmination in intellectual and cultural development among ancient Chinese city-states.³²³ This is needless to say specific manifestations of the Spring and Autumn epoch interactions have attracted little scholarly attention.³²⁴ During this period, culture became construed and embraced by the state systems of

³¹⁸ Armin Selbitschka, "Early Chinese Diplomacy: "Realpolitik" versus the So-Called Tributary System." *Asian Major*, Volume 28, Number 1 (2015), p. 71

³¹⁹ Britton, *Op cit.* p.93.

³²⁰ Nicola Di Cosmo, *Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). p. 206.

³²¹ Di Cosmo, "Ancient China and Its Enemies", p.120.

³²² *Ibid.*, p.120.

³²³ Parama Sinha Palit, "China's Cultural Diplomacy: Historical Origin, Modern Methods and Strategic Outcomes." *China Research Center*, Volume 12, Number 2 (2013), p. 2

³²⁴ Selbitschka *Op cit.* p.71

ancient China as a potentially effective tool of ‘soft power’. Ancient strategists in China abhorred the use of force and territorial expansion and instead favoured diplomatic manoeuvring to ensure the survival and security of their ‘state’.³²⁵

For instance, Confucius or Kong Zi (circa 551 B.C – 479 B.C) emphasized the need for regulation and limitation of power and taught about education and humanity as opposed to war. Mencius (circa 372 B.C – 289 B.C) condemned war as a means of achieving objectives and suggested the idea that a benevolent ruler could readily win the masses and would have no enemies. Sun Tzu³²⁶ (circa 722 B.C – 481 B.C) in “*The Art of War*” posited that attacking the mind of the enemy was more strategically beneficial to the kingdom than having fortified cities. By so saying, Sun Tzu’s sentiments are akin to the current notion of going for the minds and hearts of the foreign public.

The treatment of public diplomacy in China’s scholarship is grounded in Confucianism and Confucian standards. Confucianism is and was a diverse doctrinal framework, which included Taoism, Legalism, Mohisma and Buddhism. Confucianism provided the basis for the Chinese Imperial Bureaucracy, which elaborated and underscored the scholarship and practice of diplomacy including PD. Perhaps following the Kong Zi-Mencius political construct and the teachings of Mohism and Taoism, ancient Chinese state systems of the Spring and Autumn era engaged in public diplomacy. State intermarriages became an important means of establishing friendly and cordial relations between two state systems. The kinship ties among the kingdoms of ancient China ensured greater cultural understanding and exchange of values. Selbitscka³²⁷ argues that many pre-modern societies depended on marital alliances in their ‘foreign’ relations.

For instance, arranging marriages to realize political ends between state systems was a customary practice in Western Zhou by circa 1045 B.C.³²⁸ The marquis of *Qi*, in 539 B.C. offered women of kinship to *Jin*. In addition, the older sister of the Duke Jing of *Jin* became the wife of the ruler of *Lu* Ying Er. These diplomatic strategies were aimed

³²⁵ Ibid, p. 2.

³²⁶ Sun Tzu (Author), Ralph D. Sawyer (Translator), *The Art of War*. (New York, NY: LTTL, 1994)

³²⁷ Selbitschka *Op cit.* p.71

³²⁸ Maria Khayutina, "Marital Alliances and Affinal Relatives in the Society and Politics of Zhou China in the Light of Bronze Inscriptions," *EC* 37 (2014), pp. 39-99

at achieving a two-fold objective; one, “buy” the powerful entity’s goodwill, and two, ensure the spread of values of the sending entity among the population of the receiving entity, perhaps to shape their view of the sending entity.

However, despite these early manifestations and practice of public diplomacy, the crystallization of Chinese public diplomacy in modern times is traceable to the “Century of Humiliation”.³²⁹ This is the period between China’s defeat in 1840 in the Opium War and the creation of the PRC in 1949. The Chinese deemed that the internal rebellions that pervaded this period had made the country exceedingly vulnerable to foreign attacks. The attacks had emanated from the West, a place whose cultural values, traditions and ideas were inimical to Chinese culture.

Nevertheless, the Chinese leadership considered that owing to the West’s technological and military superiority, the rejection of the West cultural practices, values, ideas and traditions was unsustainable. The fear was that the Chinese could copy Western culture, become weak, lose the Chinese identity and become a protectorate.

In the 1930s, the humiliation was extended with the Japanese invasion of and occupation of Chinese land. The Chinese were subsequently subjected to draconian rule by Imperial Japan, leading to greater mistrust of Chinese foreign powers. Therefore, the Century of Humiliation created the need for the Chinese to reclaim their heritage acquired during the Chinese golden age of the Spring and Autumn period. The founding of the Communist Party by Mao Zedong, the Long March of 1934 – 1935, and the Great Leap Forward of 1958 to 1960 enabled China to spring back from humiliation and the Chinese to lay the foundations for reclaiming their socio-political standing in international politics.³³⁰ However, the Cultural Revolution of 1966 presented an impediment to the Chinese reclamation of its place among states. The Mao-sanctioned Red Army’s crackdown on chief officials and intellectuals tainted China’s image among foreign audiences.

³²⁹ Aksoy *Op cit.* p. 60.

³³⁰ Frank Sieren and E Bruce Reynolds, *The China Code: What’s Left for Us?* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 111–12.

The turning point for China began in 1978, with Deng Xiaoping's "Four Moderations" which marked financial reform policies in industry, agriculture, science and technology. These reforms implied that rather than stand aloof, China would embrace globalization and 'open up'.³³¹ The 'Opening-Up' policy initiated under Deng Xiaoping influenced the foreign public's opinion about the PRC and created the perception that China was emerging as a responsible sovereign state. Nonetheless, the events of Tiananmen Square of 1989 presented a devastating blow to China's image abroad and China became a subject of economic, political and trade sanctions. Consequently, China found itself isolated and attempted to improve its relations, especially with its Asian neighbour on the dictum of a "good neighbour".

It should be conceived that it was after the Tiananmen Square incident that China modernized its public diplomacy program to positively communicate its political values, cultural values and experience to foreign audiences. This became a key objective of President Jiang Zemin after he succeeded Deng Xiaoping. China became focused on improving its image in the court of global opinion. China's emphasis on public diplomacy was advanced during the rule of Hu Jintao who succeeded Zemin. China's Deputy of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People Consultative Conference, Zhao Qizheng in an article in the *People's Daily*, opined that public diplomacy was crucial to spreading Chinese culture abroad and by so doing improving foreign audiences' understanding of China. Zhao's view was that China needed not just to listen to the world but to talk back.³³²

China is also responding to a barrage of criticisms relating to its political system (largely perceived to be authoritarian by international audiences), its human rights records, its lack of democratic institutions, and its support for regimes considered to be authoritarian and human rights abusers such as North Korea, Zimbabwe and Sudan.³³³ China's loans to the developing world are viewed negatively as a way of entrapping

³³¹ Oded Shenkar, *The Chinese Century: The Rising Chinese Economy and Its Impact on the Global Economy, the Balance of Power, and Your Job* (New Jersey, NJ: FT Press, 2006), p. 3

³³² Zhao, Qizheng, "Better Public Diplomacy to Present a Truer Picture of China." *People's Daily*, March 30, 2017. <[Http://English.Peopledaily.Com.Cn/200703/30/Eng20070330_362496.Html](http://English.Peopledaily.Com.Cn/200703/30/Eng20070330_362496.Html)> Accessed: February 2021.

³³³ Rawnsely, *Op cit.* p. 283

this country into a kind of debt trap with the clandestine goal of controlling the commanding heights of recipient countries' economies.

Similar to other states in the world, China's engagement in public diplomacy is strategically aimed at not only reclaiming the glorious heritage of the Chinese people but also at explaining China, the Chinese culture and China's internal and foreign policies to foreign audiences.³³⁴ The PRC is aware of the negative perception of China that is growing in tandem with its rise as a global military, political and economic power. It is embracing diplomacy, and particularly public diplomacy as a potentially viable means of cultivating a positive image of itself in the minds of foreign publics. According to Vildan Askoy,³³⁵ the public diplomacy of China focuses on the cultural heritage of the Chinese and China's growing economy. It can also be argued that China's public diplomacy centres on communicating China's intentions to the world as both its economic and military power grows.

China has deployed a barrage of tools including the media (China Radio International, China Daily, *Xinhua News Agency* and CCTV (China Central Television)).³³⁶ The establishment and expansion of the Chinese cultural centres, particularly the Confucius Institutes (CI) attests to China's public diplomacy's emphasis on culture. The CI has spread to 81 countries including Kenya, where it has a presence in 4 universities. Educational and cultural exchanges have also formed a critical part of China's public diplomacy program around the world. Currently, there exists a near-ubiquitous presence of Chinese international students around the world evidences the place of the students as soft-power tools for China.³³⁷ It has been found that in 2005, more than 141,000 foreigners were educated in China, 28% more than in the previous year. Out of these 75% came from Asia, 9% from the Americas, 2% from Africa, 1% from Oceania and 12 per cent from Europe.³³⁸

³³⁴ Lampton, *Op. cit.*, p. 157.

³³⁵ Aksoy *Op cit.*, p. 67.

³³⁶ Leslie, *Op cit.* p. 168

³³⁷ Eide, *Op. cit.*, p.81.

³³⁸ Xinhua News Agency, 'More Foreigners Studying in China', 2006, <<http://www.china.org.cn/english/GS-e/170530.htm>> [Accessed: 15/5/2020].

2.2.5.2 ‘Soft’ Power and China’s Public Diplomacy

The concept of ‘soft power’ has gained currency within Chinese public discourse. The Chinese translation of soft power is *ruan shi li*, *ruan li liang* or *ruan quan li*.³³⁹ At the most basic level, the concept of public diplomacy in China is strongly intertwined with that of soft power. In Chinese scholarship, soft power is conceived as the ability to overcome the enemy without resorting to force. This is what Sun Tzu, the legendary military strategist and warrior-philosopher of the Warring State epoch implied when he talked about *bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing*.³⁴⁰ Soft power is also perceived in line with what Mencius had referred to as the kingly way as opposed to the bully’s way.³⁴¹

China’s soft power resides in several assets that have been identified by Joseph Nye. Among these is culture, which China sees as a vital part of its international competitiveness. Many Chinese scholars and academics concur that Chinese soft power resides in China’s rich cultural heritage, language (mandarin), literature, philosophy, art, medicine cuisine and architecture.³⁴² The accentuation of harmony in Chinese culture, which is rooted in Confucianism is not unique but has a wide appeal for audiences around the world.

In light of the challenges that China has faced with its image and reputation, especially among the foreign public, it has been imperative for China to project its soft power to win the hearts and minds of its international audiences. China has often underperformed in the sphere of soft power. It has previously dedicated very limited resources towards boosting and modernizing its soft power assets and communicating these in its public diplomacy engagements. Nonetheless, China has recently and gradually become conscious of its weakness and has focused on revitalizing its performance.³⁴³ These aims and efforts provide the delicate link between its public diplomacy and soft power.

³³⁹ Ibid., p. 426.

³⁴⁰ Sun Xiaoying, ‘Build Up Soft Power; Grasp Every Opportunity of Peaceful,’ *Dongnanya Zongheng* Volume 1, Number 12, (2004), pp. 77–81.

³⁴¹ Wang and Lu, *Op. cit.*, p. 427.

³⁴² Ibid. p. 428.

³⁴³ Barry Buzan, “Confusing Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” p. 1.

China is highly sensitive to its national image abroad. Its establishment, in 1990, of the Overseas Publicity Department (OPD) within the Central Party Committee (CPC), was in response to its sensitivity to its national image abroad. The OPD was mandated to promote a positive image of China abroad through cultural events, favourable publicity, and media relations in foreign countries.³⁴⁴

2.2.5.3 China's Public Diplomacy in Kenya

In 1954, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier at the time pronounced five principles that would underscore China's foreign relations over the next decades, which underpinned China's diplomatic engagement with Kenya. These five principles were; mutual respect for the sovereignty of other countries, mutual non-interference in other countries' internal affairs, mutual non-aggression, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.³⁴⁵ This is the basis upon which China has related to the developing world including Africa.

African leaders have considered China an "all-weather friend"³⁴⁶, which is in itself a big score for the PRC in terms of its reputation and image in Africa including Kenya. China has previously adopted diplomatic practices implicit in conventional diplomacy to engage Kenya. In this sense, China had previously centred on formal government-to-government engagement with the Kenyan governments.³⁴⁷

These formal diplomatic encounters began immediately after Kenya entered the international stage as an independent state in 1963. Kenya and China enjoyed cordial relations during the reign of President Jomo Kenyatta (1963 – 1978). It was the fourth country to recognize Kenya as an independent state (following West Germany, Russia, and Ethiopia) establishing an embassy in Nairobi on February 5, 1964.³⁴⁸ China's

³⁴⁴ Kejin Zhao, "The Motivation Behind China's Public Diplomacy." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Volume 8, Number 2 (2015), p. 26

³⁴⁵ Lilian Tunai Mulati, "China-Kenya Relations: An Analysis of Its Nature since Independence." *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science*, Volume 3, Number 10 (2019), p. 735.

³⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 735.

³⁴⁷ Samuel M. Makinda, "The Rise of China in Kenya's Foreign Relations." In Nic Cheeseman, Karuti Kanyanga and Gabrielle Lynch, *The Oxford Handbook of Kenyan Politics*. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2020).

³⁴⁸ Mulati, *Op. cit.* p.737.

embassy in Kenya remains the largest in Africa in terms of personnel and size. Kenya's cordial relations with the PRC persisted even though the two countries pursued different economic and political systems; the PRC operated on a communist blueprint while Kenya inherited a capitalist and liberal economic and political framework from the British.

The strategic location of Kenya near the Gulf of Eden and Kenya's relatively developed infrastructure within the East African region and the Greater Horn of Africa (GHOA) made it quite appealing to the rival power blocs. China's interest in Kenya had been an attempt by Beijing to gain access to the Gulf of Eden and to seek support for its quest to find support for its "One China Policy" and quest to replace Taiwan at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In 1964, the vice president of Kenya at the time, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga led a high-powered delegation to China to enhance China-Kenya bilateral relations.³⁴⁹

Throughout the regime of Kenyatta and his successor President Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi (1978 – 2002), China's diplomatic relations with Kenya were mainly organized along the conventional model, that is, formal engagement through the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs). China had given little credence to public diplomacy. China formally supported infrastructure development and accorded foreign development aid to the government of Kenya (GoK). Moi International Sports Complex was developed through a Chinese Yuan Renminbi (CNY) loan of approximately, KSH 1.16 billion in 1987.

Chinese loans and grants have gone to various infrastructure and development projects including; the supply of medical equipment and drugs, the Maize Flour Processing Project in Bomet town, the Moi International Sports Complex project in Kasarani and the Standard Gauge Railway Line (SGR). China has provided Concessional Loans for the construction of several roads, like the Kima/Emusustwi Road, Kipsigak — Serem -

³⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 739.

Shamakhokho Road, and the Gambogi-Serem Road and the upgrading of the Moi Referral Hospital in Eldoret.³⁵⁰

However, this is not to say that there were no Chinese soft power projections in Kenya. China had engaged in several activities in Kenya, which meet the threshold of public diplomacy as conceived by Gullion.³⁵¹ In 1980, China had committed to providing 10 scholarships yearly for Kenyan students. The PRC also requested Kenya to train Chinese students at Kenya Utalii College to acquire skills that would enable it to develop its tourism industry.

As its interest in Kenya has increased, China has engaged more in public diplomacy in Kenya. Its media presence in Kenya has increased, it has expanded its cultural and educational exchanges with Kenya, and it has established several cultural centres or CI in some public universities in Kenya. For instance, in 2006 it relocated Xinhua's overseas news service to Nairobi from Paris. Media analyses constitute the mainstream of the more profound analysis of the PRC's soft power. In line with its public diplomacy goals, Kenya is the only African country that plays host to four Chinese media organizations including; China Radio International, CCTV, Xinhua News Agency and China Daily.³⁵² On the contrary, according to Michael Leslie,³⁵³ a recent survey by American research centres, PEW, dubbed Global Attitudes and Trends 2015, Kenya among other African countries reported negative opinions about Chinese media in Africa.

Concerning cultural centres, there are four Confucius Institutes in Kenya, which are located at the University of Nairobi (UoN), Kenyatta University (KU), Moi University (MU) and Egerton Universities.³⁵⁴ Chinese cultural exchanges in Kenya have not been limited to CI but have rather included the dissemination of Chinese culture by thousands

³⁵⁰ Candice Newcomb, "The Impact of Chinese Investments on Kenyan Economy." *Master's Thesis, Chapman University*, 2020. <<https://doi.org/10.36837/chapman.000190>> (Accessed 25th May 2021)

³⁵¹ Young, *Op cit.* p. 279.

³⁵² *Ibid.* p. 73.

³⁵³ Michael Leslie, "The Dragon Shapes Its Image: A Study of Chinese Media Influence Strategies in Africa." *African Studies Quarterly*, Volume 16, Issue 3 – 4, (2016), p. 168.

³⁵⁴ About Confucius Institute/Classroom <http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm> (Accessed 6th May 2020)

of Chinese currently working in Kenya. While the number of Chinese workers in Kenya is not well known, a 2010 estimate places it between 5,000 and 10,000.³⁵⁵

2.3 National Image

2.3.1 Origins and Development of National Image

This part of the chapter examines a national image, to explain why the national image is important to countries including China. It analyzes the origins of national image and its development as a concept within diplomacy in general and public diplomacy in particular. How public diplomacy has been conceived and practised since antiquity, as presented in the previous section, suggests that public diplomacy aims to influence the foreign public's perception of the national image of the country practising public diplomacy. Two questions that follow naturally from such conception, and which must be answered presently is, what is the national image? And why is it so important for states? An understanding of national image must begin with an understanding of its constituent concepts - nation and image.

Nation

Baylis, Smith and Owens³⁵⁶ define a nation as a group of persons who recognize one another as having a common identity with an emphasis on homeland. Nevertheless, a nation, as applied within this study, draws from the definition provided by Benedict Anderson³⁵⁷ as an imaginary political community. A nation is imaginary because even members of the smallest nation will never know, hear from or meet most members of their nation but still consider themselves linked to each other.³⁵⁸

However, people who make up a nation imagine or have been persuaded to consider that they have common salient characteristics, which unify them as a nation and validate their claim for political representation. It is upon this mutual recognition of several

³⁵⁵ Kenneth King, "China's Cooperation in Education and Training with Kenya: A Different Model?" *International Journal of Educational Development*, Volume 30 (2010), p. 489.

³⁵⁶ Baylis *Op cit.* p. 570

³⁵⁷ Khalid Manzoor Butt, "Nation, Nation-State and Nationalism: Evaluating 'Janus Face' of Nationalism." *The Journal of Political Science*, (2010), p. 34.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.* p.34

individuals based on shared attributes that permit persons to be considered members of a particular nation and to distinguish them from others. The criteria for nationhood are not only dynamic but are also convoluted, contested and varied.³⁵⁹ Nonetheless, at least three types of nations exist, *Volksnation*, *Kulturnation* and *Staatsnation*.³⁶⁰

The *Volksnation* is simply based on the imagined identity and relates to ethnic nationhood. The *Staatsnation* is centred on a patriotic commitment to constitutionalism and the legitimacy of the general political order. The *Kulturnation* is a cultural nation or is based on a shared national culture that is well defined and vigorously promoted by the state.³⁶¹ The nation-states are themselves forms of territorialization of state power; that is, those established according to socially constructed national identities. The nation-state is a political community in which the state (a community of people interacting in the same political system) claims legitimacy based on representing the nation.³⁶²

The nation-state would no doubt exist if all the members of a single nation were organized in a single state without representation of other national communities.³⁶³ However, this is rarely the case; that is, it is practically impossible to find a nation-state, in fact in most nation-states, the three analytically distinct dimensions of nationhood (*Volksnation*, *Kulturnation* and *Staatsnation*) are found to be mutually reinforcing and constitute what is deemed more appropriately as a country or a nation. It is the image of the conceived country or the “nation-state” that is promoted through public diplomacy. While there is a subtle difference between a nation and a country, this study follows trends in literature that have conceived nation and country interchangeably.

³⁵⁹ Bob Jessop, “Nation and State”, In S. Krossa, ed., *Introduction to Contemporary European Studies: Concepts in the Context of Globalization*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), pp. 171.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p.172

³⁶¹ *Ibid.* pp.172 -73

³⁶² Baylis *et al.*, *Op cit.* p. 570

³⁶³ *Ibid.* p.570

Image

At its core, image is a human construct and is subjective³⁶⁴ and vulnerable to different conceptualizations. As such, image is viewed differently among people, and across space and time. As a human construct, image imbues an assortment of perceived attributes internally conceived by the beholder or projected by the referent object, event, person or entity even a country.³⁶⁵ In this sense, an image is conceivable as an organized representation of an object of reference in a person's cognitive system.³⁶⁶ According to Walter Lippmann, images are mental pictures of reality, constructed by humans to simplify their environment.³⁶⁷ Gradually, individuals develop a reliable picture of the environment. In this sense, people respond to situations by constructing pictures previously independently developed or which have been previously directed to them.³⁶⁸

From the foregoing, it is implicit that the public's perception of image can be shaped by the image-makers. It therefore follows that two aspects of image can be conceived; that is, projected image and perceived image. The projected image is a product of image building and is the image that is produced to generate desirable outcomes.³⁶⁹ It relates to the impressions and ideas that are presented for people's consideration.

The projected image is often presented through diverse means of communication to target audiences. In this sense, a projected image is mostly a purposely constructed form of communication.³⁷⁰ This means that images are capable of being projected, either consciously through active promotion or unconsciously, through communication channels to target audiences.³⁷¹ The recipients of image prognoses are then capable of assembling the messages based on their predisposed constructs to adopt a particular

³⁶⁴ Xiufang Li and Naren Chitty, "Reframing National Image: A Methodological Framework." *Conflict and Communication Online*, Volume 8, Number 2 (2009), p. 1.

³⁶⁵ Ibid. p.1

³⁶⁶ Li and Chitty *Op cit.* p. 1.

³⁶⁷ Walter Lippmann, *Public opinion*. (New York, NY: Free Press, 1922), p. 11

³⁶⁸ Ibid. p.11

³⁶⁹ Li and Chitty *Op cit.* p. 1.

³⁷⁰ Chung-Shing Chan and Yunan Zhang, "Matching Projected Image with Perceived Image for Geotourism Development: A Qualitative-Quantitative Integration," *Asian Geographer*, Volume 35, Number 2, (2018), p. 145

³⁷¹ Anna Farmaki, "A Comparison of the Projected and the Perceived Image of Cyprus." *Tourismos: An International Multidisciplinary Journal of Tourism*, Volume 7, Number 2 (2012), p. 97.

behaviour. Perceived image on the other hand is the outcome of people's interaction with the projected image and their assumptions and considerations.

According to Chung-Shing Chan and Yunan Zhang,³⁷² perceived image is the output of people's emotional and reasoned interpretation of the projected image. As such, the formation of a perceived image is informed by a person's affective and cognitive components that work together to form the main construct of image evaluation. Both projected image (established through promotional activities) and perceived image (held by the target audiences) therefore influence a person's evaluation of a phenomenon or an entity including that of foreign countries.

National Image

National image has been conceptualized as an attitudinal construct, which implies a conglomeration of measurement variables including the assessment of the national economy, the training of citizens and citizens' work competency as well as the country's level of technological advancement.³⁷³ The definition adopted in this study for national image draws from an expanded definition by Ingrid M. Martin and Servin Eroglu³⁷⁴ that country or national image is an array of normative inferred and informational beliefs people have of a country which underline their interpretation of a country's culture, products and national symbols. In this sense, image is intricately linked to the attributes of the nation or as held by its beholders.

Inherent in the elucidation provided, it can be seen that a country image comprises at least two components; cognitive component and affective component. The cognitive country image relates to the audiences' beliefs of a country about econometric variables such as levels of economic development, levels of technological advancements, industrialization levels and the living standards of its citizens.³⁷⁵ The affective country

³⁷² Li and Chitty *Op cit.* p. 1.

³⁷³ Alexander Buhmann and Diana Ingenhoff, "Advancing the Country Image Construct from a Public Relations Perspective." *Journal of Communication Management*, Volume 19, Number 1, (2015), p. 62.

³⁷⁴Ingrid M. Martin and Servin Eroglu, Measuring a Multi-Dimensional Construct: Country Image, *Journal of Business Research*, Volume 28, (1993), p. 193

³⁷⁵ Cheng Lu Wang, Dongjin Li, Bradley R. Barnes and Jongseok Ahn, "Country Image, Product Image and Consumer Purchase Intention: Evidence from an Emerging Economy." *International Business Review*, Volume 21 (2012), p. 1042.

image on the other hand relates to foreign audiences' attitudinal evaluation of a country's political, social and cultural systems in a positive or negative light.³⁷⁶ It is the evaluation stage and concerns the feelings people have or develop about the associations with the country.³⁷⁷

However, a third component of country image can also be conceived, one which relates to the conative facet. Conative image, as opposed to either affective or cognitive facets, concerns the purposeful or intentional, but not necessarily entirely rational evaluation of a phenomenon.³⁷⁸ It implies a person's actual behaviour, conduct and intention based on the information obtained about the object or entity of reference. It is about how people feel about an entity against the backdrop of information they have about it and how they act on that information.³⁷⁹

The perceived image of nations implies the mental pictures of other nations as conceived by foreign publics from the perspective of social psychology.³⁸⁰ Furthermore, country image pertains to the picture that the 'image-builder' intends to engrave in the minds of the target persons or groups.³⁸¹ The political actions, abilities and motivations have also underscored the understanding of national image. Nevertheless, and importantly so, the national image has also been conceived in comparative terms; that is, the nature of the relationship between countries in which the strengths and weaknesses of a country and its status as an enemy or friend have been important referent points.³⁸²

Image is therefore a function of what a person knows and thinks about an object of reference (cognitive), how the person feels about that object (affective) and how a

³⁷⁶ Ibid. p.1042.

³⁷⁷ Dora Agapito, Patricia Oom do Valle and Julio da Costa Mendes, "The Cognitive-Affective-Conative Model of Destination Image: A Confirmatory Analysis." *Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing*, Volume 30, Number 5, p.474.

³⁷⁸ Ibid. p.474.

³⁷⁹ Umit Basaran, "Examining the Relationships of Cognitive, Affective and Cognitive Destination Image: A Research on Safranbolu, Turkey." *International Business Research*, Volume 9, Number 5, p.166.

³⁸⁰ Lippmann *Op cit.* p. 11

³⁸¹ Hongying Wang, "National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy." *China: An International Journal*, Volume 1, Number 1, (2003), p. 61.

³⁸² Buhmann and Ingenhoff, "Advancing the Country Image Construct from a Public Relations." p. 62.

person acts towards the object using the information held about it (conative).³⁸³ Considered this way, it therefore follows that country image or national image is therefore the cognitive, affective and conative depiction of a country of reference held by a person (or a group of people).³⁸⁴ National image and national branding are two concepts, which are intricately tied but conceptually distinct. Country or national image is considered a multi-dimensional concept.³⁸⁵ Country image has been construed herein as a holistic construct, which derives from the opinions, perceptions and attitudes foreign audiences have towards the country.

2.3.2 Why is National Image Important?

In several instances, national image is a product of stereotyping or placing countries and their people within predetermined categories frequently with either negative or positive undertones.³⁸⁶ Xiufang Li and Naren Chitty³⁸⁷ observe that individual image repertoires are principally overlaid with personal experiences and mostly stereotypes. Stereotypes are an array of traits that are attributed to social group members and which are human projections upon the rest of the world on the grounds of positions, values and rights.³⁸⁸

Despite being entirely superficial, stereotypes act as mental shortcuts to intentional orientations or perceptions of attitudes. The stereotype can be either planned or unplanned and since it is dynamic, images evoked are capable of being managed.³⁸⁹ Through planned stereotypes, people are socialized into how to perceive things even before encountering them. The primary focus of image building therefore involves countering the potentially damaging image and reinforcing the constructive aspects. In

³⁸³ Ibid. p.474.

³⁸⁴ Michael Kunczik, "Transnational Public Relations by Foreign Governments", In Krishnamurthy Sriramesh and Dejan Vercic, (Eds), *Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research and Practice*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003), p.412

³⁸⁵ Ingrid and Eroglu, *Op cit.* p. 194

³⁸⁶ Ulla Hakala, Arja Lemmetyinen and Satu-Pavi Kantola, "Country Image as a National-Branding Tool." *Marketing Intelligence and Planning*, Volume 31, Number 5 (2013), p. 542.

³⁸⁷ Li and Chitty, "Reframing National Image: A Methodological Framework." p. 1.

³⁸⁸ Daniel Perlman and Chris P. Cozby, *Social psychology*. (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981), p.440.

³⁸⁹ Hakala, *et al.*, "Country Image as a National-Branding Tool." p. 542.

the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, countries and governments became and have become more apprehensive about the significance of their systematic national image.³⁹⁰

Peter van Ham considers the geopolitics and realpolitik of the world as being replaced by a post-modernist world of influence and images.³⁹¹ Within this post-modern dispensation, establishing an identity and a positive image are major preoccupations of states. Public diplomacy, being primarily concerned with the management of national image³⁹² is especially crucial in this context. This is mostly due to its focus on values and values dissemination as opposed to traditional diplomacy, which centred on problems.

More than ever states are concerned with national image construction in an attempt to either create domestic political support or expand the international influence of the country.³⁹³ In an increasingly globalizing world in which countries are engaged in concerted competition for global markets, it makes sense not only to participate in global affairs but also to enhance status on the world stage. After all, enhanced status permits nations to ensure the realization of their national interests.

The importance of national image for governments derives from the fact that it influences the country's tourism industry, business, trade and diplomatic relations by shaping the attitude and behaviours of central stakeholders and the public abroad.³⁹⁴ More importantly, national image; that is, the causes and effects of the psychological and social process, shape a country's economic, cultural and political discourses. In this sense, establishing a positive national image and reputation abroad is considered more important than even territory and raw materials.³⁹⁵ There exist at least four reasons why nations need to manage their images; the first reason pertains to appeal to foreign

³⁹⁰ Li and Chitty, "Reframing National Image: A Methodological Framework." p. 1.

³⁹¹ van Ham *Op cit.* p. 4.

³⁹² Diana Ingenhoff and Susanne Klein, "A Political Leader's Image in Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: The Impact of Competence, Charisma, Integrity and Gender." *International Journal of Communication*, Volume 12 (2018), p.4508.

³⁹³ *Ibid.* p. 1.

³⁹⁴ Buhmann and Ingenhoff, "Advancing the Country Image Construct from a Public Relations." p. 62.

³⁹⁵ Eytan Gilboa, "Searching for a theory of public diplomacy", *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Volume 616, Number 1, (2008), p.56

publics; second, to add value to its exports; third to attract foreign investments; and fourth to enhance international acceptance of its domestic and foreign policies.

The need for countries to project a positive image of themselves and transform how they are perceived is aimed at serving an instrumental purpose. A good image permits the country to generate trust among the foreign public, which then enhances cooperation and facilitates the establishment of strategic alliances.³⁹⁶ Additionally, a positive image is crucial in fueling economic development and therefore serves the national interest. A bad image on the other hand provokes hostile responses, hampers economic development, and eventually undermines national security.³⁹⁷

Therefore, in line with the understanding advanced by Nye the affective image component is especially crucial since a country's image is considered from the standpoint of its 'soft power; that is, its "ability to attract".³⁹⁸ According to Nye, power is the ability to influence others to realize desired outcomes that one wants.³⁹⁹ Nevertheless, soft power is not influence alone also rests on the hard power of payments and threats. Furthermore, soft power transcends persuasion, as it is also the ability to entice and attract others mostly through the projection of a positive image of oneself. The 'soft power' of a country resides in its resources of values, policies and culture⁴⁰⁰ and the image it projects of itself about these.

2.3.3 Measurement of National Image

The four main dimensions through which a country's image is conceptualized are political, economic, technological and social desirability.⁴⁰¹ The political dimension relates to the country's political system and pertains to such aspects as democratic, dictatorial, capitalist, communist, civilian system, military system, free market and centrally planned systems.⁴⁰² The political dimension also pertains to the consideration

³⁹⁶ Akli *Op cit.* p.34.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.* p.661.

³⁹⁸ Nye *Op cit.* p. X.

³⁹⁹ Joseph S Nye, Jr., "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Volume 616, Issue 1 (2008), p. 94

⁴⁰⁰ Nye, Jr., "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power." p. 94

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.* p. 194

⁴⁰² *Ibid.* p. 198

of a country as either pro-western or pro-communist, as was the case especially during the Cold War era and to a limited extent in the post-Cold War epoch.

The economic image relates to a country's standing in econometric terms. It relates to the levels of living standards, the country's quality of products, the level of stability of the country's economic environment,⁴⁰³ the extent of labour costs the existence or non-existence of a welfare system and levels of economic development.⁴⁰⁴ The technological dimension incorporates the industrialization levels, as well as a country's levels of technological advancement, the levels of the country's technological research, literacy levels and the proportion of mass-produced relative to handcrafted products.⁴⁰⁵

The social desirability dimension of country image pertains to such antecedents as standards of living, quality of life and levels of urbanization.⁴⁰⁶ It must be noted that the four dimensions are not entirely exhaustive of the underpinning elements of national image. For instance, while cultural familiarity is not included as a dimension of the country's image within these four dimensions, culture is a crucial aspect of the country's image construct.

2.3.5 China's National Image in Different Countries

China is today considered a major power on the global stage. According to a 2006 multinational survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA), Americans perceived China as a strong state with a growing military and economic wherewithal. Among the US cohort, on a scale of 0 to 10, China was rated 7.8 as an influential power on the world stage and more than half of those surveyed indicated that they expected China's economy to grow to levels equal to that of the US.⁴⁰⁷

Nonetheless, despite China's concerted public diplomacy efforts aimed at projecting its soft power and advancing a positive image of China, the country's image is not perceived as favourable in most parts of the world. For instance, within the US and in

⁴⁰³ Wang *et al.*, *Op cit.* p.1042.

⁴⁰⁴ Ingrid and Eroglu, *Op cit.* p. 194

⁴⁰⁵ Wang *et al.*, *Op cit.* p.1042.

⁴⁰⁶ Ingrid and Eroglu, *Op cit.* p. 194

⁴⁰⁷ Chicago Counsel Global Affairs, "The United States and the Rise of China and India: Results of a 2006 Multination Survey of Public Opinion." <www.ccf.org> (Accessed 20 May 2021).

most countries in the Western world, China's growth and active presence on the international stage are viewed as a threat. A study conducted by Goodman⁴⁰⁸ back in 1999 found that 70 per cent of the news coverage of China by the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* referred to conflict, 32 per cent to violence and 24 per cent to severe crisis. Sainan Wang⁴⁰⁹ argues that while there has been an improvement in the coverage of China in the American media, it has remained generally negative, especially about stories touching on ideological and political frames.

The American Attitude Towards China Survey (AACS) conducted by the Indiana University-based Centre for Survey Research (CSR)⁴¹⁰, aimed at providing a more nuanced understanding of China among the American public. The AAC findings were that Americans understood the significance of China's rise for the US with 60 per cent of the participants agreeing that China was an influential player in global politics. Two-thirds of the participants noted that China's political system was effective in serving its citizens and close to 60 per cent perceived China as undemocratic and expected no transition to democratic governance in China.⁴¹¹

In Germany, the public generally has a negative opinion of China. This is according to research conducted by Heidi Kreppel and Dirk Holtbrugge,⁴¹² which sought to establish the perception that German consumers had of Chinese products. The study found German consumers perceived Chinese products to be cheaper and as being of relatively lower quality than those from other European countries, Japan and North America.⁴¹³

Between 2012 and 2016, the Chinese firm Huawei, the University of Duisburg-Essen and the German Institute of Global and Area Studies conducted a joint survey, which

⁴⁰⁸ Robyn S. Goodman, "Prestige Press Coverage of U.S.-China Policy during the Cold War's Collapse and Post-Cold War Years: Did a Deteriorating Cold War Paradigm Set the Stage for More Independent Press Coverage?" *Gazette*, Volume 61, Number 5, (1999), pp. 391-93.

⁴⁰⁹ Sainan Wang, "China's Image as Perceived by the American Public After the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games." *Graduate Theses and Dissertations*. (Ames, IO: Iowa State University, 2009), p. 26.

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⁴¹¹ John Aldrich, Jie Lu & Liu Kang, "How Do Americans View the Rising China? *Journal of Contemporary China*, (2014), pp. 3 – 5.

⁴¹² Heidi Kreppel and Dirk Holtbrugge, "The Perception of Chinese Products by German Consumers – A Sociopsychological Approach." *Journal of Global Marketing*, Volume 25, (2012), pp. 79 – 99.

⁴¹³ *Ibid.* p. 90.

became known as the ‘Huawei studies’.⁴¹⁴ The Huawei studies’,⁴¹⁵ which sought to assess German perceptions of China, found that Germans tended to associate China with unpleasant topics such as idea theft, economic espionage, and human rights violations.

A large-scale poll by the BBC World Service conducted in 2014 to determine Germany’s view of China, established that the Germans held among the most negative anti-Chinese ideas in the world.⁴¹⁶ A Pew Research Centre’s 2019 survey, called *Global Perceptions and Patterns*, revealed that people in Sweden 70 per cent and in Canada 67 per cent viewed the PRC unfavourably around the world are split in their opinion of China. In that research, the lion's share of unfavourable opinions was in Japan where 85 per cent viewed the PRC unfavourably.

China has also expanded its presence and influence in Latin America. The Sino-American trade expanded exponentially, especially between China and Brazil with the bilateral trade between the two growing fifteen-fold between 2000 and 2013.⁴¹⁷ Naturally, as Latin America-China relations grow, it would be expected that new perspectives emerge. According to data obtained from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (Lapop) in 2012, Latin Americans have a favourable view of China. The same is true for the public of the Caribbean nations.⁴¹⁸

In Brazil, public opinion concerning the influence of China in the region is just below the regional average of about 65 per cent.⁴¹⁹ The study by Lapop found that Brazilians have more trust in the Chinese government as compared to the US government.⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁴ Jan-Philip Stein, Xiaomeng Lu and Peter Ohler, “Mutual Perceptions of Chinese and German Students at a German University: Stereotypes, Media Influence and Evidence for a Negative Contact Hypothesis.” *Compare*.

⁴¹⁵ Huawei, *Germany and China – Perception and Reality*. (Berlin: Huawei Technologies Deutschland GmbH, 2012).

⁴¹⁶ BBC, “BBC World Service Poll 2017”. Available at <
https://www.globescan.com/images/images/pressreleases/bbc2017_country_ratings/BBC_2017_Country_Ratings_Poll.pdf> (Accessed 5 May 2021).

⁴¹⁷ Ariel C. Armory & Nicolas G. Velasquez, “A Honeymoon with China? Public Perception in Latin America and Brazil. *Revista Tempo do Mundo*, Volume 2, Number 2 (2016), p.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid. p. 22.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid. p. 22.

⁴²⁰ Vanderbilt University. *Latin American Public Opinion Project (Lapop)*. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University, 2012).

Nonetheless, Brazilians do not prefer the Chinese model of development. More specifically just about 22 per cent of Brazilians view China's development model positively, which is close to the regional average for Latin America, which stands at 19.6 per cent according to Lapop research findings.⁴²¹ Instead, over 60 per cent of the Brazilian participants considered Japan or the US as their preferred development model.⁴²²

Another study conducted by Ian Prates⁴²³ found that the Brazilian public had a very limited understanding of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Chinese language is not well received in Brazil with very few Brazilians showing interest in the language. The Brazilian media showed little interest in covering China and those that did, were significantly negative in their coverage of China.⁴²⁴

China has established close economic, political and cultural ties with countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of value, China is currently Africa's largest trading partner. China's total trade value with sub-Saharan Africa was estimated to stand at US\$135.9 billion in 2015. China has also enhanced its public diplomacy efforts in Africa. China's media presence in Africa includes several Chinese state-owned media operating in Africa including Xinhua News Agency, CCTV Africa, Beijing Review, China Radio International and China Daily Africa Weekly.⁴²⁵

There are also private companies and surrogates of the Chinese media firms operating in Africa including the private Chinese digital pay TV operator, StarTimes.⁴²⁶ Wasserman and Van Dijk,⁴²⁷ argue that Chinese media had a marginal influence on the attitudes and routines of media personnel in Africa. China has established 61 CIs across Africa. In 2005, more than 141,000 foreigners were educated in China, of which 2 per

⁴²¹ Ibid.

⁴²² Armory & Nicolas, *Op. cit.* p. 25.

⁴²³ Ian Prates, "The Brazilian Perception of China's Belt and Road Initiative." (Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning – CEBRAP), pp. 7 - 12

⁴²⁴ Prates, *Op. cit.* pp. 9 – 18.

⁴²⁵ Yanqiu *Op cit.* p.3

⁴²⁶ Ibid. p.3.

⁴²⁷ Ibid. p. 2215.

cent were from Africa. China was to double up its scholarship to African students from 2000 every year in 2006 to 4000 per year in 2009.

How China's image is perceived is critical for the continued success of Sino-African relations. Previous research shows that some Africans perceive China in terms of imperialism and neo-colonialism.⁴²⁸ Within this perspective, China's engagement in Africa is perceived as largely beneficial to China and significantly detrimental to Africa.⁴²⁹ Nonetheless, some studies have found that compared to the West, a significant number of the African public perceives China positively as a good trading and development partner.⁴³⁰

Therefore, a variation in the perception of China occurs depending on which country one is focusing on. The research findings by the Ethics Institute of South Africa on African's general perception of China are shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. For instance, previous studies in Southern Africa, particularly in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Lesotho have found that the public in the two countries have a significantly negative or unfavourable view of China. This negative perception emanates from the local population's concern that Chinese migrants have outcompeted them in the local job and business markets.⁴³¹

In West Africa, particularly among Nigerians, China is perceived favourably. According to a Pew Research Centre study conducted among Nigerians in 2010, Nigerians held a favourable perception of China viewing it as a partner rather than an exploiter or enemy.⁴³² Nonetheless, while Nigerians viewed China positively, a significant number perceived China with a caveat, arguing that China is only a friend if you give them what they want.⁴³³

⁴²⁸ Timothy S. Rich and Sterling Recker, "Understanding Sino-African Relations: Neo-Colonialism or a New Era?" *Journal of International and Area Studies*, Volume 20, Number 1 (2013), pp. 61 – 76.

⁴²⁹ Courage Mlambo, Audrey Kushamba and More Blessing Simawu, "China-Africa Relations: What Lies Beneath?" *The Chinese Economy*, Volume 49, Number 4 (2016), pp. 257 – 276.

⁴³⁰ Ibid. p. 257.

⁴³¹ Mlambo *et al.*, *Op. cit.* p. 258

⁴³² Ibid. p. 270.

⁴³³ Ibid. p. 270.




Figure 2.1: African’s Perception of China’s Reputation

Source: Ethics Institute of South Africa

Positive Negative Unsure




Figure 2.2: African’s Perception of China’s Quality of Work

In East Africa, in Uganda and Tanzania, there is a relatively positive perception of China and the Chinese. In Uganda, the public view China as crucial to the growth of the Ugandan economy.⁴³⁴ In Tanzania, China’s presence and investment are perceived as good for the Tanzanian economy. Tanzanians consider the Chinese and Chinese investments as hugely beneficial to the development not only of the economy but also of human capital in the country.

2.3.6 China’s National Image in Kenya

As Africa has experienced increased Chinese engagement, Kenya has also seen its encounters with China and the Chinese people increase. As Waweru⁴³⁵ observes Kenya has been among the key targets of China’s diplomatic engagements with Africa. However, the emergence of instances of discord and disapproval of China’s

⁴³⁴ Ward Warmerdam and Meine Pieter van Dijk, “China-Uganda and the Question of Mutual Benefits.” *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 20, Number 2 (2013), p. 290

⁴³⁵ Sammy Mwangi Waweru, “Who is Against Sino-African Relations? Evolving Perception on Chinese Engagement in Kenya. *Chinese Journal of International Review*, Volume 2, Number 2, (2020), pp. 2050011-2

engagement in Kenya and the growing anti-Chinese sentiments has attracted the attention of pundits and practitioners on Kenyan's perception of China.

The Kenyan public perception of China is important for the Chinese government as it enables it to (re-)orient its soft power assets strategically to ensure the attainment of a favourable perception among Kenyans with a view of realizing China's diplomatic objectives. A research survey conducted by the Ethics Institute of South Africa in 2010 found that while on average, Africans were unhappy about China's influence in their respective countries, Kenyans held a substantially positive view of China and Chinese firms.⁴³⁶

According to the research findings by the Ethics Institute of South Africa, 56 per cent of Kenyans considered China a having a good reputation and 77 per cent thought that China had a good reputation. However, on whether the China-Kenya relations were based on equality, only 25 per cent of Kenyans thought that relationship was equal. In an Ipsos Synovate survey on perceptions of Kenyans towards China, carried out in August 2018, it was reported that the majority of Kenyans think China is a threat to the Kenyan economy. In the Ipsos Synovate report, 38% of Kenyans perceived China as unfavourable. They perceived China as posing a threat to Kenya's economy in terms of cheap goods, corruption and loss of jobs.⁴³⁷ The Ethics Institute of South Africa survey and the Ipsos Synovate study show that the Kenyan's perception of China is dynamic and changes over time.

In 2016, it was found that over 75 per cent of Kenyans held the view that China was a good influence on Kenya's development aspiration.⁴³⁸ This finding supported previous studies, which established that Kenyans had a positive attitude towards China's relations with Kenya. However, as has been suggested in the previous paragraph, the

⁴³⁶ GCR "Survey of African Opinion Finds Kenyans have Special Relationship with China." *Global Construction Review (GCR)*, 16 April 2014. Available at:<<https://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/survey-african-opinion-finds-1kenyans-have-spec90/>> (Accessed 5 May 2021)

⁴³⁷<https://nation.africa/kenya/news/china-a-threat-to-kenya-s-economy-new-survey-shows-84152> accessed 10sep2020.

⁴³⁸ Lekorwe Mogopodi, Anyway Chingwete, Mina Okuru and Romaric Samson "China's Growing Presence in Africa Wins Largely Positive Popular Reviews," (2016), Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 122, p. 21. P. 13 - 17

attitudes and perception of China is dynamic and unstable. For instance, in recent years amidst increased Chinese engagement in Kenya through various diplomatic practices including public diplomacy, there has been a rise in anti-Chinese sentiments among Kenyans.⁴³⁹

According to Waweru,⁴⁴⁰ Kenyan traders view the presence of the Chinese, particularly Chinese traders unfavourably. According to these traders, the Chinese have a relatively easy way of conducting business in Kenya due to their huge capital finance and support from the Chinese government. The Kenyan public viewed China negatively after rumours emerged that China was planning to take over the Port of Lamu and the Standard Gauge Railway service (SGR), which had been built with a Chinese loan due to Kenya's failure to service the loan.

2.4 Influence of Public Diplomacy on National Image

The influence of public diplomacy on national image can be understood by drawing from two schools of thought identified by Deibel and Roberts⁴⁴¹ - the 'tough-minded school' and the "tender-minded school". The 'tough-minded school' of thought holds that the national image can be projected to foreign audiences through persuasion via communication activities and channels. In this sense, political advocacy and international broadcasting can be used to project the national image to foreign audiences. Within the 'tender-minded' school, it is held that the country's image can be projected to foreign audiences through slow media and cultural exchanges including the incorporation of educational exchanges.⁴⁴²

The point underlying these two schools of thought is that countries can instrumentalize the five components of public diplomacy; listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange and international broadcasting and deploy them towards the advancement of country image. Paul Sharp⁴⁴³ by applying the instrumentalist model or approach

⁴³⁹ Waweru, *Op. cit.* p.3

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid. p.14

⁴⁴¹ Terry L. Deibel and Walter R. Roberts, *Culture and Information: Two Foreign Policy Functions* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), p.15

⁴⁴² Ibid. p.15

⁴⁴³ Sharp. *Op. cit.* p. 106

perceives public diplomacy as involving the pursuit of direct relations with foreign publics not only to advance interests but also to extend countries' values. Needless to say, the values are part and parcel of the national image. Others such as Michael McClellan⁴⁴⁴ have emphasized the strategic importance of cultural, informational (listening, advocacy and international broadcasting), and educational programming (cultural and education exchange) in public diplomacy.

Countries have used five dimensions of public diplomacy to shape and advance their national image. During the Cold War, the United States instrumentalized “educational exchanges” or cultural exchanges to project positive images of their nation.⁴⁴⁵ For instance, in the US the Fulbright Act of 1946 established a scholarship program for scholars and students to research and study outside the US with the underlying goal of advancing mutual understanding of national image through cultural exchanges.⁴⁴⁶ The US educational exchanges, which became known as the ‘airlifts’ were instrumental in symbolizing the country’s consumer culture, material wealth, individual freedom, the American way of life, technological know-how and political democracy.⁴⁴⁷

Similarly, China has used a conglomeration of informational and educational programming to promote its image in the developing world. For instance, through the instrumentalization of public diplomacy components China has advanced its economic developmental model – the ‘Beijing Consensus’ in the developing world to the extent that this model is increasingly being considered a viable alternative to the Western capitalist model.⁴⁴⁸ China has stepped out of its international broadcasting to reduce what it deems as a negative perception of the nation by the foreign public. This is a result of what has been termed as the misinterpretation of China’s image by Western media.⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁴ McClellan, “Public Diplomacy in the Context of Traditional Diplomacy,” *Public Diplomacy*, (2004) <<http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/45.htm>> (accessed: 4 June 2021)

⁴⁴⁵ *Bu Op Cit.* 394.

⁴⁴⁶ Madalina Akli, “The Role of Study-Abroad Students in Cultural Diplomacy: Toward an International Education as Soft Action.” *International Research and Review: Journal of Phi Beta Delta*, Volume 2, Issue 1 (2012), p. 33

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p.394.

⁴⁴⁸ Ying Fan, “Soft Power: Power of Attraction or Confusion? *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, Volume 4, Number 2 (2008), p.155.

⁴⁴⁹ *Hartig Op. cit.* p. 655.

In practice, it is difficult to dissociate the cultural component and the exchange component in states' practice of cultural diplomacy aimed at projecting a country's positive image. It is therefore conceivable why a definition of cultural diplomacy implicates educational exchanges. For instance, the US State Department conceives cultural diplomacy as the "exchange of information, ideas, and other cultural aspects" between nations for mutual understanding.⁴⁵⁰ This is a common challenge implicit in the literature on cultural diplomacy and exchange programs. This is more so because among the main actors in cultural diplomacy including artists, musicians, and filmmakers, there are also students, academicians and scholars involved in the exchange programs.

Nonetheless, what may separate exchange programs from cultural diplomacy as a component of public diplomacy is the fact that it involves the "human factor" in addition to the presentation of information and images.⁴⁵¹ The critical thing is that educational exchange, despite appearing to be 'apolitical' inherently operates within a wider international political space and serves a political purpose.⁴⁵² Within the practice of public diplomacy, the political purpose of educational exchanges is to influence the perception of the state among foreign audiences.

The assumption that underpinned these educational exchanges, was the notion that through education exchanges and their resultant cultural diffusion "real influence" was capable of being exerted on visitors from other countries to adopt a positive image of the recipient or sending state.⁴⁵³ There are examples to attest to this influence of public diplomacy on foreign perception of the national image. American and Russian exchange programs during the Cold War were influential in shaping the minds of foreign exchange students from the rest of the world of either American prowess and the success of liberal capitalism or the inherent positive aspect of communism.

⁴⁵⁰ Akli *Op cit.* p.34.

⁴⁵¹ Giles Scott-Smith, "Exchange Programs and Public Policy." In Nancy Snow and Philip Taylor, (Eds.). *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy.* (London, UK: Routledge, 2009), p.50

⁴⁵² Ibid. p.51

⁴⁵³ Akli *Op cit.* p.34.

Recently, the influx of Chinese students in the US and vice-versa has resulted in enhanced American public acceptance of China as a global economic power.⁴⁵⁴

However, there are also instances in which educational exchange programs do not have any real influence on the national image. A good example of this is the case of US-Iranian educational exchange programs. In this case, while the US and the Iranians have conducted several educational exchanges for students and scholars to increase the perception of either country by the public in either Iran or the US, it is evident that nothing much has been gained.⁴⁵⁵ Also despite the numerous educational exchanges between China and the US, several Chinese students who have participated in the exchange programs still consider the US as self-serving and interfering. Likewise, American students still largely consider China as a threat to international peace⁴⁵⁶

Within this setting, therefore, public diplomacy aims to cultivate and promote a positive image of the country among international public audiences.⁴⁵⁷ It entails governmental efforts at communication to foreign audiences in particular to influence their cognitive, affective and conative image of the sender country.

2.4.2 The Influence of Public Diplomacy on China's National Image

Li Defang and Weihong Li⁴⁵⁸ have noted that China's national image (*Guo Jia Xiang Xiang*) has been especially important for China's general diplomacy and public diplomacy in particular. According to Falk Hartig⁴⁵⁹ one of the most significant implications of China's public diplomacy has been its consequences for the country's perceived national image among foreign publics. The national image of the PRC is intricately tied to its global influence (*guoji yingxiangly*) and it is conceived that by

⁴⁵⁴ Scott-Smith *Op cit.* p. 52.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.* p. 52.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.* p. 52.

⁴⁵⁷ Ruxana-Irina Popescu and Razvan-Andrei Corbos, "Considerations on Public Diplomacy's Role in Promoting Country Brand." *Journal of Public Administration, Finance and Law*, Issue 3(013), p. 135.

⁴⁵⁸ Li Defang and Weihong Li, "Analysis of China's Public Diplomacy Model." *Liaocheng Daxue xuebao*, Volume 1 (2012), p. 76

⁴⁵⁹ Hartig *Op cit.* p.660.

promoting the national image, China's public diplomacy has advanced the country's national interest.⁴⁶⁰

How China has managed its image through public diplomacy can be understood through at least two closely related approaches, but which have distinct foci – the proactive approach and the reactive approach. The proactive approach pertains to the concerted public diplomacy's efforts to present a positive image of the PRC.⁴⁶¹ The reactive approach relates to and is manifest in the PRC's endeavour to present a more 'realistic' or "truer picture" of China.⁴⁶²

In line with the proactive approach, China's public diplomacy endeavours to project a positive and good image of China to the rest of the world. Within this context, China's public diplomacy aims to outline and explain the conditions underpinning China's socio-political and economic development as a "responsible partner".⁴⁶³ This approach seeks to present China as a country that is peaceful contributing to global development. In this sense, China seeks to be perceived as a nation that is working "hard to give its citizens a better future" and as a "stable, "responsible" and "reliable economic partner".⁴⁶⁴ Furthermore, China's public diplomacy seeks to be recognized and respected as having an ancient, but vibrant culture.⁴⁶⁵

Thus, the intended image that China seeks to project is an image of affluence, strength and political responsibility which surmount the popular foreign perceptions of China as backward, repressive and a threat to international security. In tandem with the reactive approach to the PRC's image management, China's public diplomacy has aimed to counter the Western attribution or negative portrayal of China by Western countries to correct the misinformation and remedy the damage done to China's image abroad.⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid. p.660.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid. P.661.

⁴⁶² Qizheng *Op cit*.

⁴⁶³ Gao Fei, "Public Diplomacy: Definition, Formative Conditions and Its Functions". *Waijiao Pinglun* Volume 6 (2005), p.110.

⁴⁶⁴ Ingrid D'hooghe, "The Expansion of China's Public Diplomacy System." In Jian Wang (Ed.). *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy Through Communication*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p.24

⁴⁶⁵ Hartig *Op cit*. p.661.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid. p.661.

The ultimate goal of China's reactive approach to public diplomacy is to transform the international conversation about the PRC. This approach has been conceived within the "Don Draper School of International Communication" which argues that if a country dislikes what is being said about it abroad, it should transform the conversation.⁴⁶⁷

This virtually means that the PRC should 'talk back' as it may. Inherent in the reactive approach is the conception of public diplomacy as a tool for explaining China to the world. This follows from both implicit and explicit presumption that the Western world in particular has failed to understand China and has instead portrayed it negatively. Hence, public diplomacy is a vital instrument which can be used to help international audiences better know the 'real China' (or *zhenshi de Zhongguo*).

This means influencing if not changing the marketplace of ideas about China and leaving to the external stakeholders, the privilege of interpreting what China is and what it is not as well as what it stands for. What can be understood from the foregoing is that China's public diplomacy has been both proactive and reactive, and has aimed at either enhancing or transforming China's perceived image among international audiences. What is critical however pertains to the manner China has projected and transformed its international image. This pertains to the approaches it has used and how it has deployed the five components of public diplomacy to this end.

China has deployed cultural diplomacy, which is one of the five components of public diplomacy,⁴⁶⁸ as a means for presenting a positive image of the PRC to the rest of the world and for presenting a truer picture of China to the world. Even before the creation of the Confucius Institute (CI) in 2004, China had deemed cultural diplomacy as a critical instrument for projecting and shaping China's public image. Particularly between the late 1980s and early 2000s, through the China National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (*Hanban*), China initiated several measures aimed at spreading knowledge of the Chinese language and teaching it in several foreign

⁴⁶⁷ Gary Rawnsley, "China's Struggle with Soft Power." *University of Nottingham*, October 22, 2013. <<https://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2013/10/22/chinas-struggle-with-soft-power/>> Accessed 19, 2021.

⁴⁶⁸ Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories." p. 31.

countries. The *Hanban* also organized several cultural events to teach about China's 'way of life'.

The *Hanban* became the launch pin for the CI in 2004 and 2006 it organized the first International CI Conference in Beijing.⁴⁶⁹ The CI was aimed at pursuing the opportunities for national image projection presented by cultural diplomacy. The CI has been the most perceptible channel for communicating China's public diplomacy.

China established 353 CI around the world between 2004 and 2011, and there exist 473 Confucian-related classrooms in 104 countries and regions.⁴⁷⁰ The explicitly stated mission of the CI is to develop Chinese language and culture teaching resources to contribute to world cultural harmony and diversity.⁴⁷¹ CI has become the platform through which the *Hanban* has organized several events aimed at shaping China's national image among the foreign public. CI has become the means for engaging local communities to promote Chinese culture through Kung'fu, Chinese medicine, calligraphy and painting, Chinese cuisine and Chinese songs and dances.⁴⁷²

For instance, in 2010, at the 5th CI Conference, it was reported that the *Hanban* had organized textbook exhibitions, art performances and lecture tours in more than 300 CI in more than 50 countries to promote Chinese culture and language.⁴⁷³ In Russia and Spain for instance during the "Chinese Language Year" over 600 cultural events were organized, which attracted more than 300,000 attendees.⁴⁷⁴ China has also cultivated the opportunities presented by the exchange component of public diplomacy. However, it is difficult to separate China's cultural diplomacy and its exchange diplomacy as separate components since in China the two are intricately intertwined.

⁴⁶⁹ Ingrid D'hooghe, *The Rise of China's Public Diplomacy*. (The Hague, NED: Institute of International Relations *Clingendael*. p.29

⁴⁷⁰ Pan *Op cit.* p.22

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.* p. 22

⁴⁷² Pan *Op cit.* p. 28

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.* p.28

⁴⁷⁴ Liu Ynandon, "Working together towards the sustainable development of Confucius Institutes", paper presented at the 5th Confucius Institute Conference, Beijing December 10." <www.chinese.cn/conference10/article/2010-12/12/content_207940.htm> (Accessed May 10, 2012).

In this regard, Chinese universities have enrolled thousands of international students, which has ultimately enhanced China's international image. For instance, in just four years between 2006 and 2010, the number of international students that were majoring in Sinology or Chinese language in Chinese universities rose from 98,700 to 165,680.⁴⁷⁵ Two things are clear here; one that China has intensified its efforts to enroll international students in Chinese universities to learn about China, and two, that an increasing number of international students are finding learning about China appealing and necessary.

2.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter examined the influence of public diplomacy on national image. Public diplomacy directly influences foreign audiences' perception of national image. Through public diplomacy, countries can project a positive image of themselves through the five components including listening, advocacy, cultural exchanges, educational exchanges, and international broadcasting. The next chapter, which is chapter three, investigates the role of Chinese media on the perception of China's image in Kenya.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 28

CHAPTER THREE: ROLE OF CHINESE MEDIA ON PERCEPTION OF CHINA'S NATIONAL IMAGE IN KENYA

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter, chapter two; examined the influence of public diplomacy on national image. It focused on how public diplomacy has been used by various countries globally to influence their image, then narrowed down to a case study of how public diplomacy has been used by the Chinese government to influence its image in Kenya. The chapter was pivoted on the premise that there is a link between public diplomacy and perceptions of national image. The findings revealed that China's engagement in public diplomacy in Kenya was an attempt by the PRC and the CPC to influence, favourably, how the Kenyan public view China.

This chapter analyses the influence of Chinese media on the Kenyan public's perception of China's national image. In so doing, it explored the diverse spectrum of Chinese media activities, cooperation and operations in Kenya over the last decades. It provides an assessment of the impact of these on its audiences with particular bias on Kenyans' perception of China. The fundamental questions that this chapter seeks to address are; one, has the Chinese media influenced Kenyan public perception of China? Two, has that influence led to a favourable or an unfavourable view of China by the Kenyan public?

The chapter commences by taking a necessary detour into the historical roots of media involvement in the public diplomacy sphere. This is followed by a detailed account of Chinese media involvement in public diplomacy around the world. China's media offensive in Africa, its operations and cooperation efforts in the continent are then examined including Chinese media's efforts towards media infrastructure development, content production, direct investment and training in Africa. It then focuses on exploring the influence of Chinese media presence in Kenya's mediascape as a backdrop to the detailed analysis of the influence of Chinese media on the Kenyan public's perception of China's national image.

3.2 The Pedigree Media and Public Diplomacy

Traditional or old diplomacy was highly institutionalized, formal, slow, interpersonal, and customarily protected by secrecy. It was until recently very much a private engagement.⁴⁷⁶ This conventional diplomacy had been primarily centred on person-to-person communication through the medium of ambassadors and envoys.⁴⁷⁷ Explicit in such a conception was the idea that diplomacy could never be public let alone conducted through the media.

Before the outbreak of the First World War (WWI), the conduct of diplomacy involved discrete communication between and among the ‘official’ diplomats, secret negotiations and secret agreements.⁴⁷⁸ This ‘old’ diplomacy began to end with the inventions in the area of telecommunication technology. For instance, in 1850, after receiving the first telegraph, the British Foreign Minister at the time, Lord Palmerston remarked, “This is the end of diplomacy”.⁴⁷⁹ What Lord Palmerston had envisioned is the growing threat posed to old-style personal diplomacy by the rapid changes in communication. Today’s ‘new diplomacy’ is public diplomacy.

In 1918, in his ‘Fourteen Points’ speech, President Woodrow Wilson conceived of an ‘open covenants of peace’ made in the view of the public.⁴⁸⁰ In this sense, Wilson heralded what came to be termed as ‘new diplomacy’. Nonetheless, as Jyotika Ramaprasad⁴⁸¹ observes, there exists little acknowledgement of the role of media in diplomacy in extant ‘diplomatic’ literature.

In the 1930s, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini’s effective use of media presented a culmination of the centrality of the media in public diplomacy.⁴⁸² Nonetheless, at this stage, the media was conceived as performing purely propaganda goals of injecting

⁴⁷⁶ Jyotika Ramaprasad, “Media Diplomacy: In Search of a Definition.” *International Communication Gazette*, Volume 31 (1983), p. 69.

⁴⁷⁷ R. G. Feltham, *Diplomatic Handbook*. 7th Ed. (New York, NY: Pearson Education, 1998), p.151.

⁴⁷⁸ Ramaprasad, *Op. cit.* p.69

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.* p.69

⁴⁸⁰ Eytan Gilboa, “Diplomacy in the Media Age: Three Models of Uses and Effects.” *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Volume 12, Number 2 (2001), p.3.

⁴⁸¹ Ramaprasad, *Op. cit.* p.69

⁴⁸² David Stromberg, “Media and Politics.” *Annual Review of Economics*, Volume 7, Number 1, p.175

targeted message contents into audiences and brainwashing them. During the Second World War, the media was crucial in shaping the international public opinion.

By the end of 1939, Britain through the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service had produced close to 4000 cinemas to spread British ‘propaganda’.⁴⁸³ A critical analysis of the media’s role in international politics soon dissipated this hypodermic needle theory. The mass media had emerged as the critical interface between diplomacy and public opinion.⁴⁸⁴ The collapse of the Shah regime in Iran and the seizure in Tehran of the US Embassy in the early 1960s presented one of the most outstanding media-orchestrated media influences on foreign policy in modern history.⁴⁸⁵

As the crisis developed in Tehran, questions emerged about the role of the media in diplomacy and terms such as ‘Terrorvision’ and ‘radio revolution’ were used to describe the media’s coverage of the takeover of the embassy.⁴⁸⁶ Patricia A. Karl has argued that if the Vietnam War was to be termed as the ‘living-room’ war, then events in Iran amounted to the ‘living-room’ revolution.⁴⁸⁷ The American public and the US government, as well as the Iranian government, became hostages of the media. For instance, Ayatollah Khomeini, in responding to what he considered a biased coverage of the issue by the American media, resolved to run a full-page advert in the *New York Times*. By so doing, Khomeini sought to explain his stance to the international audience concerning the embassy takeover.⁴⁸⁸ The fact that the situation in Iran presented a new era for the media’s role in public diplomacy is not in doubt at all.

Therefore, as William J. Stover⁴⁸⁹ points out, journalists and the media can perform public diplomacy roles even when conventional diplomatic channels are infeasible.

⁴⁸³ Mirchandani and Abubakar, *Op. cit.*, p.11.

⁴⁸⁴ Philip M. Taylor, *Global Communications, International Affairs, and the Media since 1945*. (London, UK: Routledge), p.66.

⁴⁸⁵ Patricia A. Karl, “Media Diplomacy”, *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, Volume 34, Number 4, (1982), p.143.

⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid.* p. 143.

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p. 144.

⁴⁸⁸ Catherine Claire Hausman, “The Iran Hostage Crisis: A Media Narrative.” *Honor Theses 1713* (2021). <https://egrove.olemiss.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2727&context=hon_thesis>

⁴⁸⁹ William J. Stover, “Journalistic Diplomacy: Mass Media’s New Role in the Conduct of International Relations.” *Peace Research*, Volume 13, Number 3, (1981), pp. 113 – 114.

According to Eytan Gilboa,⁴⁹⁰ three levels of diplomatic engagements are discernible; secret diplomacy, closed-door diplomacy, and open diplomacy. The media's role in diplomacy is more apparent in open diplomacy, in which the media and the public can easily access negotiations.

For instance, at the height of the Cold War in 1971, the *Pentagon Papers* provided the means for the US to provide information to the public in the Soviet Union. Likewise, the Israeli state, especially before the normalization of relations with the Arab states between 1948 and the 1980s, used the mass media to communicate its policies to the Arab public. This influenced not only the Arab public's attitudes towards the Jewish state but also shaped the opinion of the civil society organizations in the US about Israel.⁴⁹¹

By 1980, the media had established its stature as a player within the context of public diplomacy. For instance, the media's ability to immediately inform global audiences about key world events occurred with the media's coverage of the assassination, on October 6, 1981 of Egyptian President el-Anwar Sadat.⁴⁹² Through innovations in communications and information technology (IT), Ted Turner's Cable News Network (CNN) emerged as a powerful player in public diplomacy.⁴⁹³ Through a combination of cable television networks and satellites, CNN began to broadcast news around the world.⁴⁹⁴ During the Gulf War (1990 – 1991), CNN emerged as a global international relations actor and inspired the other existing broadcasters such as the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), the Star and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) to establish global television networks.⁴⁹⁵

Recently, new communication technologies including global television and radio, and digital platforms such as smart mobile devices (SMDs), the internet and social media (SM) applications including social networking sites such as Twitter, Facebook,

⁴⁹⁰ Eytan Gilboa, "Mass Communication and Diplomacy: A Theoretical Framework." *Communication Theory*, Volume 10, Number 3, (2000), pp.276.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid. p. 115.

⁴⁹² Karl, *Op. cit.* p.144.

⁴⁹³ Mirchandani and Abubakar, *Op. cit.*, p.3

⁴⁹⁴ Eytan Gilboa, "The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International Relations." *Political Communication*, Volume 22, Number 1 (2005), p.27.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid. p.27

WeChat, YouTube, and blogs are driving the change in the discourse and practice of public diplomacy.⁴⁹⁶ Various terms have been used to capture the spectrum of these transformations in public diplomacy.

Underpinning all these conceptions is the understanding that media greatly impacts the current practice of diplomacy and is a vital tool for international negotiation and foreign policy. James Glassman, the Former US Under-Secretary for Public Diplomacy has referred to this transformation as ‘public diplomacy 2.0’.⁴⁹⁷ ‘Virtual diplomacy’, ‘digital diplomacy’, ‘cyber diplomacy’ and ultimately, ‘media diplomacy’ are among emergent terms that seek to describe the revolution in the public diplomacy sphere.⁴⁹⁸

William J. Stover⁴⁹⁹, in recognition of the media’s potential for public diplomacy, talks of journalistic diplomacy. According to Jan Melissen, these changes in public diplomacy constitute a ‘new public diplomacy’.⁵⁰⁰ According to Etyan Gilboa, this new public diplomacy involved exposing diplomacy to public opinion and the media in as much as it involved directed and unmediated negotiations between state representatives.⁵⁰¹

Literature on the relationship between diplomacy and the press has recognized the phenomenon of media diplomacy.⁵⁰² Media diplomacy refers to instances in which state officials and representatives use the media to shape foreign public opinion about the state.⁵⁰³ Media diplomacy has emerged as a popular term, underscoring the novel opportunities that the media offers to diplomats to communicate to global audiences.⁵⁰⁴

Diplomacy proper embraces all facets of foreign relations between nation-states from ongoing propaganda activities and relational aspects such as image building to the

⁴⁹⁶ Cristina Archetti, “The Impact of New Media on Diplomatic Practice: An Evolutionary Model of Change,” *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, Volume 7 (2012), p.182.

⁴⁹⁷ James K. Glassman, ‘Public Diplomacy 2.0’, Speech Delivered at the New American Foundation, Washington, DC, 12 December 2008, < <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3NU4d81Ps4>.>

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid. pp. 18 2 – 3.

⁴⁹⁹ Stover, *Op. cit.*, p. 113.

⁵⁰⁰ Jan Melissen ed., *The New Public Diplomacy*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.13

⁵⁰¹ Gilboa, *Op. cit.* p.27.

⁵⁰² Ramaprasad, *Op. cit.* p.69

⁵⁰³ Archetti, *Op. cit.*, p.188.

⁵⁰⁴ Christer Jonsson, “Diplomacy, Communication and Signaling,” In Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr and Paul Sharp, Eds. *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy*. (New Delhi, IND: SAGE, 2016), p. 87.

occurrence of conflicts between nations and the negotiation of international disputes. Within this understanding, 'media diplomacy' encompasses the entire possible combination of situations. Jan Melissen⁵⁰⁵ posits that this form of public diplomacy transcends the conventional understanding of public diplomacy, which is aimed at peddling information to foreign audiences and avoiding foreign press, as it involves engaging foreign audiences. Media diplomacy suggests a direct (but not necessarily intentional) involvement of the media in activities associated with diplomacy through withholding certain information deemed sensitive, acting as couriers of diplomatic messages, and creating diplomatic incidences.⁵⁰⁶

Moreover, media diplomacy entails governments' manipulation of the media agencies to realize diplomatic goals. Other than through auto-censure and the government's chilling criticism of the media, manipulation of the media also transpires in that the use of the news media is today included in governments all formal communication. According to Ramaprasad,⁵⁰⁷ the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has a long history of manipulating the media including journalist infiltrators in foreign media and planting fake stories in foreign countries.

Nonetheless, there are incidences in which the media on their own volition or from the request of the government may at times play up or play down certain foreign events or issues. For instance, in 1960, despite being aware that the US was spying on Russia using its U-2 planes over Soviet airspace, it failed to publish the facts until the Russians shot down the plane.⁵⁰⁸ What is apparent, is that media diplomacy places media at the core of public diplomacy. The media operates as an independent actor intensively participating in diplomatic processes and events, and even initiating diplomatic processes. At the same time, the media is a powerful tool in the hands of foreign policymakers.

The media was a key aspect of the new actors that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s in the international political space including non-state actors and forces, which would

⁵⁰⁵ Melissen ed., *Op. cit.*, p.13

⁵⁰⁶ Ramaprasad, *Op. cit.* p.69

⁵⁰⁷ Ramaprasad, *Op. cit.* p.75

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.* p. 73.

have a great influence on the nature and conduct of international relations. The influence of these media on the conduct of international relations was revolutionary for the concept of public diplomacy. The activities of these media created an opportunity for diplomats and states to advance their soft power through what has become known as the ‘new diplomacy’.

3.3 The Nexus between Media and Public Diplomacy

By the nexus between media and public diplomacy, what is implied is the point of connection between the mass media and the government's act of influencing the attitudes of foreign publics through attraction and persuasion. This part of the chapter seeks to scrutinize and evaluate what role the media plays in public diplomacy and the projection of soft power.

Governments exercise diverse forms of power, the most common of which is ‘hard’ power, ‘smart’ power and ‘soft’ power.⁵⁰⁹ Power is the ability to influence targets to obtain one’s preferred outcomes, which can be realized through payment (inducement), coercion, or persuasion and attraction.⁵¹⁰ ‘Hard’ power pertains to the use of military, economic and political resources to coercively realize one’s objectives. ‘Smart’ power is the intelligent combination and application of both soft and hard power resources.⁵¹¹ ‘Soft’ power refers to the ability to realize preferred outcomes through persuasion and attraction as opposed to either coercion or payment. It involves the use of language, special policies, cultural aspects and media to realize goals through non-coercive means.⁵¹²

Concerning ‘soft power’ projection, the media has become a potent tool for public diplomacy, especially in the current information age. The link between the media and politics, or more precisely, the role of the media in politics can be conceptualized in two aspects. In the first case, the mass media matters in politics since it provides

⁵⁰⁹ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2004), p.4.

⁵¹⁰ Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power: The Origins and Political Progress of a Concept.” *Palgrave Communications*, (2016), p. 1

⁵¹¹ Ibid. p.161.

⁵¹² Michael Leslie, *The Dragon Shapes Its Image: A Study of Chinese Media Influence Strategies in Africa*. *African Studies Quarterly*, Volume 16, Number 3-4, (2016), p.161

information to rational constituents or voters. This is the case at least according to the rational learning model of the effects of the media.⁵¹³ Currently, global television, global FM radio stations, and global print media have central sources of information about world affairs, in as much as diplomats and political leaders are

In this context, the constituents and audiences can make rational choices about issues based on the information they obtain from the media. In the second phase, the mass media is a tool for political propaganda. According to the key theories of media including the priming, agenda-setting, and framing theories, the media can manipulate audiences to act according to the wishes of the media content creators.⁵¹⁴

The news media functions as referees for the legitimacy and credibility of the resources of soft power such as language, ‘political values’, and culture as well as ‘special’ policies.⁵¹⁵ According to Patricia A. Karl, media has grown to be a part of, if not an integral player in the communication between governments and foreign publics.⁵¹⁶ Media can act as both an agenda-setter and a gatekeeper in international politics shaping and regulating information flow to the public.⁵¹⁷

Nonetheless, the media also plays a spectrum of roles, some of which involve augmenting the goals underpinning official diplomacy. Through strategic communion, the media offers governments the ability to shape and sway how they are perceived by foreign audiences. As an outlet for public diplomacy, the media can produce the foreign public’s support for its views and values.

Seminal thinkers such as Kenneth Boulding and Walter Lipman categorically state that mass media are crucial in constructing national images and advancing the objectives of foreign policy.⁵¹⁸ By communicating the elements of soft power, the media acts as a crucial tool for not only nation branding, but also for promoting the image of the state.

⁵¹³ Stromberg, *Op. cit.* p. 173

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 173

⁵¹⁵ Li Zhang, “The Rise of China: Media Perception and Implications for International Politics. *Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 16, Number 64 (2010), p. 234.

⁵¹⁶ Karl, *Op. cit.*, p.143

⁵¹⁷ Brian Hocking, “Rethinking ‘New Public Diplomacy’”, In Jan Melissen ed., *The New Public Diplomacy*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 30

⁵¹⁸ *Ibid.* p.161.

Thus, communication is at the core of public diplomacy and media influences the practice of public diplomacy.⁵¹⁹

Information collation, reporting and sharing are integral to the practice of diplomacy across the centuries so much, so that the revolutions and advances in communication technology have shaped diplomatic practice.⁵²⁰ For instance, in *Under the Wire*, David Paul notes the significant impact of the telegraph on diplomatic practice.⁵²¹ Additionally, for centuries, media networks and new technologies such as the internet, social media and mobile phones have revolutionized the conduct of public diplomacy.

Extant literature on media and politics and by extension diplomacy can be assessed in several ways. Firstly, global media has resulted in the establishment of a ‘global village’ as previously mentioned. The effect of this is on how people not only view themselves but also others. Not only does the media provide information, but it also shapes how people learn about the world.

In this sense, the mass media has influenced how individuals conceptualize or picture the world.⁵²² In this regard, the media became a powerful socialization agent, in providing the means for people to differentiate ‘in-group’ from ‘out-group’ identities by representing a series of similarities and contrasts.⁵²³ It is needless to say the construction of ideas about in-groups and out-groups is vital in determining who is an enemy and who is an ally in international relations. Secondly, the media’s importance in politics in general and in diplomacy in particular can be determined through the shifts and transformations in the configurations of a state’s power.

According to Terhi Rantanen and Oliver Boyd-Barret,⁵²⁴ international, national and local news agencies disseminate information and images about countries between countries, and form associations between people from the local to the international

⁵¹⁹ Christer Jonsson and Mamrtin Hall, “Communication: An Essential Aspect of Diplomacy.” *International Studies Perspectives*, Volume 4, Number 2 (2003), pp. 195 – 210.

⁵²⁰ Archetti, *Op. cit.*, p.181.

⁵²¹ David Paul Nickles, *Under the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

⁵²² Coban, *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁵²³ *Ibid.* p. 46.

⁵²⁴ Terhi Rantanene and Oliver Boyd-Barret, “State News Agencies – A Time for Re-Evaluation?” *Mediuen und Zeit*, Volume 16, Number 4, (2001), pp. 38 – 45.

level. In so doing, media are pluralizing forcers that contradict parallel 'hard' power's ability to control and influence.

Thirdly, global media has been able to integrate audiences into the process of diplomacy, peace and war. Through their agenda-setting capabilities, the media can draw the public's attention to issues happening in other countries and around the world, and shape people's opinions about government policies concerning those issues.⁵²⁵ In the same way, governments can utilize media platforms to advance their foreign policy agenda and create awareness of their foreign policies to the foreign public. It is within these contexts that the concepts of 'CNN Effect' and 'Al-Jazeera Effect' emerged.

In defining the 'CNN Effect', Steve Livingston conceived three ways in which the media would influence the discourse of public diplomacy. He opined that one, the media would behave as an agenda-setting agent in setting the discourse for national interests, second, the media would accelerate the response time for foreign policy decision-making, and third, the media would act as an impediment actor by impacting public opinion. According to Filiz Coban⁵²⁶ the 'CNN Effect' epitomized a 'soft' power and transformed the United States into the world's hegemonic power in the 1990s. It is no doubt, as Filiz Coban⁵²⁷ has noted, CNN, Al-Jazeera, and BBC among others are expanding individual's awareness about their culture, religion and place in the world.

Media research and literature of the 1990s accentuated the rise of the media and public opinion and their latent influence on key global political decisions. The emergence of the terms 'media diplomacy' and 'CNN Effect' attests to optimism about the general potential of the mass media on global politics. In terms of agenda setting, the media has the potential to define issues and in so doing, help the public to conceptualize priority issues.

In this sense, through news coverage, the media provide a useful means for validating a state's foreign policy decisions and for shaping public opinion about the policy. An example of such a link between media and public diplomacy was in 2003 when after

⁵²⁵ Coban, *Op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁵²⁶ Coban, *Op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁵²⁷ Filiz Coban, "The Role of the Media in International Relations: From the CNN Effect to the Al-Jazeera Effect." *Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy*, Volume 4, Number 2 (2016), p. 46

declaring the war against Iraq and declaring it a war of liberation - *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, the White House launched a media campaign aimed at supporting the idea of liberation.⁵²⁸ As an accelerant, the media shape behaviours by increasing public awareness, leading the pressure to act and establishing a sense of urgency.⁵²⁹

However, it should be noted that media coverage, pressure and influence, do not always translate to policy response. This is true concerning the atrocities in Bosnia and the Rwandan genocide, which transpired despite intense media coverage of the conflicts. The availability of new forms of media has created global awareness and has motivated the world population to novel visions and new ideas.⁵³⁰ Around, the world, thanks to the advancements in broadcast capabilities and the internet, people are taking notice of political developments elsewhere around the world.

According to Eban,⁵³¹ nothing has revolutionized the diplomatic craft more than the current vogue of the tenacious media attention. The mass media, particularly social media and global television have become major sources of information about world affairs. The revolutionary transformations in international relations, politics and mass communication have expanded the media's role in diplomacy.

More specifically innovations in communications and information technology (IT), have enhanced the broadcasting capacity for actors. Internet expansion has led to the realization of a 'global village'.⁵³² It is now conceivable to talk about the advent of a 'Global Society' and of the 'Information Age'.⁵³³ The remarkable thing about these revolutionary changes and developments is that they have altered the meaning of power in modern international politics. It has accorded greater weight to the concept of 'soft power' by enhancing the ability of actors to realise their desired goals through appeal as opposed to coercion.

⁵²⁸ Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p.52.

⁵²⁹ Coban, *Op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁵³⁰ Feltham, *Op cit.*, p.151.

⁵³¹ Abba Eban, *Diplomacy for the Next Century* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), p.75

⁵³² Gilboa, "Diplomacy in the Media Age: Three Models of Uses and Effects." p.2.

⁵³³ Feltham, *Op cit.*, p.151.

The new media has given countries certain operational advantages in information network management. New ways of communicating with IT systems have accorded cultural diplomacy actors and policymakers to expand their target audiences and promote the national image through the new digital platforms.⁵³⁴ Throughout the twentieth century and particularly in the current twenty-first century, governments have explored the media's potential to influence public opinion on their foreign policies.

For instance, as Cohen⁵³⁵ found out, the British Foreign Office (BFO), foreign policy actors including individual officials, ministers and government departments utilize the media as a direct channel to foreign audiences to either conceal or explain foreign policies. In public diplomacy, the media is a tool for manipulating other governments, particularly the international public sphere.⁵³⁶ During the Cold War, the media was an effective asset for the US as it allowed it to disseminate its ideological message and anti-communist propaganda out to global audiences.⁵³⁷ The US was able to advance its tactical disinformation agenda against the Soviet Union, by manipulating international public opinion through media content.

3.4 Overview of Chinese Media and Its Role in China's Public Diplomacy

The media landscape of China has developed rapidly in recent decades following a series of restructuring and reforms aimed at increasing the country's international competitiveness. 294 TV stations are operating in China offering 1283 channels, there are 1.2 billion viewers and over four million TV sets in the country.⁵³⁸ Most of the TV stations are state-owned. The advertisement income for television stations in China is estimated at US\$24.87 billion.⁵³⁹

Since the Zedong years, and particularly at the turn of the twenty-first century, media engagement has become a necessary feature of China's public diplomacy engagement

⁵³⁴ Hwajung Kim, "Cultural Diplomacy as the Means of Soft Power in an Information Age." *Institute for Cultural Diplomacy*, p. 2

⁵³⁵ Cohen, *Op. cit.*, p.52.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.* p. 52.

⁵³⁷ Coban, *Op. cit.*, p.52.

⁵³⁸ Sun Yusheng, "The Reform of Chinese Television and the Rise of the New Media." In *The Growth of Media in China: An d Its Impacts on Political and Economic Development of China*. Conference Report. Copenhagen, 28 November 2008), p.7.

⁵³⁹ *Ibid.* p.7.

around the world just as it is for other states. In recent years, particularly after the end of the Second World War, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has overseen an extensive expansion of Chinese media in the international arena to shape media content around the world concerning China and its foreign policies.⁵⁴⁰

Estimates suggest that China currently spends up to US\$10 billion on its “external propaganda” – *duiwai Xuan Chuan*, out of which the biggest chunk is channelled to its foreign language media outlets such as the China Central Television, *Xinhua* News Agency, China Daily or the Global Times and China Radio International. By comparison, the US’s expenditure on external communication was estimated to be US\$733 million in 2014.⁵⁴¹ Consequently, over the past few years, China has speedily expanded its international media offerings around the world across multiple channels including radio (China Radio International, CRI) news coverage (*Xinhua* News Agency (XNA), print media (China Daily) and television (China Central Television, CCTV).⁵⁴²

Chinese media expansion overseas intensified during the reign of the former President, Hu Jintao, and has continued to expand in tandem with China’s growing economic and military rise. Hu Jintao’s strategy of “going global”, China has intensified its informational diplomacy offensive through state-owned media firms.⁵⁴³ In 2009, Hu Jintao allocated US\$7 billion (45 billion Yuan) aimed at positioning China’s state-owned media within the global media for the explicit mandate of favourably influencing international public opinion towards China.⁵⁴⁴

In 2009, China spent US\$6.6 billion on efforts aimed at strengthening the presence of its media in the global media space.⁵⁴⁵ In recent years, Chinese media has expanded its

⁵⁴⁰ Sarah Cook, *China’s Global Media Footprint: Democratic Responses to Expanding Authoritarian Influence*. (Washington, D.C: National Endowment for Democracy, 2021), p.1.

⁵⁴¹ See DW, “The role, influence and power of the media in public diplomacy. Chinese and Western perspectives,”(June 14, 2016) < <https://www.dw.com/en/the-role-influence-and-power-of-the-media-in-public-diplomacy-chinese-and-western-perspectives/a-19255957>>

⁵⁴² Samantha Custer *et al.*, *Ties that Bind: Quantifying China’s Public Diplomacy and Its ‘Good Neighbor’ Effect*. (Williamsburg, VA: Aid Data at William & Mary, 2018), p.8.

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.* p.8.

⁵⁴⁴ Jeffrey Robin and Ronojoy Sen, (Eds.), *Media at Work in China and India: Discovering and Dissecting*. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2015), p.43.

⁵⁴⁵ International Federation of Journalists (IJF), “The China Story: Reshaping the World’s Media: IJF Research Report on China and Its Impact on Media 2020.” 2020 < https://www.ifj.org/fileadmin/user_upload/IFJ_Report_2020_-_The_China_Story.pdf>

global footprint by establishing cooperation agreements with international journalism unions, training programs and content-sharing arrangements that not only provide a Chinese perspective on coverage of China but also provide opportunities for foreign journalists to visit China.⁵⁴⁶ David Shambaugh⁵⁴⁷ in an article in *Foreign Affairs* estimated that China was spending up to US\$ 10 billion annually on its ‘soft power’ projection of which state media accounted for a significant portion of that amount.

President Xi Jinping of China has repeatedly called on Chinese media to strengthen its capacity to communicate internationally to explain China’s story to international audiences and to spread China’s voice around the world.⁵⁴⁸ Consequently, by 2011, the PRC had provided multiple incentives for Chinese media that would target foreign audiences to present China’s ‘true’ image or picture to global audiences.⁵⁴⁹ In 2018, Chinese state-owned media had a formidable international presence.

At the backdrop of all these, it is no wonder therefore that the Freedom House report of January 2020, *Beijing’s Global Megaphone*, established that the media toolbox of the PRC had accelerated over the previous years since 2017.⁵⁵⁰ China intends to leverage its state-owned media companies to refocus international discourse on China’s ‘peaceful rise’ as opposed to the popular narrative of a “China threat” that pervades Western media’s coverage of China.⁵⁵¹ Content shared by Chinese media includes Chinese-language soap operas dubbed in specific local languages, documentaries, and cinematic films with strong Chinese content.⁵⁵²

While China’s media diplomacy is still maturing, Chinese state-owned media companies are aggressively expanding their presence in the international media sphere. China’s most prominent state-owned media outlets currently have an international

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid. p.2.

⁵⁴⁷ David Shambaugh, China’s Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect. *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 94, Number 4, (2015), 99– 107

⁵⁴⁸ Falk Hartig, “How China Understands Public Diplomacy: The Importance of National Image for National Interests.” *International Studies review*, Volume 18 (2016), p. 655.

⁵⁴⁹ Wu *Op cit.*, p.4.

⁵⁵⁰ Sarah Cook, “Beijing’s Global Megaphone: The Expansion of Chinese Community Party Media Influence Since 2017.” May 15, 2021. < <http://globalcommitteeoftheruleoflaw.org/freedom-house-special-report-beijings-global-megaphone/>>

⁵⁵¹ Custer *et al.*, *Op cit.* p.8.

⁵⁵² Zhang *Op cit.* p. 234.

presence spanning the gamut of formats. China's six most established media outlets are China Central Television (CCTV), China Global Television Network (CGTN), China Daily (which is China's English-language newspaper), CRI and the People's Daily, which according to Cook⁵⁵³ is largely considered a mouthpiece for the Communist Party of China (CPC), *Xinhua* News Agency and China News Service.

Most of these outlets have an international constellation of bureaus, which distribute most Chinese content in multiple languages. For Instance, CGTN broadcasts in French, Arabic, Spanish, Kiswahili and Russian, CCTV broadcasts some programmes in Chinese, and these media outlets distribute through cable, satellite and Internet Protocol television (IPTV). IPTV refers to the distribution of television content through Internet Protocol (IP).⁵⁵⁴ China Daily is delivered in hardcopy versions on newsstands in major cities of the world like New York, in some hotels in Hong Kong, in Kenya (in the national carrier Kenya Airways) and even in congressional offices in Washington D.C.

Xinhua currently has more than 180 news bureaus around the world sharing content including audio/video programmes, and news texts in local languages.⁵⁵⁵ China Central Television (CCTV) has established more than 70 foreign bureaus broadcasting in over 171 countries. By 2010, CCTV had a global viewership through satellite of over 85 million in 100 countries.⁵⁵⁶ No separate figures are however available for CCTV Africa viewership, but is huge. China Radio International (CRI) boasts the world's second biggest radio network after the BBC with 32 foreign correspondent bureaus and six key regional bureaus and broadcasts in 64 languages.⁵⁵⁷

Currently, CRI has more than 90 radio stations globally and other Chinese media such as the Economic Daily, the People's Daily and China Daily have intensified their efforts and are expanding around the world.⁵⁵⁸ While data relating to China's spending on its global media expansion per media outlet is hard to access, findings drawn from *China*

⁵⁵³ Cook, *Op. cit.* p.1

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 1.

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid. p.8.

⁵⁵⁶ Marsh *Op cit.* p.57

⁵⁵⁷ Vivian Yang, "How Chinese Media is Going Global." *World Economic Forum*, 2015. Accessed March 9, 2021. <<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/how-chinese-media-is-going-global/>>

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid. p.2

Daily's yearly filings with the government of the US according to the Foreign Governments Act (FARA) showed that its expenditures had increased markedly. Between 2009 and 2019, *China Daily's* expenses increased from US\$500,000 to over US\$5 million.⁵⁵⁹ In 2018, it was reported by the Australian media that CGTN was spending up to US\$500 million in promotional campaigns in an attempt to attract cable TV viewers.⁵⁶⁰

In Europe and particularly within the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries *Xinhua* has 16 local news bureaus⁵⁶¹ including in Azerbaijan, Moldova, Armenia, Ukraine, Belarus Georgia, and the Asia-Pacific region. The news agency has a strong presence in North America (New York and Mexico City), in Europe (Brussels), in the Asia-Pacific region (Hong Kong), in the Middle East (Cairo) and Eurasia (Moscow). Its regional headquarters for Africa is in Nairobi, Kenya. The *Asia Weekly* periodical produced by China Daily has been circulated to several states around the world.⁵⁶²

Therefore, in terms of international presence, Chinese media rivals some of the most formidable Western media. For instance, the New York-based Associated Press (AP) has 280 bureaus around the world; the Paris-based Agence France-Presse (AFP) has 200 bureaus in regions around the world, and the London-based Reuters has 200 bureaus.⁵⁶³ In comparison, China's *Xinhua* News Agency boasts 180 bureaus around the world. Considering that Chinese media is in its infancy compared to the veteran Western media, it can be argued that their growth has been impressive. *Xinhua* has for instance surpassed the Moscow-based Russian News Agency (TASS) and Japan's Kyodo News, which have 138 bureaus and 95 bureaus around the world respectively.⁵⁶⁴

In Europe, Asia and North America, China Radio International (CRI) advanced this direct strategy through at least two surrogate firms; WCRW Radio and Global CAMG Media Group.⁵⁶⁵ The Guoguang Century Media (GCM), which is itself a subsidiary of

⁵⁵⁹ Cook, "Beijing's Global Megaphone", p. 2

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 2

⁵⁶¹ Custer *et al.*, *Op cit.* p.8.

⁵⁶² Yang, *Op. cit.* p.3

⁵⁶³ Ibid. p.3

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid. p.3

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid. pp.8 - 9.

CRI, owns at least a 60 per cent stake in these companies. According to a report by Reuters,⁵⁶⁶ the content shared by GCM’s subsidiaries in North America and Europe is supplied by CRI and is mostly pro-Beijing programming. In 2012, CCTV launched operations in Africa with the establishment of CCTV Africa in Nairobi, and in North America with the launch in that year in Washington D.C of CCTV America. Plans are in place to create CCTV Europe.

As it expands its global presence through offline media, Chinese media have also embraced emergent social media platforms. For instance, in January 2015, after rebranding its social media accounts; Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, *Xinhua* News Agency, relaunched its global presence on social media accounts with a new unified name “New China”, which is a direct translation of *Xinhua*. In just under six months after rebranding, *Xinhua* News Agency had acquired 1.5 million followers on Facebook, 2.1 million followers on Twitter and 58,000 subscribers on YouTube. CGTN has also realized a formidable social media following as is shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: CGT N's Social Media Following

Name of Sub-Outlet	Facebook
CGTN-English	90 million
CGTN-French	20.3 million
CGTN-Arabic	14.4 million
CGTN-Spanish	15.7 million
CGTN-Russian	1 million

Source: Freedom House⁵⁶⁷

Similarly, CCTV News, China Daily, CRI, Global Times (a newspaper under the People’s Daily Group that is published in English) and People’s Daily have active and strong social media presence. Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (BAT) are ‘super platform apps’ and are purely Chinese content producers. These forms of digital media platforms are considered within the purview of Chinese media as they accord China the ability to project itself to an international audience.

⁵⁶⁶ Koh Gui and John Shiffman, “*Voice of China*: Beijing’s covert radio network airs China-friendly news across Washington, and the world.” *Reuters*, November 2, 2015. Accessed: March 10, 2021 <<https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-radio/>>

⁵⁶⁷ See: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/beijings-global-megaphone>

BAT's globalization is permitting non-Chinese audiences elsewhere on Earth to access information about China. WeChat, which is owned by Tencent has slightly more than a billion total subscribers worldwide and has a language compatibility of more than 20 languages extending to more than 200 countries around the world. According to Daniel Zang, Alibaba-owned Tmall seeks to expand overseas. Baidu's search engine currently serves some 30 million internet users around the world and has become compatible with several local languages spoken in several countries around the world including Thailand, Brazil, Egypt and Malaysia.⁵⁶⁸

Apart from the state-owned media, the private media companies in China are also expanding overseas. For instance, China Business Network (CBN), owned by the Shanghai Media Group (SMG), took over Singapore's Starhub TV in 2012.⁵⁶⁹ Another strategy, which China has used to advance its media diplomacy, is by buying majority shares in local media. Notable Chinese media including *Huanan* TV, Beijing TV, *Jiangsu* TV, and *Guangdong* TV have reported viewership among international audiences through their partnerships with overseas providers of satellite TV programmes.

Through large Chinese corporations, China has been able to gain majority ownership in outlets. For instance, China's largest e-commerce company Alibaba has purchased controlling powers in the Hong Kong-based newspaper *South China Morning Post* for US\$260 million. The newspaper has a significant international audience in the Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, the newspapers started pushing a positive image of China.⁵⁷⁰ The PRC's adoption of the media as a tool for its public diplomacy is necessitated by the realization that in the information age, active rather than passive communication is key and that China's narrative was being conveyed through the Western third-party voices that do not portray the 'real' China.⁵⁷¹ In any case, China's

⁵⁶⁸ Yang, *Op. cit.* p.4

⁵⁶⁹ TVA Editor, "China Business Network Comes to Singapore." *Television Asia Plus*(2011)<<https://tva.onscreenasia.com/2012/12/china-business-network-comes-to-singapore/>>

⁵⁷⁰ Custer *et al.*, *Op cit.* p.9.

⁵⁷¹ Yu-Shan Wu, "China's Media and Public Diplomacy: Illustrations from South Africa. (Beijing, CHR Michelsen Institute, 2014), p.1.

institutionalization of public diplomacy; that is, soft power through media is a function of the need to respond to national and international developments.

China aims to advance its “soft power” through its international media to widen its international influence and to recalibrate what the Beijing administration deems as a Western-controlled news agenda.⁵⁷² It is upon this note that H.E Tian Xuejun, the Chinese Ambassador to South Africa, in 2012 reiterated the need to counter Western media imagery of China-Africa relations.⁵⁷³

He recognized the framing of China as either “plundering Africa’s resources and of the Chinese in Africa as taking jobs meant for Africans and admitted the absence of in-depth understanding at the people-to-people level.⁵⁷⁴ According to Custer *et al.*,⁵⁷⁵ the government of China considers informational or media diplomacy as a chance for China to ‘tell its story’ to the world and correct international misperceptions about China, its intentions and its people. The PRC has deployed multiple strategies aimed at realizing the goals set for its media diplomacy. The imagery of China in Western media is mostly negative; the PRC’s economic success is often juxtaposed against imagery of human rights violations, coercive military leanings in the Asia-Pacific region, and its ventures in the developing world, particularly Africa is portrayed in a colonialistic axiom.⁵⁷⁶

It is this seemingly persistent negative portrayal of China, that China’s public diplomacy seeks to counter-weight through the media campaigns by the state-owned Chinese media.⁵⁷⁷ This has involved the leveraging of local media outlets in foreign countries to advance state-sanctioned content through paid advertising or direct content delivery by Chinese state-owned media to foreign audiences.⁵⁷⁸ Among the most

⁵⁷² Vivien Marsh, “Mixed Messages, Partial Pictures? Discourses Under Construction in CCTV’s *Africa Live* Compared With the BBC.” *Chinese Journal of Communication*, Volume 9, Number 1 (2016), pp. 56–70.

⁵⁷³ Gornfinkel *et al.*, *Op cit.* p. 82.

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.* p.82.

⁵⁷⁵ Custer *et al.*, *Op cit.* p.8.

⁵⁷⁶ Fantu Cheru & Cyril Obi Ed., ‘The Rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Critical Interventions. (New York, NY: Zed Books, 2010), pp. 1-2

⁵⁷⁷ Wu *Op cit.* p.1.

⁵⁷⁸ Richard Heydarian, “Is China’s Soft Power Bubble about to Burst?” *The National Interest*, August 25, 2015. Accessed: March 11, 2021 < <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-soft-power-bubble-about-burst-13683>>

influential Chinese media companies operating around the world to advance a positive image of China are *Xinhua* News Agency, CRI, CCTV and China Global Television Network (CGTN).⁵⁷⁹

The CPC's intentions in using the media are aimed at presenting to the world, China's system of governance as benign, promoting China as a model for information management to the developing world, and encouraging transparency in Chinese investment and financing. Simultaneously, China seeks to suppress the negative criticism of its domestic policies and the international activities of China-liked corporations and entities, and by so doing, gain the support of foreign governments and the public vis-à-vis the Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet issue, and the issue of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.⁵⁸⁰

China's appreciation of the use of media to promote its image can be traced back to the Mao Zedong years. Mao Zedong, China's founding president, in 1959 reiterated the crucial significance of the media in the PRC's political landscape when he suggested that the "newspapers must be run by politicians".⁵⁸¹ More significantly, he captured the *raison d'être* of the media when he recognized the potential of *Xinhua* News Agency to "let the world hear our voices."⁵⁸² In 2003, on a state visit to Moscow, China's Minister of State Council Information Office, Zhao Qizheng decried the Western media's negative coverage of China and their control of international public opinion about China.⁵⁸³

These observations and concerns are and have always been at the core of how China views the place of the media in its public diplomacy strategies. It is fair to argue that among China's public diplomacy instruments, the mass media (including television, radio, internet, newspapers, magazines, journals and publications) has become among

⁵⁷⁹ Zhang *Op cit.* p. 234.

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid. pp. 1 – 2.

⁵⁸¹ Weifeng Zhong, "How China's State-Run Media Foretold the Trade War Stand-off." *The Bridge*, July 16, 2019. Accessed: March 11, 2021 <<https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/how-chinas-state-run-media-foretold-trade-war-stand>>

⁵⁸² Emeka Umejei, *Chinese Media in Africa: Perception, Performance and Paradox*. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020), p.50.

⁵⁸³ Ingrid d'Hooghe, "Public Diplomacy in the People's Republic of China," In Jan Melissen ed., *The New Public Diplomacy*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 91

the most potent targeted at foreign audiences.⁵⁸⁴ The CPC seeks to utilize the Chinese media to leverage propaganda, censorship, disinformation and influence over certain key nodes in the flow of information. These aims transcend the simple goal of “telling China’s story” to the rest of the world. 585

According to Sara Cook,⁵⁸⁶ the CPC has mainly used three strategies in its attempt to shape media content and influence foreign publics; promoting a favourable image through various forms including suppressing critical viewpoints, propaganda and gaining control over content delivery systems.

Propaganda as construed by Cook⁵⁸⁷ implies the active, intentional and purposeful promotion of content by the government of China in Chinese state-owned media and the pro-Beijing private media agencies. Suppression involves the suppression or pushing down and even obstruction of ideas critical of China or the CPC, and other sensitive information by the Chinese media outlets. The CPC also uses a content delivery model by which it is using other digital platforms including social to push favourable content about China to millions of international audiences.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 96

⁵⁸⁵ Cook, *Op. cit.* p.1

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁷ Cook, *Op. cit.* p.1




Figure 3.1: Media Tactics Deployed by the CPC to Pursue its Soft Power Goals

Source: Freedom House, 2017⁵⁸⁸

Nonetheless, unlike other countries, these media resources are mostly state-owned. Furthermore, despite China and Chinese media’s active presence around the world, Chinese media’s global operations are still loosely coordinated and are devoid of a shared strategy. Madrid-Morales, *et al.*,⁵⁸⁹ opine that there is a clear overlap in goals and objectives of the Chinese media. The lack of a clear strategy in Chinese media diplomacy is seen in all areas of their operations including Africa.

⁵⁸⁸ See <https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/beijings-global-megaphone>

⁵⁸⁹ Madrid-Morales, *et al.*, p. 12

3.5 International Media's Coverage and Portrayal of China

The analysis of international, mainly Western media's coverage of China is critical for this study as it captures the underpinning reason why media diplomacy is so critical to China. After all, it can be argued that apart from building China's national brand among international audiences, China's diplomatic experiment with the spectrum of state-owned media is aimed at combating the negative imagery of China deemed to be pervasive in the Western media.

The representation of China by the Western media has both a direct and indirect impact on China's international image and hence shapes how other countries and populations view and treat China. The available literature, according to Muhammad Arif and Noor Hayat⁵⁹⁰ informs that the media is a crucial player in the production and reproduction of prejudices, stereotypes, beliefs, opinions and ideologies.

Therefore, the insight into how China is perceived around the world can be done is by assessing how China has been reported by the foreign media. Western image of China is largely constructed around the international (mostly Western) media coverage of China. Western media imagery of China has conventionally been negative. For instance, in 1868 an article by *New York Times* (NYT), reported on the "Selection of a wife for the young emperor" and opined that "bands of marauders" were laying China to waste.⁵⁹¹

According to Li Zhang⁵⁹² between 1989 and 1992, China attracted little attention from leading Western international news agencies. Since the early 1990s, international coverage of China has mainly centred on China's rise with the focus being on China's economic reform, the stock market, exports and imports, joint ventures, development, banking and finance. Daniel Griffiths⁵⁹³ studied the coverage of China by three leading

⁵⁹⁰ Muhammad Arif and Noor Hayat, "International Media Framing of China's Domestic Politics: An Analysis of Al-Zeera English and BBC News." *Media Watch*, Volume 9, Number 1, (2018), p.95

⁵⁹¹ New York Times, March 8, 1868

⁵⁹² Zhang, *Op. cit.* p. 246

⁵⁹³ Daniel Griffiths, "The International Media Coverage of China: Too Narrow an Agenda. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), p.7

international media agencies; BBC, *the Economist* and NYT and found that five themes dominated.

The five themes that dominated media coverage of China included politics, the economy, foreign relations and national security, human rights, and the environment. Li Zhang⁵⁹⁴ observes that there has been a change in international media's coverage of China since 1993. While the political issues such as China's politics surrounding the issue of Taiwan, and human rights issues especially following the Tiananmen Massacre were still rife among the public in the West, the Western media shifted towards covering China's economic growth.⁵⁹⁵ Media attention towards China grew even further after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, with China's choice to participate in the capitalist economic order being termed by the Financial Times as a puzzle for international trade.⁵⁹⁶

Western media are generally relatively 'negative' and critical in their tone and in certain topics concerning China. Jianqing Wu⁵⁹⁷ argues that there is a persistent stereotyping of images of China in Western media. For instance, Western media have painted *China's One Child Policy* as draconian. This is in the face of the fact that this policy has resulted in preventing an additional 400 million births, which would have sparked economic and social instability in China since its implementation by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. The policy is also limited to ethnic Han living in urban population and not the entire Chinese population as often suggested in Western media.⁵⁹⁸ Western bloggers such as John Smeaton⁵⁹⁹ have nonetheless, erroneously termed the policy as infanticide, forced sterilization, and abortion.

Other issues, whose coverage by the Western media has followed this negative stereotyping are the Tibet Issue and the *Xinjiang Riot*. CNN has previously referred to

⁵⁹⁴ Zhang, *Op. cit.* p. 246

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid. p. 243.

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid. pp. 243 - 44.

⁵⁹⁷ Jianqing Wu, "An Empirical Study of Stereotyped Images of China in American Media." *Journal of Language Teaching and Research*, Volume 1, Number 6 (2010), p. 913.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid. pp. 914 - 15.

⁵⁹⁹ John Smeaton, CNN's Ted Turner says Chinese one-child policy is not draconian, Tuesday, 12 May 2009, <<http://spuc-director.blogspot.com/2009/05/cnns-ted-turner-says-chinese-one-child.html>>

Tibet as a ‘country’ or as an ‘Autonomous Region of China’.⁶⁰⁰ The implication of this is that such a framing paints China as an oppressor and Tibetans as oppressed. This is despite that apart from the British Colonial government having treated Tibetans as slaves between 1903 and 1950 and later supporting Dalai Lama’s oppressive rule over Tibetans, China has spent hundreds of millions of dollars annually in developmental aid in Tibet.⁶⁰¹ Nevertheless, despite this coverage of the issue over Tibet by Western media, their narrative of the story is what is popular with foreign publics around the world.

Another issue, which has been erroneously covered by the Western media, and which has tainted China’s image concerning its human rights record is the issue about the *Xinjiang Riot*. Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in northwestern China is largely inhabited by Uygurs who are mostly Muslims. In 2009, the Uygurs staged a riot in Urumqi in which the rioters went on a killing spree slaughtering up to 160 civilians. However, the NYT termed the riots as “peaceful demonstrations” It also used real pictures with wrong captions.

It seems that conventional frames punctuate the ‘China story’ as depicted by the Western media. China is portrayed in terms of continued human rights violations, environmental pollution, authoritarian governance, and a dynamic economy. Figure 3.2 shows Griffith’s findings on the main themes of the BBC and New York Times’ coverage of China. Nonetheless, just two themes, politics and economics accounted for 53 per cent of the coverage. Specific narratives were dominant in certain sectors. For example, according to Griffiths,⁶⁰² half of the coverage on politics dealt with elite corruption and more than three-quarters of the stories by the leading news agencies were on environmental pollution.

Nonetheless, more critically, the tabloid manifested an instance in which local media was portraying China’s soft power through a subtle media message. Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin,⁶⁰³ point up that, a survey of over 25 nations in 2020 suggested that the

⁶⁰⁰ Wu, *Op. cit.* p. 915.

⁶⁰¹ *Ibid.* p.915

⁶⁰² Griffiths, *Op. cit.* p. 13.

⁶⁰³ Lim and Bergin, *Op. cit.*

coverage of China had become more positive in their local media in recent years. The same survey found that just less than a quarter of the countries surveyed was it reported that the coverage has been negative. The findings suggested that Europe had the most favourable change in local media coverage of China with a 6.3 score on a scale of one to ten. North America reported the least positive coverage of China by local media with a score of 3.5




Figure 3.2: Major Themes in NYT and BBC's Coverage of China

Source: Griffiths⁶⁰⁴

A 2010 study of the China coverage by BBC World News Service, CNN International and Deutsche Welle (DW) that was conducted by the California-based US Centre on Public Diplomacy (CPD)⁶⁰⁵ provided some insight, which is reflective of the treatment of China by the dominant international media. The CPD study found that BBC World

⁶⁰⁴ Griffiths, *Op. cit.* p.14

⁶⁰⁵ US CPD was created in 2003 as a partnership between University of Southern California's School of International Relations and Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism as a research organization for furthering the study of global public engagement and cultural relations.

News' coverage of China was the most political and as such had the highest potential to challenge China's official presentation of factors.⁶⁰⁶

It established that the Services' coverage of China was fairly biased when detailing PRC's human and political rights record, and China's role in world politics.⁶⁰⁷ Comparatively, the Time Warner Inc.-owned CNN International China coverage was the lowest and its coverage focused on non-political 'soft' news stories such as general human-interest stories. Even on issues that would seem important to CNN's audiences and agenda like the Sino-US relations especially the conflict over Taiwan, Tibetan independence and trade, the CPD reports that CNN failed to provide a balanced and thorough coverage.⁶⁰⁸

More specifically, according to the study, CNN International's coverage of China's related stories included 12 per cent of global economic news, 29 per cent of China-related stories and 26 per cent of *other news stories*.⁶⁰⁹ According to Seib and Powers,⁶¹⁰ CNN International was the only international news network among those studied that failed to broadcast any story touching on the political rights in China. Furthermore, the network remained silent and failed its coverage of Taiwan and Tibet issues, to criticize China over its position on the issue.

DW has also emerged as a strong media player in the coverage of China-related news stories. Unlike its counterparts, the BBC World Service and CNN International, DW reports consistently on China, providing a balanced and straightforward account of events in the PRC.⁶¹¹ DW's China coverage mostly centred on stories it deemed had a connection to and significant implications for Germany, and the German economy in particular. As such, the network's focus, as reported by Seib and Powers⁶¹² in the US

⁶⁰⁶ Philip Seib and Shawn Powers, *China in the News: A Comparative Analysis of the China Coverage of BBC World, CNN International and Deutsche Welle*. (Los Angeles, CA: US Center on Public Diplomacy, 2010), p.3

⁶⁰⁷ Geoffrey A. Fowler, "CNN's Coverage of China is Raising Hackles." *The Wall Street Journal*, April 19, 2008. < <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120856947042728137>>

⁶⁰⁸ Seib and Powers, *Op. cit.* p. 4

⁶⁰⁹ Laura Ruth Silver, "China In the Media: Effects on American Opinion." *Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations*, (2017), p.21

⁶¹⁰ Seib and Powers, *Op. cit.* p. 5

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.* p.5

⁶¹² *Ibid.* p.5

CPD study, was on China's role in the global economy with 34 per cent of its coverage touching on that topic as compared to BBC's 28 per cent and CNN's 12 per cent. DW's coverage of the issue of China's role in the global economy and Chinese society was mostly positive and portrayed China as a safe, happy and stable place to live in. China was presented as a positive economic model for the rest of the world.

In 2011, Yang Ye⁶¹³ did a comparative study of the coverage of China by the NYT and the *China Daily*. He found that NYT coverage was mostly anti-Chinese government frame. This finding, according to Muhammad Arif and Noor Hayat⁶¹⁴ reflects the general attitude among Western media particularly the US portrayal of China as a threatening entity.

Another network, which even though not fall under the purview of Western media and which has crucial media in covering China is *Al-Jazeera English* (AJE). AJE, which was established in 2006, is owned by the royal family of Qatar and is an international news network with its headquarters in Doha, Qatar. AJE's major themes in its coverage of China were China's government affairs, narrowing the income gap, the one-child policy, the Taiwan conflict and politics, and corruption.⁶¹⁵ *Al-Jazeera English* has had a rough engagement with the government of the PRC especially the CPC-controlled government of China. In 2012, the network was forced to shut down its bureau in Beijing following Chinese authorities' refusal to renew the press credentials and visa of its correspondents in the country.⁶¹⁶

AJE's coverage of China has been relatively negative. For instance, out of 28 news reports about China, 10 were positive, 15 were negative and 3 were fairly neutral. AJE's coverage accentuated corruption, the negative aspects of China's policy in Tibet/*Xinjiang*, and the negative aspects of the one-child policy.⁶¹⁷ *Al-Jazeera* is considered to be more negative than even the BBC World Service and CNN

⁶¹³ Yang Ye, "A Comparative Analysis of New York Times and China Daily's 2011 News Coverage of the Chinese Government.", Dissertation, 2012

⁶¹⁴ Muhammad Arif and Noor Hayat, "International Media Framing of China's Domestic Politics: An Analysis of Al-Zeera English and BBC News." *Media Watch*, Volume 9, Number 1, (2018), p.95

⁶¹⁵ Ibid. p. 99

⁶¹⁶ Al-Jazeera, *Al-Jazeera English Forced Out of China.* May 9, 2012 < <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2012/5/9/al-jazeera-english-forced-out-of-china>>

⁶¹⁷ Arif and Hayat, *Op. cit.*, p.99

International in its coverage of China.⁶¹⁸ In comparison, in the same period (January 2013 to December 2014), BBC World Service published 25 news items, 7 were positive, 10 were negative and 8 were neutral. BBC’s negative coverage was mainly focused on general reforms in China’s political system, judicial affairs, political rivalries and economic affairs. The comparison between AJE and BBC’s coverage of China is shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Comparison of AJE and BBC News Coverage of China and Tone

Comparing AJE and BBC News Coverage of China			Comparing the Tone of News Coverage of China by AJE and BBC News		
Frequency	Al-Jazeera	BBC	Tone	Al-Jazeera	BBC
News	28	25	Positive	10	7
			Negative	15	10
			Neutral	3	8

Source: Muhammad Arif and Noor Hayat 619

The Western attitude of China has nonetheless not been entirely static but has changed over the years. In the 14th century and 15th centuries, China was pictured as the magic ‘Tartary of splendour admired by Europe, which gave way to its depiction as ‘Voltaire’s China. In the 18th century, the Western media accentuated China’s silk and ceramic superiority and in the 19th century, the favourable imagery of China in Western media was redefined with a grotesque depiction of China as a tyranny incapable of withstanding the modernity of the West. China has recognized and embraced the value of the media for public diplomacy endeavours. It recognizes that power is becoming gradually intangible and that the media’s role in public diplomacy is crucial.

Recently, at the height of the at the height of Corona Virus – 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, a pro-government tabloid *Informer* in Serbia erected a billboard in Belgrade that depicted the face of China’s President Xi Jinping with the words “*Thank you,*

⁶¹⁸ Silver, *Op. cit.* p.21

⁶¹⁹ Arif and Hayat, *Op. cit.*, p.99

brother Xi.”⁶²⁰ The billboard was in appreciation of China’s sending of medical equipment to support Serbia in its fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.

3.6 Perception of Chinese Media and China’s National Image

The media has permeated the public diplomacy space to an extent that scholars can now talk about ‘media diplomacy’, ‘CNN Effect’, ‘digital diplomacy’ and even ‘television diplomacy’.⁶²¹ In this sense, public diplomacy has been conceived in terms of where state actors utilize the media and channels of communication to shape public opinion in foreign countries.⁶²² For centuries, the attitude of the Western media in their coverage of China reflected the prejudices that were persistent at home instead of providing real information about China and the Chinese people, and a clear idea of China’s ‘brand’.⁶²³ The news stories that the dominant Western media broadcasted about China have been fundamental in creating stereotypes and prejudices among international audiences about China.

Joshua Cooper Ramo,⁶²⁴ in the *Brand China* report, opined that the greatest threat to China that exists today is its national image. He observes that a mismatch existed between China’s imagery of herself and other countries’ imagery of China.⁶²⁵ It is within this backdrop of the growing salience of the media in public diplomacy and China’s need to ‘tell its story’ to the world that Chinese media’s role in China’s public diplomacy and particularly Chinese media’s influence on foreigners’ perception of China’s image can be conceived. For instance, while China considers herself an international cooperator, a peace-loving country and an autonomous actor on the international stage, the public in other countries perceive China as a militant, authoritarian state, and an obtrusive force.⁶²⁶

⁶²⁰ Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin, “Inside China’s Audacious Global Propaganda Campaign.” *The Guardian*, December 7, 2018 < <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/07/china-plan-for-global-media-dominance-propaganda-xi-jinping>>

⁶²¹ Gilboa, “Diplomacy in the Media Age: Three Models of Uses and Effects.” p.3.

⁶²² Ibid. p.4.

⁶²³ Hugo de Burgh, “The Chinese Media: Western Perceptions, Chinese Reality.” In *The Growth of Media in China: And Its Impacts on Political and Economic Development of China*. Conference Report. (Copenhagen, 28 November 2008), p. 15.

⁶²⁴ Joshua Cooper Ramo, *Brand China* (London, UK: Foreign Policy Centre, 2007).

⁶²⁵ Ibid.

⁶²⁶ Zhang, *Op. cit.* p.234.

Over the years Chinese media has expanded to reach hundreds of millions of international audiences including radio listeners, television viewers and social media users. It can be argued that Chinese media efforts around the world have had a perceptible impact on international audiences. The government of China has endeavoured to project its soft power abroad and enhance China's image abroad. How has the media facilitated this goal?

Muhammad Arif and Noor Hayat⁶²⁷ argue that media create frames which shape perception in four ways. First, media frames have the potential to stimulate opposition to or support for an issue or event. Second, media frames provide the basis for causal interpretation, moral judgments and solutions. Third media frames also present particular ideology, and four media frames use attractive words, phrases and metaphors that help shape people's opinion about an event⁶²⁸ or a country and even the media itself. The fundamental question, which needs to be answered, is, has the Chinese media presence and activities around the world impacted international audiences' perception of China, and if so, in what ways?

China has a strong international media presence. As has been found in the overview of China's global media presence, some of the Chinese media networks operating in regions and countries around the world include; *Xinhua News Agency*, CCTV, China Daily, CRI, the Global Times, People's Daily, CGTN and a host of state-run digital and social media platforms. How these Chinese media networks are perceived is crucial for China, not only because they form part of the image of China among international audiences, but also because the content they carry has the potential to shape attitudes and perceptions of foreign audiences about China.

Chinese media is largely perceived as being central to "Beijing's Propaganda Machinery" and owing to state control, Chinese media is unable to be perceived as a credible and authoritative source of news and information.⁶²⁹ It can be argued that when it comes to the Chinese media, the perception of audiences concerning the

⁶²⁷ Arif and Hayat, *Op. cit.*, p.94

⁶²⁸ Ibid. p.94

⁶²⁹ Ibid. p. 3

independence of the broadcasters is the single defining antecedent that assures perceptions of credibility and grants a positive reputation.⁶³⁰ Unfortunately, it is based on this element that international audiences will perceive Chinese media and assess its credibility as a reliable source of information about China and the world.

In general, Chinese media is still viewed with indifference and mistrust in countries around the world. For instance, in the United Kingdom (UK) CGTN has been criticized for what is as seen deep-rooted CPC's control of the content broadcasted by the network.⁶³¹ United Kingdom's media regulator Ofcom has recently terminated CGTN's license to operate in the UK citing the network's close relationship with the Chinese states. CGTN being state-owned, is deemed to broadcast biased news that favours the Chinese government and in so doing is largely considered a propaganda mouthpiece for China in the UK.⁶³²

There is little doubt that China's use of media to expand its soft power globally has raised concerns. Merriden Varrall⁶³³ opines, for instance, that CGTN's association with the CPC limits its ability to appeal to audiences around the world and influence international discourse. This perception applies to other Chinese media like the *Xinhua* News Agency whose links with the Chinese state have their credibility questioned by international audiences. As such, the popular view is that despite the government's substantive investment in the Chinese international media, these networks still struggle to realize the public diplomacy goals set by the CPC. In the developing world, and particularly in Africa Chinese media is seen as a threat to the media industry. It is conceived, as Herman Wasserman⁶³⁴ has noted, that the operations of Chinese media in Africa will erode professional journalistic culture as well as press freedom.

⁶³⁰ Sambuddha Mustafi, "Sino the Times: Can China's Billions Buy Media Credibility?", *Colombia Journalism Review*, May/June < https://archives.cjr.org/feature/sino_the_times.php >

⁶³¹ See. Mercy A. Kuo, "CGTN Loses UK License: China's Global Media Gambit." *The Diplomat*, March 22, 2021 <<https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/cgtn-loses-uk-license-chinas-global-media-gambit/>>

⁶³² Ibid.

⁶³³ Merriden Varrall, *Behind the News: Inside China Global Television Network*. (Low Institute, 2020), p.1⁶³³

⁶³⁴ Herman Wasserman, "China's Media in Africa: Expansion, Perception and Reception." *DOC Research Institute*, July 3, 2018. Accessed: March 10, 2021. < <https://doc-research.org/2018/07/chinas-media-africa-expansion-perception-reception/> >

Nonetheless, pundits view Chinese media coverage of Africa's stories positively in contrast to the monitorial 'watchdog' coverage and reporting on Africa that is associated with the normative frameworks of Western media networks.⁶³⁵ A comparative study by Vivien Marsh⁶³⁶ found that CCTV had presented news about Africa from an African perspective reflecting a positive picture of Africa compared to the BBC World News' coverage of Africa.

This resulted in Africans (who were mostly "fed up") with BBC's stereotypical portrayal of the continent assuming a more positive perception of CCTV and Chinese media in general. Chinese media focus on African solutions to socio-economic and political problems rather than on highlighting the problems has contributed to the realization of a positive perception of Chinese media among African states. It is no surprise therefore that the public in several countries especially in the developing world considers China's image favourably.⁶³⁷

In line with this, it can be argued, therefore, that Beijing's investment in media to project its soft power and to influence foreign public opinion has yielded some gains, but there are also some failures. The failures of China's media diplomacy appertain to several issues inherent in the structuring of media diplomacy by the CPC. One of the most popular criticisms, which have been levelled against Chinese media, and which have great implications for its public diplomacy relates to ownership of the media. The Chinese media that have been popular in projecting China's soft power around the world are either state-run or state-owned.

Merriden Varrall⁶³⁸ argues that despite the Chinese government's active support and massive investment in Chinese media to promote its soft power around the world, the government has made little gains in improving its international soft power status. In Africa, there is a popular perception that Chinese media including CCTV never broadcasts views that are critical of the PRC's involvement in Africa.⁶³⁹ For instance,

⁶³⁵ Ibid.

⁶³⁶ Marsh *Op. cit.* p. 57.

⁶³⁷ Cook, "Beijing's Global Megaphone: The Expansion of Chinese Community Party Media Influence Since 2017."

⁶³⁸ Varrall, *Op. cit.* p.1

⁶³⁹ Marsh *Op. cit.* p. 66.

a study conducted by Wasserman and Madrid-Morales⁶⁴⁰ among South African journalists, revealed that the journalists were divided on their perception of Chinese media's presence and operations in South Africa. More specifically, in that study, the journalists who were categorized as resisters and undecided formed the majority.⁶⁴¹

Certainly, there exist limits to Chinese media's influence on international audiences' perception of China. For one, countries and foreign publics are realizing that there exists an intricate connection between Chinese media (especially the state-owned ones) and the government of China. International audiences are becoming critical of Chinese media coverage of global events that affect them and Chinese media's overly favourable coverage of China and Chinese-related topics including the most controversial ones.

3.7 Chinese Media Offensive in Africa

China's media outreach in Africa started earlier following the independence of some African countries from colonial rule. For decades, Chinese media have wanted to establish a foothold not only in the world's media ecosystem but also in Africa's media space.⁶⁴² Africa is central in China's global media outreach as the country tries to establish a more favourable public opinion of itself on the continent. As such, China's media offensive is greatest in Africa.⁶⁴³ Mass media has proved to be a crucial factor in China's public diplomatic engagements in Africa. For instance, while the Western media have been steadily reducing the number of their correspondents in Africa, China has instead rapidly increased its media presence in the continent.⁶⁴⁴

The pedigree of China's media involvement in Africa is dated back to a time when most African countries were still under colonialism; particularly during the liberation struggles. It was at this time when the Cold War was commencing between the US-led capitalist West and the Russian-led communist East. The PRC invested in such

⁶⁴⁰ Wasserman and Madrid-Morales *Op cit.* p.2214.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid.

⁶⁴² Dani Madrid-Morales, Deniz Borekci, and Dieter Loffler, *It Is About Their Story: How China, Turkey and Russia Influence the Media in Africa.* (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2021), p. 10

⁶⁴³ Sergio Grassi, "Changing the Narrative: China's Media Offensive in Africa." *International Policy Analysis.* Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, (2014), p.1.

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 3

magazines as the *Peking Review* (and *Peking Information*, its French version), *China Pictorial* and *China Reconstructs* to reach African audiences.⁶⁴⁵ Chinese news media's initial contact with Africa was Egypt, Cairo and Beijing had established diplomatic relations after Egypt's independence in 1956.⁶⁴⁶ *Xinhua* initiated operations in Cairo shortly after Egypt's independence and by the 1980s; it had established 16 offices in Africa.⁶⁴⁷

By 1967, China's Radio *Peking* was transmitting in English to East Africa for 21 hours weekly.⁶⁴⁸ *Peking Review* and *Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-tung* could be accessed easily in East Africa.⁶⁴⁹ In 1959, *Xinhua* opened its first sub-Saharan Africa bureaus in Accra (Ghana) and Conakry (Guinea). According to Madrid-Morales, *et al.*,⁶⁵⁰ the role of the journalists involved reporting and diplomacy. The *Xinhua* journalists were tasked with the facilitation of the establishment of PRC's diplomatic relations with African states. According to Wang Shu, a Chinese correspondent with *Xinhua*, his roles involved engaging African leaders on behalf of the PRC to express the need for establishing diplomatic relations between a given African country and China.⁶⁵¹

Generally, at this earlier stage, Chinese media presence and cooperation evolved more unevenly and slowly compared to other aspects of China-Africa bilateral relations. Nonetheless, the threat to China's security posed by the Soviet Union and the US in the 1960s compelled China to seek ideological support from other countries. This created an opportunity for China to engage Africa and to seek to create a favourable image of itself among the newly independent states (most of which were non-aligned).⁶⁵²

In 1973 and 1976, Chinese media delegations visited Ethiopia, Ghana, Benin and Togo as part of a cultural exchange. The media engagements by Chinese media at this time

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 15

⁶⁴⁶ Yu-Shan Wu, "The Rise of China's State-Led Media Dynasty in Africa." *China Africa Project*. Occasional Paper Number 117 (2012), p. 11

⁶⁴⁷ Madrid-Morales, *et al.*, p. 12

⁶⁴⁸ Fackson Banda, 'China in the African Media-Scape: A Critical Injection', *Journal of African Media Studies*, Volume 1, Number 3, (2009), p.345.

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 346.

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 15

⁶⁵¹ See Madrid-Morales, *et al.*, p. 12

⁶⁵² Wu, "The Rise of China's State-Led Media Dynasty in Africa." p. 11

of the Cold War aimed at advancing ideological warfare and promoting the PRC's project of supporting the African Liberation Struggle. *Radio Peking* was especially vocal in this regard within the East African region.⁶⁵³ Chinese media engagement in Africa's anti-colonial struggle was aimed at realizing the PRC's grand strategy of acquiring African support for its dealings with Russia and the West especially vis-à-vis Taiwan. As early as 1958; China had established an office for the New China News Agency in Cairo.⁶⁵⁴

Chinese media provided ideological support to Africa's liberation movements. In the 1950's and 1970 Chinese media augmented the PRC's drive to establish diplomatic relations with the post-independent states in Africa and to acquire ideological support from the newly independent states within the context of the Cold War.⁶⁵⁵ By the beginning of 1967, a Chinese media, Radio Peking was transmitting weekly to East Africa in English.⁶⁵⁶ In the late 1980s and the post-Cold War epoch, Chinese media became a vital tool for repairing China's international image, engaging strategically important regions in the world and reinforcing its formal political ties with the African countries as it opened up to the world.⁶⁵⁷ It is worth noting that owing to the relative lack of independence for Chinese media, journalism within these media houses is therefore more pliable to China's interests.

While China's media presence in Africa dates back close to half a century, its media engagement with the continent seems to have undergone a paradigm shift from the 1950s and 1960s focus on ideological confrontations especially with the West, to the current more diverse, less ideological, a more in-depth and a substantially more pragmatic and strategic stance.⁶⁵⁸ The Chinese media onslaught in Africa has been in line with the shift in Chinese soft power orientation from "opening up" to a more proactive "going out" international relations policy at the end of the Cold War.⁶⁵⁹

⁶⁵³ Banda, *Op. cit.* p.345.

⁶⁵⁴ Leslie *Op cit.*, p.162.

⁶⁵⁵ Wu *Op cit.* p.2.

⁶⁵⁶ Leslie *Op cit.*, p.162.

⁶⁵⁷ Wu *Op cit.* p.2.

⁶⁵⁸ Madrid-Morales, *et al.*, p. 11

⁶⁵⁹ Zhang Yanqiu, "Understand China's Media in Africa: From the Perspective of Constructive Journalism." *China and Africa Media, Communication and Public Diplomacy.* (Beijing, CHN: CHR Michelsen Institute, 2014), p.3

Addressing delegates at the China-Africa Media Cooperation in Beijing, China's Minister of State General, Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SGAPPRFT), Mr. Cai Fuchao, stated this new pragmatic slant in Chinese media engagement in Africa. Fuchao stated that Chinese media firms will assume a pragmatic and realistic attitude in telling the truth, seeking practical outcomes promoting pragmatic advice and cultivating innovative cooperation.⁶⁶⁰

Two things are implicit in Fuchao's pronouncement; one, is that China is pushing its media to engage in Africa to aid in the process of developing the continent's media infrastructure; two, to actively craft a media narrative pivoted on China's development, African's own story and China-Africa relations. As China rose, the Chinese political elite became increasingly sensitive about how China is perceived in the world including Africa.

In the post-Cold War epoch, the PRC's preoccupation with African media is conceivable as an endeavour to use "Chinese nationalism" to undergird the CCP's engagement with Africa and to influence the African population.⁶⁶¹ Negative public opinion about China's national image is an anathema to the policymakers in Beijing.⁶⁶² Therefore, the internationalization of Chinese media in Africa serves the short-term goal of economic profit and the long-term goals of strategic and political influence. Consequently, there has been a remarkable upsurge in Chinese media presence in Africa in recent years. The presence of Chinese media in Africa is quantifiable through media infrastructure development in the continent, media content production, sharing and distribution, training of African journalists and journalistic exchanges between China and Africa.

It can also be determined by looking at Chinese media direct investments in African domestic media companies.⁶⁶³ Chinese media expansion in Africa is underpinned by two principal desires; the need to expand their international market share in the media-

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 11

⁶⁶¹ Banda, *Op. cit.* p.346.

⁶⁶² Varrall, *Op. cit.* p.2

⁶⁶³ Herman Wasserman and Dani Madrid-Morales, "How Influential are Chinese Media in Africa? An Audience Analysis in Kenya and South Africa." *International Journal of Communication*, Volume 12 (2018), p.2213.

scape and, more importantly, China's political objective to utilize media to buttress its soft power or discursive power globally.⁶⁶⁴ For instance, the increased Chinese media presence in Africa, including CRI's initiation of operations in Kenya in 2006 can be conceived as a continued effort by China to penetrate Africa.

It is worth noting that the most active actors in the Chinese media space are State-owned. Chinese State-owned media have increased their operation in Africa, especially since 2006 following the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The pronouncement of the "Year of Africa" in China was followed by the launch by CRI of an FM radio station in Nairobi, Kenya and *Xinhua* also moved its editorial staff from Paris, France to Nairobi.⁶⁶⁵ In 2011, Nairobi again became the regional hub for CGTN Africa (formerly CCTV Africa).

ChinAfrica, which is a bilingual monthly magazine that publishes issues to do with Sino-Africa relations, established an office in Johannesburg, South Africa.⁶⁶⁶ Currently, several Chinese state-owned media are operating in Africa including *Xinhua* News Agency, CCTV Africa, Beijing Review, China Radio International and China Daily Africa Weekly.⁶⁶⁷ There are also private companies and surrogates of the Chinese media firms operating in Africa including the private Chinese digital pay TV operator, StarTimes.⁶⁶⁸

In 2012, China also launched the "I Love Africa" multimedia phone software application for iPad devices as well as social media platforms including Facebook, YouTube and Twitter that feature entertainment and news.⁶⁶⁹ The CCTV's 'I Love Africa' iPad app has content in French, Arabic, English and Chinese and essentially

⁶⁶⁴ Dani Madrid-Morales, "Why are Chinese media in Africa? Evidence from three decades of *Xinhua*'s news coverage of Africa". In Xiaoling Zhang, Herman Wasserman and Winston Mano, (Eds.), *China's Media and Soft Power in Africa: Promotion and Perceptions*. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 79–92.

⁶⁶⁵ Madrid-Morales, *et al.*, p. 12

⁶⁶⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 12 – 13.

⁶⁶⁷ Yanqiu *Op cit.* p.3

⁶⁶⁸ *Ibid.* p.3.

⁶⁶⁹ Lauren Gornfinkel, Sandy Joffe, Cobus Van Staden and Yu-Shan Wu, "CCTV's Global Outreach: Examining the Audiences of China's 'New Voice' on Africa. *Media International Africa*, Number 151 (2014), p. 81.

targets African users.⁶⁷⁰ The most authoritative of the Chinese media in Africa is the *Xinhua* News Agency. The *Xinhua* News Agency sets the agenda that is followed by the other Chinese media.⁶⁷¹ *Xinhua* has perhaps the longest presence within the African continent beginning in the 1950s when it supported the news agency of the various African liberation movements in the form of journalist exchanges and material aid.

In 1986, *Xinhua* established a regional bureau in Africa Nairobi, Kenya. In 2011, *Xinhua* News Agency initiated five additional branches in Africa including English branches in Kigali (Rwanda), Gaborone (Eswatini), Accra (Ghana) and Port Louis (Mauritius), and a French branch in the Malian capital – Bamako.⁶⁷² These branches were in addition to the already extant 18 branches. In 2012, CCTV Africa established its headquarters in Nairobi.⁶⁷³

Since then, the Chinese media company has employed 70 African and 40 Chinese employees recruited from global media houses such as Al Jazeera and local media houses.⁶⁷⁴ While there is no data on the amount of CCTV Africa's viewership, in 2015 it had a Facebook following of 273,723 and a Twitter following of 23,050.⁶⁷⁵ CCTV News (formerly CCTV International or CCTV-9) established in 2000 self-defines as China's contribution to increased diversity and broader perspectives in the international flow of information.⁶⁷⁶ With a strong Chinese content, CCTV also captures events occurring in the developing countries in Asia and Africa.

For instance, in Africa, the focus of CCTV in Africa is to address African audiences on various topics in one-hour daily programmes including *Talk Africa*, *Africa Live* and *Faces of Africa* in addition to content on China. These programmes are broadcast in English-language in 25 African countries.⁶⁷⁷ CCTV-Africa provided a crucial platform

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid. p83

⁶⁷¹ Grassi *Op cit.* p.3.

⁶⁷² Shubo Li and Helge Ronning, *China in Africa: Soft Power, Media Perceptions and a Pan-Developing Identity*. (Beijing, CHN: CHR. Michelsen Institute, 2013), p.4.

⁶⁷³ Fei Jiang, Shubo Li, Helge Ronning and Elling Tjonneland, "Introduction – The Voice of China in Africa: Media, Communication Technologies and Image-Building." *Chinese Journal of Communication*, Volume 9, Number 1 (2016), p.2.

⁶⁷⁴ Grassi *Op cit.* p.4.

⁶⁷⁵ Marsh *Op cit.* p.58.

⁶⁷⁶ Jiang *et al.*, *Op cit.* p.4.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid. p.4.

for the construction of a Sino-centric media discourse, which is not only state-owned but also one, which is geared towards counter-weighting the Western-centric media space and highlighting the PRC's soft power. Therefore, in tandem with CCTV's goal to develop a positive image of China around the world, CCTV Africa is a key player in attempts to construct a positive image of China among African audiences including the Kenyan public.⁶⁷⁸

By 2014, *Xinhua* News Agency had more than 30 bureaus, 400 local employees and 60 journalists in the African continent.⁶⁷⁹ China's decade-long campaign aimed at boosting its global presence is at best escalating. *Xinhua* has concluded cooperation agreements on the sharing of content with state broadcasters in Zambia, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Kenya.⁶⁸⁰ The implication of these cooperation agreements and intense engagement in Africa, *Xinhua* has a relative advantage over Western media in Sub-Saharan Africa in that African media may reproduce *Xinhua* at limited or no charge.⁶⁸¹ In smaller African countries such as the Comoros, Gambia and Togo, *Xinhua* has signed a vital agreement to disseminate content that is dubbed in French.⁶⁸²

CRI was founded in 1941 and began operations as a propaganda platform for Chinese leaders. In its formative years, it functioned as an international broadcaster that mostly repeated the statements of Chinese leaders.⁶⁸³ With the liberalization of the media that began in the later 1970s, CRI expanded to become among the key media players in China's public diplomacy. It currently broadcasts in 43 foreign languages around the world, using FM, AM, satellite, internet radio and podcasts. It has 117 international FM and 32 AM radio partners in Oceania, North America, Europe, Asia and Africa.⁶⁸⁴

⁶⁷⁸ Gornfinkel *et al.*, *Op cit.* p. 81.

⁶⁷⁹ Jiang *et al.*, *Op cit.* p.4.

⁶⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸² Wasserman and Madrid-Morales *Op cit.* p.2214.

⁶⁸³ Chwen Chen, Cinzia Colapinto and Qing Luo, "China Radio International in the Digital Age: Propagating China on the Global Scenario." Accessed: March 2, 2021. <<https://www.globalmediajournal.com/open-access/china-radio-international-in-the-digital-age-propagating-china-on-the-global-scenario.pdf>> p.3

⁶⁸⁴ *Ibid.* p.3

CRI has played a crucial role in shaping China's image perception among the African public since its initialization of operations in the continent in 1956.⁶⁸⁵ CRI has established regional offices in several sub-Saharan African countries including Kenya, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Niger and Nigeria and Mali uses the shortwave station to broadcast over a wide geographical expanse.⁶⁸⁶ It has completed a cooperation agreement with the Kenya national broadcaster, Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) that allows it to broadcast over Very High Frequency (VHF) in Kenya.⁶⁸⁷

With Africa's over 30 per cent illiteracy rate, China finds it highly convenient to transmit its soft power through radio.⁶⁸⁸ CRI broadcasts in various languages including English, French, and Arabic as well as in Hausa and Swahili. The integration of Chinese media in China's foreign policy strategies is upheld in at least two international relations frameworks; the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Xiamen 2017 BRICS Summit.⁶⁸⁹ In the period between the initial official launch of the FOCAC in 2000 and its second launch in 2006, a wide range of media engagements occurred. The progression and crystallization of the PRC's media engagement in Africa can be conceptualized in the context of the FOCAC.⁶⁹⁰

The FOCAC recognized the media's role in its plan for action to augment enhanced collaboration between Africa and China. Media constitutes practically every aspect of the FOCAC underpinning all its action plans, which guide Sino-African relations.⁶⁹¹ These media engagements chiefly focused on the establishment of Chinese media infrastructure in Africa. For instance, in 2000 *Xinhua* gave a Ugandan television station a satellite, and in 2004, Gabon secured Chinese assistance in building its national broadcast station.⁶⁹²

⁶⁸⁵ Grassi *Op cit.* p.4.

⁶⁸⁶ Ibid. p.5

⁶⁸⁷ Grassi *Op cit.* p.4

⁶⁸⁸ Li and Ronning *Op cit.* p.5.

⁶⁸⁹ Wasserman, "China's Media in Africa: Expansion, Perception and Reception." *DOC Research Institute*,

⁶⁹⁰ Leslie *Op cit.* p.163

⁶⁹¹ Wasserman and Madrid-Morales *Op cit.* p.2214.

⁶⁹² Wu *Op cit.* p.2.

In 2006, China organized the Third FOCAC meeting in Beijing, which was attended by 41 African heads of state. The FOCAC ended in the “FOCAC Beijing Action Plan and Declaration”.⁶⁹³ The text appertaining the Sino-Africa media cooperation, FOCAC called upon the news media to positively contribute to the enhancement of mutual understanding and friendship between China and Africa.⁶⁹⁴ FOCAC encourages news media from both Africa and China to provide objective and comprehensive news coverage and to play an enabling role in improving mutual friendship and mutual understanding between China and Africa.⁶⁹⁵ The 2009 FOCAC also encouraged this kind of cooperation, but China went further to offer free training to media actors and journalists from Africa.

China’s global participation is pivoted on Beijing’s policy of non-interference. The Chinese media expansion in Africa is aimed at shaping media content in Africa concerning China’s engagement in Africa. Western media have, at least after the end of the Cold War largely critically reported on politics and conflicts in African countries. However, Chinese media, operating in tandem with the non-interference principle, have largely focused on informing Africans about China and its values and focusing on positive topics in the continent with the ultimate goal of enhancing China’s political and economic relations with the African states.

In its *China’s Africa Policy*, which touched on China’s role in Africa, The PRC reiterated its media cooperation with Africa. It encouraged multi-tiered and multi-formed cooperation and exchanges between Chinese and African media to enhance mutual understanding and balanced and objective coverage of China and Africa.⁶⁹⁶ Consequently, through the Sino-African Cooperation Forum (SAFC), a range of exchanges with African journalists was organized. In 2009, during the FOCAC Summit at Sharm el Sheikh in Egypt, the media engagements between Chinese media and African media were formalized through a pledge to engage Chinese communication enterprises in building the communication infrastructure in Africa.⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹³ Madrid-Morales, *et al.*, p. 12

⁶⁹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 12

⁶⁹⁵ Wasserman *Op cit.*

⁶⁹⁶ *Ibid.* p.3.

⁶⁹⁷ *Ibid.* p.23

The most perceptible form of Chinese outreach has been journalistic outreach exchanges or Chinese entities-sponsored journalistic training schemes.⁶⁹⁸ For instance, in line with this, in 2008, Chinese journalists visited the South African National Editor's Forum (SANEF) to exchange ideas with South African journalists. In 2009, South African journalists visited China.⁶⁹⁹ In 2012, at the FOCAC V, China suggested a 'China-Africa Press Exchange Centre' in the realization that few African journalists were present in China and in 2013; the Chinese ambassador to Kenya welcomed African media to establish offices in China.

In 2015, in line with the 2015 FOCAC Action Plan, Xi Jinping announced China's plan to take digital television coverage to some of Africa's impoverished villages.⁷⁰⁰ The 10,000 Villages Project aimed at enhancing television access to Africans living in remote villages.⁷⁰¹ The motivations behind Jinping's digital television project in Africa were not entirely philanthropic but were rather a stroke of a calculated soft-power genius that sought to raise China's profile amongst Africans. Through the Project, Beijing would have a commanding influence on Africa's communication infrastructure. This would ultimately give it control over one of the most effective platforms for projecting its soft power and cultivating a positive image of China among Africans.

The Chinese government has contracted Pang Xinxiang's StarTimes and given it the sole mandate to implement the 10,000 Villages Project.⁷⁰² StarTimes is China's only private company with authorization from China's Ministry of Commerce to operate in the TV and radio industries of foreign countries. StarTimes has 2.61 million subscribers across the African continent and Kenyans can view four CCTV channels through a digital pay TV platform. StarTimes has been involved in communication infrastructure development in rural Kenya.⁷⁰³ StarTimes currently beams TV shows with Chinese content to about 10 million homes in more than 30 African countries.⁷⁰⁴ In Zambia,

⁶⁹⁸ IJF *Op cit.* p.1

⁶⁹⁹ Wu *Op cit.* p.2.

⁷⁰⁰ Jenny Marsh, "How China is Slowly Expanding its Power in Africa, One TV Set at a Time. *CNN Business*, July 24, 2019. Accessed: May 5, 2021 <<https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/23/business/startimes-china-africa-kenya-intl/index.html>>

⁷⁰¹ Ibid.

⁷⁰² Ibid.

⁷⁰³ Wasserman and Madrid-Morales *Op cit.* p.2215.

⁷⁰⁴ Marsh, *Op. cit.* p.1

StarTimes was able to enter into a joint venture with the state broadcaster Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) called TopStar. In that deal, StarTimes gained a 60 per cent share in ZNBC that would last for 25 years.⁷⁰⁵

Those ventures have led to criticisms that StarTimes has in effect taken control of Zambia's television network. China's Export-Import Bank (EXIM Bank) funded the venture through a loan of US\$273 million.⁷⁰⁶ As the ZNBC deal shows, Chinese media's technical assistance for the African media has been in terms of media and communication infrastructure development. This is the case in Chinese media engagement with the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings (ZBH) and the National Radio of Equatorial Guinea. The support has included towers, transmitters, antennae and generators. In Malawi, Chinese media supported the fibre-optic communication initiative valued at US\$ 22.94 million and in 2002; China had given FM transmitters to seven provinces in Zambia.⁷⁰⁷

Emeka Umejei⁷⁰⁸ observes that the end of the Cold War in 1989 marked a turning point for the media landscape in Africa. It ushered in the period of donor-funded assistance to the African media industry as Western governments, foundations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) initiated concerted endeavours to accord the African media assistance to permit them to develop in tandem with the Western lines and standards.⁷⁰⁹ In this sense, two categories of donor-funded assistance to African media can be discerned; state-funded and foundation-funded.⁷¹⁰ Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 below show a summary of China's media presence in Africa between 2003 and 2012. (See Appendix VI and VII)

State-funded media assistance relates to the direct assistance by state actors in the provision of assistance to African media while foundation-funded assistance is

⁷⁰⁵ David Shullman, ed., *Chinese Malign Influence and the Corrosion of Democracy: An Assessment of Chinese Interference in Thirteen Key Countries*. (Washington, D.C: International Republican Institute, 2005), p. 36

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid. p. 36

⁷⁰⁷ Banda, *Op. cit.* p.351.

⁷⁰⁸ Umejei, *Op. cit.* p.1

⁷⁰⁹ Mary Myers, *Africa's Media Boom: The Role of International Aid*. (Washington, D.C: the Center for International Media Assistance, 2014), p.2

⁷¹⁰ Umejei, *Op. cit.* p.1

channelled through non-state actors including NGOs, private organizations and civil society organizations.⁷¹¹ There exists a clear mismatch between the West's conception of media assistance and the Chinese conception of media assistance to Africa. Chinese media assistance to Africa involves both direct state-funded assistance as well as the use of Chinese 'NGOs'. Furthermore, China's involvement in Africa's mediascape is pegged on collaboration and exchange geared towards realizing mutual understanding, countering the misrepresentation of China and strengthening diplomatic and ultimately, economic ties. China's efforts are also aimed at counterbalancing mostly Western media's misrepresentation and negative reporting of China.⁷¹²

3.8 Influence of Chinese Media on African's View of China's National Image

Several factors underpin China's state-owned media expansion efforts in Africa. First China intends to address what it considers as the 'misinformation' about China's national image by the Western media in the resource-rich continent. As such, China's efforts in Africa's media sphere are aimed at reframing the Western media's narrative of China.⁷¹³ Second, China is a rising power with vast hard and soft power resources. Hence, it seeks its share of representation to project its soft power among the African public to generate a mutual understanding of China and Africa.

It follows therefore that China's engagement in Africa through the media also needs to be construed through the prism of its pedigree of anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle, and its endeavour at shaping national and international identification. In this regard, it has been vital for China that it is portrayed positively in the media. Foreign public opinion about China is anathema to China for two principal reasons; one, domestically within China, a negative foreign public opinion about China undermines the CPC's narrative that China is peaceful and unthreatening to the rest of the world. Second, there are a lot of implications for China on the international stage should it be conceived as untrustworthy.⁷¹⁴

⁷¹¹ Ibid. p.1

⁷¹² Umejei, *Op. cit.* p.2

⁷¹³ Umejei, *Op. cit.* p.2

⁷¹⁴ Varrall, *Op. cit.* p.2

Through these media channels and engagements, Chinese media attempts to advance specific perceptions concerning China through highly intricate initiatives. These journalistic initiatives need to be conceptualized as China's attempt to leverage its image among the African public. The Chinese media offensive in Africa has aimed to provide an alternative to the "Western" news agenda in the portrayal of China's image.⁷¹⁵ China's engagement in Africa has attracted both favourable and unfavourable images as it is mostly perceived in stark binary; either a predatory and exploitative force or a compassionate development partner.⁷¹⁶ The fundamental question that arises against the backdrop of China's media offensive in sub-Saharan Africa aimed at shaping the African public's perception of China relates to whether such efforts have been successful.

Has Chinese media engagement in Africa positively contributed to the perception of China by the referent objects, which are African audiences? The answer is convoluted because the influence of Chinese media has not occurred in a vacuum separate from other instruments such as education exchange, and cultural diplomacy. What is apparent is that the media has significantly contributed to the perception of China among African audiences.

Human beings are greatly shaped through perceptions propagated and developed through the media.⁷¹⁷ While China has laboured to win the hearts and minds of Africans through the media offensive, whether the messages sent are equally acknowledged and accepted by the audiences is another matter altogether.⁷¹⁸ Despite growing unease with China's "go global" strategy in other areas of the world, China enjoys a relatively positive image in Africa.

Scholarships in China-Africa media relations have mostly centred on the political economy of China's media in Africa rather than audience studies.⁷¹⁹ Hitherto,

⁷¹⁵ Custer *et al.*, *Op cit.* p.8.

⁷¹⁶ Goretti Nassanga and Sabiti Makara, "Perception of Chinese Presence in Africa as Reflected in the African Media: Case Study of Uganda." (Beijing, CHN: CHR. Michelsen Institute, 2014), p.8.

⁷¹⁷ Nassanga and Makara *Op cit.* pp.5-6.

⁷¹⁸ Yanqiu Zhang and Jane Muthoni Mwangi, "A Perception Study on China's Media Engagement in Kenya: From Media Presence to Power Influence? *Chinese Journal of Communication*, Volume 9, Number 1 (2016), p. 71.

⁷¹⁹ Wasserman *Op cit.*

scholarship on Chinese media mostly centres on system-level and content-related analyses with the impact of Chinese media engagement often being either speculated or assumed.⁷²⁰ Most previous studies have centred on how Chinese media has influenced the norms and practices of African journalism.

Nevertheless, several studies have examined the influence of Chinese media on Africans' perception of China. For example, a 2011 poll by the GlobeScan/PIPA that sampled some 28,619 individuals in 27 African countries, it was found that Africans had a generally positive image of China with the highest positive views being recorded in Kenya at 77 per cent and Nigeria at 82 per cent.⁷²¹

The extent to which this perception is attributable to Chinese media activities in the continent is however uncertain. Fei Jiang *et al.*⁷²² find that the Chinese media have fostered particular perceptions about China through intricate journalistic initiatives. CCTV Africa and China's print media - China Daily Africa have contributed to the understanding of China among African audiences.⁷²³ In Angola and South Africa, public perception of China is significantly influenced by upward perceptions; that is, Africans' experiences with Chinese firms, businesses and Chinese media.⁷²⁴

African scholars, conceive Chinese media as players in balancing of international news flow about China to African countries.⁷²⁵ Wasserman and Madrid-Morales⁷²⁶ conducted a study among university students in Kenya and South Africa. The results of the study showed that African students have little use of Chinese media, and a significant number neither access it or interested in Chinese media.⁷²⁷ The implication of this is that the influence of Chinese media messages on African audiences is limited and by extension the chances of China's soft power to shape African imagery China is

⁷²⁰ Wasserman and Madrid-Morales *Op cit.* p.2213.

⁷²¹ Nassanga and Makara *Op cit.* p.10.

⁷²² Jiang *Op cit.* p.4

⁷²³ Gornfinkel *et al.*, *Op cit.* p. 84.

⁷²⁴ *Ibid.* p.3.

⁷²⁵ Yanqiu *Op cit.* p.6.

⁷²⁶ Wasserman *Op cit.*

⁷²⁷ *Ibid.*

limited. The disinterest in Chinese media is founded on deep-seated prejudices against Chinese media.⁷²⁸

Furthermore, the influence of Chinese media on the African's perception of China can also be perceived from the standpoint of Chinese media portrayal of Africa in its coverage. This draws from the overriding policy of non-interference according to which Chinese media focus on Africa's success stories, especially those involving China. In this sense, the influence of Chinese media on Africans is observable in the extent to which it has provided positive news about Africa to create a sense of understanding and shared experience with African countries.⁷²⁹

A comparative study by Marsh⁷³⁰ that examined China's CCTV and BBC World News TV on the presentation of African news, established that the former reflected a more positive picture of Africa to global audiences as compared to the latter. CCTV also broadcasted a positive image to African audiences and the implication of this was that Africans adopted a more positive view of not only CCTV but also of China. Such audiences were tired of the negative stereotypical imagery of Africa as riddled with poverty, destruction, death and disease.⁷³¹

Nonetheless, despite its influence on African's understanding and perception of China, the discourse on Chinese media offensive in Africa is silent on Africa's and Africans' role in China-Africa relations so much so that it is hard to quantify to what extent Chinese media has shaped African's perception of China.⁷³² Owing to the prevalent restrictive nature of Chinese media, the influence of Chinese media on African audiences' perception of China is limited. Studies such as those by Herman Wasserman and Dani Madrid-Morales⁷³³ have established that Chinese media have little positive impact on African information habits and that attitudes towards China remain predominantly negative.

⁷²⁸ Ibid.

⁷²⁹ Nassanga and Makara *Op cit.* p.10.

⁷³⁰ Marsh *Op cit.* 56–70.

⁷³¹ Wasserman *Op cit.*

⁷³² Wasserman and Madrid-Morales *Op cit.* p.2212.

⁷³³ Ibid. p.2212.

There is a persistent perception that China forms part of the neo-colonial powers in Africa. China's engagement in Africa continues to be seen through the prism of colonialism, one described as "the new scramble for Africa" aimed at accessing and controlling Africa's resources.⁷³⁴ China's billions worth of aid in Africa is framed as PRC's charm offensive and China is accused of cynical development aid to the continent aimed at 'buying' favours from Africa's despotic leaders and nothing more.⁷³⁵

There is a perception among African journalists working for or affiliated with the Chinese media that there still exists great inequality between Chinese and African editors in Chinese media in the continent.⁷³⁶ This reality has permitted the perception that Chinese media have a covert propaganda agenda in Africa, rather than an actual commitment to 'tell the story' of China to African audiences.

This inequality stems from the belief by Chinese management in the Chinese media and Foreign Service that if African editors are accorded more space in content development and editorial independence, they may approve stories that have adverse effects on China's image among African audiences and ultimately PRC's interests in Africa.⁷³⁷ For this reason, as Wassermann⁷³⁸ has established, African journalists express a significant level of mistrust of Chinese media mostly due to the Chinese state's overarching influence on the media.

3.9 Chinese Media in Kenya

China's media policy of 'going global' is an integral part of China's soft power projection around the world. In line with this policy, China has expanded its global communication footprint to various regions of the world to enhance the PRC's image and convey its 'story' to the rest of the world.⁷³⁹ Within the African continent, Kenya has been a major target for China's international media intended to enhance China's

⁷³⁴ Alfred Charles, "The New Scramble for Africa's Resources: Implications for Its Development." *Africanus*, Volume 44, Number 2 (2014), pp.1 – 14.

⁷³⁵ Nassanga and Makara *Op cit.* p.9.

⁷³⁶ Umejei *Op cit.* p.10.

⁷³⁷ *Ibid.* p.10

⁷³⁸ Wasserman *Op cit.*

⁷³⁹ Zhang and Mwangi *Op cit.* p. 71.

national image among the Kenyan public and ultimately enhance ties with Kenya as part of its greater China-Africa relations objectives.

Kenya has established itself as a popular international media hub, its heritage of vibrant communication industry and leadership in digital technological innovations has set it apart in sub-Saharan Africa. Kenya's media industry has been growing at about 16.3 per cent annually since 2013. These features have made Kenya a target for countries and international media networks that seek to establish a foothold in Africa's media-landscape.⁷⁴⁰ A 2013 study by Price Waterhouse Coopers suggested that Kenya's media industry would be worth US\$3 billion by the end of 2017.⁷⁴¹ China has facilitated the growth of the Kenyan media industry through investments for the improvement of media bureaus and ICT infrastructure throughout Kenya estimated at US\$150 million.⁷⁴²

Chinese media's operations date back to the 1950s when much of Africa was still under colonial rule. *Xinhua* News Agency had started operations in Egypt in 1958.⁷⁴³ In 1967, Radio Peking commenced operations in East Africa.⁷⁴⁴ Nevertheless, perhaps owing to the rapid development of its media industry as has been noted, Kenya attracted China and Chinese media's attention as a potential effective hub for its media diplomacy in Africa. In 2004, *Xinhua* News Agency established its regional headquarters in Nairobi.

In February 2006, CRI established its first overseas FM radio station in sub-Saharan Africa in Nairobi, Kenya. In 2012, China's largest national English newspaper, *China Daily* established a presence in Africa, when it opened its African regional office in Nairobi.⁷⁴⁵ In 2009, CRI established partnerships with local radio stations and added in addition to English and Kiswahili six new languages in its Kenya broadcasts.⁷⁴⁶ It

⁷⁴⁰ PwC, "South African Entertainment and Media Outlook (2013-2017): In-depth Analysis of the Trends Shaping the Entertainment Industry in South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya," 2013, <<https://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/entertainment-and-media-outlook-2013-2017.pdf>.>

⁷⁴¹ PwC, "South African Entertainment and Media Outlook (2013-2017): In-depth Analysis of the Trends Shaping the Entertainment Industry in South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya,"

⁷⁴² Melissa Lefkowitz, "Chinese Media, Kenyan Live: An Ethnographic Inquiry into CCTV Africa's Head Office." Working Paper Series (Washington, D.C.: China-Africa Research Initiative, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2017), p. 5

⁷⁴³ Leslie *Op cit.*, p.162.

⁷⁴⁴ Banda, *Op. cit.* p.345.

⁷⁴⁵ *Ibid.* p.72

⁷⁴⁶ Zhang and Mwangi *Op cit.* p. 72.

established a cooperation agreement with the KBC which permitted it to broadcast over VHF in Kenya thereby reaching relatively more public audiences within the country.⁷⁴⁷ Similarly, in 2010, *Xinhua* station launched the CNC world and then in 2011 it completed a partnership agreement with Kenya's leading mobile operator, Safaricom to create Africa's first mobile newspaper.⁷⁴⁸

China launched the Kenyan version of CCTV Africa in 2012, with a focus on broadcasting local, regional and international news. Kenya has therefore formed a crucial hub for CCTV to leverage the perception of African audiences in China's renewed efforts to foster positive perceptions of itself and to share "China's news" on global issues with the rest of the world.⁷⁴⁹ By intensifying their operation in Kenya, it can be argued that the Chinese media firms sought to provide a novel perspective on China and international news, through the production of programming for CCTV-Africa's one-hour daily bulleting.⁷⁵⁰

In Kenya, the media house brings together as its employees, about 100 journalists from Africa but with the majority being Kenyan citizens.⁷⁵¹ Again, in 2012, China's largest national English newspaper, *China Daily* established a presence in Africa, when it opened its African regional office in Nairobi. *China Daily* was to be the continent's key source of information, news content and analysis on matters touching on Sino-Africa relations.⁷⁵² The launch of CCTV, CRI and the *China Daily Africa Weekly* are vital milestones in China's aim to establish a formidable media footprint in Kenya.

CCTV Africa programming can be accessed in Kenya on the "CCTV News" Channel via the Digital Satellite Television Services (DStv). DStv is operated by MultiChoice, which is itself a joint venture between the South African MultiChoice Africa Limited and the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KCB). CCTV can also be accessed in Kenya

⁷⁴⁷ Grassi *Op cit.* p.4

⁷⁴⁸ Zhang and Mwangi *Op cit.* p. 72.

⁷⁴⁹ Gornfinkel *et al.*, *Op cit.* p. 81.

⁷⁵⁰ Jiang *et al.*, *Op cit.* p.4.

⁷⁵¹ Zhang and Mwangi *Op cit.* p. 72.

⁷⁵² *Ibid.* p.72

through the Chinese digital pay TV operator, StarTimes and through Zuku Kenya owned by the South African-based Wananchi Group.⁷⁵³

CRI's programming schedule includes 19 hours of programming delivered in English, Chinese and Kiswahili and the content covered relates to "China's economic, social and cultural development".⁷⁵⁴ From its headquarters in Kenya, *Xinhua* distributes about 2200 pictures, 2000 pieces of news in French, 1800 in English, and 150 pieces of video clips, which is more than clips by Reuters, *Agence France Presse* (AFP) and the Associated Press (AP) in terms of monthly quantity news releases.⁷⁵⁵

China has also focused on other aspects of the media and communication industry in Kenya. For instance, China-owned Huawei Limited has played a crucial role in the broader area of telecommunications and networking services in Kenya linking mobile phones and computers to the internet.⁷⁵⁶ In 2012, the government of Kenya (GoK) awarded Huawei a contract worth US\$ 71 million (Ksh. 6 billion) to build national fibre optic infrastructure connecting Nairobi to other major towns of Kenya. The China EXIM Bank financed the fibre optic infrastructure project.⁷⁵⁷ It should be reiterated that the ICT infrastructure is at the base of all media broadcasts and circulation, including for Chinese media operating in Kenya. Kenya is the leader in internet penetration and mobile service connectivity with an approximated 74.2 per cent of Kenyans having access to the internet and 82 per cent having mobile phones.⁷⁵⁸ A 2016 report by the World Bank (WB)⁷⁵⁹ noted that Chinese employers located in Kenya created the greatest number of jobs in Kenya's communication sector, employing some 931 Kenyans. On average, Chinese firms employ more Kenyans (360 locals) compared to foreign firms operating in Kenya (147).⁷⁶⁰ The majority of CCTV Africa employees are Kenyan nationals, which include Kenya's top journalists, editors, camera operators,

⁷⁵³ Lefkowitz, *Op. cit.*, p.6

⁷⁵⁴ Jiang *Op cit.* p.11.

⁷⁵⁵ Li and Ronning, *Op cit.* p.4.

⁷⁵⁶ Lefkowitz, *Op. cit.*, p.6

⁷⁵⁷ Apurva Sangi and Dylan Conte Johnson, "Deal or No Deal: Strictly Business for China in Kenya? Policy Research Working Paper – WPS7614 (Washington D.C: The World Bank, 2016), p. 2

⁷⁵⁸ Lefkowitz, *Op. cit.*, p.6

⁷⁵⁹ Sangi and Johnson, *Op. cit.*,

⁷⁶⁰ Muhammad Sabil Farooq, Youan Tongkai, Zhu Jiangang and Nazia Feroze, "Kenya and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road: Implications for China-Africa Relations." *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, Volume 4, Number 3 (2018), p.409

cinematographers and technical support staff. Based on this information, there is no doubt that China and particularly Chinese media have established a strong presence in Kenya’s mediascape, with offices, facilities and staff.

CRI’s partnership with the local radio station and KBC has permitted it to gain a bigger listenership in Kenya, perhaps more than in any other African country.⁷⁶¹ Similarly, *Xinhua*’s partnership with Safaricom that established the *Xinhua* Mobile Newspaper app allowed access to Safaricom millions of local subscribers giving Kenyans greater access to Chinese news content and African stories from a Chinese perspective. Table 3.5 shows the engagement of the government of China in Kenya’s media-scape.

Table 3.5: Chinese Engagement in Kenya’s Media-Scape 2004-12

Year	Country	Type of Engagement	Activity
2004	Kenya	Technical support	Xinhua’s Africa bureau headquarters in Nairobi
2006	Kenya	Chinese media presence	Launch of CRI in Nairobi
	Kenya	Technical support	Received broadcast equipment from CCTV worth US\$150,00
		Media presence	Xinhua moves its Regional Editorial Office to Nairobi that broadcasts in French to Francophone countries
2009		Content creation	CRI established partnerships with local radio stations and added in addition to English and Kiswahili six new languages in its Kenya broadcasts
2010	Kenya	Media presence	CCTV Africa Bureau opened in Nairobi
	South Africa	Content creation	Xinhua/CNC and Myriad International Holdings (MIH) joint venture to reach about 4 million Africans
2011	Kenya	Official exchange	China-Africa Media Conference held in Nairobi
	Kenya	Media presence	Chinese company (StarTimes) awarded a contract to distribute media content
		Content creation	Xinhua launches Mobile Newspaper in Nairobi in partnership with Safaricom
2012	Kenya	Media presence	CCTV Africa launched – regional centre established
		Technical support	Huawei awarded a contract worth US\$ 71 million (Ksh. 6 billion) to build national fibre optic infrastructure connecting Nairobi to other major towns of Kenya.

Source: Yu-Shan Wu⁷⁶²

The analysis of the findings suggests that China has endeavoured to establish a strong footprint in Kenya’s media space. China’s attempts at image enhancements in Kenya can be construed within Joseph Nye’s view that if a state can shape international rules in line with its values and interests its actions will be seen as legitimate by others.⁷⁶³

⁷⁶¹ Wu, *Op. cit.* pp.13 -14.

⁷⁶² Ibid.13 -14.

⁷⁶³ Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.* p.10.

China's media relations in Kenya can be assessed using two analytical frameworks; media intervention and media exchanges.

With regards to the first analytical framework, media intervention, Chinese intervention in Kenya is rooted in the historical legacy⁷⁶⁴ and the state of Africa's media infrastructure since the end of the Cold War in 1989. Chinese intervention in Kenya's media sector was necessitated by China's own need to put the Chinese story straight and to combat the misinformation about China it deemed was pervasive in Western coverage. The intervention also was in response to the opportunities offered by the relatively untapped power of the media in Kenya.

China's investments aimed at modernizing and professionalizing Kenya's media infrastructure and journalistic capacity are part of China's broader goal for addressing the technical gaps in Kenya's media infrastructure. Yu-Sha Wu⁷⁶⁵ has demonstrated that China has invested heavily in Kenya's media infrastructure and drawing from Apurva Sangi and Dylan Conte Johnson⁷⁶⁶ is observed that the intervention runs into tens of billions in Kenyan shillings.

Chinese media offensive in Africa particularly in Kenya is mainly centred on the second analytical framework, media exchanges.⁷⁶⁷ This approach accentuates equal cooperation between China and Kenya in the media sector. As has been noted, Beijing, through the Chinese state-owned media has facilitated training for Kenyans to leverage their capacity to understand China and its policies and in turn, present a more balanced picture of China.

Within these two frameworks, it is possible to gain an understanding of how China has endeavoured to cultivate a good image of itself within Kenya and particularly among the Kenyan public. China's intervention in Kenya's media space and its engagement in and facilitation of media exchange between Chinese media and Kenyan media and

⁷⁶⁴ Ran Jijun, "Evolving Media Interactions between China and Africa." In Zhang X., Wasserman H., Mano W. (Eds.), *China Media and Soft Power in Africa*. (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), p. 47.

⁷⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 47

⁷⁶⁶ Apurva Sangi and Dylan Conte Johnson, "Deal or No Deal: Strictly Business for China in Kenya? Policy Research Working Paper – WPS7614 (Washington D.C: The World Bank, 2016), p. 2

⁷⁶⁷ Wu, *Op. cit.* pp.13 -14.

journalists must be seen as a front for China to ensure conducive grounds exist for it to project its soft power and change attitudes among Kenyan audiences of its media diplomacy.

3.10 Chapter Summary

This chapter examined the role of the media in China's public diplomacy. Specifically, it investigated and examined the influence of Chinese media on the Kenyan public's perception of China. The findings reveal that China has invested heavily in promoting its soft power through the media. Chinese media, which is largely state-owned, has proved to be an important tool for the projection of China's soft power around the world owing to its near-ubiquitous presence in the international mediascape. Nonetheless, the influence of Chinese media on international audiences' perception of China is very limited. In Kenya, the Chinese media is still largely considered as a propaganda mouthpiece for the CPC. The next chapter, Chapter Four, examines the influence of China's cultural centres on Kenyan's perception of China's national image.

CHAPTER FOUR: ROLE OF CHINESE CULTURAL INSTITUTES AND CENTRES ON THE IMAGE OF CHINA IN KENYA

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined the role of the Chinese media in shaping the Kenyan public's perception of China's national image. It examined the diverse spectrum of Chinese media cooperation, activities and operations in Kenya over the last decades. Chapter three found that while the Chinese media had launched a concerted effort in Kenya's media scape to project China's soft power and China image more positively, Kenyans remain largely indifferent about China and their perception of the Chinese media and consequently Kenyan's perception of China's national image has not changed significantly in tandem with those media efforts.

This chapter centres on examining the role of Chinese cultural institutes and centres on the image of China in Kenya. It seeks to answer the question, what effect, if any, have Chinese Cultural Institutes and Centers had on the image of China in Kenya? Firstly, this chapter commences by examining the etymology of culture as a referent object in diplomacy. Secondly, it examines the role of cultural centers in public diplomacy to underpin why these centres are crucial assets in public diplomacy.

Thirdly, it examines Chinese cultural diplomacy around the world by focusing on Chinese cultural centres and the Confucius Institutes (CI). The influence of these institutes and the CI on public perception around the world is then examined. Fourthly, it examines Chinese diplomacy in Africa followed by an evaluation of the influence on African's perception of China's national image. The fifth part proceeds to examine China's cultural diplomacy in Kenya focusing on Chinese cultural centres and CI in Kenya. Part six of this chapter explores the nexus between China's cultural diplomacy in Africa and Africa's perception of China. Part seven then examines China's cultural diplomacy in Kenya. This is then followed with a summary of the chapter, which outlines the major findings made about the influence of public diplomacy on national image.

4.2 The Evolution of Culture as a Tool for Public Diplomacy

Sofia Kitsou⁷⁶⁸ has argued that culture is an essential component of diplomacy as it is both a “function and a source of identity”. According to Thierry G. Verhelst, culture is intrinsic to all aspects of social life, including customs and value systems, technology, language, technological know-how, socio-political behaviours, and other tangible and intangible aspects of human social life.⁷⁶⁹ Etymologically, both French and English apply the word ‘culture’ deriving it from the Greek word ‘*culture*’. The Greek word ‘culture’ translates to cultivate and grow, and as such, loosely refers to nurture and cultivation. According to Geert Hofstede⁷⁷⁰, who is one of the most outstanding and prolific experts on the topic, culture is the ‘software of the mind’, which underpins how humans think and behave, and it is a tool for problem-solving.

The founder of cultural anthropology Sir Edward Burnett Tylor⁷⁷¹ explained culture as that which incorporates belief, knowledge, law, art, custom, morals and other capabilities that man has acquired as a member of the human society. Bound and Briggs⁷⁷² opine that culture emanates from broader connective human values. Guy Faure and Jeffrey Z. Rubin⁷⁷³ view culture as a set of lasting meanings and shared beliefs, values, and traditions that underpin ethnic groups and orient their behaviours. It is established that culture is a relatively complex concept that has no single definition unanimously accepted in the literature on culture.⁷⁷⁴ Three general groupings exist in the definition of culture: the accounts of human beings, the perfection of art and people’s way of living.⁷⁷⁵

⁷⁶⁸ Sofia Kitsou, “The Power of Culture in Diplomacy: The Case of U.S Cultural Diplomacy in France and Germany”, *Exchange, the Journal of Public Diplomacy*, Volume 2, Issue 1, Article 3, (2013), p.22

⁷⁶⁹ Thierry G. Verhelst, *Life Without Roots*. (London: Zed Books, 1990), p. 17.

⁷⁷⁰ Geert Hofstede, Dimensionalizing Cultures: The Hofstede Model in Context. *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture*, Vol. 2, No. 1. pp. 3 – 26.

⁷⁷¹ Sir Edward Burnett Tylor, p.1

⁷⁷² Kristen Bound, Rachel Briggs, John Holden and Samuel Jones, *Cultural Diplomacy*. (London, UK: Demos, 2007), p.13

⁷⁷³ Fauré, Guy Olivier and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.) *Culture and Negotiation*. (London: SAGE Publications, 1993), p.3

⁷⁷⁴ Haifang Liu, “China-Africa Relations through the Prism of Culture – The Dynamics of China’s Cultural Diplomacy with Africa.” *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, Volume 3, Number 1 (2008), p.11

⁷⁷⁵ Williams, *Op. cit.* p.41

Nonetheless, a conceptualization of culture for this study can be borrowed from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). According to the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity,⁷⁷⁶ culture is a broader concept, which entails a conglomeration of unique material, spiritual, emotional and intellectual features of a social group or society that encompass in addition to literature, lifestyles, art, ways of living together, traditions, value systems and beliefs.

The application of culture as an analytical tool for public diplomacy is inherently problematic. This is principally because the conceptualization of culture is not subjective by its very nature but, culture is also a multifaceted concept that embraces a wide range of different topics, processes and even paradoxes, which makes it relevant only in an intuitive and vague manner.⁷⁷⁷ For this matter, the conceptualization of culture as conveyed by Geert Hofstede⁷⁷⁸, UNESCO⁷⁷⁹, Guy Faure and Jeffrey Z. Rubin⁷⁸⁰ is applied cautiously in this study with the understanding that not only is culture dynamic but its understanding is largely subjective and contextual.

Therefore, in this study, culture is not used in its narrow understanding that refers to the performance of art with education and entertainment functions. Instead, culture is accepted as a system of shared beliefs and value systems, combined with an array of self-justified presumptions represented by a spectrum of discourses. Raymond Williams, established today's most classic definition of culture in his groundbreaking work '*Keywords*' published in 1976.⁷⁸¹ Three aspects were central to Williams' conceptualization of culture; civilization (a process of spiritual, intellectual, and

⁷⁷⁶ See UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. 2001. Adopted in Paris, 2 November 2001

⁷⁷⁷ Liang Xu, "The Effectiveness of Cultural Diplomacy in State Trust Building Between China and the UK." [PhD. Thesis]. Lancaster University, 2017, p.17

⁷⁷⁸ Geert Hofstede, Dimensionalizing Cultures: The Hofstede Model in Context. *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture*, Vol. 2, No. 1. pp. 3 – 26.

⁷⁷⁹ See UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. 2001. Adopted in Paris, 2 November 2001

⁷⁸⁰ Fauré, Guy Olivier and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.) *Culture and Negotiation*. (London: SAGE Publications, 1993), p.3

⁷⁸¹ Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. (Kent, UK: Croom Helm, 1976), pp.87 - 93

aesthetic development), way of life (of humanity, a people or a group, in a given period) and symbolic or signifying system.

Within the literature on diplomacy, and as argues Haig,⁷⁸² culture transcends its ‘visible’ components such as literature, art, food and other such aspects. Culture is “the signifying system” by which a society’s social order is communicated, experienced, reproduced and explored.⁷⁸³ As such, culture is one of the leading dynamic forces and antecedents in power struggle.⁷⁸⁴ Culture has a crucial role to play in the conduct of international relations.⁷⁸⁵ Since ancient times, rulers have used culture to convey who they were, to assert their power, and to establish lasting relationships among them.⁷⁸⁶ Culture has the unique ability to reach a large number of people, which makes it public diplomacy’s ideal medium.⁷⁸⁷

For instance, when the Ancient Greek poet, Homer described Odysseus as a man who travelled far and encountered many cities and people and managed to know their minds, he in essence was enunciating the rudimentary theme of international cultural relations.⁷⁸⁸ Travel stories tend to appeal to human being’s curiosity, nonetheless, the government’s exploitation of the public’s curiosity for political advantage is rather novel and is, according to Antony Haig⁷⁸⁹, a recent development. The reciprocal exchange of products and gifts of art between Doge of Venice and Kublai Khan was a manifestation of the significance of culture in relations among nation-states.

The use of culture by diplomats is extensive and grounded in human history. A casual look at an assortment of seventeenth and eighteenth-century clocks and watches in Beijing’s Palace Museum underscores the importance and probably, the impact possible through cultural exchanges. According to Bound *et al.*,⁷⁹⁰ these are esteemed British

⁷⁸² Haigh, *Op. cit.* p.99

⁷⁸³ Williams, *Op. cit.* p.13

⁷⁸⁴ *Ibid.* p.13

⁷⁸⁵ Bound *et al.*, *Op. cit.* p.11

⁷⁸⁶ *Ibid.* p.11

⁷⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p.28

⁷⁸⁸ Antony Haigh, *Cultural Diplomacy in Europe.* (New York, NY: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1974), p.27.

⁷⁸⁹ *Ibid.* p.29

⁷⁹⁰ Bound and Briggs, *Op. cit.*, p.21

watches and clocks given to China by envoys and visiting emissaries. It is among the leading foreign collections of China and attracts cultural professionals from around the world. Culture provides the means through which human beings get to understand other human beings.

According to Erik Pajtinka,⁷⁹¹ not only had the Byzantine missionaries spread Christianity, but they had also spread their worldview, Byzantine value system, customs and beliefs simultaneously with the religious doctrine.⁷⁹² As such, these missionaries tried to buttress the international influence of the Byzantine Empire. In recent years, at least since the interwar period up to date, culture has become a key asset for international statecraft for most countries. According to Ang, Isar and Mar,⁷⁹³ culture has been explicitly recognized as a “pillar of diplomacy”. The foundational beginnings of culture as an asset for diplomacy are associated with states’ idea of implementing cultural content in the interest of advancing or promoting their foreign policy goals.⁷⁹⁴

Etymologically, culture’s impingement in diplomacy was already present in the activities of the missionaries of the medieval Byzantine Empire (circa 330 A.D). The impingement of culture in human relations is as old as humanity itself. Nonetheless, regardless of its ubiquity in relations between nations and states, the importance of culture only began to be appreciated in the 19th century when countries began to institutionalize it within their international statecraft.

Despite the ancient rooting of cultural exchanges, such culture was not institutionalized within the practice of diplomacy. For this reason, the modern origins of cultural intrusion into diplomacy can be attributed to the end of the 19th century, when states

⁷⁹¹ Erik Pajtinka, Cultural Diplomacy in the Theory and Practice of Contemporary International Relations. *Politické vedy*. Volume 17, Number 4, (2014), p.96

⁷⁹²Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*. (New York: Routledge, 1995), p.17

⁷⁹³ Ien Ang, Yudhishtir Raj Isar and Philip Mar, “Cultural Diplomacy: Beyond the National Interest.” *International Journal of Cultural Diplomacy*, Volume 21, Number 4, (2015), p.374.

⁷⁹⁴ Tim Rivera, “Distinguishing Cultural Relations from Cultural Diplomacy. CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy.” Figueroa. January 23, 2017 <
[https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u33041/Distinguishin%20Cultural%20Relations%20From%20Cultural%20Diplomacy%20-%20Full%20Version%20\(1\).pdf](https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u33041/Distinguishin%20Cultural%20Relations%20From%20Cultural%20Diplomacy%20-%20Full%20Version%20(1).pdf)>

began to establish the first dedicated cultural-diplomatic institutions.⁷⁹⁵ In this regard, France is credited for heavily contributing to the evolution of culture as an asset within diplomacy.

In 1883, the French diplomat P. Cambon, founded the *Alliance France*, in Paris and launched its first official branch in Barcelona, Spain called *Comite Local*.⁷⁹⁶ The institutionalization of culture within the conduct of public diplomacy is what has been conceptualized as cultural diplomacy. Within diplomacy and particularly public diplomacy literature, ‘Cultural diplomacy’ first appeared in the middle of the 20th century, when F. Barghorn, an American Researcher conceptualized this spectacle as the manipulation of a country’s cultural materials and personnel to realize the goals of propaganda.⁷⁹⁷

Other definitions of cultural diplomacy have framed it as an integral part of soft power policy that is grounded in the exchange of cultural materials or components including but not limited to language, art (including performing arts), music, traditions and information.⁷⁹⁸ Soft power in foreign policy, according to Kurt-Jugen Maa⁷⁹⁹ a professor at Germany’s University of Tubingen, is the deployment of cultural dialogues, operations and endeavours to persuade others. Within these latter understandings, scholars have framed the concept of cultural soft power.

However, the concept of cultural power is taken as given and is not directly analyzed in much of the literature on cultural diplomacy. Cultural soft power embraces the concept of soft power developed by Joseph Nye⁸⁰⁰. He argued that soft power resided in the attractiveness of a country’s political ideas, policies and culture. According to

⁷⁹⁵ Pajtinka, *Op. cit.* p.97

⁷⁹⁶ *Ibid.* p.97

⁷⁹⁷ F. Barghorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive. The role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960).

⁷⁹⁸ Emil Gochaevich Adleiba and Vasil Timerjanovich Sakaev, “Cultural Diplomacy of France: Essence, Main Directions and Tools,” *Journal of Educational and Social Research*, Volume 9, Number 4, (2019), p.200

⁷⁹⁹ Kurt-Jugen Maa, *Foreign Cultural Diplomacy: The Third Pillar of Diplomacy.* Translated: Jonathan Uhlaner, Mar 2016. Accessed: 1 June 2021 < <https://www.goethe.de/en/m/kul/ges/20723017.html>>

⁸⁰⁰ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.* (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2004).

Nye⁸⁰¹, of the three principal sources of soft power, culture was especially important as it can have a great appeal to foreign publics. It is from this synthesis that the concept of cultural soft power emerged to denote the significance of culture to a state's international relations and to capture the relevance of culture in a state's international competitiveness and strength.

More specifically, as argues Liang Xu⁸⁰², cultural soft power implies a state's attractiveness and influence grounded in its culture, and which is a result of ideology, ideological norms, policies, political and cultural values. It is also the power or ability to deliver cultural values to foreign audiences and thereby appeal to those audiences.

Cultural soft power imagines two aspects; cultural attraction and cultural influence. According to Liu Zhang⁸⁰³ cultural attraction refers to the internal cohesiveness and the external appeal of a country's culture. In this sense, cultural attraction relates to the ability of the culture projected by a country to generate a positive impression of that country among foreign beholders and to deepen the foreign audience's understanding of that culture. Cultural influence on the other hand implies the state's power to use culture to alter the behaviours of foreign audiences. The influence effect emanates from a state's cultural values and spiritual products.⁸⁰⁴

In reality, there is no consensus on what cultural diplomacy really entails, nevertheless, as understood within this study, cultural diplomacy relates to the manipulation and use of a country's cultural assets including sport, arts and performing arts, language, music, cuisine, science, popular culture and information to shape foreign audiences' perception of the national image. Cultural diplomacy is essentially the deployment of the culture of a state to support the goals of its public diplomacy or foreign policy.

A systematic process to develop cultural institutions to form what is today termed cultural diplomacy is traceable to the post-Franco-Prussian war of 19 July 1870 to 10

⁸⁰¹ Ibid. p.22

⁸⁰² Xu, *Op. cit.*, p.33

⁸⁰³ Liu Zhang, 'The Function of Cultural Diplomacy', in *The Influence of China and Europe's Cultural Diplomacy*. First Edit. (Beijing, CHN: Intellectual Property Press), p.12

⁸⁰⁴ K. Zhao 'Foreign Cultural Relations and Cultural Diplomacy', In Liu Zhang. (ed.) *Chinese Culture and Diplomacy*. First Edit. (Beijing, CHN: Intellectual Property Press, 2013), p.13

May 1871.⁸⁰⁵ France, the loser, sought to transform the role of culture within the context of its craft of diplomacy with the realization that ‘hard’ power particularly was neither effective nor feasible for obtaining its national interest. This was in line with even earlier advice by the former French Foreign Minister, Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Pergord to his ambassadors in the early 19th century.

It was perhaps de Talleyrand-Pergord’s urging, which formed the foundation of France’s aggressive cultural diplomacy. He had sent French ambassadors abroad saying "*Faites aimer la France*" - ensure that France is loved.⁸⁰⁶ In 1883, the French created the world’s first cultural institute, the *Alliance France* aimed at the international protection of the French culture.⁸⁰⁷ The *Alliance France* immediately embarked on a quest to spread the French language and culture abroad through language courses and the popularization of French literature all over the world.⁸⁰⁸ The result of these endeavours was the establishment of an ‘empire’ of French-speaking countries, *Francophonie* by 1970.

Nonetheless, the British and the American cultural expansion curtailed France’s pioneering of the institutionalization of cultural diplomacy during the Cold War. English superseded French, which had been the key language for diplomatic communication. Particularly, the ideological war between the US and the Soviet Union fast-tracked the US’s cultural diplomacy’s ouster of French cultural diplomacy as the archetype for the integration of culture in the practice of international statecraft.⁸⁰⁹

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid. p.200

⁸⁰⁶ Maa, *Foreign Cultural Diplomacy: The Third Pillar of Diplomacy*. Translated: Jonathan Uhlener, Mar 2016. Accessed: 1 June 2021 < <https://www.goethe.de/en/m/kul/ges/20723017.html> >

⁸⁰⁷ Charlotte Faucher and Philippe Lane. “French Cultural Diplomacy in Early Twentieth-Century London.” In Debra Kelly; Martyn Cornick. *A History of the French in London. Liberty, Equality, Opportunity*. (London, UK: Institute of Historical Research, 2014), pp. 281-83,

⁸⁰⁸ Adleiba and Sakaev, *Op. cit.* p.200

⁸⁰⁹ Ibid. p.201

4.3 The Practice of Cultural Diplomacy Around the World

Culture has today become a central focus point so much so that the concept of soft power conceptualized by Joseph Nye today corresponds to cultural power.⁸¹⁰ Perhaps owing to the pervasiveness of culture in public diplomacy, it is currently conceivable to talk of cultural diplomacy. All over the world, countries and governments seek to harness their soft power overseas by using their culture to influence perceptions abroad. The process of institutionalizing culture by governments in their international statecraft is not only novel a concept, but also a non-static one.

An assessment of what other countries, especially the powerful countries are doing in the area of public diplomacy is crucial to contextualize the space in which Chinese cultural diplomacy must exist. Within realism, it is held that powerful states define the international system, such, and in line with this logic, an assessment of their use of culture in their soft power projection is not only deliberative but also provides a window for understanding the working of culture diplomacy in the world. More importantly, the focus on the powerful states particularly the Western states here is intentional and strategic as it is to them that China's public diplomacy seeks to respond. Therefore, examining how China's competitors have deployed culture as a tool to leverage their soft power permits the framing of China's cultural relations within an international context.

The United States (US) in response to German propaganda had created the *Division of Cultural Relations* in 1938 under the Department of States.⁸¹¹ The creation of this specialized section was under the directive of President Franklin D. Roosevelt who sought to promote and coordinate the US's cultural relations with states in Latin America to offset growing fascist ideology in that region.⁸¹² Since 1940, the *Office of*

⁸¹⁰ Danielly Silva Ramos Becard and Paulo Menechelli Filho, "Chinese Cultural Diplomacy: Instruments in China's Strategy for International Insertion in the 21st Century." *Rev. Bras. Polit. Int.*, Volume 62, Number 1, (2019), p.1

⁸¹¹ Pajtinka, *Op. cit.* p.97

⁸¹² Uwe Lubken, "Americans All": The United States, the Nazi Menace and the Construction of Pan-American Identity." *Amerikastudien/American Studies*, Volume 48, Number 3, (2003), p.391.

Inter-American Affairs (OIA) established by Dwight Eisenhower has supplemented the functions of *the Division of Cultural Relations*.

The OIA's principal aim was to promote American culture in South America.⁸¹³ The Cold War presented another turning point in the trajectory of cultural diplomacy. It was at this time that culture acquired special relevance as a key instrument for the ideological struggle between the US-led capitalist faction and the Soviet-led communist faction. During the Cold War, culture emerged as an integral component between the two power factions.⁸¹⁴ It was at this time that the US expanded and modernized its cultural diplomacy activities around the world, with the principal goal of spreading democracy and freedom as the rudimentary elements of the American cultural identity. In line with this endeavour, the US established the *United States Information Agency* (USIA), to coordinate the bulk of its cultural-diplomatic activities around the world.⁸¹⁵

Nevertheless, the US's preoccupation with cultural diplomacy, as had happened during the Cold War seemed to have subsided with the end of the East-West ideological tensions in 1989. According to Pajtinka⁸¹⁶, the US reduced its cultural-diplomatic activities owing to the lack of a strong ideological opponent. That said; the terrorists' attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 seemed to have provided some significance to the issue of cultural diplomacy. The attacks, and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq have underscored the need for the US to consider the importance of explaining its cultural values to the rest of the world especially those in the Middle East.

The international statecraft of the US demonstrates that countries embrace its culture, and its pursuit and practice of cultural diplomacy. Perhaps owing to US cultural diplomacy, in recent years, how audiences abroad perceive the US has deteriorated and this has forced the US to make concerted efforts in its cultural diplomacy to enhance

⁸¹³ Tony Shaw, "The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy." *Cold War History*, Volume 10, Number 2 (2010), p.276.

⁸¹⁴ Pajtinka, *Op. cit.* p.97

⁸¹⁵ Nicholas J, Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy 1945 – 1989*. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp.i - vi

⁸¹⁶ Pajtinka, *Op. cit.* p.98

how its image is perceived. Natalia Grincheva⁸¹⁷ finds that in Japan, Argentina, Germany, and Indonesia, US positive perception stands at 11 per cent, 18 per cent, 30 per cent and 32 per cent respectively. In the UK, perhaps the US's strongest ally, the favourable view of the US stands at just 51 per cent.⁸¹⁸ The practice of cultural diplomacy to shape international perception of the US image is not new.

In 1936, the US, in response to Nazi Germany's cultural offensive in the US's backyard (Latin America), established the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations.⁸¹⁹ The exchange of people between the US and Latin American countries would strengthen cultural ties. This was followed by the US Department of State sponsorship of the Inter-American Cultural Cooperation meeting in May 1993.⁸²⁰ During the Second World War, in collaboration with Nelson Rockefeller, the US Department of State developed and promoted closer cultural ties with Brazil, Mexico and Argentina.

In 1961, the President of the US signed into law the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act or the Fulbright-Hays Act.⁸²¹ The Act reiterated the cultural and exchange activities of the previous acts including the Fulbright Act of 1946 and the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948.⁸²² The Fulbright-Hays Act provided the legal framework for the cultural exchange of performing artists, athletes, students and teachers between the US and other countries.⁸²³ Under the Act, the Office of Educational Exchange and the Office of International Information, which had been established by the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, became crucial for enhancing US cultural diplomacy.

During the Cold War, the US particularly explored the opportunities offered by cultural diplomacy to leverage its soft power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It established several

⁸¹⁷ Natalia Grincheva, "U.S Arts and Cultural Diplomacy: Post-Cold War Decline and the Twenty-First Century Debate," *The Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society*, Volume 40, (2010), p.169

⁸¹⁸ Ibid. p.169

⁸¹⁹ Kevin V. Mulcahy, "Cultural Diplomacy and the Exchange Programs: 1938-1978," *The Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society*, Volume 29, Number 1, (1999), p. 11.

⁸²⁰ Ibid. p.11

⁸²¹ John T. Edsall, "The Fulbright-Hays Act," *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Volume 15, Number 8 (1962), p.6

⁸²² Ibid. p.7.

⁸²³ Ibid. p.7

institutional frameworks for the execution of cultural diplomacy. President Jimmy Carter's Administration founded the US Information Agency (USIA) and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (BECA) under the Department of State.

During the Presidency of Ronald Regan, the United States International Communication Agency was formed. These institutions provided the framework for the US to respond to the cultural offensive of the Soviet Union in various regions of the world.⁸²⁴ The Voice of America (VOA), the American Library Association (ALA), the United States Information Service (USIS) and the Smithsonian Modern Museum of Art became important drivers of American cultural diplomacy around the world.

Similarly, Britain has had an extensive practice of cultural diplomacy. For instance, in the United Kingdom (UK) Sir R. Leeper founded the *British Council* in 1934. In 1934, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) mandated the British Council or simply BC to undertake cultural diplomacy activities.⁸²⁵ Consequently, the BC education and language programmes around the world have taken place alongside art exhibitions, capacity-building and education. The British Council's focus is on the development and harnessing of mutual trust and relationships through increased soft power. Through the British Council, the UK boasts a strong pedigree of international cultural presence and exchange. The motivation underpinning the founding of the *British Council* was the desire to facilitate the *cultural propaganda* of Britain in response to German propaganda, especially in the Middle East and South America.⁸²⁶

British's use of culture as a means of enhancing its soft power materialized more during the ideological conflict with the Soviet-led Eastern bloc during the Cold War.⁸²⁷ By the 1950s, Britain had established the British Foreign Office, which among its diplomatic functions was the conduct of cultural diplomacy. The institutionalization of cultural diplomacy was given more weight in Britain's international statecraft when it

⁸²⁴ Edsall, *Op. cit.*, p.6

⁸²⁵ Bound *et al.*, *Op. cit.* p.16

⁸²⁶ Babaoğlu, Resul, "Linguistic Imperialism or Cultural Diplomacy? British Council and The People's Houses in Early Republican Turkey", *Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkic World*, Volume 96, Number 1, (2021), pp.260-61.

⁸²⁷ J. M. Lee, "British Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War: 1946 – 61," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Volume 9, Number 1, (1998), p. 112

established the Information Research Department (IRD). However, as J. M. Lee⁸²⁸ argues, the IRD was largely associated with ‘propaganda’ and with the ‘influence of overseas British presence’ and neither culture nor cultural projection.

UK’s cultural diplomacy establishes a five-pronged ambitious program for the UK government, the BC and other cultural institutions of Britain. According to Bound *et al.*,⁸²⁹ these include effective systems of governance, which involve the creation of a wider Cultural Diplomacy Working Group stakeholder within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and under the Public Diplomacy Group.⁸³⁰ Political leadership to aid investment in the maintenance of Britain’s global cultural standing; the creation of cultural ambassadors, support for cultural literacy for the British public to ensure generations are equipped with necessary cultural skills, and the embrace of new technology to capture the opportunities for cultural diplomacy through online strategies.

These goals are in line with Britain’s three purposes for public diplomacy, which according to Mark Leonard, Catherine Stead Conrad Smewing in an article published by *Foreign Policy* in 2002 included engaging people and making them update their image of the UK; increasing foreign audiences appreciation a perception of the UK, and influencing people’s behaviour and support for the UK.⁸³¹ British cultural diplomacy has been especially efficacious in reaching people, for instance, the 2003 exhibition by the British Museum (BM) – *The Treasure of the World’s Cultures*, was attended by over 1.3 million visitors in cities in Japan and more than 600,000 in South Korea.

The annual hits on the British Library’s (BL) website are estimated at 24 million and the BC organizes more than 1500 cultural events in more the 109 countries yearly.⁸³² According to Tim Rivera, the former officer of the British Council, cultural diplomacy takes an advocacy and a promotion approach and utilizes a country’s cultural content with the explicit intention of augmenting the national interest and the objectives of foreign policy.⁸³³ The influence of Britain’s cultural diplomacy has been so successful

⁸²⁸ Ibid. p.113

⁸²⁹ Ibid. p.13

⁸³⁰ Ibid. p.13

⁸³¹ Mark Leonard and Catherine Stead, *Public Diplomacy*. (London, UK: Foreign Policy Center, 2002).

⁸³² Bound *et al.*, *Op. cit.* p.29

⁸³³ Pajtinka, *Op. cit.* p.96

that English is one of the most prominent official languages of the world. The reach of Britain's cultural influence is captured by the perpetuity of such terms as the Anglophone countries and the Commonwealth Countries.

France has been a strong contender in the global competition of cultural diplomacy. The first half of the 20th century presented a paradigm shift for the nexus between culture and diplomacy. It was at this time that the first cultural-diplomatic institutions specialized in cultural diplomacy began to be established. For instance, During World War One (WWI), France began to send diplomats mandated with performing specific diplomatic functions associated with cultural diplomacy – the *cultural attaches*.⁸³⁴ At the same time, the French Foreign Ministry (FFM) established the Department of culture called the *Directorate General for Cultural Affairs*.⁸³⁵ The practices initiated by France spread to other powers within Europe. In the interwar period – between 1918 and 1939 – several states established specialized cultural diplomacy institutions.

The French cultural diplomacy, like the British, has been one of the most successful in the world. Immediately after the Cold War particularly in the early 1990s, France established its cultural representations in various post-socialist states of Eastern and Central Europe including Czechoslovakia (now Czech Republic and Slovakia).⁸³⁶ At least four institutions conduct the cultural diplomacy of France; these are Campus France (CF, 2010), French Education Agency (AEFE, 1990), *Alliance Française* (*Alliance Française*, 1883), and Institut français (IF, 2011).⁸³⁷

Of these agencies, *Alliance Française* is especially popular and is probably the world's leading network having over 800 establishments in 137 countries on five continents. Annual enrolment in the institutes schools around the world total half a million and its cultural activities is attended by more than 6 million individuals.⁸³⁸ The *Alliance France's* activities have centred principally on supporting the international spread of

⁸³⁴ Haigh, *Op. cit.* p.68.

⁸³⁵ Pajtinka, *Op. cit.* p.97

⁸³⁶ Ibid. p.98

⁸³⁷ Ebru Eren, "Education Policies as a Tool of Soft Power: Alliance Francaise and Yunus Emre Institute," *Current Research in Social Sciences*, Volume 6, Number 2, (2020), p.129.

⁸³⁸ See *Diplomatie* < <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/cultural-diplomacy/france-s-overseas-cultural-network/>>

French.⁸³⁹ The creation of the *Francophonie* states, of which there are currently more than 58 French-speaking countries around the world, is largely attributed to the efforts of the *Alliance France*.⁸⁴⁰ Currently, French is the official language for over 275 million people and in Africa; there will be more than 750 million French speakers by 2050.⁸⁴¹

Today, *Institut Francais* is solely responsible for the cultural diplomacy of France. *Institut Francais* operates under France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is mandated with conceptualizing and driving new goals for the projection of France's 'cultural soft power'.⁸⁴² This institute replaced *CultureFrance* (CCF), which had been governed by the 1901 law. *Institut Francais* expanded the scope of cultural relations of its predecessor (CCF).⁸⁴³

The *Alliance France* and the *Institut Francais* function as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and not diplomatic agencies of France, despite having closely liaised with the French Foreign Ministry.⁸⁴⁴ Nevertheless, it is certain that these institutions have contributed to France's cultural influence around the world and has managed to shape its position at the international sphere. It has established standards to which the cultural institutions of other states such as China's Confucius Institutes and cultural centres emulate and supplant.

Germany is yet another important country in the discourse and development of cultural diplomacy. The role of the Foreign Cultural Relations and Education Policy (*Auswärtige Kultur-und Bildungspolitik*) or AKBP in steering Germany's cultural diplomacy is exemplary.⁸⁴⁵ The AKB has managed to mainstream culture as a key asset in the conduct of Germany's foreign relations. What used to be called the Foreign Office is today referred to as 'Culture and Communication', which underscore the recognition of the diplomatic value of culture in Germany's international statecraft. At the height of the Cold War, the institute was an effective means for West Germany and

⁸³⁹ Faucher and Lane, *Op. cit.*, pp. 281-298,

⁸⁴⁰ Adleiba and Sakaev, *Op. cit.* p.200

⁸⁴¹ *Ibid.* p.200

⁸⁴² See *Diplomatie* < <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/cultural-diplomacy/france-s-overseas-cultural-network/>>

⁸⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴⁴ Pajtinka, *Op. cit.*, p.97

⁸⁴⁵ Maa, *Op. cit.* p.1

the West in general to respond to Soviet Union's propaganda through the promotion of performing arts, music, film, and German language. Today, the centre is well spread around the world having 159 branches providing language in German and exporting Germany's cultural material abroad.

Among the key institutions leveraging Germany's cultural soft power is the *Goethe-Institut* (GI), formerly the Deutsche Akademie in Munich, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), and the Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations.⁸⁴⁶ During the Nazi regime, these entities were important in pushing the German cultural imperialism and the fascist propaganda of the Third Reich. Among these cultural institutions, the *Goethe-Institut*, which was established in 1951 has been a potent tool for driving Germany's cultural diplomacy and soft power since the 1960s.

In 2000, in *Konzeption* the foreign minister under Gerhard Schroder's government, Joschka Fischer, helped mainstream culture in Germany's public diplomacy. The government revitalized the *Goethe-Institut* and other institutions for cultural diplomacy of Germany especially the DAAD.⁸⁴⁷ The *Goethe-Institut* is Germany's best-funded and largest, of the three cultural diplomacy agencies and language schools. Apart from teaching German, the GI is responsible for (re)packaging the image of Germany in a manner that would attract favourable imagery of Germany by foreign audiences.⁸⁴⁸

In the Asia Pacific region, Japan has especially embraced the potential of cultural diplomacy in a manner that China may find significant even as it pursues its own cultural diplomacy. Japan's cultural diplomacy had become necessary after WWII particularly in the 1950s and 1960s when it sought to transform its pre-war image as a militaristic country into a new image as a peace-loving nation.⁸⁴⁹ After the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, Japan's cultural diplomacy shifted from that of projecting a 'peaceful Japan'

⁸⁴⁶ *Diplomatie, Op. cit.*

⁸⁴⁷ Frank Trommler, "Soft Power: Its Use in German and American Cultural Diplomacy", *AICGS*, 11 May 2015. Accessed: 23 June 2021. <<https://www.aicgs.org/publication/soft-power/>>

⁸⁴⁸ Irina Herrschner, "The Role of Art in German Cultural Diplomacy: An Analysis of the Festival of German Films in Melbourne, Australia," *Media Transformations*, (n.d), pp. 126 - 7

⁸⁴⁹ Kazuo Ogaura, "Japan's Postwar Cultural Diplomacy." CAS Working Papers. (Freie University of Berlin, GER: Center for Area Studies), p.2.

image to a picture of an economically advanced country. The establishment the Japan Foundation (JP) in 1972 with a budget of ¥20 billion (later increased to ¥50 billion) underscored this shift.⁸⁵⁰

Japan is aware of the potential of its cultural soft power and has erected institutions to facilitates its endeavour to appeal to international audiences. Through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the JP, Japan has endeavoured to convey its cultural materials to the rest of the world. The JP's key activities were to; conceptualize and assist in Japanese language education abroad, facilitate cultural exchange (including music and art exchanges) and encourage Japanese overseas studies.

In the 1980s, Japan included cultural diplomacy as one the key pillars of its general diplomacy. It created the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN-Japan Centre that presented Asian ideas and worldview to the Japanese. In 1992, Japan created the Centre for Global Partnership (CGP) to promote new objectives for its intellectual and cultural activities particularly in the US. The CGP was issued with a funding worth ¥50 billion.⁸⁵¹ In 2010, Japan introduced the idea of “Cool Japan” in an attempt to create a positive imprint among foreign publics of the Japan Brand.⁸⁵² The extent to which such branding has been successful is uncertain.

From the analysis of the cultural diplomacy of the Western nations and Japan, it is certain that these countries have established robust cultural diplomacy frameworks. It is crucial for China not only to match the efforts of other countries but also to surpass them and possibly supplant them in order to ensure the success of its public diplomacy in shaping the perception of Chinese image abroad. It is within this context of competition that a true picture of the success of China's cultural diplomacy can indeed be examined.

⁸⁵⁰ Ibid. p.2

⁸⁵¹ Ogaura, *Op. cit.*, p.3.

⁸⁵² Warren A. Stanislaus, “Japan is Using Cultural Diplomacy to Reassert Its Place in the World – But is the Message Too Exclusive?” *The Conversation*, 12 November 2018. <<https://theconversation.com/japan-is-using-cultural-diplomacy-to-reassert-its-place-in-the-world-but-is-the-message-too-exclusive-106463>> (Accessed: 26 June 2021).

4.4 Chinese Cultural Diplomacy – Continuity and Change

The history of China's cultural diplomacy predates the founding of the PRC and can be traced to the city-states of China's antiquity. The ancient Chinese Silk Route during the Yuan Dynasty was not only world's greatest trade route for about two thousand years, it also facilitated exchange of religion, art and philosophy, which are underpinning features of culture.⁸⁵³ However, it was during the *Spring and Autumn Era* (771 BC – 476 BC) with its 'Hundred Schools of Thought' that the Chinese culture spread to much of the ancient world. Confucius argued for the importance of the restriction and regulation of hard power, and emphasized the importance of humanity and education.⁸⁵⁴

This era fostered Chinese intellectual and cultural development and established the basis for future Chinese cultural diplomacy. The precedence set by Confucius teachings were echoed by Mencius during the *East and West era* (372 BC – 289 BC). Mencius denounced war and other aspects of hard power in his conceptualization of a benevolent ruler, who could attract following through appeal. Harnessed from the teaching of Confucius and Mencius, the doctrines of Taoism (Doaism) and Mohim, which resonated with Chinese leadership of the Han Dynasty, emphasized the idea of 'universal love' and the virtues of persuasion and discussion in addressing problems between individuals and even states.⁸⁵⁵

Ancient Chinese thinkers of the *East and West era* were skeptical about the effectiveness of hard power in the realization of foreign policy goals. For instance, the greatest Chinese military strategist of that period, Sun Tzu (circa. 545 BC – 470 BC), in his work *The Art of War* emphasized the importance of a leader's ideology and argued that one should attack the mind of the enemy rather than the enemy's fortified cities.⁸⁵⁶ Therefore, the acceptance of culture an important element of China's statecraft

⁸⁵³ Paul B. Eberle, Thomas L. Bradley and Arthur Tafero, "A Cultural Perspective of China's Belt and Road Initiative: Impacts, Insights, and Implications," *Journal of International Business and Cultural Studies*, Volume 12, (no date), p.2

⁸⁵⁴ Parama Sinha Palit, "China's Cultural Diplomacy: Historical Origin, Modern Methods and Strategic Outcomes." *China Research Center*, Volume 12, Number 2 (2013), p. 2

⁸⁵⁵ Joseph A. Adler, *Confucianism in China Today*. (New York, NY: Pearson Living Religious Forum, 2011), p. 4.

⁸⁵⁶ Tzu, Sun, *The Art of War*. PDF. Capstone Classics. (Chichester, England: Capstone Publishing, 2010), p.38.

has a long history that strides back to the Chinese city-state system of Chinese antiquity and is underpinned by deep philosophical considerations.

Nonetheless, modern foundations of China's cultural diplomacy are rooted in the emergence of the PRC following the successful Mao Zedong-led communist revolution and the Maoist era (1949 – 1976). Upon ascending power, one of the daunting issues that the new PRC had to address was the controversy surrounding the Cultural Revolution that had resulted in a lot of damage, death and had hindered the discourse of traditional Chinese culture. The Cultural Revolution contradicted and hindered the Confucian tradition that was popular in China, the CCP sought to shape international community's understanding of the new government and of a 'new' China. In line with this, in 1951, cultural policy became an integral component for China's statecraft.

According to Haifang Liu⁸⁵⁷ China formalized its foreign cultural policy in a bid to increase relations with the rest of the world. The CCP invited some 5,200 foreign visitors in 1956 from at least 75 countries and sent over 1,300 Chinese cultural representatives to 39 foreign countries.⁸⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the cultural exchanges permitted by the CCP were short, ceremonial and largely political visits; the CCP accorded little regard to long-term engagement such as education and research.⁸⁵⁹

Before establishing the new communist government in China, Mao Zedong set three roles for Chinese arts and cultural delegation traveling abroad; to publicize the Chinese revolution's great success, to develop friendships and reinforce relationships with individuals from other countries, to acquire new ideas (especially from the Soviet Union).⁸⁶⁰ While all three were critical, the first two particularly publicizing the great triumph of the Chinese Revolution were the most important. The 'three desires' became the guiding principles for Chinese cultural diplomats in foreign countries.

During the Deng Xiaoping presidency (1978 – 1993), the domestic cultural context and the milieu for international communication improved significantly compared to the

⁸⁵⁷ Liu, *Op. cit.*, p.13

⁸⁵⁸ Herbert Passin, *China's Cultural Diplomacy*. (New York, NY: Praeger, 1963), pp. 2 -4.

⁸⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p.6

⁸⁶⁰ Liu, *Op. cit.*, p.15

Mao era.⁸⁶¹ Deng's strategy *Gai Ge Kai Fang* – ‘Reform and Opening’ inherently led to foreign interests in exploring Chinese cultural aspects. The government provided incentives for foreigners to visit and learn about China. Such visits could take a longer period compared to the amount of time allowed for visits under Mao, and the government started to organize educational exchange programs for Chinese and foreign students.⁸⁶² This increased acceptance of cultural diplomacy as an integral aspect of China’s public diplomacy was given a further boost during the presidency of Jiang Zemin (1994 – 2003). The Sixteenth National Congress (NC) of the CCP is considered a turning point for modern Chinese cultural diplomacy and cultural soft power projection.

The Congress declared that China not only needed to provide its citizenry with a rich and healthy cultural life but that the government needed to devote more resources to reform the Chinese cultural industry and leverage China’s cultural services and offerings. The declaration of the 17th NC set precedence for the next administration of Hu Jintao (2004 – 2013). In 2004, China declared culture as the third pillar of its diplomacy, after economics and politics.⁸⁶³

In 2007, Speaking at the 17th Chinese Communist Party (CPC) National Congress, President Hu Jintao reiterated the centrality of culture for social cohesion and creativity. More importantly, he underscored the increasing importance of culture in the strengthening of soft power and the need for China to enhance its culture to leverage culture as a component of China’s soft power.⁸⁶⁴ Before the Sixth Plenary Session, China took several measures to establish an international stage for Chinese culture to showcase the governing philosophy of the CPC and express Chinese culture. The measures included hosting the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008, hosting the Shanghai

⁸⁶¹ Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese Power,” *Survival*, Volume 48, Number 2, p.18.

⁸⁶² Gill and Huang, *Op. cit.*, pp.17 - 19.

⁸⁶³ Xin Liu, “China’s Cultural Diplomacy: A Great Leap Outward with Chinese Characteristics? Multiple Comparative Case Studies of the Confucius Institutes,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 28, Number 118, (2019), p.646

⁸⁶⁴ Hu Jintao, “Hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and strive for new victories in building a moderately prosperous society in all.” Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, August 15, 2007.

<<http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm>>

EXPO in 2010 and establishing the China Culture Centres and the Confucius Institute. The last two were to organize cultural years and organize the relevant cultural activities.

In recent years, perhaps in response to President Jintao's urging or in tandem with precedence established much earlier, China has spared no resources in buttressing its cultural diplomacy to influence the foreign public's perception of China. These initiatives marked the bringing up of a 'cultural leap forward' from the unveiling of the "Years of Chinese Culture" sequence in 2003 in Italy, France, Australia and Russia, to the overseas establishment of newspaper and news channels such as the European Weekly and the China Daily Asia and to promote Chinese culture and project China's soft power. It also marked the establishment of the Confucius Institute (CI) in countries around the world in 2004.

Soft power theory has permeated China's international strategy, especially during the Presidency of Hu Jintao (2003 – 2013) and Xi Jinping's presidency (2013 to date).⁸⁶⁵ It is this new attempt to incorporate soft power in China's foreign strategy that cultural soft power has gained much traction within the political jargon of China. According to Becard and Filho⁸⁶⁶, China considers culture to be both at the core of its soft power and a tool for it to increase its soft power. According to Haifang Liu,⁸⁶⁷ some Western scholars have referred to China's cultural diplomacy around the world as its "charm offensive".

Chinese scholars however refer to it as 'soft power' with a strong conventional cultural background. Regardless of how it is conceived, China's cultural diplomacy has become integral to its international statecraft. China's 'charm offensive' started to take shape in 1951 when China reached its pioneer formal cultural agreement, with Poland. This offensive was expanded in the subsequent years when the PRC reached similar agreements with other socialist countries. In establishing cultural relations with the socialist states, China had sought to publicize the great success of its revolution to the said countries and in so doing, consolidate diplomatic relations. The subsequent cultural

⁸⁶⁵ Ibid. p.2

⁸⁶⁶ Ibid. p.2

⁸⁶⁷ Liu *Op. cit.*, p.10

exchanges occurred in the contexts of arts, literature, movies, and education including physical education, relic preservation and museums.

The media provided an important platform for China to publicize its culture and to convey the Chinese way of life through movies or films.⁸⁶⁸ By the end of 1954, China had succeeded in establishing cultural relations with at least 19 socialist countries and some of its neighbours in Asia. China's move to institutionalize and intensify its cultural relations with foreign countries was underpinned by Premier Zhou Enlai's accentuation of the need for Chinese diplomats to focus on improving China's cultural ties with other countries in tandem with trade ties to address China's international pariah status.⁸⁶⁹

Between 1952 and 1958, China's cultural diplomacy thrived as the country sent abroad some 1,700 cultural and arts delegations that involved some 17,400 cultural diplomats.⁸⁷⁰ The number of cultural diplomats China sent abroad during that period accounted for over 70 per cent of all Chinese delegations sent by the PRC. In 1958, China's Foreign Minister, Chen Yi further emphasized the importance of cultural relations for China with foreign countries and remarked that China needed to advance its cultural diplomacy to enhance the normalization of China's foreign relations.⁸⁷¹ In the 1990s, Chinese policymakers conceived the concept of 'soft power' as closely linked to culture.

In 1993, Professor Wang Huning formerly of the Fudan University and currently the head of China Central Policy Research Office (CCPRO) pushed the culture as a cornerstone of China's soft power with his publication "Culture as National Power: Soft Power."⁸⁷² The rhetoric of the Chinese government about the importance of the centrality of culture in China's diplomacy was matched with high investments in various cultural initiatives. In an article in the People's Daily in 2007, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao

⁸⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 15

⁸⁶⁹ Enfan Song, *et al.*, (eds.) *Memorabilia of diplomacy of People's Republic of China*. Volume 1, (Beijing: World Affairs Publishing House, 1997) p.255.

⁸⁷⁰ Sheping Ge, *New Book of Golden Bridge, The Stories of China's 50 Years' External Cultural Exchange*. (Beijing, CHN: Culture and Arts Publishing House, 2000) p.32

⁸⁷¹ Liu *Op. cit.*, p.16

⁸⁷² Wang Huning. "Culture as National Power: Soft Power," *Journal of Fudan University*, Number 3 (1993), pp. 23-28

addressed the need for China to grow its international cultural collaboration with other countries.

Premier Wen Jiabao argued that cultural exchange acts as bridges linking the minds and hearts of people from different countries, and as such was an important way of projecting the image of a country.⁸⁷³ Secretary Hu Jintao reiterated this centrality of culture to China's soft power projection when he stated that culture had become an increasingly important source of national creativity and cohesion and a factor of increasing relevance to the general national strength.⁸⁷⁴ In line with these views, China initiated a variety of cultural exchanges to boost its international influence. In this sense, China's international influence must also be found in its cultural force in as much as it can be found in its hard power sources – economic ability and military might.

Kaijin Miu⁸⁷⁵ explains that the idea that underscored China's focus on cultural diplomacy was informed by the notion of developing civil or people-to-people diplomacy. Within this understanding, the people were conceived to be non-governmental organizations and the common people, who were and remain both the object and the subject of cultural diplomacy. Since the early 1990s, which is after the end of the Cold War and the subsequent booming of China's economy, all kinds of discourses on culture have emerged. China's economic transformation has provoked a sense of cultural nationalism among the Chinese public and imparted a sense of pride in an assumed Chinese culture (it should be pointed out that the 'Chinese culture' is nothing more than an assumed synergy of the cultural practices of the various ethnic groups in China).⁸⁷⁶

4.5 Chinese “Charm Offensive” via Confucius Institute

It can be stated that among the most evident institutionalization and internationalization of Chinese cultural diplomacy are the Chinese cultural centres and the Confucius

⁸⁷³ Wen Jiabao, "Our Historical Tasks at the Primary Stage of Socialism and Several Issues Concerning China's Foreign Policy", *People's Daily*, March 07, 2007, accessed June 8, 2021 http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200703/07/eng20070307_355104.html

⁸⁷⁴ Tao, *Op. cit.*, p.62

⁸⁷⁵ Kaijin Miu, *A Study of China's Cultural Diplomacy*, Graduate Faculty of the Party School of Central Committee of CPC, (2006), p.23

⁸⁷⁶ *Ibid.* p.646

Institutes (CI), which have sprung up in countries around the world. The CI are some of the most potent instruments for China's public diplomacy and are also the most apparent manifestations of the country's cultural soft power agenda.⁸⁷⁷ The CI came to replace, or rather modernize the National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (NOCFL) or *Hanban* which the Chinese government had established in 1987.⁸⁷⁸

In 2004, China's State Council, which is the highest decision-making organ, approved the 'Chinese Bridges' Project, which constitutes the primary mission of the *Hanban*. The Chinese Bridges Project delineated eight objectives for the *Hanban*; the overseas establishment of the CI, producing 'Great Wall Chinese' and 'Chengo Chinese' or the technology-based resources for teaching and learning the Chinese language.

The project also aimed at establishing Advanced Placement Chinese in the universities in the US, assisting universities in creating Chinese language libraries, and enhancing college-level Chinese language proficiency.⁸⁷⁹ The CI are in essence a partnership between at least three entities: CI headquarters (*Hanban*), a Chinese institution (such as a university or a technical college), and a foreign institution (mostly a university). The Chinese Office of Chinese Language Council International (OCLCI) or *Zhongguo Guojia Hanyu Guoji Tuiguang Lingdao Xiaozu Bangongshi* conceptualized the CI programme.⁸⁸⁰

Since its inception, the CI has formed the agenda of official documents of the Chinese government such as the National Outline for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development (NOMLERD) of 2010-2020, and the current decade-long plan of the Ministry of Education.⁸⁸¹ According to Don Starr, the Chinese title explicitly spells the

⁸⁷⁷ Becard and Filho, *Op. cit.*, p.6

⁸⁷⁸ Wu You, "The Rise of China with Cultural Soft Power in the Age of Globalization," *Journal of Literature and Art Studies*, Volume 8, Number 5, (2018), p. 767.

⁸⁷⁹ Teresa Ann Shoemaker, "Confucius Institutes in Context: An Investigation of Chinese Soft Power." IRG 678 HB International Relations and Global Studies The University of Texas at Austin Submitted for the Plan II Thesis Requirement (2017), p.15

⁸⁸⁰ Don Starr, "Chinese Language Education in Europe: The Confucius Institutes," *European Journal of Education*, Volume 44, Number 1, (2009), p.69

⁸⁸¹ Shoemaker, *Op. cit.* p.15

aim of the CI as the promotion of the Chinese language abroad.⁸⁸² The composition of the leadership of the CI draws from several ministries that are chaired by a State Councilor. In the Chinese state, the highest governmental organ is the State Councilor, which comprises just five individuals. Therefore, given that one of them heads the CI shows the level of significance that China has accorded institutions. An executive director does the daily running of the CI programme.⁸⁸³

The first CI was launched in Seoul, South Korea in November 2004; this was followed by the opening of the CI in the US at the University of Maryland.⁸⁸⁴ The Constitution of the CI and the attendant By-laws, establish the CI as a non-profit institution mandated to develop and expedite the teaching of Mandarin (Chinese language) abroad and to facilitate cultural and educational cooperation and exchange between China and other countries.⁸⁸⁵

China has modelled the CI programme along Germany's *Institut*, France's *Alliance* and Spain's *Cervantes Institute* and serves as an agency for promoting Chinese culture and language abroad.⁸⁸⁶ Once established, the CI is mandated to teach the Chinese language (Mandarin) and culture, provide educational and cultural exchange programs and in so doing cultivate cultural ties with other nations. The CI should also promote multiculturalism around the world in countries in which it is operational and seek to build a harmonious world.

More specifically, there are nine foundational goals for the CI, which are to; form a pivot for all China-associated activities in local communities, forge strategic business, government and institutional alliances with China, engage academic institutions to cultivate among students, knowledge of China and to provide cross-cultural communication workshops and seminars. The CI is also supposed to promote research about Chinese culture and China within local universities, host scholars, language

⁸⁸² Starr, *Op. cit.* p.70

⁸⁸³ Ibid. p.70

⁸⁸⁴ Becard and Filho, *Op. cit.* p.6

⁸⁸⁵ Liu, *Op. cit.*, p.650

⁸⁸⁶ Anita Wheeler, *Cultural Diplomacy, Language Planning, and the Case of the University of Nairobi Confucius Institute. Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Volume 49, Number 1, (2013), p.51

teachers and researchers, promote awareness of Chinese culture and language, and in so doing provide Mandarin learning courses.⁸⁸⁷

The statute establishing the CI provides that these institutions can be created in different forms with the suppleness to attend to the needs of each country in which they are present. ‘Confucius classrooms’ and the ‘CI online’ are not different from the CI, nonetheless, they focus on middle and high school students. After the consolidation of the institute, the financing should then proceed from the joint efforts of the partner university and the *Hanban*.

The *Hanban* is under China’s Ministry of Education and collaborates closely with the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee. The *Hanban* in collaboration with the UFWD provide up-to-date teaching resources and the necessary supplementary services to all the CI branches globally.⁸⁸⁸ Concerning its resources, the *Hanban* grants its partners (Chinese or foreign universities) funding worth US\$ 100 – 150 thousand to offset the initial costs. China’s efforts at projecting its soft power through international cultural influence are most notable in China’s strengthening of Chinese cultural centres and the Confucius Institute (CI).⁸⁸⁹

The establishment of the first-ever CI presented a turning point in China’s cultural diplomacy as these institutions would soon emerge as one of the most potent platforms for China to advance its soft power performance through cultural diplomacy. Over the past two decades, by the end of 2010, the number of CI totalled 322 and Confucius classrooms around the world numbered 369 in some 96 countries.⁸⁹⁰ CI has grown both in stature and reach, and as of 2015, CI operated 491 institutes around the world. It was cooperating with local universities and colleges in some 133 countries.⁸⁹¹

⁸⁸⁷ Ibid. pp. 51 - 52

⁸⁸⁸ Ibid. p. 337.

⁸⁸⁹ Danielly Silva Ramos Becard and Paulo Menechelli Filho, “Chinese Cultural Diplomacy: Instruments in China’s Strategy for International Insertion in the 21st Century.” *Rev. Bras. Polit. Int.*, Volume 62, Number 1, (2019), p.1

⁸⁹⁰ Wheeler, *Op. Cit.*, p.52.

⁸⁹¹ Zhenjie Yuan, Junwanguo Guo and Hong Zhu, “Confucius Institutes and the Limitations of China’s Global Cultural Network.” *China Information*, Volume 30, Number 3 (2016), p.337

In 2019, the US was leading with 110 CIs, followed by the United Kingdom (UK) with 29, and 58 per cent of Confucius classrooms were located in the US and the UK signifying an uneven distribution of these institutions around the world. Between 2004 and 2007, the CI expanded exponentially around the world, and this expansion was followed by a steady high growth up to 2013 when a slowing down was noted.⁸⁹² In 2019, China established 1113 Confucius classrooms around the world with 118 CIs and 101 Confucius classrooms being opened in the countries of the Asia-Pacific.

The number of CIs in Africa at the end of 2019 stood at 54 and Africa had 30 Confucius classrooms.⁸⁹³ At the Beijing Conference of December 2007, the significance of the CI became apparent. It was reported that 1,100 delegates and representatives of some 200 CIs attended the conference.⁸⁹⁴ Attending the conference were also some 300 institute staff members from China. At the conference, it was reported that the CI had established some 1,200 classes around the world, having 500 lecturers or teachers and had enrolled 46,000 students.⁸⁹⁵

In the years between 2005 and 2007, CI established 226 institutes in 66 countries and organized 400 festivals and exhibitions that attracted more than a million participants. Still, in 2007, China sent 1,532 language teachers to 104 countries (a 53 per cent increase from 2006) and trained 16,782 teachers from abroad.⁸⁹⁶ According to the available data, out of the 226 CIs in existence at the end of 2007, 81 were located in Europe. This made Europe the leading region in terms of the number of CIs present in any continent. Of these, 38 per cent had been opened between 2006 and 2007.

Just a few European countries did not have a CI including Latvia, Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Estonia and Albania, plus the former states of Yugoslavia (not including Serbia). On the other hand, the UK, Russia, Germany and France had the highest concentration of CIs with 17, 14, 9 and 7 respectively.⁸⁹⁷ Outside Europe, the US had the highest number of CIs by comparison to any country, followed by Japan and then

⁸⁹² Ibid. p.339

⁸⁹³ Liu, *Op. cit.*, p.653

⁸⁹⁴ Starr, *Op. cit.*, p.70

⁸⁹⁵ Ibid. pp.70 - 71

⁸⁹⁶ Ibid. p. 71

⁸⁹⁷ Liu, *Op. cit.*, p.653

Thailand, with 39, 14 and 13 respectively. Africa had the least number of CI (just 18), more than three-quarters of these were new. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of CIs in Europe in 2007.

Table 4.1: The Distribution of CIs in Europe in December 2007

Country	Number of CI
United Kingdom	17
Russia	14
Germany	9
France	7
Belgium	3
Spain	3
Poland	3
Italy	3
Latvia	0
Greece	0
Lithuania	0
Luxembourg	0
Estonia	0
Albania	0

Source: Starr, *Op. cit.*,⁸⁹⁸

At the end of 2015, China had established over 500 CIs and more than 1,000 Confucius classrooms in 134 countries expanding its cultural presence and perhaps influence around the world. Literature about CI and China’s general public diplomacy is framed within the discourse of soft power. A nation’s soft power, as conceived by Joseph Nye,⁸⁹⁹ resides in its foreign policies, political values, and culture. Therefore, it is no doubt, as Wu You observes that China’s establishment of CI and Confucius classrooms abroad is seen as the PRC’s endeavour to enhance its soft power.⁹⁰⁰

4.6 The Cultural Centers, Confucius Institute and Perception of China’s Image

Chinese policymakers and scholars have redefined and conceptualized ‘soft power’ as ‘cultural soft power’.⁹⁰¹ This view of soft power was reified in 2017 when Chinese

⁸⁹⁸ Starr, *Op. cit.*, p.73

⁸⁹⁹ Nye, *Op. cit.*, p.11

⁹⁰⁰ You, *Op. cit.*, p. 767.

⁹⁰¹ You, *Op. cit.*, p.764

policymakers included the term ‘cultural soft power’ in the 17th National Congress of the CPC.⁹⁰² In this sense, it can be seen that culture forms a critical antecedent for shaping how China is perceived by audiences around the world. In tandem with its recent unprecedented economic rise, China assumed order and harmony, which are integral components of Confucian philosophy, as its guiding principles for social transformation and economic growth.

Additionally, the framing of China’s development in terms of ‘peaceful rise’, ‘lying low’ and ‘harmonious world’ reverberates to Confucian ideology. In this sense, it is perceptible that China’s choice of Confucius as the name for the institutes is an implicit endeavour by China to manage global perceptions. This is because the tranquil connotations linked to Confucius reflect China’s desired image abroad.⁹⁰³ One of the major driving forces behind China’s foreign policy has been its attention to how China’s image is perceived internationally.

The first and most important goal of China’s ‘charm offensive’ around the world is to establish a positive image of China. The second most important goal is to anchor China’s peaceful rise grounded in the notion of a ‘harmonious world’. The third objective of China’s cultural diplomacy is associated with China’s economic interests in developing its cultural diplomacy. The first two goals are particularly important. Concerning the first, China’s culture-building movements propounded through the Chinese cultural centres and the CI world over, seek to highlight Chinese culture and in so doing cultivate a positive perception among international audiences of Chinese culture. Nonetheless, the extent to which the CI and the Chinese cultural centres in general have achieved that end is a matter of scholarly debate.

Relating to the second goal, communicating China’s peaceful rise, China’s cultural diplomacy seeks to display China’s ‘peaceful rise’ and a unique way to ‘go global’. This is further aimed at addressing the perceived ‘China’s threat’ around the world. In 2005, in its first-ever white paper on peaceful development (China reconceived

⁹⁰² Carola McGiffert. *Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World*, (Washington, D.C; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), p.16.

⁹⁰³ Shoemaker, *et al.*, p.18.

peaceful rise into peaceful development), China described harmony as China’s ultimate goal for development, the establishment of a peaceful and ‘harmonious world.’

The fundamental question that needs addressing pertains to whether China has succeeded in realizing these goals and so doing positively shaping international subjects’ imagery of China. An analysis of previous research about the impact of the CI and Chinese cultural centres suggests mixed results for these institutions’ influence on international perception of China’s image. Several studies have examined the effect of CI on how China is perceived by the public in other countries.

Yuan *et al.*⁹⁰⁴ found that the increased establishment of the CI around the world has not led to the promotion of a positive image of China abroad. They found that apart from Oceania and Africa, there has been a deterioration in China’s image over the last decade, particularly in Asia, North America and Europe. According to Guo *et al.*,⁹⁰⁵ the number of years that the CI has been in operation parallels the unfavourable perception of China around the world. Table 4.2 shows the unfavourable opinion of China from regions around the world between 2005 and 2015.

Table 4.2: Unfavourable Opinion of China (%) Across Regions around the World

Year	Europe	North America	South America	Asia	Oceania	Africa
2005	31.5	31.0	-	23.8	-	-
2006	32.8	29.0	-	32.0	-	32.0
2007	43.9	39.0	25.0	33.1	-	17.1
2008	52.3	40.0	31.0	38.7	40.0	29.3
2009	45.7	39.0	24.0	38.4	-	31.0
2010	46.3	33.5	31.0	36.4	-	22.7
2011	41.5	41.0	37.0	33.4	-	30.0
2012	49.1	38.0	39.0	37.0	-	28.5
2013	48.1	43.3	22.8	39.2	35.0	22.9
2014	49.4	46.5	30.1	38.7	-	22.6
2015	43.6	45.3	28.4	39.2	33.0	15.4

Source: Pew Research⁹⁰⁶

⁹⁰⁴ Yuan *et al.*, *Op. cit.*, pp.334-356.

⁹⁰⁵ Guo *et al.*, *Op. cit.*, p.344

⁹⁰⁶ See Pew Research Center, Opinion of China, <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/24/survey/9/response/Unfavorable/>,

The rapid increase of the CI around the world is however accompanied by increasing criticism of the CI as proactive agents for the Chinese government and the CCP. The table shows how the national image of China has deteriorated in different regions of the world. This would suggest that China's projection of soft power through its public diplomacy and cultural exchanges among others has not had a significant effect on how China is seen by international audiences.

However, Portland, a London-based strategic communication agency in partnership with the University of Southern California's Centre on Public Diplomacy (CPD), reported in their "The Soft Power 30", that China moved from position 30 in 2015 to position 25 in 2017 in the global ranking of best soft power performers.⁹⁰⁷ This suggests that China's soft power is improving despite the general deterioration in how the country is perceived especially by the Western world. This five-point leap is not directly attributable to CI alone but perhaps to the intensification of China's PD activities.

A report by the *New York Times* (NYT) established that 35.5 per cent of CI-related reports were negative and that 27.5 per cent were positive with the rest (31.4%) being neutral. This confirmed earlier research by Kaisheng Li and Zhangzheng Dai⁹⁰⁸, which examined the general media milieu for the CI in the US sampling 33 media outlets and found that 50 per cent of the reports by the US media relating to CI were negative, 35 per cent were positive and 15 per cent were neutral.

Sahlin⁹⁰⁹ notes that the CI are seen outside China as instruments for advancing the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) propaganda. The CI has also been considered a threat to academic freedom in countries in which it operates due to its perceived censorship of certain topics China sees as damaging to its image or topics which are sensitive to CI's political and financial backers in Beijing.⁹¹⁰ More specifically, criticism against the CI falls into three broad categories; the perception of the CI as a

⁹⁰⁷ USC Center of Public Diplomacy - CPD. The Soft Power 30. Los Angeles: CPD, 2018. <<https://softpower30.com/>>

⁹⁰⁸ Kaisheng Li and Zhangzheng Dai, "Evaluation of Confucius Institute's Media Environment in the US," *World Economy and Politics*, Volume 7, (2011), pp. 76–93.

⁹⁰⁹ Marshall Sahlin, *Confucius Institutes: Academic Malware*. (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2015), p.3.

⁹¹⁰ Becard and Filho, *Op. cit.* p.7

political tool for the Chinese government and by extension the CCP, the economic incentive underpinning the CI expansion, and that CI has a negative consequence on the freedom of universities and colleges in which the CI operate.

First, the CI is deemed as the Chinese government's political apparatus for exporting positive imagery on dictatorship and authoritarianism. Within this notion, as argues Anne-Mary Brady,⁹¹¹ it is considered that the thinking among Chinese foreign policymakers is that learning Chinese culture and language will habitually lead to positive ideation about China. Within this view is the perception that the CI is not necessarily autonomous in driving its agenda but only pursues the strategic interests of China. Randolph Kluver⁹¹², noting what he terms as 'Confucius nodes' posits that the CI forms a geopolitical network for the exercise of China's propaganda. Criticisms about the economic incentive and the curtailment of freedom of universities are somewhat intertwined.

According to Don Starr⁹¹³, major contentions exist concerning CI's improper influence on the freedom of universities in research and teaching. The funding provided by China through the CI has appealed to universities experiencing financial constraints. Nonetheless, some of the criticisms levelled against the CI are fallacious and must be addressed. One, the criticisms of CI as serving China's strategic interests in the countries in which they are located is ignorant of the tradition established by European Institutes such as the *Goethe Institut*, the British Council, the *Alliance France*, *United States Information Agency* and *Office of Inter-American Affairs* (OIA). These institutions also spread the language and culture of their respective countries and are significantly controlled by their respective governments (despite claims of autonomy including the case of *Alliance France*).

⁹¹¹ Anne-Marie Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).

⁹¹² Randolph Kluver, 'The sage as strategy: Nodes, networks, and the quest for geopolitical power in the Confucius Institutes', *Communication, Culture & Critique*, 7(2), (2014), 192–209

⁹¹³ Don Starr, 'Chinese language education in Europe: The Confucius Institutes', *European Journal of Education* 44(1), (2009), 65–82.

Second, as Becard and Filho⁹¹⁴ explain, the government and the CCP's control of the CI is exaggerated at best and is not as intense as has been conveyed in the criticisms levelled against CI. Local agents draw or determine the agenda of the CI and are largely responsible for the programming of activities and lessons. More importantly, the Chinese instructors in the institutes are under the supervision of the management of the universities and are assessed by their students. What is critical, however, is that the CI is largely dependent on the government's financing and this has implications for the autonomy of such institutions.

In this sense, the perceptions of indirect control by the government and for that matter by the CCP, and self-censorship have some basis. In much of Asia, the perception of the CI is comparatively positive compared to that of Europe and North America. As shown in the 2015 Pew report (indicated in Table 4.2) despite constant tensions and historical frictions in the Asia-Pacific region, China is perceived in a more positive light by the public in the Asia-Pacific countries compared to the public in the West.

This according to Xin Liu⁹¹⁵ is reflected in the Asia-Pacific public's perception of the CI. The greatest concern raised about the CI is that they are heavily dependent on and controlled by the government of China.⁹¹⁶ For this reason, they are criticized for serving the 'clandestine' agenda of the PRC and the CPC elite disseminating inaccurate information about China aimed at improving China's international image.

The fact that China's cultural diplomacy through the CI has not altogether provided the intended positive results is grounded on several weaknesses and limitations inherent in cultural diplomacy. Firstly, cultural diplomacy requires a relatively long time to materialize and display its effectiveness. Richard T. Arndt⁹¹⁷ argues that the dividends derivable from cultural diplomacy may take a long duration running into decades to be paid. Therefore, concerning China's CI, which only started operations in 2004, it might

⁹¹⁴ Becard and Filho, *Op. cit.* p.7

⁹¹⁵ Liu, *Op. cit.*, p.650

⁹¹⁶ Becard and Filho, *Op. cit.* p.7

⁹¹⁷ Richard T. Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century.* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), p.14.

be too soon to determine its effectiveness. Patricia M. Goff⁹¹⁸ opines that like a seed when planted, cultural diplomacy may take root over time and might not even yield fruit whatsoever.

Secondly, the exercise of determining or assessing the efficacy of cultural diplomacy is convoluted and a daunting task. Goff⁹¹⁹ agrees and opines that determining whether cultural diplomacy has had any effect on intended audiences involves encountering many difficulties, which if not overcome, may provide fallacious results that cultural diplomacy has not been effective for a given country. For instance, while it is possible to track the number of cultural diplomatic engagements of China over a given period it is not easy to evaluate the effect of these on audiences.

Thirdly, scholars and analysts have fallaciously treated cultural diplomacy as a panacea when it is not. Cultural diplomacy may not change perceptions and requires a long duration to foster any mutual understanding. For this reason, a state must integrate cultural diplomacy with other aspects of public diplomacy to leverage on how it is perceived abroad. In the case of China, it can be argued that the efficacy of its cultural diplomacy is undercut by the numerous territorial disputes, its political intervention (or non-intervention) abroad and its military friction not only with neighbouring states but with the Western states especially the US and Australia in the South China sea.

4.7 China's Cultural Diplomacy in Africa and Perception of China's Image

The deepening of Sino-African relations has evolved amid criticism of China's African presence. The leadership of the CCP has recognized that certain aspects of China's venture in Africa have been perceived negatively among Africans. In an attempt to address this, China appealed to the Chinese culture rather than hard power to enhance its image among Africans and to facilitate its national influence.⁹²⁰ China's institutionalization of cultural relations with Africa dates back to the founding of the

⁹¹⁸ Patricia M. Goff, "Cultural Diplomacy", In Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur, (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), p.421.

⁹¹⁹ Goff, *Op. Cit.*, p.421.

⁹²⁰ Hui-Ping Tao, "China's Expanding Cultural Influence in the Age OF Globalization: A Case Study of the Chinese Media in Kenya" (2018). *Doctoral Dissertations* 1410, p.62

PRC in 1949.⁹²¹ Speaking at the 1955 Asia-Afro Bandung Conference, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai enunciated what would underpin China's cultural diplomacy with Africa. Enlai reiterated the need for Afro-Asian countries to develop cultural relations alongside economic relations. His call for cultural cooperation formed part of the Final Communique of the Bandung Conference.⁹²²

China-Africa cultural diplomacy was pioneered during the 1950s when China was looking for allies to guard against Taiwan and when the emergent African states and the liberation movements in Africa sought support for independence. By 1955, China had concluded a cultural agreement with Egypt establishing the first framework of Sino-Africa cultural exchange.⁹²³ In 1956, the government of China sent an arts and cultural delegation to visit Egypt in North Africa and Ethiopia. In 1957, a Chinese acrobatics and gymnastics delegation visited northern Africa and Ghana.⁹²⁴ In 1958, China sent twenty cultural delegations to Africa, and it received forty-five African cultural delegations.⁹²⁵ In that year, China also established cultural centres in African countries including Ghana, Morocco, Uganda, Somaliland and Angola.⁹²⁶ In 1959, China sent ten Chinese cultural delegations to Africa and received fifty African cultural delegations.

The Chinese cultural delegation included a spectrum of individuals including sports teams and personalities, acrobats, actors and theatre groups, and youth delegations.⁹²⁷ The purpose of these cultural exchanges was to establish formal relations between China and independent African states, which were increasing in number.⁹²⁸ These forms of cultural relations remain and present the pivot for China's cultural diplomatic offensive in Africa.

⁹²¹ Liu, *Op. cit.*, p.9

⁹²² Ibid. p. 20.

⁹²³ C. M. Kabwete, "On Cultural and Academic Exchange between China and African Countries," *Rwanda Journal*, Volume 2, Number 2 (2015), p.11

⁹²⁴ Liu, *Op. cit.*, p.19

⁹²⁵ Kabwete, *Op. cit.*, p.11

⁹²⁶ Ibid. p.11

⁹²⁷ Ibid. p. 11

⁹²⁸ Miu, *Op. cit.*, p.70

Since the 1990s, and in line with the Sino-Africa Forum, China's cultural diplomacy steered into several channels. One is an emphasis on the cultural marketplace. For instance, on 24 October 2000, following the Sino-African Forum, China organized the New Century China-Africa Cultural Exchange Symposium. Cultural officials representing some 22 African governments and the Organizations of African Unity (OAU) attended the forum. At the forum, China resolved to provide cultural aid without attaching the usual political conditions. China also expressed an interest in sending a delegation of Chinese cultural experts to survey Africa's cultural markets, an intention to introduce to Chinese audiences African art and culture.

Since the first-ever FOCAC meeting in 2000, the Chinese government has made great efforts to expand its cultural cooperation in African states. For example, at the 2003 FOCAC meeting, the Addis Ababa meeting and the Beijing FOCAC summit of 2006 culture featured strongly.⁹²⁹ In 2005, Ethiopia received Chinese youth volunteers under this program China. In the following year, in a public speech during his visit to Africa, President Hu Jintao announced China's plan to encourage Chinese youth volunteers to take part in construction projects in Africa.

The African Thematic Year of 2004 was among the Chinese culture-building campaigns in Africa that featured events such as 'Chinese Culture Going to Africa'.⁹³⁰ The events occurred over seven months and travelled to South Africa, Mali and Cape Verde among other 19 African countries. China has organized large forums and symposiums attended only by African artists, scholars, diplomats, government officials, and their Chinese interlocutors.

For instance, in October 2004, China organized the Symposium of Sino-African Human Rights in Beijing, it organized the Conference of Sino-African Cooperation for Environmental Protection in February 2005 in Nairobi, and in October 2005, the International Symposium on African Chinese Music was held in Beijing. Estimates suggest that China spent between 5 and 6 million Chinese Yen (CNY) of its annual

⁹²⁹ Tao, *Op. cit.*, p.63

⁹³⁰ Liu, *Op. cit.*, p.22

official budget on events such as the Beijing Summit of the FOCAC of 2006 for cultural diplomacy with the African states.⁹³¹

China organized the November 2006 Sino-African University Presidents and the December 2006 Symposium of China and Africa Shared Development held in Zhejiang and Beijing respectively. The significance of such conferences for China's cultural diplomacy in Africa can be inferred. Often the focus of these symposiums and forums has ranged from music to scholarly topics, environmental issues, education, journalism, and human rights.⁹³² Such discussions have had a powerful positive impact on the relationships mostly given that they are people-to-people interactions.

In 2004, China implemented the Overseas Chinese Project, it then launched the National Volunteer Project which sought to send Chinese 'volunteers' abroad to teach Mandarin (Chinese language) and to train professors on aspects of Chinese culture and value system. At the 2006 meeting, according to *People Daily*⁹³³, China committed to establishing a 'new' kind of Sino-African Strategic partnership centred on mutual trust, political equality, and cultural exchanges in addition to economic cooperation. In 2010, there were at least 3000 Chinese volunteers and language teachers in 114 countries around the world.⁹³⁴ In the Beijing Declaration of the 2010 FOCAC, China announced it was sending 300 Chinese youth volunteers to Africa.

According to Haifang Liu⁹³⁵ by the end of 2008, the number of Chinese youth volunteers in Africa stood at 87 and they were living in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and the Seychelles where they were working in the education, technology, agricultural and medical industries. In 2005, the Chinese Ministry of Education reported that China had sent some 200 language teachers to 16 African countries and nearly 120 primary and secondary schools and as a consequence, more than 800 African students were learning Chinese.⁹³⁶ The government of China was assisting African countries including Egypt,

⁹³¹ Ibid. p.20

⁹³² Liu, *Op. cit.*, p.18

⁹³³ See *People Daily*, The Sino- African Cooperative Forum Beijing Declaration. *People Daily* November 6, 2006.

⁹³⁴ Wheeler, *Op. cit.*, 55

⁹³⁵ Liu, *Op. cit.*, p.13

⁹³⁶ Wheeler, *Op cit.*, p. 50

Cameroon and Mauritius to build linguistic laboratories for Mandarin learning and donated books to those laboratories.

Nonetheless, dissimilar to the nature of China's culture-building campaigns with the socialist states in Eastern Europe, China's 'charm offensive' in Africa, like in Latin America was pivoted on traditional cultures.⁹³⁷ The policymakers in Beijing deem soft power as attractive since China's culture and development model is perceived, especially in the developing world, as a viable alternative to the Western one.⁹³⁸

In January 2006, Beijing spelled out its African policy identifying education, health, science and culture as key aspects or major subfields of policy together with political cooperation, economic cooperation, and peace and security.⁹³⁹ CI is the major mechanism through which the Chinese government has enhanced its cultural ties with Africa.⁹⁴⁰ The underpinning assumption (even though not explicitly stated) is that the CI activities fall under the China-African policy pronounced in 2006. According to Huang Sheng Ding and R. Saunders,⁹⁴¹ CI are an integral part of the soft power diplomacy of the PRC intended to shape and increase China's international influence.

Anita Wheeler⁹⁴² argues that as China's African presence increases, so must its ability to shape perception and images. The Chinese cultural centres, particularly the CI are one of the tools deployed by China to build a favourable reputation of China among the African public. The CIs operate as non-profit entities within local universities in Africa and are funded by the Chinese government to promote the Chinese culture including the Chinese language to African audiences.

In conformity with commitments to fostering cultural relations with Africa at the 2006 FOCAC meeting, China established its first CI in Nairobi, Kenya. By 2011, the number

⁹³⁷ Ibid. pp. 19 – 20.

⁹³⁸ Yanzhong Huang and Sheng Ding, "Dragon's underbelly: An analysis of China's Soft Power", *East Asia* Volume 23, Number 4, (2006), p.35

⁹³⁹ Wheeler, *Op cit.*, p. 50

⁹⁴⁰ Ibid. p.50

⁹⁴¹ Sheng Ding and R. Saunders, "Talking Up China: An Analysis of China's Rising Cultural Power and Global Promotion of the Chinese Language", *East Asia*, Volume 23, Number 2 (2006), p.4

⁹⁴² Wheeler, *Op cit.*, p. 50

of CIs in Africa was 28 in 19 African countries.⁹⁴³ In 2016, there were 48 CIs and 33 Confucius Classrooms in African countries. Four CIs and one Confucius Classroom are located in Kenya.⁹⁴⁴

The CI other than disseminating the Chinese culture to the African public is also supposed to present a ‘correct’ image and understanding of China to the mainstream public who lack knowledge of China.⁹⁴⁵ The institution is also supposed to develop positive attitudes and opinions of China around the world. Therefore, the fundamental question that this part of the analysis answers is what role, if any, have Chinese cultural centres and CI played in shaping African public perception of China’s image? It seeks to assess the influence of Chinese cultural centres on African audiences’ imagery of China. To answer this question, it is necessary to assess previous findings relating to the role and influence of the Chinese cultural institutions in Africa.

Dongyang Chen and Wei Ha in their research of 2015, examined whether CIs were a force for good or bad in a study that sampled 190 countries including African countries.⁹⁴⁶ It established that compared to other regions, the gravitational effect or attractive power of the CI was highly positive in Africa. The gravitational effect was highly felt about training, information provision for those seeking to study abroad, scholarship provision and the creation of official diplomatic contacts.⁹⁴⁷ However, the study did not provide a detailed account of how the African public from the different African countries, who were attending the CI viewed China.

Maddalena Procopio⁹⁴⁸ studied the effectiveness of CI in the projection of China’s soft power in South Africa between 2012 and 2014. Maddalena’s study, which sampled executives, particularly cultural centres and CI managers (including local and Chinese

⁹⁴³ Ibid. p.52

⁹⁴⁴ Tao, *Op. cit.*, p.65

⁹⁴⁵ Falk Hartig, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China,” *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Volume 17, Number 1, (2012), p.63

⁹⁴⁶ Dongyang Chen and Wei Ha, “Are Confucius Institutes Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks for Foreign Students in China: An Empirical Study of 190 Countries (1999 – 2015),” *ECNU Review of Education*, pp. 1 - 19

⁹⁴⁷ Ibid. p.14.

⁹⁴⁸ Maddalena Procopio, “The Effectiveness of Confucius Institutes as a Tool of China’s Soft Power in South Africa.” *African East-Asian Affairs*, Is 2 (2015), pp. 98 – 125.

cultural directors), and teachers, established that the CI and the cultural centres have been ineffective in projecting China's soft power in South Africa.⁹⁴⁹ This is despite concerted efforts by China through the cultural centres and the CI to not only leverage its presence in South Africa but also to attract and appeal South African public. Nonetheless, the CI resulted in the number of South African students going to study and training in China.⁹⁵⁰

In Nigeria, Emmanuel Chidiebere Edeh and Xu Li Hua⁹⁵¹ studied the influence of CI on socioeconomic development. They found that the appeal of CI and the Chinese language is underscored by its perceived economic benefits including job, travel and education opportunities. In Nigeria, Mandarin has been integrated into the curriculum of some primary and secondary schools in several states. Nonetheless, Nigeria has yet to consider Mandarin as one of its official languages.

Momo Ngomba Juliana and Guo Changgang⁹⁵² studied the effect of CIs on Cameroon's culture. Among their key findings was that the Cameroonian public viewed the CI positively and that there was an increase in the number of Cameroonian workers, organizations, institutions and youth enrolling in the programs of the CI to learn Mandarin. The two researchers also established that the Cameroonian public viewed China positively.

4.8 China's Cultural Diplomacy in Kenya

China has moved to increase its cultural relations with Kenya in the past few decades. The Chinese leaders find that cultural relations including language promotion and the facilitation of Kenyans' understanding and possibly appreciation of Chinese culture have the potential to enhance a positive image of China by the Kenyan public. Chinese

⁹⁴⁹ Ibid. p.98

⁹⁵⁰ Ibid. p.123

⁹⁵¹ Emmanuel Chidiebere Edeh and Xu Li Hua, "Growing Influence of Chinese Language in Nigeria can Impact the Socio-Economic Development," *International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development*, Volume 6, Number 12, (2019), pp. 184 – 191.

⁹⁵² Momo Ngomba Juliana and Guo Changgang, "How China's Confucius Centers Affects Cameroon's Culture," *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, Volume 7, Number 2, (2017), pp. 146 – 150.

leaders consider language as a potentially effective tool for winning the hearts and minds of the Kenyan public.

Kenyan institutions of higher learning also perceive an inherent value in having their students learn Mandarin. The Institutions deem the acquisition of Chinese language will enable Kenyans to not only widen their understanding of Chinese culture but also enable the students to seek job opportunities in Chinese companies in Kenya, in China and elsewhere in the world.⁹⁵³ In this sense, both China and Kenya perceive those mutual benefits would be achieved through their expansion of cultural ties.

In June 2004, CI entered Kenya when the representatives of the Chinese and Kenyan governments met to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) establishing the CI at the University of Nairobi (UON).⁹⁵⁴ This was the first CI in Africa established as a partnership between Tianjin Normal University of China and UON's College of Humanities and Social Science.

The opening of the University of Nairobi Confucius Institute (UONCI) took place on 19 December 2005, placing Kenya within the reach and possible influence of Chinese cultural diplomacy. In the following year, 2016, China granted UONCI KES 2 billion (US\$20 million) for the construction of a centre fully dedicated to the CI that would serve 2,000 students.⁹⁵⁵ This became China's largest investment in education in Africa and any university in Kenya.⁹⁵⁶

Zhao Xiyuan the Chinese minister-counselor enunciated that the opening of the UONCI was a reaffirmation of the immense contribution of China to the cultural exchanges between China and Kenya. UONCI pursues at least six crucial objectives, which are; to provide Chinese courses that are innovative and flexible to students and the wider communities in Kenya, present the focal point for Chinese cultural activities in Nairobi, develop and promote the teaching and learning of the Chinese language, and act as a resource hub for professionals teaching Chinese language. The UONCI also seeks to

⁹⁵³ Hartig, *Op. cit.*, p.63

⁹⁵⁴ Wheeler, *Op. cit.*, p.52

⁹⁵⁵ Shoemaker, *Op. cit.*, p.44

⁹⁵⁶ Tao, *Op. cit.*, p.126

act as an examination centre for Chinese language proficiency and as a consulting centre for the public and private sectors.⁹⁵⁷

The UONCI is not the only CI in Kenya. By 2015, China had established four CIs in Kenya in partnership with Kenyan Universities. The CIs were established at Kenyatta University (KU), Egerton University (EU), and Moi University (MU). This is more than the African average, of two.⁹⁵⁸ The establishment of the CIs in the three other universities in Kenya was due to increased interest and demand in Chinese culture and language, which was also in line with the increase in the number of Chinese companies in Kenya. Kenya currently has the second highest number of CIs next to South Africa (SA) with four Confucius Classrooms compared to SA, which has five CIs and three Confucius Classrooms.⁹⁵⁹ Table 4.3 shows the institution, the year of establishment and the Chinese partner institutions for the CIs in Kenya.

Table 4.3: CI in Kenya between 2005 and 2015

Kenyan Institution	Year Established	Chinese Partner Institutions
University of Nairobi (UON)	2005	Tianjin Normal University
Kenyatta University (KU)	2008	Shandong Normal University
Egerton University (EU)	2012	Nanjing Agricultural University
Moi University (MU)	2015	Donghua University

Source: Shoemaker⁹⁶⁰

In 2009, UON’s Communication Department incorporated the CI into its curriculum and introduced a Bachelor’s degree in Chinese Language. UON also permits enrolled students to earn a certificate in Elementary-Level Chinese, Intermediate-Level Chinese and Advanced-Level Chinese of 180 hours, 90 hours and 90 hours respectively.⁹⁶¹ The

⁹⁵⁷ UONCI, University of Nairobi Confucius Institute 2009. (UONCI, Information Booklet. Nairobi: UONCI, 2009).

⁹⁵⁸ Shoemaker, *Op. cit.*, p.39

⁹⁵⁹ Tao, *Op. Cit.*, p.65.

⁹⁶⁰ Ibid. p.40

⁹⁶¹ Shoemaker, *Op. cit.*, p.41

degree program in Chinese at the UON requires four semesters. In KU, the CI offers a ‘Certificate in Chinese Language and Culture’, it also offers ‘Beginners in Chinese Language and Culture,’ and more importantly, ‘Proficiency in Chinese Language and Culture.’

In all the CI institutions in Kenya, the Chinese curriculum involves speaking, reading, writing and listening. It also includes traditional martial arts of the Chinese (*Wu shu*), *Tai chi quan* (tai chi), calligraphy and painting, tourism, business and trade. The CI also facilitates the Chinese Choir, Chinese Club, Chinese Corner, Chinese Drama Society, dumpling making, and Dragon and Lion Dances. Other areas include Chinese cuisine, and music, and a focus on other specific aspects of Chinese culture. The UNOCI, owing to its reputation as a ‘model’ CI and good performance record in 2015, granted US\$ 10 million to extend its capacity to attend to the African continent.⁹⁶²

The creation of the Kenyatta University Confucius Institute (KUCI) in 2010 was in direct response to the demand among Kenyans for Chinese language skills and knowledge of Chinese culture.⁹⁶³ KUCI was a partnership initiative between KU and the Shandong Normal University of China. The KUC aims to be the model for cultural diplomacy not only between China and Kenya but also between China and other African governments. The KUCI has expanded to offer teaching of Mandarin to Nairobi-based secondary school teachers. KUCI had by 2018, trained more than 3,000 students and 120 students from the university had acquired scholarships to attend post-graduate studies in China.⁹⁶⁴

In 2014, China’s Nanjing Agricultural University collaborated with Egerton University to establish the Egerton University Confucius Centre (EUCI).⁹⁶⁵ The EUCI was also partly sponsored by the Chinese government to celebrate the jubilee or 50th anniversary of the China-Kenya relations. Unlike UONCI and KUCI, EUCI only focused on

⁹⁶² Lucie Morangi, “Kenyan Confucius Institute Held up as Model for Africa,” *China Daily*, May 22, 2015, accessed June 8, 2021, <http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2015-05/22/content_20789893.htm>

⁹⁶³ Tao, *Op. Cit.*, p.65.

⁹⁶⁴ *Xinhua*, “Interview: China-Kenya cultural exchanges on the right trajectory as benefits spread”, *Xinhua*, 27 Mar. 2018. <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/27/c_137067533.htm> (Accessed: 27 July 2021)

⁹⁶⁵ Tao, *Op. Cit.*, p.127.

Chinese language training, lessons on Chinese culture and scholarship opportunities. In 2015, China established the first CI in western Kenya at Moi University (MU). The creation of the institute was a partnership of China's Shanghai-based Donghua University and Moi University. The Chinese university is known for its expertise in fashion design and textile courses. Therefore, part of the focus of the partnership was to allow the CI to train Kenyan students and local professionals in fashion design and textile production.⁹⁶⁶

The CIs' activities in Kenya have not been restricted to the university classrooms, as the CI has expanded its activities to the community outside the class and in non-language fields. For instance, despite its focus being on three thematic areas of language training, lessons on Chinese culture and scholarship opportunities, in 2014, through the EUCI, China facilitated training for more than 700 agricultural professionals. In that undertaking, the EUCI collaborated with trainees to supervise a twenty-five-acre agro-science park.⁹⁶⁷

4.9 Chapter Summary

This chapter has examined the role of Chinese cultural institutes and centres on the image of China in Kenya. It sought to answer the question, what effect, if any, have Chinese Cultural Institutes and Centres had on the image of China in Kenya? The study found that while there have been concerted efforts by China in its cultural diplomacy and particularly in activities of Chinese cultural centres in Kenya, the cultural centres specifically the CI have had little impact on the perception of China's image in Kenya. How Kenyans see China's image has not changed in tandem with the efforts of the Chinese cultural centres in Kenya. The next chapter, which is Chapter Five examines the role of Chinese educational exchange with Kenya on its national image as perceived by Kenyans.

⁹⁶⁶ Tao, *Op. Cit.*, p.128.

⁹⁶⁷ Shoemaker, *Op. cit.*, p.41

CHAPTER FIVE: ROLE OF CHINESE EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES AND SCHOLARSHIPS ON CHINA'S NATIONAL IMAGE IN KENYA

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter, Chapter Four, centred on the analysis of the role of Chinese cultural institutes and centres on the image of China in Kenya. As such, it sought to examine how Chinese cultural centres particularly the Confucius Institutes (CI) have shaped Kenyan publics' perception of China's national image. It was established that the CI have played a critical role in imparting the knowledge of Chinese cultural products and Chinese language among the Kenyan publics and, in so doing, have influenced how Kenyan public's view China.

This chapter explores the role of Chinese educational exchanges on China's image in Kenya. It seeks to answer the question; what is the effect, if any, of Chinese scholarships for Kenyan students and educational exchanges with Kenya, on Kenyan publics' imagery of China? To do this, it sets the stage by taking the necessary general detour into the analysis of the development of educational exchanges as a tool of public diplomacy. It then examines the practice of educational diplomacy by select countries world over, whose educational diplomacy is exemplary before centering on Chinese educational diplomacy in the third part. The third part of the analysis also seeks to assess and underscore the influence of Chinese educational diplomacy on how China's image is perceived by foreign audiences.

The fourth part of the chapter narrows the analysis down to Africa and engages in the examination of China's educational diplomacy among African countries. This is then followed by an analysis of the influence of China's educational diplomacy on African publics' perception of China's image. Lastly, the chapter focuses on the analysis China's educational diplomacy in Kenya. In toe with the previous chapters, this chapter uses an interpretivist approach for research in order to provide a more nuanced conceptualization of the role of Chinese educational exchanges on China's image in Kenya.

5.2 The Development of Educational Exchanges in Diplomatic Practice

Educational exchange has received very little scholar attention and research as an instrument of public diplomacy.⁹⁶⁸ In fact, even the limited scholarship that has focused on examining educational exchange treat it as a subset of cultural relations under the broader subject of public diplomacy.⁹⁶⁹ It is perhaps for this reason, why most analyses of international educational exchange point to the interwar period of the previous century as the starting point of its crystallization as a practice by countries in their international statecraft and public diplomacy.

Nonetheless, as a practice, the etiological founding of international educational exchange is more profound and dated. Reticent references to the practice of educational exchange date back to the Middle Ages, at a time when educational pilgrimage was an established practice and a necessity owing to the limited number of institutions of higher learning and universities.⁹⁷⁰ The less reticent perspectives on the pedigree of international student contact trace the practice back to the second and fifth centuries before the Christian era (B.C.E).⁹⁷¹

According to Terresa B. Bevis and Christopher Lucas,⁹⁷² accounts of second century BCE attest to the attendance and admission of foreigners to city-states' schools of rhetoric and philosophy. In the fifth century BCE, account is given of the Sophists (teachers of wisdom) arriving in the ancient Greek city-state of Athens accompanied by protégés from distant places who had travelled with their masters from one city to another searching for new students.⁹⁷³ Additionally Bevis and Lucas⁹⁷⁴ while accounting for the practice of the history of international student contact referred to

⁹⁶⁸ Liping Bu, "Educational Exchange and Cultural Diplomacy in the Cold War." *Journal of American Studies*, Volume 33, Number 3 (1999), p. 393.

⁹⁶⁹ Bu, *Op. cit.* p. 393.

⁹⁷⁰ Hans de Wit, *Internationalization of Higher Education in the United States of America and Europe: A Historical, Comparative, and Conceptual Analysis.* (New York, NY: Greenwood Press), p.5

⁹⁷¹ Terresa B. Bevis and Christopher J. Lucas, *International students in American colleges and universities: A History.* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p.15

⁹⁷² *Ibid.* p.15

⁹⁷³ Emmanuel E. Akanwa, "International Students in Western Developed Countries: History, Challenges and Prospects," *Journal of International Students*, Volume 5, Number 3, (2015), p. 272.

⁹⁷⁴ Bevis and Lucas, *Op. Cit.* pp.14 – 15.

Socrates's assertion about foreigners who had followed Protagoras between cities to learn philosophy and wisdom.

In the 19th century, Christian missionaries had practiced cultural education whereby they believed that by spreading evangelical Protestantism in the global south including Latin America, Asia and Africa, they were bringing progress.⁹⁷⁵ These first missions can be deemed as the prototypes of current educational exchanges. The missionaries they did not only preach and build schools but they also offered vocational training to indigenous communities. They also sent indigenous youth to Europe and North America in the hope that they would acquire certain skills and worldview, and latter spread the acquired skills and valued back home.⁹⁷⁶ Historically therefore, student have always sought educational opportunities away from their home countries with the goals of acquiring advanced education capable of plunging them into the world of professionals and experts.

Nonetheless, more focused accounts of the development of international student exchange program, at least within public diplomacy literature, point to the world wars of the 20th century. It was at the end of the First World War (WWI) in 1919 that the Institute of International Education (IIE) was established by funding from the Carnegie Foundation and later the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial.⁹⁷⁷ The aim of the IIE was to promote understanding between and among nations and avert the kind of misunderstanding among nations that precipitated the catastrophe of WWI.⁹⁷⁸ In 1921, the President of the United States Stephen Dugan called on the U.S government to provide non-immigrant visas to international exchange students. This effort succeeded with the enactment of the Emergency Immigration Act of 1921. Despite the aim of that Act to limit the immigration into the US, it instead spelt the commencement of a long tradition of American student exchange.

⁹⁷⁵ A.V. Kourova and O. P. Mikhanova, "International Education Exchange Programs: A Brief Historical Review. *Humanities and Pedagogy*, Volume 4, Number 36, (2015), p.166

⁹⁷⁶ Ibid. p.166

⁹⁷⁷ Ibid. p.166

⁹⁷⁸ Northwest Exchange, "The History of International exchange student Exchange." *Northwest Exchange*, February 19, 2018. < <https://www.nwse.com/blog/history-of-student-exchange/> > [Accessed: 19 July, 2021]

During the Second World War (WWII), there was a drastic decline in the number of students participating in the student exchange. This was as a result of the devastation of the war, which interrupted and halted all education activities in much of the world at the time. The practice of international student exchange program by states only crystallized after the end of WWII and particularly with the onset of the Cold War. Following the end of WWII, the world was divided into two ideological factions of the US-led capitalist West and the Soviet-led communist East.⁹⁷⁹

Different models and view on the ideal political system, the ideal economic system, and ideologies framed the West-East confrontation during the Cold War. The resulting superpower competition on economic ideological and political system provided educational exchange with a new impetus as a tool for orchestrating and implementing ideological influence and shaping world audiences perception of the US and the Soviet Union in positive light respectively.⁹⁸⁰ Thus, between the start of the Cold War in 1945 and its end with the collapse of communism in 1989, both the US and the Soviet Union deployed and employed various informational, cultural and educational tools. These were overt attempts to influence foreign audiences' perception of their respective image, establish friendly political regimes abroad and increase understanding of their economic models and political systems.⁹⁸¹

Essentially education became one of the potent tools for soft power projection for the US and the Soviet Union and for that matter an integral component of their public diplomacy. According to Natalia Tsvetkova⁹⁸² education was not only a powerful vehicle for reproducing foreign loyalty but the education programs became a key strategy for winning the “allegiance” and “minds” of foreign students and audiences. Two strategies were used by both countries; the first involved choosing selected nationals of target countries to attend and receive Soviet-style or American-style education in their respective institutions of higher learning. The second strategy involved exposing these international students to practices and ideas that aligned with

⁹⁷⁹ Bu, *Op. Cit.* p.394

⁹⁸⁰ Natalia Tsvetkova, “International Education During the Cold War: Soviet Social Transformation and American Social Reproduction.” *Comparative Education Review*, Volume 52, Number 2, (2008), p.199

⁹⁸¹ Ibid. p.199

⁹⁸² Ibid. p.199

the dominant ideology in the Soviet or the American system.⁹⁸³ For this reason as argues Natalia Tsvetkova⁹⁸⁴, free-market or capitalist ideas permeated the international education programs in the US and the Marxist thought was the fulcrum of international education programs in the Soviet Union.

After the WWII, particularly in 1946, the US Senator for Arkansas, James William Fulbright created the Fulbright Program with the goal of increasing tolerance and understanding of other cultures and enhancing foreign language skills among its partakers.⁹⁸⁵ In 1948, the US enacted the Information and Education Act (or the Smith Mundt Act).⁹⁸⁶ In 1951, US created the Council on International Educational Exchange, which was mandated to send thousands of American students to Europe every year. The devastation of WWII created a new urge among nations to enhance international understanding, and cross-cultural exchange and learning through international exchange. This period saw to the proliferation of international exchange programs. In 1961, the US introduced the J-1 Exchange Visa Program, under its Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act. The aim of the J-1 Visa Program was to bring students, professors and scholars to the US for the purpose of cultivate cultural exchange with foreign nationals.⁹⁸⁷

Educational exchange programs covered diverse aspects of US's economic, cultural and military education activities during the Cold War such that some scholars found the term "educational exchange" to be synonymous with cultural relations in post-war US.⁹⁸⁸ In the ideological competition between the US and the Soviet Union, "educational exchange" emerged as a potent instrument for both countries to project favourable images of themselves. For the US, the educational exchange was vital for the projection of its image as a having an abundance of mineral wealth, technological know-how, consumer culture, political democracy and individual freedom.⁹⁸⁹

⁹⁸³ Akanwa, *Op. Cit.* p.273.

⁹⁸⁴ Tsvetkova, *Op. Cit.* p.199

⁹⁸⁵ Northwest Exchange

⁹⁸⁶ Kourova and Mikhanova, *Op. cit.* p.166

⁹⁸⁷ Northwest Exchange

⁹⁸⁸ Bu, *Op. cit.* p. 393.

⁹⁸⁹ *Ibid.* p.394

Throughout the second half of the 20th century, the practice of international student exchange among the nations of the world increased. Nevertheless, a turning point was met at the end of the 1980s. The end of the Cold War in 1989 coincided with an ease of transportation and revolutions in communications technology, which together precipitated a boom in the exchange student numbers, especially those coming to the US and Western Europe from the rest of the world in the 1990s.

Exchange programs came to accentuate cultural immersion, professional skills development, and global immersion, beyond mere language skills. In the 21st Century, several countries have extended their foreign interests in diplomacy by engaging in education. This is in tandem with the Joseph Nye's concept of soft power, which accentuates the importance of intellectual, and education exchange in shaping international relations. In 2016 alone, the US sponsored some 24,000 high school students under the J-1 Program through organizations such the Northwest Student Exchange.⁹⁹⁰

According to the Organization of European Economic Development (OECD)⁹⁹¹, in 2025, there will be 8 million foreign students studying outside their home countries. This is a huge increase compared with the 1998 estimations of 2 million. The impact of the international exchange students on the home and host countries is significant. These groups of students enhance global understanding and establish profound and lasting relationships among states, contribute to local economies and skills sharing, and fill the labor gaps in the host countries.

More importantly, international educational exchanges have the potential to positive impacts on national objectives including international image cultivation. According to Yerezhepekova and Zulfiya Torebekova,⁹⁹² states can leverage on international exchange students' mobility to realize national goals. The benefit inherent for the host countries with regards to its national objectives, is the assimilation of local culture by

⁹⁹⁰ Northwest Exchange

⁹⁹¹ Ainur Yerezhepekova and Zulfiya Torebekova, "Education as Soft Power: The Potential of Student Mobility", *Center for International Higher Education*, July 28, 2019. <<https://www.insidehighered.com/blogs/world-view/education-soft-power-potential-student-mobility>>

⁹⁹² Ibid.

the foreign students it hosts and consequently “operationalizing” its soft power. The sending state is able to realize a deeper understanding by its students studying abroad of the host countries national policies, culture and value system which it can then use to inform its foreign policies vis-à-vis that country. In line with this thinking, a number of countries, which consider education as the best way of promoting their national interests at the international stage has proliferated.

State-sponsored international student exchange is today a critical aspect of modern education. Through the links and bonds created by the international education exchanges, countries are able to obtain goodwill from foreign students who are then likely to shape public perception back home. According to de Lima Jr., most international education exchange students may develop greater appreciation of their host country. Upon returning to their home countries, positively influence their friends’, families’ and contacts’ understanding of the nation that had hosted them and in so doing, shape public attitude and imagery of that nation.⁹⁹³

For decades, countries around the world have invested in international educational programs and exchanges to foster mutual understanding between nations and people and as result have generated soft power. According to Khan, Riaz and Fernald⁹⁹⁴ modern-day states whether powerful or weak practice public diplomacy in various forms depending the resource availability, opportunity and their strength. Nonetheless, this is especially manifest among the more powerful states than for the small and less powerful states of the world. For instance, countries such as the US, China, Russia, United Kingdom, Israel, France, Turkey, Japan, Singapore and Germany among others have invested heavily in international educational exchange programs.

The American Fulbright programs, the UK’s and the Marshal Program, the European Commission’s Erasmus Mundus program and Germany’s *Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst* (DAAD) are just some of such programs.⁹⁹⁵ The German DAAD awards over 65,000 scholarships a year. Asian examples include China’s CIs and

⁹⁹³ de Lima Jr., *op. cit.* p.238

⁹⁹⁴ Khan *et al.*, *Op. cit.* p.3

⁹⁹⁵ Wanjira and Maluki, *Op. cit.* p.5

scholarships, and the Malaysia-based agency established to promote educational cooperation with countries in the ASEAN region. Nonetheless, among the nations of the world, the US is perhaps the world leader in terms of international educational exchange diplomacy. Within an integrated global society, educational exchange establishes a critical soft power capable of maneuvering the modern realm.⁹⁹⁶

The fundamental question that must be addressed and which this part of the forgoing deals with is, how do countries promote international educational exchange and align it with the goals of their foreign policy? The US has a long tradition of educational exchange going back to the early 20th century. For instance, According to US Bureau of Education, American universities had received some 2673 international exchange students from at least 74 countries in 1904.⁹⁹⁷ Nevertheless, US's educational exchange diplomacy gained momentum during Cold War in its ideological competition with the Soviet Union, when it paid particular attention to the promotion of student mobility through programs of the IIE.

The most important of US programs aimed at leveraging its soft power through international educational exchange were initiated under Fulbright program. It is worth noting that some of the world leaders of relatively powerful countries are beneficiaries of the US's educational diplomacy. For instance, Mikheil Saakashvili, who studied Masters at Columbia University, Japanese Crown Princess Masako, studied at Harvard University, Mohamed Morsi ex-president of Egypt, attended the University of Southern California, and the former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was a student at Harvard University.⁹⁹⁸ Table 5.1 shows some of the world leaders who studied in the US (the list is not exhaustive). The extent to which their education and training at the US shaped their worldview is important.

The Fulbright programs operates in more than 155 countries and awards close to 8000 scholarships annually. In total, since 1946, more than 325,400 scholars and students have taken part in the Fulbright program, out of which 202,600 were from outside the

⁹⁹⁶ Ibid. p.3

⁹⁹⁷ Kourova and Mikhanova, *Op. cit.* p.166

⁹⁹⁸ Amirbek and Kanat Ydyrys, *Op. cit.* p.502

US.⁹⁹⁹ The Fulbright program is thus an archetypal international educational exchange program that not only caters for students but also serves the public diplomacy objectives of the US.

Table 5.1: Key World Leaders Educated in the US

Country	Name	Title	University
France	Jacques Chirac	President	Harvard University
Ghana	Kwame Nkrumah	President	Lincoln University
Georgia	Mikheil Saakashvili	President (2004 – 2008)	Columbia University
Israel	Ehud Barak	Prime Minister	Stanford University
Israel	Benjamon Netanyahu	Prime Minister	MIT
Egypt	Mohamed Morsi	President (2012 – 2013)	University of Southern California
Japan	Princess Masako	Crown Prince	Harvard University
Pakistan	Benazir Bhutto	Prime Minister (1993 – 1996)	Harvard University
Philippines	Gloria Macapagal Arroyo	President	Georgetown University
Jordan	Abdullah Bib Al-Hussein	King of Jordan	Georgetown University
Ghana	Kofi Anan	UN Secretary General	MIT

Source: US Department of State¹⁰⁰⁰

5.3 International Educational Exchange and Scholarships

5.3.1 International Educational Exchange

Much of public diplomacy conducted through education channel is conveyed in the form of international education exchange.¹⁰⁰¹ International education exchange is an example of public diplomacy in the 21st century. James Tierney conceptualized international educational exchange as the movement of individuals (students) across national boundaries for educational reasons.¹⁰⁰² The educational purposes subsume all sorts of educational activities, which have an international dimension like academic

⁹⁹⁹ Saba Bint Abbas, “International Educational Exchange Programs as a Modality of Public Diplomacy: An In-Depth Analysis of the Fulbright Pakistan Program”, MA Thesis. American University. p.42

¹⁰⁰⁰ US Department of State, “Foreign Student Yesterday, World Leaders Today.” <https://www.csustan.edu/sites/default/files/OIE/documents/YEDTERDAYSINTERNATIONALSTUDENTS.pdf>.

¹⁰⁰¹ Jane Wanjira and Patrick Maluki, “International Education Exchanges as a Public Diplomacy Instrument.” *International Journal of Science Arts and Commerce*, Volume 1, Number 3, (2016), p.5

¹⁰⁰² James E. Tierney, “Exchange, International, 1. Overview”, In A. S. Knowles, Ed. *The International Encyclopedia of Higher Education*. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1977), p.1505.

exchange programs, workshops, conferences, seminars and technical assistance programs.

For Wit,¹⁰⁰³ these activities fall under international education. As such, it is evident that confusion exists regarding the use of international education and international educational exchange. A distinction can be made between international education and international educational exchange, and that distinction, according to De Lima Jr.,¹⁰⁰⁴ lies in the ‘exchange’. The term exchange denotes an act of giving something to someone and receiving something in return.¹⁰⁰⁵ This idea of giving and receiving, when brought to the definition of international education exchange, it is possible to account for the mutuality of exchange programs. For this reason, and to avert confusion over what is meant, a more nuanced understanding of international educational exchange must be adopted. One, which as Hugh M. Jenkins explains, conceives it as a partnership involving at least two parties, the admitting institution and the student application, and often state or private agency that provides all or parts of the funds required for the educational program.¹⁰⁰⁶ Implicit in this understanding of international educational exchange is the fact that it is not a by-product of other international exchanges or activities, which inexorably occur between nations in international relations.

Contrariwise, international educational exchange is an activity, which states and individuals deliberately engage or pursue with an overarching aim of serving a distinctive purpose. For countries, the reason can be to promote mutual understanding between them, enhance their reputation among the target audiences in either country and establish a favourable image among audiences.¹⁰⁰⁷ It is also understood within this study as de Lima Jr.¹⁰⁰⁸ argues, that international educational exchanges is also intractably linked to international cultural exchanges with regards to cross-cultural exchanges that inexorably transpire within international educational exchange

¹⁰⁰³ Wit

¹⁰⁰⁴ Antonio F. de Lima Jr., “The Role of International Educational Exchange in Public Diplomacy.” *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, Volume 3, Number 3 (2007), p.237.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Hornby and Wehmeir

¹⁰⁰⁶ Hugh M. Jenkins, “Exchange, International, 2. International exchange student.” In Asa. S. and Knowells, A. S. (eds.). *The Encyclopedia of Higher Education*. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1977), p.1513

¹⁰⁰⁷ de Lima Jr., *op. cit.* p.238

¹⁰⁰⁸ *Ibid.* p.238

environment. This understanding is not entirely inappropriate as it appreciates the difficulty in isolating activities that are purely educational from those that are purely cultural *per se*.

Hence, this overlap is imbued within the understanding of international educational exchange adopted in this study. In fact, it can be ventured within the context of this chapter and in line Frankel's postulations, that culture is the upshot or product of education.¹⁰⁰⁹ Therefore, considered together, three elements; deliberation, mutuality and cross-cultural interactions are pivotal to this study's application of international educational exchange as an instrument of public diplomacy.¹⁰¹⁰ More specifically, deliberation components shows that the exchanges can be manipulated to serve a purpose, mutuality denotes the fact that the exchanges are a two-way communication process, while cross-cultural interactions underscores the fact that different cultures interact. These three elements when taken together show that international education exchange can lead to the aversion of prejudices and stereotypes, and ultimately the demystification of and enhancement of image.

Etiologically, and in the modern context, international educational exchange is rooted in cultural diplomacy and is manifest in two broad forms; Exchange programs and international institutions. Exchange programs relate to international mobility of students from foreign countries to the host countries for educational purposes and training. In this sense, international exchange education involves two-way traffic of movement of scholars, students or teachers.¹⁰¹¹ As such, international educational exchange involves the transnational mobility of foreign students, professionals, trainees and scholars to host countries.

The international institutions or more appropriately international cultural institutions are established by foreign countries in the host countries with the main goal of spreading the establishing state's national values, culture and language(s) in the host country. Some key examples of such institutions, and whose soft power value has been expressly

¹⁰⁰⁹ Charles Frankel, *The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Policy: American Educational Exchange and Cultural Policy Abroad*. (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution, 1965), p.71.

¹⁰¹⁰ Ibid. p.71

¹⁰¹¹ de Lima Jr., *op. cit.* p.238

addressed in the previous chapter include UK's BC, the Germany's *Goethe-Institut*, *Alliance Française* and China's CI. Such institutions are supposed to work to attract foreign publics to the culture, art, music and heritage of their country through courses, events, classes and cultural activities. This chapter deals particularly with international educational exchange.

Within the context of public diplomacy, it is considered that international educational exchange has the potential to help improve a country's image and to convey its foreign policy more favourably. In line with this, international exchange students are selected to understand host country's cultural products, its policies and political system and to develop sympathy towards these.¹⁰¹² Through the principal of mutuality underlining international educational exchange programs, the foreign students are encouraged by their home countries to spread the values and lifestyles of their nations, while the host country expects the students to learn about its cultural values, worldview and political system.

Moreover, it is considered as de Lima Jr.¹⁰¹³ opines, that through international educational exchange, governments can develop lasting and stable foreign relations with the public in other countries and that this would enable them to successfully implement their foreign policy. The association underpinning international educational exchange must manifest mutuality for every involved actor.¹⁰¹⁴ In these encounters there is a vision and element of mutual learning experience in which both parties; that is, the provider and the learner benefits.

International education exchanges do enhance trust and greater comprehension among different groups and individuals, who may have completely different value system and cultural worldviews. More categorically, the fundamental advantage of international education exchange is that it allows governments to tap into the exchanges between individuals to expose foreign students to their country's diplomatic purposes.

¹⁰¹² de Wit *Op. Cit.* p.85

¹⁰¹³ de Lima Jr., *op. cit.* p.239

¹⁰¹⁴ Wanjira and Maluki, *Op. cit.* p.5

5.3.2 International Education Scholarships

Scholarships have become an integral component of 21st century public diplomacy in the same way as international educational exchange is. Scholarships form part of the public diplomacy as they involved people-to-people interactions. Scholarships have two objectives in as far as public diplomacy is concerned. First, they augment the development process of the recipient country in terms having their scholars return better qualified, more potentially able and capable of contributing to home country's social transformation.¹⁰¹⁵ Second, scholarships foster peoples understanding of the people, culture, political system, domestic policies and values of the host or awarding country.¹⁰¹⁶

In the latter sense, scholarships lead to the establishment of lifelong relationships between the people of the two countries that will permit the donor country to build its soft power and strengthen its public diplomacy. According to Kirkland¹⁰¹⁷ international scholarships can be categorized into at least five groups; national interest (narrowly defined), national interests (broadly defined), merit based, development based (individually focused) and development based (society oriented). According to Kirkland, the first group, scholarships based on national interest (narrowly defined), are driven by host country's goal of filling particular skills or other labor gaps and the recipients are encouraged or obliged to remain in the host country upon completion of studies.¹⁰¹⁸

The second categories of scholarships are based national interests (broadly defined) and aimed at benefiting the host country in less measurable and direct ways. The goals here include winning enduring friend for host country's public diplomacy or enhancing reputation and image of its high education program.¹⁰¹⁹ It is these forms of scholarships,

¹⁰¹⁵ Sue Enfield, "Evidence for Soft Power Created via Scholarship Schemes," *KD4*, August 28, 2019. Institute for Development Studies, p.1

¹⁰¹⁶ Ibid. p.1

¹⁰¹⁷ John Kirkland, "Case Study: Balancing Change and Continuity—The Case of the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan," In, Joan R. Dassin, Robin R. Marsh and Matt Mawer, (Eds.). *International Scholarships in Higher Education*. (London, UK: Association of Commonwealth Universities, 2018), p.159

¹⁰¹⁸ Ibid. p.159

¹⁰¹⁹ Enfield, *Op. Cit.* p.3

which are at the core of this study. The third category of scholarships is the merit-based scholarships, which are issued by the host country to enable candidates, notwithstanding their socio-economic backgrounds to obtain education that would enable them to participate in their home countries socio-economic development.

The fourth category of scholarships is the development-based (individually focused) scholarships, which aim to address the disadvantaged and help such individuals to gain necessary knowledge and skills. The last category of scholarships is the development-based (society-focused) scholarships, which target individuals assumed to be most capable of addressing home countries developmental needs and problems.¹⁰²⁰ All these scholarships, regardless of their nature, have the potential of influencing recipients' experience and view host country's culture, policies, and values and how they communicate the same to their contacts back in the home country. It is apparent that these programs result in the establishment of enduring links between the host and the recipients, and even the public back home.

5.4 International Educational Exchange, Scholarships and Soft Power

States seek to strengthen their positions and prestige at the international stage. To do this, they can deploy either their hard power assets (mainly military force and coercion) or as Joseph Nye¹⁰²¹ has opined, soft power resources such as their foreign policies, political values, culture and even education. Education and culture are perhaps the most potent soft power instruments.¹⁰²² Khan, Riaz and Fernald¹⁰²³ argue that scholars and analysts have conceptualized intellectual and educational exchange in terms of soft power, which instead of relying on coercion, depends on the strength of culture and ideas to influence disposition and friendship. According to Enfield,¹⁰²⁴ countries commonly deploy education as an effective instrument for realizing soft power.

The internationalization of higher education has permitted universities and colleges to contribute increasingly to soft power and public diplomacy. The literature on the link

¹⁰²⁰ Ibid. p.4

¹⁰²¹ Nye, *Op. cit.*, p.7

¹⁰²² Aidarbek Amirbek and Kanat Ydyrys, "Education as a Soft Power Instrument of Foreign Policy." *Procedia-Social and Behavioural Sciences*, Volume 143, (2014), p.501.

¹⁰²³ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power and Higher Education*. *Harvard University*, (2005), p.11.

¹⁰²⁴ Enfield, *Op. Cit.* p.2

between international exchange diplomacy and soft power is rooted in Joseph Nye conceptualization of soft power and its referent sources. Nye observes that educational system is today linked with the concept of geopolitics and international relations.¹⁰²⁵ Altbach and McGill opine that international education exchange functions as an international force, shaping intellectual development and mutual understanding among people around the world.¹⁰²⁶

Education is a vital tool for shaping world political agenda in states favour and attracting international audiences. Nonetheless, the potential efficacy of international educational exchanges for soft power influences is perhaps quite under explored. According to Altbach and McGill,¹⁰²⁷ observe that the potential of education as a tool for soft power projection is relatively under examined in the literature on soft power, even though there is some region-based literature touching on the topic in North America, Europe and Asia.

De Lima Jr.¹⁰²⁸ observes that little is understood about how international educational exchange facilitates country image improvement or how it enhances cultural relations between two countries let alone casting the foreign policy of a country in positive light. It is this huddle of literature gap over the subject matter, which any analysis of the manifest impact of international educational exchange as a tool of China's public policy in Kenya must overcome. It is argued that international educational exchanges impart international exchange students with a deeper understanding of the values and institutions of the host country, which help to diminish prejudice and stereotypes.

Nonetheless, little is known about how that happens.¹⁰²⁹ International education exchanges do foster real or actual engagement from the personal level, to the institutional level and even to the community level.¹⁰³⁰ Despite that, it is perhaps for

¹⁰²⁵ Wanjira and Maluki, *Op. cit.* p.4

¹⁰²⁶ Philip G. Altbach and Patti McGill Peterson, Higher Education as a Project of America's Soft Power. In Y. Watanabe & D. L. McConnell (Eds.), *Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), p.37.

¹⁰²⁷ Ibid. p. 37.

¹⁰²⁸ de Lima Jr., *Op. Cit.* (2007), p.237.

¹⁰²⁹ de Lima Jr., *Op. Cit.* (2007), p.235.

¹⁰³⁰ Wanjira and Maluki, *Op. cit.* p.4

this reason why international educational exchanges are considered potent tools not only for public diplomacy, but more so, for soft power.

Amirbek and Ydyrys,¹⁰³¹ have argued that providing foreign students with opportunities for international education is among the most potent instruments of projecting a state's soft power. In this sense, host countries design and use scholarships and international education exchange programs are to serve (among other interests) their national interests broadly defined.¹⁰³² Furthermore, currently, soft power plays a vital role in transnational intellectual exchanges, educational training and cross-cultural programs. In this sense, the idea of soft power is an inescapable force in world affairs that is parallel to hard power.

Scott-Smith¹⁰³³ opines that international educational exchanges, no matter how 'apolitical' they may seem, are inescapably conducted within the wider political environment of international politics. Furthermore, he argues that international educational exchanges and scholarships, no matter whether they occur between high schools or universities, are imbued and underpinned by political intent or are advanced for the purposes of enhancing international relations which can lead to political outcomes such as positive attitude towards a countries image.¹⁰³⁴

Sue Enfield¹⁰³⁵ posits that scholarships have the impact of shaping well-disposed future leaders. According to Khan, Riaz and Fernald¹⁰³⁶, international educational exchange is thought to perform at least three roles, which are critical to soft power projections: (1) developing mutual understanding between peoples and nations; (2) establishing a favourable image of the host country; and (3) promoting the host country's foreign policy. In this manner, and as argues Scott-Smith¹⁰³⁷, international education exchanges

¹⁰³¹ Amirbek and Ydyrys, *Op. cit.* p.502

¹⁰³² Enfield, *Op. Cit.* p.2

¹⁰³³ Giles Scott-Smith, "Exchange Programs and Public Diplomacy", *In Nancy Snow and Philip Taylor* (Eds.). *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), p.50

¹⁰³⁴ *Ibid.* p.50.

¹⁰³⁵ Enfield *Op. Cit.* p.2

¹⁰³⁶ Muhammad Mussa Khan, Riaz Ahmad and Lloyd W. Fernald, "Diplomacy and Education: A Systematic Review of Literature," *Global Social Sciences Review* (GSSR), Volume 5, Number 2, (2020), p.3

¹⁰³⁷ Scott-Smith, *Op. Cit.* p.50

are effective forms of strategic communication. Several countries practice educational cooperation as an integral part of their public diplomacy to enhance a cooperation and a common or mutual understanding. In this sense, international educational exchange provides an important mechanism for persuasion and attraction.

Strategic communication denotes the customization or tailoring and directing of information at a specific target audiences with the intention of generating a given policy response.¹⁰³⁸ In Nye's conception, when a foreign audiences admires and respects the practices, values, culture, ideals and education system of a country, soft power can be said to have taken root.¹⁰³⁹ As a global phenomenon, international education not only attracts people, but also generates interest in the cultural offerings including language, cultural practices and value system of other countries.

Therefore, it has the potential to project a positive image of the host country, increase sympathy, and enhance its influence abroad. The education system of a country is the epitome of its culture and as such conveys that country's values and norms, not only through institutional collaboration but also by international exchange students delivering them to their host countries.¹⁰⁴⁰ Antonio de Lima¹⁰⁴¹ observes that international educational cooperation can strengthen a country's soft power in at least three ways.

First, international educational exchange or cooperation and state-sponsored scholarships can help buttress certain aspects of a country's global engagement. In this sense, by granting foreign students scholarship opportunities, the host country is able to project an image of being a supportive country, which cooperates to advance international development.¹⁰⁴² Second, international educational exchange provides

¹⁰³⁸ See Jarol Manheim, *Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994).

¹⁰³⁹ Nye *Op. Cit.*, (2011), p.84

¹⁰⁴⁰ Charles Chia Sheng-Kai, "Higher Education Scholarships as a Soft Power Tool: An Analysis of its Role in the EU and Singapore." EU Center in Singapore. Working Paper No. 23 (2015), p.3

¹⁰⁴¹ Antonio de Lima, "Soft Power, Public Diplomacy and International Educational Cooperation." July 19, 2018. < <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/public-diplomacy-international-educational-soft-power-de-lima-jr-> > [Accessed: July 26, 2019]

¹⁰⁴² *Ibid.*

international exchange students with first-hand contact and experience with the host country's cultural offerings.

This permits the students to develop a better understanding of its culture, break down cultural stereotypes, and thereby contribute to the host state's cultural dimension. Through the exchange, the international exchange students are also able to learn the local language of the host country and other cultural materials and offerings. Third, international educational exchange has the potential to shape the host country's educational institutions at the global level. This has the corollary impact of leveraging its reputation among the community of nations, which has direct positive implications for the educational dimension of its soft power.¹⁰⁴³

There are certain problems and challenges inherent in the use of international educational exchanges as a tool for public diplomacy. These challenges centre on the issue of perceptions; analysts consider or see governments as the principal active actors in international education exchange programs. According to Wanjira and Maluki,¹⁰⁴⁴ due to the perception that the education exchanges are government initiatives (which they are in principle), questions have been raised concerning their credibility.

There is also concern whether the international educational exchanges are indeed profoundly mutual. In this sense, the concept of international educational exchange is considered to have little mutual benefit since the countries, the students and entire set up yield unequal relationships. The stronger nation most definitely influences the weaker nation. This does not resonate with the idea of equality underpinning the understanding of the term exchange explicit in international educational exchange.

As de Lima Jr.,¹⁰⁴⁵ argues there is a certain level of reciprocity anticipated in the concept of international education exchange, which nonetheless never perceptible in its practice in the exchange programs between the powerful and the weak states. Ingrid Eide's theory of international exchange student conceptualizes exchange students as 'culture

¹⁰⁴³ de Lima, *Op. Cit.* (2019), p.1

¹⁰⁴⁴ Khan *et al. Op. Cit.* p.6

¹⁰⁴⁵ de Lima, *Op. Cit.* (2019), p.1

carriers'.¹⁰⁴⁶ His theory not only assists in understanding how cultural stereotypes and misconceptions shape human interactions but more so how international educational exchanges can work to reduce cultural misconceptions and stereotypes, and in so doing, improve understanding. Ingrid Eide's theory of international exchange student holds that students act as culture carriers in two ways when they attend studies in a foreign country.

First, (arrow i) the student carries his or her home culture, which he or she has been socialized into and has internalized at home. The student then passes this culture onto his or her contacts in the host country during his or her study there (arrow ii). Secondly, the student also experiences and learns the culture of the host country (arrow iii), which he or she then pass to his or her contacts back home (arrow iv).¹⁰⁴⁷ This concept of student as a carriers and transmitter of culture is summarized in Figure 5.1.




Figure 5.1: Student as a Culture Carrier

Source: de Lima Jr.¹⁰⁴⁸

It is assumed however, as Marshall¹⁰⁴⁹ points out, that international exchange student's influence on the host country's culture is much weaker than the influence of the host

¹⁰⁴⁶ Ingrid Eide, "Students as Culture Carriers", In Ingrid Eide (ed.) *Students as Links Between Cultures*, (Oslo, NOR: Universitetsforlaget), p.170

¹⁰⁴⁷ de Lima Jr., *op. cit.* p.240

¹⁰⁴⁸ de Ibid. p.240

¹⁰⁴⁹ Timothy Marshall, "The Strategy of International Exchange", in Ingrid Eide (ed.). *Students as Links Between Cultures* (Oslo, NOR: Universitetsforlaget, 1970), pp. 19-20

country on him or her. This latter influence permits the exchange student to assume a more complex and differentiated image of the host country.¹⁰⁵⁰ In this sense, the international exchange student absorbs the host country's core values, which he or she experiences daily courtesy of his or her presence in that society.

The experiences then impose a certain set of perception and thinking that allows the international exchange student to evaluate and understand the host country's culture more profoundly.¹⁰⁵¹ As the student lives in the host country, and experiences its cultural materials and products, the prejudices and stereotypes that he or she might have held before are replaced with informed and qualified appraisal of the host country.¹⁰⁵² Consequently, the international exchange student's attitude towards the host country and its society gets transformed into a more accurate, multifaceted image instead of oversimplified stereotypes.

5.5 Chinese Educational Diplomacy and China's National Image Abroad

Due to China's economic growth over the past several decades, China has become a popular destination for international exchange students who not only want to learn Mandarin, but also, those who want to understand China's economic and political model, as well as the Chinese culture.¹⁰⁵³ Therefore, among China's instruments for soft power projection is international educational exchange. The PRC has used higher education in particular to project its soft power for decades. Over the recent past China has used international education exchange as a vector for its soft power and has expanded both the scale and intensity of its educational offerings to foreign students.¹⁰⁵⁴

The idea of utilizing international exchange students to connect foreign audience's hearts and minds for diverse reasons is both fascinating and significant.¹⁰⁵⁵ It is fascinating because it provides a means of connecting people from various countries

¹⁰⁵⁰ de Lima Jr., *op. cit.* p.240

¹⁰⁵¹ Glen H. Fisher, *Public Diplomacy and the Behavioural Sciences*. (Bloomington, IN Indiana University Press, 1972), p.36

¹⁰⁵² de Lima Jr., *op. cit.* p.240

¹⁰⁵³ Khan *et al.*, *Op. cit.* p.3

¹⁰⁵⁴ Rui Yang, *The Rise of China-US International Cooperation in Higher Education*. (Leiden, NED: Brill, 2018), p.2

¹⁰⁵⁵ *Ibid.* p.6

with different ideas on shared issues of concern and it is significant because it has its implications for how people from different countries perceive other countries.

China's educational relations with countries around the world are profound. While most of the international students enrolled in Chinese universities are from Asia, and particularly the Asia Pacific region, a 2014 international student trends in China indicated that 24,203 American students, 10,658 French students, 8,193 Australian students were enrolled in Chinese universities. Since the commencement of Deng Xiaoping's 'opening up' policy, China has intensified its educational linkages with the rest of the world. Xiaoping had, in June 1978's instructed his government to expand China's education exchange and send Chinese students abroad. He remarked, "I approve the increase in the number of international students...this is one of the important ways to received results..."¹⁰⁵⁶ The foreign policymakers in China were convinced that sending more Chinese students abroad and receiving even more international students in China would facilitate the attainment of its public diplomacy.

In 2018, China had become both the world's leading source of international students and the Asia's leading destination for international students. This trend was facilitated with the 'opening-up' process and has been facilitated with a rather an aggressive education diplomacy by the PRC since then. Table 5.2 shows the trends in the number of Chinese international students and the number international students in China between 2000 and 2016. What is critical in these trends is that the numbers of students in each case have increase exponentially between 2000 and 2018.

Chinese universities have admitted international students from all over the world including Europe, Asia, Oceania, North America, South America and Africa. In 2011, out of 164 national universities in Beijing, 35 (20.7 per cent) were accepting international students through the Chinese government scholarships.¹⁰⁵⁷ In the

¹⁰⁵⁶ Yiyun Hu and Lijun Fan, "Internationalization of Higher Education: Building South-South Partnerships Between China and Mexico," *International Journal of Chinese Education*, Volume 9, Number 2, (2020), p. 163

¹⁰⁵⁷ Hannane Ferdjani, "African Students in China: An Exploration of Increasing Numbers and Their Motivations in Beijing," (Stellenbosch University. Center for Chinese Studies, 2012), p.17

municipality of Shanghai there were 14 universities admitting government-sponsored international students.

Table 5.2: Number of Chinese Students Abroad and Foreign Students in China

Year	Number of Chinese International Student in Foreign Universities (in million)	Number of Foreign Students in Chinese Universities
2000	3.9	52,150
2001	8.4	61,869
2002	12.9	85,829
2003	11.73	77,715
2004	11.47	110,844
2005	11.85	141,087
2006	13.4	162,695
2007	14.4	195,503
2008	17.98	223,499
2009	22.93	238,184
2010	28.47	265,090
2011	33.97	292,611
2012	39.96	328,330
2013	41.39	356,499
2014	45.98	377,054
2015	52.37	397,635
2016	54.45	442,773
2017	60.84	489,172
2018	66.21	492,185

Source: Yiyun Hu and Lijun Fan¹⁰⁵⁸

As of 2015, China had about 397,635 international students enrolled in its universities and various learning institutions.¹⁰⁵⁹ While in the early 2000s the Chinese Government Scholarships (CGS) favoured Europe as compared to Africa, the latter years have seen a reorientation to favour African countries. This change is show in Table 5.3.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Hu and Fan, *Op Cit.*, p.165

¹⁰⁵⁹ Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho, “African Students Drawn to China Often Rebuffed by Racism”, *The New Lens*, June 4, 2018. < <https://international.thenewslens.com/article/92938>> [Accessed: July 23, 2021]

Table 5.3: Comparison of CGS between Europe and Africa 2003 - 2010

Year	Number of Scholarships Awarded	Europe	Per cent (%)	Africa	Per cent (%)
2003	6153	1442	23.4	1244	20.2
2004	6715	1880	23.5	1317	19.6
2005	7218	1761	24.4	1367	18.8
2006	8484	1858	21.9	1861	21.9
2007	10151	2107	20.8	2733	26.9
2008	13516	2628	19.4	3735	27.6
2009	18245	3022	16.56	4824	26.4
2010	22390	3283	14.66	5710	25.5

Source: Author from CGS data

A look at the bilateral educational relations between China and countries from around the world informs of not only of the trends but also on the influence of China's educational relations with other countries on its national image. In North America, China has engaged in educational exchange with Canada, the US and Mexico. For instance, According to Huhua Cao and Vivienne Poy,¹⁰⁶⁰ between 1980s and 2011, more than 37,000 Chinese researchers, scholars and students were educated in Canadian institutions of higher learning.

The Canada Learning Initiative in China (CLIC), which links Canadian universities with universities in China, has allowed Canadian students to study in China. Nonetheless, in 2015, there were just 3,585 Canadian students studying in Chinese universities out of 400,000 international students enrolled in Chinese universities. The Canadian student's perception of the Chinese students was that the Chinese students came from a more competitive environment as compared to their own. According to Linda J. Webber¹⁰⁶¹ Canadian students viewed Chinese international students as having positive study habits and the desire to succeed, which were attributes they wished to emulate.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Huhua Cao and Vivienne Poy, (Eds.) *The China Challenge: Sino-Canadian Relations in the 21st Century*. (Ottawa, CAN: University of Ottawa Press, 2011), p.101

¹⁰⁶¹ Linda J. Webber, "International Chinese and Canadian Student's Experience of Internationalization at a Canadian University," Western University January 27, 2011. <<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/61684351.pdf>> [Accessed: June 12, 2021] p.106

Similarly, China educational linkages with Mexico have also been profound. In 2010, China and Mexico concluded the signing of the *Agreement between the PRC and the United States of Mexico on the Mutual Recognition of Studies, Diplomas, and Degrees*.¹⁰⁶² In 2013, during the visit President Xi Jinping to Mexico, the two governments signed the Joint Statement of the PRC and the United States of Mexico, which include the provision of some 300 Chinese government scholarships to the Mexican government, to be spread over the next three years.

As of 2018, the number of Mexican students in China was estimated at 1540, which amounted to 15 per cent of Latin American Students enrolled in Chinese universities in that year.¹⁰⁶³ Nonetheless, Mexican international students in China accounted only for 0.3 per cent, which points on the need for China to do more. The perception of how Mexican international students perceive China's national image is problematic considering that very few studies have delved into that area of research.

The educational relations and exchanges between the China and the US are especially significant, historical and profound. The China-US educational exchanges pre-date the 1949 Communist revolution in China are engrossed in the much broader cultural relations between two states.¹⁰⁶⁴ During the 1920s, the US had moved in a ploy that sought to bring China to the American fold in light of the simmering war against imperial Japan in the Asia Pacific region.

Nonetheless, founding of the PRC by the Mao-led revolutionaries presented a turning point for the US-China relations including educational exchanges. The communists' takeover of China during the commencement of the Cold War meant that educational exchange between the two would undergo a period of dormancy until towards the end of the West-East tensions.

In 1984, President Ronald Reagan set a new discourse for US-China educational linkages when he went against at the advice of the Department of State and met a group

¹⁰⁶² Hu and Fan, *Op Cit.*, p.165

¹⁰⁶³ *Ibid.* 165.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Joyce K. Kallgren and Denis Fred Simon, Eds. *Educational Exchanges: Essays on the Sino-American Experience*. (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies UCLA, 1987), p. 24

of Chinese students studying in the US.¹⁰⁶⁵ In the twenty-first century, following end of the Cold War in 1989, US-China relations increasingly became important and intricate. Both the PRC and the US have acknowledged that educational exchanges are a power tool for public diplomacy, and have encouraged international students to study in their respective colleges and universities. China has increased its scholarships to American students seeking to study in China to 20,000 per year.¹⁰⁶⁶ Between 2005 and 2013, the number of American international students in China increased from 10,299 to 25,312 and the US became the second largest students-sending country to China in 2008 just behind South Korea.¹⁰⁶⁷

Nonetheless, there has been a decline in the number of American students enrolling in Chinese universities since 2013. In 2016, the number of American students studying in China dropped to 23,838 suggesting a declining interest among American students to attend Chinese colleges. While the number of American students studying abroad increased by 3.8 per cent in 2016, the number of those choosing China as their destination for foreign study declined by 8.6 per cent.¹⁰⁶⁸ An assessment of the attitudes, experiences and perceptions of American students of China and Chinese education provides insight into the general impact of Chinese educational diplomacy on the perception of its national image among US students. Kaitlin Peck¹⁰⁶⁹ studied the experiences of American international students in China and noted that American students in China had developed a positive perception of China and Chinese culture. Some students were of the opinion that China had a very competitive educational system and cited that they were impressed by the zeal that Chinese students had for succeeding. However, American students perceived Chinese students and society as difficult to bond with due to cultural differences.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Ibid. p.25.

¹⁰⁶⁶ David Shambaugh, "China's Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect", *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 94, Number 4, (2015), p. 99

¹⁰⁶⁷ Hongwei Yang and Yinqi Wang, "Predicting U.S. College Students' Interest in Studying in China: Social Influence, Personal Experiences, Country Reputation, and Media Coverage", *The Interdisciplinary Journal of Study Abroad*, Volume XXX, Issue 2, (2018), p.136

¹⁰⁶⁸ Ibid. pp.136 -7

¹⁰⁶⁹ Kaitlin Peck, "The Impact of Academic Exchange Between China and the US, 1979 – 2010", *Psi Sigma Siren*, Volume 8, Number 1(4), (2014), p.35

5.6 Chinese Educational Diplomacy in Africa

China's attempts to project its soft power through education in Africa, can be examined by focusing on at least three phases; phase one (1950 – 1978), phase two (1979 – 1994) and phase three (1995 to present).¹⁰⁷⁰ In the first phase, specifically between 1950 and 1978, China's engagement with Africa revolved around support for Africa's liberation struggle. After the Bandung Conference of 1955, China reoriented its focus towards establishing a network of "China-friendly" nations that accepted one-China policy.¹⁰⁷¹

More specifically, China's education relations with Africa commenced in 1956 when it received four Egyptian students following the conclusion of the Egypt-China agreement on cultural cooperation of 15 April 1956. In 1957, China expanded its educational cooperation with Africa when it received eleven African students from Uganda, Malawi, Kenya and Cameroon. Throughout the 1950, 24 African students had gone to China under the Chinese government scholarship program at the time.¹⁰⁷² In the 1960s, the PRC found new areas of engagement with Africa and this involved reciprocal exchange of state representatives with selected African countries to promote mutual cooperation in education.

According to Changsong Niu¹⁰⁷³, in response to African's demand for assistance in human resource development, the PRC sent some experts and science teachers to Guinea and Mali, and provided finances and material to the University of Dar es Salaam for the construction of schools. It also issued some African countries with teaching materials in the 1960s. The little gains made in education cooperation with Africa were however halted during China's Cultural Revolution, which resulted in the closure of all universities.¹⁰⁷⁴

Between the foundation of New China in 1949 to 1978, China's foreign policy and diplomacy was greatly shaped by the international political situation of that epoch.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Changsong Niu, "China's Educational Cooperation with Africa: Towards New Strategic Partnerships", *Asian Education and Development Studies*, Volume 3, Number 1, (2014), pp. 32 – 33.

¹⁰⁷¹ Ibid. p.31

¹⁰⁷² Li Anshan, "African Students in China: Research, Reality, and Reflection", *African Studies Quarterly*, Volume 17, Number 4, (2018), pp. 5 – 44.

¹⁰⁷³ Niu, *Op. Cit.* p.32

¹⁰⁷⁴ Anshan, *Op. Cit.* p.8

Therefore, China's aim was win international political support through technical and equipment assistance, particularly to the emerging states with whom it identified.¹⁰⁷⁵ At the end of 1978, the number of African students in China was 648, and these students had come from 25 African countries.

In phase two; that is between 1979 and 1994, China's foreign policy shifted to focus on economy as opposed to ideological alliances. This period coincided with the Reform and Opening Up policy introduced by President Deng Xiaoping. In 1983, the Chinese government declared the Four Principles of China-Africa Economic and Technological Cooperation, at the core of which was mutual development and benefit. Table 5.4 shows the number of African students on scholarship in China between 1976 and 1995.

Table 5.4: African Students on Scholarship in China between 1976 and 1995

Year	Scholarship	Self-Financed	Approximate No. of African Students in China
1976	144	-	144
1977	142	-	142
1978	121	-	121
1979	30	-	30
1980	43	-	43
1981	80	-	80
1982	154	-	154
1983	230	-	230
1984	247	-	247
1985	314	-	314
1986	297	-	297
1987	306	-	306
1988	325	-	325
1989	249	2	251
1990	252	6	258
1991	272	15	287
1992	267	20	287
1993	225	58	283
1994	220	246	466
1995	256	721	977
Total	4174	1068	5242

Source: Li Anshan¹⁰⁷⁶

¹⁰⁷⁵ Niu, *Op. Cit.* p.32

¹⁰⁷⁶ Li Anshan, "African Students in China: Research, Reality, and Reflection", *African Studies Quarterly*, Volume 17, Number 4, (2018), p.11

At the end of 1987, China had completed some 388 education-related projects on the African continent. This phase precipitated the increase of the number of foreign students going to study in China, including Africa students.¹⁰⁷⁷ Nonetheless, this period also saw limited engagement in the area of educational exchanges. This perhaps due to China's low level of economy that hindered its ability to fully explore the significance of educational exchanges for its public diplomacy and image cultivation objectives in Africa.

In the third phase (1995 to present), however, China has come full circle in understanding the potential efficacy of educational exchange as a tool for its soft power projection.¹⁰⁷⁸ The creation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) provided a new platform for strategic and profound diplomatic cooperation between China and Africa.¹⁰⁷⁹ The key foci of FOCAC meetings are training and education. At five inter-Ministerial Conferences, the government of China committed to implement measures touching on various aspects of socio-economic development including human resources, agriculture, training and education. Since its foundation in 2000, FOCAC have encouraged China's wide-ranging engagement with Africa.¹⁰⁸⁰ In actual sense, the founding of the FOCAC marked the culmination of China's cooperation with Africa that dates back to the creation of the PRC.¹⁰⁸¹

FOCAC has focused on diverse areas of engagement with Africa including social commitments, development commitments, and within these Education and Human Resources. Under the FOCAC framework the Chinese Ministry of Education (MOE) developed the government Scholarship Program and established the China Scholarship Council (CSC) mandated to manage the recruitment of students to be awarded scholarships and conduct the routine management of the program on behalf of the MOE.¹⁰⁸²

¹⁰⁷⁷ Niu, *Op. Cit.* p.33

¹⁰⁷⁸ *Ibid.* p.38

¹⁰⁷⁹ Tao, *Op. cit.*, p.63

¹⁰⁸⁰ Kenneth King, "China-Africa Education Cooperation: From FOCAC to Belt and Road," *ECNU Review of Education*, Volume 3, Number 2, (2020), p.222

¹⁰⁸¹ *Ibid.* p.222

¹⁰⁸² Niu, *Op. Cit.* p.38

China organized the November 2006 Sino-African University Presidents and the December 2006 Symposium of China and Africa, Shared Development held in Zhejiang and Beijing respectively. The significance of such conferences for China's cultural diplomacy in Africa can be inferred. Often the focus of these symposiums and forums has ranged from music to scholarly topics, environmental issues, education, journalism, and human rights.¹⁰⁸³ Such discussions have had a powerful positive impact in the relationships mostly given that they are mostly people-to-people interactions. The four issues that underpin China's educational cooperation with Africa were brought out clearly at the 2006 FOCAC meeting. During the meeting, the PRC government committed to assist African countries establish 100 rural schools over the next three years. It committed to expanding, by the end of 2009, the number of government scholarships to African students from 2,000 to 4,000 per year.¹⁰⁸⁴ Table 5.6 shows the number of African students studying in China by year between 1996 and 2015.

Table 5.6: Approximate Number of African Students in China 1996 - 2015

Year	Scholarship	Self-Financed	Approximate No. of African Students in China
1996	922	118	1040
1997	991	224	1215
1998	1128	267	1395
1999	1136	248	1384
2000	1154	234	1388
2001	1224	302	1526
2002	1256	390	1646
2003	1244	549	1793
2004	1317	869	2186
2005	1367	1390	2757
2006	1861	1876	3737
2007	2733	3182	5915
2008	3735	5064	8799
2009	4824	7609	12433
2010	5710	10693	16403
2011	6316	14428	20744
2012	6717	20335	27052
2013	7305	26054	33359
2014	7821	3356	41,677
2015	8470	41322	49,792
Total	67231	2332	236481

Source: Li Anshan¹⁰⁸⁵

¹⁰⁸³ Liu, *Op. cit.*, p.18

¹⁰⁸⁴ FOCAC, "Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)", <http://www.focac.org/eng/> [Accessed: September 5, 2011], pp.14 -15.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Li Anshan, "African Students in China: Research, Reality, and Reflection", *African Studies Quarterly*, Volume 17, Number 4, (2018), p.11

According to the World Education Services (WES), China awarded some 30,000 scholarships to African students between 2012 and 2015. The Chinese government declared that it would provide annual training for African educational professionals and officials including university heads, secondary schools' heads, primary schools' heads and heads of vocational training institutes. It also committed to creating the CI in Africa to meet the Chinese language needs of African students in local universities.¹⁰⁸⁶ China cooperation with Africa in the area of education has touched on, among other things training of human resources, rural schools' construction, and Chinese government scholarships, higher education and scholar and student exchange.¹⁰⁸⁷

Nonetheless, China has paid more attention to higher education even though it has also engaged in school building and capacity building of high schools and primary schools.¹⁰⁸⁸ The principle underpinning China's education cooperation with Africa is that of mutual benefit. In this sense, Chinese policymakers consider that China's education cooperation with Africa seeks to enhance and strengthen mutual understanding and friendship between China and Africa.¹⁰⁸⁹

Consequently, China has implemented a multifaceted approach involving scholarships and other incentives in a bid to entice African students to study in China. China's approach includes student exchange, higher education scholarships through the Confucius Institute programs, and through Chinese provincial and Chinese local governments. Through all these African students wishing to study in China are presented with a bevy of options. Niu¹⁰⁹⁰ opines that the China-Africa education cooperation is centred on mutuality, common development, learning from each other and influencing each other. Figure 5.2 shows types of funding for African students studying in China as at the end of 2012.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Niu, *Op. Cit.* p.33

¹⁰⁸⁸ King, *Op. Cit.* p.222

¹⁰⁸⁹ Ibid. p.222

¹⁰⁹⁰ Niu, *Op. Cit.* p.38




Figure 5.2: Type of Education Funding for African Students in China

Source: Adams Bodomo¹⁰⁹¹

Speaking at a FOCAC meeting in 2015, China’s President Xi Jinping announced the PRC government would implement “ten major plans” aimed at boosting the country’s cooperation with Africa. Among these plans was supporting some 30,000 African students with state-sponsored scholarships. In line with this, Beijing has reiterated that it is on course to honor its 2015 commitment. In 2003, the number of African students enrolled in Chinese Universities was estimated to 1,800, in 2016, this number had surpassed 60,000 students,¹⁰⁹² which underscores the growth of China’s international educational exchange with Africa.

China is today a leading destination for African students that want to study abroad. More interestingly, as per United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics, the number of African students enrolled in Chinese university as of 2018 surpassed that of those pursuing tertiary education in both Britain and US (each of these hosts about 40,000 African students.¹⁰⁹³ In this sense, China only trails France, which has a higher number of African students enrolled in its universities.¹⁰⁹⁴

¹⁰⁹¹ See Adams Bodomo, *Africans in China: The Experience from Education and Training*. (Beijing, CHN: CMI CHR. Michelsen Institute, 2014), p.24

¹⁰⁹²CGTN, “China-Africa in Numbers: Education Exchange”, *CGTN* September 2, 2018. <https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d514d7a67444f79457a6333566d54/share_p.html> [Accessed: July 23, 2021]

¹⁰⁹³ See UNESCO <<http://data.uis.unesco.org/>>

¹⁰⁹⁴ CGTN, *Op. Cit.*

Over the past fifty years, the government of China has awarded some 30,000 Africans from 50 countries with scholarships to study in China.¹⁰⁹⁵ It is estimated that African students studying in China accounted for 13 per cent of international students studying in China in 2017.¹⁰⁹⁶ Thus, between 2018 and 2003, the number of African students in China increased by 4,549 per cent, approximately 303 per cent per year. In 2017, African student's population in Chinese universities accounted for some 16.5 per cent of the entire foreign student population in those universities.¹⁰⁹⁷ Ghana, Tanzania, Nigeria, Zambia, and Zimbabwe formed the five sources of African international students studying China. The top ten countries sending students to Chinese universities in 2017 are shown in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7: Top Ten Students Sending African State to China 2011 – 2017

Source Country	Student Population		(%)Change 2011-2017	Rank 2011	Rank 2017	Top 10 in 2017
	2011	2017				
Ghana	1753	6527	274	1	1	1) Ghana
Nigeria	1140	5774	406	2	2	2) Nigeria
Mauritius	1052	973	-7	2	23	3) Ethiopia
Kenya	955	2508	163	4	10	4) Zimbabwe
Sudan	859	2857	233	5	8	5) Tanzania
Ethiopia	844	4883	479	6	3	6) Zambia
Cameroon	734	3050	316	7	7	7) Cameroon
Tanzania	731	4488	514	8	5	8) Sudan
Congo	676	1943	187	9	12	9) South Africa
Somalia	640	1635	155	10	15	10)Kenya

Source: ICEF Monitor¹⁰⁹⁸

A 2017, report indicated that the number of African students studying in China totaled 74,011 from 24 African countries suggesting a 258 per cent increase between 2011 and

¹⁰⁹⁵ Ibid. p.39

¹⁰⁹⁶ Victoria Breeze and Nathan Moore, "China has Overtaken the US and UK as the Top Destination for Anglophone African Students", *Quartz Africa*, June 30, 2017. < <https://qz.com/africa/1017926/china-has-overtaken-the-us-and-uk-as-the-top-destination-for-anglophone-african-students/>> [Accessed: June 13, 2021]

¹⁰⁹⁷ Niu, *Op. Cit.* p.33

¹⁰⁹⁸ See ICEF Monitor< <https://monitor.icef.com/2021/04/china-emerging-as-a-major-destination-for-african-students/>>

2017. France, which is the most popular host for Africa's international student reported a decline of 2 per cent over the same period. United States (US) and Britain was hosting 46,737 with an increase of 30 per cent and 27,775 with a decline of 24 per cent respectively.¹⁰⁹⁹ Beginning in 2006, and in line with Chinese government's commitments to African countries under FOCAC, China has targeted African students with scholarships to study in China. At the 2015 FOCAC summit, China pledged to award some 30,000 African students with scholarship by the end of 2018.¹¹⁰⁰ In 2016, the government of China pledged some 1500 scholarships for Egyptian students to study in China over the next three years.

According to Haifang Liu¹¹⁰¹ by the end of 2008, the number of Chinese youth volunteers in Africa stood at 87 and they were living in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and the Seychelles where they were working in the education, technology, agricultural and medical industries. In 2005, the Chinese Ministry of Education reported that China had sent some 200 language teachers to 16 African countries and to nearly 120 primary and secondary schools and as a consequence more than 800 African students were learning Chinese.¹¹⁰²

In that year, Zambia sent some 3,248 students to the PRC. China has provided 4,100 scholarships and short-training courses to South Sudan since that country's independence from Sudan in 2011.¹¹⁰³ The number of Ghanaian students studying in Chinese universities is more than 7,000 and the government of China has pledged to increase its scholarship allocations to Ghana. African students in Chinese universities reached an all-time high of 16 per cent of international students in China in 2018. This totaled some 81,562 compared to less than 2000 before 2003.¹¹⁰⁴ The increase in the number of African exchange students in China is attributed to among other things Chinese government scholarships to African students seeking to study in China.

¹⁰⁹⁹ ICEF Monitor, "China Emerging as a Major Destination for African Students." *ICEF Monitor*, April 21, 2021. < <https://monitor.icef.com/2021/04/china-emerging-as-a-major-destination-for-african-students/> > [Accessed: June 12, 2021]

¹¹⁰⁰ Breeze and Moore, *Op. Cit.*

¹¹⁰¹ Liu, *Op. cit.*, p.13

¹¹⁰² Wheeler, *Op cit.*, p. 50

¹¹⁰³ See <https://www.asiabyafrica.com/point-a-to-a/african-international-students-study-in-china>

¹¹⁰⁴ Breeze and Moore, *Op. Cit.*

In 2018, the government of China pledged to give some 50,000 scholarships awards to African students by the end of 2021.¹¹⁰⁵ Beijing also pledged to provide an equal number of opportunities to African students and invited 2000 African students, professionals, and scholars to China for cultural exchange. According to the UNESCO 2020 Global Education Monitoring Report, the Chinese government provided 40 per cent of all international university scholarship for sub-Saharan Africa. It was followed by South Africa, Russia, and the UK among others.

5.7 Influence of China's Educational Diplomacy on Its National Image in Africa

According to Wanjira and Maluki¹¹⁰⁶, exchange diplomacy has been found to have the ultimate effect of nurturing favourable public opinion in both the host and the home country. How this happens is still not clear and has not been the focus of scholarship as Liping Bu¹¹⁰⁷ as argued elsewhere in this analysis. Nonetheless, it is assumed, as Frankel¹¹⁰⁸ points out, that international educational exchanges provide avenues for deliberation, mutuality and cross-cultural interactions, which can lead to the aversion of prejudices and stereotypes, and ultimately the demystification of and enhancement of image.

De Lima Jr.¹¹⁰⁹ argues that the impact is greater on the international exchange student and his or her home country. This is centred on the premise that mutual understanding accrues from such engagement, and which is vital for the appreciation of other people's worldview.¹¹¹⁰ Such understanding contribute to the reduction of prejudices and misunderstandings leading to change of attitude towards other people's beliefs and value system. International educational exchanges provide forums for people from

¹¹⁰⁵ Study International Staff, "There are More African Students than Ever in China. Why are they Still Alienated?" *Study International*, January 20, 2020. < <https://www.studyinternational.com/news/african-students-china-alienated/> > [Accessed May 23, 2021]

¹¹⁰⁶ Wanjira and Maluki, *Op cit.* p.2

¹¹⁰⁷ Bu, *Op. Cit.*, p. 393.

¹¹⁰⁸ Frankel, *Op.Cit.* p.71.

¹¹⁰⁹ de Lima Jr., *op. cit.* p.238

¹¹¹⁰ Wanjira and Maluki, *Op cit.* p.2

different countries and diverse demographic backgrounds to mutually engage on issues that affect their lives.¹¹¹¹

According to Shield and Edwards,¹¹¹² students' mobility patterns from core countries to periphery countries have been deemed as mutually symbiotic and beneficial. More recently, attention to international educational exchanges trends have increased with emphasis on their potential for global influence.¹¹¹³ Within those analyses is the idea that international educational exchanges perform the key strategic function of leveraging the manner a country's image is perceived by the public in the home countries. The fundamental question which this part seeks to answer is, what has been the effect of China's educational exchanges with Africa on Africans perception of Chinese exchange programs and China's image in general?

It is important, for a country that seeks to increase understanding of its political system, culture and policies to endeavour and guarantee that exchange students acquire and pass on what they have learned to a large number of people back in their home country. It is within this context that the influence of China's educational exchange with African countries must be assessed. The key question to be answered pertains to whether China's educational exchanged with Africa has shaped African publics' perception of China and whether that perception has been positive or negative. This is the subject matter and aim of this part of the foregoing.

The perception of African students' beneficiaries of China's international students exchanges program and China's national image is mixed, with some having a positive view of China and its educational exchange program and others having a negative imagery of the same. For instance, according to Study International¹¹¹⁴ some African students find education in China quite attractive and consider the programs as being of high quality.

¹¹¹¹ Ibid. p.5

¹¹¹² Robin Shields and Rebecca Edwards, "Student Mobility and Emerging Hubs in Global Higher Education' in Laura M. Portnoi, Val. D Rust & Sylvia S. Bagley (eds), Higher Education, Policy and the Global Competition Phenomenon. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), p.237.

¹¹¹³ Charles Chia Sheng-Kai, "Higher Education Scholarships as a Soft Power Tool: An Analysis of its Role in the EU and Singapore." EU Center in Singapore. Working Paper No. 23 (2015), p.3

¹¹¹⁴ Study International Staff, *Op. Cit.*

Hannane Ferdjani¹¹¹⁵ studied African students in China and sought to evaluate their motivations to study in China as well as their views on China. He found that most of the African exchange students in China considered Beijing as the new centre for high-level scholarship. This implies that China is on the right track in projecting its educational soft power owing to its increasing global education competitiveness.

Nonetheless, Ferdjani¹¹¹⁶ study found that very few African students, out of the African student population attended China's top-level universities such as Fudan University, Peking University and Nanjing University. Beijing University, which is not among the top-seven most prestigious universities in China, is the most popular destination of African students. In 2012, Beijing University alone had 400 African students followed by Beijing Jiatong University, which had 200 African students.¹¹¹⁷

In comparison, Peking University had 30 African students enrolled in its various programs.¹¹¹⁸ In this sense, one can assume academic bias in how the top-level universities admit foreign students, especially African students. The fact that just a few Africans are enrolled in China's Ivy League universities deviates from its pronouncements that its educational engagement with Africa is based on equality and mutual benefits.

Adams Bono¹¹¹⁹ studied the experience of African exchange students in China and assessed their overall perception of the exchange system and of China. He finds that most students had a positive view of the China's international education exchange even though they cited that the amount awarded was not enough to cater for all their living expenses in China. Other African students studying in China who had prior knowledge of Chinese but little understanding of English cited that some of their programs were offered in English and that this was a huge problem for them.¹¹²⁰

¹¹¹⁵ Hannane Ferdjani, "African Students in China: An Exploration of Increasing Numbers and Their Motivations in Beijing," (Stellenbosch University. Center for Chinese Studies, 2012)

¹¹¹⁶ Ferdjani, *Op. Cit.* p.19

¹¹¹⁷ *Ibid.* p.17

¹¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* p.19

¹¹¹⁹ Bodomo, *Op. Cit.* p.24

¹¹²⁰ *Ibid.* p.24

In general, African students have relatively positive view of China, Chinese universities and China's educational sponsorship and exchange programs with Africa. Apart from the financing factor, African students have the perception that the Chinese universities have a good reputation and ranking, which underpin their decision to pursue their studies in these universities. In the study conducted by Ferdjani¹¹²¹ it was found that the type of course offered and the ranking of the university were the main determinant factors for African students resolve to study in China. The African students either studying in China or those who had studied in China were particularly interested in the Chinese economic model, its political system and Chinese science and technology. The students also had a positive view of Chinese language and culture.

Nonetheless, there are those that considered China's international student exchange program as unattractive and inconsequential for their previous negative notions about China. Students in this category point to wide scale racism and xenophobia experienced by African exchange students in China. According to Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho,¹¹²² African students in China perceive racialized attitudes towards them and Africans in general by the majority of Chinese. African students in China observe that racial hierarchies pervade the Chinese society and influence how African students are perceived within the class setting and outside university campuses. It is for this reason, why as Ho points out, many African students studying in China indicated that they were less likely to recommend to their friends and family members to pursue their studies in China.¹¹²³

These are drawbacks for China which is bent on using the international education programs to project a positive image of its national heritage to the foreign students. Rui Yang¹¹²⁴ argues that despite China's expansion and intensification of its international educational exchanges, the country remains deficit in soft power. Its use of education exchange program for international exchange students remains far less effective than anticipated. The reason for this can be found in African students' concerns about the

¹¹²¹ Ferdjani, *Op. Cit.* p.19

¹¹²² Ho, "African Students Drawn to China Often Rebuffed by Racism",

¹¹²³ Ibid.

¹¹²⁴ Yang, *Op. Cit. The Rise of China-US International Cooperation in Higher Education.* p.1

Chinese quality of education, government interferences in the exchange programs and consistency.

5.8 China's Educational Diplomacy in Kenya

China's educational engagements with Kenya predate Kenya's independent. In 1957, Kenyan students were among the eleven African students that had gone to China for studies and were part of the 24 Africans that had obtained CGSs to study in Chinese universities by the end of the 1950s.¹¹²⁵ Educational cooperation with Kenya formed part of the agenda for Chinese Prime Minister, Li Keqiang's visit to Kenya in May 2014.¹¹²⁶ The Chinese premier committed China to facilitate the establishment of an ultra-modern joint laboratory for crop molecular biology that was to cost KES 5.1 billion.¹¹²⁷ China has awarded scholarships and educational exchange opportunities to Kenyan students, policymakers and scholars to visit China and learn its distinct cultural materials and traditional values.

China's educational engagement with Kenya occurs through two interrelated frameworks. The first framework relates to China's direct engagement with Kenya through CIs and through the awarding of CGS. While in the previous chapter have been examined mainly as frameworks for the actualization of Chinese cultural diplomacy in Kenya, these institutions also form the critical platform for the implementation of Chinese educational relations with Kenya. According to Owaki *et al.*,¹¹²⁸ China seeks to transform the CI system into a significant force not only for cultural exchange but also for educational exchange with the aim of shaping perceptions about China abroad.

It has been established that China established its first CI in Kenya at the University of Nairobi in December of 2005. The focus of the UONCI was two-fold; one, to enhance China's image in Kenya through teaching of Chinese culture and language; and two, to

¹¹²⁵ Li Anshan, "African Students in China: Research, Reality, and Reflection", *African Studies Quarterly*, Volume 17, Number 4, (2018), pp. 5 – 44.

¹¹²⁶ Lillian Tunai Mulati, "China-Kenya Relations: Analysis of Its Nature Since Independence," *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science*, Volume 3, Number 10, (2019), p.744

¹¹²⁷ Ibid. p. 744

¹¹²⁸ Methody Florian Owaki *et al.*, "Chinese Language Teaching and Learning in Kenya in the Prospects of China's Reform and Opening-up. Educational Process: International Journal, Volume 8 Number 3, (2019), p.176

enhance China's educational cooperation with Kenya through engagement with Kenya's institutions of higher learning and managing scholarships for Kenyan students. The UONCI became China's largest investment in education in Africa and in any university in Kenya.¹¹²⁹

The UONCI acts as a resource hub for professionals teaching Chinese.¹¹³⁰ In line with this, the UONCI organized an African Youth Exchange Program in 2016 dubbed the "Chinese Bridge". This initiative involved the participation of 50 colleges and universities from both China and Kenya, and was attended by students and faculty members from Chinese universities and Kenyan universities. In this sense, the potential for the CI to act as the focal point and loci for China's educational exchange program with Kenya is perceptible.

Other CIs were subsequently established at other local universities including at Kenyatta University (KUCI), Egerton University (EUCI), and Moi University (MUCI).¹¹³¹ These CIs offer multiple programs including Certificate in Chinese Language and Culture', it also offers 'Beginners in Chinese Language and Culture,' and more importantly, 'Proficiency in Chinese Language and Culture.' Nonetheless, while all the CIs in Kenya imparts the speaking, reading, writing and listening of Chinese language among the Kenyan students, their educational significance is huge. For instance, KUCI had by 2018, trained more than 3,000 students and 120 students from the university had acquired scholarships to attend post-graduate studies in China.¹¹³²

Both directly through the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (CMFA) and through the Chinese Ministry of Education (CMOE), China has awarded several scholarship opportunities that has seen Kenyan students either go for full-course studies in China or attend short-term exchange programs in China. Today China is the largest single

¹¹²⁹ Tao, *Op. cit.*, p.126

¹¹³⁰ UONCI, University of Nairobi Confucius Institute 2009. (UONCI, Information Booklet. Nairobi: UONCI, 2009).

¹¹³¹ Shoemaker, *Op. cit.*, p.41.

¹¹³² *Xinhua*, "Interview: China-Kenya cultural exchanges on the right trajectory as benefits spread", *Xinhua*, 27 Mar. 2018. <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/27/c_137067533.htm> (Accessed: 27 July 2021)

issuer of higher education scholarship for students from Africa, awarding some 12,000 out of 30,000 distributed by top 50 international donors.¹¹³³

Kenya has been a key beneficiary of the CGS, which has resulted in thousands of Kenyan students attending Chinese universities in China. In 2017, 1,400 Kenyans were enrolled in various Chinese universities. This was following Beijing's implementation of its scholarship quota in 2011 that resulted in the awarding of 1,000 scholarships to Kenyan students to study in China. In 2018, just under a year later, the number of Kenyan students in China according to the Chinese ambassador to Kenya, was 2,400.¹¹³⁴ Between 2016 and 2018, China had provided training opportunities to at least 67,000 Kenyan.

5.9 Chapter Summary

This chapter has examined the role of Chinese educational exchanges on China's image in Kenya. Through the analysis of secondary and primary sources, it has found that Chinese cultural diplomacy has had some significant influence on how Kenyan publics perceive China's image. It was established that Kenyan students and scholars, who have been beneficiaries of the Chinese scholarships and educational exchange programs have in general adopted a positive perception of China's national image. The next chapter provides the summary of the major findings, and a discussion of the research findings.

¹¹³³ Wachira Kigotho, "China Increases Scholarships to Students from Sub-Saharan Africa", *University World News*, November 26, 2020. <

<https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=2020112410303875>> [Accessed: July 27, 2021]

¹¹³⁴ Stefan Trines, "New Benefactors? How China and India are Influencing Education in Africa," *World Education News Review*, April 30, 2019. < <https://wenr.wes.org/2019/04/how-china-and-india-are-influencing-education-in-africa>> [Accessed: June 16, 2021]

CHAPTER SIX: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter, which was Chapter Five examined the role of Chinese educational exchanges on China's image in Kenya. Hence, it sought to address the question; what is the effect, if any, of China's educational exchange programs and scholarships on Kenyan publics' imagery of China? It established that Chinese educational exchange diplomacy has had some significant influence on how Kenyan publics perceive China's image. It further found that Kenyan students and scholars, who have been beneficiaries of the Chinese scholarships and educational exchange programs have in general adopted a positive perception of China's national image.

This chapter focuses on analyzing and discussing this study's findings as per its guiding specific objectives and research questions. As per the specific objectives of this study, this chapter centres on examining the data relating to; the influence of Chinese media on perception of China's image in Kenya; the role of Chinese Cultural Institutes and Centres on the image of China in Kenya; and the role of Chinese educational exchanges on China's image in Kenya. As such, this chapter analyzes and discusses the role and influence of the various aspects of China's public diplomacy engagement in Kenya on Kenyan's perception of China's national image.

It applies a mixed methods approach comprising of interpretivist approaches including content analysis and thematic review, and positivist approaches especially inferential statistics in order to achieve the stated objectives. The inferential statistics used include cross-tabulation analysis, correlation analysis, regression analysis and Chi-Square tests.

6.2 The Influence of Public Diplomacy on China's National Image in Kenya

6.2.1 Background Information

This part provides the background information of the research respondents. Specifically, it provides the response rate and the demographics including gender, age, level of education, category of respondents' institution, and level of familiarity with public diplomacy. It also provides findings relating to awareness of whether Chinese government has engaged Kenyan public, whether respondents listen to, watch or read

Chinese media, whether respondents have visited China on Chinese government scholarships or whether they are aware of someone who has, and if the respondents can speak Mandarin.

6.2.1.1 Response Rate

The response rate is the percentage of the number of complete responses acquired per the number of surveys issued.

$$\text{Response Rate} = \frac{\text{Total Number of Responses Returned}}{\text{Surveys Sent Out}} \times 100$$

Considering that 400 questionnaires were issued out, and that 332 complete in-filled ones were retrieved from the field, it was found that the response rate was 83 per cent, *inter alia*;

$$\begin{aligned} &= \frac{332 \times 100}{400} \\ &= 83 \% \end{aligned}$$

This response rate is acceptable considering that Morton, Bandara, Robinson and Carr¹¹³⁵ posit that a response rate that is over 60 per cent suffices does not suffer non-response bias. The distribution of the responses is as shown in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Response Rate

	Frequency (f)	Per cent (%)
Responded	332	83
Did not complete questionnaire	13	3.25
Did not respond	55	13.75
Sample Size Total	400	100

¹¹³⁵ Susan M. B. Morton, Dinusha K. Bandara, Elizabeth M. Robinson, and Polly E. Atatoa Carr, "In the 21st Century, What is an Acceptable Response Rate," *Australian N. Z. J. Public Health*, Volume 36, Number 2, pp. 106 – 108.

6.2.1.2 Demographics

The following are results relating to respondent's demographics.

6.2.1.3. Gender

Figure 6.1 shows the results when the research participants were categorized by gender. As shown, 55 per cent were male and 45 per cent were female. This means that slightly more men than women participated in this study.




Figure 6.1: Respondents Classified by Gender

6.2.1.4 Age

Table 6.2 shows respondents when classified by age. As shown, 39.8 per cent were aged between 21 and 30 years old, 35.8 per cent were between 31 and 40 years, 16 per cent were aged 41 years and above, and 7.5 per cent were below 20 years old. In this sense, the respondents were spread across all the ages even though those falling between the ages of 21 and 40 years were especially represented in the sample.

Table 6.2: Respondents Classified by Age

Age	Frequency (f)	Per cent (%)
Below 20 Yrs.	25	7.5
21 to 30 Yrs.	132	39.8
31 to 40 Yrs.	33	35.8
41 Yrs. and above	56	16.9
Total	332	100

6.2.1.5 Level of Education

Figure 6.2 shows the results when the respondents were grouped according to their highest level of academic attainment. As shown, 39.5 per cent had a Bachelor's degree, 21.4 per cent had a college diploma, 21.7 had a certificate (or below), 14.2 per cent had a Master's degree, and 3.3 per cent had a PhD. The results show that the respondents came from all academic levels, but those with bachelor's degree formed the single largest group.




Figure: 6.2: Respondents Classified by Level of Education

6.2.1.6 Category of Institution

Table 6.3 shows the results when the respondents were grouped according to the institutions from which they came. As shown, 9.9 per cent were from government ministry, 9.9 per cent from the media, 10.8 per cent from university and colleges, 9.9 per cent from private sector (formal business) and 10.5 per cent were from private sector (informal business). Nine-point-three per cent indicated they were from the religious organizations, 9.6 from the security sector, another 9.6 per cent from the civil society (CS), 10.2 per cent, county governments and 9.9 per cent from the political parties. This result shows that the ten target institutions were well represented in this study with a standard deviation (SD) of 2.87961.

Table 6.3: Respondents Classified by Category of Institution

Institution	Frequency (f)	Per cent (%)
Government Ministry	33	9.9
Media	33	9.9
University and Colleges	36	10.8
Private Sector - Formal Business	33	9.9
Private Sector - Informal Business	35	10.5
Religious Organization	31	9.3
Security Sector	32	9.6
Civil Society	32	9.6
County Government	34	10.2
Political Parties	33	9.9
Total	332	100

6.2.1.7 Descriptive Analysis of Respondents Feedback on Chinese Public Diplomacy

Table 6.4 below shows the results that were obtained when respondents were asked questions relating to Chinese public diplomacy. As shown, 87.7 per cent of the respondents were familiar with the term ‘Public Diplomacy’ while 12.3 per cent were not. This suggests that most of the respondents were able to understand the questions that were asked concerning public diplomacy. Seventy-nine-point-eight per cent were aware of how Chinese government had engaged Kenyan public and that 20.2 per cent were not. Table 2.4 further shows that 31 per cent listened, watched or read Chinese media including radio, television, newspapers and magazines, and that 69 per cent do listen to, watch or read Chinese media. This suggests that there is a low penetration of

Chinese media among the Kenyan public, which further implies that Chinese public diplomacy efforts through the media may have little impact on Kenyan public.

This study found that 90.7 per cent of respondents had not had a chance to study in China on Chinese government scholarship while 9.3 per cent had. Sixty-point-two per cent were not aware of someone who was a beneficiary of Chinese government scholarship and 39.8 per cent were aware of people who had been beneficiaries of Chinese government scholarship. Ninety-five-point-eight per cent of the respondents could not speak Mandarin while only 4.3 per cent indicated they could speak Mandarin. This shows that Mandarin has not penetrated the Kenyan public and suggests that it is not a popular foreign language among the Kenyan public.

Table 6.4: Descriptive Analysis of Respondents Feedback on Chinese Public Diplomacy

Statement	Yes %	No %	Total %
Familiar with the term ‘Public Diplomacy’	87.7	12.3	100
Aware of how Chinese government has engaged Kenyan public	79.8	20.2	100
Listen, watch, read Chinese Media (Radio, TV, Newspapers or Magazines)	31	69	100
Have had a chance to study in China on Chinese government scholarship	9.3	90.7	100
Aware of a beneficiary of Chinese government scholarship	39.8	60.2	100
Can you speak Mandarin	4.2	95.8	100

6.2.1.8 Influence of Chinese Public Diplomacy on China’s National Image in Kenya

Figure 6.3 shows the results when the respondents were asked whether they agreed that there was a relationship between Chinese public diplomacy and Kenyan public perceptions of China’s national image. As show, the majority of the respondents 79 per cent said yes and a smaller number 21 per cent said no.




Figure 6.3: Influence of Chinese Public Diplomacy on China’s National Image in Kenya

The respondents were asked to comment on the relationship between how the Chinese governments has engaged Kenyan public and how China is perceived. The respondents provided varied answers. Some of the respondents, who made the majority, argued that Chinese government scholarships and exchange programs had made Kenyans see China as a country dedicated to assisting the development of Kenya’s human capital. The Chinese media was also viewed as having helped spread information about China in Kenya and that Kenyans were increasingly viewing China positively.

Some respondents, while agreeing that the Chinese government had engaged the Kenyan public noted that this relationship did not benefit Kenya, as it was mainly more beneficial to China and not Kenya. Some considered other areas of Chinese diplomatic engagement in Kenya to be counterproductive to China in terms of gaining public trust in Kenya.

Accordingly, this group argued that the interest rates that China ties to its infrastructural development in Kenya as an issue, which has drained Kenyan public’s perception of China’s national image. Furthermore, Chinese loans to Kenya, are viewed by the public as serving China’s covert agenda of entrapping Kenya to take loans, which it cannot pay, which then allows the Chinese government to establish a strong controlling power on Kenyan the infrastructures that Kenya has used as collateral.

6.2.1.9 Influence of Chinese Media Operations in Kenya on Kenyan's Perception of China

The respondents were asked to comment on how Chinese media operating in Kenya had influenced their perception of and thinking about China. The respondents provided varied answers. Some commented that the presence of Chinese media in Kenya had helped them understand China more and that in so doing had made them develop a positive perception of China's political system and culture. Some respondents indicated that they had broadened their understanding of Chinese culture by watching news and documentaries about China and by watching Chinese films.

Among those that listened to, watched or read Chinese media are those who argued that China indicated that Chinese media has made them see China as a tip-top highly technologically advanced country relative to other Asian countries. Others commented that by interacting with Chinese media in Kenya, they have come to see China and the Chinese as being good in business. Some of these respondents argue that they have come to see Chinese business dealings with Kenya as a good thing for Kenya, and that China is a good trade and development partner for Kenya.

However, some respondents commented that the presence of Chinese media in Kenya had not influenced their perception of China. Some of these respondents considered Chinese media as aimed at advancing China's influence across the globe. In fact, among this group are those that viewed Chinese media presence in Kenya negatively, argued that Chinese media was playing a role in facilitating the re-colonization of Kenya by China by spreading Chinese culture, language and values.

Others commented that having interacted with Chinese media operating in Kenya, they have come to see China as being on a mission to takeover (re-colonize) Africa and cautioned about learning Mandarin. There are also those who saw Chinese media operating in Kenya as capitalizing on the weakness of Kenyan media to provide authentic information about China and other international affairs, and in so doing, spreading misinformation and half-truths and Chinese perspectives on China and world affairs.

6.2.1.10 Lived, Studied or Worked in China

Figure 2.6 shows the results obtained regarding whether respondents had lived, worked or studied in China. As shown, 95 per cent of the respondents had not lived, worked or studied in China while 5 per cent indicated that they had lived, worked or studied in China. This shows that very few, among the Kenyan public had been to China, which further suggests that there is limited first-hand experience of China among the Kenyan public.




Figure 6.4: Lived, Studied or Worked in China

6.2.1.11 Interview Results:

This part examines the data collected from the survey and interviews conducted in Kenya's capital Nairobi, concerning China's public diplomacy and how China's PD has influenced its image in Kenya. It first examines the findings from the interviews followed by findings from the survey. In total 400 Nairobi residents were polled, while 6 selected key informants from each cohort were interviewed.

6.2.1.12 How Can You Describe the Image of China in Kenya?

During the interview, the researcher queried the interviews concerning their views on China's image. When asked if they saw a connection between China's PD in Kenya and its national image in Kenya, nearly all the key informants indicated that China's PD was a national branding strategy aimed at enhancing Kenyan public's attitude towards China. However, the interviewees had two views on the impact of China's PD on its national image in Kenya. These views can be grouped into two different categories;

The first group are those who saw a connection between China's PD and China's image in Kenya. This group pointed out that China's increased PD in Kenya through various channels or tools including Chinese Media, the CI and CGS have made China to be considered as a "friend" and a development partner with interest in Kenya's economic development. This group mostly comprised on government employees in the MFA. The majority of interviews described China as "Friendly" while a significant number described China as "Overly Friendly". Another group within this category considered China as "untruthful", yet another group considered China as "economically powerful". One of the interviewees from the media cohort stated that "*The leadership of China seems to be focused on trying to control much of the world through China's PD efforts in the developing world.*"

The second category of key informants indicated no significant influence of China's PD on how Kenyans perceived China. They revealed that China's PD had no effect on Kenyan's view of China's presence in Kenya. This group mostly comprised key informants in the non-policy areas. An interviewee from the media cohort who fell in this category of pessimists of China's image in Kenya opined that China practices a "*debt-trap diplomacy*" for economic and political gain. *China is using debt to trap Kenya to increase its leverage over the Kenyan government.* This group of interviewees therefore found nothing good or mutually beneficial in China's PD effort in Kenya but adopted a pessimistic view of China's presence.

6.2.1.13 What Has Contributed or Shaped the Image as Described Above?

The interviewees' reasons for characterizing China as "friendly", "overly friendly", "unfriendly", "untruthful" and "debt trap" were considered and the researcher asked the interviewees to explain their imagery of China in this way. Those who thought that China was "Friendly" cited China's close diplomatic ties with successive Kenyan governments since Kenya's independence. These group argued that China's PD efforts in Kenya was a reflection of China's close ties with Kenya. An interviewee from the government ministry cohort opined that "*China has long been a friend to Kenya and its current increased PD in Kenya is a reflection of that closeness and friendship*". They suggested that China was "Overly Friendly" cited that China did not share nearly

similar close ties with neighboring countries and implied that China had a covert interest in Kenya.

The group that argued that China was “untruthful” perceived Chinese media as not being truthful in reporting on China or covering stories associated with China. They pointed out that China was being untruthful so that it can realize its goals in Kenya. The group that deemed China as economically powerful, cited China’s economic influence in Kenya and the global economy. One of the interviewees posited that China was a threat to global peace stating that, “*China only appears to be interested in global peace but it doesn’t contribute to global peace, it is only interested in obtaining raw materials from Africa and doesn’t care if Africans are killing each other*”.

6.3 Impact of Chinese Media on Kenyan Public’s Perception of China’s Image

This section of the chapter presents the results of the survey relating to the impact of Chinese Media on how Kenyan publics perceive China. The results are presented using a mix of descriptive statistics including frequency tables and bar graphs.

6.3.1 China Radio International as a Source of Information for Kenyan Public

The research respondents were asked to indicate whether they listened to China Radio International (CRI) programmes as a source of information about China. As shown in Figure 6.5, 53.6 per cent of the respondents strongly disagreed, 19.6 per cent disagreed, 20.2 indicated they listened to CRI sometimes, 4.5 per cent and 2.1 per cent of agreed and strongly agreed, respectively, that they listened CRI’s programmes to acquire information about China.

In this regard, it is apparent that very few among the Kenyan public listened to CRI programmes as a source of information about China. This is worrisome given that CRI has established a strong presence in the Kenyan airwaves. CRI has established partnerships with local radio stations and has added in addition to English and Kiswahili

six new languages in its Kenya broadcasts. Furthermore, CRI has cooperated with the national broadcaster KBC.¹¹³⁶




Figure 6.5: CRI as a Source of Information for Kenyan Public

6.3.2 Kenyan Public Reliance on CRI and CCTV for International News

Table 6.5 shows the results when the respondents were asked to show whether they relied on CRI and China Central Television (CCTV) for their international news. As is indicated in Table 3.6, 34.9 per cent strongly disagreed, 22.9 per cent disagreed, 22.5 indicated that they ‘sometimes’ rely in CRI and CCTV for international news. Eleven-point-four per cent agreed, and 4.8 per cent strongly agreed that they relied on these media for their international news.

From these findings, it is clear that more than half of the respondents do not rely on either CRI or CCTV for international news. In fact, just a quarter of the respondents relied on CRI or CCTV for news about the world. What this indicates is that Kenyan’s do not consider the Chinese media operating in Kenya as their preferred source of information about the world. It can be inferred that Chinese media (particularly CRI and CCTV) are not well trusted by the Kenyan public. This finding confirms an earlier study by Herman Wasserman¹¹³⁷ in 2017 that sought to understand Chinese media reception and consumption in sub-Saharan Africa. That study established that very few Kenyan respondents sourced their information from Chinese media. Nonetheless, they

¹¹³⁶ Grassi *Op cit.* p.4

¹¹³⁷ Wasserman Madrid-Morales, *Op. cit.* pp. 2212 – 2231.


contrast with those made by Guyo and Yu¹¹³⁸ who found that Kenyan’s reception of Chinese media content, especially CCTV was fairly satisfactory.

Table 6.5: Kenyan Public Reliance on CRI and CCTV for International News

	Frequency (f)	Per cent (%)
Strongly Disagree	116	34.9
Disagree	76	22.9
Sometimes	86	25.9
Agree	38	11.4
Strongly Agree	16	4.8
Total	332	100

6.3.3 Perception of Whether Chinese Media Spread of Good News about China

The research respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement that Chinese media in Kenya do spread good news about China. As shown in Figure 6.6, 30.7 per cent of the respondents were moderate, 28 per cent strongly disagreed, and 21.4 per cent disagreed. Ten-point-five per cent and 9.3 per cent of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed respectively that Chinese media spread good news about China.



¹¹³⁸ Abdirizak Garo Guyo and Hong Yu, “How is the Performance of Chinese News Media in Kenya? An Analysis of Perceived Audience Reception and Motivation”, *New Media and Mass Communication*, Volume 79, (2019), p. 54.

Figure 6.3: Perception of Whether Chinese Media Spread Good News about China

These findings reveal that Chinese media is perceived by most respondents as not spreading good news about China is in contrast the finding made by Zhang and Mwangi¹¹³⁹ in earlier study of Kenyan's perception of Chinese Media engagement in Kenya. In that study, it was found that Kenyan's viewed Chinese media as helping them understand China.¹¹⁴⁰ However, even that study noted that Chinese media engagement in Kenya had not yielded the desired effects of projecting Chinese soft power in a positive way.¹¹⁴¹

6.3.4 Perception of Whether Chinese Media Spreads Accurate News about China

The respondents were prompted in the questionnaire to indicate whether Chinese media spreads accurate information about China. As shown in Figure 6.7, 28 per cent of the respondents chose "moderate", 24 per cent strongly agreed, and 16 per cent agreed. However, 18 per cent of the respondents disagreed and 14 per cent strongly disagreed that Chinese media spread accurate information about China.

These results show that close to half of the respondents (40 per cent) trusted information about China that is disseminated by Chinese media. Nonetheless, a there is a noteworthy mistrust of information about China by Chinese media with 32 per cent expressly indicated that they do not trust these media. The number of respondents choosing to be non-partisan was also noteworthy (28 per cent).

This finding supports an earlier finding by Zhang and Mwangi¹¹⁴² that the presence of China's media in Kenya is a balance between positive and negative perceptions. It has found that respondents are almost equally split in their perception of the accuracy of information about China disseminated by Chinese media in Kenya, with some viewing it as accurate and others as inaccurate.

¹¹³⁹ Zhang and Mwangi, *Op. cit.*, pp. 71 – 80.

¹¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.* p. 71.

¹¹⁴¹ *Ibid.* p. 71.

¹¹⁴² Zhang and Mwangi, *Op. cit.*, p. 75.




Figure 6.7: Perception of Whether Chinese Media Spreads Accurate News about China

6.3.5 Kenyans Perception of Chinese Media as a Tool for Chinese Propaganda

The respondents were asked to indicate whether they considered Chinese media as propaganda tool for the Communist Party of China (CPC). As shown in Table 6.6, 26.8 per cent strongly agreed and 15.7 per cent agreed respectively that Chinese media were propaganda tools for the CPC. Twenty-point-five per cent of the respondents indicated they were moderate, 20.8 per cent strongly disagreed and 16.3 per cent disagreed.

More specifically, a slightly greater number of the respondents (42.5 per cent) agreed that the Chinese media were propaganda tools for the CPC compared to 37.1 per cent who disagreed expressly. A noteworthy number of the respondents, that is; 20.5 per cent were however non-committal stating exactly where they stood. In general, it can be inferred from the findings that Kenyan's are almost evenly divided in their opinion as to whether Chinese media are propaganda tools for the CPC. Nonetheless, there is a slight bias towards the opinion that Chinese media are instruments of propaganda for China in Kenya.

These findings reflect previous findings by Guyo and Yu¹¹⁴³ when they determined that 48.2 per cent of respondents considered the content in Chinese media as propaganda compared 15.2 per cent who disagreed. Chinese media are supposed to create a positive

¹¹⁴³ Guyo and Yu, *Op cit.* p.62

image of China, nonetheless, there operations in Kenya seems to have failed to create a perception among Kenyan’s that they are independent and trustworthy sources of genuine information about China.

Table 6.6: Kenyans Perception of China as a Tool for Chinese Propaganda

	Frequency (f)	Per cent (%)
Strongly Disagree	69	20.8
Disagree	54	16.3
Moderate	68	20.5
Agree	52	15.7
Strongly Agree	89	26.8
Total	332	100

6.3.6 Interview Results:

6.3.6.1 How China Has Used the Media to Advance its Image in Kenya?

A significant proportion of the interviews were of the opinion that the Chinese media in Kenya was one of the channels through which China has resorted to create an understanding of China’s culture, foreign policy and domestic politics. They cited several Chinese media firms currently operating in Kenya as potential sources for information on China. An interviewee belonging to the Kenyan Ministry posited that that *“the presence of Chinese media in Kenya was good as it enabled Kenyans to receive authentic news about China”*.

Another interviewee from this cohort said that *“if something is deemed harmful to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Chinese media will not report it but will instead will make up a story”*. A professor from the university and college cohort pointed *“for me, the Chinese media are mainly state-owned are the mouthpiece of the Chinese government in Kenya, do you expect them to provide you with anything authentic about China or its owner”*.

6.3.6.2 What is the Influence of Media on Kenyans Perception of China?

While interviewees agreed that Chinese media in Kenya was geared towards communicating China to the Kenyans with an aim of shaping their view of China

positively, the majority of the key informants indicated that the influence of the Chinese media was limited. Some of the interviews explained that the influence of Chinese media on China’s image among Kenyans was limited due to the fact that few Kenyans watch or read Chinese mass media to get information about China.

6.4 Impact of Chinese Confucius Institutes on the Image of China in Kenya

This section of the chapter presents the results of a survey relating to the influence of Chinese cultural centres and institutes on China’s image among the Kenyan public. The results are presented using a mix of descriptive statistics including frequency tables and bar graphs.

6.4.1 Perception of Emotional Bond to Chinese Culture

Figure 6.8 shows the results from the respondents when asked their opinion as to whether they felt a strong emotional bond with the Chinese culture. As shown, 32.5 per cent of the respondents strongly disagreed, 22 per cent disagreed, 22.3 per cent strongly agreed, 10.2 per cent agree and 13 per cent were moderate. This essentially means that a greater number of the respondents 54.5 per cent felt they had no strong emotional attachment to Chinese culture compared to 32.5 per cent who agreed. This further suggests that Kenyans are passive recipient of Chinese culture and have no sense of emotional attachment to that culture. This may also point to the ineffectiveness of Chinese cultural centres and the CI to make Chinese culture appeal to Kenyans at an emotional level.




Figure 6.8: Kenyan’s Perception of an Emotional Bond to Chinese Culture

6.4.2 Kenyan's Competence in Mandarin Language

The respondents were asked to indicate whether Kenyans they were competent in Mandarin language skills. The results obtained are as shown in Table 6.7. As shown, 59.9% of the respondents strongly disagreed that Kenyans are competent in Mandarin language skills. 18.7 per cent disagreed, 15.7 per cent were non-committal and answered moderate, and 3.6 per cent and 2.1 per cent agreed and strongly agreed, respectively

More specifically, most of the respondents, that is; 78.6 percent were not competent in Mandarin language skills compared to just 5.8 per cent. These findings suggest two things; one that the Chinese cultural centres and CI in Kenya have not done a good job in 'selling' Mandarin to Kenyans and demonstrating the possible benefits inherent in their learning the language. Two, the findings also suggest that perhaps Kenyan's do not find Mandarin appealing and worthwhile as a language, which again points at the ineffectiveness of Chinese cultural diplomacy in Kenya.

Table 6.7: Kenyan's Competence in Mandarin Language

	Frequency (f)	Per cent (%)
Strongly Disagree	199	59.9
Disagree	62	18.7
Moderate	52	15.7
Agree	12	3.6
Strongly Agree	7	2.1
Total	332	100

6.4.3 Perception of Chinese Cultural Centres' Ability to Educate Kenyans on Chinese Culture

Figure 6.9 shows the results when the respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement on whether Chinese cultural centres had the ability to educate Kenyans on the different aspects of China's national values, Chinese culture and Chinese language. As shown, 26.2 per cent were moderate, 22.9 per cent agreed, 22.9 per cent strongly agreed, 14.8 per cent disagreed and 13.6 per cent strongly disagreed.

In this sense, a greater number of the respondents, 45.8 per cent were of the opinion that the Chinese cultural centres were able to educate Kenyans on Chinese cultural values and language compared to 28.4 per cent who disagreed. It was also noticed that a significant number of the respondents, 26.2 per cent were non-committal and answered ‘moderate’. Two reasons may be given for this. One is that probably the respondents were not aware of the ability of these centres to educate Kenyans on Chinese cultural values and language. Two is that, probably they knew that these cultural centres could not realize this goal of educating Kenyans on Chinese cultural values and language, and chose to answer moderate because they deemed this answer as the most politically safe answer.




Figure 6.9: Perception of Chinese Cultural Centres’ Ability to Educate Kenyans on Chinese Culture

6.4.4 Perception of the Confucius Institutes as a Tool for Expanding Chinese Business Empire in Kenya.

Table 6.8 shows respondents’ feedback when asked whether they considered CI as a tool for expanding Chinese Business Empire in Kenya. As shown, 28.9 per cent of the respondents strongly agreed, 21.7 per cent agreed, 25.9 per cent answered ‘moderate’, 14.2 per cent disagreed, and 9.3 per cent strongly disagreed. These findings show that majority Kenyans have a negative perception of the Chinese cultural centres given that 50.6 per cent of the respondents viewed the CI as a tool for expanding Chinese business empire in Kenya compared to 23.5 per cent who thought otherwise. This also points to the fact that the CI has failed to dissociate itself from Beijing and as such is seen as tool

for the PRC to advance its national interests in Kenya rather than a platform for extending cultural relations between the Chinese and Kenyans.

It is also notable that a significant number of respondents, 25.9 per cent (about a quarter) answered ‘moderate’. This suggests that either they felt the question was political and their sensitive to answer or probably they were necessarily not sure of how they perceived the CI in Kenya.

Table 6.8: Kenyan’s Perception of the Confucius Institute

	Frequency (f)	Per cent (%)
Strongly Disagree	31	9.3
Disagree	47	14.2
Moderate	86	25.9
Agree	72	21.7
Strongly Agree	96	28.9
Total	332	100

6.4.5 Perception of Confucius Institutes as a Tool for China’s Propaganda in Kenya

Figure 6.10 shows the results when the respondents were asked to indicate whether they perceived the CI as a tool for China’s propaganda in Kenya. As shown, 23.2 per cent of the respondents strongly agreed, 16.3 per cent agreed, 24.1 per cent disagreed, 14.5 per cent strongly disagreed, and 22 per cent answered ‘moderate’. More specifically, a 39.5 per cent of the respondents considered the CI as a tool for China’s propaganda in Kenya and 38.6 per cent were of the contrary opinion.

Therefore, the respondents were almost evenly divided on their perception of the CI as a tool for China’s propaganda in Kenya. Nonetheless, a significant number of respondents 22 per cent answered ‘moderate’. Two things can be inferred from this; one either they did were not sure about the CI exact role or they were sure but chose to take what they deemed the safest answer.




Figure 6.10: Perception of CI as a Tool for China’s Propaganda in Kenya

6.4.6 Interview Results:

6.4.6.1 How China Used the Confucius Institutes to Communicate China?

The interviews identified the CI as another tool of Chinese diplomacy in Kenya that China has used to disseminate information about China. The majority of the interviewees indicated that they perceived the CI as tools used by the China’s government to pursue China’s PD objectives in Kenya.

6.4.6.2 How Does Confucius Institute Shape Kenyans Opinions on China?

Compared to Chinese media, most of the interviews observed that these Classes were only able to influence the opinions of only those who attended the classes with limited influence on the rest of the public and especially those in small towns and rural areas where institutions had no presence. Comparatively, the interviewees especially those from the university cohort suggested that CIs had a greater influence on Kenyan public’s opinion about China.

6.5 Impact of Chinese Educational Diplomacy on China’s Image in Kenya

This section of the chapter presents the results of the survey relating to the influence of Chinese educational diplomacy and exchanges with Kenya on Kenyan publics’ perception of China’s image. The results are presented using a mix of descriptive statistics including frequency tables and bar graphs.

6.5.1 Kenyan Public Appreciation China's Educational Exchange Program

The research participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement that they appreciated China for its educational exchange program that included hosting Kenyan students. The results obtained as shown in Table 6.9. As shown, 12.7 per cent of the respondents strongly disagreed, 11.1 per cent disagreed, 30.1 per cent answered somewhat, 30.4 per cent agreed and 15.7 per cent strongly agreed that they appreciated China for its exchange program and hosting Kenyan students. In general, more respondents appreciated China for hosting Kenyan students compared to those who did not. Nonetheless, a significant proportion of the respondents only somewhat appreciated China for that.

These findings point to two things in relations to China's exchange diplomacy with Kenya. First, it shows that China's educational exchange with Kenya has a potential to sway Kenyan publics' imagery of China. Second, the number of respondents who did not appreciate China's educational exchange diplomacy with Kenya suggests that China needs to improve this approach to public diplomacy to ensure the realization of the desired outcomes. This is necessary so as to positively influence the perception of the proportion of the Kenyan public who only 'somewhat' appreciate China's educational exchange with Kenya.

Table 6.9: Kenyan Public Appreciation China's Educational Exchange Program

	Frequency (f)	Per cent (%)
Strongly Disagree	42	12.7
Disagree	37	11.1
Somewhat	100	30.1
Agree	101	30.4
Strongly Agree	52	15.7
Total	332	100

6.5.2 Perception of China’s Political System and Cultural Values by Kenyan Students Returning from China

The research participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement on whether Kenyan students returning from China viewed China’s political systems and Chinese cultural values positively. As shown, in Figure 6.11, 17.5 per cent of the respondent strongly disagreed that Kenyan students returning from China viewed China’s political systems and Chinese cultural values positively, 18.4 disagreed, 35.8 per cent answered that they were undecided, 16.9 per cent agreed and 11.1 per cent strongly agreed.

In this sense, 36.2 per cent of the Kenyan students returning from China had a negative view of China’s political system and cultural values compared to 28.2 per cent who had a positive view of China. The number of respondents who had an undecided view of China’s political system and cultural values was rather large, 35 per cent. These research findings suggest that China’s educational exchange has had little effect on shaping the perception about China’s political system and the Chinese cultural values of Kenyan students who study in China. It further implies that China needs to enhance its educational exchange program to ensure that a positive image of China is imparted among the Kenyan students that go partake in exchange programs in China.




Figure 6.12: Perception of China’s Political System and Cultural Values by Kenyan Students Returning from China

6.5.3 Perception of Decrease in Prejudice and Misconception of China by Kenyan Students Returning from China

Figure 6.13 shows the results that were obtained when the research participants were asked whether they agreed or disagreed that there was a decrease in misconception and prejudice of China by Kenyan student returnees from China. As shown, 12 per cent of the respondents strongly agreed, 29 per cent agreed, 34 per cent were undecided, 13 per cent disagreed and 12 per cent strongly disagreed.

More specifically, the proportion of respondent who thought there had been a decrease in misconception and prejudice of China by Kenyan student returnees from China totaled 41 per cent compared to 25 per cent who disagreed. The larger number of returning students who manifest a reduced level of prejudice and misconception about China implies that China's educational exchange diplomacy is working, at least to an extent. Nevertheless, the number of the undecided respondents was large (34 per cent). This implies that China needs to do more to help the Kenyan students studying in China develop a deeper understanding of its cultural products and its policies. This would enable the students shed off prejudices and misconceptions they might have had about China prior to their visiting China.




Figure 6.13: Perception of Decrease in Prejudice and Misconception of China by Kenyan Students Returning from China

6.5.4 Likelihood of Kenyan Students Returning from China to Recommend China to Fellow Students, Friends and Relatives

The respondents were asked their opinion about whether they thought that Kenyan students returning from China were likely to recommend China to their friends and relatives as a place where they can go for studies. Table 6.10 shows the responses that were obtained. As indicated, 12 per cent of the respondents strongly disagreed, 11.7 per

cent disagreed, 40.4 per cent were unsure, 21.4 per cent and 14.5 per cent agreed and strongly agreed respectively. More specifically, a greater number of the respondents were unsure (40.4) per cent compared to 35.9 per cent who agreed and 23.7 per cent who disagreed that Kenyan students returning from China were likely to recommend China to their friends and relatives.

Table 6.10: Likelihood of Kenyan Students Returning from China to Recommend China to Fellow Students

	Frequency (f)	Per cent (%)
Strongly Disagree	40	12.0
Disagree	39	11.7
Unsure	134	40.4
Agree	71	21.4
Strongly Agree	48	14.5
Total	332	100

6.5.5 Whether Kenyan Students Returning from China Have Changed their Perception of China

The researcher asked the research participants to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement as to whether Kenyan students returning from studying in China had changed their perception of China. As shown in Figure 6.14, 9.9 per cent of the respondents strongly disagree, 6.6 per cent disagreed, 31.6 per cent were unsure, 25.9 per cent agreed and 25.9 per cent strongly agreed. Therefore, 51.8 per cent of the respondents agreed that Kenyan students returning from studying in China had changed their perception of China compared to 16.5 per cent who disagreed.




Figure 6.14: Whether Kenyan Students Returning from China Have Changed Their Perception of China

6.5.6 Interview Results:

6.5.6.1 How China Has Used the Academic Scholarship/Exchanges to Advance its Image in Kenya?

A significant number of the key informants viewed agreed that China's CGS exchange programs was an important component of China's PD in Kenya.

6.5.6.2 What is the Effect of Chinese Educational Diplomacy of Kenyan's View of China?

The majority of the interviewees asserted that the CGS and exchange programs performed a double role in China's public diplomacy. First these programs and arrangements exposed Kenyans to China and Chinese culture for those who go to China to study. Second, the programs also increase appreciation of China among Kenyans which helps China to realize its PD objectives.

However, the majority of the interviewees argued that the overall influence of the CGS and exchange programs has been negligible as few Kenyans go to China compared to the overall population and few that go bring back a positive view of China.

6.6 Cross-Tabulation Analysis and Chi-Square Tests

Cross-tabulation analysis was performed to assess the strength of the relationship between different variables that were studied. This permitted some insight into the effectiveness of China's concerted PD in Kenya. This part provides the results that were obtained from the correspondence analysis.

6.6.1 Cross-Tabulation of Institution versus Awareness of China's PD in Kenya

The researcher performed a cross –tabulation analysis to assess Kenyan public awareness of China's PD by institution. Shown in Table 6.1 are the findings that were made. As shown, 22 out of the 33 government ministry representatives were aware of China's PD in Kenya compared to 11 who did not, and out of the 33 media representatives, 27 were aware of China's PD in Kenya while 6 were not. Out of the 36 respondents from the universities and colleges, 32 were aware of China's PD in Kenya and 4 were not. Out of the 36 private sector (formal business) respondents 27 were aware of China's PD in Kenya compared to 6 who were not, and out of the 35 private

sector (informal business) respondents, 26 were aware of the China's PD in Kenya while 9 were not. More findings are as shown in Table 6.11.

Table 6.11: Institution *Awareness of China's PD in Kenya Cross-Tabulation

Institution	Awareness of China's PD in Kenya		Total
	Yes	No	
Government Ministry	22	11	33
Media	27	6	33
University and Colleges	32	4	36
Private Sector - Formal Business	27	6	33
Private Sector - Informal Business	26	9	35
Religious Organization	22	9	31
Security Sector	30	2	32
Civil Society	24	8	32
County Government	29	5	34
Political Parties	26	7	33
Total	265	67	332

6.6.2 Cross-Tabulation of Institution versus Reliance on Chinese Media

Shown in Table 6.12 is the result of the cross-tabulation of the respondents' institution and whether they relied on Chinese media for news about China. As shown, 22 out of the 33 government ministry officials did not rely on Chinese media for information about China compared to only seven who did. Twenty-one out of 33 media representatives did not rely on Chinese media, and 11 out of 36 university and college respondents relied on Chinese media for information about China. Out of the 33 private sector (formal business) respondents 5 relied on Chinese media and 17 did not, and out of the 35 private sector (informal business) respondents, 19 did not rely on Chinese media and only 4 did.

Out of the 32 representatives of the religious organizations, 19 did not rely on Chinese media compared to only 2 who did. Out of the 32 respondents from the security sector, 17 did not rely on Chinese media for information about China while 5 did. Out of the 32 respondents from the civil society, 19 did not rely on Chinese media for information about China compared to 8 who did. Out of the 34 representatives from the county government, 20 did not rely on the Chinese media for information about China while 6 did, and out of the 33 representatives of political parties, 24 did not rely on Chinese media compared to 2 who did. This analysis shows that across all the studied Kenyan cohorts, Chinese media is not considered as source of information about China.

Table 6.12: Institution* Reliance on Chinese Media Cross-Tabulation

Institution	Rely on Chinese Media for News on China					Total
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Moderate	Agree	Strongly Agree	
Government Ministry	15	7	4	5	2	33
Media	12	9	8	1	3	33
University and Colleges	6	10	9	6	5	36
Private Sector - Formal Business	12	5	11	4	1	33
Private Sector - Informal Business	12	7	12	1	3	35
Religious Organizations	13	6	10	2	0	31
Security Sector	14	3	10	4	1	32
Civil Society	10	9	5	8	0	32
County Government	8	12	8	5	1	34
Political Parties	14	8	9	2	0	33
Total	116	76	86	38	16	332

6.6.3 Cross-Tabulation of Institution versus Perception of Chinese Media

Shown in Table 6.13 is the finding when the researcher cross-tabulated perception of China media versus respondent's institution. The respondents were divided in their perception of Chinese media as spreading accurate information about China. As shown, out of the 33 respondents from the government ministry 14 disagreed that Chinese media spread correct information about China compared to 7 who thought otherwise. Out of the 33 media representatives who participated in this study 11 agreed that Chinese media spread accurate news about China and 10 disagreed. Out of the 36 participants from the university and colleges, 8 disagreed that Chinese media were accurate in their coverage of China while 12 agreed that Chinese media spread correct news about China. More findings are as shown in Table 6.13.

Table 6.13: Institution* Perception of Chinese Media Cross-Tabulation

Institution	Chinese Media in Kenya Spread Correct News About China					Total
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Moderate	Agree	Strongly Agree	
Government Ministry	8	6	12	5	2	33
Media	9	1	12	6	5	33
University and Colleges	6	2	16	7	5	36
Private Sector - Formal Business	4	6	8	6	9	33
Private Sector - Informal Business	2	5	5	7	16	35
Religious Organization	7	5	8	2	9	31
Security Sector	5	2	8	7	10	32
Civil Society	4	8	9	4	7	32
County Government	4	7	7	5	11	34
Political Parties	10	5	9	4	5	33
Total	59	47	94	53	79	332

The researcher performed a Chi-Square test to determine whether there was a statistically significant relationship between the respondents from different institutions and perception of Chinese media. It sought to answer the question, does perception of Chinese media depend on the respondent's institution? The result is as shown in Table 6.14. As shown, the Pearson Chi-Square statistic is 50.829 which is statistically significant ($p < .05$), which means that respondents' institution and perception of Chinese media are statistically related.

Table 6.14: Chi-Square Test for Test for Institution and Perception of Chinese Media

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	50.829 ^a	36	.000
Likelihood Ratio	54.051	36	.027
Linear-by-Linear Association	.532	1	.466
N of Valid Cases	332		

a. 10 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.39.

The analysis of phi and Cramer V value suggests that the relationship is significant.

The result of the symmetric measures is shown in Table 6.15.

Table 6.15: Symmetric Measure

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.352	.252
	Cramer's V	.176	.252
N of Valid Cases		332	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

6.6.4 Cross-Tabulation of Institution versus Perception Emotional Bond to Chinese Culture

The researcher performed a cross-tabulation between the respondent's institution and respondents' perception of having emotional bond with Chinese culture. As shown in Table 6.16, out of the 33 participants from the government ministry, 23 had no emotional bond with Chinese culture compared to 6 who did. Out of the 33 respondents from the media, 19 had no emotional bond with Chinese media while 9 did. Out of the 36 respondents from universities and colleges, 21 had no emotional bond with Chinese culture while 7 felt they had an emotional bond with Chinese culture. More results

pertaining to the relationship between respondents from the different institutions and Chinese culture are as indicated in the Table.

Table 6.16: Institution versus Perception Emotional Bond to Chinese Culture Cross-Tabulation

Institution	Emotional Bond to Chinese Culture in Kenya					Total
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Moderate	Agree	Strongly Agree	
Government Ministry	15	8	4	2	4	33
Media	12	7	5	3	6	33
University and Colleges	9	12	8	5	2	36
Private Sector - Formal Business	8	6	4	7	8	33
Private Sector - Informal Business	11	6	0	6	12	35
Religious Organization	9	7	4	3	8	31
Security Sector	11	2	5	3	11	32
Civil Society	12	8	5	2	5	32
County Government	11	7	4	1	11	34
Political Parties	10	10	4	2	7	33
Total	108	73	43	34	74	332

The researcher performed a Chi-Square test to measure the strength of the relationship between respondents per institution and emotional connection to Chinese culture. As shown in Table 6.17, the Pearson Chi-Square statistic is 41.238 but which is not statistically significant ($p > .005$), which means that respondents' institution and perception of emotional bond to Chinese culture is unrelated. This means that belonging to a particular institution does not predispose a person to feel attached to the Chinese culture.

Table 6.17: Chi-Square Test for Institution and Perception of Chinese Media

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	41.238 ^a	36	.252
Likelihood Ratio	47.586	36	.094
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.311	1	.252
N of Valid Cases	332		

a. 20 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.17.

The analysis of phi and Cramer V value suggests that the relationship is not significantly strong. The result of the symmetric measures is shown in Table 6.18.

Table 6.18: Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.391	.052
	Cramer's V	.196	.052
N of Valid Cases		332	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

6.6.5 Cross-Tabulation of Institution versus Perception of Chinese exchange programs and CGS

Shown in Table 6.19 are the results of the cross-tabulation between respondents' institution and the perception of Chinese exchange programs and CGS. As shown, out of the 33 representatives from the government ministry 17 liked China's exchange program with Kenya and its CGS while 10 did not. Thirteen out of the 33 respondents from the media did not like the exchange program compared 10 who liked it.

Out of the 36 respondents from the universities and colleges, 20 indicated that they liked China's exchange program with Kenya compared to 5 who did not. Similar results were obtained the cross-tabulation analysis between respondents from the different institutions and both the private sector (formal business) and private sector (informal business). Out of the 33 respondents from the private sector (formal business), 16 liked China's exchange program and 5 did not, and out of the 35 respondents from private sector (informal business) 16 indicated they liked China's student exchange program with Kenya while 7 did not. More results are indicated in Table 6.19.

Table 6.19: Institution*Perception Chinese Exchange/CGS Cross-Tabulation

Institution	Perception of China's student Exchange Program/CGS					Total
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Moderate	Agree	Strongly Agree	
Government Ministry	6	2	8	10	7	33
Media	9	4	10	5	5	33
University and Colleges	2	3	11	12	8	36
Private Sector - Formal Business	1	4	12	12	4	33
Private Sector - Informal Business	3	4	12	13	3	35
Religious Organization	5	4	7	11	4	31
Security Sector	0	2	14	12	4	32
Civil Society	6	6	7	8	5	32
County Government	6	3	11	9	5	34
Political Parties	4	5	8	9	7	33
Total	42	37	100	101	52	332

The researcher performed a Chi-Square test to determine the strength of the relationship between respondents per institution and perception of China's exchange programs. As shown in Table 6.20, the Pearson Chi-Square statistic is 34.493 and not statistically significant ($p > .005$), this implies that respondents' institution and perception Chinese educational exchange is unrelated. This means that belonging to a particular institution does not predispose a person to appreciate Chinese educational exchanges.

Table 6.20: Chi-Square Test for Institution and Perception of Chinese Media

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	34.493	36	.540
Likelihood Ratio	38.759	36	.364
Linear-by-Linear Association	.014	1	.907
N of Valid Cases	332		

a. 20 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.17.

The analysis of phi and Cramer V value suggests that the relationship is not significantly strong. The result of the symmetric measures is shown in Table 6.21.

Table 6.21: Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.391	.052
Cramer's V	.196	.052
N of Valid Cases	332	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

6.7 Correlation Matrix Analysis

The researcher conducted a correlation analysis between pairs of variables studied to measure the relationship between them. Specifically, the researcher performed a product-moment correlation or *Pearson r*. Table 6.22 shows the results of the correlation analysis between the variables.

correlation r between respondents' institution and having studied in China yielded a moderate positive value ($r = .045, p < .05$). This finding suggests that there is a very slight relationship between the respondents' institution and his likelihood to study in China. This result was significant given that p value was greater than .05 indicating that result was not reducible to pure chance.

The researcher performed a *Pearson r* analysis to determine the nature of the relationship between and respondents' knowledge of Mandarin and their respective institutions. The r -value generated ($r = .078, p > .05$), suggested a weak but positive relationship between the two-variable suggested that a slight change in respondents' institution had an effect on their likelihood of learning mandarin. The finding was not statistically significant given that p value was greater than .05. The researcher performed a correlation analysis to determine the nature of the relationship between reliance on Chinese media on information about China and perception that the Chinese media presence was good. The resulting r -value ($r = .334, p < .05$), showed that the two variables were weakly related given that the r -value was positive. The results were significant as $p < .05$ (it was .000) indicating that the finding was not due to chance.

The correlation analysis between reliance on Chinese media for information and perception of Chinese media as providing accurate information about China also generated a weak positive r -value generated ($r = .270, p < .05$). Given that the value was positive, it suggests that either reliance on Chinese media led to the perception that they were accurate or that people who perceived Chinese media as accurate were more willing to rely on them for information about China. The Correlation analysis r revealed that those reliance on Chinese media led to a relatively favourable view of China given that the r -value generated between the two variables was r -value ($r = .267, p > .05$).

The researcher performed a correlation analysis between knowledge of mandarin and favourable view of China to determine the nature of the relationship between the two. According to the r -value generated ($r = .638, p > .05$), knowledge of mandarin and favourable view of China were positively related. The nature of the relationship was moderate but positive suggesting that knowledge of mandarin had the potential to influence people to develop a favourable view of China.

The researcher performed a Pearson Product-Moment of correlation between studying in China and favourable view of China. The *Pearson r* analysis generated a weak negative *r-value* ($r = .613, p < .05$). This figure suggests that studying in China influences a favourable view of China. The *p value* was .013, which suggested that the finding was statistically significant and was not reducible to pure chance.

6.8 Regression Analysis

To assess the causal relationship between independent and the dependent variables the researcher performed a multiple regression analysis. As shown in Table 6.23, the model suggests, as per the adjusted R^2 , that 8.5 per cent change in favourable view of China is accounted for by the independent variables, Chinese Media, China’s cultural programs (via the CI) and China’s scholarships. This finding suggests that the model does not account for 91.5 per cent variance in favourable view of China’s national image by Kenyan public. This implies that there are other factors accounting for a favourable view of China in Kenya.

Table 6.23: Model Summary for Effect of Chinese Media, China’s (CGS), and CI on China’s National Image

Model Summary				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.305 ^a	.093	.085	1.19595

a. Predictors: (Constant), Chinese Media, Chinese Government Scholarships (CGS), Chinese Cultural Programs (CI)

The results of the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) are shown in Table 6.24. As shown, the ANOVA reveals that that the findings could not be attributed to sampling error given that $F (11.190 = .000)$; *p value* generated is less than .05 confidence level (it is .000), which suggests that the model has explanatory authority.

Table 6.24: ANOVA for Effect of Chinese Media, China’s (CGS), and CI on China’s National Image

ANOVA ^a						
Model	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	
1	Regression	48.016	3	16.005	11.190	.000 ^b
	Residual	469.140	328	1.430		
	Total	517.157	331			

a. Dependent Variable: China is Favourable in Kenya

b. Predictors: (Constant), Chinese Media, Chinese Government Scholarships (CGS), Chinese Cultural Programs (CI)

The researcher performed a multiple regression analysis to understand the magnitude of the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable. The results are as shown in Table 6.25.

Table 6.25: Multiple Regression Analysis for Effect of Chinese Media, China’s (CGS), and CI on China’s National Image

Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	4.249	.703		6.040	.000
1 Chinese Media	.273	.055	.260	4.933	.000
Chinese Cultural Programs (CI)	-.400	.349	-.064	-1.145	.253
Chinese Government Scholarships (CGS)	-.476	.240	-.111	-1.982	.048

a. Dependent Variable: China is Favourable in Kenya

The general regression equation that was adopted in this study to present relationship between the independent and the dependent variables is given by below equation:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \varepsilon$$

Therefore, substituting the regression results into this formula the following question for China’s national image in Kenya is obtain.

$$\text{Chinese Image in Kenya} = 4.249 + .273 \text{ Chinese Media} - .400 \text{ Chinese Cultural Programs} - .476 \text{ Chinese Government Scholarships}$$

The equation suggests that the coefficients for the independent variables (Chinese Media, Chinese Cultural Programs, and Chinese Government Scholarships (CGS) are .273, -.400 and -.476 respectively. This suggests that for every unit in Chinese media activities in Kenya a .273 favourable view of China in Kenya is to be expected, *ceteris paribus*. Similarly, a reduction of -.400 is to be anticipated in the favourable view of China in Kenya for every unit change in China’s cultural programs in Kenya through the CI provided all other factor are held constant. For every unit change in CGS, a reduction of -.476 is to be expected in favourable view of China’s image in Kenya if all factors are held constant.

6.9 Hypothesis Testing - Chi-Square Test

The researcher performed the Chi-Square test to test the hypothesis that this study sought to determine.

6.9.1 Chi-Square Test for the First Hypothesis

Ho - Effective public diplomacy strategies account for positive international image

The researcher performed a Pearson Chi-Square to verify this hypothesis. As shown in Table 6.26, the Pearson Chi-Square value was 26.048 at $p = 0.000$. This result was significant given that the p value was less than .05. This further suggested that the hypothesis that effective public diplomacy strategies account for positive international image can be accepted.

Table 6.26: Chi-Square Test for the First Hypothesis

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	26.048 ^a	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	22.856	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	14.752	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	332		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.06.

6.9.2 Chi-Square Test for the Second Hypothesis

The second hypothesis of this study was;

H2 - Despite concerted media efforts, Chinese national image in Kenya remains negative

To test this hypothesis, the researcher performed a Chi-Square test the result of which is shown in Table 6.27. As shown, the Pearson Chi-Square statistic is 52.234, and the p -value is .000. Given that the p -value is less than .05, suggests that the second hypothesis can be accepted. This result shows that Chinese media efforts and China's national image in Kenya are related.

Table 6.27: Chi-Square Test for Second Hypothesis

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	52.234 ^a	16	.000
Likelihood Ratio	48.079	16	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	23.662	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	332		

a. 6 cells (24.0%) have an expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.69.

6.9.3 Chi-Square Test for the Third Hypothesis

The third assumption that this study made was;

H3 - Increased Chinese cultural institutes and centres in Kenya have enhanced positive perception of China in Kenya

To test this hypothesis, the researcher performed a Chi-Square test. The result of the test is as shows in Table 6.28. As shown, the Pearson Chi-Square statistic is 9.137 the *p value* is .058. This finding suggest that the third hypothesis can be rejected, that is increased Chinese cultural institutes in Kenya has not enhanced positive perception of China in Kenya. This is because the *p value* that was generated in the analysis is greater than .05 suggesting that the relationship is not statistically significant.

Table 6.28: Chi-Square Test for Third Hypothesis

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.137 ^a	4	.058
Likelihood Ratio	11.477	4	.022
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.232	1	.022
N of Valid Cases	332		

a. 5 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.48.

6.9.4 Chi-Square Test for the Fourth Hypothesis

The fourth hypothesis of this study was;

H4 - The increased number of Kenyan students in China and high-quality training by Chinese educational institutions has contributed to a positive perception of China in Kenya.

The researcher conducted a Chi-Square test on the primary data that was collected to test this hypothesis to determine whether it was to be accepted or rejected. The Pearson Chi-Square statistic obtained was 10.091 (at $p = .039$). These results indicated that the alternative hypothesis should be rejected and an assumption instead be made that there

was no association between the increased number of Kenyan students in China and high-quality training by Chinese educational institutions has contributed to a positive perception of China in Kenya. This is because the p-value was greater than the .05 and as such the result was not statistically significant. The result of the test is shown in Table 6.29.

Table 6.29: Chi-Square Test for Fourth Hypothesis

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10.091 ^a	4	.039
Likelihood Ratio	14.315	4	.006
Linear-by-Linear Association	6.123	1	.013
N of Valid Cases	332		

a. 3 cells (30.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.27.

6.10 Discussion of Research Findings

This study focused on exploring the influence of China’s public diplomacy in Kenya on China’s national image in Kenya. This part discusses the research results and findings based on the research objectives of this study.

6.10.1 The Influence of Public Diplomacy on China’s National Image in Kenya

This study examined the crucial link between China’s public diplomacy in Kenya and its consequence on Kenyan’s perception of China’s national image. Ideally, according to the soft power model as propounded by Aksoy, PD is grounded on the notion of a connection between soft power and public opinion.¹¹⁴⁴ Essentially, the more a country engages in PD the more its national image should be viewed positively by the target audience of PD. Soft power theory is valuable for understanding how nations can shape their international image through attraction and persuasion.

Soft power provides a comprehensive framework for understanding how nations construct and enhance their national image. By leveraging culture, political values, and foreign policies, countries can attract and influence others, building a favorable international reputation. As global dynamics evolve, the strategic use of soft power will

¹¹⁴⁴ Aksoy *Op cit.* p. 2.

remain crucial for nations seeking to project their image and achieve their objectives on the world stage. This study found that the majority of the respondents considered China's PD to be a facilitator of Kenyan public perception of China's national image. This view was shared among the interviewees in this study with one of the interviewees explaining that "*for me, there is not much to it other than the fact that China's increased presence in Kenya including in our media space and universities is a ploy by the PRC to make us think that it is a good country, which I don't think is the case*".

This finding confirms soft power's standing as an explanatory framework for explaining China's use of soft power instruments to shape the Kenyan public perception of its national image. It functions as a crucial framework for understanding how countries cultivate their national image and influence global perceptions. Unlike hard power, which relies on coercion and force, soft power is about attraction and persuasion, shaping preferences through appeal and legitimacy. Moreover, the participants' view, confirms David Copeland's assertion that the goal of PD is to attract foreign public and to transform their perceptions in favour of the state. However, the extent to which this is true is uncertain.

China has deployed several strategies to boost its national image among international public audiences including those in Kenya. This study has determined that China has focused on using several tools of public diplomacy including Chinese media, China's Confucius Institutes as well as Chinese government scholarships and educational exchange programs. The use of these tools is in line with Defang and Li's assertion that national image is central to China's public diplomacy.¹¹⁴⁵

China's attempt to shape Kenyan's perception of China is grounded in the soft power model which proposes that a state's power resides in its intangible resources such as culture, values and foreign policy as much as it does in hard power or tangible resources like military and economic wherewithal. Soft power is built on three primary resources: culture, political values, and foreign policies. When these elements resonate with others, they enhance a nation's ability to influence and attract. A country with a rich

¹¹⁴⁵ Li Defang and Weihong Li, "Analysis of China's Public Diplomacy Model." *Liaocheng Daxue xuebao*, Volume 1 (2012), p. 76

cultural heritage, inclusive political values, and benevolent foreign policies can wield considerable soft power. An interviewee from the Kenya Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that China's PD was still developing noting, "*China is relatively new to media diplomacy and cultural exchange diplomacy, and this is perhaps why its PD is not as effective as that of the Western nations such as France, the UK or the US.*"

This study has determined that two approaches are explicit in China's public diplomacy; the proactive approach and the reactive approach. Proactively, China is instrumentally using public diplomacy to present a positive image of China, and reactively, China is using PD to present a "truer" or more "realistic" picture of China and the Chinese culture to Kenyans separate from what the Western media has done. China's use of soft power provides a compelling case study. The country has invested heavily in cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges, media influence, economic engagement, and humanitarian aid to shape its national image.

Based on the interview results the majority of the interviewees viewed China as "friendly". An interviewee from the MFA cohort explained that "*China is a major global power that is poised to be the leading military and economic power shortly.*" However, this view of China may be due to other enabling factors and not necessarily PD. This finding was in line with Hartig who deemed China's PD as an enabling factor in how foreign publics viewed China.

This study found that in connection to China's PD activities in Kenya, the Kenyan public was divided into those who saw a connection between China's PD in Kenya and China's public image and those who did not. A member of the media disclosed that she thought that China's PD was a little intrusive arguing that "*While I don't mind their (Chinese) PD in Kenya, I just don't like the idea that we celebrate Chinese holidays in Kenya like the Chinese New Year. Do the Chinese in China celebrate Kenya's Independence Day? Why should Kenyans celebrate Chinese holidays? Aren't we in Kenya? What stands out is that those who saw a link between China's PD and its image considered China a "friendly" nation while those who saw no connection were mostly critical of China's PD.*

What is critical and what should concern China's policymakers in the domain of diplomacy and public diplomacy, in particular, is the fact that a significant proportion of the Kenyan public still views China as "untruthful" despite China's concerted PD efforts. This implies that China must do more to communicate its image more effectively to ensure its view is positive. A member of the civil society cohort expressed doubt about China's global leadership stating that "*China's PD is replete with propaganda and it cannot do the right thing concerning world affairs*". It is to be noted that soft power is characterized by several limitations which undercut its potency as a theoretical framework, and which complicate its application and effectiveness. These include changing preferences, reliance on cultural appeal and limited control over unintended consequences.

6.10.2 Impact of Chinese Media on the Kenyan Public's Perception of China's Image

The mass media has become one of the most important tools of diplomacy that states deploy to achieve public diplomacy objectives. Media is an intangible resource that forms the core for the dissemination of soft power. Chinese media outlets provide an alternative perspective to Western narratives, often highlighting China's development successes and its role in global and regional development. This can positively shape public opinion, portraying China as a rising power with a commitment to shared prosperity.

In this study, a significant proportion of the interviews thought that the Chinese media in Kenya was one of the channels through which China has sought to create an understanding of China's culture, foreign policy and domestic politics. One interviewee from the media cohort pointed out "*I do Watch Chinese news on CGTN, and I have come to realize how Western media is biased against China*". This confirms Cristina Archetti's postulation that the mass media is used by state officials to impact foreign publics' attitudes and opinions about the state.¹¹⁴⁶ Moreover, another interviewee from the media cohort stated that "*compared to media from other regions, Chinese media*

¹¹⁴⁶Cristina Archetti, "The Impact of New Media on Diplomatic Practice: An Evolutionary Model of Change," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, Volume 7 (2012), 188.

are held responsible for their reporting because they are controlled by their government and are thus careful about the content of their news.”

However, in as much as the media is a potentially significant opinion shaper for foreign publics, this study found that few Kenyans sourced their information about China and the world from Chinese media with more than half of the respondents indicating that they did not view or listen to Chinese media. An interviewee from the private sector (informal) cohort stated *“I don’t watch Chinese media much often, now you are asking me about CCT, honestly, I don’t know what that is”*.

The reason for this non-reliance on Chinese media could be due to the notion that Chinese media was both a tool for Chinese propaganda and that as such it did not provide accurate information about China. This idea can be linked to the rational learning model which states that the media has two roles, acting as a propaganda tool and informing foreign rational constituents. In the context of this study’s finding, the latter is very true. In line with this, an interviewee belonging to the university and college group opined *“I don’t watch much of Chinese media, but I recently did to keep abreast with the three floods that struck China, in Shandong, Guandong and Taiwan. What I can tell you is that the Chinese media covered all three differently. The coverage of the coverage of Shandong and, Guandong floods praised Chinese government efforts while its coverage of the flood in Taiwan focused on the victims and criticized the Taiwanese government for laxity despite having the least fatalities. Can the Chinese media be trusted as objective?”*

This study found that Chinese media has had little influence on the Kenyan public’s perception of China. This confirms Wasserman and Madrid-Morales’s study according to which Kenyan and South African students showed limited interest in sourcing their news about China from Chinese media due to apprehensions about the lack of truthfulness and propaganda in Chinese media.¹¹⁴⁷ In the interview with the university and college cohort, one interviewee stated *“For me unless you wanted to learn Chinese for some good reason, you are most unlikely to have anything to do with the Institute.”*

¹¹⁴⁷ Wasserman *Op cit.*

Connected to this, this study found that while during the interviews a significant proportion of the respondents agreed that China had sought to create an understanding of China, Chinese culture and foreign policy, an equally significant number thought that the Chinese media was a tool for Chinese propaganda. *As I learn more about China from the Chinese media in Kenya, the more my appreciation of China has increased, however, I still have doubts about China especially when I consider what I see on the news concerning how China has treated countries like Sri Lanka and Zambia.* What this suggests is the need to dissociate Chinese media from government ownership.

6.10.3 Impact of Chinese Cultural Institutes and Centres on the Image of China in Kenya

China's PD offensive in Kenya has also been significant in the area of cultural diplomacy, which has been mostly articulated through the Confucius Institutes. Joseph Nye's soft power theory articulates culture among the four pivotal sources of soft power which a country can leverage to enhance its international appeal and influence.¹¹⁴⁸ This study has found that China's main instrument for cultural diplomacy has been the CI which has a formidable presence in Kenya. It is to be noted that while soft power is a potent tool, it faces challenges and limitations. Cultural exports can sometimes be misinterpreted, political values might not always align with those of other nations, and foreign policies can be perceived as self-serving. Additionally, soft power is often undermined by actions that contradict the values a country seeks to promote.

The interview with key informants revealed that most of the interviewees considered these Institutes to be key tools in China's effort to disseminate not only information about China but also China's cultural materials including the Chinese language – Mandarin. However, one respondent from the civil society cohort had doubts about the CI's effectiveness as a tool for Chinese PD. He stated that *"if the government of China is utilizing the CIs as countermeasures for Western criticism of the CPC and hence the government of China, it is the most inefficient approaches ever deployed"*. An interviewee who belongs to the religious group stated "I do know about China but I do not know about the Confucius Institute you are asking me about; I have never attended it and I do

¹¹⁴⁸ Nye. (1990) p. 180

not intend to attend.” This response is insightful in that it suggests on of soft powers great weakness as an explanatory standpoint. Specifically, unlike hard power, which can be measured through tangible assets like military strength and economic output, soft power is difficult to quantify. The effectiveness of cultural influence, political values, and foreign policies is often measured through surveys and opinion polls, which can be imprecise and influenced by many external factors.

The focus of the CI has been language promotion, greater Kenya-China cultural ties, and the facilitation of Kenyans understanding Chinese cultural materials. This study found that the influence of the CI was limited to only those who attended the CI contrasted with Chinese media which disseminated information to the entire population. However, among the cohort that attended the CIs, the main reason for enrolling in the program was due to degree requirements rather than a personal interest in studying Mandarin or Chinese culture. An interviewee from the university and college cohort revealed her reason for attending the institute stating “*Why do you think I enrolled in the CI, know first it is because it was the next convenient language for me to position myself for a scholarship, which I need and second my university requires me to do a foreign language, beyond that I would have not enrolled in the CI program.*”

This study found that the respondents were apprehensive about the purpose and role of the CIs in Kenya with a significant proportion of them suggesting that these were institutions of China’s propaganda. This finding is not unique as it confirms an assertion that Niquet made when he examined the Institutes, concluding that they were part of China’s endeavour to modernize and empower its propaganda systems.¹¹⁴⁹ This is contrary to the views of an interviewee from the university and college cohort who observed that “*if you are concerned about the influence of the CI then you are missing the point, you should be concerned about Chinese movie industry considering that some of the more popular Chinese movies have been produced in Hollywood with the Chinese funds.*” Another interviewee from the media cohort asserted that “for me, the CI function as an arm of the CPC and the Chinese state, it only exists to disseminate state policy.” Another interviewee from the media cohort doubted the CI’s ability to influence

¹¹⁴⁹ Valarie Niquet, “Confu-talk”: The Use of Confucian Concepts in Contemporary Chinese Foreign Policy. In A – M. Brady, (Ed.), *China’s Thought Management*. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), pp. 76 – 98.

Kenyan's public perception of China positing that *“How can CIs influence Kenyans positively towards China when they cannot even suppress the criticism about the institute let alone how China is criticized in Kenya.”*

However, this was not the case with Momo and Chaggang who after studying the influence of CIs in Cameroon found that these Institutes had a positive influence on Cameroonians view of an uptake of Chinese cultural material such as learning Mandarin, Chinese martial arts and cuisine.¹¹⁵⁰ Contrary to Momo and Chaggang, a professor belong to the university and college cohort, revealed his doubts about the potency of the CI as a tool for cultural transmission during the interview. He said, *“I think, as a tool for cultural transmission, CI is a stupid idea, cultural elements such as the Beijing Operas, paper cutting and Taici are obsolete as even young Chinese people are not interested in them.”*

6.10.4 Impact of Chinese Educational Diplomacy on China's Image in Kenya

This study explored the influence of China's educational diplomacy in Kenya by focusing on the effect of CGS and educational exchange programs on Kenyan's perception of China. It has found that China's educational diplomacy in Kenya developed at least through three phases, 1950 – 1978, 1979 – 1994 and 1995 to present the overall goal of which was to expose Kenyans to China in its bid to win international support for its domestic and foreign policies including the “One China Policy”.¹¹⁵¹ Throughout the years, China's educational policy has occurred through two separate but interconnected frameworks – Chinese Government Scholarships and Chinese exchange programs.

This study has found that the CGS and the exchange programs in Kenya are aimed at achieving at least two goals; exposing Kenyans to China and Chinese cultural material to influence their opinions about China, and transforming beneficiaries of Chinese CGS and exchange programs into disseminators of Chinese culture to the rest of Kenyans. One interviewee from the university and college cohort who stated that she had been a

¹¹⁵⁰ Momo Ngomba Juliana and Guo Changgang, “How China's Confucius Centers Affect Cameroon's Culture,” *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, Volume 7, Number 2, (2017), pp. 146 – 150.

¹¹⁵¹ Niu, *Op. Cit.*, 32 – 33.

beneficiary of CGS that allowed her to study in China observed that *“I have heard reports about how unwelcoming the Chinese were and how polluted China was, I was told that the air in China is so bad that I not breathe without a mask. But when I went there I found fellow Chinese students at the university were very welcoming ad I was surprised to see flowers and trees everywhere, I didn’t even need a mask”*. This view of China as serene and a far cry from the representation of China was shared by an interviewee from the Government of Kenya Ministry who had visited China for further studies and training. He commented that *“Guangzou is very clean and very big, unlike some of the western countries that I have visited, its pavements are the size of a road”*.

Nonetheless, in connection with this, this study found that the effect of the CGS and exchange programs has been limited. This confirms Paradise’s postulation that China’s educational diplomacy is limited and at best, its effects will only be known with time.¹¹⁵² Adams Bono studied the experience of African exchange students in China and assessed their overall perception of the exchange system and China. He finds that most students had a positive view of China’s international education exchange.

Several interviewees who had studied in China confirmed that there was a hue mismatch between what they had been told about China and the China they saw. One interviewee revealed that *“I have been watching Chinese costume movies and historical documentaries, and when I went to China, it was like walking inside an actual movie, everything that I have seen on the screen I could see with my eyes and live it.”* What this indicates, is that It can be challenging to directly attribute changes in a nation’s image to specific soft power initiatives, as many variables influence public opinion. Economic ties, historical relationships, and global events also play significant roles in shaping perceptions.

In general, China’s public diplomacy used to influence its national image perception can be understood through the ‘tough-minded school’ and the ‘tender-minded school’. The ‘tough-minded school’ of thought holds that the national image can be projected to foreign audiences through persuasion via communication activities and channels. The

¹¹⁵² Paradise, J. (2012). International Education: Diplomacy in China. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 19(1), 195 - 205

'tender-minded' school, it is held that the country's image can be projected to foreign audiences through slow media and cultural exchanges including the incorporation of educational exchanges.

Soft power often needs to be complemented by hard power to be truly effective. A nation's cultural appeal and diplomatic efforts can be undermined if not backed by strong economic and military capabilities. But more importantly, as the findings made herein reveal, soft power initiatives can sometimes be viewed as mere propaganda or superficial if not supported by genuine commitments and actions. Countries that try to leverage soft power without addressing underlying hard power dynamics or domestic issues may be seen as insincere or manipulative.

In general, therefore, and based on this study's findings, it can be argued that soft power often requires a long-term commitment to be effective, which can be at odds with the short-term focus of many political agendas. Changes in government, policy priorities, or funding can disrupt ongoing soft power initiatives, reducing their effectiveness. Thus, while soft power is an important tool for shaping national image and international influence, its weaknesses highlight the complexities and challenges of relying solely on attraction and persuasion. The subjectivity of cultural perceptions, limited control over non-state actors, competing narratives, difficulties in measurement, dependency on hard power, contextual constraints, and temporal limitations all complicate the application of soft power theory.

6.11 Chapter Summary

This chapter presented the data that was collected, provided the analysis of the primary data and discussed the study findings and results. The analysis was conducted through inferential statistics that comprised of cross-tabulation analysis, Product-Moment correlation, Multiple Regression Analysis and Chi-Square Test. The hypothesis testing suggested that the first and the second hypothesis of this study were to be accepted and the third and fourth hypotheses were to be rejected. The next chapter, which is Chapter seven provides the conclusion and recommendations of this study.

CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter provided the analysis of the data and the discussion of the same. It applied a mix of quantitative and qualitative data analysis procedures. The data analysis that was conducted and the discussion made was in tandem with the research objectives that this study had sought to realize. This chapter, which is Chapter seven, presents the final chapter of this study as such it provides a summary of the major findings, the conclusion and the recommendations. The summary is based on the research objectives that this study had sought to achieve. Similarly, the conclusions and recommendations are grounded on the specific research questions. Recommendations are made for policy improvement and for future research.

7.2 Summary of Major Findings

The overall objective of this study was to examine the role of Chinese public diplomacy in pursuit of China's positive image in Kenya. Specifically, it sought to; examine the influence of public diplomacy on national image, investigate the role of Chinese media on perception of China's image in Kenya, explore the role of Chinese Cultural Institutes and Centres on the image of China in Kenya and analyze the role of Chinese educational exchanges on China's image in Kenya. It utilized the soft power theory to assess China's public diplomacy. It adopted the soft power theory as the theoretical framework for assessing China's public diplomacy.

A mixed method design that deployed both qualitative and quantitative approaches was adopted. It was conducted in Nairobi and targeted residents of Nairobi city. The researcher sampled 400 individuals to participate in this study using the random sampling technique. The sample distribution comprised of individuals from government ministries, the media, university and colleges, private sector (formal business) and private sector (informal business), religious organizations, security sector, the CS, county governments and the political parties. The qualitative data was collected using historical study and analyzed using content analysis. The quantitative

data was collected using questionnaires and interviews, and this was analyzed empirically using the SPSS.

This study found that through engaging in public diplomacy, China has been able to project a positive image of itself through the five components including listening, advocacy, cultural exchanges, educational exchanges, and international broadcasting. The tools of PD that China has used to project its soft power to enhance its national image among foreign publics include the Chinese International media, Chinese cultural institutes (particularly the CI), and educational exchanges and CGS. It found that China has been able to communicate its soft power resources in a bid to enhance its image abroad and also to respond to negative depictions of China's national image by the West and the Western media. It established that by so doing, China's activities have formed the critical link between PD and national image projection. That through PD China can shape its projected image through promotional activities and perceived image that is held by the target public in foreign countries.

PD has permitted China to expose foreign audiences to China's intangible power assets including culture, policies and political values in a manner that has had the potential of providing greater understanding of China and for correcting the misinformation and falsehood about China inherent in Western countries' depiction and imagery of China. For this reason, this study accepted the first hypothesis that effective public diplomacy strategies account for positive international image.

7.2.1 The Role of Chinese Media on Perception of China's Image in Kenya

This study found that China has a formidable presence in Kenya's media space perhaps more than elsewhere on the African continent. Most of the Chinese state-owned companies have regional headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya including CRI, *Xinhua* News Agency, CCTV and *China Daily Africa Weekly*. The Chinese media presence in Kenya is aimed at explaining China's culture, political values and policies to Kenyan public and providing information about China to Kenyan's, explaining China's intentions in Kenya and countering misinformation about China in Kenya. It established that the intention of China is to provide Kenyan public with information about China's culture, policies and political values and in so doing influence the Kenyan public to adopt a

more positive and favourable view of China's national image. Therefore, the Chinese media forms a crucial part of China's public diplomacy in Kenya.

However, this study found that despite China's concerted efforts to project its soft power in Kenya through the Chinese media few Kenyans obtain their information about China from the Chinese media sources. This study found that the majority of Kenyan public are mistrusting of Chinese media and consider them not to spread accurate information about China. Very few Kenyans rely on Chinese media for news about the world in general. A significant number of Kenyans not only consider the Chinese media as incapable disseminating accurate information about China, but also as propaganda instruments of the Chinese government. In line with these, this study established that the Chinese media has had very limited impact on how Kenyans perceive China's national image. Therefore, in line with finding, this study accepted the second research hypothesis that stated that despite concerted media efforts, Chinese national image in Kenya remains negative.

7.2.2 The Role of Chinese Cultural Institutes on the Image of China in Kenya

This study established that China has intensified its cultural diplomacy with Kenya and this is manifested through the CI that China has established in Kenya's four major public universities; University of Nairobi, Kenyatta University (KU), Egerton University (EU), and Moi University (MU). The CIs, like the Chinese media, are also integral components of China's PD in Kenya. Kenya has become a major focus for the CI in the continent and is second only to South Africa in terms of the number of CI it hosts. This study established that in terms of CI numbers it hosts, Kenya has more than the African average, of two.

The CI and its corollary the Confucius Classroom are the conveyer belt for China's cultural diplomacy with Kenya. The CI provides Elementary-Level Chinese Intermediate-Level Chinese and Advanced-Level Chinese for Kenyan students. This study also found that this institute provides training in traditional martial arts of the Chinese, *Tai chi quan* (tai chi), calligraphy and painting, tourism, business and trade. The CI also facilitates Chinese Choir, Chinese Club, Chinese Corner, Chinese Drama Society, dumpling making, and Dragon and Lion Dances. Other areas include Chinese

cuisine, and music, and a focus on other specific aspects of Chinese culture. In this sense, the CI has the potential to influence Kenya public perception of China.

Nonetheless, despite China's intensification of its 'charm offensive' in Kenya through the CI, the CI has not had the desired results for influencing Kenyan publics to adopt a positive and favourable imagery of China's national image. This study found that while a significant number of Kenyan publics were aware of the CI, very few were attending the institutes. Consequently, very few Kenyans had studied Mandarin and had been exposed to Chinese culture through the CI.

This study found that a limited number of Kenyan publics had any emotional bond with the Chinese culture and a good majority doubted CI's ability to educate them about Chinese culture. This study found that the majority of Kenyan public perceived the CI as instruments for the expansion of China's imperial influence in Kenya and as tools of China's propaganda. In this sense, this study rejected the third assumption that stated that increased Chinese cultural institutes and centres in Kenya have enhanced positive perception of China in Kenya.

7.2.3 The Role of Chinese Educational Exchanges on China's Image in Kenya

This study determined that China has a long history of providing government scholarship to Kenyan students and of educational exchange with Kenya that dates back to pre-independence years. It found that China's educational exchange with Kenya and its award of CGS to Kenyan students is aimed at allowing Kenyan students to experience China's education, culture, political values and policies so that they can develop a favourable view of China. Through the CMFA and the CMOE, China has provided multiple student exchange opportunities to Kenyan students and awarded Kenyan students thousands of CGS to study in China.

China's educational exchange and CGS has had some significant influence on how Kenyan publics perceive China's image. Despite the fact that few Kenyans (interviewed) had studied in China, this study established has established those Kenyan students and scholars, who have been beneficiaries of the Chinese scholarships and educational exchange programs have in general adopted a positive perception of

China's national image. It found that a greater number of Kenyan publics appreciated the educational exchange program with China.

A significant number of students returning from China had a favourable view of China political system and its cultural values. It determined that there was a significant reduction in the level of prejudice and misperception of China by Kenyan students returning from exchange programs and CGS in China and a significant number of the returning students were willing to recommend China to their friends and family as a destination of further studies. Based on these results, and the outcomes of the empirical analyses, this study accepted the fourth hypothesis; increased number of Kenyan students in China and high-quality training by Chinese educational institutions has contributed to positive perception of China in Kenya.

7.3 Conclusion

Public diplomacy is an integral component of China's diplomacy. China's public diplomacy is both proactive and reactive as it is aimed at both projecting China's soft power to foreign audiences and responding to the Western world's perceived negative imagery of China. Consequently, in Kenya, China has deployed a combination of tools and instruments of public diplomacy in a bid to communicate China to Kenyan citizens, and to project a positive and truer image of China to the Kenyan public. China's public diplomacy in Kenya includes the use of Chinese international media, the use of the Confucius Institutes (CI) and the use of educational exchanges and CGS. Based on the findings attendant to this study based on the qualitative and the quantitative data, the following conclusion can be made as per the research objectives.

7.3.1 The Influence of Public Diplomacy on National Image

The national image is the collective attitudinal construct and normatively inferred informational beliefs of a country that underlie people's interpretation of their country's products, culture and national symbols. Public diplomacy has the potential to shape people's understanding and perception of the projected national image by appealing to the cognitive and affective components of the country image. In the first instance, PD shapes target audience's beliefs about a country's economic development, its

technological advancements and its citizen's standards of living. In this sense, the perceived national image is a capable of by transformed through image building activities that cast the nation favourably among foreign audience.

In relation to the affective component, PD shapes exposes foreign audiences to a country's political, social and cultural systems in a positive manner allowing the audiences to also adopt a positive view of that country's soft power resources. In this way, PD has the potential to also influence the conative aspect of country image, which is how people use the information held about that country. It enhances the social desirability of the referent country among foreign audiences by enhancing their cultural familiarity with the country. In this sense national image is non-static construct that is contextually bound and which can be manipulated to realize desired goals.

China's proactive approach that has aimed at presenting a more realistic and 'truer picture' of China has leveraged on China's national image abroad by exposing foreign audiences to China's soft power resources. PD has enabled China to project its image as a 'responsible partner' in the international sphere. China's PD has enabled it to project China as a having an ancient, but vibrant culture that has a lot to offer for the international community. At the same time, China's image projection through PD has enabled China to counter the negative representation of China as a repressive, backward and a threat to the international community. Through media, cultural and education exchange, and scholarships, China has been able to counter and 'correct' the misinformation inherent in Western countries' imagery of China. China's PD has influenced if not transformed the market of ideas and information about China.

7.3.2 The Role of Chinese Media on Perception of China's Image in Kenya

China's increased media presence in Africa and particularly, Kenya is aimed at establishing a strong foothold in the country's media ecosystem and creating a source of information about China to Kenyan audiences. The mass media is a crucial factor in PRC's PD activities in Africa geared towards informing the Kenyan public of China's political values, culture and policies, and addressing the spread of misinformation about China, as well as providing a source of 'accurate' and 'realistic' information about

China to the Kenyan public. In this sense, China's public diplomacy in Kenya has been both proactive and reactive.

Kenya has essentially become a focal focus of Chinese media activities in the continent with potential implications of how China is perceived by the Kenyan public. It is the regional hub for China's media diplomacy hosting top Chinese international media houses. China's international media intended at enhancing China's national image among Kenyan the publics and ultimately enhancing ties with Kenya as part of its greater China-Africa relations objectives. Furthermore, China's intensification of its media presence in Kenya is primarily aimed at providing alternative sources of information about China to Kenyan public and countering the misinformation about China that Chinese officials perceive as prevalent in Western media's coverage of China.

Nonetheless, the influence of Chinese media on Kenyan public's perception of China is limited. Most Kenyan's do not source their information about China from Chinese media sources. This means that Chinese media and the Chinese government needs to enhance the popularity and appeal of Chinese media in Kenya in order for Kenyans to trust them as sources of information about China. Kenyan publics perceive the Chinese media as instruments of the CPC's propaganda and this curtails their repute.

7.3.3 The Role of Chinese Cultural Institutes on the Image of China in Kenya

Confucius Institutes have played an important role in expanding and deepening China's cultural diplomacy in Kenya. The value of the CI for the cultivation of a favourable perception of China's national image among Kenyans lies in the fact that forms a conveyer belt for projecting China's cultural offerings to Kenyan public. The CI permits the teaching and the transmission of Chinese language, and other key cultural offerings including literature, its philosophy, art, martial arts, medicine cuisine and architecture.

Nevertheless, while China has intensified its cultural diplomacy in Kenya through the CI in an endeavour to influence how Kenyans publics perceive China's national image, these centres have not performed as expected. The CI experience limited attendance by Kenyan students, which undercut their ability to influence perceptions. Furthermore,

Kenyan's largely consider the institution as a propaganda tool for China rather than an institution focused on cultural exchange.

The CI are manifest of China's ability to rival other Western countries, which have reputable cultural centres. The only difference between China's CI and other such institutes by Western countries such the French Alliance Française, the UK British Council, and Goethe Institutes for the Germans, is that the Chinese government's influence on these institutes is much more overt than that of the western countries. This definitely impacts on how the CI is perceived by the foreign audiences and this undercuts CI's potential to positive influence how China is perceived. It is essential that China take necessary steps that would enable the CI to project some level of independence from the government for it to achieve greater acceptance and legitimacy among foreign publics.

7.3.4 The Role of Chinese Educational Exchanges on China's Image in Kenya

China has attempted to project its soft power through education in Kenya in tandem with its media and cultural diplomacy. Nonetheless, educational diplomacy is relatively the most performing instruments among the leading three that China deployed to shape its image in Kenya. China's educational engagement with Kenya occurs through two interrelated frameworks. The first framework relates to China's direct engagement with Kenya through CIs and through the awarding of CGS.

Educational cooperation and exchange have the ultimate effect of nurturing favourable public opinion in both the host and the home country. This study, has established that Kenyan public and particularly students returning from exchange programs and government scholarships in China have a relatively favourable view of China's national image. These exchanges permit Kenyan publics to have a first-hand experience of Chinese cultural, politics and policies, and as such offer a better understanding and emotional connection with China, which essentially permit the development of a positive image of China among beneficiaries. Therefore, it can be concluded that international educational exchanges provide avenues for deliberation, mutuality and cross-cultural interactions, which can lead to the aversion of prejudices and stereotypes, and ultimately the demystification of and enhancement of image. More specifically,

mutual understanding accrues from such engagement, and which is vital for the appreciation of other people's worldviews.

7.4 Recommendations

This study makes some recommendations for further research, further readings and for policy improvements based on the study results and findings.

7.4.1 Recommendations for Further Research

For greater epistemological vigour, the researcher prefers the following;

- ✱ First, the researcher observed that there have not been extensive longitudinal studies focusing on the long-term or enduring effect of PD on the perception of national image. Hence, there is need for scholars to conduct longitudinal investigations to determine how PD affects the perception of the national image among foreign audiences in the long term.
- ✱ Second, this researcher observed that there has been limited scholarly attention on the influence of China's public diplomacy on the Kenyan public's perception of China. As such, there is in need for researchers to further investigate this relationship to establish a pool of information on the correlation between PD and national image cultivation among foreign audiences.
- ✱ Third, no previous research has been conducted that focuses on a single instrument (media, culture or educational exchange) that would permit an understanding of how that instrument of diplomacy influences the perception of national image by foreign publics. Therefore, the researcher calls on scholars to conduct studies that focus on single instruments of Chinese PD to determine the magnitude of influence that that instrument has on perception of China's national image.
- ✱ Fourth, the researcher observed that out of the three instruments of China's PD; that is, media, culture or educational exchange, the latter seemed to be more effective. However, no research has compared the three instruments. Therefore, researchers should conduct cross-sectional studies that draw a comparison

between at least two instruments of China's public diplomacy in Kenya to determine which one is more potent and suggest ways in which China can further exploit its potential.

7.4.2 Recommendations for Further Reading

For a deeper understanding of the issues, the researcher recommends the following readings;

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- * Joshua Eisenman & David H. Shinn, *China's Relations with Africa: A New Era of Strategic Engagement*. (Columbia University Press, 2023)
- * Kathryn Batchelor & Xiaoling Zhang (eds.), *China-Africa Relations Building Images Through Cultural Co-operation, Media Representation, and Communication*. (Taylor and Francis, 2017).sta
- * Liu Zhang. (ed.) *Chinese Culture and Diplomacy*. First Edit. (Beijing, CHN: Intellectual Property Press, 2013)
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7.4.3 Recommendations for Policy Improvement

Based on the findings of this study, the research makes the following recommendations for improvement of China's PD in Kenya in order to enhance Kenyan publics' favourable imagery of China.

- * Few Kenyans source their information about China from Chinese media sources. The management of the Chinese media in Kenya and the government of China need

to market the Chinese media in Kenya to increase their popularity and penetration among Kenyan the public to increase the number of Kenyans sourcing information about China from Chinese media.

- ✱ This study revealed that the Chinese government heavily influences Chinese media and the CI and that this has resulted in these entities being considered as tools for propaganda for the CPC. It is recommended that CPC reduce its influence of these tools of PD so that they can be perceived as legitimate.
- ✱ All the CI in Kenya are located in public universities. The CI have no presence in private universities, where a significant number of students are enrolled. The *Hanban* needs to collaborate with private universities and colleges in Kenya and establish CI in these institutions. This is necessary to enhance the reach and penetration of the CI in Kenya to enhance the potential of the CI to influence public perception of China in Kenya in a favourable way.
- ✱ This study has found that educational exchanges and CGS are relatively effective in facilitating a favourable image of China by the beneficiaries. Chinese officials particularly those in the CMFA and the CMOE need to leverage the potential of this tool and expand it to more Kenyan students. The Chinese officials should realize that the beneficiaries of such programs can become lifetime brand ambassadors for China, who will continuously share their positive experiences with friends, acquaintances and family.
- ✱ The researcher observed that some Kenyan students that have either attended the exchange programs or benefitted from CGS in China were concerned about racism in China. Some also cited the fact that African students on scholarship were not being admitted in top Chinese universities. These are taints on China's image, which the CMFA and the CMOE need to directly address to avert their implications for China's image. The respective ministries need to implement policies that would result in the reduction of racist incidences against African students in China and which would allow African students including Kenyan students to be enrolled in China's top-notch universities.

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Appendix I: Letter of Introduction

Gideon Kimaiyo

University of Nairobi

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

P.O. Box 30197, GPO

Nairobi, Kenya.

Email – c.gidie@gmail.com

Date : 01 October, 2020

Dear Respondent,

REQUEST TO FILL THE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESEARCH PURPOSE


I am PhD student at the University of Nairobi, Kenya; pursuing Doctor of Philosophy in International Studies. Partial fulfillment of the course is to conduct research. The purpose of this letter is kind request to fill in the attached questionnaire for research purpose.

The research topic is; **“THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN PURSUIT OF POSITIVE NATIONAL IMAGE. THE CASE OF CHINA’S IMAGE IN KENYA”**. It will focus on how Chinese government efforts aimed at the general public have been able to influence public perceptions in Kenya about China. The research specifically looks into the effect Chinese media, cultural centres and educational exchanges on China’s image in Kenya.

The information gathered in this study will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Yours faithfully,



Kimaiyo Gideon

Registration Number ; R80/53841/2018

Appendix II: Questionnaire

Section A: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

1. Gender:

Male ()

Female ()

2. Age

a) Below 20 years ()

b) 21 to 30 years ()

c) 31 to 40 years ()

d) 41 and above years ()

3. Level of Education

a) Certificate and below ()

b) Diploma ()

c) Bachelors ()

d) Masters ()

e) PhD. ()

4. Category of your Institution

a) Government Ministry ()

b) Media ()

c) Universities and Colleges ()

d) Private Sector, Formal Business ()

e) Private Sector, Informal Business ()

f) Religious Organization ()

g) Security Sector ()

h) Civil Society ()

i) County Government ()

j) Political parties ()

5. Are you familiar with the term public Diplomacy?

YES () NO ()

6. Are you aware of how Chinese government has engaged with the Kenyan public?

YES () NO ()

7. Do you watch, listen or read Chinese Media (TV, Radio, Newspapers or Magazines)?

YES () NO ()

8. Have you got a chance to study in China on Chinese government scholarship?

YES () NO ()

9. Are you aware of or know of someone who was given Chinese Scholarship to study in China?

YES () NO ()

10. Can you speak Mandarin?

YES () NO ()

SECTION B: Chinese Public Diplomacy Efforts and China's Image in Kenya

1. Below are questions relating to the influence of public diplomacy on national image. Kindly answer to the best of your knowledge

a) Is there a relationship between how the Chinese government has engaged the Kenyan public and how it is perceived?

.....
.....
.....

b) How has Chinese media operating in Kenya influenced your thinking about China?

.....

c) How has studying Chinese language and culture influenced your opinion about China?

.....

d) Have you got a chance to study, work or reside in China? How has your stay and study in China influenced your opinion about China?

.....

2. Below are statements relating to the perception of Chinese Media in Kenya and how they affect public perception towards China. You are required to indicate the extent to which you are agreeing with the statement. Rate your response on a scale of 1 to 5.

Use 1-Strongly disagree, 2-Disagree, 3-Moderate extent, 4-Agree and 5-Strongly agree

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
Kenyans listen to China international FM radio programmes					
Kenyans rely on CRI, CCTV for international news					
Chinese media presence and spread in Kenya is good					
Chinese media in Kenya spread correct news about China					
Kenyans are critical of Chinese media as the communist government mouthpiece					

- 3. Below are statements relating to the perception of Chinese Cultural centres in Kenya and how they affect public opinion towards China? You are required to indicate the extent to which you are agreeing with the statement. Rate your response on a scale of 1 to 5.**

Use 1-Strongly disagree, 2-Disagree, 3-Moderate extent, 4-Agree and 5-Strongly agree

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
There is a strong emotional bond to Chinese culture					
Many Kenyans are competent in Mandarin language skills					
Chinese cultural centres are able to educate Kenyans concerning different aspects of Chinese national values, culture and language					
Confucius institute is a tool for expanding Chinese business empire					
Confucius institute is a tool for Chinas propaganda					

- 4. Below are statements relating to the perception of Chinese educational exchanges with Kenya and how they affect public opinion towards China? You are required to indicate the extent to which you are agreeing with the statement.**

Rate your response on a scale of 1 to 5. Use 1-Strongly disagree, 2-Disagree, 3-Moderate extent, 4-Agree and 5-Strongly agree

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
There is appreciation of China for hosting Kenyan students					
Those who come back from China like Chinese political systems, culture and values					
There is decrease in prejudice and misunderstanding of China by those returning from China					
Those who come back from China strongly recommend to their friends and relatives to study or work in China					
Those coming back from China have changed their thinking and perception about China					

SECTION C: Public perception towards China's Image in Kenya

Below are statements relating to how Chinese government engagement with Kenya has influenced your thinking and perception about China. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. (Please mark your answer with an (X) using the scale 1-5, where 1=Strongly Disagree,2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree)

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
China is favourable in Kenya					
China is a source of quality goods to Kenya					
China growing economy is good thing for Kenya and the world					
The influence of China on Kenyan economy and government is good					
The rise and growth of Chinese military is good for the world peace					
China development partnership with Kenya is good					

Thank you for your time

Appendix III: Interview Guide

1. In your view, what is the nexus between Public Diplomacy and a country's National image?
2. Examine how the following Public Diplomacy strategies have been applied in advancing China's international image in Kenya.
 - a) Media
 - b) Cultural Centres and Institutes
 - c) Academic scholarships and Exchanges
3. Does the strategies mentioned have an effect on changing Kenyan attitudes towards China?
 - a) What is the influence of Media on Kenyan's perception towards China?
 - b) What role does Cultural centres play in shaping opinions of Kenyans towards China?
 - c) What is the effect of Chinese Academic scholarships awarded to Kenyans?
4. How can you describe the image of China in Kenyan?
5. What has contributed or shaped the image described in (4) above?

Appendix IV: University of Nairobi Letter of Introduction



UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
College of Humanities and Social Sciences
Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

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Nairobi
Kenya

July 23, 2020

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN


RE: KIMAIYO GIDEON – R80/53841/2018

This is to confirm that the above-mentioned person is a bona fide student at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi pursuing a **PhD in International Studies**. He is working on a research project titled, **"ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF CHINA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGIES ON FOREIGN PUBLIC OPINION. THE CASE OF CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES IN KENYA"**.

The research project is a requirement for students undertaking PhD programme at the University of Nairobi, whose results will inform policy and learning.


Any assistance given to him to facilitate data collection for his research project will be highly appreciated.

Thank you in advance for your consideration.


Professor Maria Nzomo,
Director, IDIS
&
Professor of International Relations and Governance



Appendix V: NACOSTI Research Permit

 REPUBLIC OF KENYA	 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
Ref No: 916894	Date of Issue: 04/August/2020
RESEARCH LICENSE	
	
This is to Certify that Mr. GIDEON KIMAIYO of University of Nairobi, has been licensed to conduct research in Nairobi on the topic: Assessing the Effect of China's Public Diplomacy Strategies on Foreign Public Opinion: The Case of Confucius Institutes in Kenya for the period ending : 04/August/2021.	
License No: NACOSTI/P/20/6093	
916894	
Applicant Identification Number	Director General NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
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Appendix VI: China's Media Offensive in Africa (2000 – 2006)

Year	Country of Operation	Type of Engagement	Activity
2000	Uganda	Technical support	Xinhua give Satellite Equipment to TV Station (to access its content)
2001	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	Technical support	Xinhua establishes News and Radio- <i>Television Nationale Congolaise</i> (RTNC)
	Guinea	Technical support	An agreement worth US\$9.6 million to construct radio and TV network
2002	Zambia	Technical support	Chinese loan US\$14.5 million for FM radio transmitters
	Lesotho	Technical support	2003 -5 provision of radio and TV equipment worth US\$4.5 million to expand national network
2003	Comoros	Technical support	China assists government to build TV and radio building
	DRC	Technical support	Receives third generation transmitters for broadcasting shortwave signals
2004	Gabon	Technical support	Assistance constructing the national broadcasting station
	Kenya	Technical support	Xinhua's Africa bureau headquarters in Nairobi
2005	DRC, Mali, Djibouti & Equatorial Guinea	Official Exchange	State media sign agreement with China on information exchange and cooperation
	Equatorial Guinea	Technical support	Gwang Ding Construction Company provides audiovisual equipment for the National Radio
2005	Lesotho	Technical support	US\$1.5 million for the upgrade of television and radio
	Zambia	Technical support	US\$4.5 million worth of equipment and technical support from the PRC
	Africa	Training	US\$14.5 million loan for FM radio transmitter and new government complex from the PRC. 20 African TV and radio welcomed by Chinese media University
	Uganda	Technical support	Third Workshop of African Journalists organized Through invitation by Beijing, Xinhua hosts African journalists
	Zambia	Technical support	Government of Uganda acquires US\$120 million loan for ICT infrastructure development
	Mauritius	Technical support	US\$560,000 loan from China for purchase of transmitters to expand reach of national broadcaster
	Zambia	Technical support	China constructs building for Mauritius Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), the state broadcaster
			Broadcasting equipment estimate \$8 million

Source: Yu-Shan Wu¹¹⁵³

¹¹⁵³ Wu, *Op. cit.* pp.13 -14.

Appendix VII: China's Media Offensive in Africa (2006 – 2012)

Year	Country	Engagement	Activity
2006	Nigeria	Technical support/Training	Government purchases satellite equipment from the PRC
	Malawi	Technical support	Receives US\$250,000 for a radio channel
	Seychelles	Technical support	China donates ICT equipment worth US\$50,000
	Kenya	Chinese media presence	Launch of CRI in Nairobi
	Kenya	Technical support	Received broadcast equipment from CCTV worth US\$150,000
2007	Africa	Media presence	Xinhua moves its Regional Editorial Office to Nairobi that broadcasts in French to Francophone countries
		Official exchange	In Beijing, November 2006, Sino-Africa Cooperation Forum (SACF) held. Emphasized need for media cooperation
	Africa	Training	Following SACF Xinhua begins training African journalists invited by Beijing 30 journalists from Francophone Africa attend training course at Chinese Media University
2008	Liberia	Technical support	US\$4 million for expansion of FM Radio to the Liberian Broadcasting System (LBS)
	Africa	Content creation	Xinhua's 'China Africa News Service' launched to extend coverage of Chinese and African news of mutual interest
2009	Africa	Official exchange	Summit in Sharm el Sheikh (Egypt) organized by China that emphasized media cooperation
	Mozambique	Content creation	Agreement that news from China, to come from China
	Africa	Official exchange	State Council on Information Office seminar attended by 94 African journalists, discussed the state of media
2010	Kenya	Media presence	CCTV Africa Bureau opened in Nairobi
	South Africa	Content creation	Xinhua/CNC and Myriad International Holdings (MIH) joint venture to reach about 4 million Africans
2011	Kenya	Official exchange	China-Africa Media Conference held in Nairobi
	Zambia	Official exchange	MOU on press protection and capacity building
	Kenya	Media presence	Chinese company (StarTimes) awarded contract to distribute media content
		Content creation	Xinhua launches Mobile Newspaper in Nairobi
2012	South Africa	Content creation	Xinhua CNC partnered with MIH's Cable network.
	Kenya	Media presence	CCTV Africa launched – regional centre established

Source: Yu-Shan Wu