

TECHNOCRACY AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION

BY

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
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SAFARI APREHENSIVE COLLECTION

DECLARATION

This is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my brother Christopher Absalom Kuya and my sisters who have been very supportive since our loving parents passed away. To Pauline and Loise.

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ABSTRACT

This study revolves around the traditional question of who wields political authority and on what grounds should the led obey him. There is a claim that in a technocratic society, the politician no longer holds and exercises complete political authority, that he shares it with the technocrats.

Before the publication of such works as Daniel Bell's *The Coming of Post – Industrial Society* (1973), W. H. G. Armytage's *Rise of The Technocrats: A Social History* (1965) and other works such as Gendron (1977), Benn (1977), Sklair (1977) and Nelkin (1977), Rotenstrerich (1972) and Tiles and Oberdiek (1995), it was taken unchallenged that the politician holds political authority. These works thus stand as an eye opener, that we cannot take unchallenged the position that the politician wields political authority. These works invite a debate on the possibility of having a different class of individuals, apart from the politicians, which can wield political authority.

This study has developed a position that goes beyond these opposed views on technocracy. After a discourse on conceptual development of a technocracy, two views emerge. That either, the politician is subordinate to the technocrat because the technocrat has authority in matters that concern social policy or that the technocrat is a servant in a system that is under the political authority of the politician. In this study we find the former case more genuine given the operations of the technocrats.

Through analysis, the study has found out that the democratic system in itself creates avenues for the development of a technocracy. That therefore, someone else other than the politician holds political authority. Having accepted, on the basis of the veil of infallibility, that the technocrat is a solution to all problems, the politician is forced to develop a veil in political goodwill whose purpose is to guise himself before the electorate that he is still in political authority. This enables us reflect on popular mandate in contradistinction with technical expertise in which case we observe that the two veils form the grounds for social and political obligation in a technocracy.

It is the conclusion of this study that accepting a politician a continued mandate, due to the veil in political goodwill, when it is clear that he will not yield much in comparison to the technocrat, is to logically fall in the trap of the veil of infallibility. In this case, mandating the politician amounts to affirming the social and political authority of the technocrat. This work is a contribution to political philosophy showing through its exposition the need of a technocratic basis for political authority and obligation.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This study is concerned with the exposition of technocracy as a new basis for political obligation. The traditional account of political obligation revolves around tracing who is in political authority and under what grounds does such a person(s) have the right to rule. It is on this basis that we can trace the resultant political obligation.

Chapter one introduces us to the study providing a rationale to it. The chapter provides us with the problem to the research, which is to attempt a discourse as to whom of the politician and the technocrat wields political authority. This becomes the gist of the study when we trace the grounds for political obligation.

Chapter two gives the problem a philosophical basis. Here a reflection on some major philosophers is done with an aim of explicating how political authority is maintained or justified and on what grounds lays the resultant obligation. Perhaps of all the philosophers considered Rousseau works are essential, for they later become the estimated ideal in a democratic state authority. Grounds for political obligation could be based on the knowledge of the good, the will of God, the social contract, and the General Will, which is geared towards Common Interest.

Chapter three is confined to political authority and how it relates to the masses in a democratic system. The terms 'popular sovereignty' and 'majority rule' are contrasted to General will and how these relate to the Common Good. The chapter concludes by looking at some of the openings democracy has provided to the rise of technocracy. In this case the chapter considers democracy in the light of meritocracy.

In Chapter four we attempt a discourse on the conceptual understanding of a technocracy. Later an exposition on the exercise of political authority in a technocracy is done. On this basis we attempt an understanding on the grounds for social and political obligation in a technocracy.

In the final chapter, we make several observations and recommendations before making concluding remarks with an aim of reflecting on the plausibility of technocracy.

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

Technocracy: A system whereby the determining influence on political dispensations in the State belongs to persons who have skills in their relevant fields of expertise (technical know-how).

Technocrat: A person who exercises authority and power by virtue of his competence, and expertise in a given field. He is, therefore, a skilled individual who is in a position to influence decisions in the process of political decision making.

Technology: This term refers to a practical art. The term refers to a branch of knowledge that rationally and professionally demands adherence to the rules involved in making or doing things. It is knowledge of action.

Political Authority: The use of organized ideological influence to mobilize social support for a specified purpose, especially political.

Political goodwill: The willingness of a politician to accept the implementation of a given decision or advice not because it is politically expedient but because it is based on sound technical knowledge. That though the idea does not belong to the politician, he appropriates it and gives it all the backing necessary for its implementation.

Political Obligation: The willingness on the part of the citizenry to obey the rules and instructions from their leaders for purposes social and political development

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Civilization is said to have arisen in the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, Mesopotamia. This falls within the present day Iraq (See for example Wender 1976: 23-31; Field, 1966:21; Pearce, 1960:11 and Lewis, 1962). Kings who were considered to be representatives of gods governed the inhabitants of Mesopotamia - the Sumerians. As such, the union between the church and the state was in the person of the King. We can derive from the foregoing that political authority was drawn from religion. The government, thus, based on the principles of religion (Lewis, 1962).

In ancient Egypt a centre that sprout contemporaneously with Mesopotamia, the Pharaoh was held in high regard since he was considered an incarnate of a union between an earthly mother and a spiritual father. Pharaoh like his counterpart in Mesopotamia derived his political authority from religion (See Lewis, 1962; field, 1966; and Pearce, 1960).

Ancient Greece, on its part, it was preoccupied with central questions whose response determined its peoples' attitude towards religion, law, philosophy, politics and government. These questions touched on the kind of relationship that existed between human beings and nature, their relations to other human beings among others. It was within this framework that different city-states embraced different governmental philosophies. Athens, for instance, embraced democracy while Sparta had a kingship system. It is in this period that Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Buddha and Confucius lived (See Plato's *Republic*; Aristotle's *Politics*; and Confucius' *Analects*). These great thinkers offered a great revolution in thought and religion and generally contributed to social philosophy in a significant way. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle focused on thought, while religion became the confine of Buddha and Confucius.

In feudal Western Europe, the place occupied by land cannot be underplayed. In Perry Anderson's words, the feudal mode of production was "dominated by land and a natural economy" (1974:147). This thought has been shared by a number of scholars such as Bloch and Ganshof (See for example Bloch, 1967: 444 and Ganshof 1947:142). Flach however, represents a different thought that reads personal groupings as the mode of production in this historical epoch (cf. Bloch 1967:444). This thought can be countered in the light of the infrastructure inherent in such groupings. What brought such groupings together was a particular common interest. In this case it was land. A similar argument cuts across different historical epochs.

In ancient Egypt for instance, the groupings had religion as a common interest. just as the capitalists had such groupings due to a common driving force – the ownership of capital. The feudal lords, thus, owned huge pieces of land as opposed to the serfs who did not own any land. The latter had to offer themselves to the service of the lords in return for food (See Mihyo, 1977:36). The serfs had to pay rent. This they did by either paying in cash or in kind. It is the later that ensured that the lords had constant labourers at their disposal (See Bloch, 1967 and Anderson, 1974:147). “Powers of jurisdiction were,” in Ganshof’s words, “very closely bound up with feudal relationships” (Ganshof, 1947:143). Thus, the lords determined the course of the political authority on the basis of the role they played in the development of the economic system of feudalism.

During the feudal period, two factors contributed to the eventual collapse of the system. There was an over emphasis on the natural supremacy of the lords at the expense of natural liberty of the individual. Feudal lords borrowed heavily on the doctrine of predestination something that seemed to characterize the relationships at the moment. The lords, thus saw their rights as guided and guarded by the divine. It is an attempt to solve this conflict that the bourgeois’ class arose. Secondly, drawing from the elevation of reason, as did Hobbes (See Mihyo, 1977:45), nothing divine needs to contradict reason. In the case of feudalism, to maintain position that it’s was a system based on divine provisions, it had to stop engaging in any unnatural acts. Its acts were considered unnatural because by advocating the place of natural law in the system, the feudalists ironically attacked themselves by fighting natural liberty and natural reason. Feudalism had to collapse.

With the collapse of feudalism, capitalism as a form of production took over. (See for example Marx and Engels, 1961:18). Here, authority resided in the ownership and control of productive processes. The bourgeois derived political authority and obedience from ownership of capital hence they controlled laws, ethics and politics (See Engels, 1961:81).

1.2 The Statement of Research Problem:

In the discussion above, our aim is to try and provide a justification for political authority. That at any one given historical epoch authority resides in a given structure that justifies the existence of certain structures of a political system such as law, religion, and morality among others. Thus, at one point, it is land. At another it is religion, yet at another it is capital.

Much as land and capital are still important, a different system seems to be emerging. That in nearly all matters of life, there is need for some expertise. Today, public policy is conceptualized within some technical framework. This introduces a group of experts; we shall refer to as technocrats. These come in, in matters that concern social policy. The involvement of the technocrats in this study is seen from two opposed framework. In the first school of thought, the technocrat wields political authority. The politician, therefore, is at the mercy of the technocrat in terms of wielding 'real' political authority.

This thought has its proponents W. H. G. Armytage's *The Rise of Technocrats: A Social History* (1965), Longdon Winner's *Autonomous Technology: Technics - out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought* (1977). Another text this study considers important is that by Daniel Bell, *The Coming of a Post- Industrial Society* (1973).

The second school of thought holds that a technocrat is merely a 'tool' of the politician. In this case, the role of the technocrat is to assist the politician in policy matters (See Bell, 1973; Weinberg, 1977 and Rotenstreich, 1972). Much as assisting in matters of policy is important, the technocrat becomes a ladder upon which the politician climbs to his political glory. This school too has been defended by among others Tony Benn's 'Technical Power and People' (1977), the works by Albert H. Teich – *Technology and Man's Future* (1977). Others include, Alvin M. Weinberg in his 'Can Technology Replace Social Engineering,' (1977) and Paul Goodman's 'Can Technology Be Humane?' (1977).

In a technocracy, we have a system where on the one hand, we have persons with the expert knowledge, and on the other, we have the will of the masses expressed in political leaders who are elected. The two work together and interact in the process of decision-making (A position taken by Bell, 1973; Coates, 1977; Weinberg, 1977 and Rotenstreich, 1972). The former are experts in social policy including knowledge in institutional development. They are authorities in that field and therefore, they are leaders. The latter derive their authority from universal suffrage.

They are leaders because they are elected. They are elected because people have faith in their ability to formulate social policies that are progressive for society. People have faith in them to deliver goods and services.

Technocracy is a concept with wide acceptance and utility. On the face of it, given the know-how possessed by the technocrat, the layman cannot help but appreciate the role played by the technocrat. On instruments that require technical expertise, the layman becomes almost 'incapacitated' and all he does is to wait for these people with the know-how to do the required repairs. He is willing to take in unchallenged that which the expert affirms. With the technocrat appearing indispensable to the politician, the ruled is caught in between bestowing confidence in this 'new breed' of leaders that they never mandated and the elected leader whom they mandated by the power of the vote.

Although coming late in appreciating the problems of technology after history and sociology, philosophy, it has been claimed that it has developed cold feet on the issue of technology in general and specifically technocracy (See Tiles and Oberdiek, 1995: 3). Yet the role of philosophy, however, is to offer analyses that ordinarily give insight into meaning of what there is. History is chronological on the issues of technology and technocracy. It tells us when technology arose and where. Sociology describes technology and its impact on modern social settings; hence in sociological terms technology is meaningful when related to civilization in societies.

Therefore, technology and technocracy offer a fertile ground for philosophical reflection. Within the philosophical field, this study seeks to understand the impact of technology and technocracy on social organizations and shifts in authority, thus creating a new ground for political obligation. This work is about technocracy and political obligation.

Those who work behind the scenes in policy formulation and implementation, use their knowledge to influence political process. The scenario is such that the politician needs a mandate from the electorate to rule. Popular mandate gives the politician the basis for political authority especially in a democracy. Yet in the process of development, the politician works with the technocrats. Coupled with this, our society is run in such a way that its needs and interests are objectively looked at and analysed through science and modern technology. This requires a person with skills, an expert, a technocrat. On the face of it, the traditional politician as an important decision-maker is ruled out. He only provides the framework for decision implementation. But on close examination the traditional politician is an indispensable person in the process of political decision-making. From the foregoing this study sets out to answer the question that, of the politician and the technocrat, who actually wields political authority? To whom are the led obliged to obey and why?

1.3 Aims and Objectives

This study broadly aims at giving technocracy a philosophical analysis. This we will achieve by reflecting on the meaning and nature of technocracy. In turn, this study aims at giving technocracy a justification. On this basis this study seeks to examine the reasons for the shift of political authority from the politician to the technocrat, and secondly, to establish the grounds for the expert wielding political authority.

1.4 Rationale and Justification of study

In undertaking this study, an elaborate exposition of the relations that exist between the technocrat and the politician is done. This exposition forms a discussion that points to a number of works (See for example Armytage, 1965; Goodman, 1977; Coates, 1977 and Winner, 1977). These works are concerned with who holds political authority. For some, it is the politician yet for others it is the technocrat. It is not enough to only concentrate on the question of who is in authority.

This study, thus, approaches this relationship from a different perspective. It attempts an understanding that traces the reasoning behind the supremacy of the technocrat, in as far as political authority is concerned.

This study approaches such a position in contradistinction with the popular mandate entrusted to the politician by the electorate. From this, we set out to analyse technocracy in as far as it affects political authority and how this relates to the resultant obligation.

There has been some works that attempt to establish the relationship between the politician and the technocrat. Such works include among others, Tiles and Oberdiek (1995) and Rotenstreich (1972). Bell (1973) observes that the shift from an industrial to a post – industrial society is a reason to consider the technocrat as one who wields political authority. Others who hold this view include Dorothy Nelkin ‘The Political Impact of Technical Expertise,’ (1977) and J. F. Coates ‘Why Public Participation is Essential in Technology Assessment’ (1977). The opposed position indicates the roles of technocrats as servants of the politicians. That much as theirs is an important role, the technocrats have to work under the political authority held by the politician (see for example Benn, 1977). The works by G. Boyle, *The Politics of Technology* (1977), is unique in this study for it cuts across the opposed views on technocracy. For him, there are arguments that indicate either side can be considered.

From the foregoing, we are left wondering whom among these two groups carry the day in terms of providing a better rationale for political authority today. Perhaps of concern to this study is the issue of political authority in the face of the politician – with the popular mandate, on the one hand, and the technocrat – with his technical expertise on the other. The works cited above have not offered an adequate solution on this issue. This study therefore, attempts an exposition on technocracy as a basis of political authority thereby offering a rationale for the technocrat wielding political authority and thus justified demanding a political obligation from the masses.

1.5 Scope

This study will analyse technocracy in as far as it affects the establishment of political authority. This will be done within a framework of other bases for political obligation.

1.6 Hypothesis

Thus, this study will seek to demonstrate that political authority has shifted from the politician to the technocrat.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This study operates from the framework of historical materialism. We shall premise this study on the assumption that there is an infrastructure that determines and actually founds the superstructure. Marxism, argues Timparano (1975:40), was born as an affirmation of the decisive primacy of the socio-economic level over juridical, political and cultural phenomena, and as an affirmation of the historicity of the economy.

Karl Marx, it is argued, held that historical materialism was the “guiding thread for his studies.”(Jordan, 1976: 298,299). It is through it that Marx understood capitalism. Abandoning his initial position of disregarding history, Marx sought to show that the ‘war’ between productive forces and relations of production had an effect on the ideology of the superstructure. To give it a clear grasp, Marx wrote -

My investigation led to the result that legal relations as well as forms of state are to be grasped neither from the so-called general development of the human mind ... that however, the autonomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy.(Marx, 1983: 4)

There is, for Marx, an economic angle to all kinds of human activities. That the infrastructure (Economic Institution) affects the superstructures (Family, Religion, Politics and Education). We can, therefore, accept Marx's position that: -

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production, which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which raises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. (Marx, 1983: 4)

Marx thus, through historical materialism, helps us see the basis of social life. From this point, the study exposes the hidden 'factor' and the foundations of political authority, a fact that helps us understand the resultant political obligation. Thus, as we locate the basis of political authority, we get the grounds for political obligation. On this basis, we can affirm that:

Each generation finds the real basis in existence as something given, for it is handed down from its predecessors; each real basis conditions the life and development of the succeeding generation, to be modified in turn by their action and passed on in its changed form. The real basis provides the starting-point to which different forms of consciousness and ways of thinking-legal and juridical systems, class divisions, ethics, philosophy religion ... should be related. (Jordan, 1967: 301).

This study, thus, endeavours to expose the very infrastructure that founds political authority. Specifically, it exposes the 'veils' that operate in the political structures in as far as political authority is concerned and in the process showing how political obedience is derived.

1.8 Methodology

This study employs a theoretical and analytical methodology. Data is collected from secondary sources since the research involves a library investigation. Information is gathered from books, articles and unpublished works (papers and thesis) on the topic of concern. In the analysis of data, content analysis and historical studies are used. All this is to show if any, the consistency of the information obtained in the light of the hypothesis.

Thus far, the problem is stated. What concerns us is whether technocracy is a basis for political authority and if so, is there a resultant obligation? The crucial question is whether there is a link between political authority and obligation. Answering this question demands a philosophical look at the problem. We thus find it inevitable to philosophically ground our problem.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 POLITICAL OBLIGATION

2.1 Introduction:

In this chapter one, we have stated that the technocrat and the politician are viewed as in a tussle for political authority. Specifically, we were at pains explaining the relationship between political authority and political obligation. Certain questions will guide us. Such questions include what is the good society? What are the foundations of a civil society? What is justice? How does the individual relate to the state's authority? What is authority and to whom ought it be vested in and why? In this chapter, therefore, we attempt a philosophical foundation to the problem.

2.2 Moralism Position

The works of Plato will guide us on this position. Plato builds his political philosophy on his moral philosophy. Subsequently, his moral philosophy rests on his theory of knowledge (See Stumpf, 1988:62; Lavine, 1990: 45; and Ochieng' – Odhiambo, 1998). The culmination of this interplay is seen in the role played by Plato's adage 'knowledge is virtue'.

The quest for a moral, just and good state leads Plato into drawing a striking similarity between the individual and the state. For him, the state, just as for the individual, is concerned with justice. The link between the individual and the state is not serendipitous. It was agreed, at least in Plato's time, that such a link had a natural as well as logical explanation. To understand who a just man is, Plato proposed a need to understand the nature of a just state (*Republic*, 442-443). The relation between the individual and the state revolved around the tripartite soul viz a viz the tripartite state. The concept of soul for Plato is both psychological and biological (See Ochieng-Odhiambo, 1998:64; and Lavine, 1990: 49,51), and it arises from the common experience of the internal confusion and conflict that is shared by all men. This conflict is tri-dimensional. That there is an awareness of a goal or a value (call this reason), and then there is a drive towards action, which initially is neutral but responds in the direction of reason (call this spirited element), finally, there is the desire for things of the body (call it appetitive element). Justice in the soul is achieved the moment there is proper functioning of the three elements.

Extending his analysis to the state as 'individual writ large,' Plato stratifies the state into philosopher kings, soldiers, and the artisans. Justice is achieved in the state on the same principle – that is, if these three function harmoniously. To ensure this happens, Plato in the *Republic* Book 3 (414 –415d) introduced the notion of the golden lie. The purpose of this lie is twofold: to give basis of the tripartite state as having its foundation in the divine and secondly, to give basis of the tripartite state as having its foundation in the divine and secondly, to ensure the propagation of the system based on justice.

For Plato, the initial stratification is education based. After a rigorous training, the artisans and soldiers drop at different stages, leaving the philosopher kings to proceed with further training. The philosopher or the men of gold, are those who had successfully undergone the physical, mathematical and dialectical training. State justice ultimately rests upon the wise and moral duty bestowed on the philosopher kings. It is in this connection that Plato saw no other alternative but for the philosophers to be Kings or for Kings to become philosophers (See *Republic*, 473 d). On this basis, Plato saw political authority in safe hands if it is vested in Philosopher Kings. These are persons with both the theoretical knowledge and skill of rulership; in addition they have the moral aspect or the knowledge of the good. The philosopher kings were in a sense, experts. Plato's reliance on experts was brought about by the problems he had with democracy.

In a democracy, where the people have say in the running of the state, Plato equates the *hoi polloi* to the artisans who have no knowledge required in governing. The morality of the masses is naturally inferior to the morality and justice of the philosopher kings because they lack the knowledge of the social good. Plato's focus was on the best form of government. He pegged his hopes on the possibility of a society governed by a philosopher king with the knowledge of true justice and the best form of government (See Lavine, 1990: 21).

A ruler is known if he possesses the knowledge of the good. Such knowledge is the basis for his political authority. We can thus far appreciate therefore when Plato writes: -

The truth is that if you want a well governed state to be possible, you must find for your future rulers some way of life they like better than government; for only then will you have government by the truly rich, those, that is, whose riches consist not of gold, but of true happiness of a good and rational life. (*Republic*, 475)

This passage indicates two things. That the philosopher king will not be in political authority as a way of amassing wealth but secondly, that he has a noble duty that of ensuring that he does what is good for the state, (See Plato's *Republic* Book 3 414 d). They have such love for knowledge that political authority will not overtake them and this love brings good results to the state. The masses have therefore to obey the philosopher king because he is capable of giving them the good. Through his authority, the state achieves justice. To this end Plato is confident of the kind he has described because they know best the principles of good government and their rewards are better than those of the politician (See *Republic*, 521 b).

2.3 Divine Will Perspective

St. Augustine and Jean Bodin works formulate a different explanation for political obligation. There was a case of divine will in the process of political authority. Drawing from his epistemology, St. Augustine's explanation relates man to his Maker – God. The place of man in creation is crucial. He differs from all other creatures yet within man there are great desires and drives, impulses and inclinations to be satisfied, a thing Augustine attributes to sin (See Encyclopedia of philosophy, vol.1: 203).

Man is essentially expected to be virtuous. By virtue, St. Augustine meant, a “rightly ordered love.” This involves the right order of priority, valued because of their true worth. The place of virtue and order leads him to read the role of law in human life. Human activity is supposed to conform to law. It is through law that men are required to shape their actions and by which they are to be judged. Human laws do not, however, cover each aspect of human behaviour. This that leads St. Augustine to ‘eternal law’, “by which all human behaviour is judged [and] leaves no aspect of man’s life out of it’s purview; it is the same everywhere and at all times.” (See Encyclopedia of philosophy, vol.1: 203).

The eternal law is impressed on the hearts of men. Joined to this fact is the self – evident manifestation of God’s existence through His creation. This then introduces the place of God in man and the place of man in society. St. Augustine had the thought that the state had a single role – to ensure that man had an opportunity to fulfill his destiny. The state is thus a stage to man’s ultimate destination in eternity. The laws in the state must aim at this ideal. To ensure this, the laws have to estimate the ‘eternal law.’

In his *The City of God*, St. Augustine refined this line of thought in the light of his theological foundation. The power of sin in man has a profound effect on the role of the state. The earthly institution, insisted Augustine, has to lay a need for man’s redemption through Christ showing the need for His grace. Political authority and in its train – governmental structures such as those to enforce punishment, are according to Augustine, not natural to man.

They are however, very essential because they reflect an arrangement for man's fallen condition. These structures thus exist to correct some of the evils that arise due to man's fallen state. Political authority exists to ensure the fulfillment of what the divine desires. That in affecting his duty, the authority is working out God's will for the citizenry. In St Augustines's estimation, such a state would have God held in high places. Obeying a political authority is in a word obeying God. The citizenry obeys the authority because they effect God's will, which is for the Good of everyone. The eternal law (the law of God) is not burdensome and it is therefore easy to obey.

Jean Bodin has propounded a similar position. He had defined sovereignty as the absolute and perpetual power of a Republic. The foundation of the state is however seen in the light of families. The family, which consists of father, mother, children, servants and any property they own, is a natural community from which other societies arise. The state is therefore a government of households because each household head (*pater familias*) acts in concert with the others to form citizens.

The sovereign is the distinguishing mark of the state as opposed to other associations. The citizens, according to Bodin, are but subjects to the sovereign. The sovereign is thus a supreme power over citizens and subjects, unrestrained by law (Sabine, 1973: 377). The law does not restrain the sovereign because the sovereign is the source of law. But the law of God binds the sovereign. He is answerable to God and subject to natural law.

In fact this limits the sovereign, for much as the law comes from the sovereign, natural law is above human law.

The citizens, as the subjects of the sovereign have to obey him because he is a source of law and the eternal law of God only limits him. By this limitation, the sovereign, it can be asserted that his decrees are based on God's will. But a number of questions arise: does every action of the sovereign imply God's dictate? Suppose the sovereign ordered that which is contrary to God's will, what ought to happen?

These questions have been given different answers. Here we concentrate on two for they recognize the fact that divine power is unalienable in matters of sovereignty. The first thought has it that no sovereign can act contrary to God's will. This is because they are acting on the very law of God. We shall reject this notion for obvious reasons; that it is less likely to be so. In the bible for example, King David gave an order for a census to be conducted; yet this was not in God's will. There have been other living examples, the case of the Martyrs in Uganda of East Africa. We cannot turn a blind eye to the reality of commands that go contrary to God's will. The second thought accepts a possibility of error. If divine will is the basis for political obligation then the citizens are not obliged to obey any laws of the authority.

2.4 The Social Contractarians:

Another group of philosophers to be considered is that of the social contractarians. Generally these insist that the government is founded on a social pact entered between the citizens and the sovereign. Generally, a contract involves an offer and an acceptance. The sovereign offers peace and tranquility. It offers security and this happens to be its only function.

It is also the reason why the sovereign requires absolute power so that none of the individuals X, W, Y and Z should be superior to the other, but that all are subject to one sovereign. The sovereign has this offer to the citizen to avert his fear in the face of the life in the state of nature. Acceptance on the part of the citizen is to obey the sovereign. The sovereign, if he performs his part of the contract, justice will be ensured. So by obeying the sovereign, the citizen is assured of two things, justice and the fact that the evils of the state of nature are all eliminated.

Social Contractarians have been divided into two: the absolutist and the libertarians. The former insists on the sovereign having absolute power over the citizens, a case we will consider Thomas Hobbes. The latter insist on the liberty of the citizen in the government. John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau are representatives of this thought.

Before the existence of a government, Thomas Hobbes in his book the *Leviathan*, through a logical abstraction, argues that man was in a state of nature. In this state, man is by nature (that is by instinct and desire) a selfish individual. He is egocentric and his desire is to preserve his liberty and he is driven by the impulse to self-preservation.

For Hobbes, men are naturally equal both in mind and body, a fact that indicates the equality of hope in men, that they may desire the same thing. The desiring of the same thing naturally leads to competition, a process that leads to the desire to destroy and dominate one another. The fear of those evils may easily lead to a war of all against all. Life in such a state is thus solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. In the state of nature and consequently of war, there is no morality; no just or unjust actions.

To avert insecurity and unsocialized character of men, the individuals in a state of nature come together into a community. The individuals thus give up their rights to a sovereign, or a sovereign body, who have power to keep the peace and ensure the citizens security. The process by which the individuals come together is called the social contract. Hobbes in this regard proposes a sovereign with absolute powers. A strong structure must be in place to ensure adherence to the contract. Without some prudential obligations, justice, equity and modesty will just be words. In Hobbes' words, 'covenants without sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.' (See Hobbes, 1965). With the powers of the sovereign being unlimited, peace and order can be maintained.

The role-played by the society in ensuring that there is security requires administration of justice, proper legislation and the exercise of power in form of punishment for those who disregard the law. In the state, Hobbes argues that the right to self-preservation is absolute. The subjects in the state have the right to self-defence. The motive of instituting political authority is therefore, self-preservation. It is this aspect that determines political obligation. If the authority ensures that its citizenry have their self-preservation guaranteed, such an authority is to be obeyed and the reverse is true. This task is enormous and calls for a sovereign with absolute powers. In any case a sovereign without absolute power is no sovereign and only comparable to a toothless bulldog (See Leviathan).

If the sovereign cannot provide security for the citizens, such a case warrants resistance or defiance. The sovereign has no right to threaten the individual's life, any attempt, therefore, or any growing weakness on security thereby threatening life frees the individual from all obligations (See Mabbot, 1967: 16). The reason for Hobbes sharp assertion is founded on the fact that if a sovereign cannot provide security, such is no sovereign and the situation is not from that the state of nature.

John Locke was uneasy with the contention that the state of nature is that of war. Locke reads some confusion in the Hobbesian account. He argues that the Hobbesian account confuses the state of nature for that of war. For Locke, the state of nature is one of peace, goodwill, mutual assistance and preservation (See *Second Treatise on Civil Government*, Chapter 3 para.19). The state of war is one of eternity, malice, violence and mutual destruction. If this be the case, one would like to see why we need a civil society if the state of nature such a golden society? Locke's contention is that, such a society is precarious.

He writes that the "pravity of mankind being in such that they had rather injuriously prey upon the fruits of other men's labours than take pain to provide for themselves, the necessity of preserving men in what honest industry has acquired ... obliges men to enter into society with one another" (*Second Treatise on Civil Government, Chapter 3*, para. 19). The danger with the state of nature is that it lacks organization to give effect to the rule of right (see Ochieng-Odhiambo, 1998:39). Everyone is a judge unto himself and unto others.

There is need therefore, to have an independent impartial body to arbitrate over any disputes among citizens. Instead of having thousands of supreme judges, their responsibility should be given to an independent impartial body.

But the state of nature provides ingredients for respecting the human rights and duties. It allows every individual protect his own as best as he can. The notion of property, thus, is crucial in Locke's philosophy. For him, each individual has a right to own part of what nature provides. Private property, however, is a result of an individual's efforts and labour. Here then, we can see two aspects; there is a natural right and related to this, there is a possibility of private property ownership. The individual has certain unalienable rights, such as that to life, happiness and ownership of property. What really matters for Locke however is the fact such a union of persons is for purposes of preserving their property. In this case no one, not even the sovereign can attach an individual's property without his consent. This is in fact the reason for a civil government. The chief end of men uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. It is on these grounds that we can obey a given authority. This protection is for the common good.

Within this, Locke appraises 'consent' as crucial a ground for political obligation. No one can be subjected to political power without his own consent (see Raphael, 1971: 94). Locke had maintained the same principle in regards to property ownership. When the people consent to a given authority, they are in effect promising to obey its rules and orders. In other words it's a moral obligation, on their part, to obey the authority.

Concerning the natural rights, Locke argues that the state has a duty to ensure the protection of these rights. The state is in his estimation, designed to guarantee and protect natural rights, a fact that ensures that justice is maintained. Justice ensures fairness and in the event of a state pursuing justice – who is for the good of the citizens, the citizens are, therefore, under obligation to support the government and obey its rules. In any case a right indicates an obligation on the part of others to respect this right. If the state propagates this, its laws are to be obeyed. In the event that the state does not have the rights of the individuals at heart, it frees the citizens from any obligation. In Locke's estimation, if I am under an unjust government, I have an obligation to replace it with a just government.

Another libertarian in the social contractarian category is J. J. Rousseau. Rousseau did not differ much with Hobbes contention that man is egoistic by nature. This he propounds when he considers the three stages through which society has evolved: human nature, states of nature and the civil state. In the human nature stage, man is drawn by two impulses, that of self-love and self-preservation. Generally, man is sympathetic to his fellow men hence the reduced cases of conflict amongst men at this stage. Conscience seems to be the guide of men. In the state of nature, man's life is simple and unsophisticated. He does not know right from wrong, a fact that makes Rousseau refer to him as a noble savage. The noble savage is led by his simple life, to search for what is enough for him. Two things, however, happen during this stage that threaten the peace that has been enjoyed.

First, there is a population growth. People increase in number. Secondly and related, the notion of property ownership arises. Due to the second event, man became selfish and unjust destroying the happiness that characterized men before. It is at this point that Rousseau explicates his predicament. If each man were let to be a judge of his own, what would become of society? The concept of liberty has a crucial role in Rousseau's philosophy. He was not ready to sacrifice this for any purpose. But Rousseau saw the catastrophe awaiting man, especially in the trend men would adopt if they are let to 'enjoy' their freedom. Rousseau, therefore, had a compound problem: "To find a form of association which may defend and protect with the whole force of the community the person and property of every associate, and by means of which each, coalescing with all, may nevertheless obey only himself, and remain free as before." (Rousseau, 1988: 14).

The problem is to find an association that would protect individual liberty, but ensure that in obeying that association man remains free as before and he obeys himself. Having maintained that man is born free and everywhere he is in chains,' Rousseau argued that liberty of man could only be alienated for their own sake.

Two issues needed Rousseau's attention. First, how can those men come together under a sovereign and meet their goals? Secondly, what was to be done to man's self-interest? Rousseau handled the first problem by reflecting on the social pact or social contract. On the second, Rousseau had to turn self-interest into an obligation, something he aptly captures by reflecting on the general will.

On social contract, Rousseau argues that reason 'forces' man to move from the state of nature to the civil state. This state would help protect every member of the society. This is because sovereignty is given to the whole community with each individual in it retaining his equal portion of the sovereignty. This conception of the state, therefore, creates a common superior who judges over all. In this way, Rousseau charges:

[...] each giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and there is not one associate over whom we do not acquire the same rights which we concede to him over ourselves, we gain the equivalent of all that we lose, and more power to preserve what we have. (1988:15).

In an attempt to turn self-interest into moral and political obligation, Rousseau identifies three different wills: individual will, will of all and general will. If an individual desired to have a book that will benefit him alone, such an individual is operating on his or her private and personal interest. The will of all is nothing but an aggregate of particular wills (See Rousseau 1988:29). An illustration will do. Suppose a cabinet working together had each minister geared towards the elimination of corruption. Eliminating corruption becomes every minister's particular will. The will of all, in this case, is the aggregate of all their particular wills. This is to have a corrupt – free government.

The general will is that which is in the best of interests for the group as a whole. It is the will of all citizens when they function as a body politic. Put differently, it is the will of all the citizens when they are acting as one political community – for purposes of common Good and not for private good. General will thus acts on a different principle – that of 'all' as opposed to the will for all which acts on a perspective of the particular.

In our illustration above, the difference between will for all and general will is as follows; If a minister is found to be less competent and still hangs on his position at the expense of what the whole cabinet would want done. Such will reflect will for all – it is but an aggregate of particular interests. Under the general will, the cabinet has, as one body, a will to ensure that the government is corrupt free. This means that a cabinet member can resign to pave way for a competent person who would ensure the best performance of the government.

The General Will, contends Rousseau, is the basis of legitimate political authority because it is the collective will of the individuals as pertains the social contract. The purpose of the General Will is to direct human action to the common good. Rousseau argues:

So long as a number of men in combination are considered as a single body, they have but one will, which relates to the common preservation and to the general well being. In such a case all the forces of the state are vigorous and simple, and its principles are clear and luminous; it has no confused and conflicting interests, the common good is everywhere plainly manifest and only good sense is required to perceive it (1988:105).

Sovereignty is the exercise of the general will. The body politic cannot do without the general will. It is inalienable and in that sense the sovereign power is but a collective being which can only be represented by itself alone (see Rousseau, 1988:25). Sovereignty is also indivisible. The will is either general or not. We cannot say that we have legislative power and executive power. In the case of a seeming division is a mistake. Any part taken, as a division of sovereignty is “subordinate to it, and always suppose supreme wills of which these rights are merely executive.” (Rousseau, 1998: 28).

If there is a sovereign, what are the grounds for obeying that sovereign? It is this fact that Rousseau attempts to capitalize on by drawing a relationship between the state and the individual. The attempt is designed to ensure that what the individual wants coincides with what the state wants. Individuals who compose the state form the sovereign. In this case and especially in consideration of the general will, the sovereign cannot have an interest that is contrary to the individuals who form it. The sovereign, Rousseau argues, cannot be against its members and in that case, the sovereign is “always everything that ought to be.”(See Rousseau, 1988: 18).

The laws have an object that is general. Consider for example, the law ‘ you shall not kill.’ This law cuts across a general spectrum and it does not name names or create classes. The law can say that nation X will have the post of President, but the law can never elect such a person. The law is therefore an act of general will. Such a will therefore demands that a President be under the law since he is a member of the state.

What would happen if an individual, out of his own private will differs with the general will? He will be doing more harm to himself than to the other people. This is because being a part of the whole (body politic) he is a part of the sovereign. But more importantly, defying the General Will is equivalent to defying oneself. In other words, the individual must recognize the General Will as his own will.

Therefore, if the government is in accordance with the General Will, an obedient individual is obeying himself and remains as free as before. For Rousseau obligation to submit to the authority, arises only when that authority is in line with the general will and therefore serves the common good. If the sovereign is serving an interest other than that which is general, such as channeling all development projects to his constituency, then such will not be taken to be a common interest. In such a case, a servant in that government or indeed everyone opting to defy the sovereign's powers is thereby justified.

For Rousseau therefore, the state has a supreme moral and political authority, something that depends on whether the assembly considers itself one body. In this case, this body has one will (the general will) which is concerned with the common preservation and general well being (common interest). The assembly through voting reaches decisions as long as particular or private wills do not outrun the general will. Obeying an authority in this case is done for purposes of the whole group. It is for the purpose of Common Good.

2.5 The Marxist Position:

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in *The Communist Manifesto*, build a case of political obligation in the face of communism as a logical successor of capitalism. Capitalism as a system propagated class antagonism that has rocked the human history. The antagonistic classes in capitalism were the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The exploitation of the latter by the former formed the social relation in such a system. The bourgeois own capital while the proletariats own labour.

Marx and Engel's write, " capitalism cannot exist without wage workers and in the same proportion as the medieval burgher of the guild developed into the modern bourgeois, the guild journey man and the day labourer, outside guilds developed into proletariat." (1961:46). In this case they had to formulate a philosophical thought that could correct the wrongs in the capitalist system. In any case, the capitalist society had no public interest. Instead it had class interests (See Alford and Friedland. 1985: 271 –287). Only the capitalists are thus a privileged class. Marx and Engels thought depicts a classless society where the state is in charge of the masses, a process to be realized once the proletariat has straightened the capitalistic ills through the proletariat dictatorship.

It is within this framework that the common interests of the commons are catered for. Marx and Engels argue that the immediate aim of the communist is to ensure that the proletariats overthrow the bourgeois. The role endowed to the proletariat is well intended because they do not have separate interests from those of the masses (See Marx and Engels; 1961:25). They are concerned with each individual in the state. It is a case of Common Good. In this connection, Marx and Engels argue;

The communists are distinguished from the other working- class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggle of the proletarians of different countries, they point out and bring to the fore the common interests of the entire proletariat, independent of all nationality. 2. In the various stages of development through which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole. (1961:25).

The common interest is to abolish private property. Property is very instrumental in the capitalistic system. In the bourgeois society, those with labour existed to increase accumulated labour force for the capitalist.

They were nothing but a means to some end (bourgeois property). It is in the communist society that the very interests of the labourer are catered for. By abolishing private property, therefore, the state will ensure communal ownership of property.

The masses have an obligation to obey the state because their interests have been taken care of. In any case, the proletariat “uses their political supremacy to wrest, by all degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state (i.e., the proletariat organized as the ruling class), and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.” (Marx and Engels, 1961:32). Because the state is committed to a class-less society, by obeying its commands, the masses have a favourable living condition, for they live communally while the state looks into their welfare.

In this chapter, we can from the philosophers considered, conclude that there is a link between authority and obligation. The interests of the led are very fundamental in the process of political authority. All that matters is the Common Good. If the political authority can manage this, then it ought to be obeyed. The reverse is true, that in the event that the political authority is not concerned with the common interest of the citizenry, there is no obligation to obey it. The question to ponder upon, in chapter three and four is how these foundations relate to the practical situations of democracy and technocracy.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 DEMOCRACY

3.1 Introduction

After a philosophical grounding on the issue of political authority and obligation, in the preceding chapter, we now make an attempt to understand how this relates to the exercise of democracy. Democracy is a term with much acceptance and utility. It is a widely admired political system that is difficult to maintain in as far as its ideals are concerned. This chapter focuses attention on the grounds for political obligation in a democracy. In this chapter, we introduce the concepts of General Will and the 'will of the people' in the light of Common Good. Towards its close, we reflect on the relation between democracy and meritocracy.

3.2 Definition, Nature and Basis of Democracy:

Democracy can trace its definition from its etymology. Coming from two Greek terms; *Demos*, which means people and *Kratos*, which means power, democracy thus has a place for the people in its governmental structure. Plamenatz (cited in Benn and Peters, 1959:333) defines a democratic government a "government by persons freely chosen by and responsible to the governed."

From the definitions above, we can formulate a discussion on the nature of democracy. Democracy can either be direct or indirect. The former is a system in which the citizens handle issues of policy, laws and working conditions by themselves. They do not exercise any of these through an indirect force like a representative (see for example Bali, 1992: 138). This aptly captures the popularly known definition that democracy is a government of the people, by the people for the people. This is the method of government that operated in ancient Greece especially in Athens. Robert Dahl, in his book *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (cited in Alford and Friedland, 1986: 59), argues that the people have a crucial role to play.

Specifically, the people are given an opportunity to formulate and signify their preferences, and have their preferences weighted equally in the conduct of the government. Direct democracy thus clearly indicates the direct involvement of the citizens in the matters of government.

Today, states have enlarged in terms of population and scope of its activities, a fact that makes direct democracy impracticable (see Bali 1992: 138 and Robert Dahl cited in Alford and Friedland, 1986:59). This impracticality leads us to the consideration of indirect democracy. Indirect democracy introduces, strictly speaking, two distinct groups; that of the representatives and the represented. The system is referred to as indirect because the citizens do not directly get involved in social policy formulation and other governmental matters. Instead, they get involved in government through representatives whom they elect.

Democracy is based on a number of principles. Equality and freedom are the basis of democracy. Democracy holds that all individuals are equal and this means that they have an equal right to liberty and self-direction. For a system to be regarded as democratic, the political authority must ensure that those who attain the required age are granted voting rights. This encourages equality regardless of caste, creed, sex and colour. The citizens must have full opportunities to discuss matters of public interest (see Bali, 1992:139). Freedom hinges on the rule of law, a process that ensures adherence to the stipulated laws. These laws should guarantee political freedom such as freedom of speech, assembly and protest against wrong governmental policies.

The role played by the majority in democracy is crucial. The majority vote mandates the winner. Alford and Friedland (1986:89), argue that the stability of the democratic government is contingent on how the leaders must “subject themselves to the disciplines of maintaining an electoral majority.” The subsequent post-election policies are made on the assumption that the will of the majority is catered for. This principle allows anyone in political authority as long as they gather the necessary majority votes.

It is perhaps in consideration of this, coupled with the fact that his was a philosophy based on morality, that Plato argued against democracy. Democracy, Plato maintained, saw “no need whatever to worry about whether the rulers are outstanding men of character who have been well brought up and have devoted themselves to fine pursuits.

All anybody has to do to get power is to swear that he is loyal to the people.” (Boyd, 1962:157). This explains the danger that can befall a state if an individual is popular yet immoral, regardless of whether or not he is educated.

It appears that the people have a considerable say in matters that affect the government. The majority’s word carries the day. But this takes us to a next level. If we have a majority, there is a minority. If people have the power, how can the majority and minority interests be considered? Is it possible to have popular sovereignty? If yes, under what brackets can it operate?

3.3 Popular Sovereignty and Grounds for Political Obligation:

To give the term popular sovereignty an apt understanding, A. V Divcy distinguishes between legal and political sovereignty. The latter he defines as that “ body ... the will of which is ultimately obeyed by the citizens of the state.” (Cited in Benn and Peters, 1959:334). Two varied, though related interpretations to the term ‘popular sovereignty’, have been sought. First, that it reflects the will of the people as expressed in the decisions carried by a majority votes. Put differently, the first interpretation asserts that ‘popular sovereignty’ is synonymous with ‘majority rule’. The question to handle in this case is whether or not those in power reflect the interest of the majority. Do we really have a group we can refer to as majority? There are many interest groups in a state and a vote result should not class a particular group as the majority. The reason is that these groups have different positions at different periods depending with the kind of policy being introduced.

Illustrating the above contention, suppose a state A has interest groups X, Y and Z. If we suppose further, that X, Y, and Z have fifty members, forty and twenty respectively. It would be out of place, for example, to indicate that since X enabled the government in power to win, that the position of Premier be included in the constitution because forty – five of X's group have accented to the position. Yet, even if X is responsible for the election of the government of the day, you cannot say X is the will of the people based on those elections. Consider this case. If X had fifty members on the issue of Premier, perhaps the issue of affirmative action, X may increase its membership to seventy; twenty more from Y and Z. What comes out clearly is that popular sovereignty cannot classify individuals on the basis of their voting patterns. Benn and Peters bring this out well when they argue that any "individual is likely to find himself ranged with a majority of his fellow- citizens on some, and with a minority on other issues. The groups are constantly shifting." (1959:336). On this basis, you cannot generally classify a given group of persons based on a particular interest (such as an election).

Secondly, popular sovereignty has been seen as a sizeable portion of the electorate: that part of the population goes by a certain position, while the minority does not. But this interpretation too does not hold much water. In any given state, there are a variety of interests. It would be misleading therefore to assert that the election victory indicated a given position, because upon a critical reflection, what is termed a given position is an aggregate of interests. Perhaps an illustration will make this point clear. Suppose a state had potential presidential candidates A, B, C and D.

Further suppose that these candidates represent different groups with different interests. If, in the event that A faced B in the election since C and D backed B's ambition and thus stepped down in his favour, what would be the scenario like? Upon B's election to office, we cannot say that all the one million voters affirmed the same interest by voting B. The reason here is simple. They had similar and not the same interests. The voters knew that upon the election of B, s/he would appoint C and D to high positions that will enable the groups represented by the two have their interests catered for. Like the first interpretation, any other issue, up to and including governmental policies may attract different voting patterns. What the above illustration indicates is that popular sovereignty is not based on one interest but it is an aggregate of a legion of interests.

These two interpretations boil down to the importance of groups. That there is no majority but many conflicting minority-interests. This means further that for the survival of the political authority, such minority group interests must be taken care of. This is the contention Benn and Peters are bringing out when they write:

On election day, the voters 'pass judgment' on a government's record, and, by choosing between political parties, settle the broad lines on which government will be conducted in the next few years. But between elections, the government must mediate between interest groups, none of which, perhaps, could claim to speak for a majority, but each may include people on whose support the government must rely in the next elections (1959: 338).

It is paramount that the interests of each group be taken into consideration. This will ensure that the government is given the mandate for another term (See Yves, 1993:146; Pamela Abuya in Presbey et.al, 2002:319). The principle in operation is that if an interest group has votes then its interests must be catered for.

If the government is concerned with the various interest groups, the interests of the electorate are therefore put into consideration. The political authority in a democracy exists because through the vote, the politician is mandated to rule. If the voting acts as the basis of political authority, what are the grounds for political obligation? Put differently, what is the basis of obedience in a democratic system?

Political authority in a democratic system is expected to carry out its duty as an expression to the General Will whose aim is the Common Good (see for example Benn and Peters, 1959:334; Rousseau, 1998). Appreciating this fact in the light of our foregoing discussions, where majority is nothing but an aggregate of a legion of interests, it becomes rather challenging to achieve the General Will.

If majority is nothing but a numerical figure, it implies that affirming there is the 'will of the people,' is a difficult yet not an impossible task to prove. Let us say that a given political authority is in office after being popularly elected by a variety of interest groups, A, B, C and D, suppose further, that E and F represent the opposing interest groups. What would direct us toward the General Will? These groups, E and F need the consideration of the government in which case they are part of a system much as they voice a different concern. This was aptly captured by Gandhi, who maintained that the evolution of democracy is contingent on giving our opponents an ear (See Bali, 1992:140).

The contention above can also be framed from the understanding that the political authority is in office because of the pledges made during election campaigns. To secure its place in the subsequent elections, the politician has to implement the pledges (See Yves, 1993: 146; Benn and Peters, 1959: 338 – 345; and Pamela Abuya in Presbey et. al., 2002: 319). Why should the political authority meet its pledges? Is it for the sole purpose of reelection? The answer to the second question is negative. The reason for fulfilling these pledges is to partake in the process that reflects General Will. That in meeting these pledges, it cultivates obedience in the electorate. Practically, if an adult met his promise each time he sends the child, the child will obey him next time he sends the child. Consequently, if a given electorate voted a given political authority, it has a right to rule and be obeyed if it implements the electors' will.

A couple of remarks may come in handy in this discourse. Some scholars agree that electors' will ends on the Election Day (see for example Benn and Peters, 1959: 245). If this were the case, the second and related remark indicates the importance, therefore, on the part of the political authority to work with a variety of interests groups. A stable political authority, Larry Diamond opines, should be in a position to make credible decisions. "This," he contends, requires a system "that can produce a government stable and cohesive enough to represent and respond to competing groups and interests in society without being paralyzed or captured by them." (Diamond and Plattner, 1993:96). As a concluding remark on General Will, obedience can only be obtained when the interests of all the conflicting interests are put in place. Only then can we appropriately talk of General Will.

In other words, General Will whose object is Common Interest is realized when the political authority impartially deals with all conflicting interests (See also Benn and Peters, 1959:345).

Thus far, we may suppose that since the political authority is the concrete expression of the General will, in terms of the laws and policies, the governed are obliged to obey the command given by such an authority (See Raphael, 1971: 98). Disobedience is fought by the authority's coercive power in as far as such an action is geared towards General will. General Will thus, becomes the will each citizen has.

Natural rights theory forms a basis for obedience in a democracy, at least at the individual level. This theory holds that each individual has certain inviolable rights. These are absolute moral rights such as right to life, right to liberty and the right to pursue happiness. The political authority is expected to protect these natural rights. In doing this, justice is ensured. Once the political authority protects the natural rights of its citizens, it ought to be obeyed. In a nutshell, this theory ensures the interests of the minority groups are catered for because they too have natural rights. The majority is thereby required by these criteria to tolerate and compromise with the minority interests. With forty-two tribes, Kenya would stand a better place, if these tribes forged a sought of unity in diversity. Each tribe has its people who have natural rights. Kenya's purpose should be to focus on a sufficient solidarity (See Benn and Peters, 1959:349). For Kenya therefore, a national solidarity is better than forty-two tribal loyalties.

If the state can ensure the consideration of each interest group on the basis of natural rights, then the authority ought to be obeyed. These rights indicate an obligation to have them obeyed. If I have a right to life, it is expected that X, Y and Z will obey it.

In the event that the unlikely happens, we cannot avoid the prudential obligation, which the political authority will apply. The doctrine of natural rights has been attacked due to its theological and metaphysical basis thereby almost dismissing it. Natural theorists argue that the term is used in a different sense. That, in most cases, it focuses on rights in as far as they touch on the moral aspects. Generally, we can conclude that metaphysical and theological or not, the theory lays a special emphasis on each individual.

Extrapolating this discourse, the natural rights theory opens the reality about the potential of every individual. Each person is a source of some claim. Exploring on the right of liberty, each person is thereby allowed to have an opportunity to express himself. This in essence means that proper channels need to be put in place to ensure that these claims are known. How a political authority balances these claims is instrumental (See Diamond and Plattner, 1993: 96). In a state with two interest groups, A and B with the latter being the minority, the above criteria implies that no strong claim from A should make the government concentrate on A's interests at the expense of B. Interestingly, it also implies that the weak interests of B should not be underplayed just because B is a minority. What comes out clearly is the fact that in each person there is a moral principle that demands he be treated as a source of some claim.

When each individual has a claim, then the political authority is required to provide a rationale for the activities he is engaged in and the policies formulated. In a way of recap,

Benn and Peters write:

All parties would be sensitive to a wide range of interests, and whoever governed would have to justify their policies by appealing to widely accepted moral criteria. Their decisions would not be influenced by one particular sectional viewpoint, and whatever they did would have to stand criticism (1959:351).

A close look at the place of the people in as far as sovereignty is concerned, takes us to the role of elections. Elections are held periodically and this time frame may act as a catch point to the relationship between politicians and the electorate. If the politician cannot be accountable, to the electorate, then he risks losing the seat come the subsequent elections. It is assumed that the power of the people in a democracy is thus seen in appointing, controlling and dismissing a government (Simon, 1993).

To understand this, we propose a taxi-driver theory (See Simon 1993:148), which aids us, explain the logic behind popular sovereignty. When an individual hires a taxi, he is actually in charge much as the taxi driver does the driving rounds. Upon reaching his destination, the individual stops the driver from going any further. This is the ideal situation in a democracy. But suppose we extrapolate this argument and propose that the passengers are ignorant. The taxi-driver can immediately take advantage of them and drive them to a place of his choice.

This illustration helps us read two possible scenarios in a democracy. If the electorate is 'punitive' and 'ignorant', that is they are not aware of what beholds them in the power struggle, the politician will take advantage of them. This is in spite of the fact that the people ceded the powers he is misusing. But secondly, if the people know their position, then the leader has to seek their mandate at each elective period. In this way the government properly becomes the servant of the people and thus we can elect representatives on the basis of their programs. The principle is simple: we elect new or any representatives on the basis of their performance or promised performance. The question to ponder at this stage is whether or not by giving this mandate to the representatives indicates a complete transfer of power? If the government is the peoples' servant, can we be justified in assuming a partial transfer of power? At quick glance we can simplify this argument by saying that subsequent elections seem to indicate partial transfer. This is however, complicated when a party has been in power for a long time, such as in Kenya's Kenyan African National Union (KANU). After ruling for forty years its performance seemed dismal and that its continued leading would be catastrophic. It is on this basis that the party lost in the 2002 general elections.

The participation of the people in the elections, indicate a special place in sovereignty. They thus exercise power. But soon after elections, the politicians have the mandate. Therefore, we can aptly argue that the people cede power to the politician giving him a place to wield political authority.

3.4 Democracy and Meritocracy:

Democracy operates on the principles of equality and liberty. How then does democracy fit in a system that demands merit? Do we uphold a position simply because a majority accented to it? Logic warns that there is a possibility of the majority being wrong. Plato and Aristotle were not for democracy at least as a form of government. In a passage that reflects a no-nonsense position, Agarwal et.al offer a summary on democracy, that: -

Aristotle, the father of political science, condemned democracy as a perverted form of government, a sort of mob rule. Plato his teacher, dubbed it as a *rule of ignorance*. Lecky described it as ' the government of the poorest, *the most ignorant*, the most incapable who happen to be the most numerous'. The votes in democracy are counted and not weighed. Decisions are arrived at by majority vote in the assemblies, juries and cabinets so that the wise may be isolated and fools may carry the day. (Emphasis added) (Agarwal, 1993:285)

It is at this point that the interplay between meritocracy and democracy becomes crucial. In a democracy, he with the majority votes becomes the winner. Therefore, when we elect a leader, we do it not for his credentials, but because of his popularity. In any case we can have a popular leader who is not a democrat, but this is not our concern in this study.

In trying to shape out what he meant by asserting that democracy will easily slip into a tyranny, Plato saw a democratic city divided into three groups: those in power, those with money and the majority ordinary citizens. It is the first two groups that determine the 'game' of democracy at the ordinary citizens (Boyd, 1962:160). This being the case, we may want to explore the kind of people who occupy the places of power in a democracy.

A number of our leaders have been ignorant and at times illiterate by ordinary standards of education.

But the development of a nation does not depend on politicians alone. Different persons such as experts happen to be partners in this progressive agenda. Trouble comes in when the politician is in charge of the appointments that touch on these experts. It is at this point that the interplay between meritocracy and democracy comes in. We generally associate merit on some kind of training. This in essence suggests that men are not equal – some are more qualified than others. It is perhaps this fact that led Plato to argue that the very ideals of democracy: equality and liberty are the sole ingredients for its critique. Equality in Plato's estimation is far fetched because it goes against human nature. Men are unequal in their capacities and should be given different functions in accordance with different capacities (Raphael, 1976:285).

Based on the above argument, the leadership in a democracy is charged with a responsibility that needs to be handled cautiously. These leaders are in charge of the state; they run the state on their own understanding. These political leaders appoint government officials and other state dignitaries. Agarwal et.al argues: -

The success of democracy depends greatly on the *quality of leadership* it is able to provide. Leaders in a democracy are capable of doing much good as well as harm. They must be men of sound judgment, unimpeachable character and outstanding initiative. In this connection it may be pointed out that democratic process itself in the long run helps in bringing up the right kind of leaders. (Emphasis added) (1993:285).

The position taken by Agarwal et.al could in many ways be prescriptive. It sets an ideal conception for who is supposed to be in political authority in a democratic system. The reality at times may fall short of this ideal. That much as the expectation is to see the leadership compromised of persons with quality traits, the reverse is often the case.

Often important positions in a state are given to unqualified persons due to political connection. In such a practice, the expert and industrious persons have their expertise neglected, and in their place, supporters and sympathizers of the political authority are hired in spite of their expertise.

As a conclusion to this chapter, we may assert that in a democratic system, political authority is based on the mandate given by the majority votes. We have established that this power is only ceded to the politician. Any attempt by the politician to consolidate such powers as at the expense of the people, is strictly speaking, a mistake. The authority held by a particular political authority can as well be given to another politician through the elections. The question to pose at this section is whether the ideals of a democracy pose any real danger to the system. Can we have a different system that emanates from the manner in which authority is handled in a democracy? How is the very demand of implementing programmes pledged in a democracy handled? If a new system were to emerge, does it demand a new basis to political or social obedience? An attempt to answer these questions forms the gist of our analysis in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 THE EXERCISE OF TECHNOCRATIC AUTHORITY

4.1 Introduction:

Towards the close of chapter three, we did explore the place of democratic ideals in the face of meritocracy. This is further explored when we relate democracy to development. The process of development demands proper social policy formulation. Such an exercise is technical and it demands that experts handle it (See for example Mugenyi, 1987). In this chapter, we examine the role played by the technocrat in the new setting that emerges from a democracy. We thereafter present a conceptual development of a technocracy.

4.2 Conceptual Development Towards A Technocracy:

In a democracy, the politician is elected to office partly because of the election pledges he makes in his manifesto (See Wanyande, 1987). Transforming these pledges into programs that benefit the citizenry becomes an uphill task for the politician because the system is such that elections determine who is to occupy a political office. Elections will thus put in office the individual who managed to get the majority votes. This individual may not be a competent manager in as far as the formation of policies is concerned.

This scenario inevitably invites a special group of elites who comes in to assist the politician handle this task. Elites are persons who are of exceptional standards in their particular fields. The link between the elites and democracy has been the thesis of a number of scholars. Bottomore (1964), for instance, argues that these special groups of elites have formed a 'rule' that the minority has to constantly be in power. In Bottomore's estimation, in every society, there is a minority, which effectively rules. Bottomore further contends:

The distinctive feature of democracy, as a form of government, is that it permits elites to form freely, and establishes a regulated competition between elites for the positions of power. Thus conception of democracy as a political system in which political parties compete for the votes of a mass electorate, implies further that the elites are relatively 'open' and are recruited on the basis of merit (i.e. there is presumed to be a continuous and extensive circulation of elites), and that the mass of population is able to participate in ruling society at least in the sense that it can exercise a choice between the rival elites (1964:112).

In this case a number of patterns that are witnessed in a democracy may as well lead to its demise. Meritocracy, for example, will be against the democratic ideal of equality since it seems to place a number of persons in different classes from the rest. From this point, we cannot help but appreciate the fact that the politician will have to interact with groups of persons who are instrumental in the development of a nation. There are groups we may refer to as elites, who interact with political leaders. In this chapter we look at technocrats as a special group of elites that interact with the political leaders. Since in a democracy, the person with the majority of votes is declared the winner, there is a possibility that he who is popular may not be in a position to perform. Generally, the way the politician interacts with the technocrats is very crucial to the development of a nation.

Mugenyi aptly captures this interplay between the politician in a democracy and technocrats when he argues that elected politicians have a tendency of being populists yet this has to be contrasted with the technical tendency of decision-making processes. In this regard, Mugenyi argues that the “role of consultants and expatriates ... has often been decried. But it must be considered in the light of the capacity of politicians to process demands and prescribe competent solutions that continually add to national development.”(1987:158).

On the other hand, the technocrats need a society that recognizes merit. In this case it will be in order to see the societal demands development and other advancements as a recipe for postindustrial society. The notion of postindustrial society is, in Daniel Bell’s estimation, a new axial principle through which the society defines a common core of its problems and how it will confront these problems (1987:60). Bell’s argument makes a lot of meaning in our thesis. His position that we need to know the axial in each society helps us locate the basis of political authority. Bell argues that in its capitalist society the axial institution was private property. The post-industrial society has its axial principle in theoretical knowledge. In his words, Bell writes-

The concept ‘ post industrial society’ emphasizes the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the axis around which new technology; economic growth and stratification of society will be organized.... In the Western political systems the axial problem is the relation between the desire for popular participation and bureaucracy (1987:60,61).

Bernard Gendron shares similar thoughts when he writes:

[...] for the agrarian age in technology the primary factor of production was land, for the industrial age it was inanimate capital (such as machinery), and for the post industrial age it is human experience (sometimes called 'human capital') Thus, in the agrarian age landowners controlled the economy, and in the industrial age, the owners of capital (the capitalists) controlled the economy. It would see to follow that in the postindustrial age, the owners of expertise control the economy (1977:46).

The means of production in the post-industrial society is knowledge. It is from this understanding that Gendron argues that knowledge "has replaced ownership as the source of economic power, and the goals of the knower have replaced the goals of the owner" (1977:45). The place occupied by knowledge in a post-industrial society cannot, therefore, be underplayed. The need for a political and cultural configuration seems inevitable. It is in this sense that Alford and Friedland argue that the "growing organizational complexity of the society requires both corporate and state planning by the technocracy – a technically and scientifically trained corps of experts" (1990:175).

The politician has no option but to work with the technocrat so as to realize his goals in form of pledges. As such, the technocrats become partners in the running of the country. It is in this realm that Daniel Bell looks at technocrats as an indispensable administrative staff in a political system (1973:364). A similar position has been taken by Agarwal et.al who observe that the technocrats are obvious personnel in any development conscious state, since the politician cannot solve all issues alone (1993:293).

Their position, however, is that these experts call them civil servants, technocrats or the army, need to operate within given confines. For them, the technocrats should not be given an upper hand at the expense of the political leader (See Agarwal et.al, 1993:293).

According to Weinberg (1977:22,30) the role of the technocrat is to explicate the social and technical problems we experience. Theirs thus, is an assisting role. They assist and advise the politician in formulating solutions to the problems the citizenry face. The technocrat is charged with a duty of making the seemingly intractable social problems traceable. The resultant product of the cooperation between the technocrat and the politicians is development. Weinberg, thus, underscores that ours is a post-industrial society.

At this stage, the technocrat has to cooperate with the politician from behind the scenes. The reason for this is twofold: that the very democratic ideals of having the people's sovereignty must be seen to operate. Secondly, policy formulation should be seen to operate within the confines of Common Good. The place of science in a technocracy has variously been discussed. Sklair Leslie, for example, argues that the moment we mention that science and technology are controlling the world, we automatically create problems for democracy (1977:174). But the progress of any state depends on those in authority; a process Sklair cites two criteria for its selection:

- a) exclusively technical, a criteria that would ensure experts are permitted to make decisions and gain credence, and
- b) a mixture of technical and non-technical methods. Here we have both the technical experts and politicians (1977:178).

Option (b) is an accommodative position and it enshrines two possibilities. Either the technocrat has to relate aptly with the politician or be the politician's servant. Option (a) will form what we will rightly refer to as technocracy. Evident in these criteria is the conspicuous absence of the role played by the people, something that capture Sklair's attention. The man on the street plays his role when he votes the politician into office. He has no place directly or indirectly in policy formation (See Benn and Peters, 1959).

Thus far, we can conclude that the first stage – that of politician technocrat co-operation marks a 'mock democracy'. In Sklair's words, the:

Role of the public, therefore, is restricted to the provision of a general mandate for action. But, as we have seen, and as few citizens in the advanced industrial societies would wish to deny, there is rarely if ever any real debate about big science or its consequences, precisely because the issues are deemed to be too technical for and sometimes even for the politicians themselves (1977:178).

It is in this regard that technicalities begin to emerge. We realize the potential possessed by the technocrat much as he is acting behind the scenes. But perhaps unfortunate, is the fact that for the citizenry to be co-opted in the decision making process, it need to be braced with the demands of a science oriented world. In this case, the layman has to keep himself updated with technological advances.

In our case, we expect everyone to have an idea on how policy will be affected by abortion, genetic engineering, nanotechnology, structural adjustment programs and the politics of foreign aid. These are things not even an averagely educated individual can have an immediate grasp. It is therefore an uphill task to expect the citizenry to be updated constantly with the ever-growing field of technology.

Thus, Sklair proposes a reconciliatory approach to the technocrat-politician power struggle. Sklair argues that it is foolish to leave out technocrats in issues that relate to decision making, just as it will be absurd to let the technocrats handle the issues single handedly. We can assert that "it is clear that those who are technically trained are competent and have the essential role to play that all specialists in society might play, namely to tell us what is possible and impossible, likely and unlikely" (1977:173). As technocracy dawns, democracy plays a secondary role. Daniel Bell is of the opinion that "one can easily argue that 'real power' [shifts from] the hands of elected representatives to the technical experts... [beginning] a new type of government, neither democracy nor bureaucracy, but a technocracy." (1987:78).

If the new type of government is technocratic, then those with knowledge play a dominant role in political authority. The politician, important as he is, may not have much say especially when the technocrats "use the power conferred by their office to control access to information, which their clients, constituents, or members might use against them. Elites shape public opinion by controlling the selection of issues and managing participation." (Alford and Friedland, 1990:176).

The desire to develop a nation coupled with a possibility of a non-performing politician, the role of a technocrat is inevitable. It is at this stage that we shall refer to technocracy in its proper sense – when the technocrats are in power. In this system, the approach to issues is scientific. Science is about rationality, therefore, the policy formulation must be a system based on objective data collection, and analyzed and evaluated in a rational procedure and through a rigorous process. In this light, Nelkin argues, that “ scientific knowledge is used as a rational basis for substantive planning, and as a means of defending the legitimacy of specific decisions.”(1977:190).

Bureaucracies play a role in technocracies. A bureaucracy is a body of officials whose performance of duties is professional and independent of personal sentiments and opinions. It needs to be noted that personal sentiments and opinions is the province of the politician. The highly bureaucratized a nation is, the less authority the politician will have. This is because the technocrat will ensure that through their scientific approach to issues, their prowess is recognized (see for example Benn, 1977:165; Coates, 1977:186). The effect of involving the technocrats in the society is manifold. They make themselves accessible to the public much as they do this in a way that the public cannot put up an effective resistance (see Arymtage, 1965:283).

4.3 Grounds for political Obligation:

The technocrat's expertise comes in handy when we are faced with the demand of developing and implementing social and political policies. By the use of their expertise, we get programs implemented that eventually have an impact on the citizens' lives. Our concern here is whether the manner of operations of the technocrat places a duty on the part of the citizen to obey his commands. Put differently, are there any grounds for a social and political obligation?

The operations of the technocrat are such that it is assumed that he can manage all the tasks given to him especially so if this is within his area. Such an assumption, that which exonerates him from any fault. Such exoneration arises from the fact that the technocrat is a performer especially in issues that relate to policy formulations. It is in this regard that Dorothy Nelkin observes:

The complexity of public decisions seems to require highly specialized and esoteric knowledge, and those who control this knowledge have considerable power. Yet democratic ideology suggests that people must be able to influence policy decisions that affect their lives. (1977:190).

Technically, by asserting that the focus of policies be scientific, we can conclude that the "capacity of science to authorize and certify facts and pictures of reality [is] a potent source of political influence" (Nelkin, 1977:190). This influence we will refer to as the 'veil of infallibility'. The veil of infallibility is due to the influence and performance of the technocrats and therefore it becomes a ground for his right to authority and consequently, political obligation on the part of the citizens. It is on the basis of the 'infallibility' that the public is in complete consensus with the technocrat's command.

Perhaps an illustration will do, suppose an individual X engaged in a social policy and development activity, say construction of housing units in a particular city (call this activity V). This requires the expertise of a technocrat, T. By the fact that T has been acknowledged as very instrumental in events of V's nature, person Y has no option but to obey the instructions given by T. Failure to do so will definitely lead to the construction of the housing units being a failure. We can argue that Y or any other individual: A, B, C, or D has to obey T's instructions since he 'rarely' errors in matters that concern social policy and development.

But this is not the only ground upon which the technocrat derives obedience. The people, just as the politician realize that the technocrat can through his quality of infallibility, perform. The politician has, through the democratic exercise, been mandated to come up with adequate policies that will steer the state towards development. As a matter of fact, these policies ought to reflect the politician's pledges during the campaign period. Democracy, however, opens possibilities of electing less competent managers. It opens possibilities because the most popular individual occupies the office. In such a case, and in similar cases where the politician pledged a program that requires expertise, the technocrat comes in. It is at this point that the process has to be completed by the role of the politician accepting a particular program. This we will call the veil in political goodwill. That much as the idea could have come from the politician, he lets the technocrat handle the process of social policy formation and development. The role of the technocrat is to advise on the implementation and he later does the implementation of those projects that are acceptable to both the politician and the public.

Development, thus, belongs to the technocrat, yet credit goes to the politician. This is what marks the veil in political goodwill. In case of failure, much as the politician may blame the technocrat, the public will definitely blame the politician for this failure. Since the technocrat is allowed some space in the process of policy formation and implementation, obeying him amounts to actualizing these policies, which are to the good of the public. The politician is thus 'trapped' for he has to deliver what he promised. This is what Owuoché and Jonyo present when they write:

Frame of reference for an effective appraisal of political parties in relation to their objectives is dependent on political commitment to carry them out to their logical conclusion (2002:31).

What Owuoché and Jonyo leave out, however, is the role the experts play and in our case the technocrats. The veil in goodwill ensures that the democratic system is perpetuated in a technocracy. It ensures that the politician is in the office. Political goodwill is thus a tool in the hands of the politician not to fight the technocrat but to show the public that he is still in office. Therein lies the veil: that the mandate he was given is still in operation.

It can be affirmed that, democracy as a system gives the public the opportunity to choose their leaders. The system is such that the most popular persons are elected to office. Such a process would welcome less competent managers. It is this instance that poses a problem to the political authority in terms of social policy formulation and development.

Democracy, however, has had as its partner, a team of elites (or technocrats) who are men with know-how in particular fields of social policy and development. These have the authority from the politician to formulate and implement policies in the form of goodwill. These become the grounds for obligation in a technocracy. We can thus far demonstrate that there is a shift in political authority from the politician to the technocrat. Social policy and development which is a tangible result expected of an elected political authority, is handled by none another than the technocrat. The grounds are such that the technocrat can rarely err. This grants him a special place in issues that he is competent enough to handle.

If the technocrat implements social policies, the politician would be threatened. So whether or not the policy is the politician's idea, he has to 'accent' to it. This is designed to confirm his place to the citizenry who gave him the mandate to be in that office. Thus far, our problem has been discussed and we have demonstrated our hypothesis. The question to pose at this moment is whether or not we can trust the technocratic authority. Can we have confidence in it? Specifically, our thesis is to examine whether or not technocracy is plausible.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 THE PLAUSIBILITY OF THE TECHNOCRATIC

5.1 Introduction:

Thus far, we have argued the case of technocracy, making an assertion that the technocrat is actually the one that wields authority. We specifically, in chapter four, demonstrated the circumstances under which this occurs. Certain issues need our attention in this chapter. Are we comfortable with technocracy as a basis for political authority? Is this perspective ridiculous and none human? Do we need to legitimize the 'under pipe dealings'? If so what will be the moral aspects? This chapter therefore seeks to establish the plausibility of technocracy as a political system.

5.2 Observations and Recommendations:

As a way of giving the work some philosophical foundation, we did reflect on the thoughts expounded on political authority by some philosophers such as Plato, Jean Bodin, J.J. Rousseau, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes and Karl Marx. From the works of these philosophers, we did conclude that those in political authority have a right to be in such positions. Those in political authority have a right to be in such positions. That theirs is a responsibility to ensure the society is geared towards what benefits everyone.

We saw that for Plato the philosopher King had a task, based on his know how and knowledge of the good, in leading the state. In his divine command theory, the leader is but a representative of God in which case he is in authority to effect God's will.

The social contractarians focused on the social contract whose basis is the common good of all the citizens. Karl Marx and Engels talked of a common interest of abolishing private property. We may assert that since those in authority are concerned with the welfare of those they lead and in this case they have a right, the ruled have an obligation to obey the rulers. That therefore there is a link of obligation established between the rulers and the ruled. On the same basis, we may argue that in the event the authority doesn't serve in the interests of the citizenry, then disobeying it is the only moral thing to do. This is aptly captured by Finnis when he argues:

Someone who uses his empirical opportunity, or even his legally recognized authority, to promote schemes opposed to practical reasonableness cannot then reasonably claim to have discharged his own responsibilities in reason, and may be unable to justify his claim to have created a good and sufficient exclusionary reason affecting the responsibilities of those whose compliance he is seeking or demanding (1980:246).

We did establish that popular sovereignty, if any, involves the people ceding power for purposes of common good. The common good of a particular community involves treating the whole community as one. It is in this regard that we arrived at a conclusion that even opposing group interests have to be put into consideration by the political authority. This we did conclude is the only way to ensure victory in the subsequent elections.

But we also did categorically conclude that within a democracy, there is a need to appoint people with qualifications and who are capable of linking democratic practice into development. This calls for abandoning those who look at democracy as an end in itself. The purpose of election, we did observe, is to implement the pledges given to the electorate by the politician. Critically reflected though, much as technocracy has been the handmaiden of democracy, the two systems operate on different ideals. As democracy insists on equality and liberty, technocracy insists on merit; which is supported by the fact that individuals are different. In a technocracy, some individuals are more qualified than others. On this basis, we had to draw a conceptual development of a technocracy.

Technocratic evolution has formed the backbone of this thesis thus far. In this system technical know-how is emphasized. We have seen a lot of emphasis being laid on those who are with specialized training in various fields. The technocrats in particular have been our focus. Authority has thus been let out from the capitalist to the technocrats. Much as the capitalist is let to have ownership of capital, he is nevertheless left with no basis of political authority. Here we did observe that policies are handled from a scientific angle, a fact that requires performers or experts. The argument is that, nothing is impossible when a technocrat is in his/ her field.

This we called the veil of infallibility, that given their fields, experts have always performed exceptionally well. The temptation has been to make a blanket assumption that such as infallibility sweeps all other aspects of the human nature.

This proves tricky given that the technocrats could be an authority on one aspect of the human life and thus cannot be competent to handle all the aspects of human person. To advance the thesis of technocracy we want to maintain that technocrats have to operate under given veils. Important is the veil of infallibility. That contrary to our above fears, the technocrat can have his expertise double up in matters of politics. This immediately introduces a power struggle. At the top of the democratic political leadership is the politician. Thus a conflict ensues between the politician and the technocrat. We did explore how far their feuds can go, but maintained the reason why the politician is defeated. For fear of defeat, he has to depend on an expert. Democracy is very interesting. It makes the politician be in the midst of 'conflict' of interests, on the one hand he has the mandate to take care of and on the other, the legitimacy of this consent, which requires effectiveness.

Other veil – that in political goodwill emerges. We may conclude that the idea may be political, but there is a technical requirement for its implementation. Accepting this technical touch, means letting the technocrat do what is his qualification. Such we call political goodwill. The reason why the politician gives in to the technocrat is due to the fact that he like any other person is susceptible to the veil of infallibility. This is because he is desperately in need of fulfilling his pledges and policies. It is at this breaking point that the technocratic revolution takes place.

This revolution, however, is strange in two ways. First it is conducted under the pipe. Put in a different way, technocracy changes the basis of authority but maintains the superstructure at status quo (the democratic process). Secondly it ensures that the process of this dealing is retained as a political secret. It is this connection that we can read the veil in political goodwill. Political goodwill remains the only tool in the politician's hand to claim a share in a technocracy.

The nature of political leadership is such that it envisages a twofold structure. On the one hand, it is a matter of administration, while on the other hand; it is a hollow ritual and symbol. Technocrats come in to assist in the administrative tenets of politics. Winner contends that technocracy can be understood in a distinctly modern sense (1997:135). This calls for the administrative involvement. The politician has a secondary duty that which the technocrat can as well handle, namely, a hollow ritual and symbol.

5.3 The Plausibility of the Technocratic Authority:

Gendron expresses his concerns on technocracy. He is skeptical of the technocratic system. His opinion is that like the ideal goals of capitalism, we maybe headed for another capitalistic catastrophe if we adopt technocracy. He thus writes:

We know what ultimate goals were foisted upon the capitalist by capital ownership as an instrument of power: the maximization of profits and personal wealth. But what ultimate goals are foisted upon the manager-technician by technical expertise as an instrument of power? The answer seems surprisingly simple. If the technical expertise is the source of power, then manager-technicians can only maintain and expand their power, both as individuals and as a group, by stimulating both the growth and applications of technological knowledge. The more knowledge, the more power; the greater the application of that knowledge, the more power (1977:56,57).

Further, Gendron argues that no one has sufficiently argued the case for technocracy. It is here that we will differ with Gendron because his position borders an *argument ad ignorantium*. That since no “utopian ... has given a systematic defense” (1977:60) of technocracy, then none exists. Put differently, no technocratic system exists because no one has proved it exists. Such is a fallacious position.

We shall neither argue that technocracy is a reality because no opponent has proved the contrary. It is on this basis that we could reject his misplaced philosophical argument but appreciate his concerns for a kind of system technocracy would offer. The important aspect in this case is that technocracy is an estimation of Plato’s ‘Philosopher Kings’ concept. Technocrats are, so to speak, modern day philosopher kings. The aspect of morality is very necessary in their exercise of political authority. This may not go well with the position that one may not be moral as long as s/he is competent. Our response to this thought is in the face of authority. Human beings are social and leading them cannot be divorced from morality. Our recommendation will be that in addition to their competence, technocrats need to be moral. It is the aspect of morality that will enable the citizenry be assured of proper leadership. They may not grasp the technicalities involved in the technocrats operations but morality will guide them.

5.4 Conclusion:

This study has shown that the technocrats have a considerable part to play in the administration of policies in a technocracy. We established that the technocrat has been the handmaiden of the politician though the former is slowly establishing a take-over from the latter. It is in this regard that we can talk of the technocrat as one in authority. We also did establish the need for an authority, either in systems that lack commitment or those with a commitment to the common good. Suppose we had two groups, A and B where B a group that has such a commitment to common good, while A does not. Group A would need an authority to steer it to the desired societal goals. B, on the hand, which reflects a model of technocracy, will also require an authority to ensure the achievement of the common good (See Finnis, 1980:230-259).

This study has argued that whoever is in authority must be capable of performing effectively. As a matter of fact, such a person, or body of persons, must be ready to solve or settle any problems a particular people are facing. By the fact that a people are under an authority, poses some moral concerns that ultimately place responsibilities on the part of the ruler and that of the ruled.

The principle behind such an argument is that the authority is good because it ultimately brings out what is of general good to the whole community. Such an action could be based on the knowledge of the good, on the general will, consent, and know-how. On this basis we indicated that the technocrat is in authority.

Two issues emerge that demand our attention. First, is the authority of the technocrat **de jure** or **de facto**? Secondly and in contradistinction with the politician, whose authority is legitimate and justified? **De jure** translated means 'in law', while **de facto** means 'in fact'. Authority **de jure** is that authority recognized by the law. It has a connotation of that particular authority exercising such in reality. Authority **de facto**, on the other hand does not confine one as to be recognized authority by the law as such. Think of a state with a recognized authority X (say Prime Minister or President) in its constitution. If Y is actually in charge of running the affairs of the state, we can argue that, X has authority **de jure** but not **de facto** (See Benn & Peters, 1959:255-265). It is thus clear that X has authority **de jure**, while authority **de facto** is in the hands of Y. Such a relationship, we established exists in the early stages of a technocracy. In fact the kind of relationship between the politician and the technocrat tries to bridge the **de facto** and **de jure** aspects of authority in a technocracy. In the early stages of technocracy, the politician is in authority **de jure** and not **de facto**. In the advanced stages of technocracy the technocrat is in authority both **de jure** and **de facto**.

In trying to answer our second question concerning legitimacy and justification of authority. Legitimacy of authority has to do with the legal framework within such a technocratic authority will operate. Such a framework is not the confine of philosophy since it can be resolved by reference to rules and laws put down for a particular state (See Benn and Peters, 1959:275,276). The concern of philosophy is in terms of the kind of ends or goals a particular authority seeks. Herein lies the aspect of justification.

Three possible situations can be realized. A particular authority can be both legitimate and justified. That is, the law recognizes it and it meets the necessary ends. Secondly, a state could be illegitimate yet justified. Consider a political authority held by army officers who are in power after toppling a democratically elected leader but ensure the safety and common interests of that state are met.

This would be illegitimate since its powers are not based on the constitution, but justified for ensuring that the evils inherent in the democratic system overthrown are eradicated and common good is adhered to. Finally, a state authority can be legitimate but unjustified. If X was elected democratically elected, and thus legitimate yet he is not performing for the betterment of the society. In such a case there is no end being anticipated and X is thus legitimately in office but not justified. We thus located authority in a technocracy as one in which on the basis of the ends, it is justified. Based on the know-how, the technocrat performs to the betterment of the society. His authority, thus demands an obligation to obey his commands.

Historical materialism, philosophical as it is, recommends that it is not comprehensive to be mesmerized by the beauty of the superstructure. What really matters is the infrastructure. With an assumption of empirical data on the one hand, and an investigative analysis on the other, we provided an exposition of technocracy.

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