



December, 1982

APOLLO ROBIN NDIRAMBI

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
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1962 - 1971

INTEGRATING UGANDA INTO UGANDA,

DECLARATIONS

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented
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
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This thesis has been submitted for examination with our
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ABSTRACT

Through an empirical survey, unstructured interviews, secondary sources and participant observation, our thesis has shown that although there were religious and social differences in Buganda, Obote's strategy of attempting to integrate Buganda into Uganda, reinforced ethnic solidarity among the Baganda. The bond of ethnic solidarity overshadowed class and religious divisions. Obote's strategy of using force to crush Buganda's hegemony and her cherished monarchy and legislature, made the Baganda so insecure that as they groped for security, their ethnic solidarity was reinforced. And thus our study shows that although class analysis is important for understanding African politics, ethnicity can also under certain circumstances, have decisive influence. For example, it has been shown that insecurity can enhance ethnicity. To this extent, we differ from the Marxists who reject the view that ethnicity has a decisive influence and who seek to explain Uganda's politics in terms of class struggles.

In order to reduce ethnicity, it is recommended that all tribes must be assured of economic, political and social security. The Central Government must use objective criteria to allocate scarce resources. The policy of correcting

historical imbalances must be comprehensive and it must be systematically phased out in order to avoid one ethnic group being overwhelmed by many dramatic changes at the same time. A comprehensive exercise would, for example, preclude correcting over-representation of one ethnic group in the army while allowing over-representation of another ethnic group in the civil service. A programme of systematic urbanisation and industrialization is advocated in order to reduce the impact of the rural primordial ties which tend to reinforce ethnic solidarity. The programme is also likely to create fully fledged workers who rely on functional inter-dependence for their survival. Such people would be amenable to national integration.

We have shown that Obote lost three opportunities: the democratization of Buganda, the penetration of the common man and the creation of viable national institutions to replace the local traditional ones which he had abolished such as monarchy and Buganda's legislature. Consequently, his capacity to integrate Buganda into Uganda was to this extent impaired. It is recommended that Buganda be fully democratized and mobilized for national integration.

It has been shown that Obote's failure to solve the Buganda question politically contributed to the militariza-

tion of Uganda's politics along ethnic lines. For as the Central Government used more force and Emergency Regulations in order to contain Buganda, it became more dependent on the army. It also became necessary not to encourage the ethnic groups which were contained by force to join the army especially at the senior level. For if the groups which were contained by force joined the army in big numbers especially at a senior level, they would challenge the policy of being contained by force. In the end, the army seized power in 1971. Full restoration of the civilian supremacy is still eluding Uganda while the Buganda question remains unsolved.

In order to restore full civilian supremacy, it is suggested that the policy of containing Buganda by force be replaced by a political formula which is acceptable to the groups contending for power. This formula entails agreeing on a constitution which recognizes Uganda's cultural pluralism. Power could be decentralized under a unitary constitution or under a quasi-federal constitution. It is also essential to create an army which represents all the ethnic groups of Uganda at least proportionately. As part of the national service, Ugandans should be given military training. This formula would enhance the capacity of the civilians to act as the counterweights to the power of the army.

Credit is given to Obote for having established central control over Buganda. However, it is also shown that he failed to achieve transethnic and social integration.¹ It is argued that to a certain extent Obote was a victim of Uganda's complex socio-political problems and that he also made some great mistakes and lost the opportunities which would have facilitated integrating Buganda into Uganda.

After whom we criticize for overstating Buganda's acceptance of modernity, makes an important observation that the Baganda were able to accept modernity along the Kiganda model. Our interpretation of Obote's failure to integrate the Kiganda traditional institutions with the modern institutions is that the success of the Baganda to accept modernization along their own terms, did not undermine their ethnic solidarity. Consequently, modernization did not lead to the detribalization and to a greater degree of transethnic integration. Absence of political toleration also arrested the reconciliation of the differences between Buganda's traditional and the national institutions.

A pragmatic-pluralist model has been suggested to handle the problems of Uganda's plural society.² Having established the massive rejection of the socialist ideology,

¹ These terms are defined in Chapter I.

² This model is discussed in Chapter I.

(x)

It is recommended that a widely accepted national ideology which taps the material and spiritual aspirations of the Ugandans, be evolved and spearheaded by virile political parties. Absence of a widely understood national language has limited the realization of the transethnic integration. We have recommended the adoption of English and Kiswahili as the two official languages as well as the establishment of a National Language Committee to spread and popularize the languages.

Uganda's acceptance of the intertribal marriage belies the view that they are difficult to integrate with other ethnic groups. It is suggested that this area be exploited to enhance transethnic integration by providing more objective opportunities for the realization of more transethnic marriages.

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INTRODUCTION

Although African leaders have denounced ethnicity, a number of them have pursued policies which have had the consequence of exciting and strengthening the vitality of ethnicity. Consequently, ethnicity is still arresting the process of national integration in many parts of Africa. The problem of integrating the centrally placed Kingdom of Buganda into Uganda from 1962 to 1971, illustrates how the policies and strategies of some African leaders have reinforced ethnicity instead of undermining it. This study also shows how the unresolved problems of the national integration have in turn caused other problems which include the militarization of the national politics along ethnic lines.

Our study seeks to examine the problem of integrating Buganda into Uganda under the following seven Chapters:- Chapter I explains why we have chosen to focus our attention on Buganda and it examines three major dimensions of national integration which are transethnic, territorial and social. It analyses approaches to the study of national integration. Five indicators of national integration are used to test our hypotheses. The existing gaps in the existing literature are examined and possible remedies are suggested. Finally,

our methodology is spelt out and sources are broken down under survey research, unstructured interviews, secondary sources and participant observation.

The origins of Buganda's hegemony and separatism are discussed in Chapter II. We attempt to show how Buganda's hegemony caused some feelings and habits of autarky among the chiefly traditionalists and a sense of ethnic consciousness. We also show how Buganda's pre-eminence was resented by the other parts of Uganda. We try to show how the independence political and constitutional formula reflected Buganda's historical hegemony. The absence of a widely understood national language is one of the major factors which are held responsible for inhibiting the realization of transethnic integration.

The problem of creating a viable governing alliance is examined in Chapter III. The difficulty of allying Kabaka Yekka (KY), Buganda's traditional party, with Uganda People's Congress (UPC), a nationalist party, and of making the Kabaka of Buganda the President of the whole of Uganda as well, are some of the cases which illustrate the intricacies of allying modern institutions with the traditional ones. The failure of this exercise is attributed to the irreconcilable values and objectives between the modern and the traditional institutions and to the absence

of political toleration. Obote's failure to exploit Buganda's predisposition to inter-tribal marriage in order to enhance transethnic integration, is examined. This Chapter shows the operation of the pragmatic-pluralist model.¹

Obote's attempt to integrate Buganda through legal institutions is discussed in Chapter IV. The Chapter shows the failure of the modern legal institutions to solve the struggle for power between the Kabaka's Government and the Central Government because of the survival of many traditional values and because of the absence of political toleration. The cases which we discuss, portray the problems of establishing central authority over the subordinate units - territorial control, and of bridging the gap between the elites and the masses on the vertical scale - social integration.

Obote's abandonment of the pragmatic-pluralist approach and of his unsuccessful attempt to adopt a revolutionary - centralizing model, are discussed in Chapter V. He abolished monarchy, Buganda's legislature and federalism in Uganda. His actions made the Baganda so insecure that they were re-tribalized. However, Obote's heavy dependence on the use of force and emergency powers to contain Buganda,

¹ This model is defined in Chapter I.

militarized Uganda's politics along ethnic lines.

Obote's attempt to use ideology in order to restore the civilian supremacy, to popularize the republican culture and to interpret the 1966 crisis in terms of the struggle between the chiefly traditionalists and the common men is discussed in Chapter VI. It is also shown that he tried to use the ideology to justify his nationalisation measures which did not uplift the common men economically. We show how the ideology was massively rejected in Buganda because it did not tap the material and spiritual aspirations of the Ugandans. It misrepresented the reciprocal relationships which existed between the chiefly traditionalists and the common men under an economy of affection. The failure of the weak UPC to sell the ideology is also discussed.

The concluding Chapter weaves together the various themes. We conclude that whereas Obote achieved territorial control, he did not advance transethnic and social integration of Buganda. We argue that his policies reinforced ethnic solidarity which tended to blur religious and class differences in Buganda. Recommendations are made for two official languages, for restoring civilian supremacy and for reducing ethnicity.

CHAPTER I

INTEGRATION: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

This study seeks to focus attention on attempts which were made to overcome ethnic fragmentation in Uganda from 1962, the year in which the country achieved political independence, to 1971, the year in which the civilian government was overthrown and replaced by a military regime headed by Amin.¹ The study will try to show the constraints and the opportunities which existed as the Central Government led by Dr. Obote attempted to integrate the Kingdom of Buganda into Uganda. We shall try to show how, despite the fact that there existed social and religious cleavages in Buganda, the Kingdom's ethnic consciousness was enhanced as it struggled to keep its special position within an independent Uganda. It will be shown that failure to solve the Buganda problem politically contributed to the militarization of Uganda's politics along ethnic lines.

We take the view that ethnicity lies at the root of national integration in most parts of Africa. Indeed, in many parts of Africa, ethnic groups have existed longer than the societies in which they were artificially incorporated by the colonising powers. Many ethnic groups have a widely spoken language, accepted institutions such

¹ Amin's military regime was in turn overthrown in 1979.

as clans, effective chains of command and cultural cohesion. These attributes which are either lacking or fragile at the central level, have tended to confer on ethnicity more lasting and comprehensive bonds of cohesion than nationalism.

The colonizing powers tended to buttress ethnic and local consciousness by encouraging Africans to be steeped in local and tribal politics and by discouraging inter-tribal interaction to take place at a horizontal level.¹

It must also be noted that the very exercise of trying to incorporate these virile groups into nation-states after the departure of the colonizing powers, has itself tended to enhance ethnic consciousness. This has been so because some ethnic groups have been cut down to size and have lost their privileged position. Others have been made insecure by the process of allocating scarce resources.

All these factors have reinforced each other to make ethnicity a strong force which has bedevilled the process of national integration in Africa.

We have decided to deal with national integration because of the following reasons: it has preoccupied national leaders especially in Africa because it affects

¹ There is a lot of information on this issue. See, for example, C.G. Rosberg Jr. and J. Nottingham, The Myth of 'Mau Mau': Nationalism in Kenya (Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1966) especially Chapter VI, and R. Dumont, False Start in Africa (London: Sphere Books Ltd., 1967).

the stability and the survival of a state. For example, the attempt by the wealthy Province of Katanga to secede from the then State of Congo affected the stability and the survival of that State, more so as the big powers vied with each other to influence the events in Congo.¹ Nigeria suffered from the same problems when Biafra declared that it had seceded from the State of Nigeria.² The unresolved problems of national integration plunged Nigeria into a bloody civil war. Indeed, before a high level of national integration is attained, it is difficult to tackle other important issues such as economic development. For example, the attempt by Southern Sudan to secede from the rest of Sudan, raised major racial, political and military issues which spilled over the borders of Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and other parts of the world.³ Eventually, the Organization

¹ For details consult C. Young, Politics in the Congo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

² Oye Ogunbadejo, "Nigeria and the great powers: The impact of the civil war on Nigerian Foreign Relations", African Affairs, Vol.75, No.298, Jan.1976, pp.14-31 and S.A. Akintoye, Emergent African States (London: Longman Groups Ltd., 1976), pp.132-144.

³ For more information, consult Mohammed Omer, The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1968) Chapter 9. The African Leaders sought to avoid the conflict between the Arabs of the Northern Sudan and the black Africans of Southern Sudan which would mar the happy relationship which existed between the Arabs and the black Africans in the O.A.U.

of African Unity (OAU) was drawn in the process of solving some of them. From 1962 to 1971, Uganda was so steeped in solving issues of national integration that other domestic and international issues received inadequate attention.

Uganda has been chosen as a case study because most of the intricate problems which baffled and afflicted the entire country, either emanated from Uganda or were rightly or wrongly attributed to Uganda. Furthermore, the Kingdom possessed attributes of a nation-state. These included ethnic consciousness, effective institutions such as Kabakaship (Kingship), the Lukiiko (Legislature), hierarchical and clear chains of command, a viable economic base and strong traditions. Its geographical centrality enabled it to dramatise its issues. Its numerical strength meant that it could not be ignored in the politics of political bargaining.

Integrating these large ethnic groups which have attributes of a nation-state, may sometimes entail reducing their ethnic cohesion. Paradoxically, the very exercise of reducing their cohesion tends to create insecurity and to enhance ethnic solidarity as the case of the Ibo of Nigeria demonstrates.¹

¹ James O'Connell, "Political Integration: The Nigerian Case" in A. Haslewood, African Integration and Disintegration (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp.129-184.

DEFINITION OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

For purposes of our study, we shall define national integration as a broad process which entails three major dimensions: (1) transethnic integration, which refers to the problem of bringing together different ethnic and religious groups to form one territorial nationality, (2) territorial integration, which is concerned with the problem of establishing national central authority over subordinate units, and (3) social integration, which refers to the bridging of the elite - mass gap on the vertical plane.¹

Transethnic integration

This dimension of national integration is concerned with different ethnic groups which in many cases lack a common language and do not accept each other as compatriots at a horizontal level because of the prejudices which they hold against each other. Weiner grasps the problem of integrating various ethnic groups quite well. According to

¹ For other definitions of national integration, read the following: M. Weiner, "Political integration and political development" in J.L. Pinkle and R. Gable (eds.), Political development and social change (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1971) pp. 643-645, P. Jacob and J. Toscano (eds.), The Integration of Political Communities (New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964) pp. 3-10, J. Coleman and C. Rosberg, Political Parties And National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964) pp. 8-9, C. Rosberg, "National Identity in African States" The African Review Vol. 1, No. 1, March, 1971, p. 79 and A. Masrui, Cultural Engineering and Nation - Building in East Africa (Illinois: North Western University Press, 1972) p. 283.

him, ethnic integration refers:

to the problem of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity.¹

In some cases, one is dealing with plural societies in Africa where ethnic groups with different languages and cultural qualities were brought together by a colonising power which made no serious effort to integrate them at a horizontal level. At this point, we must identify the major aspects of an ethnic group. The criteria for defining an ethnic group in Africa normally include language, territory, common cultural values or symbols and an active sense of identification. The size of an ethnic group and its location in the polity have integrational consequences. A shared language is important for communication and maximising interaction within the group and for excluding those who do not speak it. However, it must be noted that the linguistic criterion has limitations. For example, although the Acholi and Langi of Uganda share linguistic intelligibility, they are separate ethnic groups.²

¹ M. Weiner, "Political Integration and Political development" The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Sciences Vol.358, March 1965, p.53.

² Apolo Nsubambi, "Language Policy in Uganda" African Affairs Vol.70, No.276, January 1971, especially pp.66-67.

In Scotland where Gaelic is entirely extinct, the survival of ethnicity is separate from the maintenance of the language per se.¹

Territory is important for providing a sense of homeland and for demarcating the boundaries of an ethnic group. However, the exceptions to this observation include the Jews who acquired an active sense of ethnic identity even before the State of Israel was created in 1948. Crawford Young informs us that primarily urban ethnic groups such as the Ngala in Kinshasa, have no precise territorial referent though all arrived in the city from the same general direction.²

Common cultural values or symbols tend to keep an ethnic group together and to separate it from other groups which do not practice or believe in those values. Indeed, differences in cultural values and symbols may be reflected at a political level and may cause major political differences. For example, the monarchical ethnic groups which accept the cultural view that a commoner should never be above a person who has royal blood, may pose political problems of who should be a head of State and who should precede him in plural societies in which monarchical and

¹ C. Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1976) p.48.

² Young, Ibid., p.48.

non-monarchical groups co-exist. Cultural values of an ethnic group may also be important in predisposing it to democracy and modernity and vice-versa. For example, to the extent that equalitarianism, individualism and achievement were highly placed in the value system of the Iboes, they were more pre-disposed to accept democratic rule than the Hausa whose value system tended to be the reverse of the Iboes.¹

An active sense of ethnic identification provides an important subjective basis for ethnicity. Kasfir writes:

Ultimately, if we are to unravel the politics of subnationalism, we must rely on the subjective criterion of an active sense of identification of the ethnic group member.²

An active sense of ethnic identification may be caused by insecurity or by an attempt by a privileged ethnic group to preserve its special position in a political system in which the less privileged groups may be trying to reduce historical imbalances. More will be said about the causes of insecurity and its consequences in our subsequent discussion.

¹ A. Olorunsola (ed.), The Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Africa (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1972), pp.7-9.

² N. Kasfir, "Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Uganda" In Olorunsola, Ibid., p.62.

An important aspect of ethnicity is related to the primacy of identification with an ethnic group and to the question of whether or not this identification is seen as conflicting with national identification. The problem may be posed as follows: "If there is a major conflict between the demands of a nation and the demands of an ethnic group, does the nation command the ultimate loyalty?" In this context, we are mainly concerned with the subjective attitudes and feelings of the various ethnic groups towards each other and the nation. If the ethnic group commands the ultimate loyalty, secession becomes a legitimate course of action by an ethnic group which feels that its most treasured interests are threatened within a nation-state. And yet secession threatens the survival of a nation-state.

Sub-national 'nationalism'

There are 'nations' which are trapped within artificially created states. And so there is a problem of handling the sub-national nationalism of these 'nations' which are referred to as tribes despite the fact that they qualify to be nations. These 'nations' force us to pose the question, 'Is there a difference between a nation and an ethnic group?' Emerson defines a nation as:

... the largest community which
when the chips are down, effectively
commands men's loyalty, overriding
the claims both of the lesser

communities within it and those which cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still greater society, reaching ultimately to mankind as a whole.¹

He adds that the nation seeks to take over the state as the political instrument through which it can protect and assert itself. However, according to this definition, ethnic groups like the Baganda, the Ibo, and the Hausa, qualify to be nations. What they lack is international recognition. Ostheimer rightly observes:

It seems anachronous to refer to the 'nationalism' of three million Welsh in Great Britain, but the 'tribalism' of eight million Ibo within Nigeria Recent events indicate that the Welsh are much more reconciled than the Ibo but there is no clear dichotomy between nation and tribe.²

The problem of national integration which some African nations face is to integrate different ethnic groups which possess attributes of nationhood. The Kingdom of Buganda was for all practical purposes a nation. And yet the 'nation' of Buganda had to be integrated into the larger nation of Uganda. From 1962 to 1966, Obote sought to integrate the 'nation' of Buganda into Uganda by according to the Kingdom a federal status and a measure of autonomy.

¹ R. Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp.95-96.

² J.N. Ostheimer, Nigerian Politics (New York: Harper, 1973) p.7. Cf. A. Mafeje, "The ideology of tribalism", The Journal of Modern African Studies 9,2(1971)pp.253-61.

From 1966, he used force, abrogated the 1962 Constitution, and abolished the federal formula. He proceeded to dismantle the political and administrative cohesion of Buganda, an approach which excited ethnicity to grow among the Baganda who felt insecure.

The size of an ethnic group and its geographical and strategic position in the country have integrational consequences. The size is important in the process of electoral bargaining. Buganda which was 16 per cent of the total population, could not be ignored by any politician who sought to win national elections. Its location in the centre of Uganda meant that even her local affairs received national attention. The Kikuyu of Kenya and the Ibo of Nigeria are also big tribes whose political and economic actions impinged upon the sobriety and stability of their countries directly. For example, the attempt of the Ibos to secede from Nigeria, nearly wrecked the survival of that state.¹

On the other hand, the absence of a major tribe in a polity, tends to make the process of national integration relatively easy especially if the different ethnic tribes enjoy a high degree of cultural homogeneity and if the country has an integrative national language which is

¹ We realize that the Ibos are not geographically located in the centre of Nigeria. However, their size and their economic and educational success, made them one of the heartland tribes of Nigeria.

widely used in the country. Tanzania which possesses all these qualities, has enjoyed a high degree of national integration. It has about 120 ethnic groups which belong to the Bantu culture and none of them is in a position to dominate others. Kiswahili, the national language, is widely spoken in Tanzania. Hyden has observed:

Tanzania has no single major tribe, which has tended to dominate others, like the Baganda of Uganda. The largest tribe, the Sukuma, inhabiting a wide area South of Lake Victoria, constitute roughly one twelfth of the total population, according to the national census of 1957. The total number of tribes is around 120, some of which nowadays have less than 10,000 members. Among other large tribes in Tanzania are, the Nyanvesi, the Ha, the Makonde, the Gogo, the Haya, and the Chagga; these constitute each between three and five per cent of the grand total.¹

His statement is so clear that it does not need further clarification.

Causes of ethnicity

The failure of the state to provide adequate security and welfare, and the unequal distribution of modernisation among the different ethnic groups, are the major causes of ethnicity in Africa. The failure of the state to provide adequate security and welfare to individuals has forced them to rely upon traditional and ethnic methods for their

¹ G. Hyden, Political Development In Rural Tanzania (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), p.39.

support.¹ For example, the anti-Ibo sentiments which led thousands of Ibos to be killed in Nigeria created so much insecurity among the Ibos that they sought to secede from Nigeria. And yet many Ibos, such as N. Asikiwe, the first President of Nigeria, had been leading nationalists and pan-Africanists. Paul Anber informs us that the Ibos had since colonial contact been more mobile, more receptive to change and more nationally oriented than Nigeria's other ethnic groups.² However, the failure of the State to provide the Ibos with security, aroused ethnicity among the Ibos.

Second, Paul Anber has convincingly shown that contrary to current theories which presume that educational and economic development in the emerging nations must erode tribal loyalties, modernization may directly lead to the reinforcement of ethnic identity rather than to its deterioration. He discusses the case of the Ibos to illustrate his theory. The Ibos embraced modernity with unparalleled rapidity. According to Anber:

¹ Cf. C. Rosberg, "National Identity in African States", Op.cit. especially pp.83-84 and C. Nnoli, "Socio-Economic Insecurity and Ethnic Politics in Africa", The African Review, Vol.4, Number 1, 1974.

² Paul Anber, "Modernization and Political Disintegration", The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.5, No.2, 1967, p.167.

... Many Ibos also became arrogant and self-righteous in their new status, thus arousing the resentment of other ethnic groups, the Northerners in particular, whom the Ibos generally regarded contemptuously as backward and inferior.¹

The Ibos were, however, faced with a political system in which the despised Northerners used their numerical strength to obstruct constitutional changes and to dominate the political scene in Nigeria. To use again Anber's words:

Their status, educationally and economically, contrasted with their subordinate status politically and (in the eyes of the other ethnic groups) socially. Both because others singled them out and because they built their own barriers to assimilation, they steadily became more tribalistic (i.e. more self-conscious of and actively securing benefits for their own community or ethnic group) as they became more modernized.²

There are two aspects of the consequences of the uneven modernisation which had disintegrative consequences. The Ibos who were pre-eminent in the field of modernization,

¹ Anber, Ibid., p.168. Read also A. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa", American Political Science Review, No.1, Vol.LXII, March, 1968, p.73.

² Anber, op.cit., pp.168-169.

were frustrated because they occupied a subordinate political status which was not commensurate with their distinguished position in their acquisition of modernization. They became less willing to integrate with people whose acquisition of modernization was lower than theirs. The less privileged ethnic groups who resented the supremacy of the Ibos in the field of modernization, used their numerical strength to attain supremacy at the political level. By assuming political supremacy, the less modernised groups were paving the way to offset the imbalances in the acquisition of modernization. This development tended to excite the Ibos to become more tribalistic and therefore less available for transethnic integration at a horizontal level. The Baganda of Uganda faced a similar problem.

While the process of competing for scarce advantages of modernization tends to excite ethnicity, the uneven distribution of the European generated change tends to exaggerate the differences and conflicts which the Europeans found among the different ethnic groups. Zolberg who observed this problem writes:

Pre-existing distinctions between groups in Africa were usually supplemented by other stemming from the uneven impact of European generated change. Often by the time of independence, one tribe or group of tribes had become more

urban, more educated, more
Christian and richer than
others in the country.¹

Zolberg concludes that at the mass level, old and new cleavages tend to be consistent rather than cross-cutting. In another article, Zolberg demonstrates how in Ivory Coast, the effect of cash crop agriculture was that there tended to develop 'poorer and richer' tribes, differentiations which coincided with earlier distinctions between the Northerners, Southerners, Easterners and Westerners.² On the other hand, the factors in Ivory Coast which have made for additional differentiations arising out of modernisation, are simply absent in the State of Mali.

The two causes of ethnicity which we have discussed, are compounded by the absence of a shared culture. Etzioni suggests that while a shared culture is not a prerequisite for unification, it is a requirement that has to be fulfilled before unification can be advanced.³ He adds that no union is highly integrated unless a shared culture has evolved.⁴ The shared culture becomes an important

¹ A. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa", op.cit., p.73.

² A. Zolberg, "Patterns of National Integration", The Journal of Modern African Studies, No.3, Vol.4, 1967, p.456.

³ A. Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt and Winston, Inc. 1965), p.36.

⁴ Ibid., p.36. He uses culture to include religion, language, secular ideologies and arts.

binding force for the different ethnic groups. The Colonial policies of tribal compartmentalization did not enhance the realization of a shared culture of the heterogeneous ethnic groups which tended to practise endogamous marriages. And so the potential for national integration for countries like Uganda, Zaire and Nigeria¹ must be low because they lack what Etzioni calls elements of shared culture.

John Stuart Mill suggests that possession of political antecedents, collective pride and humiliation, enhances national consciousness. To use his own words:

The strongest case for the feeling of nationality... is identity of political antecedents, the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past.²

It must, however, be pointed out that one major adverse consequence of ethnicity is that it has tended to stand in the way of sharing glory and grief and political antecedents.

¹ On the issue of the different cultures of Nigeria, see Olorunsola, "Nigeria" in V.A. Olorunsola (ed.) op.cit., pp.11-12.

² John Stuart Mill, Representative Government, 1961 reprinted in part in Alfred Zimmern, Modern Political Doctrines (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), p.206.

Important men such as Kabarega and Mutesa I of Uganda, who have some claim to being venerated as founding fathers, are regarded as tribal and not national political figures because of ethnic rivalry in Uganda.¹ And thus unlike the Americans who have developed a common homogeneous culture in the veneration accorded to the founding fathers such as Washington, Jefferson and their principles, many African countries have failed to do so because of the ethnic rivalries.²

Although ethnicity tends to be disintegrative, Wallerstein informs us that it serves to aid national integration in four ways. First, ethnic groups tend to assume some of the functions of the extended family and hence they decrease the importance of kinship roles; second, ethnic groups serve as a mechanism of resocialization; third, ethnic groups help to keep the class structure fluid, and so prevent the emergence of castes; and fourth,

¹ For details, see Apolo Nsibambi, "Political Integration In Uganda: Problems and Prospects", East Africa Journal February, 1969, p.39.

² This idea is advanced by S.M. Lipset, Political Man, the Social bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1963), pp.68 - 69. The Americans also attempt to inculcate nationalism into their youth through Manifest socialization which includes singing the national anthem in schools and recognizing the national flag.

ethnic groups serve as an outlet for political tensions.¹

Territorial Integration or Establishing National Authority
over Subordinate Units

The second dimension of national integration is concerned with the problem of establishing national central authority over subordinate political units. Kasfir has noted:

Under the British rule, District Councils... became the repositories of local power in defence against central power.²

The point to note here is that in Africa, the indigenous people were encouraged to be steeped in local governments which enjoyed prestige, financial resources and bureaucracies.

The central institutions such as the legislature, were monopolized by Europeans and Asians. And thus the departing colonial powers bequeathed to the nationalists central institutions which lacked legitimacy. Worse still, the legitimacy of the rulers at the centre was questioned by the traditional rulers who claimed to be the natural and historically approved leaders of the masses. The British had in many ways penetrated Africa through the traditional

¹ Details can be obtained from I. Wallerstein, "Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa" in H. Bokstein and D.E. Apter, Comparative Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp.665-670.

² N. Kasfir, "Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Uganda" in V.A. Olorunsola, op.cit., p.54.

or 'natural' rulers.¹ The colonial rulers had enjoyed a special position because they possessed technological supremacy which had petrified the indigenous people. For example, the gun which was a lethal weapon, had outperformed the arrow. The use of chloroform which enabled doctors to perform major operations on patients with relative ease, dazed and puzzled the indigenous people. The fact that a colonial ruler was a foreigner, also tended to set him apart from the local feuds. He was thus regarded as an impartial arbiter. All these advantages tended to confer some degree of legitimacy to the departing colonial rulers. In some cases, the African nationalists had failed to get political legitimacy because they could not even win elections and so they had to resort to massive rigging of elections. All these factors tended to deprive the central institutions and the incumbents of political legitimacy.

Nyangira has clarified the problem we are discussing by observing that one of the problems facing the new states is that of creating an accepted centre of political authority to replace traditional centres of power.² An alternative

¹ Lucy Mair, "New Elites in East and West Africa" in V. Turner (ed.), From Colonialism in Africa 1870 - 1960 Volume 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p.182.

² W. Nyangira, "Relative Modernisation and Public Resource Allocation in Kenya" East African Universities Social Science Council 8th Annual Conference, Nairobi, December 19 - 23, 1972, p.4.

way of articulating the problem is that the new states must create central authority which is accepted by the traditional centres of power. For a more lasting solution does not lie in replacing traditional centres of authority as some African leaders have sought to do in order to solve the problem of legitimacy at the centre.

Lipset says:

A basic problem faced by all new nations and post-revolutionary societies is the crisis of legitimacy. The older order has been abolished and with it the set of beliefs that justified its system of authority. The imperialist ogre upon whom all ills were blamed has now disappeared, and there has been a slackening of the great unifying force, nationalism, under whose banner private, ethnic, sectional and other differences were submerged.¹

What emerges from what we have discussed so far is that the task of establishing central authority over subordinate units is complicated by the fact that the national or central rulers lack legitimacy as well as the central structures over which the rulers preside. Easton informs us that if the rulers presided over institutions which enjoyed structural legitimacy, the accepted institutions

¹ S.M. Lipset, The First New Nation: the United States in historical and Comparative Perspective. (New York: Basic Books, Heinemann, 1963), p.16.

would assist the rulers to acquire legitimacy. To use his own words:

Under those conditions in which the existing structures and norms are accepted over time, they will be effective to some important degree in contributing to the legitimacy of persons who operate within them.¹

In short, Easton draws our attention to the fact that structural legitimacy has some independent effect. According to Easton, the problem of legitimacy refers to how members evaluate the values, norms and structures (regime) guiding the political system, and how they also appraise the government leaders (authorities).²

While transethnic integration is concerned with subjective feelings which individuals belonging to different social groups have toward the nation, territorial integration refers to the objective control which central authority has over the entire territory under its claimed jurisdiction. Legitimacy has figured prominently in discussing

¹ D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1965), p.301.

² This is a vertical problem as opposed to the horizontal problem of transethnic integration. According to Easton, 'Authorities' refers to those in government (incumbents) and 'regime' refers to goals, norms, values and structures of authority. This usage of 'regime' is thus different from the one which we refer to say, Nyerere's regime. For details, see Easton, Ibid., pp.193-5.

territorial control because it plays an important role especially in the non-Western Culture where as Hyden observes, 'distrust of those who are not in one's own family, tribe or religious group, dominates any objective test of truth in traditional societies'.¹

Sudan represents significant and complicated aspects of establishing central authority over subordinate units. The central government has been grappling with the problem of the Southern Sudan which moved from a position of seeking for a federal relationship with the centre to secession. Since the British ruled this country, a major racial, religious, political and economic gap was allowed to grow between the North and the South. The more developed north which is dominated by the Muslim Arabs, has dominated the less developed South which is mostly inhabited by the Christian Nilotes such as Dinka and Muer, the Nilo-Hamites such as Didinga and Boya, and the Sudanic group such as the Azande.² The differences between the North and the South have been aggravated by 'the great distances, poor communications, a recurring scepticism in Khartoum about the economic possibilities of the South, and a natural pre-occupation in Khartoum with Northern problems of great

¹ G. Hyden, op.cit., p.25.

² It must be noted that many of the Southerners belong to the traditional African religions.

urgency and proximity.¹ The independent government of Sudan inherited a major problem in which although the South was formally united with the North and belatedly represented in the same political institutions, the South remained depressed. The Military regime of Abboud sought to integrate the South by intensifying the spread of Arabic and Islamization and the use of force. This approach merely alienated the South and caused secession problems until a new political approach of reconciliation and of according autonomy to the South was adopted by the government of Numeiry.² The North-South problems are still afflicting Sudan. For our discussion, we must note that the relative incapacity of the Central Government of Sudan to exercise effective control over the south, has created border problems between Uganda and Sudan and other African countries.

The elite - mass interaction or social integration

The third dimension of national integration refers to

¹ Beshir, op.cit., p.55. Cf. M.A. Mahgoub, Democracy on Trial: Reflections on Arab and African Politics (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1974), pp.175-237.

² For details, consult, Beshir, Ibid. and B.C. Sarkisian "The Southern Sudan: A re-assessment", a paper delivered at the African Studies Association Meeting, November 8-11, 1972, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and G. Rosberg, "National Identity in African States", op.cit., pp.90-91.

the vertical gap between the elites and the masses.¹ The 'gap' is caused by differences in life styles, aspirations, values and the process of modernisation. Binder maintains that bridging the gap between the masses and the modernising elites is crucial in achieving national integration.² The elites especially in Africa, have often been educated in Western countries where they have imbibed individualistic, secular, universal and technological values. These values have tended to baffle the masses who are rooted in the traditional culture, a culture which tends to be primordial, particularistic and communal.³ The gap between the elites and the masses also expresses itself in the economic disparities and opportunities between the two groups.

According to Mosca, the elites owe their power and superiority to their qualities of organisation, military science, intellectual and technological skills. However,

¹ On the concept of elites, see P.C. Lloyd (ed.) The New Elites of Tropical Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) and G. Parry, Political Elites (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1971).

² L. Binder, "National Integration and Political Development", American Political Science Review, Vol.LVII, No.3, September 1964, p.627. Cf. J.Coleman and C.Rosberg Jr., op.cit., p.9 and Edward Shils, "Political Development in the New States", Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol.11, 1960, pp.265-411.

³ Clifford Geertz, "The integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the new States" in Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) see especially pp.105-163.

according to Pareto, the elites are those who have the highest indices in their branch of activity. Pareto emphasizes that the elites need not be the best at things because they have used moral methods. They can, for example, be best in politics because they have used a combination of force, cunning and persuasion.¹

There are two major criticisms of the 'gap' theory. Firstly, it tends to overlook that in many parts of Africa, the elites have their feet both in the urban and in the rural areas. The elites stay in the urban areas but they grow their food in the rural areas where they inevitably interact with the masses. This observation is, for example, true in Uganda where the degree of urbanization by the indigenous Ugandans has been slight.² It should also be remembered that there are a number of traditional practices which tend to bring the masses and the elites together. These include funeral, succession and marital rites.³ The

¹ For details consult Mosca Gastano, The Ruling Class (London: MacGraw Hill, 1939) Translated by Livingstone.

² D. Rothchild and M. Rogin, "Uganda" in C. Carter (ed.) National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 367-368. It must, however, be noted that Amin's expulsion of the Asians in 1972 encouraged Africans to replace them in the urban areas of Uganda.

³ For details, consult L. Mair, An African People in the twentieth Century (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1934), pp. 78-103 and pp. 205-222.

vaneer of Western education which some elites display, tends to hide the fact that when the chips are down, they are basically primordial and culturally close to the masses.

Secondly, the 'gap' theory assumes that the elites that win power retain their cohesiveness. Ake observes:

The coming of Independence brings many cleavages to the ruling elite just as it does to the nationalist movement. For one thing, as the political leaders make the transition from shouting anti-imperialist slogans to devising concrete programmes for national development, differences between them begin to come into clear relief. Radicals and gradualists, modernisers and traditionalists, individualists and statists, strive for influence.¹

The situation is further complicated by the rift between the older leaders and the younger generation, the two generations having had different political experiences. The exploitation of ethnicity by elites also tends to weaken their solidarity. Other factors which weaken the solidarity of the elites and which Ake discusses, include the suspicion between the intellectuals and the professional politicians, and the competition for office which comes with independence.²

¹ O. Ake, A Theory of Political Intergration (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), p.23.

² Ake, Ibid., pp.27-29.

The masses are not coherent either. For example, some peasants in Buganda own land and they are sufficiently rich to employ hired labour especially from Ruanda and Burundi.¹ The poorer peasants sometimes resent the richer peasants. The problems which face the pastoral Masai and the pastoral Karamojans of Uganda are different from those faced by the landless Luo, Kikuyu or Kamba in Kenya.² The pastoral Karamojans of Uganda who are faced with a semi-arid environment, are pre-occupied with acquisition of cattle, green pastures and water.³ Raiding which has been condemned in other parts of Uganda, is, however, a legitimate exercise in Karamoja because it enhances the acquisition and maintenance of cattle on which the Karamojans depend for survival. In short, the interests of the pastoral Karamojans are different from the interests of the non-pastoral masses in other parts of Uganda. The major point to grasp for our discussion is that the interests of the masses are not coherent and that the masses are not a coherent social

¹ For details, see A. Richards (ed.), Economic Development And Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda (London Oxford University Press, 1973).

² Cf. G. Lam, "The Neocolonial Integration of Kenyan Peasants" Development and Change Vol.8, January 1977.

³ A.R. Nsubambi and P. Byarugaba, "Problems of Political and Administrative Participation in a semi-arid area of Uganda: A Case Study of Karamoja" in G. Kiros (ed.) The Development and Prospects of Semi-Arid Areas in Eastern Africa. Proceedings of Workshop April 9-13, 1980. (Nasareth, Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, November 1980), pp.180-198.

group. This fact tends to reduce class cleavages.

The three dimensions of integration - transethnic, territorial and social integration, are concerned with the mechanism which makes it possible for different parts of a political system to cohere in such a way that the political system runs effectively and smoothly. Ethnicity is a common factor in the three dimensions of the national integration. In the transethnic dimension, ethnicity makes it difficult for different ethnic groups to accept each other as compatriots on the horizontal scale. In the territorial dimension, ethnicity complicates the task of establishing central authority over the subordinate units. In Uganda, the Kingdom of Buganda which tended to challenge central authority, was an ethnic group which enjoyed some degree of cohesion and it was resented by the ethnic groups which wielded power at the central level. Ethnicity plays a negative role in the two cases by making it difficult to realize national integration. However, in the case of social integration, ethnicity plays a positive role by reducing the gap between the elites and the masses. This is so because it provides cross-cutting loyalties.

Conflict and national integration

Although conflict in a society might have a propensity for disintegrating it, the process of conflict resolution is an essential process of national integration. Conflict is caused by scarce resources and opportunities for which

different people compete.¹ And so national integration is perceived in terms of managing or containing the various forms of conflict through a series of methods which include the use of referee institutions such as courts. Writers who regard conflict as a positive phenomenon include Coser. He informs us that conflict helps to revitalize existent norms and that it contributes to the emergence of new ones. For example, when through the process of conflict people question the norms which have been taken for granted, a well considered case is made to justify either retaining, amending or replacing them.

The very process of questioning, defending or rejecting the norms, enervates the norms. For the norms are juxtaposed with fresh ideas. Social and political conflict also makes it possible for adjustments of norms which are appropriate to new conditions to occur. Coser argues that conflicts bring together those who unite against the common enemies. He observes that where there are many crosscutting conflicts in a society, one enemy in relation to one conflict situation, may be one's ally in relation to another and therefore social solidarity will be ensured. Political conflict also provides an outlet for underlying tensions and thus it forestalls violent explosions.

¹ For details, see L. Coser, The Function of Social Conflict (Glencoe Ill: Free Press, 1956) especially pp.150-153. See also John Rex, Key Problems of Sociological Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1973).

Coser makes a distinction between conflicts which do not contradict the basic assumptions upon which the society is founded and those in which the disagreeing parties no longer share the basic values upon which the legitimacy of the social system rests. The conflicts which contradict the basic assumptions upon which a society is founded, have a high propensity for destroying the unity of a society. Coser advises that in order to avoid conflict disrupting a society, the contending parties must expect that certain issues cannot be regarded as being settled in advance and that when these issues are raised again, they will be settled according to the prevailing balance of power.

The marxists argue that conflict is inevitable between those who own the means of production and those who are forced to sell their labour to the capitalists in order to exist. They take horizontal integration between the ethnic groups for granted. But as we shall show in our subsequent discussions, ethnic and cultural differences at a horizontal level, are quite basic in Africa. The Marxists are pre-dominantly concerned with a vertical conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and they assert that this conflict can only be resolved by an absolute victory by the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. We must, however, point out that our conception of conflict-resolution must include compromises and adjustments. It is not always

possible to attain absolute victories. Conflict resolution must entail acquiring a capacity to discover areas for compromise. For example, if people realize that they are inter-dependent, then the question of one group winning a total victory over the other need not arise.

The link between conflict and integration was forged by Karl Marx who argued that conflict was necessary in order to move from a lower to a higher stage of development where integration could be realized. Marx took for granted horizontal integration while arguing that vertical integration was impossible under capitalism. He borrowed a dialectical philosophy from Hegel and changed it into dialectical materialism, a concept from which historical materialism was in turn derived.¹ He argues in The Communist Manifesto that the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of the class struggles.² During the capitalist stage, the struggle reaches its final stage and the bourgeoisie who are the owners of the means of production, are overthrown by the proletariat and a socialist phase is established. Marx argues that it is through the dialectical process that a society moves from

¹ On historical materialism, consult I.S. Berlin, K. Marx (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) especially Chapter IV.

² K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955), p.9.

the primitive, communal, slave, feudal, and capitalist stages to the socialist phase. Under the socialist phase, conflicts or contradictions between the classes cease to exist and production reaches its fullest development. During the socialist phase, man is fully integrated into society because the exploitation of man by man and the alienation of man cease to exist. Marx believed that conflict was necessary in order to generate social change. We must, however, state that conflicts can lead to an impasse if the opposing forces have equal strength.

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

For purposes of our discussion, we shall discuss the following approaches to the study of national integration; the modernisation, the marxist, the institutionalization, the pragmatic pluralist and the revolutionary-centralizing approaches.

Modernization

Whereas the advocates of modernization argue that it enhances national integration by undermining ethnicity, the marxists who attempt to analyse politics in terms of classes, dismiss the importance of ethnicity because in their view ethnicity merely reflects the class struggles.¹ It has been argued that increased modernization leads to

¹ More will be said about this point from p.42.

detrribilization which in turn enhances transethnic integration. Before we pursue this theme, we must acquaint ourselves with the concept of modernisation. It is a multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity. The major indices of modernisation are urbanisation, industrialisation, secularization, media participation, political participation a cash nexus and structural differentiation.¹

Urbanisation and industrialisation are essential to ensure that there is economic growth and that there is an exchange of services and goods between the urban and the rural areas. Secularisation ensures that events and problems are evaluated through reason and not through irrational fears. Media participation encourages mobilisation of the people and it encourages them to know their political and other rights. Huntington has, however, argued that social mobilisation and political participation which have rapidly increased in Asia and Africa, have been responsible for the decay of political institutions in these

¹ On the structural aspects of modernisation, read D.Apter, The Polition of Modernisation (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp.67-70. Modernization is also associated with acquiring a mobile personality. For more information, read D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1958).

areas.¹ He has argued that political participation has tended to create a situation in which the masses make so many demands which cannot be met by the ruling regimes. It must, however, be noted that participation promotes understanding, commitment and responsibility.

Firth argues that modernisation refers to 'those peculiar economic institutions and political processes necessary to establish a cash nexus in the place of a feudal or socially obligatory system, as the primary link relating people to each other, and to the social system, in production of goods and the services and in their exchange'.² The institutions lead men away from local self-sufficiency (autarky) to a system of mutual economic and political inter-dependence. For purposes of national integration, it is argued that mutual dependence creates a bond that links society together. Durkheim regards the division of labour as being integrative because it provides functional inter-dependence at a horizontal level. He writes:

We are thus led to consider the division of labour in a new light. In this instance, the economic

¹ S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (London: Yale University Press, 1975), pp.32-39.

² Raymond Firth, "Orientations in Economic Life" in E.E. Evans Pritchard (ed.), The Institutions of Primitive Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1954), pp.12-24.

services that it can render are pitiful compared to the moral effect that it produces, and its true function is to create in two or more persons a feeling of solidarity. In whatever manner the result is obtained, its aim is to cause coherence among friends and to stamp them with its seal.¹

He adds that the function of the division of labour is the integration of society and that its cause is the increase in 'moral density' which is in turn caused by population pressure.² According to him, lower or primitive societies are held together by 'mechanical solidarity' while higher or industrial societies acquire organic solidarity through the division of labour.

We must, however, point out that the division of labour can reduce an individual to carrying out a routine piece of work, a condition which according to Karl Marx, can cause alienation. In Uganda, the economic inter-dependence was dominated by Baganda and therefore it tended to create hostility instead of inter-dependence.

Structural differentiation is another aspect of modernisation which we must briefly discuss. Nyangira has observed:

¹ E. Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier MacMillan Ltd., paper back, 1964), p.56.

² Ibid. p.257.

The modernisation process leads to an increase in the number and variety of decisions a political system must handle. Thus, whereas a traditional chief in a simple society may be his own judge, legislator, and executive administrator, a President of a modern polity performs only specified functions. Even if such a President were to attempt to perform the functions of the court and legislature in addition to executive ones, he could not effectively and efficiently cope with the volume of work.¹

Almond and Powell have defined structural differentiation as the process whereby roles and structures change, become more specialized or more autonomous, or whereby new types of roles are established and new structures created.²

During the period of modernisation, traditional social organisations break up and new institutions emerge which are linked through economic factors. Furthermore, modernisation is associated with the centralization of power. Huntington has written:

Modernisation is associated with a marked redistribution of power within the political system: The breakdown of local, religious, ethnic, and other power centres

¹ W. Nyangira, "Relative Modernisation and Public Resource Allocation in Kenya", op.cit., p.5.

² C.A. Almond and C. Powell Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (New York: Little Brown and Company, 1966), p.22.

and the centralization of power in the national political institutions. Tribes and Villages with more highly concentrated power structures innovate more easily and more rapidly than those with more dispersed power structures.¹

In our study, we shall attempt to show how the Uganda Central Government attempted to curb the power of the robust sub-political system of Buganda and how it centralized power.

Modernisation, detribalization and national integration

Advocates of the detribalization model argue that forces of modernization such as urbanization, industrialization, education and increased political participation, will either reduce or eradicate indigenous values and ethnicity. They argue that this change takes place because increasing levels of modernization create transethnic cultural, occupational and political linkages which replace ethnic arrangements and consciousness with class consciousness.² Osei-Kwame and Achola have challenged the validity of the detribalization model of national integration. They have shown in their empirical survey that the Northerners in

¹ Huntington, op.cit., p.142.

² See For example, Abner Cohen "The Lesson of ethnicity" in P. Osei-Kwame and P.W. Achola, "A new conceptual model for the study of political integration in Africa", The Journal of Developing Areas July 15, 1981, p.587.

Ghana who showed a high degree of intraethnic solidarity, also showed a high degree of transeethnic tolerance. They also discovered that the ethnic groups which showed a low level of intraethnic cohesion, showed a low level of transeethnic tolerance.¹ They concluded:

Cultural displacement (detrribalization) cannot constitute integration because, at least in the African context, it represents loss of ethnic group identity; and yet, ethnic group identity is the springboard from which to forge reinforcing coalitions with other ethnic groups.²

The major weakness of their argument is that it ignores important variables which affect the willingness of an ethnic group to accept transeethnic interactions. These include security. Even if an ethnic group enjoys solid intraethnic solidarity, if it feels insecure, it will tend to reject intraethnic interactions. As already noted, Anber has shown that the Ibo of Nigeria who enjoyed intraethnic solidarity, became inwardlooking and eventually secessionists when they were threatened by genocide. Furthermore, their argument that the detrribalized society had a low transeethnic tolerance and high intraethnic cohesion ignored the fact that detrribalized societies require effective political institutions such as political parties not only

¹ Ibid., pp.597-597.

² Ibid., p.600.

to integrate them but also to aggregate and articulate the issues for them. Their conclusion that the detribalized societies showed a low transethnic tolerance was also based on attitudinal surveys which 'capture the intention to interact and not actual interactions.'

Because of these reasons, we are not persuaded that detribalized ethnic groups do not show a greater propensity for transethnic integration than societies which are not detribalized. Our contention is that while the Baganda accepted selected areas of modernization as Apter shows, they accepted modernization in such away that it endorsed their ethnic solidarity. When Apter argues that the Baganda 'traditionalized'¹ modernity, he is essentially saying that the Baganda accepted modernity along a Kiganda model which reinforced their solidarity. He should have gone a step further to argue that Baganda's model of modernization did not detribalize the Baganda and make them more available for transethnic integration. If we take urbanization as an index of modernization, there is a lot of evidence to show that the Baganda like most Ugandan Africans, were only partially urbanized.² To this extent, the Baganda were only partially modernized. Many

¹ D.Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp.21-27 and 442.

² For details read D. Rothchild and M. Rogin, 'Uganda' in G. Carter (ed.), op.cit., pp.367-8.

of them commuted from the rural or semi-rural areas to go and work in the urban areas. Rothchild and Rogin estimated that the urban African population was little above one per cent of the total African population. They added that there was no well developed urban African middle class such as one finds in West Africa.¹ Consequently, the predominant influences were rural. Even the urban areas in which the Africans worked, were in some respects 'urban villages'. An urban area like Katwe was a mixture of the urban and the rural. The consequence of all these factors was that the ordinary Ugandan was not detribalised by the modernisation process. Furthermore, the insecurity which he suffered from the other ethnic groups which sought to reduce his position of pre-eminence, made him less willing to accept transethnic interactions at a national level. From our discussion we are ready to conclude that modernisation does not necessarily lead to detribalisation and to greater crossethnic integration.²

¹ Ibid.

² We also reject the view which equates modernisation with Westernisation. We accept the view that traditional and modern societies are not mutually exclusive. Cf. R. Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered" Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. IX, 1966-67, pp. 292-34.

The Marxist approach to national integration

Sklar has argued that tribalism or ethnicity should be viewed as a dependant variable rather than as a primordial political force in the new states.¹ His basic forces to be analysed are the economic issues. Mamdani has analysed politics in Uganda from 1962 to 1972 in terms of class struggles. He has rejected explaining politics in terms of ethnicity because in his view it is not an explanation. To use his own words:

In Africa, the political scientist identified the traditional with the tribal: tribal society was traditional and primordial, timeless and unchanging. Conflict was then explained as tribalism. The form of the conflict was presented tautologically, as its own explanation: two tribes fight because they are different tribes. But tribalism is not an explanation but an ideology, one which itself needs to be explained.²

He proceeds to explain politics in terms of two major antagonistic classes. He says that the central question is to identify who produces and who appropriates the fruits of the labour.³ He uses Lenin's definition of a class to

¹ R.L. Sklar, "Political Science and National Integration - A Radical Approach" The Journal of Modern African Studies 5,1,1967, p.6. Cf. C.Grundy, "The 'Class Struggle' in Africa: An Examination of conflicting Theories", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 2,3, 1964, pp.379-93.

² M.Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp.2-3.

³ Ibid., pp.8-9.

define social classes as large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in the historically determined system of production, by their role in the social organisation of labour and consequently by the dimensions and mode of acquiring the share of social wealth which they dispose.¹

Mamdani's approach has several strengths. It analyses issues not in terms of personalities but in terms of the classes to which these people belong and thus reduces the political emotions which are usually associated with discerning politics in terms of personalities. This approach also avoids the problems which some modernisation theorists face when they associate modernization with moving from a tribal to a westernized way of life. His approach also clearly shows how African countries were underdeveloped when they were integrated into the world capitalist system which extracted surplus (the difference between what is produced and what is consumed) from the African countries.

The approach, however, suffers from the following shortcomings. When it explains political conflict purely in terms of class conflict, it ignores the fact that in Africa, ethnic ties sometimes cut across class divisions

¹ Ibid., p.8.

because cultural and linguistic differences have a decisive influence in their own right. Sometimes ethnicity and class differentiation may coincide but this does not necessarily mean that they are identical. The extended family system under which a person may look after his tenth cousin, tends to redistribute income and prevents the crystallization of class differentiation and formation. Furthermore, the migratory tendency of the working class,¹ and the tendency of the Africans to have important ties both in the urban and rural areas, have reduced the consolidation of a stable working class. Masrui has described some Africans as being transclass people. This means that the African belongs to both the working class and to the peasantry. To use his own words:

Migrant labour in Africa, for example, is a manifestation of rural-urban ambivalence, leading to the transclass duality of a person who is both an urban wage-earner and a rural land-holding peasant.²

These factors have tended to undermine the emergence of clear classes which are in opposition to each other and which have class consciousness. And yet according to Marx, class consciousness and conflict are crucial elements of

¹ It is well explained by A. Richards (ed.), op.cit.

² A. Masrui, Cultural... op.cit., p.158.

a class. Marx says of the peasantry in The Eighteenth Brumaire:

In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that divide their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of other classes, and put them in a hostile contrast to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no unity, no national union and no political organisation, they do not form a class.¹

In this statement, class consciousness and conflict are important attributes of forming a class.

What we have in many parts of Africa are emerging classes which have not acquired a fully-fledged class consciousness.² Under these circumstances, ethnicity remains a significant rallying point for identity. This fact explains why peasants and landlords, two groups which would otherwise belong to contradictory classes, have rallied together in some parts of Africa in order to defend

¹ K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers 1885), p.109.

² There are, however, some African countries like Kenya which experienced such massive capitalistic penetration that fully-fledged classes have emerged. These classes, however, have no autonomy of their own. They are dependent on the European and American societies which dominate them. For details consult the following: G. Kitching, Class and Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of an African Petite Bourgeoisie, 1905-1970 (London: Yale University, 1980) and B. Davidson, Can Africa Survive? Arguments Against Growth without Development (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1974).

certain goals which are important for an ethnic group. The Marxists are likely to point out that peasants who ally themselves with landlords, suffer from a false class consciousness. But the burden of proving this statement must lie with those who use 'false-consciousness' to explain away the alliances between groups which should be antagonistic to each other. What must be remembered is that the degree of deprivation is important in determining the presence or absence of class conflict. For example, a peasant in Ethiopia under the late Emperor Haile Selassie was much more deprived than a peasant in Buganda under Mutesa II, the Kabaka of Buganda. To this extent, it was much easier to mobilise the peasants in Ethiopia for a revolution than the peasants in Buganda. More will be said about this point in our subsequent Chapters.¹

Weber agrees that the Marxian usage of economic class is important for social stratification but he suggests that status and power cannot be reduced to it. As an example to illustrate the difference between class and status, Weber points out that the members of a person's class are those who serve his location in the process of production, distribution and exchange. In contrast, the members of a person's status group are those who share his

¹ Cf. J. Markakis and N. Ayele, Class and Revolution in Ethiopia (Nottingham: Spokesman Bertrand Russell House, 1978).

style of life and his relative position in terms of social estimation and prestige.¹

The purpose of this discussion is to show that to explain all political phenomena in terms of classes, is inadequate. Our position is that while class analysis is important, other factors such as ethnicity have also a decisive influence in Africa. It is pertinent to note that even Mandani who explains Uganda's politics in terms of classes, lapses into recognizing the existence of tribalism. For example, he describes the political unrest in Buganda of 1930's and 1945 as the politics of 'tribalism'.² Incidentally, we take a different interpretation of those events. We regard them as being nationalistic and not tribalistic. For example, the Uganda Farmers' Union which was formed in 1941, dealt with nationalistic issues which included a concern about low prices which were given to the growers of cotton throughout Uganda. Mwaenzi who led this Union, was a nationalist who started the first Ugandan Nationalist Party in 1952.³ We must add that in his

¹ These matters are incisively discussed by G. Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp.138-145. Cf. L.A. Coser and B. Rosenberg (eds.) Sociological Theory: A Book of Readings (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1969), pp.314-319.

² Mandani, op.cit., pp.170-175.

³ It was called the Uganda National Congress.

subsequent Chapters, Mamdani again lapses into recognizing the importance of ethnicity in Uganda. To use his own words:

Unlike Kenya and Tanzania, Uganda did not emerge after independence with one ruling petty bourgeoisie, a section of it controlling state power. Instead, two separate Petty bourgeoisies came forth, one Buganda and one non-Buganda...¹

The Baganda who formed a distinct ethnic group, were pitted against the non-Baganda in this quotation. If classes were strong, the various classes in Buganda would have allied with their counterparts along class lines in other parts of Uganda and the ethnic group of Buganda would not have been pitted against the rest of Uganda in such ethnic terms as Mamdani states.²

What are the implications of adopting a Marxist approach for national integration? It means that the focus of attention will not be ethnicity but class struggles. National integration will be sought in terms of removing underdevelopment, imperialism and the consequent

¹ Ibid., p.229. The emphasis is mine.

² Y. Tandon, a Marxist who is critical of his fellow marxist, criticises Mamdani for making his principal contradictions the tribal differences between Buganda and non-Buganda instead of focusing on imperialism as the principal enemy of Uganda. For details, see Y. Tandon, "Whose capital and whose state?" The African Review, Vol.7, Number 2, 1977, especially pp.108-112.

class antagonism. Our submission is that whereas the analysis of class antagonism is important for understanding African politics, there are some countries which are significantly rural and in which classes are not fully fledged. Uganda is a case in point. In such countries, ethnicity is an important factor which cannot be ignored.

Deutsch attempts to link integration with communications by suggesting that cohesiveness among people can be indicated by the extent of communications which exist between them.¹ The problem with this approach is that it is difficult to know the content of the communications. Indeed, in some cases, the effect of the communications may be depriving one group of benefits while it is rewarding the other. This unequal exchange may cause more hostility between the groups than integration. There is no linear relationship between the growth of communications and the growth of integration. The increase of transactions may lead to negative consequences. For example, Nye observed:

The increase in trade flows in East Africa in the past decade had a negative effect on relations between the Governments because of the imbalance reflected in Tanzania's

¹ K. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communications and Control (New York: Lippincott Company, 1964).

growing deficit in regional trade. This worried leaders.¹

Because of these considerations and especially our incapacity to measure the content of communications, we shall not use Deutsch's model.

The institutionalisation approach to national integration

Institutions foster political integration when they act as referee bodies for the resolution of political conflict. Huntington argues that a society with weak political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires. He writes:

Politics is a Hobbesian world of unrelenting competition among social forces - between man and man, family and family, clan and clan, region and region, class and class - a competition unmediated by more comprehensive political organisations.²

In short, there is a lot of competition in politics and worse still, there are few institutions for resolution of conflict. If this competition is to be healthy between man and man, between different religions and classes, it is important to build institutions through which conflict

¹ J.S. Nye, "Regional integration: Concept and Measurement" in his Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organisation (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1971), p.33. Cf. W.E. Fisher, "An Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocultural Paradigm of Political integration", International Organisation Vol.23, No.2, Spring 1969.

² S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (London: Yale University Press, 1975), p.24.

can be channelled. Institutions such as political parties can foster national integration by enhancing mass participation in politics. Huntington describes institutions as stable, valued, and recurring patterns of behaviour.¹ He contends that the primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change.² He suggests that if a society is to be a community, the power of the groups must be exercised through political institutions which 'temper, moderate, and redirect that power so as to render the dominance of one social force compatible with the community of many'.³ Among the factors which facilitate the realization of national integration is institutionalization. He says:

Institutionalization is the process by which organizations acquire value and stability. The level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures.⁴

Institutionalization makes organizations more than simply instruments to achieve purposes. Indeed, the leaders and members of the organizations come to value them for their own sake. A multi-purpose organization is better suited

¹ Huntington, Ibid., p.12.

² Huntington, Ibid., p.5.

³ Huntington, Ibid., p.9.

⁴ Huntington, Ibid., p.12.

to adjust itself to the loss of any one purpose than an organisation which has one purpose. He points out that in a highly developed political system, political organisations have an integrity which they lack in less developed systems. The major function of autonomy is to prevent the intrusion of disruptive external forces. However, autonomy does not preclude disruption emanating from the internal causes. An effective organisation requires substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the groups and on the procedures for resolving disputes.

Institutionalization is linked with the acquisition of primary consensus. Primary consensus is concerned with long term agreement about the fundamental values and institutions of a society. In Africa, acquisition of primary consensus has been complicated by the existence of ethnicity, a phenomenon which is concerned with prejudices that different cultural groups hold against each other. The problem has been aggravated by cultural intolerance. In Uganda, the monarchical and non-monarchical groups have failed to tolerate each other as a result of which there has been a confrontation between the two cultures. Under these circumstances, it has been very difficult to arrive at primary consensus regarding the institutions which should be adopted in many parts of Africa. Consequently, the realisation of secondary consensus has not been forthcoming.

Secondary consensus is concerned with agreement about policies and leaders. If people lack primary consensus, they are unlikely to acquire secondary consensus.

Huntington informs us that the psychological and cultural characteristics of people condition their capacity to develop political institutions. For example, whereas the Chinese put the family above the government, the Tokugawa Japanese do not do so. We are informed that these cultural differences between the Japanese and the Chinese, explain their differences in modernisation. The Japanese peacefully and smoothly created new political institutions and united them with old ones. This was possible because there were no serious differences between the traditional Japanese culture and the modern culture. On the other hand, the clash between the Chinese traditional cultures and the modern culture, led to forty years of civil war before modern political institutions could be developed and extended throughout the Chinese society.¹

Institutionalization is a paradoxical phenomenon. For on the one hand, institutionalization of power entails the limitation of power. Otherwise the person who acquires it may use it arbitrarily. On the other, the builder of an

¹ S. Huntington, "Strategies of Institutional Development" in J.L. Finkle and R.W.Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc.1971), p.478.

institution needs personal power in order to build it. But he cannot buttress the institution unless he foregoes personal power. This paradoxical aspect of institutionalisation tends to elude many political leaders because once they have acquired power, they find it difficult to relinquish it because it confers prestige and privileges which they find difficult to forego.

Huntington regards the political party as the distinctive institution of the modern polity and points out that other institutions such as bureaucracies are carry-overs from traditional systems. He writes:

Where traditional political institutions are weak or non-existent, the prerequisite of stability is at least one highly institutionalised political party. The function of the party is to organise participation, to aggregate interests to serve the link between social forces and the government.¹

Political institutions are not created overnight and it takes a long time for them to acquire value and stability.

The institutionalisation of a political party in Africa can be judged by its duration and by its capacity to enhance transethnic interactions. The duration is important in giving it the experience to overcome crises and to bring together different ethnic groups. The exercise of resolving

¹ Huntington, *Ibid.*, p.90.

conflict confers on the party political legitimacy. We shall show that in Uganda, national parties had existed for a short period and that they largely consisted of part-time politicians who did not spend enough time, energy and resources to institutionalize them. The Courts enjoyed the legitimacy of being impartial but they were not sufficiently institutionalized to overcome ethnic problems. On the whole, the political and legal institutions in Uganda were fragile and as such, their capacity to enhance national integration was limited.

The pragmatic-pluralist approach to national integration

Before we discuss the pragmatic-pluralist approach, we must briefly explain pluralism, a phenomenon which is relevant to the problems of integrating societies which we shall discuss in our study. Furnivall who worked in Indonesia and Burma and who founded pluralism, observed that during the Colonial domination, some societies which only shared political and economic institutions, only met in the market but otherwise they did not interact with each other. Each society was confined to its racial, religious and ethnic way of life. There was absence of consensus and there was only subordination of the majority by a minority. The societies were held together by force. To use his own words:

In Burma as in Java, probably the first thing that strikes the visitor is the medley of peoples - European, Chinese, Indian and native. It is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals, they meet but only in the market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit.¹

In other words, because of the religious, racial and ethnic differences, these societies which are only forced to meet in a market-place where they buy essential goods, do not combine or interact with each other.

Furnivall adds that even in the economic sphere, there is a division of labour along racial lines. The Colonial power used force and technological superiority to impose a superstructure of administration and business and it was able to hold these segmented societies together by force. These societies lacked national integration. 'The characteristic expression of pluralism in this context, took the form of dissensus, and conflict between racial, tribal, religious and regional groups, and the system was maintained by domination, regulation and force.'²

¹ J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice (New York: New York University Press, 1947), pp.304-305.

² L. Kuper & M.G. Smith (eds.), Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p.3.

M.G. Smith expanded Furnivall's work and articulated a general theory of cultural pluralism. He wrote:

Pluralism is a condition in which members of a common society are internally distinguished by fundamental differences in their institutional practices. ... The prevalence of such systematic dissimulation between the members of institutionally distinct collectivities within a single society constitutes pluralism.¹

Smith emphasised the point that the plural society must consist of collectivities which are culturally and socially separated by autonomous institutional structures. The collectivities are held in the political system by domination of a group which uses the coercive instruments of the state. Smith observed that plural societies varied in the institutional heterogeneity or homogeneity of their ruling sections. For example, the dominant whites in South Africa are institutionally and socially heterogeneous, while the Tutsi of Ruanda were the reverse.²

In theocratic politics, the religious bases of society as a 'divinely prescribed order enjoin pluralism purely on religious grounds wherever the dominant congregation is a minority, irrespective of racial, linguistic or institutional communities across religious boundaries.'³

¹ Ibid., p.27.

² L. Kuper, Ibid., p.36.

³ Ibid., p.40.

For example, where devout Muslims form a dominant minority as in Northern Nigeria, there is a theocratic plural society in which religion provides the basic legitimation, irrespective of other shared institutions such as kinship.¹

What are the weaknesses of the Furnivall-Smith theory of pluralism? If the cultural sections ignored each other and were institutionally autonomous as we are led to believe by Furnivall and Smith, there would be no society at all. To the extent that these groups form a society, they have some common goals. There are also some plural societies which do not possess institutional exclusiveness. Uganda is a case in point. It must also be noted that there can be economic and racial similarities between the different groups, similarities which could create criss-crossing relationships across the racial and religious differences.

What is the link between cultural pluralism and national integration? The degree of heterogeneity in any society indicates possible areas of conflict between groups. These areas of conflict could destroy the stability of the political system. Indeed, by definition, pluralism is associated with absence of value consensus, cultural heterogeneity, conflict and sectional domination. If people merely meet in a market place but do not interact with each other, this is an indicator of poor national

¹ Ibid., p.40.

integration. It is, therefore, necessary to replace racial, religious and ethnic differentiation by crosscutting relationships which transcend the divisions.¹

National integration entails depluralising society.

Depluralisation is a process of reducing racial, ethnic and sectional ties. Professor Masrui observes that even in an integrated society, pluralism itself does not completely disappear but that a society ceases to be plural when the stage of coalescence is fully reached.² Here one has a coalescence of identities but not a merger of interests.³

Depluralisation can be facilitated by a common commitment to compromise, the cumulative experience of compromise and conflict resolution and by the process of functional differentiation providing new bases for association between members of different sections. Durkheim suggests that the transformation from segmented to organically interdependent societies through the division of labour would enhance depluralisation.⁴

¹ On the issue of crosscutting relationships which enhance pluralistic integration, consult W. Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960) especially pp.79-81.

² A. Masrui, "Pluralism and National Integration" in Kuper and Smith op.cit., p.332.

³ L. Kuper, "Ethnic and Racial Pluralism: Some aspects of Polarisation and Depluralisation" in Kuper and Smith, Ibid., p.462.

⁴ E. Durkheim, op.cit., pp.56-80.

There is an old tradition in which pluralism refers to the dispersion of power between groups which are bound together by crosscutting loyalties. For example, Dahl describes the American political system in these terms. He describes a system of constitutional checks and balances and a competitive balance of power in the American system. He argues that these arrangements are conducive to the preservation of a democratic government.¹ The pluralistic society which is concerned with liberal democracy, is outside the scope of this study.

What is the relevance of the plural society to Uganda? Uganda possesses ethnic, religious and racial pluralism. It has some thirty tribes many of whom do not share linguistic intelligibility. Before monarchy was abolished by the Central Government in 1967, there was a cultural clash between the monarchical tribes of Buganda, Toro, Ankole and Bunyoro and the rest of the non-centralised tribes. For example, the monarchical tribes argued that a 'commoner' should not be above a king, an assertion which was rejected by the non-centralised tribes. The rivalry between the Protestants, Catholics and the Muslims, was manifested at a political level where some political parties

¹ A. Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1967).

were formed to defend the interests of the disadvantaged religious groups.¹ Before independence, the Europeans enjoyed top positions of authority, the Asians, occupied the middle positions and the Africans were at the bottom of economic and social scales. Some schools tended to reflect the racial divisions.

However, Uganda's pluralism is different from the one which is described by Smith. According to him, pluralism is characterized by institutional segregation between the members of a society and by the domination of a minority over a majority through the use of force. There was more racial harmony in Uganda largely because Uganda did not have the problem of a white settler minority who sought to dominate the majority African population as they did in Kenya and Southern Africa. Uganda was developed primarily as an African country and the Africans did not have a major problem of acquiring political power from the Colonial government. While the 1962 quasi-federal Constitution gave some autonomy to the monarchical societies, the federal formula did not create an institutional segregation between the monarchical and the non-centralized societies.

The religious differences also tended to be weakened by other criss-crossing factors such as ethnicity, the

¹ For details read A. Low, "Political Parties in Uganda, 1946 - 1962" in his Uganda in Modern History (London: Weidenfeld And Nicolson, 1971), pp.167-222.

over-arching institution of the Kabakaship and the rivalry between Buganda and the rest of Uganda. On any given political issue, many political permutations were possible. And so we had in Uganda ethnic, racial and religious pluralism which was not buttressed by institutional segregation. The existence of this pluralism increased possible cultural and political cleavages in a society which lacked national consciousness. The abolition of monarchy in 1967, was partly an exercise in depluralizing the society. But the naked use of force in the abolition of monarchy, and the absence of integrating institutions, posed serious integrational problems.

Coleman and Rosberg have clearly explained the pragmatic-pluralist approach. In contrast with the central revolutionary approach, the pragmatic-pluralist approach places less emphasis upon ideology. This is so because it is extremely difficult to agree on an acceptable ideology in a plural society which is divided along racial, religious and ethnic lines. Placing less emphasis on ideology, is a pragmatic political move of allowing an acceptable ideology, to evolve slowly as the different cultural groups acquire cumulative experience of compromise and conflict resolution. The leaders tolerate the persistence of traditional elites and structures because they realize that it is not practical and expedient to ignore traditional structures

to which people have had primordial attachment for a long time. The degree of popular mobilization and commitment is much less than in the revolutionary centralizing states. This is so because the people are not experiencing drastic changes and therefore their familiar ways of life are not disrupted. It is thus not necessary to mobilize them as in the case of the revolutionary centralizing states which make a drastic departure from the past and which wish to create a new political culture. Although it is hierarchical, the pragmatic-pluralist states allow a looser relationship between the party and other associations in a climate of tolerated but controlled pluralism.¹

The pragmatic-pluralist approach has posed problems for some African leaders. It has been argued that Africa is facing so many staggering economic, political and modernisation problems that it is in a state of emergency. And thus the leaders have called for centralized and revolutionary parties in order to solve the critical problems which are afflicting Africa. African leaders who take this view include Nyerere of Tanzania, the late Nkrumah of Ghana, and Sekou Toure of Guinea.² The pragmatic-pluralist approach

¹ J.J. Coleman and C. Rosberg, op.cit., p.6.

² For details consult H. Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967) and Coleman and Rosberg, op.cit., pp.6-9.

is also viewed as being too slow and energy consuming. The revolutionary centralising leaders attempt to use centralised instruments of power in order to transform African societies as quickly as possible.

The revolutionary centralising leaders also contend that the pragmatic-pluralist approach tends to encourage ethnic and religious groups to claim for autonomy which they use to nurse sectional interests and foreign intrigues.

These arguments can be countered. The process of national integration especially with regard to plural societies, is a slow one. It must entail striking a balance between centralisation and decentralization. Centralising and suppressing local and cultural problems has, in many cases, just overloaded the 'national' leaders and this approach has not provided lasting solutions. For example, Nkrumah of Ghana advanced these arguments in order to justify his revolutionary centralising model as he confronted the plural society of Ghana. But by the time he was overthrown, political alienation and frustration were rampant in the country and his party was ineffective as an integrating instrument.

The Revolutionary-Centralising approach

The basic features of the revolutionary-centralising approach have also been well articulated by Coleman and Rosberg. The leaders of this approach are pre-occupied with

ideology, the content of which is programmatic and transformative regarding the socio-economic modernisation of their societies.¹ The leaders use ideology to justify making a substantial departure from the past and they also justify centralising power in order to redistribute wealth more equitably. They are prepared to confront traditional systems and if necessary to abolish them. The conflict between the older order and the new order becomes inevitable and ideology is used to justify the new political culture in terms of universalistic goals such as the realization of justice, equality and the dignity of man. Coleman and Rosberg observe:

The (leaders) tend also to be ultrapopulist and egalitarian, with heavy stress upon direct commitment to and participation in the party and the state. Organisationally the parties tend to be monolithic and strongly centralized, achieving a monopoly over-frequently, indeed, a complete fusion with all other associations, as well as an assimilation of party and governmental structures throughout the society.²

A number of points must be made. In practice the leaders find that they are so overloaded with ethnic differences and demands that they cannot afford to monopolise decision-making. In fact, the monolithic structures tend

¹ J.S. Coleman and C. Rosberg, Ibid., p.6.

² Ibid.

to be weakened by organisational weaknesses and differences.

S. Ryan who studied the CPP of Ghana which fitted the nomenclature of being 'revolutionary and centralizing', wondered why a party which was supposed to be dynamic, was unable to come to Nkrumah's rescue when he was removed by the army. He discovered that the party was not institutionalised.¹ Many of these parties tend to adopt ideologies such as Socialism which are not put in practice. For purposes of national integration, it may be stated that in many cases, these parties tend to suppress political divisions and so fail to give lasting political solutions to problems. The exceptions to this tendency is TANU of Tanzania.² It must, however, be noted that this country inherited a number of advantages which as already noted, included a widely spoken local language - Kiswahili - and the absence of a heartland tribe which was opposed to being integrated into the nation.

In our study, we shall analyse Obote's attempt to use the pragmatic-pluralist and the revolutionary-centralizing approaches in Uganda. As already noted, we shall argue that although there were social and religious differences in Buganda, as the Kingdom struggled to preserve its special

¹ S. Ryan, "The theory and practice of African One-Partyism: The CPP Re-examined" The Canadian Journal of African Studies. Vol.4, No.2, Spring, 1970, especially pp.145-6.

² It is now called Chama Cha Mapindazi (CCM).

position in an independent Uganda, ethnicity became the major rallying point.

GAPS IN THE EXISTING LITERATURE ON BUGANDA

The existing literature on Buganda has been largely based on secondary sources. Furthermore, the books which concentrate on Buganda do not deal with the entire period which we shall cover.¹ In other cases, it has not been the intention of the writers to focus on Buganda or to deal with the issue of integrating Buganda into Uganda. For example, Mwandani who explains the politics of the whole of Uganda from 1962 to 1972 in terms of classes, does not set out to deal with the issue of national integration.²

¹ The exception to this fact is D.A. Low, Buganda ... op.cit. However, this sound book depends largely on secondary sources. Cf. E. Mutea, Desecration of my Kingdom (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1960). Important books which do not cover the entire period from 1962 to 1971 include the following: L.A. Fallers (ed.), The King's Men: Leadership and Status in Buganda on the Eve of Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), D.Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda, op.cit. D.A. Low and G. Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule 1900-1955 (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), A.I. Richards, op.cit., L.P. Mair, op.cit., S.M.M. Kiwamuka, The Kings of Buganda (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971) and P. Kavuma, Crisis in Buganda, 1953-55 (London: Rex Collings, 1979).

² M. Mwandani, op.cit. Cf. S. Karugire, A Political History of Uganda (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980), G.S.K. Ibingira, The Forging of an African Nation (New York: The Viking Press, 1973) and T.B. Kabwegyere, The Politics of State Formation (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1974), Ginyera-Pinyowa, Apolo Milton Obote and His Times (London: NOK Publishers, 1978) and P.M. Gukiina, Uganda: a case study in African political development (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972).

The existence and even more importantly, the mobilisation of the differing political groups in Buganda for purposes of integrating Buganda into Uganda, is an issue which the existing literature on Buganda has not given serious attention. Indeed, there has been a tendency by politicians to blame wholesale the Baganda for actions and speeches which have been made by some sections which have not necessarily represented the majority interests of the Baganda. Our study seeks to fill in these academic gaps.

Apter has attempted to evaluate the problem of integrating Buganda into Uganda in terms of the Kingdom's structural propensity to accept modernity. He argues that Buganda has an 'instrumental hierarchical' system which has a greater capacity to accept change than Ghana's 'Consummatory-Pyramidal' System. He defines instrumental systems as those which are characterized by a large sector of intermediate ends separate from and independent of ultimate ends.¹ The consummatory systems are defined as those characterised by a close relationship between intermediate and ultimate ends.²

¹ D. Apter, "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernisation of Ghana and Uganda" in W.J. Hanna (ed.), Independent Black Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1964), p.256.

² Ibid., p.256.

Apter says that the Buganda political kingdom around which most Ugandan politics revolved, was a modernising autocracy whose major characteristic was that authority emanated from the position of a King whose role was based upon the ideas and practices of power itself.¹ He adds:

Our key hypothesis is that the modernising autocracy can adapt and adjust institutions without great difficulty until the point is reached where the principle of Kingship is itself challenged.²

He also contends that the Buganda Kingdom had a 'hierarchical system of authority' and a 'complex of values called instrumental',³ which enabled Buganda to accept change and to traditionalize 'innovation'. He points out how Buganda adapted quickly to Christianity, accepted education and a cash economy without altering its basic Kiganda social system. By contrast, he argues that among the Ashanti, responses to innovation were relatively complicated because of its consummatory system.⁴

Professor Apter's model suffers from several shortcomings: Firstly, it pays inadequate attention to the historical realities which existed in Buganda and which in

¹ D.Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda, op.cit., p.21.

² Ibid., p.21.

³ Ibid., p.27.

⁴ Apter, Ibid., p.442.

turn conditioned Buganda to accept some of the changes. Since these factors have been adequately documented elsewhere,¹ they will only be sketched here in order to clarify our contention. During the 1870's the Egyptian empire which was to the north of the present Uganda, was extending southwards. By 1880, the empire controlled parts of the present northern Uganda. Accordingly, when Mutesa I, the King of Buganda, welcomed the European missionaries who arrived in 1877 (Church Missionary Society) and 1879 (White Fathers), he did so partly because he regarded them as political counterweights to the threat from the north. The British managed to stop the Egyptian advance from the north with the help of the Baganda.

The remaining threat to Buganda was the neighbouring Kingdom of Bunyoro. It was also crushed when the Baganda allied with the British and defeated Kabarega, the King of Bunyoro who had militarily resisted British penetration of his Kingdom. These two incidents taught the leading Baganda that it paid to collaborate with the new leviathan, the British. From then onwards, Buganda's predominance was guaranteed by that leviathan. When, in 1897, Mwanga, the Kabaka of Buganda, revolted against the British, he was defeated and Daudi Chwa, a minor, became the Kabaka under a Regency. This was yet a third episode which showed the

¹ D. Low and C. Pratt, op.cit.

Baganda the dangers of rejecting changes. The Political formula which the British worked out with the leading Baganda Chiefs under the 1900 Agreement, served to encourage the Baganda to accept some of the changes. Under the formula, Baganda accepted British protection and in return the Baganda Chiefs led by Sir Apolle Kagwa, the Prime Minister of Baganda for thirty seven years, and also a Regent when the 1900 Agreement was negotiated, were given special advantages. These included the right to own freehold land and to share power with the Kabaka through Baganda's legislature which was officially recognized by the British. These Christian elites controlled the newly acquired power for over twenty years and since they had benefited individually by collaborating with the British, the elites willingly conditioned Baganda to accept the changes.

It is interesting to speculate whether while those crucial changes were taking place, the institution of Kabakaship was significantly invoked since the incumbent was at the time a minor. Apter would have to prove that there was signal differentiation between the institution of the Kabakaship and the incumbent. This point deserves to be given serious attention because according to Apter, the institution of Kabakaship was important in conditioning Baganda to accept changes, especially if it was not threatened by them. We must point out that the power of the

King was eroded by the changes because henceforth, he had to share power with the elites in a manner which was regulated by the 1900 Agreement and which was guaranteed by Britain. Indeed, it is arguable that the erosion of the power of the King under the Agreement was facilitated by the fact that the then King was a minor. The major point to grasp for this discussion is that Buganda's capacity to respond to some of the changes must not be interpreted solely in terms of what Apter calls a 'modernizing autocracy' with instrumental values. The actual role which the elites, led by Sir Apelle Kagwa, played in conditioning Buganda to accept selected changes, must be stressed in historical terms. It should be emphasized that the majority of the peasants remained conservative.

There are also particular historical accidents which ought to be stressed as factors also conditioning Buganda to accept selected changes. These included the geographical centrality of Buganda and the intercession of the Missionaries on behalf of Buganda. The geographical proximity of the Baganda to the colonial capital which was the centre of the changes meant that they were more exposed to the changes than the other tribes of Uganda. In this respect, the Baganda can be compared to the Kikuyu of Kenya whose proximity to the Europeans meant that the impact of

the European policies was more acutely felt by them than other tribes.

Missionaries also acted as intermediaries between the British administrators and the Baganda, especially whenever there was a political stalemate.¹ The Missionaries also played the role of articulating the views of the Baganda to the British and vice-versa. For our discussion, the most important role of the Missionaries was that they tended to intercede on behalf of the Baganda during periods of crisis. They played this role during the negotiations of the 1900 Agreement and during the crisis of 1953 when the Kabaka was deported by the British. This role of the Missionaries tended to help the Baganda to understand and accept some of the changes in the field of politics, education and religion. These important historical facts do not, however, receive adequate attention under Apter's model of a 'modernizing autocracy'.

Secondly, Apter tends to overstate the degree and the level to which 'Buganda's modernizing autocracy' accepted changes. For example, he speaks of the Baganda nationalists being and remaining 'deeply religious Christians'. There

¹ For more details on this theme, see Low and Pratt, op.cit., especially pp.38-83. The Missionaries participated directly in the negotiation of the 1900 Agreement and in some cases sided with the Baganda against the British. See also Low, Buganda in Modern History op.cit., pp.41-42.

² Apter, op.cit., p.440.

is, however, evidence to show that a number of these people were nominal Christians. For example, many of them continued to have more than one wife, a practice which contravened the official Christian values. Others continued to pray to their Lubaale, or the indigenous god, during times of crisis.

Indeed the Balokole movement which was started in Uganda in 1922, was partly a reaction against nominal Christianity.¹ Some Baganda became Christians for political reasons; for to be a Christian, especially a Protestant, enhanced one's chances of getting good education and an influential political post. It therefore appears that the question of how effectively Buganda accepted changes is not adequately answered by Apter.

Thirdly, Apter's model does not deal with an important post-independence phenomenon, the use of naked force to induce change. And yet, in 1966, naked force was used against this modernizing autocracy and its basic features were crushed. The post-independence military coups and the introduction of a single party system, which have been rampant in Africa and which Uganda has experienced, cannot be adequately explained in terms of Apter's model. This is

¹ For details on this Movement, consult T. Tuma and P. Mutibwa (eds.), A Century of Christianity in Uganda, 1877-1977 (Nairobi: Uzima Press Ltd, 1978), pp.128-130.

partly because they were not anticipated by most of the writers during the pre-independence era.

Lastly, we argued earlier on in this Chapter that Buganda's model of accepting modernisation tended to endorse her ethnic solidarity. This was so because Buganda, as Apter rightly observed, traditionalised innovation and thus accepted changes along the Kiganda culture. Buganda's model of modernisation did not enhance detribalization and transethnic integration. Apter who was not primarily concerned with national integration, did not pursue this important theme.

WHAT ARE THE INDICATORS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION?

A widely understood national language

There are several indicators of national integration but for purposes of our discussion, we shall discuss five of them.¹ The first one is a widely shared culture.² One major aspect of culture is the existence of a widely used national language. The issue of a widely understood language is important in Africa where there are many heterogeneous ethnic groups which do not share linguistic intelligibility. The incapacity of such groups to

¹ For a sound discussion of other indicators of national integration, see, for example, J.S. Nye, op.cit.

² Etzioni, op.cit., pp.36-37.

communicate with each other complicates breaking down cultural and political barriers.¹ Thompson informs us that language is the fundamental instrument of human communication, which either facilitates or impedes interaction between the plural societies. He adds:

If two people lack a common language, they can communicate only by noise, gesture and touch as do animals.²

A language entails more than communication. It expresses shared beliefs, historical ties, expectations and ideals of a people. To use the words of Gallagher:

Language is the verbalization of the shared beliefs, fraternal bonds, communal historical ties, and the joint expectations of people. It is only a mirror of existential reality, however, and accordingly, as the beliefs and expectations are strong and fully shared, or slight and in the process of weakening, these results will be reflected in the thinking, writing and general creativity of the times.³

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- ¹ For example, Nigeria has over 200 ethnic groups. For details consult A.O. Sanda, "Ethnic interests and political fragmentation in Nigeria, 1950-1976" Nigerian Behavioral Sciences Journal Vol.2, No.II, 1979, pp.55-60.
 - ² Thompson, "Historical perspectives of Pluralism in Africa" in L. Kuper & M.G. Smith, op.cit., p.355.
 - ³ C.F. Gallagher, "North African Problems and Prospects: Language and Identity" in J.A. Fishman, C.A. Ferguson and J.Das Gupta (eds.), Language Problems of Developing Nations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p.145.

The existence of a widely understood language has, for example, facilitated the consolidation of nationhood in Tanzania, Botswana and Lesotho. Switzerland which is relatively well integrated, has three official languages. It may, therefore, appear to discomfort those of us who include a common language in our definition of nationhood. It must, however, be noted that Switzerland has other uniting factors. These include its remote location across the strategic Alpine passes, a strong tradition of cantonal self-rule, and a political evolution of nearly seven centuries.¹ These factors have contributed to the shaping and preserving of a Swiss national unity. Despite exceptions of this kind, the fact remains that the possession of a widely understood language is an important indicator of national integration. Indeed, the problems of disintegration which the French speaking Canadians pose in a predominantly English speaking Canada, endorse the importance of a widely accepted and used national language.

How does a widely understood national language reduce ethnicity? It does so by introducing transethnic intelligibility. Ethnic groups harbouring false prejudices

¹ D.A. Rostow, "Language, Modernization, and Nationhood - an attempt at typology" in J. Fishman et al., Ibid., pp.90-91. He discusses other bilingual countries which include Canada, Belgium, India and Holland.

² A.D. Dunton and Andre Laurendeau, Royal Commission On Bilingualism in Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965).

against each other, which are based on wrong information, get a chance of discovering the facts and of re-examining their relationships. The language makes it possible for cultural exchanges to take place. The 'nationals' feel a sense of solidarity when they share some confidential issues by using a language which excludes 'foreigners'. A national language also confers on a country national prestige. The language is supposed to be the embodiment of its cultural continuity and identity.

An important hypothesis which we shall test postulates that if the official national language is widely used among a group of people, this is a measure of a high degree of national integration. For our discussion, a widely used language will range from 60% to 100%. A high degree of national integration will range from 60% to 100%. While these figures represent an element of arbitrariness, they can be justified on the grounds that they constitute a safe working and representative majority for purposes of making decisions. We assume a fair distribution of the knowledge of the language in a population. The national language is discussed in Chapter II.

Support of government policies

Our second indicator of national integration, concerns support of government policies. If a government pursues national policies which enjoy the support of the

citizens, this is an indicator of a high degree of national integration. Three conditions must be satisfied to gain support. The national policies must be widely communicated to the people through the radio, television, newspapers, political parties and other agencies. Communication must be done in such a way that people understand the policy so that they may be in a good position to decide whether or not they support the policy. If the policy is not well articulated to the people, it may be rejected either because the people don't understand it or because it is easy for the opponents of the policy to distort it to the people. The policy must also serve the interests of the people either in the short or long run.

National policies are important in either endearing ethnic groups to the state or alienating them. If an ethnic group feels that the national policies work against it, it is likely to be re-tribalised and to seek for its own measures of enhancing its interests. If the national policies are fair to all ethnic groups, this is likely to enhance their attachment to the nation.

For our discussion, we have chosen to focus our attention on the following policies: The return of Buyaga and Bugangassi counties to Bunyoro, allowing the Kabaka's government and the Central Government to compete for police and financial powers through the respected courts of

law, the abolition of Monarchy and Lukiiko, the nationalisation measures, the abolition of car loans and annual increments and the national service and election proposals. We have chosen them because they were controversial and significant to Buganda and to other parts of Uganda. They appear in Chapters III, IV, V and VI.

Support of party politics

If a political party pursues policies which are widely accepted, this is an indicator of a high degree of national integration. This is our third indicator of national integration. A political party plays an integrative role when it aggregates the various interests of the competing political groups and it adopts broad policies which are acceptable to the competing groups. The problem which a dominant political party faces is to determine the degree and form of control which it should exercise over other grounds. As noted in our previous discussion, the pragmatic pluralist parties tend to give autonomy to the subordinate groups. In the case of Uganda, Uganda Peoples Congress chose to ally with Kabaka Yekka (KY) in order to gain an overall majority in Parliament and also to persuade Buganda to join national politics. The UPC sought to enhance national integration by adopting the following reconciliatory policies: Forming an alliance with KY and making the Kabaka

of Buganda the President of Uganda. The policies of UPC, the divisions within UPC and KY and their consequences for national integration will be discussed in Chapter III. The incapacity of the UPC to play an integrative role because of the major divisions within the party, will be discussed in Chapter V.

Acceptance of inter-tribal marriage

Our fourth indicator of national integration concerns inter-tribal marriages. Our hypothesis which will be tested, postulates that a person who encourages inter-marriage across ethnic boundaries, is more willing to accept national integration than a person who does not do so.¹ The assumption is that marriage represents a very close relationship and that if a respondent accepted inter-tribal marriage, he would probably be willing to accept other less intimate relationships which are nevertheless important for bringing different ethnic groups together in order to create a community. Marriage is, of course, a mystical union between two individuals. But while the choice is basically an individual matter, family and clan approval is usually essential particularly in Africa in order to gain support, especially during difficult times. Clan and family approval may not be as important in other parts of the world where

¹ Cf. The Bogardus social distance scale. For details read C. Selltis et. al. Research Methods in Social Relations (New York: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1951), pp. 371-373.

individualism is highly cherished and institutionalised. However, despite the fact that in Africa individualism is being strengthened by western values, marriage is still a matter in which the clan and other members of the tribe play an important role.¹ And thus accepting marriage outside one's tribe entails an integrative process of cultural bargaining between the couples on behalf of their respective tribes. There are also procreative rights to be considered. For example, among the matrilineal societies of Tanzania and Ghana, the children belong to the clan of the women. The children inherit property from the maternal uncles. A patrilineal man marrying a matrilineal woman would have to compromise on the conflicting procreative arrangements. We must state that there are no matrilineal tribes in Uganda. We have only patrilineal ones.

However, Uganda has its cultural complications which are aggravated by the absence of linguistic intelligibility between some ethnic groups. For example, it may be easier to arrange a marriage within the Nilotes of the Northern Uganda than between the Nilotes and the Bantu of the Southern Uganda. This is so because despite the fact that there are

¹ For details, consult the following: M. Fiol, Consensus and Conflict in African Societies (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1977) especially pp.137-140 and A Report of the Commission on Marriage, Divorce and the Status of Women under the Chairmanship of the Hon W.W. Kalema (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1965) hereafter referred to as the Kalema Report.

political differences between the Nilotes, they share linguistic intelligibility. The same fact applies to the Bantu.¹ The Bantu and the Nilotes do not share linguistic intelligibility. Consequently, if an Acholi from the Nilotic group wished to marry a Musoga from the Bantu group, the matrimonial venture would entail sorting out important linguistic and cultural differences. To this extent, a successful marriage of this type has a greater exemplary value for bringing the ethnic groups together than an inter-tribal marriage either within the Bantu or the Nilotic group.

A person who accepts inter-tribal marriage can under certain circumstances, be a worse tribalist than a person who rejects inter-tribal marriage. These circumstances include a situation in which one of the partners insists that only his tribal rituals, values and language must prevail. In this situation, there is no inter-tribal bargaining and compromise, two conditions which are essential in bringing together different ethnic groups to form a nation. Apart from these caveats, we must affirm that even predisposition to inter-tribal marriage which may not necessarily

¹ We are aware of important differences which exist between the Bantu ethnic groups. For example, among the Bakiga who belong to the Bantu group, mother's brothers' children are marriageable. However, among the Baganda who also belong to the Bantu group, a person must not marry anybody who is related to his mother. For more details see the Kalama Report Ibid. There are also differences between the Nilotes and the Sudanic groups.

be translated into concrete matrimonial action, lays a tolerant socio-political environment for national integration to take place as opposed to a situation under which people are outright opposed to inter-tribal marriage because of prejudices.

Inter-tribal marriage is likely to reduce ethnicity by maximising transethnic cultural interaction. The children of an inter-tribal marriage are biologically transtribal and they represent widening circles of intimate cross-crossing cultural interactions especially in Africa where marriages bring clans together. Inter-tribal marriage is discussed in Chapter III.

A widely supported national political ideology

Our fifth indicator of national integration concerns support of a national political ideology. The existence of a widely spoken language is not a sufficient indicator of national integration. In fact, this language may merely enable the different ethnic groups to misunderstand each other more fluently. The people must agree on a broad set of political goals. It is therefore necessary to have a clearly defined political ideology which acts as a political map for a nation. This ideology must not be imposed from above. It must be widely supported. Otherwise it remains an empty political ritual.

Our hypothesis which shall be tested is that if a national political ideology is widely accepted among a group of people, this is a measure of a high degree of national integration. An ideology may be contained in a document such as the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, Obote's Move to the Left and Nyerere's Arusha Declaration. On the other hand, the absence of a written set of political objectives to be attained, does not imply absence of a widely accepted ideology. For example, Americans have consistent capitalist beliefs which influence their political behaviour, but the political beliefs cannot be found in a single authoritative document such as the Arusha Declaration of Tanzania.¹

Tanzania is a good example of a country which has a political ideology that is widely accepted. It has a socialist ideology which acts as an integrating source of inspiration and guide to the Tanzanians.² The country is grappling with serious problems of underdevelopment but the widely shared political ideology tends to unite people to adopt a strategy of tackling the complex problems.³ The widely

¹ Cf. P. Campbell and P. Howard, America Needs An Ideology (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1957).

² Cf. Hyden, op.cit., especially pp.41-42.

³ Consult L. Cliffe and J. Saul (eds.), Socialism in Tanzania Vols. I and II (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972). Cf. I.G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1975).

spoken Kiswahili, a language which has no elite connotations, also enhances the spread of the socialist ideology through the Party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). The absence of a widely accepted ideology in other African countries and the attempt by some leaders to impose certain ideologies on the reluctant populations has become a major source of disunity.¹

It is usually the role of elites to systematize, spread and popularize ideology. The elite may systematize an ideology and fail to popularize it. The failure to do so may be attributed either to lack of effective political institutions or to the irrelevance of the ideology to the burning needs of the day or to both. When Marx systematized his ideology, it had a great appeal to the workers because it articulated the suffering of the factory workers. When elites systematize an ideology and fail to sell it to the masses, then an elite-mass gap exists at the level of ideology. It is our submission that whereas Obote succeeded in systematizing the socialist ideology in his five documents, he failed to sell and popularize it to the masses. Political ideology is discussed in Chapter VI.

METHODOLOGY

Our information on Buganda is based on survey research, secondary sources and the knowledge which I acquired as a

¹ S.A. Akintoye, op.cit., especially pp.120-131.

participant observer in my capacity as a Polling Agent during the elections to the Lukiiko and as an Establishment Officer in the Katikkiro's Office. The survey whose target sample was 410 people, was supplemented by a separate and an unstructured interview of 76 people. These consisted of people who were politically important in Buganda and who were experts on the affairs of the Kingdom plus some non-Buganda who played an important political role in specific events which affected Buganda. For example, the non-Buganda who were actively involved in forging the alliance between UPC and Buganda's Movement known as Kabaka Yekka, were interviewed. The following are some of the politically important categories of people who were interviewed: The Kabaka of Buganda, three Katikikios, Ministers, Members of the Lukiiko, County Chiefs and the Secretary General of UPC. The unstructured interviews were carried out between 1966 and 1968. The survey was carried out between 1979 and 1980.

Domains of the study

Our target population was divided into the urban and rural domains. The urban domain consisted of households working and residing in Kampala City while the rural domain consisted of tax payers living in 796 parishes of the former Kingdom of Buganda designated as rural in the 1969 Uganda population census.

Sample size and selection

Our target sample consisted of 410 people of whom 300 were tax payers living in the rural domain and 110 households living in the urban domain. In choosing the size of the rural sample in Buganda, the procedure which Mueller and his co-authors advocate, was adopted.¹ Accordingly, we took into account the allowable error of 5 per cent and the degree of homogeneity of a population proportion which in our case was estimated at 0.7. We chose a sample of 300 respondents. Our choice of the sample also took into account our limited manpower and financial resources.

After getting the sample for the rural domain, we used a three-stage cluster sample to get the actual respondents. Counties were used as first-stage sampling units, parishes within counties as second-stage sampling units and tax payers within the sampled parishes as third-stage (ultimate) sampling units.² The twenty counties in the frame were first divided into four strata which coincided

¹ For details, see J.H. Mueller, K.F. Schuessler and H.L. Costner, Statistical reasoning in Sociology (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, Second edition, 1970), pp. 390-392. On the allowable error, see also W. Buchanan, Understanding Political Variables (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), p. 82.

² Uganda is divided into districts, counties, sub-counties and finally parishes. A parish is the smallest administrative unit in Uganda with a chief who draws a regular salary. Parishes have been used significantly as primary sampling units in almost all rural surveys in Uganda.

with the four districts into which Buganda is administratively divided.¹

To facilitate ease in computing estimates, two counties were selected by a simple random procedure from each stratum giving us a total of eight sampled counties out of a total of twenty counties. Within each of the selected eight counties, two parishes were selected by a simple random procedure. We obtained 16 sampled parishes out of 402 parishes. The 300 sample units were distributed among the 16 parishes on the basis of population size which is shown in Table I.

The strata, selected counties in each stratum, number of parishes, taxpayers and the overall ultimate sample size for each stratum, are given in the table below:-

TABLE I¹

Sample size in the rural area

<u>Stratum</u>	<u>Selected Counties</u>	<u>Number of Parishes</u>	<u>Number of Parishes Selected</u>	<u>Tax Payers</u>	<u>Ultimate Sample Size</u>
1. West	Basiro	58	2	63611	66
Mengo	Butambala	24	2	10105	10
2. East	Bulwuli	26	2	17153	18
Mengo	Kyaggwe	104	2	63697	66
3. Masaka	Bukoto	50	2	38257	40
	Kalungu	42	2	16734	17
4. Mubende	Singo	82	2	69475	72
	Buwijja	16	2	10883	11
	Total	402	16	289915	300

¹ To the extent that each stratum was under the same administrative set up, it enjoyed some measure of administrative homogeneity with respect to the variables under study.

² Source: The Uganda Population Census, 1969 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1969), p.50.

In the rural domain, the lists of households and

In the urban domain, a two stage cluster sample was selected with blocks as the first stage (primary) sampling units and households as the second (ultimate) sampling units. From a total of 70 blocks, two were selected by a simple random procedure. From each of the blocks, we listed households. In the first block, there were 1435 households and in the second block there were 1430 households. By using a sampling interval of 26, and moving from a random start, we obtained a systematic sample of 55 households from each block. From the two blocks, we obtained a total sample of 110 households.

A sampling frame at each stage of sampling is a pre-requisite for random sampling and if no adequate sampling frame viz., one without omissions or duplication, is available before the start of a survey, it must be constructed before sample selection can be made. We had therefore to create sampling frames where they did not exist in the urban and rural domains.

In the urban domain, Kampala City was first divided up into 70 blocks. These were geographical segments containing the ultimate units of interest with clear and identifiable boundaries using the latest available map sheets of the City. Within the two selected blocks, households were listed out for purposes of sample selection.

In the rural domain, the lists of counties and parishes within the selected counties were drawn from the records of the 1969 Uganda Population Census. Within the 16 selected parishes, lists of graduated tax-payers were extracted for use as our sampling frames. Such frames of ultimate sampling units, however, are incomplete as they do not include the very old males and most of the females who are exempted from paying graduated tax in Uganda. Hence the list of tax-payers and households in any parish do not coincide. However, most tax-payers, are heads of households and vice-versa. There is, therefore, a high correlation between a frame of households and a tax-payers' list in rural areas of Uganda. Incidentally, tax-lists have invariably been used in rural surveys in Uganda as a sampling of primary frames from which sampling frames of interest have been created.

Questionnaire

Our questionnaire consisted of 75 questions most of which were precoded in order to ease analysis of the survey results.¹ The questionnaire was pre-tested in a pilot survey which consisted of eighty people of whom 30 were urban workers and fifty were rural dwellers. The thirty were randomly selected from the workers in Halls of

¹ It has been attached at Appendix I.

residence at Makerere University, 25 were randomly selected from a list of tax-payers at Buloba and 25 were randomly selected from a list of tax-payers at Kansira. After carrying out the pre-test, the questionnaire was revised in order to improve our capacity to tap the required information more accurately. Better techniques of posing questions were also learnt. For example, we learnt that conservative Baganda did not want to count their children because the parents believed that counting them might cause their children to die. And so instead of asking a respondent to count the number of his children, he would be asked to mention the names of his children and the Research Assistant would count them.

Field work

We used three Research Assistants of whom two were Makerere University students and one was a former secondary school teacher. They were trained in the techniques of administering questionnaires and recording responses accurately. They were used in the pilot and actual survey.

Problems and solutions

The respondents were so co-operative that out of the target sample of 410, we were able to interview 391 people. We were unable to interview 19 people because 7 were very sick, 8 could not be traced and 4 declined to be

interviewed. We came across a few people who were suspicious of our intentions. For example, some thought that our information might be used to discover those who had not paid tax. However, the explanation that they were chosen by chance from among so many other people (random selection) and that their names would not be mentioned, removed the suspicion.¹ Furthermore, we made it clear that our mission was purely academic. We used chiefs, trusted teachers and religious leaders to explain to the people the nature of our work. Drinking and mixing with these people was an additional asset. They relaxed.

In some cases, it was not possible to get the respondents during the first visit and it was necessary to make several visits in order to find them. While the revival of political parties caused a lot of excitement and participation, it also meant that there was a tendency to identify people in terms of partisan politics. We had to dispel the view that we were representing political parties. To facilitate communication, the questionnaire was both in Luganda and English. The co-operation which we received, contributed greatly to the reliability of the data which we gathered.

Secondary sources

Our survey was enriched by secondary sources which

¹ The people whose names are mentioned, gave us express permission to do so.

were newspapers, books, proceedings of the Uganda High Court, the Uganda Parliament and the British Privy Council. The Uganda Government Archives at Entebbe were a good source of historical information.

Participant Observer

During the general elections to the Lukiiko of 1962, I was a Polling Agent. This major electoral process gave the author a lot of political insights. For example, some voters asked me whether or not there was a machine which could detect the party for which they had voted despite the fact that voting was by secret ballot. I assured them that there was no such machine.

As an Establishment Officer in the Katikikire's Office from 1964 to 1966, I was in charge of all the twenty County Chiefs who frequented the Katikikire's Office in order to report to him what was happening in the entire Kingdom which consisted of the twenty counties. These people also wanted to be briefed on the wishes of the Kabaka and the Buganda Government. It was also an office which dispensed political patronage. Many of the affairs of the entire civil service of the Kingdom were channelled through our office. Our boss, the Permanent Secretary, used to delegate some important powers to us. We used to go on inspection tours which enabled us to get acquainted with what was going on in the field. I must, however, point out that there were some

CHAPTER II

THE ORIGINS OF BUGANDA'S HEGEMONY AND SEPARATISM

Before discussing the origins of Buganda's hegemony and separatism, we must acquaint ourselves with some basic information about Buganda and the social composition of Uganda.

The area and geography of Buganda

Ranking as one of the four Provinces of Uganda, the Kingdom of Buganda consisted of Mengo, Masaka and Mubende districts whose total land and water area was 23,096 square miles of which 16,138 was land while 8,958 was open water and swamp.¹ In 1965 Buyaga and Bugangassi were transferred to Bunyoro. The present area of the Buganda Region is thus as follows:-²

East Mengo District is	9,037	square miles
Masaka district is	7,978	" "
Mubende district is	3,922	" "
West Mengo district is	2,514	" "
The total area is	23,451	square miles.

Buganda³ is a dissected plateau ranging from 3,800 to 4,000

¹ Uganda Statistical Abstract (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1964), p.1.

² Commissioner of Lands and Surveys, Entebbe, Uganda.

³ Buganda refers to the area of the tribe.
Baganda refers to the people of the tribe.
Wuganda refers to one person of the tribe.
Luganda refers to the language.

feet in altitude and is adorned with flattish-topped hills which are separated by wide and swampy valleys. Lying generally between lakes Victoria and Kyoga, and between the Nile and (in part) Kagera rivers, Buganda is a fertile area with catenary soils and many other pedological qualities which are favourable to a diversified and productive pastoral and arable agriculture. Rain falls throughout the year with two distinct maxima: March to June, and September to December. The first maximum is rainier than the second. There are two relatively dry seasons, the severer one lasting from January to early March and the mild one from June to early August. On the whole, rainfall amounts in Buganda decrease from West to East. The influence of Lake Kyoga is minimal and the altitude of Buganda falls from Lake Victoria to Lake Kyoga. Consequently, rainfall amounts decrease fairly sharply from the shores of Lake Victoria to those of Kyoga. Buganda enjoys a rainfall reliability which is among the highest in East Africa away from the highlands. The fertile soil and reliable rainfall have earned this Region the name of "The fertile crescent of the Lake Basin".

The social composition of Uganda

Uganda has some thirty tribes which are divided into the following main language groups: The Bantu who are found in Southern Uganda. They include the Baganda, Basoga, Banyoro, Batoro and Banyankore. The Nile-Hamites (para-

Nilotas) live in the north-east and they include the Karamojong and Iteso. The Nilotes who include Asholi and Langi, live in the central north of Uganda. The Sudanic-speakers who include Nadi and Lugbara, are found in the north-west of Uganda. The census which indicated the ethnic origins of Ugandans, was that of 1959. Table II gives a breakdown of the main ethnic groups.

TABLE II

The distribution of tribes among the four major ethnic groups.¹

Bantu	Number	Per cent of total African population
Baganda	1,044,878	16.3
Banyankore	519,283	8.1
Basoga	501,921	7.8
Bakiga	459,619	7.1
Banyarwanda	378,636	5.9
Bagisu	329,257	5.1
Batero	208,300	3.3
Banyoro	188,374	2.9
Barundi	138,749	2.2
Bagwere	111,681	1.7
Bakonjo	106,890	1.7
Banyole	92,642	1.4
Basamia	47,759	0.7
Bagwere	36,130	0.6
Basamba	34,506	0.5
Bakenyi	23,507	0.4
Batwa	2,592	-
	<u>4,224,744</u>	<u>65.7</u>

¹ Derived from the compilation of the results of the General Africa Census of 1959 by the Department of Lands and Surveys. See also Atlas of Uganda (Kampala: Department of Lands and Surveys, 1967). We have used the 1959 Census because the 1969 and 1980 Census figures do not show the ethnic composition of Ugandans. I understand that the removal of ethnic composition was intended to reduce the importance of ethnicity.

TABLE II Continued

Nilotic	Number	Per cent of total African population

Lango	363,807	5.6
Acholi	284,929	4.4
Alur	123,378	1.9
Badama	101,451	1.6
Jonam	27,422	0.4
	<u>938,635</u>	<u>13.9</u>

Sudanic	Number	Per cent of total African Population

Lugbara	236,270	3.7
Madi	80,355	1.2
Lendu	4,744	1.1
	<u>321,369</u>	<u>6.0</u>

Nilo-Hamitic

Iteso	324,716	8.1
Karamojong	131,713	2.0
Kumam	61,459	1.0
Kakwa	37,828	0.6
Sebei	36,800	0.6
Pokot (Suk)	21,850	0.3
Labwor	10,042	0.1
Tepeth	4,363	-
	<u>828,771</u>	<u>12.7</u>

MAJOR ORIGINS OF BUGANDA'S HEGEMONY

What were the major origins of Buganda's hegemony and separatism? First, instead of the leading Baganda resisting colonial penetration, they, in most cases, responded creatively and calculatingly to the penetration.¹ Second,

¹ On the other hand, Kabaka Mwanga of Buganda, represents the groups which resisted colonial penetration and were defeated by the new Leviathan, the British. For an imaginative appraisal of Mwanga, see D. Mudoola, "Prelude to Military Conquest: Buganda - A Case Study in Colonial Conquest", USSC. Conference Paper, University of Nairobi, 1969.

the British entered Uganda largely through Buganda where they concentrated their impact before spreading to other parts of Uganda. Third, Buganda possessed effective chains of command which were conveniently utilized by the British to spread their influence throughout Buganda and other parts of Uganda. Fourth, Buganda's geographical centrality assisted the Kingdom to maximise her influence on the affairs of the entire country. Fifth, the British discovered familiar monarchical institutions in Buganda, a discovery which tended to predispose the British to the Baganda.

We wish to argue that Buganda's separatism is attributable to the chiefly traditionalists who wielded power in Buganda and who believed that if Buganda participated in the national affairs, the remaining parts of Uganda which were less developed and privileged than Buganda, would work together in order to deprive the Kingdom of her special position and monarchy. On the other hand, the Baganda nationalists believed that Buganda could best preserve her special position by participating vigorously in the national politics. A second factor which explains Buganda's separatism is that during the colonial era, there was absence of effective horizontal interaction between the ethnic groups of Uganda. Thirdly, we shall suggest that Buganda's economic and political pre-eminence, tended to foster some habits of antarky in Buganda instead of inter-dependence.

It will, for example, be pointed out that Buganda's capacity to absorb its elites meant that there was no pressing functional necessity for most of the Baganda to seek for jobs at the central level unless they were frustrated at the Baganda level. Finally, the absence of a widely spoken national language complicated the realization of national integration.

Buganda's response to Colonial penetration

The existing literature suggests that when the British came to Uganda, the ruling elites in Buganda did not, on the whole, resist them. Indeed, the Baganda sought to secure military and other material advantages from the 'white men'. Low has explained Buganda's response to the Western influence in the following words:

It derived in part from the basic values of the Baganda (there was a striking contrast between the disdain for and hostility towards strangers exhibited by so many Kenyan peoples and the eager desire to know what they had to offer which the Baganda displayed). It derived as well from the conversions to Christianity which occurred in Buganda in the 1880s and 1890s; and from the mutually profitable alliance which the Baganda chiefs succeeded in making in the 1890s with the British administration.¹

¹ Low, Buganda in Modern History op.cit., p.232. Cf. S.M. Kiwuka, "The Traditional History of the Buganda Kingdom", PhD Thesis, University of London, 1963, p.606. On the other hand, Cox, the Resident of Buganda, regarded the Baganda as being very conservative and suspicious about change. See Cox, the Resident of Buganda, to the Chief Secretary, May 11, 1939, in Secretariat Minute Paper No.2421, Entebbe National Archives, Uganda.

When Muteesa, the Kabaka of Buganda, welcomed the Missionaries who arrived in Buganda in 1877 and 1879, he did so partly because he calculatingly regarded them as counterweights to the threat from the northern part of Uganda.¹ We should note that during the 1870s, the Egyptian empire which was to the north of the present Uganda, was expanding southwards. By 1880, the empire controlled parts of the present Uganda.

The British who were in need of working with the indigenous people who knew the local terrain of Uganda, found in the Baganda suitable allies and collaborators. The Baganda assisted the British in defeating Kabarega, the King of Bunyoro, who had resisted the colonial penetration.² Low has observed:

The ready response of the Baganda did not, however, mean that they were simply collaborators. It should be emphasized indeed that their readiness to co-operate was always coupled with an unremitting determination to see that the integrity and autonomy of their Kingdom was not impaired. No-one, for example, did more to uphold

¹ For details consult Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa (London: Longman group Limited, 1970), pp.65, 69 and 76.

² Bunyoro Kingdom was a serious threat to Buganda's rising power. For details on Buganda's collaboration with the British, See A.D. Roberts, "The Sub-imperialism of the Baganda", Journal of African History, Vol.3, No.3, 1962 and A.D.Roberts, "The lost counties of Bunyoro", Uganda Journal, Vol.26, 1962.

the admittedly reduced (but nevertheless still very largely intact) autonomy of Buganda than the otherwise arch collaborator, Sir Apollo Kagwa, Katikkiro (Chief Minister) of Buganda from 1889 to 1926.¹

The clash between Apollo Kagwa and J.R. Postlethwaite, an Acting Provincial Commissioner of Buganda, illustrates Kagwa's attempt to retain the autonomy of Buganda. Samwiri Namala, the Omulukw'Ekibuga,² referred a controversial matter concerning the issuing of beer permits within the Kibuga³ to the Protectorate Provincial Commissioner. Kagwa who strongly felt that Buganda was sufficiently autonomous to handle such affairs, blamed Namala for having appealed to the British Authorities. In his letter to the Provincial Commissioner, Kagwa asserted:

The matter has very much annoyed the Buganda Government to see that its chiefs do not trust it can settle all their disputes without referring these to the Protectorate Government... The Lukiiko is greatly annoyed over this issue. It is incomprehensible why this official of the Buganda Government did not refer the matter to the Kabaka if he was not satisfied with the Lukiiko's settlement...

¹ Low, Buganda in Modern History, op.cit., pp.232-3.

² Omulukw'Ekibuga was a chief who was in charge of the urban area of Mengo. His rank was that of a deputy county chief.

³ Kibuga refers to either a city or an urban area.

In conclusion I beg to inform you that in future the Buganda Government is not prepared to regard as right and to take into consideration matters conducted after this fashion.¹

This letter raised a fundamental issue concerning the questions of the relations which should exist between the Protectorate officers and the Buganda chiefs. The Provincial Commissioner who was subsequently supported by the Governor and the Chief Secretary, asserted the right of a chief to appeal directly to the Provincial Commissioner. Postlethwaite demanded that the Katikkiro should ask for forgiveness concerning the tone and content of his reply. Eventually the issue which involved Kagwa's assertion of Buganda's autonomy, led to his resignation. This episode clearly demonstrates that while the Baganda were collaborating with the British, they were at the same time struggling to confer on Buganda a measure of autonomy.

Colonial penetration largely through Buganda

The British entered Uganda largely through Buganda where they concentrated their effort before penetrating other areas of Uganda. We must note that Mutesa requested A. Stanley to make an appeal to Britain for Missionaries to come to Buganda and give the Kingdom 'light'. The Missionaries responded warmly to this request and they came

¹ Low and Pratt, op.cit., p.215. See also D.A. Low, The Mind of Buganda (London: Heinemann, 1971), pp.44-46, and Daudi Chwa, The Kabaka, Lwaki Kagwa Yussimula, Kampala, 1928.

to Buganda where they introduced mission schools and hospitals. The Missionaries also assisted Buganda's response to colonial penetration by acting as significant intermediaries between the British administrators and the Baganda, especially whenever there was a political stalemate. For example, they interceded during the crisis of 1953 when the Kabaka was deported by the British. The Archbishop of Canterbury who received the Buganda delegation in a friendly manner, used his influence to put Buganda's case before the British Authorities.¹ When the 1900 Agreement was being drawn between the British and the Baganda, the Missionaries frequently interceded on behalf of Buganda.² Low informs us that Missionaries who included Tucker and Walker were officially brought into the negotiations of the 1900 Agreement.³

Buganda's hierarchical and effective Chains of Command

Buganda possessed hierarchical and effective chains of command through which British orders and influence could be extended with relative ease. The top man in the Buganda hierarchical system was the Kabaka below whom there was the

¹ Interview with three members of the delegation.

² See Low, Buganda in Modern History op.cit., p.38. For an account of the role of the Roman Catholic Church in the northern part of Uganda consult A.G.G. Ginyera-Pinyowa, op.cit., especially Chapters IV - VIII.

³ Low and Pratt, op.cit., p.38.

Katikkiro, the Treasurer, the Chief Justice, the county chiefs, the sub-county chiefs, and the Parish chiefs. The chiefs were responsible to the Katikkiro for all matters under the control of the Kabaka's Government. Buganda was governed by the Kabaka through the council of ministers and the Lukiiko. In contrast to this hierarchical system which suited the British indirect rule, the non-centralized societies lacked effective leaders over a wide area. Burke comments:

... early administrators in the Nilotic areas of the north, the Nilo-Hamitic areas of the north-east, looked in vain for a Buganda-like hierarchy of chiefs. What they found was either a confusing array of clan leaders, some of whom appeared to hold sway over considerable areas and lesser clan leaders or a system of political authority built about institutionalized age-grades... the Baganda willingly lent their assistance to the extension of British hegemony over these outlying areas.¹

The Kiganda system of administration was exported to other areas of Uganda. The Baganda were used as British Agents in other areas of Uganda. Kakungulu played a notable role in pacifying the Eastern Province of Uganda and was the first President of Busoga. Coote, a British administrator who had

¹ F. Burke, Local Government and Politics in Uganda (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1964), pp. 33-34.

led an expedition in Western Uganda observed:

I consider the system of employing Baganda Agents will prove the only method of administering the district. The Bakiga are all split up into clans, recognize the authority of no chiefs, and my successor will find in Yowana Saebaliija an excellent, most trustworthy and reliable man to put in as head agent of the district.¹

Using Baganda Agents provided the British with two advantages: The Baganda acted as their shock absorbers. This was so because the Baganda were in daily contact with the indigenous people and the Baganda were the people issuing orders on behalf of the British. Accordingly, the Baganda were held responsible for the ills of the colonial administration. Some Baganda incurred the wrath of their fellow Africans because they were arrogant. Kabwegyere says:

Commenting on the behaviour of Baganda Agents, Jackson found them different Baganda from what one would expect them to be in the context of Baganda where he noted they were accustomed to obedience... but outside their own country the Baganda, whether employed as agents, private servants, rickshaw boys, or porters, are arrogant, overbearing, greedy, conceited, delight in asserting themselves, and generally 'show off'.²

¹ Secretariat Archives, SMP.1047/10. Coote to Entebbe, August 18, 1910.

² T. Kabwegyere, op.cit., p.82.

The major point we should note is that the anti-Kiganda sentiment which was caused by the 'sub-imperialism' of the Baganda, tended to postpone the reaction against the British colonialists themselves. Even when the Baganda were removed from other areas of Uganda, they were used as bogey-men. For example, Philips, a District Commissioner of Kigesi, who became an important figure as the man responsible for chasing away the Baganda from Kigesi, encouraged hostility of the Bakiga against the Baganda by warning them that if they did not work in accordance with his wishes, he would recall the Baganda to rule instead.¹ Denoon, reveals:

This use of the Baganda as bogey-men is not only dishonest and typical of the official pre-occupation with the tribe as opposed to any reference group - it was also exceptionally effective, and it has become an article of Bakiga faith since that time, that all the excesses, abuses and humiliations associated with early colonial rule are attributable to the Baganda...²

The second advantage of using the Baganda Agents was that they were cheaper than using the British Administrators who needed high salaries, an annual leave in Britain and other

¹ D. Denoon, "The Allocation of Official Posts in Kigesi, 1908 - 1930" in D. Denoon (ed.), A History of Kigesi (Kampala: Press Trust, 1965), p.228.

² Ibid., p.228.

advantages. Furthermore, the Baganda were more familiar with the socio-political and geographical terrain of the country than the foreigners and to this extent the Baganda were more useful as agents of spreading colonial rule than the foreigners.

Buganda's geographical centrality

Buganda's geographical centrality conferred upon it the advantages of a heartland tribe. As Masrui puts it:

The Kikuyu and the Baganda are comparable at least in the fact that they are both heartland tribes - that is numerous enough and politically central enough to be at the very heart of their nations politics. Both lie astride the capitals of their respective countries. Some of the major political issues affecting the nation as a whole take place within close proximity to their homes.¹

Hopkins has noted that geographical centrality enabled the Baganda to deal with the British at much closer quarters, on more familiar terms and on a much more regular basis than did others.² Consequently, the Baganda acquired proficiency in the art of neutralising and evading the Protectorate Government controls. Buganda's centrality meant that her

¹ A.A. Masrui, "Leadership in Africa: Obote of Uganda" International Journal Vol.XXV, No.3, September, 1970, p.541.

² T. Hopkins, "Politics in Uganda: The Buganda Question" in J. Butler and Castagno (eds.), Boston University Papers on Africa: Transition in African Politics, (New York: Praeger, 1967), p.253.

demands could not be easily relegated to the background as the case was with regard to Karamoja, a district which is far removed from the centre of Uganda. For example, the deportation of the Kabaka of Buganda in 1953, acquired national dimensions, although it was basically Buganda's local matter. This was so partly because Buganda's geographical centrality ensured that her affairs captured the national attention. Buganda also enjoyed the spill-over from the national institutions which were geographically located in Buganda. The capital of Uganda, the University of Makerere, the Medical School, to mention a few, are located in Buganda. Buganda thus benefitted from these institutions in the way of employment.

Similarity of monarchical institutions predispose the British to the Baganda

When the British and other Europeans went to Africa, they expected to find in the continent barbarians who lacked dignified institutions. Indeed, Africa was referred to as the 'dark continent'. When, however, the British stumbled into Buganda's palace, they were rather surprised to find a King who was surrounded by a dignified royal paraphernalia. The British discovery of similar monarchical institutions in Buganda tended to predispose them to the Baganda. Masrui has commented:

The British arriving in Buganda saw in the institutions of the Buganda Kingdom familiar instruments of government. This led to collaboration with the Buganda ... The Buganda became a most favoured nation... The explorer H.M. Stanley was impressed by Buganda and considered its King 'a prince well worthy of the most sympathies that Europe can give him'.¹

The British approval of monarchical institutions partly explains why all the Kingdoms in Uganda were elevated more than the non-centralized areas.² Gingyera-Pinyowa has described the elevation of the Ugandan Kings by the British in the following words:

The argument went that these societies which had monarchical institutions resembled the 'civilized' states of Europe and, hence had a higher level of cultural development; while other societies were still in the same savages and were at a lower level of social development.³

The 1900 Agreement formalises Buganda's special position.

The factors which we have discussed assisted Buganda to acquire a special position in Uganda. This position was formalised by the 1900 Agreement which was made between

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- ¹ A.A. Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana (London: Weidenfeld And Nicolson, 1967), pp.30-31.
 - ² For example, the British ruled Kingdoms through Agreements, an arrangement which was not extended to the non-Kingdom areas.
 - ³ Gingyera-Pinyowa, "The republicans outlaw the royalists in Uganda", East Africa Journal, November, 1967, p.9.

Britain and Buganda. Since the Agreement has been discussed fully elsewhere,¹ we shall only deal with its main features and consequences. It made Buganda one of the Provinces of Uganda and recognised the Kabaka as the ruler of Buganda. He was to exercise direct rule over the people of Buganda with the assistance of the Lukiiko in a manner approved by Her Majesty's Government.² The Kingdom was divided into twenty counties. Freehold land commonly known in Uganda as mailo land was introduced. The Kabaka received 350 square miles attached to his office and 150 square miles as a private citizen. To each of the posts of the Katikikiro (Prime Minister) Omwaniika (Minister of Finance) and Ogulamusi (Minister of Justice) was attached 16 square miles. 8 square miles were attached to the post of each of the twenty county chiefs. One thousand chiefs and private landowners were allocated estates of which they were already in possession and which were computed at an average of 8 square miles per individual.³ 1,500 square miles which were known as crown land were to be under the control of the Protectorate

¹ Low and Pratt, op.cit., D.A. Low, The Mind of Buganda op.cit., pp.37-40 and A.B. Mukwanya, Land Tenure in Buganda (Kampala: East African Studies No.1, East African Institute of Social Research, 1953, and distributed overseas by Kegan Paul, London).

² The Uganda Agreement, Article 6.

³ Article 15 of the Uganda Agreement.

Government. Low has observed:

The pragmatic and political nature of the settlement was underlined by a private agreement between Johnston and the three Regents that, once the Agreement itself was signed, they would receive an extra forty-five square miles between them and Apollo would receive, in addition, a hundred head of cattle.¹

These grants were a compensation for the abandonment of Buganda's claim to tribute from Busoga.

We should note that at the time of negotiating the Agreement, Daudi Chwa, the Kabaka, was a minor. Consequently, the task of negotiating the Agreement depended a lot on the three Regents who were Apollo Kagwa, a Protestant Katikkiro, Stanislas Mugwanya, a Roman Catholic joint Katikkiro and Zakaria Kisingiri, a prominent Protestant. We must add that before the 1900 Agreement was negotiated, there had been intense religious wars between Roman Catholics, Protestants and Muslims.² The Agreement facilitated the ascendancy of the Protestants under Kagwa's leadership. Walbourn writes:

... the settlement of 1900 established a tradition that the Kabaka and his first and third ministers should be Protestant, while the second minister should be Catholic.

¹ Low and Pratt, op.cit., p.184.

² For details see D.A.Low, Religion and Society in Buganda 1875-1900, (Kampala: East African Institute of Social Research, 1956).

of the twenty counties, ten should be administered by Protestant chiefs, eight by Catholics and two by Muslims. Partly owing to the British practice of using Ganda political agents to establish their authority in other parts of Uganda, partly, perhaps, because 'the British Administrative Grade is the fruit of the Reformation', partly, it may be, due to differences in the educational outlook of the two denominations, that pattern has been repeated over the greater part of the country.¹

What were the major consequences of the Agreement?

The Bakungu² gained a two-pronged hold over the peasants. In the first instance, the chiefs held bureaucratic and political power over the peasants by the virtue of their chiefly positions. Secondly, the peasants who occupied the land of the chiefs, had to pay the chiefs tribute. A new landed aristocracy was thus created. Wrigley has observed:

The aristocracy was still an open one, for membership could be acquired by purchase of land - and lost by its sale. But since the proceeds of land sales were to a large extent reinvested in education, the second and third generations have on the whole been able to preserve their position. Some families have come up, others have gone down - or even - out but the original

¹ F. Welbourn, Religion and Politics in Uganda (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1965), p. 7.

² In this Context it refers to the chiefs.

land owning families have not altogether lost their identity as a distinct social group.¹

Rowe informs us that in 'a burst of acquisitive enthusiasm', chiefs passed a law in Lukiiko in 1926 which required the peasant cultivators to give between 20% and 35% of their cotton crops to their landlords together with a tenth of all other produce.² It was the 1928 Buganda Busuulu and Nvujjo Law which rescued the peasants. It guaranteed the security of the peasants who held land under the customary arrangement. More will be said about this subject in our subsequent discussion.

Although Wrigley suggests that the Agreement established a permanent aristocracy,³ it must be noted that the Busuulu and Nvujjo Law and the process of selling land, had the effect of reducing the economic power of the chiefs over a period of years. Furthermore, the introduction of cotton and coffee had the effect of giving prosperity to hardworking peasants who found it easy to pay only Shs.10/- per year while they were reasonably safeguarded from eviction. Wrigley himself has observed that the payments which the peasants had to make to the landlords were heavy at the time

¹ C.C. Wrigley, "The changing Economic Structure of Buganda", in L.A. Fallers (ed.), op.cit. pp.31 - 32.

² J.A. Rowe, "Land and politics in Buganda, 1875-1955" Makerere Journal, 1964, p.9.

³ Wrigley, op.cit. p.31.

they were imposed but that later on they became small. He writes, "In the first place the general rise in incomes and the fall in the value of money have made the fixed due an almost negligible sum."¹ He adds that the measure was ultimately fatal to the landowners as a class because once they allowed peasants to occupy land, the landowners lost all effective control over it for ever, unless the occupier chose to vacate it.² Mair informs us that whereas in 1900 land was allocated to 3,700 people, by 1930, there were 30,000 registered owners of land.³ By 1967, land purchases and inheritance had increased the number of landowners to 112,000.⁴ These figures suggest that the process of land fragmentation and land ownership was increasing since 1900.

Second, the Agreement formalised differential treatment of Buganda, a phenomenon which tended to foster a superiority complex in Buganda and resentment outside Buganda. For example, Article 5 of the Agreement provided:

The laws made for the general governance of the Uganda Protectorate by Her Majesty's Government will be equally applicable to the Kingdom of Buganda, except in so far as

¹ C.C. Wrigley, "The changing Economic Structure of Buganda" in L.A. Fallers (ed.), The King's Men op.cit., p.43.

² Ibid., pp.43-44.

³ L. Mair, op.cit., p.170.

⁴ J.J. Jorgensen, Uganda: A Modern History (London: Croom Helm, 1981), p.91.

they may in any particular way conflict with the terms of this Agreement, in which case the terms of this Agreement will constitute a special exception in regard to the Kingdom of Buganda.

Third, the Baganda and the British held conflicting views about the importance of the Agreement. The Baganda regarded it as a charter which conferred on Buganda an autonomous and a special position, an interpretation over which the British had reservations. Furthermore, the Baganda held the view that the Agreement had been made between equals, another interpretation which conflicted with the British conception of the Agreement. We must elaborate upon these points. Low comments:

... it was natural for the Baganda to consider that their relationship was quasi-diplomatic. Moreover, given the concessions they had secured, the Agreement, equally naturally, appeared to the Baganda as in some sense at least an Agreement between equals.¹

The Baganda argued that they were never conquered by the British and that they freely invited them through their King Muteza I to protect and give 'light' to Buganda. This view was later on included in a memorandum which was sent to the Queen seeking termination of the British protection.²

¹ Low and Pratt, *op.cit.*, p.54.

² Apter, *op.cit.*, p.481. See also Apolo Nsubambi, "Federalism: Its rise and fall in Uganda", East Africa Journal December 1966, pp.10-11.

When S. Kulubya, a Treasurer in the Kabaka's Government, was opposing the East African Federation on behalf of Buganda in 1931, he said:

The Buganda Agreement is the very life blood of us as a nation... our one desire is to be left alone to carry on in the same way as we have been doing since the solemn promise which marked the signing of the Agreement.¹

On the other hand, Sir Harry Johnston, the British Commissioner who negotiated the Agreement with Buganda, believed that there was nothing in the nature of a solemn undertaking about the Agreement and that if the Baganda failed to rule themselves, then the Agreement would be scrapped and that the British would rule Buganda by direct intervention. Ibingira, a Lawyer who examined the Agreements which the British made with the Kings of Uganda, demonstrates that the Agreements lacked legal force. To use his own words:

It is beyond dispute therefore, that within Uganda and in British municipal law, these Agreements lacked the force of law and bound the British Crown only during its pleasure.²

Despite these observations, it must be noted that it was in the political interests of Britain to accord some serious attention to the Uganda Agreement because the Baganda and

¹ Evidence to the Joint Select Committee on East Africa, London, 1931, Vol.2, p.551.

² Ibingira, op.cit., pp.14-15.

the British needed each other especially during the early phase of the colonial penetration. For as already noted, the British used Baganda Agents and the Kiganda system of administration to penetrate other areas of Uganda. In return, the Baganda were accorded a position of administrative pre-eminence. Commenting on the Agreement Ingham has rightly said:

The weakness of the Agreement from a long term point of view, lay in the very completeness of the arrangements made for Buganda as a separate unit while at the same time making it a province of the Uganda Protectorate... Since there was no provision for Africans to take part in the Central Administration, there was a real danger of Buganda developing as a state within a state.¹

The seeds of the problem of integrating Buganda within Uganda can therefore be traced to the 1900 Agreement.

Lastly, the Agreement ignored the clan leaders known as Abataka who lost their traditional burial land (obutaka) as it was indiscriminately allocated to the chiefs. They fought vigorously to scrap the land settlement which undermined their traditional prestige. Mutibwa has observed that the clan leaders looked at the land settlement as a calculated manoeuvre to make the political chiefs usurp the Bataka's

¹ K. Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958), pp.91-92.

traditional place in the Kiganda society.¹ However, the British were not prepared to scrap the Agreement upon which they had secured the unwavering support of the Christian oligarchy led by Kagwa. Indeed, the British were now set on penetrating Buganda and the rest of Uganda through the assistance of the vigorous Christian oligarchy.

Buganda's economic pre-eminence

Having discussed the factors which contributed to Buganda's political and administrative hegemony, it is also necessary to discuss the factors which contributed to Buganda's economic pre-eminence. However, before we do so, we must point out that the retail and wholesale trade and the marketing and ginning of agricultural produce was dominated by Asians. They also controlled two large sugar estates and many small factories. The dominance of the Asians in the economic field aroused what Scott has called "the envy of the multitude".² The multitude were the Africans. And thus when we speak of Buganda's pre-eminence, we should bear in mind that while the Baganda were pre-eminent among their fellow Africans, the economy of the whole of Uganda

¹ P. Mutibwa, "British Imperial rule in Buganda: The beginning of a crisis in Buganda-British relations in the 1920's", a UESS paper, University of Dar-es-Salaam, December 20 - 22, 1976, pp.4-5.

² R. Scott, The Development of Trade Unions in Uganda (Kampala: East African Publishing House, 1966), p.5.

was otherwise increasingly dominated by Asians.¹

Buganda's economic supremacy can then be attributed to the following factors: First, as already noted, the Kingdom enjoys fertile land which is favourable to agriculture. Buganda's rainfall is reliable and well distributed throughout the year. The annual mean rainfall ranges from 45 to 55 inches. Buganda's main crop is matooke, plantains, a crop which once it is mature, yields fruit all the year round. Wrigley has observed:

The Baganda were thus set free from the precarious eking out of food supplies from one harvest to the next, from the laborious pounding of grain, from the exigencies of shifting cultivation and from the constant threat of famine which combined to make the life of most East African peoples so arduous and so meagre.²

The secure agriculture enabled the Baganda to have permanent settlements and to devote their energy to other activities. The second advantage of Buganda is related to her geographical centrality and it is well articulated by Fallers.

¹ For a discussion of the reasons which contributed to the Asian economic dominance consult D.P. Ghai (ed.), Portrait of a Minority-Asians in East Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1965) and G.P. Ingels, "Immigrant Influences upon the Development of policy in the Protectorate of Uganda 1900 - 1952, with particular Reference To the Role of the Legislative Council", Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1968. In 1972, Amin expelled the Asians from Uganda, a move which created a new economic situation in Uganda.

² Wrigley op.cit., p.17.

He says:

Buganda is also the core of the country in another and more contemporary sense. Buganda has contained both the capital and the commercial centre of the Protectorate and consequently the new political economic institutions which have grown up during the association with Great Britain have their locus in Buganda.¹

The economic consequence of the vital national institutions being located in Buganda was that they provided jobs to many Baganda. The Baganda thus enjoyed the double advantage of working in the city by commuting from their nearby homes where they grew their food. In contrast, the immigrants from other parts of Uganda, and from the neighbouring countries of Ruanda and Burundi, had to make lengthy journeys in order to look for employment in Buganda.² They had to rent expensive accommodation and buy food as well. The phenomenon of the migratory labour from the less developed parts of Uganda to Buganda, became a common feature of Uganda's economic life. Since the Baganda have received more education than other tribes and since the Baganda exhibited greater stability at their jobs than the immigrants who had to make frequent trips to their homes, the Baganda tended to occupy

¹ A. Fallers, "Ideology and Culture in Uganda Nationalism" American Anthropologist Vol.63, No.4, August 1961, p.678.

² For details, consult A. Richards, op.cit.

skilled jobs while the unskilled jobs were left to the immigrants. This phenomenon tended to inculcate into the Baganda a superiority complex. To use Mair's words, "... the Baganda have generally translated the old sense of superiority into the idea that skilled labour is the sphere of the Baganda and unskilled work that of other tribes".¹ Among the educated migratory labourers to Baganda and other parts of Uganda in the south, were men like Peter Oola and Otema Alimadi, both former King's African Rifles' men and Uganda National Congress pioneers in Acholi, and Charles Onyatta, Uganda National Congress pioneer in South West Nile. Ekan sums up well the advantages which the Baganda enjoyed because of their greater stability at work. He says:

Ganda constitute a third of the enumerated labour force, and perhaps a larger proportion still of the total working population in Kampala. Because of their greater stability they are at the apex of the occupational and wage structure. Much of the skilled and supervisory work is still done by Asians and Europeans, but amongst Africans it is the Ganda who provide most of the foremen, the clerks, the mechanics and the carpenters, and it is they who earn substantial wages whilst the immigrants -

¹ Mair, op.cit., p.11.

the 'foreigners' as the Ganda call them - take on the labouring work.¹

The third contributory factor to Buganda's economic pre-eminence is that cotton and coffee, the two major cash crops of Uganda, were first introduced in Buganda. Cotton was introduced in 1904 by Borup of the Uganda Company, first in Buganda and then in other parts of Uganda. It became the leading export crop. It was not until 1923 that cotton was introduced in the district of West Nile. Since, however, the introduction of cotton reduced labour movement to Buganda and the Eastern Province where the Protectorate Government was anxious to maintain adequate supply of labour, the Government refused to encourage a further extension of cotton growing in the West Nile until the labour problems in the 'more central districts became less acute'.² In the 1950's cotton was virtually replaced by coffee. Elkan writes:

In Buganda, where the rise of coffee was most spectacular, the area under coffee rose from 31,000 acres in 1939 to 203,000 acres in 1952, and is now estimated at over 300,000 acres.³

¹ W. Elkan, Migrants and Proletariats: Urban Labour In The Economic Development Of Uganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p.44. He wrongly refers to Baganda as Ganda.

² Ibid., pp.34-35.

³ W. Elkan, The Economic Development of Uganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p.41.

The impact of these cash crops was great on Buganda. They introduced a cash economy and prosperity to the Kingdom. While cotton ginning and coffee curing were dominated by the Asians and Europeans, those activities provided further employment activities in Buganda.

Lastly, the freehold land tenure system which was introduced in Buganda by the 1900 Uganda Agreement, conferred on Buganda additional advantages over other parts of Uganda. Other areas of Uganda basically retained the traditional land tenure system, a system which revolved around communal ownership of land. The Baganda were for example, able to borrow money against their land. The experts of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development observed:

As in most of Africa, the tenure arrangements for the rest of the land - outside of Buganda - are nearly entirely traditional in character and are gradually becoming a drag on the transformation of peasant cultivation into modern farming methods.¹

The Baganda were, however, so afraid of their land being taken or bought by Europeans and Asians, a situation which had taken place in the neighbouring Kenya, that restrictions were imposed on buying the land in Buganda. Consequently 'mailo' land could not be transferred to non-Africans except

¹ The International Bank for Reconstruction And Development: The Economic Development of Uganda (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1961), pp.13-14.

with the consent of the Governor and the Imkiike. Outside Buganda, land held as registered title by Africans could not be transferred to non-Africans without the Governor's consent. The East African Royal Commission which favoured individual land tenure, advocated the development of land by purchase or lease on the basis of 'willing buyer and willing seller'.¹

The factors which we have discussed fortified Buganda's economic pre-eminence in Uganda. We must point out that inter-dependence in Uganda created hostility instead of integration because it was dominated by Buganda. The major point to grasp here is that Buganda was so economically pre-eminent as we have shown that the chiefly traditionalists in Buganda felt that she could secede from the rest of Uganda, especially since other areas of Uganda resented her economic hegemony. Buganda's economic hegemony created what Durkheim calls mechanical solidarity. Under mechanical solidarity each part contains in itself 'all that social life consists of, it can go and carry it elsewhere'. Likewise, Buganda's economic pre-eminence fostered among the chiefly traditionalists who were leading Buganda, a sense of economic autarky and thus they felt that the Kingdom could exist by itself. On the other hand, other parts of Uganda and the Buganda nationalists felt that their economic

¹ The East Africa Royal Commission 1953 - 1955 Report
(London: Her Majesty's Report Stationary Office, 1961,
Cmd 9475), p.427.

existence was so interlinked with that of Buganda that the Kingdom could not be allowed to secede. What the deprived areas outside Buganda demanded was to re-distribute the resources more equitably in order to reduce what Gingyera-Pinyewa called the 'sad imbalance of economic opportunities between the North and the Southern parts of the Country.'¹ Buganda's economic pre-eminence created another disadvantage for Buganda. For whereas other areas of Uganda were forced for economic reasons to either migrate to Buganda or to visit it frequently, there was no immediate economic necessity for the Baganda to visit other areas of Uganda. Consequently, a number of leading Baganda tended to be ignorant of what was going on outside Buganda.² This ignorance was compounded by the absence of linguistic intelligibility between the people from the Northern part of Uganda and Baganda.³

¹ Gingyera-Pinyewa, *Issue...* op.cit., p.28.

² This generalization excludes Baganda evangelists and nationalists who visited other areas of Uganda. It also excludes the Baganda Agents who ventured to other areas of Uganda during the era of the colonial penetration.

³ For details on the point, see Apolo Nsubambi "Language Policy in Uganda: An Investigation Into Costs and Politics", Journal of African Affairs, Vol.70, No.278, January, 1971.

The Dundas reforms: reduce control and supervision of Buganda by the British Officials

Mutibwa has pointed out that the period between 1900 and 1925, witnessed the 'glorious period of Buganda - British relationship'.¹ The Christian oligarchy under the leadership of the forceful and shrewd Kaggwa utilized this period to consolidate their power and the autonomy of Buganda. However, by mid-1920s the British shifted their attitudes towards the old chiefs, a shift which was epitomized by the Kaggwa-Postlethwaite conflict which led to the resignation of Kaggwa. The new British young administrators did not have sentimental attachments to the 1900 Agreement and to the now old Christian oligarchy. The young administrators insisted on intervening more directly in the affairs of Buganda. For example, they screened the appointment of chiefs, a task which had hitherto been jealously exercised by the old Buganda oligarchy. The old generation was replaced by younger Buganda chiefs. Sharp misunderstandings and suspicions between the Buganda and the British marked the interventionist policy of the young British administrators in Buganda's affairs.² If this policy had been sustained,

¹ Mutibwa, op.cit., p.12.

² For more details about this period consult Mutibwa Ibid. Low and Pratt, op.cit., and E.M.K. Mulira, Troubled Uganda (Fabian Colonial Bureau Pamphlet, Series No.6, 1950). By interventionist we mean close supervision and control of Buganda's affairs by the British officials.

integrating Buganda into Uganda might have been easier because it would have reduced Buganda's sense of pride and autonomy. The interventionist policy was not, however, sustained partly because it strained the Buganda-British relations and brought the British too close to very complex Kiganda feuds. The leading Buganda rulers regarded the British intervention in the appointment of chiefs as a violation of Buganda's autonomy which was enshrined in the 1900 Agreement.¹ It was Sir Charles Dundas, the Governor of Uganda, 1940-4, who clearly reversed the interventionist policy. Low and Pratt have summarized Dundas' policy in these words:

Applying the canons of an unrevised theory of indirect rule to the Buganda scene, Sir Charles could not but disapprove of the supervision and control which administrative officers were exercising in Buganda. His view, in the judgement of the Commissioner investigating the 1945 riots, 'apparently was that British supervision was being given in a way which prevented the Buganda Government from developing self-reliance and proper self-government.' Moreover, in his view, it conflicted with the Agreement.²

In June 1944, he re-organised the Provincial Administration in Buganda by making the Resident and his staff become advisers. Later on in the year, he abolished the posts of

¹ For example, Kagwa strongly held this view.

² Low and Pratt, op.cit., pp.227-8.

the District Commissioners and the Assistant District Commissioners. They were replaced by Protectorate Agents who assumed purely Protectorate duties in nature and had nothing to do with the Buganda Government. In his speech to the Lukiiko, Dundas declared:

Accordingly I wish the Resident and his staff to confine themselves to advice and guidance, leaving inspection and control to your Governments and its Agents.¹

In the same speech, he said that in making the Resident become adviser and not a controller of Buganda's officials and that in removing the past situation under which the British Administration carried out detailed inspection of the work of chiefs, he was removing a system which was no longer necessary and which was not contemplated when the Agreement was concluded. It will be recalled that twenty years back Kagwa had unsuccessfully opposed increased expansion of central control of Buganda's affairs. Dundas' reforms tallied with what Kagwa had unsuccessfully struggled for.

ORIGINS OF BUGANDA'S SEPARATISM

The first cause of Buganda's separatism was that the colonial administration was characterized by the paucity of horizontal interactions between the different ethnic groups of Uganda. Sir Edward Mutesa, the Kabaka of Buganda, captures this point when he says:

¹ Low and Pratt, Ibid., p.279.

Buganda's relationship with
Uganda had never been import-
ant before. We had dealings
with the British and we had
friendly neighbours.¹

The major point to grasp here is that the colonial system of administration was characterised by vertical interaction between the districts, the basic units of local administration, and the colonial authorities. At the district level, the colonial administration was represented by the District Commissioner.² There was thus absence of effective horizontal interaction between the different ethnic groups of Uganda. Even when the Central Legislative Council was introduced in 1921, the Africans were not represented in it.

In 1947, Sir John Hall, the Governor of Uganda, belatedly realized the need to create a common nationality. He hoped to create the nationality through councils. The Provincial Councils were, however, not successful because by the time they were instituted in 1948, districts which in many ways coincided with ethnic groups,³ had acquired their own vested interests and identity. For example, the district of Busoga rejected participating in the Eastern Provincial Council. The major reason for Busoga's refusal

¹ Mutesa, op.cit., p.149: The emphasis is mine.

² For more details, consult Burke op.cit.

³ West Nile district was, for example, an exception to this fact because it included Lugbara, Kakwa and Alur tribes.

to do so was that the Basoga did not wish to dilute their autonomy by associating with the non-Basoga in the East whom they regarded as being less developed. The Basoga used to refer to the non-Basoga pejoratively as 'Bakedi'.¹ Mudoola observes:

The refusal (of the Basoga) to send members to the proposed Provincial Council in 1947 also reflected the cultural arrogance of the Basoga towards other peoples in the Eastern Province. In 1953, a decision was made to transfer the Provincial headquarters to Mbale and the Basoga Lukiko protested against this. They considered it as part of the Colonial moves to erode Basoga's 'Kitiibwa' by forcing her to "face East".²

The Basoga therefore requested to have direct relations with the Protectorate Government by making Basoga a Province. The Provincial Commissioner of the Eastern Province said that Basoga's refusal to participate in the Eastern Provincial Council was due to the chiefly class which feared that their personal interests would be damaged by the Council.³

¹ Interview with a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Makerere University, who comes from Basoga. Bakedi in this context refers to less 'developed' people.

² D.M. Mudoola, "Chiefs And Political Action: The Case of Basoga, 1900-1962", Ph.D. Thesis, Makerere University, 1974, pp.292-293. Kitiibwa means prestige or dignity.

³ See The Annual Report of the Eastern Province for 1948, p.37.

Basoga's refusal to participate in the Provincial Council was typical of what was going on in other areas of Uganda, whose districts had acquired vested interests in the allocation of resources. Wallis who examined local administrations in 1952, noted that the districts regarded themselves as the natural successors to the British authority. The districts wished the Protectorate Government to go so that they might become independent states.¹ It is pertinent to add that if the Provincial Councils had been fully accepted, they would have only joined the tribes of the Provinces. A higher body joining the Provinces would have been necessary. But the Legislative Council which would have performed this task was distrusted by the Africans. This was so because it was dominated by foreigners. Absence of effective horizontal interaction between Africans encouraged the Africans to be steeped in their local affairs at the expense of working together to form one nation.²

The second cause of Buganda's separatism is that her economic hegemony tended to foster habits and feelings of

¹ Report of Inquiry Into African Local Government in the Protectorate of Uganda (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1953) pp.13-16. It was also known as the Wallis Report.

² The conferences of the Prime Ministers and the Secretaries General which were started in 1958 through Buganda's initiative, were not successful because delegates to these conferences had to seek approval of their district or Kingdom legislatures concerning what position they would take. This fact again illustrates that district and Kingdom councils were the sources of political power. Even the meetings of the Kings could not afford to override what the councils strongly held. These meetings were not sponsored by the Colonial Government.

autarky among the chiefly traditionalists. For whereas other tribes were forced by practical necessity to come to Buganda in order to seek for employment and education, there was no functional and pressing necessity for the Baganda to go outside Buganda. Buganda's resources enabled it to absorb most of her elites right from the 1900 Agreement. In contrast, other areas of Uganda lacked adequate resources. They were therefore unable to attract most of their elites who subsequently sought political and economic satisfaction at the central level. Obote who was a member of the Lango district council, is a case in point. Low has described the prestige and power of Buganda's chiefly positions in the following words:

These positions presented a pinnacle of unusual power, influence, accessibility and autonomy, and the activities of those who held them were as a result always the subject of intense scrutiny by those with political interest.¹

What Low says about the power and influence of the chiefly positions of the Kabaka's Government, was even more evident after the departure of the British when the Kabaka's Government enjoyed more financial autonomy and resources. For example, the Katikikiro of Buganda used to earn more income than the Prime Minister of the whole of Uganda. Katikikiro

¹ Low, Buganda in Modern... op.cit., p.175.

Kintu revealed to the writer that he used to get about four thousand shillings per month from the Bugulu and Nvujjo¹ which were collected from the 16 square miles attached to his post. His monthly salary was 4,333/- shillings. He used to get a pension of 1700/- shillings per month because he had worked as a civil servant before he became Katikkiro.² And thus the Katikkiro's total monthly earnings used to revolve around 10,033/- shillings.³ These earnings exclude frequent presents which he used to get from his admirers. The writer recalls that whenever an officer of the Kabaka's Government toured Buganda, he used to get chickens, Matooke (plantain) and goats as presents. The earnings of the Katikkiro were greater than that of the Prime Minister of the whole of Uganda whose salary was Shs.7,000/- per month.

And so Buganda's economic and political capacity to absorb its elites partly explains a paradoxical situation under which the Baganda who were the most privileged and educated people in Uganda, lost leadership at the central level to the non-Baganda elites. The relative incapacity of the areas outside Buganda to absorb their elites spurred

¹ Bugulu means ground rent and Nvujjo is tribute.

² He held the following posts: Correspondence clerk in the District Commissioner's (D.C.) office, Head Clerk in the D.C.'s office, Deputy county chief at Singo and Kyaggwe counties, county chief Singo, Assistant Katikkiro in 1942 and Katikkiro from 1955 to 1964.

³ For the salaries of other officials, see Kabaka's Government Draft Estimates 1961/62, 1962/63 and 1963/64.

the non-Baganda elites to seek for careers at the central level. We should also note that there were some highly qualified Baganda working in the Central Civil Service who did not wish to be posted to the remote and underdeveloped areas of Uganda such as Karamoja. This fact provided an additional incentive to some civil servants to work in the Buganda civil service rather than in the Central Civil Service. For example, the writer in his capacity as an Establishment Officer, recruited two specialist surgeons from the Central Civil Service, who had refused to be posted to the remote parts of Uganda.¹ We must add that the desire to work at Kampala, the city of Uganda, and the neighbouring developed areas, was not confined to the Baganda. The Head of the Central Civil Service informed the writer that he came across many civil servants who did not wish to be posted to the remote areas of Uganda even where they were born because these areas lacked modern facilities.² Such people preferred to work in the institutions of Uganda which were located at Kampala, the nerve centre of the modern facilities. The phenomenon of the civil servants wishing to work in the city and the neighbouring areas, tended to work in favour of the Buganda Government which was geographically located in the centre of Uganda. The thrust of our argument is that

¹ They requested to remain anonymous.

² Interview with the Head of the Central Civil Service.

Buganda's economic, administrative and political pre-eminence and centrality, tended to foster feelings and habits of autarky and separatism among the chiefly traditionalists in Buganda instead of enhancing inter-dependence and national integration.

The third cause of Buganda's separatism is closely linked to the first one. The chiefly traditionalists were afraid that the less privileged non-Buganda might, with the assistance of some alienated and educated Buganda nationalists, use their numerical strength to eliminate Buganda's Monarchy, Lukiiko and the Kingdom's special position.¹

There are two aspects of this fear which must be clarified.

The first one concerns envy of Buganda's special and privileged position regardless of whether or not she was a Monarchy. The second one concerns Buganda's distrust of the areas which did not have Monarchs. The envy which Buganda's special position and success provoked, has been well documented as we must now demonstrate. Ogingere-Pinywa who comes from the Northwest of Uganda, has written that Buganda's economic and educational pre-eminence "gave rise to a degree of covetousness that did not help to blur

¹ This fear was strongly voiced by the twenty county chiefs, three Katikkiros and thirty six members of the Lukiiko who were interviewed.

the line dividing Buganda and the Baganda from the rest."¹ Low has suggested that Buganda's success generated a profound ambivalence towards the Kingdom and an ambivalence which "came to express itself particularly in envy - that jealous-like emotion which, while anxious to emulate, is resentful of any claims to superiority."² Opua from Acholi warned that if Buganda's privileged position was not reduced, the deprived northerners who dominated the army, might use it to cut down Buganda to size after the departure of the British. He declared in the Acholi district council:

We feel that Government is deliberately trying to widen the gulf between Buganda and the rest of the Protectorate... I feel that equal opportunities should be given to all... so that Mukasa and Otin may work together as equal partners when time comes. Let us not make the mistake that they have made in the Sudan... What is taking place in the Sudan is not a mutiny but a civil war. Might I give the warning that the same state of affairs is likely to happen in Uganda when the British Government decides to retire. A dissatisfied North

¹ Ogingyera-Pinyowa, "Some Dimensions of Pre-Independence politics in Uganda, 1952-62, A Case study based on the Catholic Church And Politics in Northern Uganda in the Decade 1952-1962", Ph.D. Thesis, University of Chicago, March 1972, p.27. Cf. Hopkins, op.cit., pp.251-252.

² Low, Buganda in Modern... op.cit., pp.230-231.

plus Teso might prove too tough unless handled with care. We form the majority in the army and the police forces, and would prove a nuisance. Now, I suggest, is the time to remedy our past mistakes.¹

This quotation is important because it forecast the use of naked force in an attempt to equalise the distribution of scarce resources between Buganda and the rest of Uganda.

This problem caused a confrontation between Buganda and the Central Government in 1966 and Buganda was cut down to size through the use of force. Magezi from Bunyoro complained in the Central Legislature that the emphasis in the field of development was concentrated on Buganda. To use his words:

I am very worried that so many upcountry friends or colleagues on this side of the House might be being driven back by tribal sentiments... So much emphasis is being put or placed on the development of one part of the whole Protectorate to be the advance-guard, which I believe to be wrong.²

Babiha from Toro complained in the Central Legislature that Buganda was favoured by the British in the field of education. He pointed out that in the past seven years, fifty-six

¹ Minutes of the Asholi district council, December 1956, pp.5-7.

² Proceedings of the Legislative Council, January 11, 1956, p.78.

overseas scholarships had been given to Buganda and that the non-Buganda were only given thirty four.¹

These examples clearly show that there was a desire on the part of the non-Buganda to reduce Buganda's hegemony and to establish parity of treatment between Buganda and other areas of Uganda. The major point to grasp for our discussion is that regardless of whether or not the feelings of the non-Buganda were justified, they had the consequence of making the chiefly traditionalists in Buganda seek separatist methods of preserving Buganda's hegemony. The traditionalists had noted that even people like Babiha and Nagesi who came from the Kingdoms like Buganda, shared with the people from the non-Kingdom areas, the desire to reduce Buganda's hegemony.

The chiefly traditionalists were also apprehensive that the non-centralised tribes were hostile to the institution of Monarchy.² At this juncture we must point out that the hostility which some non-Buganda displayed towards the Kabaka of Buganda was partly caused by the fact that some Buganda injudiciously made statements which irritated the non-Buganda. For example, J. Kiwanuka wrote in the Uganda Express that Mutesa's birthday which fell on November 19,

¹ Proceedings of the Legislative Council April 13, 1954, p.3. See also June 16, 1954, p.39.

² This view was strongly expressed by 30 members of the Lukiiko, 3 Katikkiros and ten Ministers in the Kabaka's Government.

should be observed as a public holiday not only in Buganda, but throughout the Protectorate because it was the most important day of the year in Uganda. Nekyon from Lango, a non-centralized tribe, retorted:

I think Mr. Kiwamuka mistakes Uganda for Buganda. If Mr. Kiwamuka thinks there is a King of Uganda as a whole he is causing a worse ill-feeling than the Protectorate Government does.¹

Nekyon's statement inter alia warned that the idea of 'Monarchizing' the whole of Uganda whose major parts were republicans, caused a worse ill-feeling than the actions of the Colonial Government.

Richards states that there was cultural intolerance between the monarchical and the non-centralized areas of Uganda. She notes that when, for example, the Baganda knelt before their Kabaka and his chiefs, a practice which is a traditional way of according respect to them, the non-centralized tribes accused the Baganda of 'cradling on their bellies in front of their chiefs from dawn to dusk'.² What is important for our discussion is that the chiefly traditionalists of Buganda believed that the cultural intolerance and ignorance which was exhibited by the non-centralized tribes towards Monarchy, would spur them to abolish the

¹ Uganda Herald November 26, 1953. The emphasis is mine.

² A. Richards, The Multicultural States of East Africa (London: McGill - Queen's University Press, 1969), pp. 12-13.

institution. The fears of the traditionalists were aggravated by the fact that they suspected that many of the educated Baganda nationalists were not totally committed to the preservation of the Monarchy.¹ This fear partly explains why the traditionalists took political measures to exclude the most educated Baganda from holding key positions in Buganda after the return of the Kabaka from the deportation in 1955.

CONCRETE MANIFESTATIONS OF BUGANDA'S SEPARATISM
AND QUEST FOR AUTONOMY

When the Central Legislature was introduced in 1921, instead of seeking for representation in it, Buganda sought for assurances from Britain that it would not undermine Buganda's Agreement and her special position. In his letter of March 12, 1921, Daudi Chwa, the Kabaka of Buganda, expressed concern about the extent of the legislative power of the Central Legislature. He wondered whether or not the interests of Buganda and her special position which was enshrined in the 1900 Agreement, would not be relegated to the background. Ten years later, the same concern was expressed by S. Kulubya, the leading Buganda's delegate to the Joint Select Committee on closer Union in 1931. When

¹ For example, one county chief said in the Lukiiko in 1957 that the educated people were so greedy about holding key posts both in Buganda and at the central level that they were even capable of sacrificing the Kabakaship in order to attain this goal.

asked why the Baganda did not want representation on the Legislative Council, he replied:

If we get a representative on the Legislative Council it is quite possible, say, with one or two representatives that he will be outvoted then by the majority and when he has been outvoted in that way it will be very difficult for us to open the questions because we have our representative there. So if you leave it as it is we have every chance of complaining on anything that might be passed by the Legislative Council and we can always approach the Secretary of State if nothing is altered.¹

In 1950, the Lukiiko refused to nominate one of its members to participate in the Legislative Council on the grounds that the Council was not contained in the 1900 Agreement.

Buganda spearheaded opposing the proposed East African Federation in 1953. On June 30, 1953, Lyttleton, the British Colonial Secretary, made a speech in Britain in which he spoke of the economic and political advantages which would be gained if there was a federation in East Africa. He called for a consideration of the federation. Buganda opposed the federation because its autonomy and special position which were enshrined in the 1900 Agreement, were likely to be ignored in an East African Federation.

¹ D. Rothchild (ed.), Politics of Integration (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), pp.21-22.

The Buganda Lukiiko believed that the interests of the white settlers who were controlling Kenya, were likely to override the interests of the Africans and Buganda's special position. The Kabaka's Government had successfully opposed the proposed federation in 1920s. In his letter of October 29, 1927, to Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the Chairman of the East African Commission, the Kabaka had declared:

It is clear... that if this proposed federation of the British East African dependencies is effected, the importance of Buganda will necessarily and proportionately be diminished... Again the present status of Buganda, although not intentionally destroyed, will necessarily be lost sight of in view of the vast numbers of the various native tribes with their relative importance that will be included in the proposed federation... it is feared that it will no longer be possible to accord special consideration to the interests of the Buganda and the constitution of their Kingdom as has hitherto been done by His Majesty's Government of the Uganda Protectorate...¹

The Kabaka added that he was, however, not opposed to the amalgamation of certain public services such as postal and medical services between Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. This statement was made on condition that the amalgamation of the services would not impair the interests of the native administration of the three countries.

¹ Ibid., p.21.

Chief Y. Zirabamusale of Busoga and S. Kulubya of Buganda had strongly resisted the federation before a British Joint Select Committee on closer union in East Africa of 1931. Zirabamusale speaking on behalf of Busoga and the Eastern Province declared before the committee:

We in Busoga fear that if Uganda Protectorate is joined together with Kenya and Tanganyika, European settlers may come into Busoga and take away our land from us.¹

The reaction of Buganda to the proposed federation in 1953 was sharp. The Kabaka of Buganda told the Governor of Uganda in his letters of August 6, 1953, that the Baganda had noted that the Central African Federation had just been imposed upon the unwilling African majority.² There was prolonged correspondence between the Kabaka's Government, the Governor of Uganda and the Colonial Secretary. The upshot of the matter was that Buganda demanded that her affairs be transferred from the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office and that a plan be devised to give the Kingdom independence. The two demands were rejected by the British Government.

The demand for independence for Buganda alone, illustrates clearly that if the chiefly traditionalists were unable to preserve Buganda's special position in a united

¹ Ibid., p.41.

² Ibid., p.58.

Uganda, they were ready to secede from the country. In fact, Sir Edward's earlier point that Buganda's relationship with the rest of Uganda had never been important, is verified by Buganda's demand that she be given independence alone. According to the Katikkiro at this time, the Baganda felt that if they demanded independence for the whole of Uganda, they would be told by their neighbours that they had no mandate to speak for the whole of Uganda.¹ While this view cannot be entirely disregarded, the interviews which the writer carried out in Buganda and outside Buganda, suggest that the absence of horizontal interaction between the various tribes of Uganda, meant that there was absence of a Ugandawide feeling. Each tribe tended to fend for itself regardless of the consequences of its actions to the rest of Uganda. In this sense, the British did not foster territorial nationality. The chiefly traditionalists who had access to vertical communications with the Governor and the Colonial Secretary, resolved to press for Buganda's interests.

The deportation of the Kabaka and its consequences

After visiting London for consultation with the Secretary of State, Sir Andrew Cohen returned to Uganda and demanded that the Kabaka must agree that he would not oppose the policy of the Protectorate Government in the Lukiiko and

¹ Interview with the Katikkiro. The details behind the delegation to the Secretary.

² The details can be obtained from the first three volumes of the Lukiiko.

that the Kabaka would undertake to submit names of Buganda members for appointment to the Legislative Council. The Kabaka rejected these demands and Her Majesty's Government withdrew its recognition from the Kabaka on November 30, 1953. He was deported from Uganda, a move which stunned Buganda and other parts of Uganda.¹ Buganda sent a delegation to Britain consisting of M. Malira, a former teacher at King's College Budo and a member of the Lukiiko, A. Kironde, a lawyer, T. Makumbi, a Headmaster and M. Muganyizi, Omulamuzi.² The delegation was to press for the return of the Kabaka. Meanwhile the legality of the deportation was contested in the High Court of Uganda. The Chief Justice ruled that the withdrawal was not a justifiable issue and that in this matter the Crown could be and was the judge of its own case. He, however, added that the withdrawal of recognition under Article 6 of the Agreement was an error.³ On hearing the part dealing with the error, a number of Baganda rushed into the streets of Kampala shouting that the Kabaka had won the case and that the Governor had no authority (obuyinsa) to deport the Kabaka. There can be no doubt that the error undermined the authority of the Protectorate Government before the eyes of the Baganda.

¹ For details see Kivuna, op.cit., especially Chapters 3 and 4 and Low and Pratt, op.cit., pp.330-332.

² Mr. A.K. Sempa, Secretary to the Lukiiko joined the delegation as its Secretary.

³ The details can be obtained from Low and Pratt op.cit., pp.342-343.

A committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Keith Hancock was set up to consider the reorganisation of Buganda. This committee consisted of some of the best educated Buganda. These included: Y. Lule, a Lecturer at Makerere University, E. Mulira, Dr. E. Kalibbala who was residing in New York, Omulamusi Mugwanya, a Bishop and two priests. The Lukiiko set up a sub-committee under the Chairmanship of Owasasa Kintu to examine the recommendations of the Hancock Report after which they were accepted by the Lukiiko. The major recommendations of the Hancock committee were that the Kabaka should become a constitutional Monarch, the Ministers should be responsible to the Lukiiko and not to the Kabaka and that an Appointments Board be set up. The Kabaka returned on October 17, 1955, and the 1900 Agreement was replaced by the 1955 Agreement which conferred more autonomy on Buganda.

What were the major consequences of the deportation? First, the Kabaka returned as a victorious nationalist who had successfully defied the hitherto invincible 'whitemen'. Although he was formally declared to be a constitutional Monarch, he became more powerful politically than he had been before his deportation. He now assumed the political mantle of a martyr, a posture which greatly enhanced his influence. He proceeded to use this influence openly to shape the political destiny of Buganda with the assistance

of the chiefly traditionalists who used systematic political tactics to exclude the educated Baganda from sharing the key political positions in Buganda. While the Kabaka used his great influence to shape the political destiny of Buganda, he was at the same time shielded from the consequences of his political actions by the virtue of being regarded as a constitutional Monarch.

Second, a ministerial Government was introduced in Buganda. The Katikkiro was to be elected by the Lukiiko and five Ministers were to be selected by him from a list of 15 people chosen by the Lukiiko. Third, direct elections were to be introduced to the Lukiiko which was to consist of a Speaker, 6 Ministers, 6 nominees of the Kabaka, 20 county chiefs (ex-officio members) and 60 representative members. The total membership was thus 93. Fourth, an Appointments Board chosen by the Kabaka to appoint chiefs and other administrative officers of the Buganda Government was set up. Fifth, representation of Buganda in the Central Legislature was accepted in Buganda. Sixth, the Cabinet of Buganda which used to consist of the Katikkiro, Omwanika, and Omulamusi was increased to six posts. The new posts were Health, Education and Natural Resources. At the central level, a ministerial system of Government was also started. Membership of the Central Legislature was increased from 56 to 60 of whom 30 were Africans.

Was Buganda integrated into Uganda by the 1955 formula? The acceptance of Buganda to participate in the Central Legislature was a significant step towards linking the Kingdom to the rest of Uganda. However, the chiefly traditionalists who took the view that Buganda could best safeguard her autonomy and Monarchy by adopting a separatist approach, managed to discredit the educated Buganda nationalists who were struggling to link Buganda to the rest of Uganda. The chiefly traditionalists argued that they were blackmailed to accept participating in the Central Legislature by making the participation conditional to the return of the Kabaka from Britain. After the return of the Kabaka, Buganda disengaged from participating in the Central Legislature.

From 1955 up to the time of independence, the chiefly traditionalists monopolized the key posts in Buganda and they systematically and successfully excluded the educated Buganda nationalists from occupying key positions in Buganda. In addition, the traditionalists sought to preserve Buganda's autonomy and to exclude the Kingdom from participating in the 'distrusted' central institutions especially the Central Legislature. At the same time, the Roman Catholics in Buganda attempted to challenge the Protestant hegemony. These struggles complicated integrating Buganda into Uganda.

We must discuss these points beginning with the exclusion of the educated Baganda nationalists from holding key political positions in Baganda. We noted that when the Kabaka was deported, the responsibility of securing his return was thrust upon the educated Baganda who had the academic credentials and contacts to resort to litigation and persuade the British to reverse the deportation of the Kabaka. Following the return of the Kabaka, the chiefly traditionalists made systematic attempts to monopolise political power at Mengo¹ and to exclude the educated Baganda nationalists from sharing power. Ibingira writes:

They (the chiefs) now turned on the politicians in order to liquidate them. E.M.K. Mulira, President of the Progressive Party, was prevented from attending the Lukiiko. A fictitious charge was levelled against J.W. Kiwanuka, one of the leading men of the U.N.C., for not only insulting the Kabaka but having plotted to assassinate him. M. Mugwanya, the President of the Democratic Party, was prevented personally by the Kabaka from taking a seat in the Lukiiko which he had won at a by-election.²

Ibingira's statements are basically correct but he does not explain important details surrounding the struggle for power between the chiefly traditionalists and the Baganda nationalists. We must explain the struggle by clarifying the

¹ The seat of the Kabaka's Government.

² Ibingira, op.cit., p.122.

exclusion of Mulira from the Lukiiko.¹ Mulira moved a motion in the Lukiiko calling for the abolition of the system under which people were indirectly elected to the Lukiiko at the Parish and the county levels. He had noted that at the parish and county levels, the chiefly traditionalists used to influence the election of the people to the Lukiiko by virtually instructing the ignorant masses in their parishes and counties not to vote for the people whom the chiefs disliked. Mulira's suggestion was that people should stand in a constituency from which they should be elected directly to the Lukiiko without going through 'sub-elections' at the parish and county levels. While what Mulira was proposing was necessary for the political democratization of Buganda, it threatened to reduce the influence of the chiefs. The chiefs also feared that this was a prelude to further erosion of their influence which they derived by being ex-officio members of the Lukiiko. Mulira was angered and disappointed by two things. Firstly, the Speaker ruled that it was not necessary for him to summarise the points which he had made when he was given an opportunity to introduce his motion. Secondly, although it appeared that he had convinced the majority of the people to accept his case, his motion was

¹ The information used in this discussion, was obtained from the following people: E.M. Mulira, E. Kitayimbwa, J. Kiwanuka, W. Masasi, A.D. Lubowa, S. Kalule who was Speaker of the Lukiiko, S. Mugwanya and E. Nutesa, the Kabaka of Buganda.

overwhelmingly rejected. This defeat suggested to him and to a number of educated Baganda nationalists that the chiefly traditionalists were not prepared to accept political reforms which were likely to reduce their influence.

In disgust, Mulira walked out of the Lukiiko. Among the people who sympathized with him and walked out of the Lukiiko, were Joseph Kiwanuka, the Editor and proprietor of Uganda Post and Uganda Express; A.D. Lubowa, the Editor of Uganda Eyogera and Ndugga Musazi, a relative of I.K. Musazi, the leader of the Uganda National Congress, the first nationalist party which was started in 1952. Mulira was expelled from the Lukiiko for walking out of it because his action was construed to be an insult to the Kabaka who was the head of all the Kiganda institutions. Lubowa, Musazi and Kiwanuka agreed to pay a fine of Shs.100/= each. Mulira eventually appealed to the High Court of Uganda against his expulsion. However, before his case was heard, A. Kimitu, a taxi-driver, asked him during a rally at Bwayise why he had appealed to the High Court and not the Kabaka. Mulira replied, "Kabaka yakyibwa mu luyogaano lwe by'obufusi". In effect Mulira answered that the Kabaka was a constitutional Monarch and that it was improper to involve him in political matters. Mulira was accused of insulting the Kabaka. He was further accused of saying that the Kabaka had no authority in his Kingdom. Mulira was convicted in a court at Nabweru and was

initially imprisoned. However, he appealed to the Buganda's Principal Court and he won the case concerning his statement that the Kabaka was a constitutional Monarch. The Buganda Principal Court, however, ruled that his dismissal from the Lukiiko and the termination of his membership were valid. On February 23, 1959, Justice Lyon of the Uganda Court, ruled that Mulira was still a member of the Lukiiko. The case was described in the Court as 'an internal squabble and a mere storm in a tea cup.'¹ The Judge added that the appeal was mainly of academic interest only and that its effect would be to enable Mulira to get certain allowances.

The charges which the chiefly traditionalists levelled against Mulira had the effect of frustrating him and of damaging his influence on the masses. This was so because the charges included the devastating allegation of insulting the revered Kabaka and of undermining his authority. Since the case against Mulira's expulsion took three years before it was actually resolved, he was excluded from attending the Lukiiko deliberations. By the time the case was resolved, it was time for new elections to the Lukiiko and the accusations levelled against him were so serious that he was defeated in the elections. The educated Baganda nationalists like B. Kiwanuka, were provoked by this case. Kiwanuka even volunteered to be Mulira's lawyer without charging him a single cent.

¹ Uganda Argus, February 26, 1959, p.5.

While the political struggle between the educated Baganda nationalists and the chiefly traditionalists was taking place, a religious-political conflict between the Roman Catholics and the Baganda Protestant Establishment emerged in the open. After the signing of the 1955 Agreement, there was to be elections of a new Government. Three candidates stood for the Katikikiroship: P.N. Kavuma, a Protestant, and an outgoing holder of the post, M. Kintu, a Protestant, who had played a prominent role in enabling the Baganda to accept the slightly amended Hancock's proposals and S. Mugwanya a grandson of Stanislas Mugwanya, a leader of the Roman Catholics from 1889 to 1921. According to three Protestant members of the Lukiiko and one Katikikiro, the Kabaka played an active role in preventing Mugwanya from winning the contest by inter alia sending a delegate from Britain who told the members of the Lukiiko that Mugwanya had deserted the delegation which he had led in order to secure the return of the Kabaka. Kavuma stood down and Kintu won the contest. Mutesa, the Kabaka of Baganda, Omuwanika Sempa and Katikikiro Kintu, refuted the allegation when they were interviewed by the author. They asserted that the contest for the Katikikiroship was an outright political contest which was won by Kintu. However, they pointed out that while the delegation of which Mugwanya was the leader

was still struggling to secure the Kabaka's return, Mugwanya suddenly 'deserted' it despite the Kabaka's personal plea that he should not go back to Uganda. Mugwanya accepts that he left the delegation in Britain. However, he maintains that he left the delegation in Britain because he was satisfied that it had presented its case to the British and that any more prolonged stay in Britain was not likely to make the British reverse their decision. An episode happened a year later in 1956 which suggested that there were misunderstandings between the Kabaka and Mugwanya. This episode alienated a number of Roman Catholics. Welbourn writes:

The stage was set for political action on a specifically Catholic basis. In 1956 Mugwanya, having failed to secure election as Katikikiro, was elected as a member of the Lukiiko for Mawokota. The Kabaka refused to approve the election on the technical grounds that Mugwanya was a member of the East African Central Legislative Assembly. This was further evidence for Catholics, if they required any, that they were being persecuted. In the meantime the Democratic Party had been formed, Mugwanya becoming its first President-General.¹

Two points stand out from the interviews which the author carried out with the leading Roman Catholic politicians such as B. Kiwanuka, the subsequent leader of the D.P., A.D. Lubowa, a former Minister in the Kabaka's Government and

¹ Welbourn, op.cit., p.18. The emphasis is mine.

Mugwanya himself. Leading Protestant leaders such as Kintu, Sempa, Mulira and Muslims such as Tomusanga, were also interviewed about this matter. The first one was that whatever the motives of Mugwanya's departure from Britain while the delegation was still pressing on with their case, it angered the Kabaka and surprised members of the delegation who remained in Britain.¹ Unfortunately, a confrontation between the Kabaka and Mugwanya, acquired religious dimensions since they were both leading personalities in the two religious camps. Second, when Mugwanya contested the Katikkiroship, a post which had been traditionally monopolised by the Protestants, he excited their desire to preserve their hegemony. This was more so because Mugwanya appeared to be likely to win the contest. Kavuma and Kintu, the two Protestants, were going to split the votes of the Protestants. It is pertinent to note that there were more Roman Catholics in Buganda than Protestants. Walbourn reveals that 35% of the population of the Kingdom were Catholics, 28% Protestants and 14 per cent Muslims, and that the six Ministries in the Kingdom were allocated in the proportion 1:4:1 while county chieftainships remained 8:10:2.² Although B. Kiwanuka and many leading Roman Catholics denied that the DP was a Catholic Party, it is hard to believe that a party which was

¹ They were all interviewed.

² Walbourn, op.cit., p.17.

led by Mugwanya, a leading Roman Catholic who had in effect unsuccessfully challenged the Protestant hegemony, could avoid being concerned with alleviating the disadvantaged position of the Roman Catholics. Ginyera who is a Roman Catholic writes that following Mugwanya's 'audacity' in 1955 to seek the post of Katikikiroship which was traditionally a Protestant preserve, a party was expressly created to articulate the Catholic intolerance of the discrimination against the Catholics in the allocation of public offices.¹ He adds:

... the stage was set for Catholics to pay attention to the matter all over the country. Since the Party formed had a national scope, the Catholic Church as presented in the Northern Region took up the matter very seriously.²

Low writes:

It (DP) was almost exclusively Roman Catholic in origin inspiration and membership, and at first sight would appear to have been the natural opposition to the largely Protestant Progressive Party.³

How is the conflict between the Protestant chiefly traditionalists and the Roman Catholic politicians related to the issue of integrating Buganda into Uganda? The alienated Baganda Roman Catholics sought for a national

¹ Ginyera-Pinyowa, Issues In... op.cit., p.62.

² Ibid., p.62. See also Welbourn, op.cit., pp.18-19.

³ Low, Buganda in... op.cit., p.183.

platform which would eventually give them the capacity to control the whole of Uganda. B. Kiwanuka, the first Prime Minister of Uganda, is a case in point. Religious divisions were now providing cross-cutting loyalties, loyalties which went beyond ethnic barriers. It is these religious cross-cutting loyalties which partly explain why the Baganda Protestant chiefly traditionalists eventually rejected Kiwanuka, their fellow Uganda who was a Roman Catholic. The traditionalists instead allied themselves with Obote, a Langi, who is a Protestant. But the religious cross-cutting loyalties were divisive because they only united people of

the same religion and thus instead of fostering the unity of the entire country, they only united parts of Uganda on religious grounds.

While the institution of the Kabakaship was in some respects associated with the hegemony of the Protestants, it possessed some over-arching characteristics which tended to persuade many Roman Catholics to support it instead of resent it. For example, the Kabaka was Sabataka, the chief of all clans. Every Uganda belongs to a clan. The Kabaka was therefore interlinked to the Baganda through the clan system of which he was the Head. Every clan performed special functions to the Kabaka. For instance, the Mboyo clan were his carriers (abakongozzi) and the Mkina clan formally installed the Kabaka. Furthermore, the Kabaka belonged to

his mother's totemic clan, a matrilineal practice which was different from the universal patrilineal clan system in Buganda. The matrilineal royal system served the over-arching purpose of giving every clan a chance to produce a Kabaka.¹ If the Kabaka had followed the patrilineal practice like the Kings of Ankole, Toro and Bunyoro, only one clan would have monopolised his office.² The over-arching characteristics of the monarchy tended to embrace what was otherwise a divided tribe along religious grounds. This fact partly explains why the Roman Catholics deserted the DP and voted for the Kabaka Yekka Movement in 1962.

What we have so far discussed shows that Buganda was not politically homogeneous and that there were several political groups in Buganda which could be mobilised for national integration. For the sake of clarity, we must state them as follows: The first group consisted of the chiefly Protestant traditionalists who wielded power, especially after 1955, and who became increasingly convinced that safeguarding Buganda's interests lay in adopting separatist methods. The second group consisted of the alienated Baganda nationalists like B. Kiwanuka, who sought to forge friendly links with the non-Baganda. For example, when

¹ For more information read S. Kiwanuka, A History of Buganda: From the Foundation of the Kingdom to 1900 (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1971).

² On Ankole, read S. Karugire, A History of the Kingdom of Nkore in Western Uganda (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 72-100.

Kiwamuka became the Prime Minister of Uganda, he went to the extent of announcing in Fort Portal, the major city of the Kingdom of Toro, that he would not advise the Governor of Uganda to sign the writ for the elections of 1962 until the Kingdoms of Toro, Bunyoro and Ankole, were accorded a federal status like Buganda.¹ Buganda denounced Kiwamuka's statement and the problem was solved when the Governor used special powers from London and ordered that the election arrangements should go ahead. There were also frustrated Baganda nationalists like Mulira, who believed in a Constitutional Monarchy but who, like Kiwamuka, sought for a national platform.

There were Roman Catholics like J.P. Musoke, who allied themselves fully with the Protestant chiefly traditionalists. This was so because on balance, the institution of the Kabakaship with which the Protestant chiefly traditionalists had allied, had captured their commitment. There were workers and peasants² who did not wield much political power because the Lukiiko was not substantially democratically elected. The chiefly traditionalists were able to influence the peasants and the workers inter alia because of their bureaucratic chiefly positions and because they were supported

¹ Uganda Argus, March, 20, 1962.

² These groups can, of course, be subdivided. However, this exercise would be largely academic in this instance because politics was squarely dominated by the chiefly traditionalists. For details on social mobility in Buganda, read Fallers, op.cit., pp.158-211.

by the Kabaka who was widely venerated in Buganda. It should, however, be noted that a person of poor origins like Sir Apolle Kagwa could attain the highest position of Katikkiro if he possessed merit. The mobility within the Kiganda society provided it with a higher potential for social integration than the societies which were fraught with caste and other rigid social divisions.

The chiefly traditionalists reject political parties and they demand for the independence of Buganda

In 1958, the Lukiiko unanimously requested the Kabaka to make a formal approach to the Queen to end the 1894 and all subsequent Agreements. The memorandum which amounted to demanding political independence for Buganda alone, was drafted by a five-man committee which was led by A.K. Sempa, the Minister of Health and Works. In the same year, the Lukiiko banned political parties and refused to participate in the elections to the Central Legislature. There were four reasons why the chiefly traditionalists rejected the parties. The parties were suspected of flirting with Communism, an ideology which was against the existence of Monarchy, and yet Monarchy in Buganda was the cornerstone of the Kingdom's existence. James Lutaya, the county chief of Singo, expressed concern in the Lukiiko about Communism which was being spread by political parties.¹ Katikkiro Kintu endorsed Lutaya's

¹ Uganda Argus, December 16, 1958, p.1. He confirmed these views when he was interviewed by the author.

fears and pointed out that the Government had once confiscated a politician's passport because he was intending to take part in a Communist inspired Conference.¹ In particular, the Uganda National Congress which had an office in Cairo, was highly suspected for being infiltrated with Communism. The Roman Catholic Church in the Northern Uganda which was also waging a serious war against Communism, associated the UNC and the Progressive Party with Communism.²

Another reason why the Nengo chiefly traditionalists rejected political parties is that they feared that other areas of Uganda would work through parties in order to crush Buganda's special position which was enshrined in the 1900 Agreement. Yet another cause for rejecting political parties which was not openly stated but which could be discerned, is that the chiefly traditionalists who controlled Buganda's politics, were not prepared to compete for power with the nationalists who were in some ways more educated than the traditionalists. Lastly, the chiefly traditionalists felt that some of the party leaders had not been particularly well screened before assuming leadership and that they had become leaders overnight. The ease with which unscreened people became party leaders, was repugnant to the Nengo Establishment which insisted on knowing 'Mwana Wani'.³

¹ Ibid.

² For details see A.G.G. Ginyera-Pinyowa, Issues In... op.cit., p.119.

³ 'Mwana Wani'? literary means, 'Whose child is he?'

before recruiting a person to a position of responsibility. Mwana wani was intended to ensure that a person's background, his ethnic origins, his values, his integrity and experience were fully investigated.¹ Sir Edward Mutesa, the Kabaka of Buganda, had this to say about political parties:

The idea of political parties was unknown. Nor was there any question of a vote with the majority imposing its will. Rather a decision would emerge which satisfied all. In fact, Government by consensus, a fashionable phrase at the moment, lent a basic approach to us.²

The chiefly traditionalists' opposition to political parties was clearly expressed in a subsequent Memorandum by the Lukiko to Her Majesty the Queen seeking the termination of the British Protection over Buganda. It said:

... It would be asking too much of the Baganda to entrust the destiny of their country into the hands of the political party leaders whose experience has not been proved by time. This could be extremely risky in the light of recent history, which has shown clearly that politicians in emergent countries use Parliamentary democracy as a springboard to virtual dictatorship.³

¹ Interview with the Kabaka, three Katikikiros and 36 Members of Lukiko.

² E. Mutesa, the Kabaka, *op.cit.*, p.31. Cf. H. Kyeyune and Apolo Nsubambi, Buganda: A Federal State of Uganda (Nengo: Kabaka's Government, 1962), pp.10 and 13.

³ Buganda's Independence (Nengo: The Information Department of the Kabaka's Government, October, 27, 1960), pp.30-31.

The Governor disallowed Buganda's resolution but the resolution and the subsequent hostility of the chiefly traditionalists towards the parties meant that Buganda which was the birthplace of political parties, became also the death place of the parties. We must point out that over this matter the traditionalists were supported by the Kabaka who wielded a lot of influence in Buganda. The traditionalists enjoyed political patronage and effective chains of command over the entire Kingdom. In contrast, the parties were led by what Low has called 'Week-end' politicians. These were mostly teachers, doctors and businessmen who participated in politics during week-ends when they were free. They made a big contrast with a man like Nyerere of Tanzania who resigned from teaching in order to devote all his energy to politics. The parties in Uganda also lacked resources with which to challenge the political efficiency of the Kabaka's Government.

By 1959 leaders of the political parties were so frustrated that most of them embraced a populist movement which emerged at this time. It was known as the Uganda National Movement and was led by Kannyo.¹ Its major aims included the abolition of the economic dominance of the Asians and the preservation of the position of the hereditary

¹ He was an unskilled painter and builder who had an electric impact on the masses.

rulers. E.M.K. Mulira, the leader of the Progressive Party, who addressed the masses at Katwe said that the leaders of political parties had resolved to set their parties aside because they had realised that they were leading the country to disunity which was not their intention.¹ The Democratic Party was one of the few parties which refused to merge with the movement.

We must point out that during the conference of the Prime Ministers and Secretaries General which took place in June 1960, the Buganda delegation rejected even to discuss a proposal that leaders of the political parties be invited to attend future conferences of the Prime Ministers and Secretaries General. The Buganda delegation made it clear that it had no mandate to discuss this matter.² The chiefly traditionalists demonstrated their grip over Buganda when in 1958, Kintu defeated Y.K. Lule in a contest for Katikkiroship. Lule, a former Lecturer at Makerere University, and the then Minister for Community Development in the Central Government, represented the hopes of the educated Buganda nationalists. His defeat demonstrated their political impotence in Buganda. In March 1958, Buganda refused to participate in the Legislative Council elections. The Protectorate Government pointed

¹ Uganda Argus February 16, 1959, p.5. See also Apolo Nsubambi, "Populism in Uganda, 1959-1961", The Indian Journal of Political Studies vol.2, No.1, January, 1978.

² Minutes of the 4th meeting of the Second Conference of the Prime Ministers And Secretaries General held at Makerere College, Kampala, June 23, 1960, pp.24-25. It was chaired by J.P. Musoke, Minister of Justice, Kabaka's Government.

out that this was a violation of the 1955 Agreement. The Kabaka's Government replied that the substitution of a Speaker for the Governor as Chairman of the Legislative Council, changed its character contrary to the 1955 Agreement and that the Governor could no longer protect Buganda's special position as it was enshrined in the 1955 Agreement. The matter was eventually taken to the Privy Council and the results of the appeal which indicated that the Kabaka's Government had lost the case came out in November 1960.¹ It was time to make arrangements for the next Legislative Council elections. And so Buganda was not represented in the Council from 1958 to 1961. Abu Mayanja accused the Lukiiko of violating democracy in Buganda and of entrenching an anti-democratic system by cutting off Buganda from the rest of Uganda.² The Progressive Party urged Buganda to note that Buganda could not separate herself from the rest of Uganda.³ The Democratic Party pointed out the necessity of participating in the Central Legislature. It is thus clear that by now the educated Buganda nationalists were working together to urge the chiefly traditionalists not to follow a separatist political path. It is pertinent to point out that the legislature of Ankole also followed Buganda's line

¹ The Katikikiro of Buganda v. Attorney General (1960) E.A. 784.

² Uganda Argus March 6 and 29, 1958.

³ Uganda Argus January 3, 1958.

by opposing the election to the Central Legislature.

The chiefly traditionalists demand secession

In August 1960, the Secretary of State received the Kabaka and a delegation from the Lukiiko who now demanded for a federal relationship with the Central Government. The Secretary of State replied that since he proposed to set up a Constitutional Commission to advise on this matter as recommended by the Wild Committee of 1959,¹ he could not prejudge its findings. The delegation argued that the Commission should precede the elections which were planned in 1961. And so the delegation came back having failed to achieve its objectives. Buganda adopted a two-pronged reply: She declared Buganda's independence and boycotted the registration of electors which began in August and only 35,000 out of an estimated 700,000 qualified to register in Buganda did so. In other areas of Uganda heavy polls were recorded. The Democratic Party won the national elections largely because they were boycotted in Buganda. The electoral strength was as follows: D.P. won 43 (having obtained 21 from Buganda) and U.P.C. 35. Benedicto Kiwanuka thereupon became the leader of the House and Minister without Portfolio.

¹ This Committee which was set up in 1958, considered the form of direct elections for members of the Legislative Council to be introduced in 1961. See Report of the Constitutional Committee. (Government Printer, Entebbe, 1959).

In addition to the eighty two directly elected members, the Legislative Council consisted of nine specially elected members, and seven members nominated by the Governor and three ex-officio Civil Service Ministers, the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General and the Minister of Finance. Soon Kiwamuka became the Chief Minister and the post of the Chief Secretary was abolished. And thus Buganda remained essentially unrepresented in the Legislative Council.

In the Lukiiko's memorandum concerning the termination of British Protection, some of the major issues raised were as follows:¹ First, Buganda contributes nearly 60 per cent of the total revenue of the Uganda Protectorate which total amounted to more than £526 million in 1957/58; of this contribution Buganda received back only £11 million from the Central Government. Second, it is inconceivable for the Kiganda society to exist without a King. The Baganda believe that they can safeguard their prestige and special position only through the survival of the Kabakaship and the Lukiiko. Third, the Legislative Council which was introduced mainly as a forum for the European Planters and traders has been viewed with suspicion as a possible agent to sap the strength of the Lukiiko and lower Buganda's prestige. Fourth, the Treaty relationship between Buganda and Britain demanded that Her Majesty's Government could not surrender its powers

¹ See Buganda's Independence op.cit., pp.22-35.

under the Agreements to a new Government with which Buganda had not concluded an Agreement. Fifth, the Baganda cannot entrust their destiny to party leaders who lack experience. Sixth, in order to avoid another "Katanga"¹ in this country immediately after independence, Buganda has decided to go it alone from December 31, 1960.

Lastly, the memorandum declared:

... Parliamentary democracy ought to suit the local conditions, because there cannot be such a thing as international parliamentary democracy. Independence should be a means to an end and not an end in itself. Buganda cannot sell her heritage for the purchase of Uganda's independence. That heritage is much more precious in the long run. Nor is Buganda willing to sacrifice everything at the altar of Uganda's unity.²

The chiefly traditionalists were so serious in implementing the secession that trips were made abroad in order to gain international recognition. For example, Sempa visited Sudan. But they soon realized the futility of the move as a result of which secession became a political move for enabling Buganda to acquire a federal relationship with the Central Government.

¹ Katanga seceded from Congo (currently Zaire) in 1960.

² Buganda's Independence op.cit., p. 36.

NATIONAL LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION

The problem of integrating Buganda in Uganda was aggravated by the absence of a widely understood language which could foster communication and other forms of interactions with other ethnic groups. English was adopted as the official language for the whole country but it was not widely understood in the country. The leaders at the central level had to use interpreters whenever they addressed different ethnic groups. Sometimes it was necessary to use English, Kiswahili and the language of an ethnic group which was being addressed. It was clearly difficult to have an undistorted and a continuous flow of information in the country in a situation which required interpreters. Worse still, English was the language of the educated people. Accordingly, it tended to widen the vertical gap between the elites and the masses.

Luganda was spread beyond Buganda because the Baganda were used as agents in other areas of Uganda. Furthermore, many other non-Baganda who sought for employment in Buganda, used either Luganda or English. If there was a possibility of upgrading one indigenous language to a national status, Luganda was a serious contender for this role. However, at a political level, making Luganda a national language was not acceptable to other ethnic groups because doing so was associated with enhancing Buganda's cultural hegemony.

Buganda's economic and political pre-eminence was already causing a lot of concern to other areas which pressed for parity of treatment.

The wide-spread use of Luganda in Buganda enabled the Kabaka's Government to sell its policies to its people. The policies of the Central Government which were articulated in English which was not well spread, made the Central Government more remote from the people in Buganda.

In Chapter I, we discussed the importance of a national language for enhancing national integration. An important hypothesis which we shall test postulates that if an official language is widely used among a group of people, this is a measure of a high degree of national integration. To the question, 'When you listen to the news on the radio, do you tune to the English or to your mother tongue?' I got the following responses:

Table III¹

Language listened to on the radio

<u>Language</u>	<u>RURAL</u>		<u>URBAN</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
To the English	77	27	38	37
To my Mother Tongue	189	66	63	61
Other	22	7	2	2
Total	288	100	103	100

¹ Source: Survey data, 1979 - 80. Mother tongue in this context was Luganda.

And so in the rural area, only 27% listen to the English version while 66% listen to the Luganda version. In the urban area, the percentage of those who listen to the English version was 37 and was higher than in the rural area where educational opportunities are fewer and where there are less chances of different ethnic groups interacting with each other. Those who listen to the Luganda version were 61% in the urban area.

Another question which was asked was 'What Language do you use at your job?' We got the following responses:-

Table IV¹

Language used at work

<u>Language</u>	<u>RURAL</u>		<u>URBAN</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Luganda	198	69	44	43
English	72	25	45	44
Kiswahili	16	6	12	12
Other	<u>2</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
	<u>288</u>	<u>100.7</u>	<u>101</u>	<u>101</u>

In the rural area 69% used Luganda, 25% used English and 6% used Kiswahili. In the urban area, 43% used Luganda, 44% used English and 12% used Kiswahili. The results show that in the urban area, English is clearly more used than Luganda at the place of work. This is so because many employers

¹ Source: Survey data, 1979 - 80.

insist on recruiting people who have attained some reasonable formal education, the minimum of which tends to be primary seven. Furthermore, the existence of many tribes in the urban area who do not share linguistic intelligibility, tends to force them to use English, a language which many of them pick up in their schools. Despite these observations, the overall results show that Luganda is far more widely used than English.

Whereas Kiswahili is widely used in Tanzania and Kenya, it is not so in Uganda. Historically Kiswahili had a low status in Uganda because it was reserved for the less educated people. It also competed with Luganda, a language of a heartland tribe. Furthermore, some Missionaries who spearheaded the spread of education in Uganda, tended to discourage the spread of a language which was associated with the spread of Islam, a religion which was competing for converts with Christianity. In Tanzania, Kiswahili is not only the official language but it is widely spread. The Germans encouraged the use of the language as well as the post-independence leaders.¹ It has fostered national integration by bridging the gap between the elites and the masses.

¹ For more information read M.H. Abdulaziz, "Tanzania National Language Policy and the rise of Swahili Political Culture" in L. Cliffe and J. Saul (eds.), Socialism in Tanzania Vol.I (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972), pp.155-164 and A. Mazrui, "The National Language Question in East Africa", East Africa Journal, June, 1967.

In Kenya, Kiswahili is also widely used especially among the workers.¹

In Chapter I, we defined a widely used language as the one which ranges from 60% to 100%. According to this criterion, English, the official language of Uganda, does not qualify to be called a widely used language because according to tables III and IV, the people who used it fall far below 60% especially in the rural area. To this extent, English faces serious problems of fostering national integration. This is a serious matter because English is the only language which is used in the Central Legislature. Those who cannot speak it fluently, cannot be eligible to become members of the Legislature. A person who has the legitimate support of his area to represent it in the Legislature, may be prevented from playing this role because he does not speak the official language which is hardly understood in his area.

The absence of a widely spoken language has created another problem. During the colonial era and even after Uganda had acquired independence, Kiswahili was the language which catered for interethnic communication in the army.

¹ For details consult W.H. Whitely (ed.), Language in Kenya (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).

English was mostly used by the more educated people in the army. Since Kiswahili is not well spread in Uganda, a situation has been created under which the bulk of the army which can only communicate efficiently in Kiswahili, cannot communicate with the majority of the civilian population which does not know Kiswahili.¹ The Baganda who were very poorly represented in the army,² faced an ugly situation in 1966 when they were militarily confronted with an army with which they could hardly communicate.

What are the implications of what we have discussed for national integration? First, the army which was to determine significantly who would wield power in the post-independence era, was cut off from the civilian population because of the absence of a widely spoken common language. The absence of equal ethnic representation in the army most of which could not communicate with the civilian population especially in Buganda where Kiswahili was poorly understood, sharpened the confrontation between the army and the Kingdom of Buganda during the crisis of 1966. Second, the various ethnic groups which could not communicate with each other, continued to harbour false prejudices which they held against each other. Third, the Central Government became more remote

¹ The only exception to this observation arises where a military man is speaking to the people of his ethnic group.

² They were poorly represented in the army partly because they preferred to work in the civil service.

from the daily experiences of the ordinary Ugandans because the official business was conducted in a language which he did not understand. On the other hand, the Kabaka's Government which was physically near the ordinary Ugandans, was also enjoying the additional advantage of using the familiar Luganda for official discourse.

Harts who once perceived the relationship between nationalism and the national language wrote:

National consciousness sees in the national language the principal traditional bond of the community, the means for educating the people to solidarity, and a symbol of national personality. Nationalism, moreover, regards the absolute domination of the national language in its country as a matter of prestige...¹

The absence of a widely understood national language in Uganda meant that it lacked a 'principal traditional bond of the community'. By resorting to English, the language of the colonising power as the official language, the Ugandans were forced to compromise their nationalistic feelings in order to overcome the complex problem under which no indigenous language could be politically accepted to attain a national status.

Uganda should think seriously of upgrading Kiswahili

¹ F. Harts, Nationality in History and Politics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), p.87.

and English as the official languages. Kimsihili would enhance regional intercourse because it is already widely spoken in the neighbouring countries. It is an African language which is not associated with the colonial dominance of former Imperial Countries. It has also been developed to articulate scientific ideas. English should be retained at least in the short run because of its international utility.

QUEST FOR FEDERALISM AND AUTONOMY

In December 1960, a Commission under the Chairmanship of the Earl of Munster was appointed to consider the future form of Government best suited to Uganda.¹ Its recommendations and observations were published in June 1961, and they included the following provisions: It recognised the Buganda question and the strategic position of Buganda. It said:

Buganda has so long been regarded as the leading Province and its Central geographical position makes it so important that its bad relations with the Protectorate Government have become a drag on the development of the whole country. It is hardly too much to say that every serious problem which we encountered in Uganda has its root in the Buganda problem. In local government matters for

¹ Report of the Uganda Relationship Commission, under the Chairmanship of the Right Honourable the Earl of Munster (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1961). Hereafter it is referred to as the Munster Commission.

instance, the fact that the
Buganda Government has been
able to defy the Central
Government's financial
controls has naturally
encouraged financial irrespon-
sibility elsewhere.¹

It noted, for example, that the Toro Kingdom which was so much
smaller and poorer than Buganda, had its 'appetite for
autonomy whetted' by the 1955 Buganda Agreement and that
Buganda's subsequent disregard of the authority of the
Central Government strengthened Toro's resistance to local
government reform. Since Buganda's politics of asserting
her hegemony has already been discussed, we shall not repeat
it here. In view of these facts and problems, the Commission
observed:

The prospect that the country
might disintegrate and suffer
miseries like those of the
Congo, had suddenly become
a real source of anxiety.
Against this background the
hypothesis of a unitary state
could no longer be taken for
granted.²

It also further pointed out that Buganda was already a
state within a state, enjoying a considerable degree of
autonomy protected by a treaty.³ Accordingly, a federal

¹ Ibid., p.23.

² The Munster Commission Ibid., p.27.

³ It was also suggested that Buganda might be given more
autonomy than it enjoyed if it played its true part in a
united Uganda. The Munster Commission, Ibid., pp.37 and 43.

status was recommended for Buganda. A semi-federal status for the remaining Kingdoms of Ankole, Toro and Banyoro was recommended. It was argued that a federal system would be too weak and expensive for the three Kingdoms which lacked the human and the financial resources.¹ The remaining areas of Uganda were to be ruled unitarily. A strong central democratic Government was recommended.

Another delicate issue which the Commission attempted to solve, though unsuccessfully, was the dispute between Buganda and Banyoro over what Banyoro called the 'lost counties'. In 1896, parts of Banyoro were given by the British to Buganda as quid pro quo for the assistance given by the Buganda to the British in establishing imperial control in Banyoro. In 1921 the Mubende-Banyoro Committee was formed in order to reclaim the 'lost counties' from Buganda. The King (Omuluka) of Banyoro sent petitions about the issue to the Secretary of State in 1943, 1945, 1948, 1949 and 1954. A Commission of Privy Counsellors² studied the problem but failed to find a solution which was acceptable to Buganda and Banyoro. The recommendation of the Munster Commission that a referendum be held in some of the disputed counties, was rejected by Buganda. After this deadlock, the

¹ Ibid., p.49.

² See Report of a Commission of Privy Counsellors on a Dispute between Buganda and Banyoro (The Molson Report Cmd.1717, 1962).

following compromise formula was arrived at in London: Section 26 of the Order in Council to the 1962 Constitution provided that in order to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of the county of Buyaga and the county of Bugangazi as to the territory of Uganda in which each of these counties should be included, a referendum should be held. The voters were to decide whether the disputed counties should (i) form part of the Kingdom of Buganda; (ii) form part of the Kingdom of Banyoro; (iii) be established as a separate district of Uganda. It was further provided that the referendum should be held two years or more after independence.

Lastly, the Commission respected and approved Monarchical and traditional institutions. It thus strongly recommended that the Monarchy as an institution should be entrenched with firm guarantees. However, the Wallis Report on Local Government of 1952, discouraged the demand for figureheads and argued that they were to a large extent symptoms of tribalism.¹ The Commission disagreed with this view and argued:

a local ceremonial head should be a real help to attract loyalty to a somewhat remote local government. We think, therefore that these aspirations, even though not based on tradition, are just as deserving of sympathy as the

¹ Quoted in the Munster Commission, op.cit., p.54.

British affection for Mayors,
High Sheriffs, Lords Lieutenants and so on.¹

The Commission also believed strongly in the preservation of democracy. These recommendations constitute the core of the philosophy behind the 1962 Constitution.

INDEPENDENCE FORMULA WEAKENS THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

The independence Constitution of 1962 endorsed Buganda as a sub-centre of power when she was given important and independent sources of revenue² and important legislative powers which required special majorities in Parliament and in Buganda's legislature before they could be altered. Buganda's power was fortified by her capacity to use her numerical strength in Parliament to tilt the balance of power. Her independent sources of revenue included graduated tax and entertainment tax. She was also entitled to receive 50% annual statutory contribution from the general revenue and 50 per cent of assigned revenue raised from Buganda. It was intended that these be raised from the sale of petrol and diesel. The minimum yield was guaranteed.

We must clarify these issues by giving concrete figures. In 1964, Buganda received statutory contribution

¹ Ibid., p.54.

² These are contained in Schedule 9 to the 1962 Uganda Constitution.

from the Central Government amounting to Shillings 17,160,000.¹ The assigned revenue which Buganda received, was Shillings 15,060,000. Her total revenue was about 83 million Shillings. The revenue of the other federal states was much less than that of Buganda. The revenue of the federal states of Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro and Busoga was 15 million, 9 million, 9 million and 22 million respectively.²

The importance of giving Buganda independent and important sources of revenue was that she could assert her federal autonomy. She was backed by her sizeable manpower. In contrast, the other federal states lacked important independent sources of revenue. Buganda was additionally given exclusive powers to legislate for Kabakaship, the Public Service of Buganda, the public debt of Buganda and other matters.³

Section 94 provided for a high Court of Buganda which had within Buganda the same jurisdiction as the High Court of Uganda had within Uganda. In practice, the Chief Justice and other Judges of the High Court of Uganda were the same as those of the High Court of Buganda. Consequently, the importance of this arrangement was largely to inflate Buganda's sense of autonomy and superiority complex because this arrangement was not extended to other areas. Later on differential

¹ Source: Officer on Special Duty (Finance) Ministry of Regional Administrations.

² Ibid.

³ Schedule 7 Part I to the 1962 Constitution of Uganda.

treatment of Buganda posed the integrational problem of establishing parity of treatment between Buganda and the rest of Uganda.

Whereas Buganda enjoyed these advantages, the 'federal' states of Basoga, Toro, Ankole and Banyoro lacked independent and important sources of revenue.¹ Additionally, they lacked manpower to sustain their federal autonomy. To this extent, the federalism of these four districts was in some ways a myth.

To amend the Constitution required at least two-thirds of all members of the Assembly. In order to alter the entrenched clauses which affected such matters as finance, land and the legislative powers of the federal states, the Bill required at least two-thirds support in Parliament and two-thirds majority support in the legislature of the affected federal state.²

We wish to make an important clarification. Whereas it is valid to argue that the independence Constitution weakened the Central Government, this argument is not adequate by itself to account for the initial political

¹ For details see schedule 8 to the 1962 Uganda Constitution. The entrenched powers given to them under this section related to their rulers, public holidays and traditional matters. Graduate tax was their major source of income. Otherwise, they had to accept Grants and controls from the Central Government.

² Section 5 of the 1962 Uganda Constitution. According to section 5 of the Constitution, Section 38 which dealt with the composition of the Parliament could be repealed by a simple majority vote. In other words, this matter was one of the few important things which were not entrenched.

weakness of the Central Government. This is so because the Central Government retained some important powers which included the responsibility to regulate commerce and trade, external affairs etc.¹ This constitutional argument must, therefore, be appreciated together with other factors which weakened the Central Government. The other factors included Buganda's political organisation called Kabaka Yekka (K.Y.) on which the U.P.C., the governing party, depended in order to acquire political power and to retain it until it was strong enough to dispense with KY. More will be said about KY in the subsequent discussions. During the elections to the Lukiiko in February 1962, the UPC and KY agreed not to compete with each other and so the struggle was between KY and DP. KY won 65 seats and the DP only managed to secure 3 seats. 38 members of the D.P. and 7 independent candidates lost their deposits. Following this dazzling success of KY, the Lukiiko decided to act as an electoral college and she sent 21 members to represent Buganda in the National Assembly. Later on these members were increased to 24. After the general election of April to the National Assembly, UPC and KY formed a coalition Government.

¹ See, for example, schedule 7, part II of the 1962 Uganda Constitution. Some of these constitutional issues have been dealt with by Apolo Nsubambi in his "Some reflections on the Uganda Independence Constitution of 1962", The Uganda Journal Vol. 39, 1980.

OBOTE'S CONSTRAINTS AND ASSETS

Obote's capacity to handle the problem of Buganda and other national issues can best be appreciated if we discuss his constraints and assets as well. He lacked the aura of martyrdom which Nutesa, the Kabaka of Buganda, and Kenyatta of Kenya, enjoyed. As already noted, in 1953, Nutesa defied the British as a result of which he was deported. The humiliation which he suffered and the endurance which he showed, earned him the aura of martyrdom especially in Buganda. In 1955, he came back to Uganda as a political hero. Kenyatta's detention and his famous trial at Kapenguria, also earned him the mystique of a martyr. Although Obote was an articulate and effective critic of the colonial Government especially in the Central Legislature, he had not yet performed a major political act to earn him the aura of martyrdom.

Whereas Nutesa came from a heartland tribe which consisted of 16 per cent of the total population of Uganda, Obote came from the less privileged tribe of the Langi of the Northern Region, a tribe which consisted of 5 per cent of the total population. The importance of the large population was that it gave Buganda bargaining power in Parliament and in the process of forming a national Government.

Obote's right to rule, legitimacy, was derived from

elections but he had even failed to master an overall majority through elections. Furthermore, he was a 'commoner' and according to the Baganda chiefly traditionalists, he could not be above the Kabaka in Buganda. Kiwanuka, the first Prime Minister of Uganda, was also a commoner. He could not be allowed to be above the Kabaka. Obote's legitimacy in Buganda was thus only derived through allying himself with the institution of the Kabakaship, an institution whose articulators were Kabaka Yekka and the Lukiiko.¹ But Obote came from a non-centralized culture where there were no Kings and thus when he associated himself with monarchy, he was making a tactical political move in order to win the confidence of the Baganda.

Obote lacked another advantage which Nyerere, the President of Tanzania, enjoyed. In Tanzania, Kiswahili was widely spoken and accepted as a national language. It was an African language which enabled Nyerere to penetrate the masses in Tanzania. As already noted, the Uganda leader lacked a widely understood national language. His capacity to penetrate Ugandans was to this extent limited. Some Northerners like D. Ocheng, an Acholi, who was made Buganda's representative in the Central Legislature, learnt Luganda very

¹ This view was shared by the three Katikikiron, ten Ministers in the Kabaka's Government and 36 Members of the Lukiiko.

well. Obote did not. And thus as Obote confronted Buganda's centrality, a gulf of mutual incomprehension and lack of understanding existed between him and Buganda.¹ The gulf of incomprehension was linguistic and cultural. This problem was worsened by the fact that some of Obote's closest Baganda allies tended to exhibit unguarded hostility towards the chiefly traditionalists at Mengo, the seat of the Kabaka's Government. These people included G. Binayisa, E. Kitayimbwa and W. Kalema. It is likely that the hostility of Obote's Baganda allies towards the Mengo Establishment, impaired their capacity to interpret objectively to Obote the complex political groups in Buganda. Obote also grappled with intraparty cleavages to which the chiefly traditionalists in Buganda reacted as we shall show later on.

Obote's greatest asset was that he was a calculating and a reconciliation leader from 1962 to 1966.² For example, his action of making the Kabaka of Buganda the Head of State in the face of extreme opposition in his party and elsewhere, was both an act of reconciliation and a calculated move to gain access to the Kabaka who had hitherto been shielded by

¹ The expression is derived from C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures and a Second Look (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.4.

² A. Mazrui, op.cit., pp.538 and 552. Cf. C. Gertzel "Leadership and Institution Building in Uganda", The African Review, Vol.2, Number 1, June, 1972, especially pp.185-186.

the chiefly traditionalists. He also successfully utilized the political tactic of appealing to his fellow less privileged Ugandans to support him as he confronted Buganda's supremacy and political arrogance. Later on, he attempted to appeal to the Abasajjira (commoners) in Buganda to support him as he attacked the chiefly traditionalists in Buganda.

Conclusion

In this Chapter, we have tried to analyse the factors which were responsible for Buganda's hegemony and separatism. We have attempted to show that the chiefly traditionalists who dominated the political scene in Buganda and who accepted separatist goals in order to preserve Buganda's special position, were able to overpower the Buganda nationalists who were committed to a united Uganda. The Kabaka who was on the side of the chiefly traditionalists, was instrumental in giving the chiefly traditionalists supremacy and political legitimacy. For the institution of the Kabakaship was sometimes able to bridge the religious and other divisions within Buganda because it had overarching characteristics which we discussed. The ordinary peasant and the worker were also attached to this institution to which they attributed the stability and the economic success which they enjoyed. We have argued that to the extent that Uganda lacked a widely understood national language, it was not integrated.

The British were sympathetic to the chiefly traditionalists as a result of which they treated their demands with courtesy. The chiefly traditionalists were in return inclined to accept the British as more impartial arbiters than the Ugandan nationalists whose credentials to lead Uganda were questioned by the traditionalists. The independence political and constitutional formula endorsed Buganda's hegemony and also gave it a capacity to dominate national issues.

This Chapter has also attempted to demonstrate that the local orientations towards the Central Government, showed distrust towards it as a result of which the local units demanded autonomy and constitutional fetters in order to prevent the Central Government from interfering in their local affairs and destroying their cherished traditional institutions. In other words, there were negative orientations towards the incumbents at the central level and toward the central institutions over which they presided. These negative orientations, complicated the task of establishing central control over the subordinate units. There was also mal-integration at a horizontal level, a phenomenon which hindered the realization of transethnic integration.

It is against this background that we must assess in the next Chapter, Obote's attempt to endear Buganda to the central institutions and the incumbents by forming a viable

governing alliance which was acceptable to Buganda and to the rest of Uganda.

THE CHANGING OF COURSE IN 1962
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This chapter seeks to establish the major developments. The first one is that the 1962-63 elections opened a chance for positive criticism towards the national political structures and their attempts to grow in Buganda. In this context, the national political territorial integration process, while the alliance continued, was a territorial integration. The second major change is that the 1962-63 elections opened a chance for positive criticism towards the national political structures and their attempts to grow in Buganda. In this context, the national political territorial integration process, while the alliance continued, was a territorial integration. The third major change is that the 1962-63 elections opened a chance for positive criticism towards the national political structures and their attempts to grow in Buganda. In this context, the national political territorial integration process, while the alliance continued, was a territorial integration. The fourth major change is that the 1962-63 elections opened a chance for positive criticism towards the national political structures and their attempts to grow in Buganda. In this context, the national political territorial integration process, while the alliance continued, was a territorial integration. The fifth major change is that the 1962-63 elections opened a chance for positive criticism towards the national political structures and their attempts to grow in Buganda. In this context, the national political territorial integration process, while the alliance continued, was a territorial integration. The sixth major change is that the 1962-63 elections opened a chance for positive criticism towards the national political structures and their attempts to grow in Buganda. In this context, the national political territorial integration process, while the alliance continued, was a territorial integration. The seventh major change is that the 1962-63 elections opened a chance for positive criticism towards the national political structures and their attempts to grow in Buganda. In this context, the national political territorial integration process, while the alliance continued, was a territorial integration. The eighth major change is that the 1962-63 elections opened a chance for positive criticism towards the national political structures and their attempts to grow in Buganda. In this context, the national political territorial integration process, while the alliance continued, was a territorial integration. The ninth major change is that the 1962-63 elections opened a chance for positive criticism towards the national political structures and their attempts to grow in Buganda. In this context, the national political territorial integration process, while the alliance continued, was a territorial integration. The tenth major change is that the 1962-63 elections opened a chance for positive criticism towards the national political structures and their attempts to grow in Buganda. In this context, the national political territorial integration process, while the alliance continued, was a territorial integration.

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF CREATING A VIABLE GOVERNING ALLIANCE, 1962 - 1964;

THE UPC-KY ALLIANCE

This Chapter seeks to establish four major arguments. The first one is that the UPC-KY alliance created a chance for positive orientations towards the national political structures and their incumbents to grow in Uganda. To this extent, the alliance enhanced territorial integration. Second, while the alliance enhanced some territorial integration, the terms under which it was formed, deprived Obote of two opportunities: the opportunity to democratize and modernize the Uganda polity and enable the people of Uganda to choose their representatives to the Central Legislature directly. The opportunity for Obote to associate himself directly with the common man in Uganda was also missed. Third, we shall show how Obote initially recognised the cultural pluralism of Uganda and used the liberal pluralistic model from 1962 to 1965 in order to integrate Uganda into Uganda. However, it will be argued that while this model suited the Ugandan setting, it was bedevilled by the absence of goodwill, toleration and functional objectives around which people could gather. We wish to hypothesize that political alliances are not likely to foster national integration if the participating groups are basically irreconcila-

ble in values and objectives. We shall show how Obote's attempt to ally modern institutions with traditional ones failed because of the survival of many of the traditional values. The UPC-KY alliance, the making of the Kabaka the President of Uganda and the issue of the lost counties, will illustrate the problems of creating a viable governing alliance. Lastly, it will be argued that while the inter-tribal marriage between Obote of Lango and Miria of Buganda was an important exemplary formula in fostering transethnic integration, it was not exploited by Obote to enhance transethnic integration.¹

As already noted, during the pre-independence elections of April 23, 1962, the UPC which did not sponsor candidates in Buganda, won 37 of the 61 directly elected

¹ The following people who were interviewed under the unstructured survey because of their special knowledge of Buganda, authorized the author to mention their names: E. Mutesa, the Kabaka of Buganda, M. Kintu, the Katikkiro of Buganda, P. Kavuma, the Katikkiro of Buganda, Mayanja-Nkangi, the Katikkiro of Buganda, A. Sempa, the Minister of Finance, A.D. Lubowa, the Minister of Local Government, Dr. Muwasi, the Minister of Health and Works and Katikkiro of Mdaiga, F. Lwebaga, one of the leaders of the Common Men in Buganda, W. Nadiope, Vice-President of UPC, Masembe Kabali, one of the founders of KY, J. Bakka, a county chief and one of the founders of KY, F. Mpanga, Attorney General, J. Kakonge, Secretary General of UPC, M. Bukikaire, Organizing Secretary of UPC, A. Tamale, Member of Lukiiko, J. Musoke, the Minister of Justice, Spire, county chief, Harji Temusange, county chief, Y.P. Mukasa, Member of the Lukiiko, M. Mugwanya, the Minister of Justice, B. Kiwanuka, the first Prime Minister of Uganda and leader of the Democratic Party, E.M.K. Mulira, Member of Lukiiko, I.K. Musasi, founder of UPC, D. Oshiong, Member of the Lukiiko and K. Senakula, Member of the Lukiiko.

seats in areas outside Buganda. The KY won 21 seats and the DP 24. The nine people who were specially elected by the National Assembly were divided between KY and UPC. UPC was allotted 6 seats and KY 3. The Attorney General Godfrey Binaisa, who belonged to Parliament by virtue of his post, was a UPC supporter. Under these arrangements, UPC had 44 seats, KY 24 and DP 24. Obote's failure to muster an overall majority in Parliament enabled Buganda to acquire the political capacity to hold the Central Government to ransom. For if she opted out of alliance, the UPC would be unseated from power. The only remaining political alternative of denying Buganda her bargaining position would have entailed either an alliance to take place between the DP and the UPC, or the UPC to go into opposition. The chaotic political events in the neighbouring state of the then Congo under which Katanga had attempted to secede from Congo, had taught the Ugandan politicians that if Uganda was to avoid chaos and bloodshed, it was necessary to find a political formula of incorporating Buganda into Uganda.¹

FORMATION OF THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN KY AND UPC

The formation of KY has been covered extensively

¹ Obote made this point in the Central Legislature. See Proceedings of the Legislative Council, May 15, 1961, and Uganda Argus May 4 and 6, 1961.

elsewhere.¹ In this study, we shall highlight its major aims, features, and add the points and interpretations which the existing literature has not adequately covered. We shall then throw some light on the terms of the alliance between KY and UPC. KY was formed in June 1961 in order to safeguard the Kabakaship, Buganda's traditions and special position. It was also a spontaneous reaction against the election in March of 1961 of a Democratic Party Government led by Benedicto Kiwanuka. We must recall that the Buganda Government had boycotted the elections of 1961 because she wanted the Protectorate Government to clarify in concrete terms the future position of Buganda, her Kabaka and Lukiiko before participating in the elections. When Kiwanuka defied the orders of the Buganda Government to participate in the elections, and when he also opposed Buganda's demand that the Lukiiko should act as an electoral college in order to screen her representatives to the Central Legislature, Kiwanuka was regarded in Buganda as the arch-enemy of Buganda's interests. He was accused of another devastating political sin. After winning the elections of 1961, he was alleged to have said that it was up to the Kabaka to see him so that Kiwanuka

¹ See Kyeyune and Apelo Nsubambi, op.cit., pp.15-16, Abu Mayanja, You And Your Vote. A guide to the Lukiiko Election (Mengo: Friends Press Ltd., February 1962), Mutasa, op.cit., p.160, C. Gertzel, "How Kabaka Yekka came to be", African Report, October 1964, pp.9-13, I.R. Hancock, "Patriotism And Neo-traditionalism in Buganda: The Kabaka Yekka ('The King Alone') Movement, 1961-1962", Journal of African History, XI, 3, 1970, pp.419-434 and Ibingira, op.cit., pp.236-239.

might solve Buganda's problems. It is difficult to ascertain the exact words which Kiwanuka used. According to the Uganda Argus, Kiwanuka offered to meet the Kabaka of Buganda "if possible and see what he could do to assist him and Buganda".¹ According to Kiwanuka, he felt that after becoming the leader of the entire country contrary to the wishes of the chiefly traditionalists in Buganda, it was necessary to work out a formula of working with Buganda. He added that his statement which was 'distorted', was calculated to entreat the Kabaka and his Government to come to terms with the Central Government which wielded the overall power in Uganda. Whatever the exact words which Kiwanuka said, they were construed by the chiefly traditionalists in Buganda to mean that Kiwanuka who was a commoner, was setting himself above the Kabaka. One county chief remarked, "Why did Kiwanuka who had disobeyed the Kabaka's instructions not to participate in the elections expect the Kabaka to go to him in order to safeguard Buganda's interests which Kiwanuka had sabotaged as if he was not a Muganda himself?" Since Kiwanuka was a Roman Catholic and a leader of the DP, a party which was associated with enhancing the Roman Catholic cause, a confrontation between Kiwanuka and the Kingdom of Buganda which was dominated by the Protestants, acquired a religious

¹ Uganda Argus, March 27, 1961.

dimension. The issue was, however, more complicated than the claim that it was a political sin for a Roman Catholic Kiwanuka to oppose a Protestant Establishment.¹ For there were many Roman Catholic Baganda who saw the election issue of 1961 as entailing a confrontation between the survival of Baganda's Monarchy and the wish of the 'greedy' political party leaders to assume political power at the expense of the Monarchy. The Roman Catholic Baganda who were interviewed and who held this interpretation of the struggle, pointed out that they were not happy about what they called the monopolization of the key posts in Baganda by the Protestants. However, they hurriedly added that the survival of Baganda's Monarchy was a matter which every true Baganda had to fight for.

It is suggestive to note that when the Lukiiko set up a committee to deal with those who had participated in the 1961 elections, it was headed by the County Chief Spire, a Roman Catholic. On April 7, 1961, the Lukiiko suspended B. Kiwanuka, the leader of the DP, A.K. Mayanja, the Minister of Education in the Kabaka's Government, who was a Muslim intellectual, A.J. Masoke, the Minister of Justice, and 15 other members of the Lukiiko.² The two Ministers were later cleared of the allegations by the Spire's committee. Spire's

¹ Hancock, *op.cit.*, p.420.

² Uganda Argus April 8, 1961.

committee recommended that the remaining 'rebels' should be dealt with by 'a special Electoral Court' of Buganda.¹ It was the Kabaka himself who pardoned the 'rebels'. He reinstated them in May 1961² and urged the Lukiiko to remember that Buganda was facing so many grave problems that it was essential for the Baganda to work together.

The victory of the DP opened the eyes of some chiefly traditionalists to the necessity of having some kind of organisation under which it would nurse the supporters of the Kabakaship. The initial meetings to consider this matter took place at John Bakka's house at Mengo. Hancock has tended to overstate Masembe-Kabali's role in the formation of KY and he has also tended to underestimate Bakka's role in the formation of the Movement.³ What we must point out is that Bakka was a close friend of the Kabaka and that he was instrumental in persuading the Kabaka to support the KY. The two people had studied together at King's College Budo. Furthermore, Mutesa used to spend many of his holidays at County Chief Manyangenda's home, the father of Bakka.⁴ The

¹ Uganda Argus, April 11, and May 4, 1961.

² Uganda Argus, May 4, 1961.

³ For example, on p.421, third paragraph of his article op. cit., Hancock attributes the formation of KY solely to Masembe-Kabali.

⁴ Bakka held the following posts: Sub-County Chief at Nabweru and Deputy County Chief, Singo, Establishment Officer in the Katikkiro's Office, Assistant Katikkiro and County Chief of Sese.

people who met at Bakka's house to work out the plans of unseating the DP in Buganda were known as Bakakamega.¹

Bakakamega was a small group of men consisting of mainly the sons of chiefs who were close to the Kabaka. They included: J. Bakka, Latima Npigi, Nansube-Kabali, Settimba, Kalinimi, A. Tamale, H. Muloki, Omugoga, and a son of the first ruler (Kyabasinga) of Busoga, Christopher Nabenge, E. Luboobi, G.W. Sentamu, and Yonassani Naasa, Omugisha, who had been educated at King's College Budo. This school was originally set up for the sons of chiefs. The patron of the Bakakamega was the Kabaka himself and H. Muloki was its Vice-Chairman for a long time. These people used to play games and hold social parties together. Since the majority of the Bakakamega were not holding chiefly positions at the time of being active members of the group, they enabled the Kabaka to acquire extra informal knowledge concerning what was going on in Buganda. The Kabaka himself felt relaxed within this group which included mature and knowledgeable ex-chiefs such as L. Npigi, the former Minister of Finance in the Kabaka's

¹ When Kabaka Muteesa was on his way to Lusira in order to visit his close friends who included A. Tamale, his car was involved in an accident at a place where there was a poster showing the words 'Kakamega'. The poster was, of course, showing directions to people wishing to go to a place called Kakamega which is in Kenya. The incident was embarrassing because the Kabaka, who did not wish to be identified, had used a private car and had left his palace without informing the relevant officials of where he was going. The Kabaka's social group which was groping for a name to call itself, stumbled into the name Bakakamega in remembrance of the incident.

Government. The elderly former chiefs who were no longer angling for chieftainship, used to reveal to the Kabaka some unpalatable secrets which the existing chiefs were afraid of telling him. It is significant to note that the group included a few non-Buganda such as Muloki, who sensitized the Kabaka to what was happening outside Buganda. It was the Bakakamega who firmly made it clear to the Kabaka that contrary to what some members of his Government had told him, he could not ignore the DP victory. The Bakakamega added that although Buganda had rejected political parties, it needed a political machinery outside of the chiefly establishment, which would mobilize his supporters. John Bakka was specifically requested to enlist the Kabaka's 'participation' in a rally which was aimed at challenging the DP and mobilizing the supporters of the Kabakaship. Since the Kabaka was supposed to be a constitutional Monarch, his 'participation' in the rally had to be disguised by an arrangement under which the Kabaka had to be the chief guest at a wrestling ceremony to be held at Mankulukuku Stadium. Meanwhile all supporters of the Kabakaship were urged to attend the wrestling and a rally which was deliberately made to coincide with the time when the Kabaka was leaving his palace in order to go and attend the wrestling. The plan worked well for the Kabaka appeared at the helm of the rally. And since there were many placards displaying the words "We

support Kabaka Yekka", the excited masses shouted "Kabaka Yekka", a slogan which meant that they supported Kabaka alone. The rally was such a glaring success that one founder of KY asserts that although the DP was technically in power, it was totally demoralized and defeated on this day.

We must point out that although all the Bakakamega supported the formation of KY, the initial work of forming it was confined to Bakka, Masembe-Kabali, Latima Mpagi and Tamale. They had taxed their minds trying to find a name to be given to Buganda's royalist Movement but they had failed to find a suitable one. One Minister had suggested that they should call it a conservative Movement, a suggestion which was not fully accepted because it was feared that the Movement might be regarded as a political party since there was such a party in Britain. After the rally, they all stumbled into the name Kabaka Yekka as being the most suitable name of Buganda's Movement. From this time, meetings of KY were staged throughout Buganda. The chiefs in the Kabaka's Government embraced the Movement wholeheartedly. Donations poured into the Movement. For example, P.K. Bah, an Asian, donated a Humber Car to the KY. Another Asian donated two Vespas.¹ Since the chiefly traditionalists had rejected

¹ Report Y'Akakiiko Ka Kabaka Yekka Akabunlirisa Ebiyuddeko Kabaka Yekka Okulagaya, p.28. This is a Commission of inquiry which investigated the reasons which led the KY to weaken. Its Chairman was E.M.K. Mulira. Hereafter it is known as Mulira's committee.


political parties, the initiators of the Movement insisted that it was not a political party and that it was a political Movement. The Movement lacked official structures although it was known in Uganda that ultimately the Kabaka himself was the head of it and that the chiefs would use their offices to nurse it. Two founder members of KY lamented that after the rally, the Ministers of the Kabaka's Government started 'appropriating' the leadership of the Movement partly because they were afraid that the nationalists like Mulira who had embraced the KY, might utilize the Movement to unseat the Ministers from power. We must add that the experience and esteem which Bakka and Masembe had acquired in starting the KY, must have made them credible successors to Kintu's Government. To this extent, Bakka and Masembe were also rivals to the political incumbents in the Kabaka's Government. However, the fact that the 'hated' DP was still in power at the Central level, provided KY with an attractive target to attack and thus an artificial harmony within KY was maintained between the nationalists and the chiefly traditionalists until the DP was defeated in 1962.

A pamphlet entitled Kabaka Atta Nnabe (The Kabaka kills the destroyer of the termite hill) was published in 1962 by a staunch member of the Kabaka Yekka who was a member of the Lukiiko.¹ The message of the pamphlet was expressive and devastating to the DP. For the Kabaka who is also known

¹ He requested to remain anonymous.


as Namungwa. Queen Ant, was shown to be contending with the DP which was the Ant eater. This message did not require any further elaboration to the ordinary Baganda. The struggle against the DP was not only verbalised and journalised, it was also visualised as the two photographs which are shown on the subsequent pages indicate. The first photograph, shows the kind of Uganda which would exist under the leadership of KY. The hereditary rulers are displayed taking precedence over the Prime Minister of Uganda. Baganda's Lukiiko is depicted as having a parallel position with the National Assembly. The implication was that the Lukiiko would not be subordinated to the National Assembly. The Legislatures of Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole, Busoga and the local councils which are depicted as being at par, are below the National Assembly and the Lukiiko, an arrangement which portrayed the supremacy of Baganda over other areas of Uganda. The photograph of the Prime Minister which is shown is that of Sir Apollo Kagwa, the famous man who was the Katikkiro of Baganda for 37 years and who was the architect of Baganda's special position. Photograph number two portrays Uganda under the DP's leadership. The Queen of Uganda (as she is called in the photograph), the Governor-General, and the Prime Minister of Uganda, and the National Assembly, precede the hereditary rulers who are miserably shown being

at the bottom of Uganda. Furthermore, the hereditary rulers are shown being reduced to the level of the Secretary Generals, the bosses of the local councils. The Lukiiko and the Legislatures of the remaining Kingdoms and Busoga are at par with the local councils. They are also below the National Assembly. Kiwamuka is himself portrayed as the Prime Minister of Uganda under the setting in which the esteem and prestige of the Kings and their Assemblies are suppressed. These two photographs were very expressive and they required little elaboration to the ordinary Ugandan who henceforth regarded Kiwamuka and the DP as the chief enemies of Buganda.




The illustrative picture is displayed below the Prime Minister of the whole country. Secondly, the National Assembly is displayed as having a central position with the National Assembly and the other local legislatures.

FIG.1 UGANDA UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF KABAKA YEKKA



The hereditary rulers are displayed taking precedence over the Prime Minister of the whole country. Buganda's Legislature is depicted as having a parallel position with the National Assembly but it is above the other local Legislatures.

FIG.II UGANDA UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY



The hereditary rulers are miserably shown being at the bottom of Uganda. They are preceded by the Head of State of Uganda, the Prime Minister, and the National Assembly.

Terms of the UPC-KY alliance

The people who played a critical role in enabling the alliance between KY and UPC to take place, were Grace Ibingira, A. Sempa, D. Ochieng and Abu Mayanja. The Kabaka himself reveals that after the elections in 1961, Abu Mayanja and D. Ochieng brought Obote to his palace at Basunankika.¹ Mutema observes:

he (Obote) was very friendly almost obsequious... An alliance between Buganda and UPC was suggested with innumerable promises of respect for our position after independence. He would step down and I should choose whoever I wished to be Prime Minister. Though I did not particularly like him, for he is not particularly a likeable man, I agreed to the alliance without misgivings. He understood our fears for the position of Buganda, we shared his hopes for a united, prosperous and free Uganda. Kintu was alone in opposing his new friendship. Obote had said that he meant to crush the Buganda and Kintu would not forgive or trust him. We waived it aside as an impetuous remark made to please crowds. Now we thought him reformed, the obvious and best ally against Kiwanuka and the hated DP.²

The people who were responsible for the alliance had certain credentials which were amenable to the chiefly

¹ Mutema, the Kabaka of Buganda, op.cit., p.160.

² Ibid., p.160.

Buganda Establishment. G. Ibingira is a prince from Ankole, who had trained at King's College Budo, the famous Protestant school in Buganda. He is a Protestant, and speaks Luganda fluently. He is a British trained lawyer and was the Legal Adviser of the UPC. He had easy access to A. Sempa, a Minister in the Kabaka's Government, and a former teacher at King's College Budo, who had become a close friend of the Kabaka while the Kabaka was a student at King's College Budo. The late D. Ochieng was an Acholi who had studied at King's College Budo. He was a Protestant and he spoke impeccable Luganda. He had married Ouganda and had acquired a Kiganda culture. He was a great friend of the Kabaka and was later made Buganda's representative in the National Assembly.¹ He was a graduate from a British University. Abu Mayanja was an eloquent and talented trained lawyer who was made a Minister of Education in the Kabaka's Government in 1959. He is a Muslim who wielded influence in Buganda both in his own right and also through Badru Kakungulu, the uncle of the Kabaka.

The terms of the alliance were as follows: Monarchy had to be preserved in a functioning and dignified form, the Kabaka of Buganda was to be the President of Uganda after

¹ He was at one time an Organizing Secretary of the Kabaka Yekka. Because Ochieng was an Acholi, he shared linguistic intelligibility with Obote, a Langi.

the departure of the British Governor-General, and the UPC was neither allowed to open branches in Buganda nor to contest for the elections in the Kingdom. Buganda would not act as an electoral college to select her representatives to the Uganda National Assembly. The Kabaka was also assured by Obote that while they shared power, Buganda should not worry about the dispute between her and Bunyoro about the 'lost counties'. Out of the seventeen Cabinet posts (i.e. including the Post of the Prime Minister), Buganda procured five. Buganda's posts included key ones like Finance, Education and Economic Affairs. Buganda acquired a cosmopolitan attitude when, unlike other districts and Kingdoms,¹ she chose people who did not belong to her tribe to represent Buganda in the National Assembly. These were D. Ochieng, an Asholi, J.T. Simpson, an Englishman who became Minister of Economic Affairs at the Central level, and Mrs. S. Viaram, an Asian who was given a Kiganda name, Namubira. However, the terms of the alliance were not written down, a mistake which enabled the UPC leaders to violate them with impunity as they became politically stronger. Later on Muteesa lamented that Obote spoke so

¹ Ankole is an exception to this rule because the Kingdom selected Balinda, Omutunganda, to represent her in the National Assembly.

convincingly that it became unnecessary to write down the terms of the alliance.¹

Obote faced serious opponents of the alliance within and outside his party. They included mature republicans and the Youth Wingers. The major fear of the Youth was that the alliance with Buganda would make it impossible for the UPC to follow rigorously a socialist ideology. The republicans were apprehensive that Obote would henceforth be forced to follow what they termed 'Buganda's conservative and Monarchist policies'. The Banyoro who regarded independence as an occasion for mourning because of their 'lost counties', wondered how Obote could resolve the dispute which involved Buganda on whom he depended in order to stay in power.² Obote justified the alliance in these words:

This was the only possible practical way to ensure political stability in the country and recognition of the National Assembly by every part of the country, both of which were essential for the achievement of Independence.³

KY wins elections to the Lukiiko

A few days before the elections to the Lukiiko, Abu

¹ Mutasa, op.cit., p.166.

² Interview with a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Makerere University who was keenly involved in the issue of the 'Lost Counties'.

³ A. Obote, Myths and Realities, a Letter to a London Friend, (Kampala: African Publishers, Ltd., November, 1968), p.4.

Mayanja, the Cambridge educated lawyer and Treasurer of KY, published a persuasive guide to the Lukiike elections. He emphasized the importance of preserving the Kabakaship. To use his own words:

... Kabaka Yekka, as its name implies, believes that the first duty of Government is to maintain and uphold the institution of Monarchy as the foundation of order, security, unity and patriotism in Buganda.¹

By associating the Kabakaship with security, order, and unity, Mayanja was endearing Monarchy to the Non-Africans who suspected that after independence, there might be chaos. A chair was chosen by the KY as its election symbol. The DP chose the hoe to be its election symbol. The impact of the chair was significant especially to the peasants who associated it with the throne.² In contrast, the hoe was merely associated with the agricultural manual drudgery.

As already noted, the UPC agreed with KY not to compete in the elections to the Lukiike and thus the contest was between the DP and KY. KY won 65 out of the 68 seats. 38 members of the DP and 7 independent candidates lost their deposits. The overwhelming victory of the KY in Buganda

¹ Abu Mayanja, op.cit., p.7.

² The writer who was a Polling Agent during the elections, noted that some people knelt before the chair as a sign of respect to something which in their interpretation represented Buganda's Throne.

ensured that the DP was rejected as a party in Uganda. The decisive nature of the victory of KY also revealed the paradoxes of Uganda's politics which may be sketched out as follows: Many Roman Catholics were associated with the Democratic Party. This suspicion was enhanced when the Catholic Archbishop of Rubaga, the Most Rev. Joseph Kiwamba, wrote a Pastoral Letter in order to give the Catholics some guidance on the coming elections of 1962.¹ He said:

Parties which have never produced a Manifesto and which are not recognised by Government cannot be considered as parties of which you would become members. 'Kabaka Yekka', (Kabaka alone), 'Mwoyo gw'Bagwanza' (Heart of the Nation) are among those which have not yet produced their Manifesto and are not yet registered as parties.²

The Kabaka of Uganda was so incensed by this Letter that he ordered the arrest of Mgr. J. Sebayingga,³ the Domestic Prelate of Rubaga, who was deputizing for the Archbishop of Rubaga who was away. In the Letter, the Archbishop had also mentioned that 'only Catholics and only DP are blamed because those who controlled the Government fear that their

¹ See Dr. Joseph Kiwamba, The Most Rev. Archbishop of Rubaga, (Uganda), Church And State, Pastoral Letter, (November, 1961), p.16.

² Ibid., pp.18-19.

³ He was released after half an hour but the Catholics were justifiably angered by the Kabaka's action.

monopoly might soon decline and they might even be withdrawn altogether.¹

These actions clearly tended to widen the gap between the Protestants and the Catholics. Under these circumstances, it was suspected that the Catholics who were the biggest single religious denomination in Buganda, and who were suspected of being anti-Kabaka, were going to rally behind the DP which was fighting against KY. The chiefly traditionalists were afraid that the Pastoral Letter of the Archbishop which strongly advised Catholics not to be members of the KY,

might greatly tilt the scales against KY, more so because under normal circumstances, the advice of a Roman Catholic Archbishop enjoys the full aura of legitimacy, sanctity, and venerableness among the Roman Catholics. The Archbishop had specifically written:

... I do not like these slogans of 'Kabaka Yekka' (the Kabaka alone) nor the party nor the activities, which they say is to be behind the throne' or to fight for the throne' or 'support the Lukiiko'.²

The Archbishop had also asserted the supremacy of the Church over the State in significant areas of human interaction.

¹ The Pastoral Letter, op.cit., p.8.

² Ibid., p.15.

To use his own words:

The jurisdiction of Church over man is much higher in dignity than that of the State, since the Church works in the super-natural order for the eternal welfare of souls. The State works in the natural order for the temporal welfare of its citizens. Therefore the authority of the Church must have precedence over that of the State; no one can say that the Church can be subject to the State in the fulfilment of her duties. Jesus Christ gave his Church all the authority she needs, absolutely all, in religious and moral matters, to make laws, to exercise her judicial power and the authority to punish (*immortale Dei*, 5).¹

I have quoted this letter at length because it illustrates the struggle for power between the Church and the State, a struggle which was rampant in Buganda.

The victory of the KY established that a linear relationship between the Roman Catholicism and the DP, which many Ugandans were willing to entertain, was not existing in Buganda where the basic values of the Kabakaship sometimes cut deeper and more penetratingly than the religious values. The observations which the author made elsewhere on the Kabakaship are pertinent. He wrote:

¹ Ibid.

... Kabakaship is the embodiment of the traditional values of the past, present and the future. The orientation of the Baganda towards the occupant of this office is expressible in terms of attitudes and feelings of deference, awe, fear and certain states of anxiety and love - a strange mixture which either eludes or baffles foreign observers.¹

Commenting on the victory of KY, Abu Mayanja declared:

One of the brightest features of the Kabaka Yekka victory is that it dealt what I should like to think was a fatal blow to the ugly head of religion in politics. Until the Kabaka Yekka victory, even a person as normally reasonable as myself used to regard every Roman Catholic as a member of the Democratic Party or a DP sympathiser until he proved to the contrary. The Roman Catholic Church entered the Lukiiko election with a zeal and relish and determination which left most of us really aghast. But as the poll showed, most Catholics including, by the way, a few nuns and Priests, voted for Kabaka Yekka and not for the Democratic Party. This is one of the most hopeful signs that Uganda might after all confound all the gloomy Prophets and make a success of her independence as a united country.²

The dazzling victory of KY gave Uganda a sense of

¹ Apolo Nsubambi, "Some Observations on J.M. Lee's Article", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol.IV, No.1, March 1966, p.66.

² Abu Mayanja, "What is Kabaka Yekka?" Africa Report, May 1962, p.13.

solidarity which was in some respects superficial. It was the antipathy towards the DP, a party which was represented as being against the survival of the Kabakaship that enabled the heterogeneous groups of Buganda to work under the umbrella of the KY. And thus the chiefly traditionalists and the nationalists appeared to work together under the KY. However, as we shall show later on, after the disappearance of the threat of the DP, major differences erupted within the KY, differences which led to the defections from KY to occur.

KABAKA IS MADE HEAD OF STATE OF UGANDA

The Munster Commission realized that the post of a Head of State was highly treasured in Uganda because it was associated with pomp and esteem. We must remember that Buganda had asserted that no Ugandan should precede the Kabaka in Buganda, an assertion which implied that unless the Kabaka became the Head of State, the relations between the Kabaka and any other Ugandan Head of State might prove to be very tricky. As already noted, the Baganda had accepted a British Governor-General as a Head of State because he represented the Queen of Britain, a Monarch 'whom they had allowed to protect Uganda'. The Munster Commission had recommended that a British Head of State should continue being in Uganda after independence until the Ugandans were

sufficiently united to select an African Head of State. On August, 29, 1961, Buganda's Constitutional Committee had recommended to the Lukiko that the Kabaka's position in relation to the future Prime Minister and Head of State in Uganda must be clarified before Buganda would agree to participate in the National Assembly.¹ The Toro Rukurato (Legislative Assembly) had reacted to the Minister's recommendations by asserting that no African would be accepted by the people of Uganda as a whole to be the Head of State.² It is under these difficult conditions that Obote urged his party to select the Kabaka as the Head of State, for there was a nationalistic feeling that within a year of independence, the Head of State in Uganda should be a Ugandan and not a British. Since, however, Obote had to appear not to disregard other Kingdoms and districts of Uganda, he made the contest for the post an open one while he was quietly putting pressure on his party to vote for the Kabaka of Buganda. The Kingdoms had asserted that a commoner should not hold this post, an assertion which Obote by-passed by allowing the non-centralized areas to create Constitutional Heads in their areas. These were Rutakirwa in Kigezi, Omulungu in Bugima, Laloyo Maher in Acholi, Kinoro in Soboi and Lorriro in Nadi. The district of Busoga which had historically been

¹ Uganda Argus, August 30, 1961.

² Uganda Argus, July 17, 1961.

ruled by princes, upgraded its Kyabazinga to a hereditary status. Teso, West Nile and Karemoja were the only districts which did not create ceremonial rulers.

Within Buganda, there was a big debate as to whether or not the Kabaka should accept to contest for the post. Most members of the Lukiiko felt that it was wrong for the Kabaka to indulge in a political contest which he might lose and thus damage his dignity. They also felt that by contesting the post, the Kabaka was reducing himself to the level of the politicians whose political fortune depended on elections. They argued that a hereditary Monarch should not contest for the post of Head of State. The Kabaka himself was in a dilemma. On the one hand, he loved pomp and he also believed that no Ugandan should precede him in Buganda. Furthermore, he felt that he was the obvious man who qualified for the post of Head of State in Uganda. On the other, the arguments which were advanced by those who were against Mutesa accepting the contest, were persuasive. Mutesa reveals:

He (Obote) was not in a position to snub the Baganda, who would have been enraged if any other ruler were chosen, as the new President would have precedence over the Kabaka even in Buganda. Similarly, it was difficult for me to refuse ... The only factor which caused me to hesitate was wondering whether there would be conflict between my duty as President and my duty as Kabaka.

I decided that I could separate the roles as I could separate my position as Commander in Chief from my position as Colonel in the Grenadiers, to which I had just been promoted.¹

Ibingira's intervention and assurances were critical in finally persuading the Kabaka to accept the contest. As soon as the Lukiko members learnt that the Kabaka had accepted the offer, they rallied behind him.

Meanwhile Obote faced a near revolt in his Party. Nekyon had openly declared that he was against the Kabaka's nomination as the Head of State.² W. Nadiope, the Kyabasimba of Busoga and the Vice-President of UPC, decided to contest for the post. The Kings of Toro, Ankole and Bunyoro openly declared that they had opted out of the contest and that they supported W. Nadiope.³ The UPC Youth Wingers and most of the members of the UPC felt that it was wrong to desert Nadiope, the Vice-President of the Party, and to support Nutesa for the post. Obote decided to create the Post of Vice-President, a post which he promised to give to Nadiope. The offer was rejected by Nadiope and his sympathisers. At this juncture, Obote informed his party that if the party insisted on rejecting Nutesa as the proposed Head of State,

¹ Nutesa, op.cit., pp.172-3. The emphasis is mine.

² Uganda Argus, November 6, 1963.

³ Obote, Myths and Realities, op.cit., p.5.

he was going to resign from the leadership of the Party. Obote eventually prevailed over his party and Mutesa was elected by the National Assembly as President and Supreme Head and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Uganda. Nadiope was also elected as the Vice-President of Uganda. The President's powers were, however, nominal and he was required in most cases to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet.

Major Consequences of making the Kabaka of
Buganda the President of Uganda

Making the Kabaka of Buganda the President of Uganda

was one of the boldest steps which Obote took in order to integrate Buganda into Uganda. The institutional conflict between the President of Uganda and the Kabaka of Buganda, appeared to be at least temporarily suspended. The tussle concerning the precedence of Kabaka in Buganda appeared to be solved although later on the issue caused problems between the Prime Minister and the President when the relations between Obote and Mutesa were strained. The chiefly traditionalists in Buganda were for once persuaded to transcend the institution of the Kabakaship in Buganda and to realize that the position of the President of Uganda was at least symbolically significant and worthy of attention.

Otherwise the Kabaka of Buganda would not have taken the risk

of competing for it. Kanyeiamba has commented that some of the Kabaka's functions started boasting that the Kabaka was now Emperor of Uganda.¹ This statement suggests that Buganda's superiority complex and ego were boosted when Mutesa was made the President of Uganda. The superiority complex of the Baganda was as it were 'nationalised' when their Kabaka was raised to the highest post in the country. To this extent, the Kabaka's new post was integrative because it brought the Baganda psychologically and institutionally closer to the national institutions. Buganda had thus moved from one extreme position of secession to the other of accepting her Kabaka to become the President of the whole of Uganda. Ryan has commented:

Obote's gambit of offering Mutesa the Presidency in 1963 when the DP and substantial elements in the UPC opposed it also showed a great deal of foresight and courage, since it could have weakened the UPC and other Kingdoms, the rulers of which were strongly opposed to this obvious attempt to confirm Buganda's supremacy.²

We wish to accept Ryan's comment but add that the issue of the Presidency temporarily weakened Obote outside Buganda.

¹ W. Kanyeiamba, Constitutional Law and Government in Uganda (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975), p.69.

² S.D. Ryan, "Uganda: A Balance Sheet of the Revolution" Nyasoro, Vol.3, No.1, June 1971, p.40.

He was now regarded by some non-Baganda as Baganda's stooge. Henceforth the non-Baganda watched with keen interest and suspicion to see what else Obote might grant to Baganda.

Another major consequence of making Nuteza the President of Uganda, was well articulated by Obote himself in 1967. He said:

The moment the Kabaka held the Bible and took the Oath to be the President of Uganda, I knew he was in. But he never realized it until last year and therefore, he wanted to kick me out, and I was polite. The rest of the story is known to you.¹

Obote was in effect saying that when he made the Kabaka the President of Uganda, he removed him from the palace politics where he was culturally and constitutionally shielded from the storms of open politics and their ugly consequences.

Nuteza was now placed in the full glare of the national politics. If he made any mistake, he was ruthlessly exposed to the public forthwith. The days were gone when Obote wished to see him and was prevented from doing so by the complicated palace procedures which were inter alia meant to safeguard the Kabaka's royal mystique. Henceforth Obote could and did demand that as Prime Minister of Uganda, he had to see the national President about urgent national matters. And thus Obote had easy access to the President who happened

¹ Uganda Argus, March 6, 1967, p.2.

to be the Kabaka of Buganda at the same time. Obote found it easier to rise up Mutesa in his dual capacity.

By placing the Kabaka in the most coveted position in Uganda, Obote excited the envy which other areas of Uganda held against Buganda because of the Kingdom's historical hegemony. And when it was time to confront Buganda in 1964 and 1966, Obote received solid support from the rest of Uganda.¹

A number of issues happened which strained the relationship between the President and the Prime Minister. Kanyeihamba informs us that in order to project Uganda's image as an independent sovereign state to the people, it was decided to display large portraits of leaders in public places and on the television screen. He adds:

If the President's photograph was displayed, this would annoy many republicans who would be confused as to whether it was the President or the Kabaka who was being shown... The Government decided that the Prime Minister's portrait be displayed instead. Mutesa was exceedingly annoyed.²

Kanyeihamba does not appear to appreciate that beneath the facade of displaying portraits, was a struggle for power between Obote and Mutesa. Obote knew that Mutesa possessed Buganda as a strong political base where he wielded power.

¹ Cf. M. Lee, "Buganda's position in a Federal Uganda", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol.III, No.3, November, 1965, pp.166 and 175.

² Kanyeihamba, op.cit., p.69.

He had seen Mutesa intervene directly during the constitutional conferences in London in order to settle political deadlocks and he had seen what had happened to Kiwamuka who was represented as Kabaka's enemy. The issue of displaying portraits was related to the tricky issue of precedence over which the Kingdom of Buganda had made a definite stand. Kanyehamba has himself pointed out that the decision to display the Prime Minister's portrait was made against a background in which some of the Kabaka's functionaries had started boasting that the Kabaka was Emperor of Uganda.¹ Those who attended public functions most of which took place in Buganda, must have noted another matter which is likely to have irritated national leaders. Obote, the Prime Minister of Uganda, would be greeted with a few cheers. In contrast, Mutesa, even before he became the President of Uganda, would be greeted with deafening cheers, clapping and scenes of people prostrating themselves on the ground as a sign of love and respect. Karugire captured the problem we are discussing in these words:

... Obote who had by then become the President of Uganda, found it necessary to pass a stringent law to make it an offence for any one to even throw a tomato at him and if convicted, one would be liable to imprison-

¹ Ibid., p.69.

ment for life without an option for a fine. Yet a Kabaka of Buganda, who had been deposed by the same Obote, would not have needed such a protection to his dignity within his Kingdom. In other words, whereas the Kabaka commanded natural respect and obedience from his subjects, President Obote needed a punitive piece of legislation to exact the same from his countrymen over whom he ruled.¹

This lengthy quotation is self-explanatory. It articulates well the problems of legitimacy which the Kingdom of Buganda posed for the leader at the Central level.

Conflict between Monarchy and Republicanism

The last major consequence of making Mutema the President was that Mutema's dual role as the Kabaka of Buganda and the President of Uganda, brought to the fore the conflict between republicanism and monarchy. This was so inter alia because the chiefly traditionalists in Buganda had successfully insisted that the occupant of the Presidency must not be a commoner. The republicans had retorted that anybody who possessed merit regardless of his origins, qualified to be the President of Uganda. Republicanism was egalitarian while monarchy was hierarchical. Even where the element of hereditary succession to leadership was found among the non-centralized societies such as among the Alur, the localized

¹ Karugire, A Political History... op.cit., p.189.

constituent political units were of equal status.¹ The lineage or clan leaders were simply primus inter pares. The monarchical political culture, however, entailed acceptance of political and socio-economic inequality within the whole society. Hereditary succession to leadership was justified on the basis of the uniqueness of the King, his nearest descendants and affines. Such titles as Mpologoma (lion) and Sabasajja (the chief of all men) which were given to the Kabaka of Buganda, played the symbolic role of emphasizing the uniqueness of the Kabaka. In these Kingdoms, a commoner (omukoni) could not qualify to be a King, only a prince could do so. The prince was believed to possess, 'royal blood' as opposed to a commoner.²

Deferential behaviour which took the form of kneeling before the Kings, was scorned by the non-centralized societies. For example, Akana Adoko from the non-centralized tribe of Lango suggested that the practice of kneeling before the Kabaka of Buganda, reduced the people who did so to the

¹ A. Southall, Alur Society (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, 1956), p.60.

² For a discussion of the monarchical political structure of the Kiganda society, see Fallers, The King's Men, op.cit. The political and social structures of the other tribes are discussed by the following: J.E.Goldthorpe, Outlines of East African Society (Kampala: Makerere University College, 1962); J. Beattie, Banyoro: An African Kingdom (New York: Holt Rinehart Winston, 1960); H.J.Driberg, The Lango: A Nilotic Tribe of Uganda (London: T. Fisher, Unwin Ltd. 1923); A.R. Richards (ed.) East African Chiefs (London: Faber and Faber, 1966) and her The Multicultural States of East Africa op.cit.

level of 'dirty insects and worms'.¹ The most repugnant aspect of monarchy to the republicans, was the phenomenon of hereditary succession to leadership. This element irritated the republicans because of two major reasons. The Kingdom of Buganda used it to disqualify the nationalists who did not possess royal blood from being legitimately above the Kabaka. Whenever the leader of the whole of Uganda was juxtaposed with the Kabaka of Buganda in Buganda, he was overshadowed by the Kabaka. Obote wished to shatter the monarchical values and credentials, which tended to confer

to the Kings more political legitimacy in their areas than to the talented nationalists who came from the humble origins. The second argument against the hereditary succession, was, to use the words of one republican, "that even a fool could become a ruler because he possessed royal blood". The chiefly traditionalists retorted that a fool who was charming and eloquent could also mesmerize the masses and get elected to the highest position of leadership. The antagonism which the republicans held against monarchy was summed up by Akena Adoko when he described monarchy as a 'pernicious vitriolic, enslaving and evil system.'² In

¹ Akena Adoko, Uganda Crisis (Kampala: Consolidated Printers Limited, 1969), p.9.

² Akena-Adoko, op.cit., p.107.

short, what was dear to the Baganda chiefly traditionalists, was repugnant to the nationalists who believed in the republican culture. The cultural intolerance and ignorance which existed between the different ethnic groups of Uganda, tended to aggravate the conflict of values between republicanism and monarchy. For example, when Akena described monarchy as an enslaving and evil system, he displayed cultural intolerance, an intolerance which incensed the chiefly traditionalists and the monarchical constitutional nationalists in Buganda. The linguistic incomprehension which existed between the different ethnic groups of Uganda also aggravated the problem of each tribe not appreciating the cultural differences which existed in Uganda.

The Kabakaship reflected basically traditional values under which the ordinary Buganda at a personal level expected the Kabaka to exercise power. On the other hand, the Presidency reflected modern values. It was sometimes confusing, especially in Buganda, to know at what level of values the Kabaka who was also the President of Uganda, should be received. For example, since the Baganda were used to kneeling before the Kabaka, they found it confusing not to kneel before him in his capacity as the President of Uganda. The republicans disdained the idea of kneeling before the President of Uganda and they were suspicious that the Baganda might try to 'monarchise' or 'Kabakanise' the

Presidency which they claimed should reflect republican values. The republicans were quick at pointing out that Mutesa became the President of Uganda through election and not through hereditary succession.

And thus the dual political mantle which Mutesa wore, did not resolve the basic conflict between republicanism and monarchy. It must be emphasized that Mutesa's tendency to overshadow the Prime Minister of Uganda, and the clash between the republican and the monarchical values, tended to reinforce each other and aggravate the struggle for power between Obote's supporters and Mutesa's admirers. It is against this background that we should understand why the portrait of Mutesa who was the Head of State, was not displayed on the television and instead the Prime Minister's portrait was displayed.

Empirical evidence of how people responded to the issue of making the Kabaka the President of Uganda

At this juncture, we must incorporate into our discussion the results of our survey data. To the statement that 'the making of the Kabaka of Buganda the President of the whole of Uganda in 1963 quickened the abolition of monarchy' we got the following responses:¹ In the rural area, 41 per cent accepted, 19 per cent were neutral, 29 per cent disagreed and 11 per cent did not know. In the urban

¹ Source: The survey data, 1979 - 1980.

area, 69 per cent accepted, 5 per cent were neutral 26 per cent disagreed. The significant point to note is that whereas there were 11 per cent in the rural area who did not know the consequences of the question, in the urban area all the respondents were able to work out an answer. They had more access to the general information flowing from radio, television and newspapers than the rural dwellers. We should also note that the urban dwellers were more decisive than the rural dwellers in diagnosing the negative consequences of making the Kabaka the President of Uganda. Most of the respondents who felt that it was wrong for the Kabaka to accept being the President of Uganda, argued that Nutesa came too near the people who had declared openly their hostility to monarchy. They rejected the possibility of striking a balance between the republicans and the monarchists.

Although the majority of the respondents held the view that making the Kabaka of Buganda the President of Uganda quickened the abolition of monarchy, they also held the view that the move brought the Baganda closer to the Central Government. To the statement that 'the making of the Kabaka of Buganda the President of the whole of Uganda in 1963 brought the Baganda closer to the Central Government' we got the following responses:¹ In the rural area, 85 per cent accepted 3 per cent disagreed, 7 per cent were neutral and 5 per cent did

¹ Survey data, 1979 - 1980.

not know. In the urban area, 80 per cent accepted, 18 per cent disagreed and 2 per cent were neutral. The two views expressed which appear contradictory can be reconciled as follows: while the revered and loved Kabaka was at the same time holding the Presidential post, the ordinary Baganda focussed his attention to the Presidential and other central institutions surrounding it. The Baganda was also endeared to the central institutions. While this process of bringing the Baganda closer to the central institutions was going on, the contradictions between the traditional institution of the Kabakaship and the modern Presidential institution, were at the same time unfolding themselves in a political atmosphere in which it was difficult to reconcile the contradictions. This was so because there was cultural intolerance between the monarchists and the republicans. Worse still, there was still the unresolved question of the struggle for power between Obote and Muteesa and their followers. To this extent, when Muteesa came so close to his antagonists, he quickened the demolition of the monarchy which had hitherto proved difficult to be penetrated by the hostile republicans.

What were the integrational consequences of the alliance? The formation of the alliance was a positive move in the direction of integrating Baganda into Uganda. The

terms were, however, in some respects disintegrative especially in the long run as we shall show. The alliance constituted a voluntary formula under which Buganda accepted participating in the national affairs of Uganda since 1958 when it ceased participating in the Central Legislature. The elections of 1961 which were boycotted by the Kabaka and chiefly traditionalists, had clearly shown that they held significant sway in Buganda. For in the elections, the Buganda turnout was less than 2 per cent of eligible voters and the DP which won the boycotted elections, was aware that its victory was in many ways empty. To the extent that the Kabaka and the chiefly traditionalists enjoyed legitimacy in Buganda, their acceptance of the alliance legitimized Buganda's participation in the national affairs. It also legitimized Obote's rule at the centre and in Buganda. The alliance legitimized Obote's rule at the centre because it gave him the overall majority in Parliament which he had failed to get. It legitimized his rule in Buganda by temporarily suspending the conflict between modernity and tradition and the conflict between monarchy and republicanism. The formula facilitated consensus and consent and territorial integration. It was not necessary for Obote to use force in order to rule because there was consent which facilitated

his rule.¹ Now that the Kabaka and the chiefly traditionalists were participating in the national affairs, they created positive orientations towards the central institutions and their incumbents to the ordinary Buganda. For whereas before the alliance the Central Government and the incumbents were portrayed by the chiefly traditionalists as Buganda's enemies, after the alliance, the twenty County Chiefs of Buganda, and their subordinates down to the parish level, were portraying the centre as having gone into Omakage (a special bond) with Buganda. There were now positive orientations in Buganda towards the centre. Buganda's hierarchical chains of command were effective in relaying political messages to the Kingdom. The writer visited a remote part of Budda county in January, 1962 and he randomly asked people about the alliance. He was surprised to discover that the Omakage was known by several people who were randomly selected. The terms of the alliance were, however, not clearly understood. The predominant theme in Buganda was that Buganda would have a lion's share of the central resources and that the Kabaka would become the

¹ For details on how legitimacy facilitates rule, consult, C.J. Friedrich, "Legitimacy and Political Obligation" in his From Man And His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics (London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), Chapter 13.

Emperor of Uganda. This view was held by 93 per cent in the unstructured interview of the 76 people.

The alliance was an exercise in pluralistic reconciliation. KY, a traditional party which stood for the preservation of monarchy, was now allying itself with UPC, a nationalist party whose major leaders stood for republican values. KY had either to cast aside or suspend its separatist tendencies and some of its excessive traditional demands. UPC had similarly to suspend its republican intolerance of the monarchy. The pragmatic pluralist model which we discussed in Chapter I was now being practised in Uganda. The model required a lot of tolerance and compromise, two major political resources which sustained Uganda from 1962 to 1965.

There were, however, some aspects of the alliance which had negative consequences. Allowing the Lukiiko to act as an electoral college to nominate people to represent Buganda in the Central Legislature, deprived Buganda of a major opportunity to elect people to represent them in the Central Legislature. Other areas of Uganda which were regarded as being less modernized and less economically and educationally advanced than Buganda, had an opportunity to elect their members of Parliament. Buganda was denied this chance. To this extent, the Central Legislature became a

remote institution from the ordinary Uganda. The common man in Uganda was also denied the benefit of acquiring civic competence. For the process of campaigning in which issues are thrashed out and of casting a vote for a candidate, are politically educative and they confer some degree of civic competence to the voters.¹ It is our submission that the people who were eventually nominated by the Lukiiko, reflected the interests of the Kabaka and the chiefly traditionalists, who controlled the Lukiiko. And so whereas Uganda was economically and educationally modernised, it was politically unmodernised. Some of the people who led Uganda were not politically competitive at the national level and they were unable to survive the demolition of the Kingdoms in 1966.

Obote who accepted the decision of the UPC being forbidden to campaign and establish UPC branches in Uganda, missed an opportunity of mobilising the common man in Uganda. These people remained under the grip of the chiefly traditionalists. When Obote in 1969 tried to woo the common man in Uganda, they did not respond to him because since 1961, he had lost the opportunity of penetrating and understanding them. He used slogans which were not representing their

¹ On civic competence and participation, read G.A. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown And Company, 1963), Chapter VIII.

pressing problems. For example, he referred to 'feudalism' as representing a major obstacle to the interests of the common man. But the foundations of feudalism had been undermined by the colonial capitalistic penetration. More will be said about this theme in the subsequent Chapters. Obote's alternative of rejecting the indirect representation of Buganda in the Central Legislature would have entailed making it clear to the chiefly traditionalists that he was willing to go into the opposition. We must point out that by this time the chiefly traditionalists had realized the importance of bargaining for political power. If both parties had been firm in opposing Buganda's indirect election to Parliament, the chiefs would have yielded to the pressure.

UPC AND KY FACE INTRA-PARTY CLEAVAGES

While the making of the Kabaka the President of Uganda had some integrative aspects as we noted, it irritated the republicans like Nakyon and some Youth Wingers who regarded it as an act of 'monarchizing' or 'Kabakanizing' the whole of Uganda. The UPC also faced a struggle for power between Kakonge and Ibingira, and ideological differences which were spearheaded by the Youth who demanded that the UPC should pursue a socialist ideology and nationalise private property. The intra-party cleavages within the Party impaired its capacity to act as an integrative

institution. The cleavages also created strains in the alliance between KY and UPC. KY was also facing internal cleavages which emerged after its dazzling electoral success of February 1962. At this time, UPC started opening branches in Buganda, a practice which KY held to be contrary to the unwritten terms of the alliance. We must examine the interplay of these forces and relate them to the issue of integrating Buganda into Uganda.

In order to understand the intra-party cleavages of the UPC, we must make a brief appraisal of its origins. It was formed in March 1960 when Obote's Wing of the Uganda National Congress merged with the Uganda Peoples Union (UPU). Low informs us that the UPU was the first party to be formed by the non-Buganda and that its leaders all belonged to the Legislative Council and that it potentially represented three-fifth of the whole country. He adds:

... it represented not just a new outlook in the less advanced parts of the country, but a direct reaction to the establishment in a strong position within Buganda of the Baganda neo-traditionalists.¹

The UPC was ideologically heterogeneous and it consisted of independent local bosses. J.M. Lee has described the Party as the 'grand whiggery of local bosses which should

¹ Low, Buganda In Modern... op.cit., p.190.

not be confused with orthodox democratic centralism'.¹ For example, the members included Nadiope, the Kyabasinga of Busoga, Obote who was Lango's most articulate representative in the Central Legislature, Obwangor, a big boss of Teso, a district which he represented in the Central Legislature, Sir Tito Winyi, the King of Bunyoro, Prince Akiiki Nyabongo of Toro, Grace Ibingira, a prince from Ankole, and a Publicity Secretary and later on the Secretary General of the Party, and Nekyon, an avowed republican from Lango. And thus right from the beginning, Obote did not have a firm grip over the party which was a coalition of district local bosses. Above all, the party was associated with the Youth League which regarded itself as the custodian of the Party's ideological purity.² Raiti Omongin, a youth in his early 30s sat on the Executive Committee of the UPC as early as 1962, and the party appointed Katabarwa as the Organising Secretary for the Youth. John Kakonge, the Secretary General of UPC until 1964, was a young man who was very friendly to the Youth. His open commitment to Socialism enthused the Youth, especially at the time when Uganda was on the whole capitalist oriented and heavily predisposed to the Western Powers.

¹ Lee, op.cit., p.177.

² A.B. Mujaju, "The Demise of UPCYL and the Rise of NUYO in Uganda", The African Review, Vol.3, 1973, p.304.

STRUGGLE FOR POWER WITHIN UPC

During the Delegates' Conference which took place in 1964 at Gulu in Acholi, Kakonge was replaced by G. Ibingira as the Secretary General of the UPC. Beneath the struggle for power between Kakonge and Ibingira, was a tussle between the Capitalistic and the Socialistic ideologies. Kakonge who was supported by the Youth, was committed to the socialist ideology.¹ Ibingira's supporters accused him of being a communist, an accusation which was politically devastating during 1960s.² The Youth who were friendly to Kakonge, were alienated by his ejection from the Post of the Secretary General of the Party. Mujaju writes that there developed an alliance between the Youth and Kakonge and that this group viewed itself as outsiders versus the insiders of the Party who included Ibingira, the new Secretary-General, Nadiope who played a big part in ousting Kakonge,³ and Obote, the leader of the Party.⁴ Ibingira ejected the Youth League members from the headquarters of the Party and he also threw out of the Kampala offices Kakonge's sympathizers.

¹ Cf. M. Mandani, op. cit., pp.241 and 270.

² Gingyera-Pinyowa, PhD. Thesis, op.cit., p.326. See also The Reporter (East Africa's Fortnightly Magazine), August 13, 1965, pp.10-11.

³ See the account of the UPC Conference in The Reporter, May 22, 1964.

⁴ Mujaju, op.cit., p.293.

In 1964, the Youth League held a conference and at the end of it demanded for the abolition of private property, called on the party to define its version of socialism and condemned Western imperialism.¹ It also referred to the Commonwealth as a 'new colonialism and a tool for the plunder of Africa's continental wealth'.² Later on they described Ibingira as a puppet politician and as an agent of dollar imperialism, charges which infuriated Ibingira. Ibingira reacted sharply and asserted that the UPC did not believe in the abolition of private property and that the Uganda Peoples' Congress Youth League had no right to take an independent political policy.³ The League did not renounce its stand. It merely pointed out that until the UPC defined its socialism, it was entitled to define its own. In 1965, the League leaders were dismissed from the Party. The League refused to accept the dismissal and went underground. At this juncture, Obote's ideological position was not very clear but since he was allied to the Conservative KY, he had to appear not to support the Youth. He assumed the role of a reconciliator between the contending groups within the Party. Later on when Ibingira posed as a threat to

¹ Mujaju, Ibid., p.300.

² Ibid.

³ Uganda Argus, September 5, 1964, p.5.

Obote's political survival, Obote wore the Youth's radical ideological mantle and the Youth supported him.

How did the intra-party cleavages within the UPC affect the UPC-KY alliance and the big issue of integrating Buganda into Uganda? The notion of nationalising private property was totally unacceptable to the chiefly traditionalists who owned land and who asserted that the UPC was attempting to introduce what they called 'communism'. The chiefly traditionalists equated socialism with communism, an ideology which they claimed was against the survival of their Monarchy. The Buganda Government expressed concern about these issues to Obote and Ibingira. The Buganda Government also condemned what it called the heclogism of the League.¹ The League had also engineered strikes in Asian-owned business in order to encourage the African Ugandans to take them over.² The Democratic Party said that the League was getting its instructions from the UPC leaders and that the League had taken on the responsibility of the Special Branch.³ The relations between the DP and KY warmed up, a development which worried Obote since he had not mastered an overall majority in Parliament. On August 2, 1964, Obote was forced to warn that KY must stop campaigning

¹ Uganda Argus, March 26, 1963, p.3.

² Mujaju, op.cit., p.298.

³ Ibid.

with DP.

But as far back as 1963, the UPC felt frustrated by the fact that under the terms of the UPC-KY alliance, it was not allowed to open branches in Buganda. The UPC felt that its capacity to penetrate Buganda and to gain an overall majority in Parliament were being undermined by not being allowed to open the branches in Buganda. It decided to defy the terms of the UPC-KY alliance. For example, G. Binaisa, the Attorney General of Uganda, opened a UPC branch at Luwero trading centre. Developments like this one opened up open hostility between KY and the UPC until the Acting Katikkiro of Buganda decided to call the Lukiiko to appraise the future of the alliance. An alliance between KY and DP was also entertained and Kiwansika, the leader of the DP, was cheered when he visited Mengo, the seat of the Kabaka's Government. Obote reacted sharply to these events. He declared at a press conference that the UPC could not be dislodged from its position in the Government by any 'Mathematical manipulation' in the National Assembly.¹ He added, "The UPC would regard as unconstitutional a Lukiiko order for the 21 Buganda Members of Parliament to break the alliance with UPC and join the DP."² He added that such a move would be an affront to the sovereignty of the Uganda Parliament.

¹ Uganda Argus, April 12, 1963, p.1.

² Ibid.

Abu Mayanja, a lawyer and a Minister of Education in the Kabaka's Government, challenged Obote and his Party to go to the High Court of Uganda to seek a declaration of the correct Constitutional position. He added:

It was absolutely intolerable for the UPC to suggest that it was unconstitutional for the Lukiiko to discuss the alliance. We are not prisoners. The Lukiiko is the electorate as far as the 21 Buganda members are concerned. There is nothing in the constitution to say that the 21 Buganda members shall join hand only with the UPC or with any other group for that matter. The Lukiiko's control over Buganda members of Parliament was moral and political and not legal.¹

Kiwamuka, the President-General of the DP, remarked that Obote must have made his statement without consulting his constitutional lawyers.² Referring to Obote's argument that a Party with the majority in the three regions could rule even if there was another party with an overall majority in Parliament, Mayanja said that this statement could not bear a moment's critical examination in the light of Section 62 (Subsection 3) of the Constitution. This section required the Governor-General to appoint as Prime Minister a member

¹ Uganda Argus, April 13, 1963, p.5.

² Ibid.

of the National Assembly who appeared likely to command the support of the majority of the National Assembly members.

These statements clearly indicated that the process of integrating Buganda into Uganda was still slippery.

Obote's party was so divided that it was unable to unite 'diversity'. Obote was slowly but surely moved by the divisions within the KY and DP which caused defections that swelled his party and he gained an overall majority in Parliament. It is to these divisions that we must direct our attention.

POLITICAL DIVISIONS WITHIN KY

The Mulira's Committee sums up very well the problems which KY was facing. First, the originators of the movement lacked experience in running political parties and since they were afraid of calling it a political party, they shunned the essential task of giving it a formal structure and clear regulations to govern it. The Kabaka was the concealed Chairman of it but since he could not physically direct its affairs, KY faced serious organizational problems. Each enthusiastic supporter of it could say and do what he liked in the name of the party.¹ The Committee recommended that eventually it should become a political party with clearly defined structures, a recommendation which was not

¹ Mulira's Committee, op.cit., pp.5-6.

accepted by the chiefly traditionalists.

Second, the relationship between KY and Kabaka's Government became tricky after the DP was defeated. For the victory was followed by a period of disenchantment in which the originators of the KY felt that they were not given important posts in the Kabaka's Government.¹ When for example, Katikkiro Kintu became the Chairman of KY, the originators of KY like Masembe-Kabali and Bakka felt that the Government leaders were now 'appropriating' the Movement which Bakka and Masembe had started. The political mal-contentants who had embraced the KY were equally disenchanted when they were not politically rewarded for supporting KY so enthusiastically. The malcontentants soon joined the Abawajjere (common men) movement which demanded that the Ministers and the chiefs should cease getting ground rent and tribute from the land attached to their offices. More will be said about this matter under the Lwebuga legal-political tangle in the next Chapter. There developed a rivalry between the officials of KY and the chiefs in the Kabaka's Government. For example, the chiefs felt that the task of organising rallies should be dominated by them, a position which was rejected by the officials of KY who were not chiefs.

¹ Ibid., p.10.

Third, there was a struggle for the Katikikiroship through KY. In particular, the Catholics in KY were accused of wishing to capture the Post through KY while the Protestants were also accused of wishing to cling to the Post through KY.¹ Each person wished to be a leader as a result of which people were hired to mudaling their political opponents.

Fourth, using the title 'Kabaka Yekita' had some disadvantages. The implications of not joining KY were that one was accused of being anti-Kabaka, an institution which was so dear to the Baganda that even the non-supporters of KY joined it out of fear of being accused of being anti-Kabaka. The Mulira Committee down-played this fact and it recommended the retention of the title, a recommendation which was popular but short-sighted.

Fifth, it was recommended that the terms of the UPC-KY alliance be written down. Otherwise it was difficult to know who had violated what and when.

Sixth, there were no books showing the income and expenditure of the Movement which had received lots of donations. For example, nobody knew how the donation of Shs.100,000/- from the Asian friends was spent.

¹ Ibid., p.13.

Seventh, the defections from the KY were noted and they were merely condemned by the Committee. It belatedly occurred to the KY members that the idea of screening their representatives to the National Assembly was not as simple as it sounded.

Eighth, the practice of the UPC opening up branches in Buganda was condemned. G.L. Binayana, the Uganda Attorney General of Uganda, and Kalule Settaala, were bitterly criticised for opening up the UPC branches in Buganda, a practice which was said to ridicule KY. The Report of Mulira's Committee came out on April 26, 1963. The Committee consisted of the following people:

E.M.K. Mulira, Chairman,
F. Lubega, Vice-Chairman,
A.D. Lubowa, Secretary,
F.O. Ssembuguza, Member,
G.M.C. Kiddu, Member,
A. Tumale, Member.

Defections from KY and DP to UPC¹

The mentioned problems were not solved. Consequently, more people started crossing the floor from KY to UPC. I.K. Musasi who had unsuccessfully supported a motion in the

¹ For a stimulating discussion of the various dimensions of crossing the floor in East Africa, consult G.F. Enghola and A. Masrui, "Crossing the Floor And the Tensions of Representation in East Africa", Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.XXI, No.2, Spring, 1968, pp.137-154.

Lukiiko in September 1962, which would have deprived the Ministers and the chiefs of the revenues which they obtained from the official mailo land attached to their offices, joined the UPC. Later on Obote made him Chairman of the Central Land Board. J.W. Kiwanuka left KY and joined UPC in February 1963. He denounced the election of Kintu as Chairman of KY because he regarded him as the chief obstacle to the realization of reforms in Buganda. The phenomenon of crossing the floor gathered momentum as Obote rewarded the defectors from KY and the DP by giving them posts at the Central level. Mutasa lamented:

By the opening of 1964 we knew our position was serious. During that year a series of shocks made it desperate. Members of KY in the National Assembly were crossing in dribs and drabs to UPC, lured by the chance of office, the frustration of being an opposition who were not permitted to oppose, and not least by Obote's personal powers of persuasion. Some thought they were strengthening the moderate wing, who would soon take over, if necessary, dispense with Obote. Others who should have known better - were convinced that an opposition was Un-African, a luxury we could ill afford....¹

While people were defecting from KY to UPC, the struggle for power within the DP and the disenchantment with being in

¹ Mutasa, op.cit., p.176.

opposition, made politicians cross from the DP and join the UPC. Others crossed from the DP to the UPC in order to give Obote the necessary political strength in Parliament so that he might tackle the delicate issue of the lost counties which involved Buganda and Bunyoro. In April 1963, a member from the DP from Bunyoro, joined the UPC and he declared openly that he wished to join the Party which would solve Bunyoro's dispute with Buganda.

Kiwamuka, the leader of the DP, never managed to get a seat in Parliament. His party was so routed during the 1962 elections that he remained outside Parliament. He, however, retained the leadership of the party while B. Bataringaya from Ankole, took over the leadership of the DP in Parliament. Bataringaya disagreed with Kiwamuka's attempt to forge an alliance with KY. Bataringaya also attempted to wrestle the leadership of the party from Kiwamuka but he failed to oust Kiwamuka. Consequently, on December 11, 1964, he joined the UPC. This move was a shattering blow to the DP and Obote exploited it by making Bataringaya the Minister of Internal Affairs, a key post. He was also photographed embracing Obote who welcomed him to the UPC with apparent enthusiasm. Bataringaya crossed with 5 other DP members of Parliament. M. Chemonges, a member of Parliament from Sebei, had crossed from the UPC to the DP in 1961 when his area was declared a separate

district by Kiwanuka during his short spell of political power. Chamonges rejoined the UPC in 1963 and was made a constitutional Head of Sebei. Obote's political patronage was clearly paying off handsomely.

What were the major consequences of the crossings into the UPC? Buganda lost her political bargaining position in Parliament. Obote enjoyed an overall majority in Parliament. He could now confront Buganda. Addressing the UPC Buganda Region Annual Delegates' Conference in the Agakhan School Hall in Kampala on August 2, 1964, Obote called upon the KY to disband and he declared that it had completed its task. He added that it was undesirable to run the KY in the name of the Kabaka who was the President of the whole country.¹ He now attempted to court the common men in Buganda by saying that his party had no quarrels with the common men in Buganda whom he described as being basically progressive.² He pointed out that he had a big quarrel with the ambitious men in Mengo, the seat of the Kabaka's Government. Obote went beyond these statements and made another scathing attack on Buganda. He said, "Some KY leaders thought it possible to introduce Buganda imperialism into Uganda, but the UPC opposed this just as it opposed white imperialism".³ G. Binyisa, the Chairman

¹ Uganda Argus, August 3, 1964, p.3.

² Ibid., p.3.

³ Ibid., p.3.

of the UPC Buganda Region who welcomed Obote, said that the UPC-KY alliance existed only in Parliament. This statement heralded the termination of the alliance. Obote urged the delegates from the 85 branches that he had only one message for them, namely that they should go out throughout the Kingdom of Buganda and convert the people to the UPC.

Masembe-Kabali, the Secretary General of the KY, attacked what he called Obote's tactics of divide and rule and called for fresh elections.¹ He made this statement knowing that if there were fresh elections, the people who had crossed from KY into the UPC would find it extremely difficult to be re-elected to Parliament. Obote who had cultivated Buganda assiduously because of the political necessity of staying in power, had annoyed the rest of Uganda. But he was regaining their support because he showed that he could reply to Buganda firmly. He proceeded to make arrangements for the referendum to take place concerning the two of the disputed lost counties. Before he did so, he terminated the UPC-KY alliance in September, 1964. 13 out of the initial 21 KY members crossed the floor to the opposition side where they were greeted by the depleted DP opposition sympathisers. However, the KY members retained a separate political identity. Before we discuss the

¹ Uganda Argus, August 6, 1964.

referendum, we must mention another important consequence of crossing the floor. It enabled Obote not to resort to extra-constitutional procedures between 1962 to 1966 in order to stay in power.

LOST COUNTIES

Lee suggests that the Central Government's effective transfer of the lost counties from Buganda to Bunyoro brought the Kabaka's Government up against the physical power of the rest of Uganda.¹ The point to grasp is that the rest of Uganda was sympathetic to the Bunyoro Kingdom which appeared to be molested and humiliated by the privileged Kingdom of Buganda which appeared to the non-Buganda to have hitherto been overnursed by Obote. As already noted, Obote had supported Buganda's demand to elect her representatives to the National Assembly through an indirect method, a procedure which was not extended to the rest of Uganda, and which served the political interests of the chiefly traditionalists in Buganda. The same Obote had successfully struggled to force the reluctant National Assembly to elect the Kabaka the President of Uganda. Bunyoro had reacted against Obote's political intimacy with Buganda by voting out the UPC representatives of Bunyoro in the National Assembly during the general elections of April 1962. They were

¹ Lee, op.cit., pp.165-166.

replaced by the DP men because the DP was hated in Buganda and it had also shown sympathy towards Banyoro's cause in the dispute. The issue of the lost counties was clearly an explosive one and it had caused violence. Dunbar comments:

In October, 1960, the Banyoro in the 'Lost Counties' lost patience and took action slashing the crops and burning the buildings belonging to the Baganda. The Baganda treated them with disdain; Banyoro was forbidden in the courts, in the schools, in official speech or correspondence in the Churches. Violence continued until the end of the year.¹

The Mubende-Banyoro Committee founded in 1921 by the Banyoro living in the lost counties fought for the restoration of the counties to Banyoro. They did so by collecting funds, organising petitions to the Governor, organising violence such as crop slashing, the maiming of livestock or even murders.² Banyoro's grievances against Buganda were aggravated by two major factors. Buyaga and Bugangaisi, the disputed counties, contained tombs of the previous Kings of Banyoro. Banyoro was poor in human and natural resources. Kiwamuka suggests that her annual personal income

¹ A.R. Dunbar, A. History of Banyoro-Kitara (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.189.

² S. Kiwamuka, "The diplomacy of the lost counties and its impact on the Foreign Relations of Buganda, Banyoro and the rest of Uganda, 1900-1964", Mwaso, Vol.4, No.2, 1974, p.115.

was between 300 - 400 shillings and that she always suffered from a constant brain drain to Buganda which had more economic opportunities.¹ In pursuing for the restoration of the lost counties, Bunyoro was partly groping for her lost past glory which was wiped away when she resisted the colonial penetration by the British who had guaranteed Buganda's supremacy. The dispute created political cohesion in Bunyoro.

Ndaiga Scheme

Section 26 to the Order in Council to the 1962 Constitution had provided for a referendum in which the inhabitants of Buyaga and Bugangaisi would choose between joining Buganda or Bunyoro or forming a separate district. Since the British realized that in 1962, Obote was depending on Buganda to stay in power, they included in the Section a provision that the referendum would take place on a date not being earlier than 9th of October 1964. This provision gave Obote at least two years in which to master the necessary Parliamentary strength in order to rule without the alliance with KY. In anticipation of the impending referendum, the Buganda Government which knew that the majority of the people in the two counties were Banyoro, launched the

¹ Ibid.

Ndaiga scheme in 1963. The scheme entailed settling ex-servicemen (Kawonago) at a place called Ndaiga in Buyaga county and also it aimed at developing the two disputed counties. The first aim of the scheme was to swell the numbers of the Baganda in the area so that Baganda could win the referendum. The second aim was to develop the area in such a way that the inhabitants would be persuaded to stay with Buganda. At one stage there were as many as 8,000 new settlers at Ndaiga most of whom were ex-servicemen.¹ Development projects included a tea plantation, roads, and clubs for Youths.² The Ndaiga Agency was set up to organize and control the transportation of workers and help those who had been given land to develop it effectively.

The Kabaka showed his total commitment to Buganda's cause when he himself went to Ndaiga frequently and stayed there for some time. He was criticized by the rest of Uganda for involving himself openly in a delicate issue while he was the President of Uganda.³ A. Nakyom, Obote's cousin, and the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, who was openly critical of the Kabaka's activities in Ndaiga, said that although he was not a prophet, he forecast that the

¹ Nutesa, op.cit., p.169.

² Ibid., p.169.

³ Cf. Ibingira, op.cit., pp.272-273.

Baganda who had settled at Ndaiga would discover after the referendum that they had wasted their money, energy and time.¹

The presence of the Kabaka at Ndaiga had an electric impact on the Baganda who rushed to the underdeveloped area to throng him, protect him and show their solidarity to his cause. His presence at Ndaiga transformed it into another 'sub-kingdom' where Dr. E. Mwasi, the Minister of Works and Health in the Kabaka's Government, was made the Katikkiro of Ndaiga. The adventure was thrilling because it involved staying in the underdeveloped area with the Kabaka who was a great hunter. He had initially disguised his stay at Ndaiga as a camping exercise. Kiwanuka has aptly observed:

To be near or with the Kabaka was the very heaven. The royal presence was all satisfying, substituting for riches, worldly happiness and even family life.²

One Minister summed up the impact of the Kabaka's presence by saying, "Where the Kabaka is, the sun never sets."

Over two million shillings are said to have been spent in a period of less than two years.³ A member of Lukiiko who belonged to the Lukiiko's committee which probed the Ndaiga expenses, estimated that the expenditure was greater than two million shillings. He was, however, also

¹ Kiwanuka, op.cit., p.133.

² Ibid., p.130.

³ Kiwanuka, op.cit., p.132.

unable to give the mother the exact figures of the expenditure. He was very critical of the way the money was wasted.

On November 4, 1964, the referendum was held and Buganda lost Buyaga and Bugangainzi to Bunyoro, an experience which disillusioned the Baganda. Katikkiro Kinta incurred the wrath of the Baganda who moved a vote of no confidence in his Government and it fell on November 9, 1964.¹ Kinta was slapped by the angry and disillusioned Baganda mobs who were restrained by the police from carrying out more violence. The President of Uganda who was also the Kabaka of Buganda, was required to sign a statutory instrument to effect the transfer of the two counties to Bunyoro. His dilemma had been anticipated and the Constitution had been amended and a provision enabling the Prime Minister to sign on his behalf had been included in the amendment.² And thus Obote signed the instrument.

Kanyeihamba criticizes Mutesa for refusing to sign the instrument. To use his own words:

He (the Kabaka) refused to do so giving as a reason that he would not transfer the administration of his subjects to another country. The President of Uganda was still thinking in

¹ For details, consult I.R. Hancock, "The Buganda Crisis of 1964", African Affairs, Vol.69, No.273, April, 1970.

² The Constitution of Uganda (Third Amendment) Act No.36 of 1964.

terms of parts of his country being foreign. But he may be forgiven, for his true "country" was still Buganda.¹

It is true that Mutesa's refusal to sign the instrument compromised his stature as the President of Uganda and that it gave Obote a chance of questioning Mutesa's credentials for continuing to be the President of Uganda. It must, however, be noted that Mutesa who derived his power from being the Kabaka, could not afford to maximise the process of dismembering his Kingdom, especially when he knew that there was a more diplomatic method by which the counties could go to Bunyoro without entailing his overt endorsement of the transfer. The Baganda had pointed out to Obote that even the Organisation of the African Unity which had reflected on the issue of settling boundary disputes, had resolved not to tamper with the territorial integrity of each state, however unjustly the boundaries were drawn by the Colonial powers. The Baganda had gone further by arguing that if the Colonial settlement was to be tampered with in respect of Buganda and Bunyoro, Buganda had a right to revert to her historical territorial jurisdiction of her areas such as Busoga. These arguments suggest that the issue of the lost counties was more complex than the critics of Obote and Mutesa tend to appreciate. Mutesa who

¹ Kanyehamba, *op.cit.*, p.70.

appreciated the complexity of the lost counties, later on made some generous remarks about the issue. He said:

The lost counties were a difficult issue and I do not blame Obote for not giving me his complete and immediate support. It must be made clear, however, that this was not the cause of our split between us.¹

It is significant to note that after Buganda had lost the two counties to Bunyoro, the chiefly traditionalists who were incensed by the issue, did not request Mutesa to resign from the Presidential Post. They did not revert to secession either.

Major Consequences of the referendum

Mutesa's involvement in the Ndaiga scheme which did not prevent Buganda from losing the counties, humiliated and alienated his Kingdom which had hitherto been used to winning political battles. In 1968, after Obote had removed Mutesa from the Presidency, he exploited Mutesa's involvement in the Ndaiga scheme. He displayed Mutesa to the rest of Uganda as a man who had no respect for the Constitution and who abused his esteemed position. To use Obote's own words:

... Mutesa's involvement in the scheme exposed him as a man who had no respect for the Constitution, his position as President,

¹ Mutesa, op.cit., p.170.

or his Oath of Office. His decision to settle in the disputed areas, and in fact to be the headman of a group imported for the purpose of defeating the Constitutional provision regarding the settlement of the "lost counties" issue, must be seen as an attempt to rig the referendum.¹

His words fell into sympathetic ears of the Ugandans especially outside Buganda, who had been disgusted with Buganda which had hitherto dominated the political scene with impunity. Obote's political credibility and prestige were restored outside Buganda. For he had demonstrated that he could handle firmly the hitherto 'defiant' and difficult Kingdom of Buganda. The defeat of Buganda cracked the solidarity of even the chiefly traditionalists, a political development which worked in Obote's favour. For people like Masembe-Kabali, the Secretary General of KY, A. Tamale, a member of the Lukiko and a close friend of the Kabaka, and county chief Spire, were openly disenchanted with Katikkiro Kintu's leadership. Although the Kabaka wished to retain Kintu, the wrath against him for having failed to preserve Buganda's 'sovereignty' was so widespread in Buganda that he had to go with his Government on November 9, 1964. Masembe-

¹ M. Obote, "The Footsteps of Revolution", East Africa Journal Vol.V, No.10, October, 1968, p.10.

Kabali later on joined UPG. More crossings from KY into UPG occurred as the myth of Mengo's 'political invincibility' was now dispelled in a humiliating manner.

Mayanja-Mukungu, a Minister in the Central Government, and a graduate from the Oxford University, replaced Kintu as the Katikikiro of Buganda. He represented the hopes of the educated Baganda nationalists who had hitherto been dominated and rendered impotent by the chiefly traditionalists. He had the political blessing of the UPG Government which spoke warmly about him. He assured the Baganda that he had a concrete plan to prevent any further reduction of Buganda's territory.¹ The only people who had been entitled to participate in the referendum were those in the two counties who were entitled to vote according to the electoral register of 1962. The ex-servicemen whom Buganda had settled in the counties in order to swell the number of the Baganda who were friendly to her cause, were prevented from participating in the referendum. Buganda regarded the exclusion of the ex-servicemen as constituting sufficient grounds to appeal against the results of the referendum. The Kingdom characteristically resorted to litigation in order to regain her lost prestige and property and also in order to buy the necessary time during which the disenchanted Baganda might

¹ Kiwamuka, op.cit., p.135.

cool down. The validity of the referendum was first challenged by Buganda in the High Court of Uganda and after losing the case, she appealed to the Privy Council in Britain. The appeal was dismissed in April, 1965, during which time the new Buganda Government had settled down.¹

Although some chiefly traditionalists like Masembe-Kabali were alienated by Buganda's politics and had joined the UPC, the remaining ones were angry with Obote and they regarded him as a political cheat. They felt that their suspicions about Obote were after all correct. He had opened UPC branches in Buganda contrary to the UPC-KY terms of alliance; he had dismembered Buganda, contrary to the terms of the alliance, and above all he had terminated the alliance after he had successfully utilized it to acquire political power. A. Ompa, a chiefly traditionalist who had been a Minister of Finance in the Central Government while the alliance was alive, was now stripped of his position and was sitting on the opposition benches still clinging to KY. He represented the core of the disillusioned and angry chiefly traditionalists who had been outperformed by Obote, a man whom they had underestimated.

Lastly, we must point out that for two underdeveloped

¹ For details see The Kabaka's Government and another v. Attorney General of Uganda and another, Privy Council Appeal No.56 of 1964.

counties to have been claimed 'lost' when they were still in Uganda and when the related tribes of Uganda were basically merely fighting for the political jurisdiction of the counties, illustrates absence of transethnic integration in Uganda. It was now the turn of the Baganda who were in Buyaga and Bugangaizi which had been regained by Bunyoro, to suffer. Katuramu, Bunyoro's Prime Minister, made it clear that the new 'settlers' were not welcome in the counties. People who were suspected of having voted on the side of Buganda, were harrassed. At least five houses at Ndaiga were set on fire.¹ Y.K. Kalanda, one of the ex-service men living in

the regained counties, appealed to the Kabaka to save his people from being terrorized.² Kalanda was apparently not aware that the Kabaka's jurisdiction could no longer reach and protect him.

INTER-TRIBAL MARRIAGE AND TRANSETHNIC INTEGRATION

In 1963, Obote of Lango, married Miria of Buganda. This inter-tribal marriage had integrational consequences. However, before we discuss it, we must address ourselves to how the general issue of inter-tribal marriage was viewed in Buganda. According to our survey data, inter-tribal marriage was accepted in Buganda. However, the same data shows that

¹ Kiwuka, op.cit., p.113.

² Munno, April 23, 1963.

while it was accepted, it was not widely practised. To the question, 'Would you encourage inter-marriage between the various tribes of Uganda?' 68% accepted it. 26 per cent in the rural area opposed it and 31 per cent in the urban area opposed it.¹ They were also asked, 'Would you encourage inter-tribal marriage for your children?' This question was closer to their families than the first one. 56 per cent in the rural area accepted it and 52 per cent in the urban area accepted it. 31 per cent opposed it in the rural area and 21 per cent opposed it in the urban area.² Two points stand out in these results. The first one is that the rural area showed a higher percentage of accepting inter-tribal marriage than the urban area. The peasants were expected to be more conservative than the urban dwellers and therefore less willing to accept inter-tribal marriages.

To answer this apparent puzzle, we must note that the questions so far discussed were capturing attitudes towards inter-tribal marriage and not the actual behaviour of the respondents. We had to pose another question: 'Are you married to a person of another tribe?' 23 per cent in the

¹ Source: Survey data, 1979 - 1980.

² Source: Ibid.

rural area agreed and 26 per cent in the urban area agreed.¹ In other words, when it came to actualising inter-tribal marriage, the percentage of those who had practised it was higher in the urban area than in the rural area. This is not surprising because people in the urban area tend to be freer from the primordial and conservative bonds of ethnicity than the village dwellers.

The second point to observe is that despite the existence of a high percentage of people who accepted inter-tribal marriage, the percentage of actual inter-tribal marriage was low. This fact can be explained by the following reasons: The objective opportunities which enhance inter-tribal marriage are still few. Ethnically mixed boarding schools and residential Universities would provide such opportunities. Uganda has only one residential University. The existing boarding schools where the basic process of socialisation takes place, have tended to be largely dominated by the ethnic groups in which they are located. Furthermore, they are still few.

Our survey showed that in the rural areas, 83 per cent of the respondents had not lived outside Buganda and 46 per cent in the urban area had not lived outside

¹ Survey data, 1979-1980. The Kalema Report observed that the custom of one man having more than one lawful wife - polygyny - is the more common form of polygamy in Uganda and in many other parts of Africa. Read the Kalema Report, op.cit., pp.3-4. Polygynous marriages probably increase chances of marrying outside one's tribe than monogamous marriages.

Buganda.¹ The objective opportunities for rural people to be exposed to transethnic interactions outside Buganda, was to this extent limited. The rural people were ordinarily interacting with their fellow Baganda. They did, however, come in contact with the non-Buganda migrant labourers who were looking for jobs. However, the migrant labourers tended to be 'on the move' looking for the most favourable employment opportunities. They had also a habit of visiting their tribal homes every three months in order to take money to their homes and re-unite with their families.² Such people did not provide suitable opportunities for effective transethnic interactions to thrive in the countryside.

The urban dwellers had better chances of interacting with more varied ethnic groups who sought for jobs in the city where the employment opportunities were greater than in the rural area. But even here the turn-over of the migrant labour force was high. Furthermore, Uganda lacked a widely understood language to cater for effective transethnic communication. We should also note that there were cultural differences which tended to restrict inter-tribal marriages. For example, whereas the practice of circumcision was a major cultural ritual which introduced a male into manhood

¹ Source: Survey data, 1979-1980.

² For details on these issues, read Richards, op.cit.

among the Bagisu, the Baganda did not practise it. Inter-tribal marriage between the Baganda and the Bagisu entailed striking a compromise on this issue.

Despite these observations, the Baganda on the whole accepted inter-tribal marriages. Even Kings who were on the top of the social ladder, practised it frequently. The non-Baganda wives acquired a Kiganda culture. Learning Luganda was a key factor which enabled them to penetrate the Kiganda culture. The Baganda were also friendly to the non-Baganda who went to Buganda looking for jobs.¹ According to the population census of 1959, 45 per cent of the African population in Buganda were non-Baganda, the majority of whom were migrant labourers.² To the extent that the Baganda accepted inter-tribal marriage, they showed a greater capacity for transethnic toleration than those tribes which rejected it. This fact was not explored by Obote. We must examine a related point by discussing an inter-tribal marriage between Obote himself and Miria.

Obote marries Miria Kalule from Buganda in 1961

Although Obote's marriage to Miria Kalule, a Muganda, was a personal matter, it had important integrational implications because Obote was the Prime Minister of Uganda and

¹ Some married Baganda and they also acquired land in Buganda.

² See 1965 Statistical Abstract (Kampala: Government Printer, 1965), p.10. The total African population of Buganda was 1,834,128 of whom 828,027 were non-Baganda.

later on he became the President of Uganda. Furthermore, he had abandoned the prevalent practice of marrying a person from his tribe and he had married a Buganda who came from the privileged and the dominant Kingdom of Buganda. According to the Kiganda custom, a special cultural bond had been forged with Obote who was now the brother-in-law of the Baganda. They expected special political, financial and social favours from him. Obote was nick-named Bwete, a name which indicated that he belonged to the Mamba¹ clan of Buganda. The non-Buganda regarded the marriage with mixed feelings. For example, some Banyoro suspected that Obote would find it very difficult to be an impartial arbiter in the dispute of the lost counties involving Buganda and Banyoro. Some republicans feared that the Baganda would use their special marital relationship with Obote in order to blackmail him and force him to make unfair concessions to their King.

Was the marriage integrative?

To the extent that it transcended his ethnic boundaries, it was an example in transethnic cultural fusion. He himself had occasion to remark in 1980 that he could not hate Baganda when his children were half Baganda and half Langi and his wife was Ouganda.² His marriage was even

¹ A Mamba is a fish.

² Uganda Times, May 28, 1980, p.5.

more significant within the Ugandan context because it bridged the gap between the Southerners and the Northerners. Because of the absence of linguistic intelligibility between the Northerners and the Southerners, there was little cultural interaction between these regions. The Nilotes tended to marry among themselves and the Bantu tended to do a similar thing. Obote's marriage was thus an example of transethnic integration which embraced the Nilotes and the Bantu. It was also an exercise in depluralising the culturally heterogeneous Ugandans. For his children now belonged both to the Baganda and the Langi. The parents could no longer ignore the two tribes to which their children biologically belonged.

However, there is no evidence to suggest that Obote used this marriage to endear himself to the Baganda during his first term of office. The Baganda, too did not make an effort to go closer to him. There was still a linguistic barrier between Obote and the Baganda. Obote always spoke to them in English and those who did not know English, had to use interpreters. He should have made an effort to learn Luganda. Equally the Baganda should have made an effort to learn Langi.

The marriage did not interfere with Obote's capacity to deal with Baganda firmly. In 1964, Baganda lost two

counties to Bunyore and in 1966, Obote abolished Buganda's monarchy. And thus those Baganda who were expecting concessions from their brother-in-law, were disillusioned by these episodes. And thus this great exemplary inter-tribal marriage remained purely a personal matter from 1963-71. It is in his second period of office that he has tried to use it to promote transethnic goals.

It is during the second phase of his rule that on at least two public occasions, he referred to Baganda as his brothers-in-law.¹ He also went out of his way in preparation for the general elections of December 1980, to point out that his brothers-in-law had the biggest well trained manpower and business assets and he called upon them to rebuild a new Uganda.² This kind of speech is missing from 1962 to 1971. And so Obote's great exemplary inter-tribal marriage remained purely a personal matter during his first term of office. To this extent, it was not exploited to enhance transethnic integration.

Conclusion

This Chapter shows Obote's attempt to integrate Buganda through the pragmatic-pluralist approach under which

¹ Uganda Times, May 28, 1980, p.5 and Uganda Times, November 7, 1980, p.1.

² Uganda Times, November 7, 1980, p.1.

monarchy and republicanism could co-exist safeguarded by a quasi-federal Constitution. It also shows Obote's attempt to ally modern institutions with the traditional ones. The UPC-KY alliance and the making the Kabaka of Buganda the President of Uganda, are cases in point. We have argued that while these policies brought the Buganda closer to the rest of Uganda and thus fostered transethnic integration, the experiment was bedevilled by the fact that the participants in the alliance reflected antagonistic values and objectives. The KY reflected Buganda's primordial and monarchical values. It even lacked a formal structure because the traditionalists did not like the movement to be called a political party. The UPC reflected republican and nationalistic values. Each group hoped to outperform the other so that its objectives would eventually prevail. This Chapter shows that so far Obote was more victorious in getting the upper hand of the alliance.

The Chapter shows two missed opportunities. The opportunity to modernise and democratise Buganda, a process which would have enhanced Obote's attempt to integrate Buganda along the horizontal and vertical level, was missed. The involvement of the Buganda in electing directly their representatives in the National Assembly, would have enhanced their civic horizons and their transethnic

interactions. Obote also missed an opportunity to come closer to the ordinary Ugandans who remained fully under the grip of the chiefly traditionalists. We have noted that the divisions within the UPC impaired its capacity to spearhead the cause of national integration. We have also tried to show that while his inter-tribal marriage was symbolically significant in transcending the cultural boundaries between the Nilotics and the Bantu, and that while it had great potential to bring the Baganda closer to him, the marriage was not exploited to tap these vital integrational dimensions during Obote's first term of Office.

We must, however, point out that although several people crossed from KY and DP and joined UPC, they did not seem to represent the wishes of their constituencies. This was so because they were ostracized in their constituencies and the few who attempted to address rallies in their areas, were largely boycotted. To this extent, the defections which were swelling the power of UPC in Parliament, were not representing what was happening in Uganda. Furthermore, the problem of establishing central authority over Uganda, was still eluding Obote. The most articulate expression of this problem was the photograph which we discussed earlier in this Chapter under which the Lukiiko was portrayed as being parallel to the Central Legislature and not being

under it. The Kings were also portrayed as being above the Head of State of the whole country. In the next Chapter, we shall discuss how these sought to deal with the problem of territorial integration under the politics of litigation which took place in Courts.

With limited means to maintain law and central authority under these adopted the policy of using the legal institutions which were set up by the British in order to establish central authority over the Kingdom of Mysore. During this period, there was still using the principle-fundamental model of integrating Mysore into British India. For example, Mysore was allowed to maintain its customary law in its areas where the British were not allowed to intervene. Mysore had also used the Federal system and had refused to allow the Central Government to integrate Mysore's Court system into the national system. At the same time, there existed at the central level, under British administration, the Courts, which attempted to set up national institutions as the Kingdom's Government and the Central Government fought for political power. Mysore's limited position as the way of Courts, tended to set up a framework similar to the power of the Central Government, and as that made it possible for competitive political parties to thrive in Mysore.

It will, however, be shown that the legal institutions were unable to offer a lasting solution to the struggle for

CHAPTER IV

INTEGRATING BUGANDA THROUGH

LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

This Chapter seeks to examine how the Central Government under Obote adopted the policy of using the legal institutions which were set up by the British in order to establish central authority over the Kingdom of Buganda. During this period, Obote was still using the pragmatic-pluralistic model of integrating Buganda into Uganda. For example, Buganda was allowed to operate its customary law in its courts where the lawyers were not allowed to appear. Buganda had also used its federal powers and had refused to allow the Central Government to integrate Buganda's Court system into the national system. At the same time, there existed at the central level, modern legal institutions, the Courts, which attempted to act as referee institutions as the Kabaka's Government and the Central Government fought for political power. Buganda's dominant position and the use of Courts, tended to act as effective counter-weights to the power of the Central Government, and so they made it possible for competitive pluralistic politics to thrive in Uganda.

It will, however, be shown that the legal institutions were unable to offer a lasting solution to the struggle for

power between the two Governments because litigation was a slow and painful process which required a lot of political toleration and good will, important factors which were disappearing as each political actor distorted and exaggerated the decisions of the Courts in order to gain political advantages. We shall discuss the police station case, the Lwebuga legal-political tangle and the finance case. But before we do so, we must briefly examine the factors which facilitated the existence of the politics of litigation in Uganda.

Two major factors were responsible for a litigious tradition in Uganda. First, there was what Engholm and Masrai have appropriately described as Buganda's 'treaty complex' which operated in her relations with the Central Government from the Colonial days.¹ This term will be broadly defined to mean Buganda's belief in the inviolability and political sanctity of the 1900 Agreement and the subsequent Agreements which were made between Buganda and the British Government. Apart from the fact that this Agreement, as we noted in the previous discussion, established the system of private ownership of land in Buganda and recognised the Lukiiko, Kabaka and his Courts, the Buganda, rightly or wrongly, tended to regard the 1900 Agreement as being a

¹ G.F. Engholm and A.A. Masrai, "Violent Constitutionalism in Uganda", Government and Opposition, July-October, Vol.2, No.4, 1967, p.590.

charter for Buganda's special rights. As early as 1914, when the powerful and famous Katikkiro of Buganda, Sir Apollo Kaggwa, and Z.K. Kisingiri, the Treasurer, were complaining about Colonial practices which were 'violating Buganda's power', the 1900 Agreement was quoted as a major point of reference. They wrote a letter to the Provincial Commissioner and inter alia, said:

We beg most humbly to draw your attention to the following points which, in our opinion, are ruining the power of the Lukiiko and violating the provisions and intention of the Uganda Agreement of 1900,¹ in connection with the administration of our Country... At present, however, some Sasa Chiefs disregard the Lukiiko altogether and consider themselves directly responsible to the District Officers. The District Officers have not discouraged this, with the result that sometimes, some important administrative point is discussed and settled by the Sasa Chief and the District Commissioner without our knowledge...²

As already noted, S. Kulubya, the Minister of Finance in the Kabaka's Government, once described the 1900 Agreement as 'the life blood of Buganda as a nation'. Other cases to illustrate the seeds of Buganda's treaty complex must be

¹ The Uganda Agreement of 1900 was in fact the Buganda Agreement of 1900. Sasa means county.

² Quoted in D.A. Low, The Mind of Buganda on oil, pp.45-49.

cited. When the Kabaka of Buganda was deported in 1953 by the British, as we noted in the earlier Chapters, the Baganda took the matter to the High Court of Uganda. Again the 1900 Agreement was the major point of reference. When the Baganda opposed the federation of East Africa, the 1900 Agreement and Buganda's special position, formed pillars of Buganda's arguments against the federation.

The 1900 Agreement was replaced by the 1955 Agreement which was in turn replaced by the 1962 quasi-federal Constitution, a constitution which enshrined Buganda's special position. And thus it became the new contract under which Buganda agreed to join freely the political system of Uganda. Buganda's faith and pride in the judicial system were enhanced by section 94 of the 1962 Constitution which provided for Buganda's High Court, a Court which was expected to exercise justice in the name of the Kabaka. Section 96 of the 1962 Constitution provided for the right of appeal to the Privy Council in Britain on matters concerning the interpretation of the 1962 Constitution. This section increased Buganda's faith in litigation because the Baganda and other Ugandans believed that if the Uganda High Court was politicized and was inclined to be biased against their interests, there was a 'trusted' Court outside the political system of Uganda which was free from the domestic political pressures.

This belief was confirmed when the Privy Council upheld some of Buganda's submissions which had been rejected by the High Court of Uganda, as we shall show in the financial case involving Buganda and the Central Government.

Second, faith in litigation was facilitated by the complex Constitution of 1962 which each Government attempted to interpret in such a way that it acquired extra financial and other advantages at the expense of the other. In particular, the Kingdom of Buganda sought to fortify her special position and to acquire more autonomy and power through interpreting the Constitution in such a way that it was consistent with her cause. The Central Government attempted to do a similar thing. J.M. Lee aptly suggested:

... the Constitution cannot be ignored in studying Uganda because the law is one of Buganda's chief weapons. Uganda politics are played in an atmosphere where each side is looking for legal 'loopholes' to be turned to its own advantage.¹

And thus all the mentioned factors reinforced each other to give Uganda a vigorous tradition of resolving political issues through courts and through using constitutional procedures.

¹ Lee, op.cit., pp.175-6.

POLICE STATION CASE

The Kabaka's Government claimed the transfer from the Central Government to the Kabaka's Police force of rural police stations and posts in Buganda which were then manned by the Uganda Police. The Buganda Government's Attorney General argued that the transfer of such powers was based upon a moral and political duty to implement the recommendations for such transfer which were made by a working party of the Kabaka's Police force under the Buganda Agreement of 1961.¹ He also contended by way of a counter-claim that there was no provision in the Constitution barring the implementation of the said working party for the transfer of the rural police stations and posts in Buganda from the Uganda Police to the Kabaka's Police force. He further argued that the powers given to the Inspector General by Section 81(2)² and to the Prime Minister or to an authorized Minister by Section 81(3)³ of the Constitution of Uganda did not include the power to give directions for preventing the

¹ See Attorney General of Buganda's defence in the High Court of Uganda, Civil Case No.488 of October 23, 1963. Counsel for the Defendant (i.e. Kabaka's Government) were E.F.M. Gratianen, Q.C.(of the English Bar), Jayawardena (Buganda's Attorney General) and Paul Jayarajan. It was the Central Government which took the case to the Court.

² These included power to give directions with respect to the use and operational control of any police force in Uganda.

³ The Prime Minister or any person acting on his behalf was authorised to give the Inspector General of Police such general directions of Policy concerning maintenance and securing of public safety and order.

Kabaka's Government from establishing police stations and posts in Buganda and for excluding without reference to a particular operation or to particular circumstances, the Kabaka's Police force from operating in any part of Buganda.

The High Court ruled that it could not be troubled to consider moral and political submissions. Also Gratiaen admitted that no concrete cases had arisen concerning, for example, challenges to the powers of the Inspector General. Accordingly, hypothetical claims were also dismissed by the High Court. The High Court also upheld the Central Government's argument that there was nothing in the Constitution which required the Central Government to transfer the stations or posts to the Buganda's Police force.¹

What was the major political consequence of this case? The author still maintains what he said elsewhere, namely, that ostensibly this case was about police stations but in fact it was about the struggle for control of police powers between the Central Government and the Kabaka's Government.² This case confirmed the supremacy of the Central Government in police matters. It was a major matter over which the Prime Minister of Uganda and the Acting Katikire of Buganda exchanged open letters which appeared

¹ See Attorney General V. The Kabaka's Government, Civil case No.483 of 1963, 20.4.64.

² See the author's article "Some Observations on J.M.Lee's Article", op.cit., p.67.

in local Newspapers.¹

Obote knew that the control of the police was a major resource whose monopoly had to be publicly known to be in the hands of the Central Government. Two years later during a military confrontation between the Kabaka of Buganda and the Central Government, the Kabaka of Buganda depended on his police force to defend his palace effectively for a number of hours until he was overwhelmed by the Uganda army. According to the Police (Amendment) Act, 1963, No.2, the ranks and composition of the Kabaka's police force were provided for in the third Schedule and were not to be exceeded. The total of Buganda Police Officers of the subordinate rank was 637, while the total of all ranks was 650. They consisted of 13 superior police officers, 9 Inspectors, 28 Assistant Inspectors, 1 Head Constable Major, 7 Head Constables, 21 Station Sergeants, 28 Sergeants, 53 Corporals and 490 Constables. The importance of this arrangement is that while the Central Government could change ranks and raise the composition of its police force unilaterally, the Buganda Government could not do so constitutionally. This was yet another powerful way of controlling the police force of Buganda by the Central Government.

¹ See, for example, Uganda Argus, February 20, 1963.

The struggle over police powers entailed a bigger issue of establishing central authority over the subordinate but robust Kingdom of Buganda. As already noted, the districts and Kingdoms regarded themselves as the natural successors to the British power. In this respect, they were spearheaded by the Kingdom of Buganda. The Kabaka himself displayed Buganda's claim to be the rightful successor to the British when he said that it was unfitting for Obote, the Prime Minister of Uganda, to raise the flag of independence on October 9, 1962. He argued that the actions of his great grandfather were responsible for shaping the modern Uganda. He regarded Buganda as the rightful Kingdom to raise the flag of independence.¹

The Court which endorsed the supremacy of the Central Government in police matters, provided an important forum for resolving conflicts which entailed the struggle for power. This was an important development which was made possible because the reputation of the Court for impartiality was still high. Obote's interpretation of his legal victory was revealed in 1968 when he declared:

The most challenging example of complete disregard of the provisions of the Constitution was the demand that all Central Government Police Posts and

¹ Mutema, op.cit., p.27.

stations in Buganda should be transferred to Mengo. This was a direct contradiction of the provisions of section 80 of the Constitution, which clearly stipulated that the Uganda Police and the Kabaka's Police would both operate in Buganda. The rejection by the Uganda Government that the Uganda Police be turned into what the Lukiko called "our things", was yet another cause and a reinforcement of their determination to form a Government amenable to their way of thinking and operation. A Government not controlled by the people, Parliament and Constitution, but by personalities.¹

This quotation clearly shows that Obote attached much importance to his legal victory.

LWEBUGA LEGAL-POLITICAL TANGLE²

On January 21, 1963, Eriabu Lwebuga, one of the leaders of the Abawajjere (Common Men) pressure group within the Kabaka Yekka appeared before Senior Judge M.B.K. Nokedde (President of the Mengo Principal Court), Judge P.H. Kasya (Member of the Principal Court) and Junior Judge B.A. Kitaka (Member of the Court). He was charged under the Buganda Native Customary Law on three counts as follows:

¹ Obote, "The footsteps...", op.cit., p.11.

² Some of these points were raised in Apolo Nsubanzi's paper, "The Politics of Litigation in Uganda, 1962-1967". A paper given at Cambridge University, U.K. on November 15, 1972.

Issuing seditious publications aimed at inciting violence among the Kabaka's subjects, alienating the loyalty of the Kabaka's subjects and attempting to overthrow the Buganda Government headed by Mr. Michael Kintu.¹

He was remanded in custody. Lwebuga's arrest attracted a lot of political attention not only in Buganda but in other parts of Uganda because he was one of the leaders of the Abawejjere Movement. This organisation claimed to stand for the interests of the Common Man in Buganda. The Abawejjere demanded that the official land attached to the posts of the Ministers and the County Chiefs from which they used to get ground rent and tribute in addition to their salaries, should be abolished. They also wanted the County Chiefs to cease being ex-officio members of the Lukiko. These were radical demands because they hit at the root of the privileges in Buganda. If the demands were accepted, this would set on foot the erosion of other privileges which were granted to the Kabaka and the Chiefs under the 1900 Agreement. The Abawejjere were careful not to mention directly issues which affected land or other privileges belonging to the Kabaka because they knew that the ordinary Buganda were just not prepared to tamper with the cherished and revered

¹ Miscellaneous Cause No. 11, 1963 in Her Majesty's High Court of Uganda, Kampala, February 19, 1963, p.1.

institution of the Kabakaship. The Kabaka was, however, shrewd enough to realise that if he rushed to grant the Abawejjere what they were demanding, he would be cracking the very establishment of which he was Ssabataka (the head of all clans). It was also known that removing the County Chiefs from the Lukiiko would greatly reduce the capacity of the Kabaka to ensure that his will prevailed in the Lukiiko. The demands of the Abawejjere became more intriguing because the chiefly traditionalists believed that the Abawejjere were subtle mouth pieces of the governing Party (UPC) which had hitherto failed to penetrate Buganda's politics. It is interesting to note that the Prime Minister of Uganda chose the title 'The Common Man's Charter' in 1969 when he introduced 'socialist' measures which were, inter alia, aimed at abolishing privileges and Monarchical values. From 1969, Obote repeatedly appealed to the Abawejjere to realise their 'rights' during his public rallies.

The Abawejjere were vigorously supported by the Kabaka Yekka Youth Movement which should be briefly examined. It was formed in 1963 and its Chairman was C. Kyasse, a Headmaster of a Private School who was about forty years old. Its Vice-Chairman was Dr. Lumu. The Treasurer was Galiwango of Singo County, a trader who was about 29 years old. The Youth Wing was highly supported by E. Lwebuga,

the Organising Secretary of the KY, who was in his early 30s.¹ The Youth Wingers were committed to the cause of reforming the Kabaka's Government. To this extent, they supported Semakula's unsuccessful motion of September 1962, which would have deprived the Ministers and the County Chiefs of the revenues which they received from the land which was attached to their offices. They also disliked the manner in which the elderly chiefly traditionalists monopolised the key posts at Mengo. They also urged the Senior Members of KY to recognise that there were Abawejjere in Buganda who deserved to be economically and politically uplifted. Sebugwawo, the Minister of Finance, declared that there were no Bawejjere in Buganda. His statement was based on the fact that Buganda was such a fertile Kingdom and that there were so many economic opportunities in Buganda that these favourable conditions did not warrant the existence of destitute people in Buganda who were known as Abawejjere. He added that it was Obote and the UPC who were attempting to create divisions in Buganda by baptising poor people Abawejjere. The Youth Wingers retorted that there were Abawejjere in Buganda who did not own land and who were

¹ Lwebuga held the following political posts: Organising Secretary of the Uganda National Movement 1959-1960, Organising Secretary of the Progressive Party, 1955-1961, Organising Secretary of KY, June 1961-1966.

exploited by the landowners. Lwebuga strongly supported the Youth in this matter.

Among the Youths were politicians who wished to oust Kintu from the Katikkiroship. These people included Dr. Lumu who later on openly contested for the post and lost to Kintu. In order to force Kintu to resign from the Katikkiroship, the KY Youth Wingers arranged for a symbolic ceremony in which a rope was to be put around Katikkiro Kintu. This ceremony was intended to show that they had lost political confidence in the Katikkiro. Juma Kisaka was arranged to put the rope around Kintu. A lorry was hired from the office of KY at William Street, Kampala, and the Youths headed for Mengo where they failed to get hold of Kintu who had gone on leave. They waved the rope around Bulange as they demanded the appearance of Kintu in order to disgrace him politically. This episode incensed Kintu and his Government, more so because it was done by the KY Youths who were suspected by the chiefly traditionalists of having been bribed by the UPC. The Government decided to arrest Lwebuga who appeared to be the ring leader of the movement.

The Kabaka Yekka Youth Wing became more aggressive. Earlier on, they had given the Kabaka's Government fourteen days to fulfil five conditions or else resign. These included abolition of the official mailo land benefits of the three Ministers and the County Chiefs, and raising the prices of

crops. The ultimatum was read at a meeting of about 500 people at Kampala's Clock Tower (the Ugandan equivalent of the Speaker's Corner in Hyde Park, London) by the Chairman of the Youth Committee which had been on tour of Buganda 'questioning the views of the people about the official mailo land problem'.¹ They had also demanded that the existing Lukiiko be dissolved and that another election be organized. In January 1963, the Abawejjere had met the Lukiiko members bearing placards which displayed the following sensitive political issues 'our representatives should not be the Chiefs' 'stooges', 'abolish taxation of women', 'we are fed up with a rotten machinery'.² This brief political background clarifies the circumstances under which Lwebuga was arrested. It also shows that Lwebuga was represented as a champion of the Common Man who was being suppressed by the privileged Buganda Establishment.

On February 9, 1963, George Farmer, Uganda's Acting Director of Public Prosecutions,³ ordered the Kabaka's Principal Court to discontinue all criminal proceedings against Eriabu Lwebuga. He made this order under Section 82 (c) of the 1962 Constitution which 'authorized him to dis-

¹ See Uganda Argus, December 10, 1962, p.3.

² Uganda Argus, January 9, 1963.

³ Hereafter referred to as the D.P.P.

continue at any stage before judgement is delivered any such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by himself or any other person or authority'. The Buganda Government was outraged by the action of the D.P.P. and they rejected it forthwith. Mpanga who was a leading lawyer in the Kabaka's Government, said that he had reason to believe that similar measures might be taken by the Central Government in relation to the case of Joseph Kasairwe, the leader of the Mubende-Bunyoro Committee, who was alleged to have incited people to refuse to pay taxes and market dues to the Buganda Government. He added:

This order constitutes not only unprecedented interference with the course of justice in a free country, but it is also deplorable and deliberate contempt of the Court on the part of the Director of Public Prosecutions... It was imperative in the interests of law and order and good government both in Buganda and Uganda, that as little interference as possible should be made by the Central Government in the affairs of Buganda.¹

On February 13, 1963, the Acting D.P.P. was served with a summons by the Kabaka's Principal Court at Mengo commanding his appearance before the Court on February 15,

¹ Uganda Argus, February 11, 1963. See also the Eastern Africa Law Reports, 1964 (London: Butterworth & Co. Publishers) Ltd., 1965), pp.570-1.

1963 to justify the "order". The Acting Registrar of the Buganda Principal Court, H.B. Dhumba, issued a statement that the Court had refused to accept the D.P.P.'s order because the D.P.P. had failed to certify that the order was issued by him in person. Dhumba accused the Uganda Minister of Justice of 'mixing' the Judiciary with politics.¹ It was reported that the Acting D.P.P. went to the Mengo District Court buildings in Kampala accompanied by two police officers and a lorry - load of armed policemen. Meanwhile the Lukiko met and 85 members voted in favour of the amendment Bill which provided for the creation of the offices of the Director of Public Prosecutions and a Solicitor General in Buganda. One person abstained from voting. This Bill amended Section 18 (4) of the Buganda Constitution which read, "The Director of Public Prosecutions of Uganda shall be responsible for control of all criminal proceedings in Buganda". The approved amendment added, "except criminal cases brought before the Principal Court or any other Court in Buganda operating under the Buganda Courts Ordinance. Such cases will be under the control of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Buganda."²

A.L. Basidda, the Acting Katikikiro of Buganda, expressed the suspicions and feelings of many of the Lukiko

¹ Uganda Argus, February 16, 1963, p.5.

² Uganda Argus, February 13, 1963.

members when he said, "there was someone behind that order whose intentions were to place us on nails,"¹ The Uganda Argus had expressed similar sentiments when it said:

Uganda's Acting Director of Public Prosecutions, acting under the instructions of the Uganda Attorney General has ordered the Kabaka's Principal Court to discontinue all criminal proceedings against Eriabu Lwebuga, Leader of the 'Common Man' pressure group within Kabaka Yekka.²

As we shall show later the Newspaper paid heavily for publishing this piece of news in this manner. There were a number of reasons for suspecting that the Acting D.P.P. had been directed by 'someone' to stop the proceedings against Lwebuga. First, the UPC governing party was known to be very sympathetic to Lwebuga's cause which was said to be aimed at improving the lot of the Common Man in Buganda. These suspicions were enhanced when the Prime Minister of Uganda addressed a public rally at the Clock Tower in Kampala and said:

What have they as Common Men got from all this (the creation of Buganda's D.P.P.)? Supposing Buganda has a D.P.P. of her own does that mean the people of Kisenyi³ will tomorrow be richer than they are?⁴

¹ Uganda Argus, February 13, 1963.

² Uganda Argus, February 11, 1963.

³ This is a slum area in Kampala.

⁴ Uganda Argus, February 15, 1963.

Obote had taken pains to write an open letter to the Acting Katikkiro of Buganda and had reminded him that it was the Buganda delegation at the London Conference which had led all other delegations against the proposal that these powers should not be given to the D.P.P. And thus the Prime Minister's overt concern about this matter and his reference to it in the public speeches in order to score points against the Buganda Establishment, tended to endorse the view that the Uganda Acting D.P.P. had been influenced to stop the proceedings against Lwebaga.

Second, Abu Mayanja, a lawyer, openly pointed out that in ordering the dropping of the charges against Lwebaga, the Acting D.P.P. had not called for the papers in the case and that he had not examined the record. Mayanja remarked that the D.P.P. made a 'blanket order' to drop all proceedings which was a shocking manner of carrying out such vital orders.¹

Third, there was also a 'Common Man's' argument which I personally heard in the corridors of Mengo, which went like this. 'How could Omusungu² understand the intricacies of our domestic politics to the extent of interfering in it unless he was directed to do so by highly placed Ugandans?'

¹ Uganda Argus, February 16, 1963.

² Mr. Farmer, the Acting D.P.P. was a European (Omusungu).

G. Ibingira, the Uganda Minister of Justice, made a statement in Parliament in which he said:

It is most astonishing therefore that the same people (Kabaka's Government) who argued that this Government must not control the D.P.P. have now wrongly alleged that it is our Government which is directing him and are attempting to diminish his authority by appointing their own D.P.P. The D.P.P. is by law not required to give reasons why he institutes or discontinues proceedings against anybody in any court. For him to be required to give evidence in a court as to why he exercises his constitutional power is analogous to summoning a Judge of the court to give reasons for his judgment.¹

Despite the stern warning which the Minister of Justice gave the Kabaka's Government not to question the actions and the independence of the Uganda D.P.P., the Acting Registrar of the Buganda Principal Court issued a defiant statement in which he replied:

Even the Governor-General could be summoned to give evidence before a court of law under cap. 77, section 19 of the Buganda Courts Ordinance.²

The Buganda Government refused to release Lwabuga and Buganda's assertion of her autonomy assumed dramatic

¹ Uganda Parliamentary Debates, February 14, 1963, p.300.

² Uganda Argus, February 16, 1963, p.1.

dimensions when it was rumoured and widely believed that the Uganda Acting D.P.P. might be arrested for refusing to appear before the Mengo Principal Court as he had been ordered to do. This rumour acquired credibility when Ibingira, the Minister of Justice, warned the Buganda Government that if they attempted to arrest the Uganda Acting D.P.P., they would face grave consequences. The Uganda Acting D.P.P. was accordingly protected by armed Ugandan policemen. Mengo's¹ political morale was boosted when local Newspapers wrote so approvingly about Mengo's toughness. For example, one of the leading Uganda Newspapers, Munno, described Mengo as Olwasi (i.e. 'rock') in an editorial which praised Buganda's 'brave' actions during this political tussle.² Taifa Uganda Emvya another Uganda Newspaper which was widely read, used the following headline:

'Mengo Ebiragiro Yabigebye
Iwa D.P.P. Farmer kugana
kuwanda mu Kooti e Mengo.'

These words, which captured the attention of many readers, may be translated as 'Mengo dismissed the orders of D.P.P.'

¹ Although Mengo normally refers to the seat of the Kabaka's Government, in this context it refers to the political Establishment of Mengo plus their sympathisers.

² See Munno (Kampala) February 13, 1963.

³ Taifa Uganda Emvya, February 16, 1963.

Farmer because he refused to appear before the Court of Nengo'.

Did Buganda have the legal authority to create the position of a D.P.P.? When the Bill which created the position of D.P.P. in Buganda was passed, Fred Mpanga, the Legal Officer in the Kabaka's Government, was appointed the Solicitor General and the Acting D.P.P.¹ As a federal state, Buganda had the legal authority to create posts including that of the D.P.P. However, the Kingdom lacked authority to give meaningful powers to the Buganda D.P.P. The Lukiiko realised this fact and gave a mandate to the Kabaka's Government to open negotiations with the Central Government on the powers to be enjoyed by Buganda's D.P.P.²

The creation of the D.P.P. seems to have been aimed at discouraging the central D.P.P. from 'intervening' in the affairs of the federal Kingdom of Buganda.³

How widespread and supported was the Abwajjere Movement?

According to our survey, those who had not heard of the Movement in the rural area, were 84 per cent and 58 per cent in the urban area.⁴ Those who had heard of it in the

¹ See Uganda Argus, March 2, 1963.

² Uganda Argus, February 23, 1963.

³ Cf. Uganda Argus, February 13, 1963.

⁴ Source: Survey data, 1979-1980. These results correspond to the unstructured survey results.

rural area were 16 per cent and 42 per cent in the urban area. The Movement was clearly an urban phenomenon. The organisers were confined to the sub-urban areas of Katwe, Nengo and Kampala and they did not make any serious effort to spread it to the rural area. The organisers of it admitted to the writer that they lacked financial resources to spread the Movement. They also discovered that the ordinary peasant in rural Buganda was not sufficiently deprived to accept being called a destitute which the name Omuwejjere suggested. Indeed, of those who had heard of the Movement in the rural area, only 6 per cent supported it, 90 per cent opposed it and 4 per cent were neutral.

In the urban area, of those who had heard of the Movement 40 per cent supported it, 25 per cent were neutral and 35 per cent opposed it. The conditions of the urban and semi-urban area of Buganda were less satisfying economically to the Common Man than the rural areas. To this extent, the Common Men in the urban area showed a greater potential for accepting some of the radical changes than the Common Men in the rural areas. The relatively high percentage of the neutral people in the urban area suggest that the issues of the Movement were not well articulated to them to make up their mind. We came to this conclusion through asking all the groups more questions. These questions concerned the objectives of the Abawejjere Movement and its contacts.

Joyce Lwebuga applied for habeas corpus on behalf of her husband in the High Court of Uganda. Fred Mpanga on behalf of the Kabaka's Government argued:

I am not disputing such power of the D.P.P. to discontinue criminal proceedings in any court in this Country, that includes the Buganda Courts. What I am contending, I am disputing, is whether the power given to the D.P.P. under Section 82, whether that power has been properly exercised.¹

He further argued that the D.P.P.'s order was not effective to secure the discharge of the prisoner and that the Buganda Principal Court itself had to be moved to make an order both to discontinue and to discharge the prisoner or of its own motion order his discharge.² Criticising the D.P.P.'s order, Mpanga pointed out that it just happened all of a sudden without the D.P.P. asking for the papers and that the order did not specify the charges, the case and the number. He added that the D.P.P. never sent his representative to the Mengo Principal Court as happened in the previous cases.³ Wboijana who defended Lwebuga submitted that it was not for the High Court to amend the Constitution by laying down the

¹ See Miscellaneous cause No.11 of 1963 in Her Majesty's High Court of Uganda at Kampala, February 22, 1963.

² Ibid., pp.2-3.

³ Ibid., p.8.

procedure and that it was for Parliament to lay down the procedure. He also contended that the D.P.P. was not required to give any reasons for his action.¹

Justice Sheridan made the following points in his judgment:² First, that Section 82 of the 1962 Constitution vested in the Director of Public Prosecutions the unfettered right of control of criminal courts other than Courts Martial in Uganda. Second, that Section 82(6) made it clear that in the exercise of the powers conferred by the Section, the D.P.P. was not to be subject to the direction of control of any other person or authority. Third, that as soon as the Baganda Principal Court had received the Order of the D.P.P., it was a necessary consequence of that order that the Court should immediately have discharged the prisoner. Fourth, that the Baganda Principal Court had no power to inquire into the mode of the D.P.P.'s exercise of his powers and that the D.P.P. did not have to give any reasons for the exercise of his power. He concluded his judgment with these words:

I am satisfied that the Prisoner is at present illegally detained by an order of the Principal Court and I order him to be set at liberty forthwith. The applicant is to have costs of these proceedings.³

¹ Ibid., pp.9-10.

² Miscellaneous Cause No.11 of February 22, 1963.

³ Ibid., p.3.

Political and Legal Consequences of the Tangle

The political and legal consequences of this case were far-reaching. Lwebaga was released and he was embraced and surrounded by his sympathizers who were freely shouting UPC slogans. It is important to note that although Lwebaga had not yet openly resigned from being a member of KY, those who shouted KY slogans during the excitement of welcoming him from prison, were silenced¹ because KY was closely associated with the Nengo Government which had lost this politico-legal fight. The UPC Government gained some credibility in the urban parts of Buganda for appearing to champion the cause of the Common Man. This was so because it was believed at Katwe² that it was the UPC Government which had directed the Acting D.P.P. to discontinue the proceedings against Lwebaga who was seen as the 'champion of the Common Man in Buganda.'

This interpretation of the Lwebaga incident put the UPC Government in a dilemma. On the one hand, it wanted to make it clear that in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, it could not direct the Uganda D.P.P. to discontinue the proceedings against Lwebaga and that the

¹ See Munno, February 23, 1963, p.8. Later on Lwebaga and other Members of KY joined UPC.

² This is an important suburban area of Buganda where African Newspapers were printed.

D.P.P. had acted independently. On the other hand, the Central Government was eager not to destroy the political credit which was being circulated at Katwe that it had come to the rescue of the leader of the Common Man. The ordinary man in Uganda found it extremely difficult to distinguish these legal niceties. And yet there were serious legal and political consequences from not making the distinction. Meanwhile central control was boosted by this case. Local Newspapers published the story that Mengo had no authority to continue detaining Lwebaga after the D.P.P.'s orders.

The remaining legal facets of this case were once again publicly raised when the Uganda D.P.P. and the Uganda Attorney General sued Uganda Argus Limited for damages arising out of libel.¹ Earlier on we noted that the Uganda Argus of February 11, 1963, published an article stating that the Acting D.P.P. acted under the instructions of the Uganda Attorney General to discontinue criminal proceedings against Lwebaga. Sir Udo Udoma, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Uganda, described this piece as being 'mischievous', 'irresponsible' and 'reckless journalism'.² He found the paper guilty of falsely charging both the Uganda D.P.P. and the Attorney General of having acted contrary to

¹ See Farmer and Another V. Uganda Argus Limited (Civil Case Nos. 317 and 349 of 1963) in the High Court of Uganda July 11, 1964. It is reported in the Eastern Africa Law Reports, 1964, pp.568-581.

² Ibid., p.580.

and in open violation of Section 82 of the Uganda Constitution. In short, the D.P.P. argued that in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, he acted independently. The Attorney General also contended that he did not direct the D.P.P. to stop the proceedings against Lwebuga because this would have been violating section 82 of the Uganda Constitution. Sir Udo Udoma said, "surely these charges if true would be sufficient to render the plaintiffs unfit to hold their respective high public offices". Accordingly, the Uganda Director of Public Prosecutions was awarded damages of shillings 40,000/- with costs, while the Uganda Attorney General was awarded damages of Shs.50,000/- with costs against the defendants. This case was also a victory in favour of the Central Government because it served as a strong warning to the Buganda Government that the financial cost of challenging the powers of the Central Government was high.

The Lwebuga tussle entailed a conflict between Buganda's customary law and the Ugandan law concerning the liberty of an individual. As one Attorney General observed:

The liberty of an individual is such a fundamental matter that even unlawful imprisonment for five minutes is actionable. Since the Uganda Director of Public Prosecutions had been fully satisfied that there was not enough evidence either to justify prosecuting Lwebuga or

detaining him, the Ugandan law had to prevail over the customary law more so because this issue concerned the liberty of an individual.¹

This case illustrates pluralistic competitive politics which were spearheaded by Buganda between 1962 and 1966. Masrui captured this aspect of Uganda's politics in these words:

Buganda's dominant position facilitated pluralistic competitive politics and helped to encourage certain habits of conflict resolution in the political style of the country as a whole.²

The pluralistic and open politics encouraged integration by assisting the resolution of conflict in an open manner and through the courts.

The support which the Abanjojere initially received suggests that although Buganda had tended to act as a cohesive political unit, there was a political and an economic gap between the masses and the chiefly traditionalists, a gap which the UPC was attempting to exploit in order to penetrate Buganda's politics. This gap was, however, very intriguing because of two factors. The institution of the Kabakaship which had over-arching characteristics which we noted, tended

¹ Cf. H.P. Morris, "Jurisdiction of the Buganda Courts and the Scope of Customary Law in Uganda", Journal of African Law, Vol.9, 1965, especially pp.160-161 and C.M.N. White "African Customary Law: The Problem of Concept and Definition", Journal of African Law, Ibid., p.88.

² A. Masrui, "Privilege and Protest as Integrative Factors: The Case of Buganda's Status in Uganda", in R. Rotberg and A. Masrui(eds.), Protest And Power In Black Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p.1075.

to bridge the political gap between the masses and the chiefly traditionalists. The economic gap between the chiefs and the masses in Buganda, was not properly understood by the people outside Buganda. The chiefs were often wrongly banded together as a feudal landowning-class which exploited the masses, masses to whom Obote attempted to pose as their saviour.¹ What Obote and his colleagues missed was that since 1900, there had occurred a significant transformation of the relationship between the chiefs and the masses which was aptly grasped by Wrigley. He observed:

During the inter-war period, there took shape a new pattern of agrarian society. At the bottom was an undifferentiated mass of free peasant cultivators, the defacto proprietors of small holdings which yielded both food and a modest money income. Above them was an administrative hierarchy of salaried chiefs, who apart from the residual bugulu and ganyu in Buganda, no longer derived any direct profit from the land or its profits.²

And thus the masses in Buganda who were not desperate, were not ready to respond to Obote's political overtures. They preferred to work with the chiefly traditionalists, the devils whom they knew than with the devils they did not

¹ More will be said about this subject when we shall be discussing Obote's Common Man's Charter of 1969.

² C. Wrigley, "Crops and Wealth in Uganda", East African Studies, No.12, Kampala, 1959, pp.48-49.

know. What we have dismissed is complex but it can be summarised by pointing out that the Lwobaga tangle gave UPC some success in Buganda but that this success was limited because the gap between the chiefly traditionalists and the masses was not as big as the UPC thought.

The failure of the Abawejjere to quantify the benefits which would have been gained by the advocated reforms, tended to weaken their case. They could have, for example, pointed out that the Katikikiro used to get about 4,000/- Shillings per month from the ground rent collected from the land attached to his office and that the Minister of Finance used to get about 3,000/- Shillings per month from this source. One Katikikiro defended this source of revenue on the ground that it used to assist the chiefs and the Ministers to meet their huge daily entertainment expenses. They added that the revenue was also necessary to enable the Ministers and the Chiefs to maintain themselves in a dignified manner which was demanded of them.

The initial refusal of the Kingdom of Buganda to obey the orders of the Uganda D.P.P., the serving of the D.P.P. with summons to justify his order before Buganda's Principal Court, and the appointment of Buganda's D.P.P. illustrate the problem which the Uganda Central Government faced in establishing its authority over the Kingdom of Buganda.

However, it must be pointed out that Buganda complied promptly with the High Court's order to release Lwabaga, a fact which illustrates that Courts served the cause of enhancing value integration which in our context refers to acceptable procedures for the resolution of conflict.

FINANCE CASE

This case illustrates Obote's failure to establish central authority over Buganda through using modern courts as referee institutions. Each group sought to use Courts in order to secure financial gains at the expense of the other. During the Independence Constitutional Conference which was held in October 1962, the Buganda delegation enhanced Buganda's 1961 Agreement by securing a special financial relationship between the Uganda Government and the Kabaka's Government, a relationship which was embodied in the ninth Schedule to the 1962 quasi-federal Constitution. Section 107 of the Constitution which was entrenched¹ provided:

The Government of Uganda shall make payments to the Kabaka's Government in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement set out in Schedule 9 to the Constitution.

Paragraph 3 of the Order in Council provided that Section 107

¹ According to Section 5(4) of the 1962 Constitution, an Act of Parliament could only alter Section 107 of the Constitution provided that it had the express consent of at least two-thirds of the members of the Buganda Lukiiko.

of the Constitution should come into effect on July 1, 1963, which was the first day of the next financial year. Paragraph 19 of the Order in Council made provision for the payments concerning the period between 1st October, 1962 and 30th June, 1963. The paragraph read:

The Government of Uganda shall, in respect of the period between 1st October, 1962 and 30th June 1963, pay to the Kabaka's Government a contribution towards the cost of services administered by the Kabaka's Government in pursuance of arrangements entered into under section 79 of the Constitution of Uganda or referred to in section 14(1) of this Order of such amount as the Government of Uganda, after consultation with the Kabaka's Government, may determine, which amount shall not be less than £375,000 in respect of each month.

The following were the terms of Schedule 9 to the Constitution:

1. The Delegations of the Central and Kabaka's Governments have agreed that Buganda's financial requirements, in addition to her independent sources of revenue (including graduated tax), and calculated on lines similar to the figures for local authorities block grants, should be provided as follows:-

- (a) fifty per cent, by assignment of certain revenues raised in Buganda (with minimum yield guaranteed) - it is intended that these should be from petrol and diesel duty and the items mentioned in paragraph 3 below; and
- (b) fifty per cent, by an annual statutory contribution from general revenue (not to be reduced without consultation with the Kabaka's Government).

2. At intervals of from three to five years there will be a review of these arrangements, not only to consider the rate of annual statutory contribution, but also to consider - in the light of actual yields - whether there should be any change in the revenues selected for assignment.
3. Revenue from stamp duty on mailo transfers and from licences on powered two-wheeled vehicles will be included in the assignments above. As to the other recommendations in paragraph 67 of the Fiscal Commission's Report, it is now agreed that the Kabaka's Government should be able to levy entertainment tax on entertainments for which it is the licensing authority. The Buganda Delegation, however, reject the proposal that Buganda should raise revenue from the licensing of unpowered bicycles or unmanufactured 'black' tobacco.
4. Additional sums which may be required in respect of further services for which the Kabaka's Government assumes financial responsibility will be made available by increasing the amount of the statutory contribution.
5. As, in accordance with its own wishes, the Kabaka's Government is excluded from the local authorities grant structure; it will not be eligible for deficiency or "catching up" grants, nor for grants to assist with the cost of salary increments.

This schedule was very important because it fortified Buganda's federal autonomy and it distinguished it from the other 'federal' states in Uganda which lacked meaningful sources of independent revenue. The Fiscal Commission which was charged, among other things, with making recommendations on the future fiscal structure and relationships in Uganda, noted Buganda's determination to acquire meaningful independent sources of revenue in these words:

We appreciate the desire of the Kabaka's Government to have independent sources of revenue so that they should be no more dependent upon the Uganda Government than would be the case in any state standing in the kind of close federal relationship in which it is envisaged. Uganda will stand.¹

Schedule 9 was indeed an outcome of hard bargaining between the Kabaka's Government and the Central Government. The proper legal interpretation of this schedule became even more crucial because the UPC/KY close relationship which had enabled the Buganda Government to assume that the Central Government would receive Buganda's financial needs sympathetically, was becoming strained daily.

Two major financial gains which distinguished the Kabaka's Government from the other 'federal' states must be noted. Buganda was entitled to receive from the Central Government assigned revenue from the sale of petrol and diesel throughout Buganda. The assigned revenue which Buganda was entitled to receive was a guaranteed minimum. In addition, if the quantity of this revenue increased as a result of the growth in the economic activity in Buganda, which was likely to happen because Buganda was the most developed area and it was in the heart of the federal capital,

¹ See Report of the Uganda Fiscal Commission (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1962), p.65. It is also referred to as the Hicks-Tress Fiscal Commission).

Buganda would automatically get the benefit of the increased revenue. In this sense, Buganda was put in a position of enjoying the advantages of this revenue without taking any responsibility for liabilities which could arise.

Furthermore, whereas the Central Government had the legal power of controlling the estimates of the other 'federal' states and the non-federal districts, it had not got control over Buganda's estimates. Article 32 of Buganda's Constitution merely provided that before submitting estimates to the Lukiiko, the Minister of Finance in the Kabaka's Government had to send the estimates to the Central Minister of Finance who was expected to make observations on the estimates. It was not provided in the Constitution of Uganda that the Lukiiko had to comply with the comments of the Central Minister of Finance. His comments were in most cases ignored by the Lukiiko.

For the sake of clarity, we must show some concrete figures concerning Buganda's income and expenditure. Buganda's revenue and expenditure from 1964 to 1967, the year in which she lost her federal status, are summarised in millions of shillings under Table V.¹

¹ Sources: Officer on Special duty, Finance, Ministry of Regional Administration, Uganda. The figures have been corrected to the first decimal point. Figures for 1962 and 1963 were not available.

Table V

Buganda's revenue and expenditure, 1964-1967

<u>Year</u>	<u>Revenue</u>	<u>Expenditure</u>
1964	83.0	84.2
1965	88.1	93.9
1966	79.0	81.4
1967	78.3	77.1

Table VI shows the figures for statutory contributions (S.C.) assigned revenue (A.R.) and Education grant (E.G.) in shillings.

Table VI

Statutory contributions, assigned revenue and Education grant for Buganda

<u>Year</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	<u>A.R.</u>	<u>E.G.</u>
1964	17,160,000	15,060,000	480,000
1965	16,500,000	19,820,000	2,620,000
1966	22,020,000	3,080,000	3,760,000
1967	18,600,000	3,540,000	3,000,000

The Kingdom had overseas investments through the Crown Agents in London in various stocks and they were worth 6,737,260/- Shillings. Devaluation of the British pound reduced their value to 5,774,800/- Shillings. Buganda had also local investments of 1,828,900/- Shillings in the Uganda Electricity Board stocks and in the Uganda Government stocks. Table VII shows the revenue for the remaining federal states in millions of shillings.

Table VII¹

Revenue for Ankole, Banyoro, Toro and Busoga

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
Ankole	15.27	16.04	17.84
Banyoro	9.03	10.01	10.59
Toro	9.43	9.91	10.77
Busoga	22.58	22.40	23.13

And thus Busoga which had the highest revenue in Table VII, had just a quarter of Buganda's revenue in 1965. Clearly Buganda's power was both financial and political.

It now remains to discuss the financial dispute between the Central Government and the Kabaka's Government, which was taken to the High Court of Uganda. Counsel for the plaintiffs (the Uganda Government) were E.F.W. Gratiian, Q.C. with Walter Jayawardena and Paul Jayarajan. "The case was concerned with the construction of Schedule 9 of the Constitution of Uganda and the question was how to calculate the financial provision which was required by Schedule 9 to be made by the Central Government to the Kabaka's Government, in respect of the latter's financial requirements'.² Lawson put the Central Government's case as follows:

¹ Source: Ministry of Regional Administration, Uganda. So many files were destroyed during the Revolution of 1966 that it was not possible to get all the figures.

² See Record of the proceedings in the High Court of Uganda in respect of Uganda Government V. the Kabaka's Government, April 13, 1964, (Civil Case No.462 of 1963). Hereafter referred to as the Proceedings.

The plaintiff's case on this issue is that the words used in clause 1 "in addition to her independent sources of revenue (including graduated tax)" are qualifications of the words "financial requirements", which means that in determining Buganda's financial requirements, you have got to find out what her requirements are after you have given allowance for her independent sources of revenue.¹

The Kabaka's Government argued that Buganda's financial requirements were the sums required to enable them to pay for the full cost of all services which they were bound to maintain and in respect of which grants were previously paid. She added that the first step in calculating any grants was to determine what was the full cost of the service measured by objective tests. In other words, the defendants were arguing that the words 'calculated on lines similar to the figures for local authorities block grants' which appear in clause I of schedule 9, referred to a formula used by the Central Government in calculating payments in respect of transferred services. The formula was hundred per cent of the net cost of the service at the date of transfer. They also emphasized that no regard was to be paid to any of the Kabaka's Government's independent sources of revenue.²

¹ The Proceedings Ibid., p.2.

² See the Proceedings Ibid., Band 26, p.2.

Gratiasen argued that the reason why Buganda's independent sources of revenue had to be kept out when calculating the statutory contributions to Buganda, was that this was Buganda's quid pro quo for being taken out of the benefits of the Local Authorities grant structure. He added that Buganda ceased being eligible for the deficiency and catching up grants and the grants for salary increments.¹ Lawson submitted that the words 'calculated on lines similar to the figures for Local Authorities block grants' meant that Buganda's financial requirements had to be calculated on the lines on which the figures for Local Authorities block grants were calculated.² This method was described by Lawson as follows:

You take the basic figure i.e. the total amount of the recurrent grants paid during the financial year ending 30th June, add to it the cost of any further transferred services as at the date of their transfer, deduct from it the additional revenue accruing to the Kabaka's Government from the implementation of the provisions which are set out in the Appendix G. That is, deduct from it the increased revenue.³

¹ See the Proceedings, Band 32, p.1.

² The Proceedings, Band 6, p.3.

³ The Proceedings, Band 4, p.2.

A few clarifications are necessary at this point. Before Appendix G. came into operation, the Central Government used to receive (i) poll tax on Africans which was collected by Local Authorities and paid over by them to the Central Government, (ii) certain taxes on non-Africans, which included poll tax and an education tax. The Local Authorities levied graduated tax on Africans and an education tax on Africans, which largely constituted their independent sources of revenue. Appendix G. stipulated that graduated tax should be payable by Africans and non-Africans alike and levied by Local Authorities and that poll tax and education tax levied by the Central Government should be abolished. Consequently, the amount of money collected by the Central Government was to that extent lessened and the amount levied and collected by Local Authorities was much increased because they were to levy graduated taxes on non-Africans and were relieved of the obligation to pay over to the Central Government the poll tax on Africans. In order, however, to restore the balance, it was provided that the extra revenue accruing from Local Authorities would be taken into account in computing Government grants.¹

¹ See Privy Council Appeal No.33 of 1964 in respect of the Kabaka's Government v. Attorney General of Uganda, pp.2-3. I have drawn on its excellent summary of these points. See also the Hicks-Tress Fiscal Report, op.cit. These points are also clarified in the Proceedings, op.cit.

Was the revenue receivable by the Kabaka's Government from the imposition of graduated tax on non-Africans to be excluded from the deductions? The Central Government had administratively agreed that additional revenue obtained by the Kabaka's Government from the imposition of graduated tax on non-Africans should not be taken into account by way of deduction in determining the financial requirements of Buganda. This decision was communicated to the Kabaka's Government in December 1962. This administrative concession was made to the Kabaka's Government while the UPC/KY alliance was still strong. The Central Government, however, reserved its right to withdraw the concession. Now that the financial dispute had been taken to the Court, the Central Government insisted that this matter be cleared by the Court as well. Lawson made this point on behalf of the Central Government in these words:

Let any question of arrangements, amicable arrangements which are on the fringes of this question, really be forgotten, as they must be because one has to bear in mind that Schedule 9 is part of the Constitution and there are parties - other Kingdoms, other territories - who are interested in the constitutional provisions other than the Central Government and the Kabaka's Government.¹

¹ The Proceedings, *Ibid.*, Band 5, pp.4-5.

The Central Government's contention was that in accordance with the method of computing grants for Local Authorities which applied to the Kabaka's Government, the Central Government was legally free to put the graduated tax into account by way of deduction in determining Buganda's financial requirements.

The next area of dispute was clause 4 of the schedule. The question which arose was whether the words 'further services for which the Kabaka's Government assumes financial responsibility' referred to the services within the responsibility of the Central Government which could be assumed by the Kabaka's Government under Section 78 and 79 of the Constitution, or whether they referred to any services which the Kabaka's Government might take over within her sphere of responsibility on her own initiative. Lawson understood the Kabaka's Government's case to be that if she decided to embark on some service which could be called a new service or a further service within her sphere of responsibility, the Central Government would be under statutory obligation to meet the cost of the new service.¹

The plaintiffs rejected this interpretation. They argued that clause 4 could not refer to any unilateral

¹ The Proceedings, Ibide. Band 8, p.2.

assumption by the Kabaka's Government of the responsibility for the administration of services which were within the executive authority of the Central Government. They argued that since certain services were solely within the executive authority of the Central Government, the only way in which the Government of a federal state could assume authority for the administration of such services, was by the Central Government delegating the administration of those services under sections 78 and 79 of the Constitution. Lawson added that the defendant's interpretation of clause 4 would reduce schedule 9 to an absurdity because the 'sky would be the limit if the Central Government's financial obligatory contributions extended to the services unilaterally assumed by the Kabaka's Government under this clause.'¹ However, the defendants accepted the plaintiff's interpretation of clause 4 before judgement was delivered.

Lastly, clause 5 was interpreted. The Kabaka's Government was determined to avoid central control which was rampant in the Local Authorities grant structure and that is why at her own wish, she was excluded from the deficiency and catching up grants and the grant for the cost of salary increments. Some clarifications are in order. The grants served as an instrument of central stimulus and control.

¹ See the Proceedings, Ibid., Band 26, p.1.

They were also used to reduce inequality of services between the districts. The Local Authorities grant structure consisted of a variety of grants which included the following:¹

(i) Block grant; the starting point for the initial block grant was the sum of the individual recurrent grants for specific services in the current year (1961/62). To this sum was added 100 per cent of the cost of services being transferred to Local Authorities. From the resulting total was to be deducted the additional revenue which the Central Government estimated should be raised by exploiting the tax powers from the London Constitutional proposals of 1961.

(ii) Expansion grants were paid subject to the availability of funds, on the basis of standard percentages of approved expansion services in accordance with the Central Government's planning priorities.

(iii) Deficiency grants were given to the poorer districts in order to enable them to maintain the level of existing services and the level of any services transferred to them. In case of the less developed districts, the deficiency grants assisted them to pay part of their share of expansion costs. It was argued by the defendants that clause five of the schedule did not prevent the Kabaka's Government from applying for the grants which were not expressly listed as grants which the Kabaka's

¹ See the Hicks-Tress Fiscal Commission, op.cit., p.37.

Government opted out of. The defendants argued that the Kabaka's Government could, for example, apply for expansion grants. This interpretation was accepted by the plaintiffs who nevertheless emphasized that the Kabaka's Government would have to accept the controls of the grants for which it applied if the Central Government agreed to accept their requests.

What was the outcome of this case? The High Court of Uganda upheld all the arguments of the Central Government and they were awarded costs. This case was heard by three Judges of the High Court who were the Chief Justice, Sir Udo Udoma, Justice Bennett and Justice Slade who read the judgment. Slade said:

From the examination of these matters, we conclude... that the block grant system was applied in its entirety to the defendant from the time of its introduction.¹

The defendant had asked the question, 'if in calculating Buganda's financial requirements, deduction is made of Buganda's additional revenue, where is Buganda's quid pro quo for opting out of the Local Authorities grant structure?' Justice Slade replied:

¹ The Judgement of the Uganda High Court in respect of the Attorney General of Uganda v. The Kabaka's Government May 4, 1964, (Civil Case No.462 of 1963), p.400. Hereafter to be referred to as The Uganda High Court Judgment.

We think we can deal with that particular point quite shortly by saying that we are not dealing with the interpretation of an agreement inter partes and so with the question of consideration. We would, if necessary, have discovered a number of aspects of the new constitutional financial relationship between the Uganda Government and the defendant which might have been thought to be of advantage to the defendant, but as we are not required to do so for the purpose of this suit, we decline to be drawn into speculation and render our task, at no time simple, even more difficult of performance.¹

The Judges also observed that the intention underlying Schedule 9 which made provision for the Kingdom of Buganda different from that made for the other Federal States, 'was not so much to alter a method of calculation of the amount of aid to be supplied, a method which had been applied to the defendant in common with the other federal states, as to effect changes in the method by which that amount of aid was to be supplied to the defendant'.² The schedule was re-written by the Judges to reflect their intention underlying it as they interpreted it. They therefore suggested the following:³

¹ Ibid., pp.402-3.

² The Uganda High Court Judgment, Ibid., p.403.

³ Ibid., pp.403-404.

The Delegations of the Central and Kabaka's Governments have agreed that in order to make provision for Buganda's financial requirements over and above the revenues raised from her own independent sources (including graduated tax), an amount, calculated in accordance with the formula adopted by the Central Government for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of the block grant payable to Local Authorities, will be provided by the Central Government in the following manner:

- (a) as to one half of such amount, by the assignment of certain revenues raised in Buganda, it being intended that such revenues should be raised from petrol and diesel duty and the items mentioned in paragraph 3 below, the Central Government guaranteeing that such assigned revenues will yield not less than the sum required to be provided under this subparagraph; and
- (b) as to the remaining half of such amount by an annual contribution from general revenue which shall not be reduced without consultation with the Kabaka's Government.

It must be noted that they interpreted the words 'on lines similar to' to mean as 'in accordance with'. They speculated that the use of the words 'calculated on the lines similar¹ to the figures for Local Authorities block grants' were intended to cater for Buganda's pride which would have been offended if it were classified as a Local Authority.

The Judges also ruled that the legislator did not intend that Buganda's financial requirements should be

¹ The emphasis is mine.

reviewed annually 'except to such an extent as might be necessary for purposes of paragraph 4 of the schedule',¹ which we must now consider. The Judges ruled that the words "further services" appearing in paragraph 4 related to functions, powers, and duties entrusted or imposed under section 78² of the independence Constitution or services administered according to section 79³ of the Constitution. The defendants and the plaintiffs reached agreement on the matter we have just discussed before judgment was delivered. Lastly, in order to avoid unnecessary future litigation, the Judges incidentally observed that the Kabaka's Government was not excluded by the provisions of paragraph 5 of the schedule from applying for other types of grants except those from which the Kabaka's Government had been specifically excluded by the paragraph.

Consequences of the Judgment

First, the Central Government was awarded costs of 66,991/- Shillings and fifty cents.⁴ The plaintiffs's Bill

¹ Ibid., p.404.

² This section enabled the Central Government to delegate authority to the federal states.

³ This section enabled the Government of Uganda to enter into arrangements with the Government of a federal state for the administration of delegated services.

⁴ The costs were for two Counsel. See the file containing Civil Case No.462 of 1963.

of costs for taxation was initially submitted as being 97,291/- Shillings and fifty cents. It was, however, taxed and allowed at Shillings 66,991/50. It will be recalled that when the Kabaka's Government lost the police case in 1963, the Central Government was awarded in August of the same year costs worth 20,607/- Shillings.¹ This money was paid by the Kabaka's Government. Again when the Kabaka's Government was defeated by Lwebuga who successfully applied for habeas corpus, the Buganda Government had to pay 6,085/- Shillings in the way of costs.² It was clear that litigation was proving to be very expensive for the Kabaka's Government which had by now lost three major cases. Considering that the Kabaka's recurrent revenue was about £4.4 Million Shillings in 1964, the three cases which it lost in the High Court, cost it nearly 0.1 per cent of its recurrent revenue in the way of paying for the Bill of costs. This sum excludes what it cost the Kabaka's Government to hire her Counsel, Gratians from Britain, and to meet other legal requirements.

Second, the morale of the Central Government was greatly boosted by winning this case. It was now given the

¹ The Attorney General of Uganda v. The Kabaka's Government (Civil Case No.488, 1963).

² Miscellaneous cause No.11 of 1963.

legal right of deducting revenue obtained from the graduated tax levied on non-Africans when calculating Buganda's financial requirements. If the Central Government exercised this right, the Kabaka's Government would lose a lot of money¹ which it had been receiving since 1962 because of an amicable arrangement which had been arrived at between the two Governments before they resorted to litigation. The victory of the Central Government hit the headlines of some vernacular Newspapers which were widely read. For example, the headline of the Munno Newspaper read:

Government Ya Uganda Yamezza
Eya Ssabasajja ku by'ensimbi.
Buganda enewa n'engassi.²

These words mean, 'The Central Government defeated the Kabaka's Government decisively over the financial dispute. Buganda will pay the costs'. The verb 'Okumegga' which literally means to wrestle to the ground, is here used in a very expressive manner to convey triumph and complete victory. In the same editorial in Munno, it was pointed out that it was sad that Buganda which had lost the police case, had also lost the finance case. The Buganda delegates to the London Independence Constitutional Conference who came back triumphantly claiming that they had brought back Buganda's 'things'

¹ It will be estimated towards the end of this Chapter.

² Munno, May 3, 1964, p.1.

or 'Buganda's legitimate property and rights', were strongly castigated by the Munno editorial commentary. It further said:

Buganda esenvudde ebbanga dene
ng'etambulira mu bulimba.¹

These words mean, 'for a long time, Buganda has been fed on lies.' The editorial commentary was in effect saying that the Central Government's victory had at last made Buganda face the moment of truth.

It is interesting to note that when the judgment was being delivered, the High Court was packed full. It included Ben Kiwanuka, the First Prime Minister of Uganda, who had been politically rejected by the Kabaka's Government during the 1962 general elections, and Kawalya Kagame, a former capable and outstanding Katikkiro of Buganda, whose father was probably the most capable Katikkiro whom Buganda has ever had. Their presence did not pass unnoticed.²

There is no doubt that the Central Government was delighted by this victory. Obote had occasion to declare that the 'ruling of the Courts confirmed the interpretation of the schedule which the Central Government had already communicated to Mengo'.³ He commented:

¹ Ibid.

² See for example, Taifa Enya, May 5, 1964, p.8.

³ See A.M. Obote, "The Footsteps of Uganda's Revolution", op.cit., p.11. Mengo in this context refers to the Kabaka's Government.

Finance was a central issue in all these demands and specifically on the matter of transferred services. Schedule 9 of the Constitution had clearly spelt out the financial relationship between the Central Government and the Buganda Government... Yet on account of only three words in it - "Buganda's financial requirements" - the Buganda Government made the provisions of this schedule a subject of protracted arguments and correspondence, and eventually litigation, on the ground that Buganda's financial requirements had to be decided by the Lukiko and whatever amount the Lukiko thought was the magnitude of that requirement, regardless of the revenues of the Central Government, what was reasonable, or the true meaning of the schedule, the Uganda Government was expected to "cough up" the money.¹

It was incorrect to suggest that the schedule had clearly spelt out the financial relationships between the Central Government and the Buganda Government. For the High Court of Uganda which upheld the Central Government's interpretation of the schedule, observed that the schedule was singularly ill-drawn. Adopting Lord Harschell's words, the Uganda High Court Judges observed:

If the object had been to render (the statute) as difficult of construction as possible, success could hardly have been more complete.¹

¹ Obote, *ibid.*

² The Uganda High Court Judgement, *op.cit.*, p.396.

The Kabaka's Government appealed to the Privy Council in Britain. The Council rejected the Kabaka's Government claim that its grants should be calculated on the basis of the full cost of running services which were formerly run by the Central Government. It at the same time upheld the Kabaka's Government's claim that there should be no deduction in respect of the estimated additional revenue accruing to the Kabaka's Government from the graduated tax levied on non-Africans. The Privy Council observed:

The respondent founds on the words which follow: "calculated on lines similar to the figures for Local Authorities block grants"... Schedule 9 does not say calculated in the same way; It says calculated on lines similar to the figure for Local Authorities block grants. In their Lordships' view the words: "on lines similar" must mean that the method of calculating Buganda's financial requirements is to follow the lines for calculating Local Authority block grants except in so far as the provisions of the Schedule otherwise require.¹

Their Lordships also declared that there would be no order to the costs of the appeal.

¹ See The Kabaka's Government (Appellants) v. The Attorney General of Uganda (Respondent) Privy Council Appeal No.33, 1964, delivered October, 5, 1965, pp.5-6.

Consequences of the Privy Council's Judgment

The consequences of the Privy Council's judgment were far reaching. First, it confirmed the belief of the ordinary Ugandans that the Privy Council in Britain could, in contrast to the High Court of Uganda, be more 'trusted' to understand Uganda's affairs and to be impartial. This view became even more plausible when in 1967 President Obote abrogated the independence Constitution and abolished the right of appealing to the Privy Council. There was a strong feeling in the country that when Obote scrapped the basic contract under which the various Kingdoms and districts had agreed to join the Uganda political system in 1962, he knew that there were many legal odds against his action and so he attempted to safeguard his political interests by abolishing the right of appealing to an outside Court - the Privy Council - over which he had no control.

Second, the Kabaka's Government construed the Privy Council's decision as constituting a political victory for Buganda over the Central Government's attempts to diminish her autonomy. Addressing a jubilant mass rally which turned up to celebrate 'Buganda's victory' at Mengo, Sambo Lubega, The Minister of Finance of Buganda declared:

Now my Ministry has become a true Ministry of Finance. Their Lordships' judgment had turned every non-African who lived in Buganda

into a Kabaka's subject. One day I will invite all of them to Mengo to pay homage to the Kabaka.¹

Lubega added that they were now 'adults' and that they did not need to go to the Central Government to ask for grants. Daudi Ocheng, an Asholi, who was a very close friend of Mengo, welcomed the Privy Council's Judgment and he observed that depriving Buganda of what was due to her as the Central Government was trying to do, was shameful because many people who did not pay taxes to Buganda, enjoyed Buganda's privileges. All Civil servants in the Kabaka's Government were released from duty at 11 a.m. to enable them to participate in the demonstrative celebrations in which music was provided by the Police Band. Earlier, a parade of some two hundred cars led by the Acting Katikkiro, A.D. Lubowa, the Minister of Health and Works, and S. Lubega, the Minister of Finance, drove from Mengo and toured Mengo district. There was overt hostility to members of the UPC who turned up to see the celebration. For example, Dr. F.B. Sembeguya, a member of Parliament who had switched from KY and joined UPC, was booed by the crowd. Addressing a jubilant crowd, Lubowa, the Acting Katikkiro, said that when the Central Government 'defeated' the Kabaka's Government in the High Court of Uganda, the Kabaka's Government was jeered and

¹ Uganda Arkus, October 9, 1963, p.1.

despised. He added:

Naye tubadde tuli awo nga Kkooti
enkulu eya Bungereza ng'etugamba
nti oluwanguzi bwaffe era ng'oku-
wanguka kwabwe, 'ekkonde evvanyuma'...¹

Literally, these words mean, 'but at this point, the High Court of England then told us that victory is ours and that theirs is defeat'. Ekkonde evvanyuma is part of a Luganda proverb, which is completed by the words lye lyasa olubale. Literally it means that he who strikes last, causes a deep cut. The nearest English equivalent is, 'he who laughs last laughs largest'. This proverb was pregnant with a lot of meaning which the jubilant crowd grasped. It conveyed the message that the Kabaka's Government had decisively defeated the Central Government. The proverb fitted various expressions which were displayed on the placards by the jubilant crowds. For example, one placard read:

Gavumenti ya Uganda tavalina
buyinga kugala ku nsimbi za
Buganda. Nkangi zenda na masego
ne Gavumenti yo. Ssabagala
Kabaka wangaala.²

The words mean that 'the Central Government had no authority to cut down Buganda's finances'. 'The Buganda Government led by Nkangi was given a mandate to continue leading Buganda'. 'Long live Kabaka'. The Sekkannyolya Newspaper described

¹ Taifa Uganda Banya, October 9, 1963, p.1.

² Taifa Uganda Banya, October 9, 1963, p.1.

the occasion as being 'iffululabigan'.¹ This is an insect which is so powerful that when it enters an anthill, the termites desert the anthill and it collapses completely. The expression meant that several houses and homes were left empty because the young and the old came out to participate in the victory.

Lubowa, the Acting Katikikiro, criticised the Central Government for preventing Radio Uganda from announcing the message from the Kabaka's Government inviting all the Baganda and their sympathisers to attend the celebration of Buganda's victory. Since the notice of this celebration was not announced by Radio Uganda and since there was not enough time to send the message to all corners of Buganda, the crowd which turned up was not as big as it would have been if ample notice had been given about this rally. In fact some Baganda who came from the remote parts of Uganda to celebrate the victory, arrived late. However, there is no doubt that the people in Kampala who joined the rally spontaneously plus the civil servants who were released from duty, made a big political impact on the people of Uganda. The Newspapers and the people who attended the rally circulated the view that Buganda had defeated the Central Government in the financial dispute and that this victory was made in Britain.

¹ Seekanyolya, October 9, 1965.

Obote felt concerned about this rally and about the news which were spreading even outside Buganda that his Government had been defeated. And therefore he said in a press conference that the decision of the Privy Council on graduated tax concerning non-Africans merely gave legal force to decisions and actions taken by the Central Government which were communicated to Mengo in December 1962. He warned Newspapers not to build up reports into 'sensational stories'.¹ He also emphasized that the Central Government's main case had been upheld by the Privy Council. It is important to note that the actual words used by Buganda fit in our thesis. Words like Okusegga were not rhetorical flourishes, they were the very stuff of the politics; they portrayed the struggle for power between the two Governments.

While the Privy Council rejected the open-ended method which Buganda claimed that the Central Government should follow in computing Buganda's grants, the Court's decision on graduated tax benefitted Buganda. The extra revenue from graduated tax paid by the non-Africans was indeed considerable and Buganda was henceforth legally - and not by concession - entitled to collect and receive it. Lubega, the Minister of Finance, estimated it to be more

¹ Uganda Argus, October 12, 1963, p.1.

than five million shillings (5,000,000/-) a year. According to the 1959 population census,¹ there were 47,021 non-Africans in Buganda, 29,748 in the Eastern Region, 4,339 in the Northern Region and 5,865 non-Africans in the Western Region.² Considering that those who earned 833/- shillings and forty cents per month (and above) were required to pay graduated tax of Shs.600/- per year, and remembering that most of the non-Africans were in the high income bracket, the total graduated tax which the Kabaka's Government was entitled to collect from them was sizeable. For example, assuming that only 20,000 of the 47,000 non-Africans paid graduated tax, the Kabaka's Government could easily have raised twelve million shillings per year from them. It is also important to note that over 90 per cent of these non-Africans lived in the city of Kampala and that they were engaged in lucrative and known jobs and thus the Kabaka's Government found it cheap and easy to collect the graduated tax from the non-Africans.

As we noted earlier on, the Baganda interpreted their right to collect this tax from non-Africans to mean that Buganda's 'sovereignty' extended to the non-Africans in Buganda who were henceforth regarded as Kabaka's subjects.

¹ This was the only available population census until 1970.

² Uganda Government 1964 Statistical Abstracts (Entebbe: Government Printer), pp.6-7.

Since most of the non-Africans in fact resided in Buganda, the Kabaka's Government felt that her political jurisdiction and control had been greatly enhanced at the expense of the Central Government. This case boosted the political ego of the Kabaka's Government. It must, however, be pointed out that Buganda used this partial victory to overshadow its other major contentions which were rejected by the Privy Council. In fact, the Privy Council's decision did not reduce the overall dominant financial position of the Central Government. It consolidated it.

Overall Consequences of the three cases

The Police Station case, the Lwebuza legal-political tangle and the finance case, entailed establishing central control over Buganda - territorial integration - the gap between the elites and the masses - social integration, and the conflict between modernity and tradition. Technically, the Courts had endorsed the authority of the Central Government in police and financial matters. This was the overall consequence of the rulings of the Uganda High Court and the Privy Council in Britain. However, when the Privy Council varied the ruling of the Uganda High Court and ordered that there should be no deductions in respect of the estimated additional revenue accruing to the Kabaka's Government from the graduated tax levied on the non-Africans, Buganda won

this aspect of the financial battle. But her partial victory was portrayed by the chiefly traditionalists as a total victory, a victory which was celebrated in the full glare of the Central Government. The different interpretations of the rulings of the Courts plus the political exaggerations of partial victories, tended to undermine Obote's grip over Buganda. Furthermore, the clear chains of command which the chiefly traditionalists enjoyed in Buganda, made it difficult for Obote to exaggerate his victory successfully in Buganda. This problem was aggravated when the Privy Council - an outside Court which was regarded as being free from Uganda's political pressure - accepted some of Buganda's legal submissions, submissions which had been rejected by the Uganda High Court. As we have already pointed out, the partial victory gave Buganda vital sources of revenue from the non-Ugandans. It should also be noted that whereas the Uganda High Court imposed costs on Buganda for losing the legal battles, the Privy Council ruled that there would be no order to the costs of the appeal. This was another variation which pleased the chiefly traditionalists and their supporters.

The Police Station case which was decided in favour of the Central Government, was not misinterpreted in Buganda and it was difficult to politicise it because the Baganda were poorly represented in the Police and the army. At this period, the power of the gun had not yet become a major

issue in Uganda's politics. The Baganda were still concentrating on winning legal and political victories. The army and the police remained a monopoly of the Central Government and these vital institutions were monopolised by the non-Baganda. However, later on the police and military institutions became vital as Obote confronted Buganda using force.

The Lwebuga tangle brought to the fore the fundamental clash between modernity and traditionalism. For the chiefly traditionalists were in effect arguing that under Buganda's customary law, Lwebuga and his sympathisers had violated the Kiganda norms when they challenged openly Katikkiro Kintu to resign and when they questioned the right of the Kabaka's Chiefs to sit in the Lukiiko and to get tribute and ground rent from the land attached to their offices. Lwebuga and his sympathisers were in effect questioning some of the pillars of the 1900 Agreement, pillars which had conferred on the chiefly traditionalists and the Kabaka the capacity to control the political fortunes of Buganda. Accordingly, the chiefly traditionalists used Buganda's customary law to charge Lwebuga with trying to incite violence, alienating the loyalty of the Kabaka's subjects and attempting to overthrow the Buganda Government headed by Kintu, the Katikkiro of Buganda. These charges were so serious that

when the Central D.P.P. directed Buganda's Principal Court to discontinue the proceedings against Lwebuga, the chiefly traditionalists were incensed by the directive. It took the High Court of Uganda to re-assert the authority of the D.P.P.

The Lwebuga legal-political tangle also showed that there was an economic and a political gap between the Abawejjere and the chiefly traditionalists. However, Obote was unable to exploit the gap in order to discredit the chiefly traditionalists and penetrate Buganda. This was so because the fertile climate of Buganda and the general level of economic development in Buganda were so favourable to the Kingdom that it was hard to find many destitute Baganda. And so when Obote in effect tried to argue that the Common Man in Buganda had nothing to lose but the exploitation of the chiefly traditionalists, his rhetoric was not persuasive to the ordinary Muganda who was far from being an exploited destitute. It should be remembered that in 1962 Obote had allied himself with the chiefly traditionalists and he missed an opportunity to associate himself with the Common Man. He seems to have underestimated the strength of a primordial bond which existed between the chiefly traditionalists and the common men through the over-arching institution of the Kabakaship, and the land tenure system. He also underestimated the conservative element of the

peasants who tend to dislike major changes. For at a personal level, the individual Muganda was conservative.

The finance case entailed establishing central authority over Buganda in this crucial sphere of finance. The Central Government hoped to utilize the financial power to reward, punish and integrate the nation-state. In order to acquire this financial power, the Central Government attempted to use the legal institutions to interpret the 1962 Constitution in such a way that the supremacy of the Central Government was endorsed. The Central Government also pointed out that money was squandered at the local level and that it was necessary to centralize this vital resource.¹ The capacity of the Central Government to use the financial resources for integrative purposes was, however, bedevilled by two factors. First, whenever the Central Government tried to justify centralizing the local resources in order to re-distribute them equitably, the chiefly traditionalists replied that there was so much financial irresponsibility at the Central level that this goal could not be achieved and that the Central Government had no moral right to point a finger at the local and the federal states for 'mismanaging' their finances. While the Central Government displayed

¹ For details see Apolo Nsibambi, "Increased Control of Buganda's Financial Sinews Since the Revolution of 1966", Journal of Administration Overseas, Vol.X, No.2, April 1971. Especially pp.101-105.

a greater sense of financial responsibility than the subordinate Governments, its record of financial management was not outstanding, a fact which even the independent Auditor General of Uganda, openly and frequently disclosed in his Reports. For example, he disclosed Officers at the central level who claimed mileage allowances for allegedly making official journeys in Uganda at the very time when they were known to be abroad where they had also made financial claims.¹

The second reason which impaired the capacity of the Central Government to use the financial resources for integrative purposes, was the belief which the chiefly traditionalists held that 'Obote's Central Government was inclined to spend most of its energy and resources depriving Buganda of its financial and political autonomy and pre-eminence. Whether this belief was false or correct, should not detain us now because what matters for our discussion is that it conditioned the actions of the chiefly traditionalists in Buganda. According to the interviews which were carried on in Buganda, the belief that Buganda would never be equitably treated by the other ethnic groups was based

¹ See The Report of the Auditor General of Uganda for the year ending June 1968, paragraph 327. For more details see the Auditor General's Reports from 1963 to 1969, which were critical of the Central Government's financial record.

on the claim by the chiefly traditionalists that the Kingdom was envied by the rest of the Ugandans. These suspicions were responsible for the chiefly traditionalists demanding for the Constitutional fetters in the 1962 Constitution. These fetters were meant to safeguard Buganda's autonomy. It is against this political background of suspicion that the financial dispute between the two Governments was taken to the Court of Uganda and to the Privy Council in Britain.

As already noted, the decisions of the Courts were either distorted or exaggerated as each political actor wished to convince his ignorant followers that he had won the legal-political victory. And so while the Courts served the important purpose of being referee institutions for the resolution of political conflict between the Buganda Government and the Central Government, in the long run the political atmosphere of suspicion and intolerance and political distortion of the decision of the Courts, impaired the capacity of the Courts to act as lasting integrative institutions. Obote thus resorted to the use of extra-constitutional methods in order to reduce Buganda's hegemony. This is the subject of our next Chapter. The words of one distinguished American Judge are pertinent to the conclusion of this Chapter. He said:

... That a society so riven
that the spirit of moderation
is gone, no Court can save;
that in a society which evades
its responsibility by thrusting
upon the Courts the nurture of
that spirit, the spirit in the
end will perish.¹

In short, the decline of political moderation, toleration
and good will in Uganda, made it increasingly difficult for
the Ugandan Courts to act as integrative institutions.
Consequently, the policy of allowing the struggle for power
between the Central Government and the Kabaka's Government
to be thrashed out in the Courts of law, faced the danger
of being replaced by the policy of confrontation where the
use of naked force was invoked. This is the subject of our
next Chapter.

¹ Quoted in G. Gunther, "The Constitution of Ghana - an
American's impression and comparison" University of
Ghana Law Journal, Vol.VII, 1970, p.11.

CHAPTER V

INTEGRATION BY FORCE: THE OBOTE REVOLUTION

In 1966, Obote who was faced with a major struggle for leadership within the UPC, abandoned the pragmatic-pluralist approach to integration. He tried to embark upon a revolutionary centralising approach. We shall, however, argue that he fell short of fulfilling the conditions of the revolutionary centralising approach. Our major argument is that Obote lost the following opportunities: After abolishing the Lukiiko which contained non-elected county chiefs, he replaced it with four councils which consisted of nominated members. He thus lost yet another opportunity of democratizing Buganda and of modernizing politically Buganda's polity. This mistake in turn deprived him of another opportunity of forging direct links with the common men in Buganda, whom he was urging to join him as he confronted the Kabaka and the chiefly traditionalists. After abolishing the monarchy and the Lukiiko, two cornerstone institutions of Buganda, Obote missed another opportunity of creating credible alternative political national institutions for integrating the humiliated and alienated Buganda into Uganda. His party, UPC was weak and divided. Consequently, he depended a lot on the army in order to survive. Uganda's politics was thus militarized until the army took over power in 1971. Our

overall assessment is that all these measures made the Baganda insecure and more retribalized as they groped for security and a sense of political direction.

POLITICAL DIVISIONS WITHIN UPC CONTRIBUTE TO THE
CRISIS OF 1966

When Obote was explaining the 1966 crisis to the nation, he did not reveal the fact that the immediate cause of the crisis was the struggle for the leadership within the UPC. He thus tried to gain the sympathy of the non-Baganda by describing the crisis in terms of the confrontation between the privileged nonarchical Establishment of Buganda led by the Kabaka of Buganda, and the republicans and the common men, of whom he claimed to be the champion. While it is true that the confrontation between the chiefly traditionalists and republicans at the central level was part of the 1966 crisis, it must be stressed that the immediate cause of the 1966 crisis was the struggle for leadership within the UPC. These divisions were so fundamental that they impaired the capacity of the party to act as an integrating institution, especially when Obote had destroyed Monarchy and had created a new political situation.

While the process of crossing the floor swelled the strength of the UPC within Parliament, it also weakened the party because some of the people who crossed into the UPC

did so in order to oust the leadership of the party from Obote. Furthermore, the ideological differences between the Youth Wingers and the Ibingira group were also becoming sharper. The Youth Wingers were still demanding for the nationalization of private property and for the adoption of a rigorous socialist ideology. These demands were unacceptable to Ibingira and the more conservative Kabaka Yekka supporters. Ibingira was also emerging as a strong rival of Obote, the leader of the UPC. Crawford Young who captured the factionalism in the UPC wrote:

A year after the defections had swelled the UPC's Parliamentary ranks, it had become dramatically clear that the multiple cleavages in the Uganda society - ethnic, religious, regional and merely personal - had been concealed but not eliminated. The party's apparent strength was eroded in a complex sequence of factional conflicts in the central and local arenas, and by the beginning of 1966, UPC seemed about to come apart.¹

In July 1965, the Kabaka himself and Katikkiro Mayanja-Nkangi met members of the Lukiiko and Buganda's representatives in the Parliament in order to discuss the

¹ C. Young, "The Obote Revolution", Africa Report Vol.II, No.6, June 1966, pp.10-11. For more information on the 1966 crisis, consult Ryan, op.cit., Gingyera-Pinyowa, "Uganda and the African Revolution", Pan African Journal, Vol.III, No.4, Fall, 1970, and Obote, "The Footsteps of Uganda's Revolution", op.cit., Nandani, op.cit., pp.245-250.

proposal of allowing the KY members to join the UPC. The Kabaka, Katikkiro Mayanja-Nkangi and Prince Badru Kakungulu, the uncle of the Kabaka, were some of the Baganda major political figures who believed that the time had come for Buganda to fight for the preservation of the Kingdom's special position through joining the UPC. Ibingira supported this proposal. Most of the members of the Lukiiko were totally opposed to the idea of disbanding the KY and of joining the UPC. The opponents of the proposal argued that Obote had already got the overall majority in Parliament and that the proposal would not strengthen Buganda's bargaining power. There was another proposal that Buganda should form a political party whose title should be more acceptable to the non-Baganda than KY. This proposal was turned down by the Lukiiko members. It was eventually decided to retain KY.

Meanwhile, the disenchanted Baganda nationalists like Mulira and Luyimbazi-Zake, decided to leave KY and they joined the UPC. These nationalists had repeatedly pointed out to the Baganda chiefly traditionalists that Buganda could not afford to remain isolated. For example in 1963, they had written:

... to think that Buganda is a separate country from Uganda would be to live in the unrealistic, isolationistic view that many of us have held up to date and which serves to prejudice Buganda and the Baganda not only

in Uganda but also outside
Uganda.¹

We must point out that by 1964, Buganda had abandoned secession especially after the Kabaka was made the President of Uganda. However, Buganda's loss of the two counties to Bunyoro had to a certain extent revived the isolationist political tendency of the chiefly traditionalists who could not be moved to join the UPC however expedient the proposal was. Even the Kabaka himself was unable to persuade them to accept the proposal of joining the UPC.² This meeting demonstrated clearly to the Baganda nationalists that they had to join the UPC from which they could realise their political aims.

Meanwhile factionalism within the UPC became more acute and was expressed openly. Ibingira attacked the factionalism. He said:

The problem has corroded into the entire fabric of the party ... The ultimate conclusion of this exercise can never be beneficial to the party as a whole. In every district and Kingdom in Uganda to day factionalism is engineered, encouraged, increased and maintained by the UPC members within the

¹ J. Luyimbazi-Zake, Nyanja-Nkangi, et al. Fresh Political Approach in Buganda, Kampala, 1963, p.5.

² Mwandani is thus incorrect when he says that in 1965 the Kabaka Yekka decided to disband as a party and it instructed its members to join the UPC. Mwandani, op.cit., p.244.

party... The real issue is that the UPC is creating problems for itself, and that is a most serious state of affairs, which must genuinely, honestly and collectively be corrected.¹

During a political rally, Obote attacked 'Africans who allowed themselves to be bought with money from other countries because the Africans in question were greedy for power'.²

These statements clearly indicated that there were serious political divisions within the UPC. A major incident had taken place in August 1965 which had humiliated the Secretary General of the UPC. A rally which had been organized at Masaka in South West Uganda, to celebrate defections from KY to UPC, was banned by the police. Ibingira, the Minister of State and the Secretary General of the UPC, was informed by the police that he could not organize the rally because it would lead to a disturbance of the peace. The opportunity for ousting Obote from power constitutionally occurred when on February 4, 1966, Ochieng made the following charges in Parliament:

- (a) that Apollo Obote, the Prime Minister, K. Onama, the Minister of Defence, A.A. Nekyon, the Minister of Planning and Community Development, and the Deputy

¹ Reporter, December 17, 1965, p.11.

² Ibid., p.11.

Commander of the Army, received gold, Ivory and moneys from the Congo.¹ It was also alleged that the Prime Minister took £50,000 worth of gold and ivory and that Onama and Nekyom received £25,000 each.²

- (b) It was further claimed that there were plots intended to use force to abrogate the Constitution and that the Deputy Commander of the Army around whom the coup was being built, was promised the position of the Commander of the Uganda Armed Forces.

What is important for our discussion is that with the exception of one Minister, all members of Parliament supported the motion which charged the Prime Minister with corruption. We should add that when the motion was moved Obote was in the Northern part of Uganda. It was agreed that the Deputy Commander of the Army be suspended and that the matter be investigated. This motion shook the confidence of the Central Government greatly.

A brief interpretation of these events is in order at this point. The moving of such a crucial motion by a

¹ See Evidence and Findings of the Commission of Inquiry Into Allegations Made by the late David Ochieng on February 4, 1966. (Kampala: Uganda Publishing House, 1971), p.9. Hereafter to be referred to as the de Lestang's Commission.

² Ibid.

member of KY which was accepted by all members of Parliament except one, indicated that there was a struggle for power within UPC which was exploited by the late Oshiong, an adroit Parliamentarian. That the survival of Obote as the leader of the UPC was at stake, was indicated by the fact that such a vital motion was moved in his absence by a clever manipulation of the Parliamentary timetable which would not have taken place if he had not been at least temporarily forsaken by his Cabinet and his party. We may add that before this incident took place, rumours concerning intra-party intrigues within the UPC had been circulating in political circles in Kampala. As far back as 1965, Mangan Aurrah, a member of the Kampala City Council and UPC said:

It has been rumoured that some leaders of Bantu tribes are associated with the move to oust Nilotic leaders from the leadership of Uganda People's Congress and Government. Where does Mr. Ibingira stand?¹

Mangan was referring to the political cleavage between the Bantu and the Nilotes which had been specifically injected in the struggle for power within the UPC around 1965. We must examine it.

¹ Africa Digest XVI, No.2, October 1965, p.36. Cf. C. Lays, Politicians and Policies: An Essay on Politics in Acholi, Uganda, 1962-1965. (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), p.12.

As already noted, the Nilotes include the Langi, Acholi, Alur, Jopadhola and the Jonam. They share a high degree of mutual linguistic intelligibility. They were over-represented in the army, especially the Langi, Obote's tribesmen, and the Acholi. The predominance of the Northerners in the army and police which Obote never disputed,¹ is a Colonial legacy which continued to thrive after Uganda had achieved independence. During the Colonial era, the people from the Northern part of Uganda were encouraged by the British to join the army partly because the white-collar jobs were monopolized by the Baganda and by the remaining people from the Bantu group.

Professor Masrui who was the Head of the Department of Political Science at Makerere in Uganda, says that after the unsuccessful mutiny of 1964, Obote strengthened his position in the army. To use Masrui's own words:

Following the disarming of the mutineers, Obote proceeded to make suitable changes in the armed forces to strengthen his position. He reportedly dismissed five hundred men and promoted those he thought he could rely upon. Pre-eminent among those who were promoted was Major Idi Amin.²

¹ See Obote, "Myths and Realities", *op.cit.*, p.11, see also "The Uganda Army: Nexus of Power", *Africa Report*, December, 1966, pp.37-40 and Ginyera-Pinyowa, "A.M.Obote, the Baganda, and the Uganda Army", *Mawazo*, Vol.3, No.3, December 1971.

² A.Masrui, *Cultural Engineering...* *op.cit.*, p.175. In 1971, Amin showed his disloyalty to Obote by grabbing power from him.

The Bantu who are found in the Southern part of Uganda include Baganda, Batoro, Banyero, Banyankore, and the Bakiga. They also share a significant degree of mutual linguistic intelligibility. Furthermore, they tended to monopolize the Civil Service and the remaining white-collar jobs because they happened to have received a greater share of education than the Northerners during the colonial era. As the author said elsewhere, the political cleavage or dichotomy between the Nilotes and Bantu was more latent than real,¹ especially in 1963. Indeed, neither the Nilotes nor the Bantu were a united political group. However, this latent cultural cleavage between the two groups was successfully exploited by the politicians as a result of which the struggle for power within the UPC was simplified by reducing it to two major opposing camps. The Nilotic group was said to be headed by Obote himself and supported by the army, while the Bantu group tended to rally around Ibingira, the Secretary General of the UPC. Ibingira enjoyed the advantage of being a prince from the Ankole Kingdom. As such, he attracted the attention of the four Kings, especially of Sir Edward Mutesa, the President of Uganda, and Kabaka of Baganda. Sir William Nadiops, the Vice-President of Uganda, and the ruler of Busoga, belonged to the Ibingira group.

¹ See the author's article, "Political integration..." op.cit., pp. 36-37.

It must, however, be stressed that while the political cleavage between the Bantu and the Nilotics played an important role during the struggle for power, this interpretation tends to simplify a more complex realignment of forces. For example, the dichotomy overlooks the fact that the late Daudi Odingo who moved the motion in Parliament in February 1966, was a Nilotic and yet he was a staunch member of KY and a close political and personal friend of Sir Edward Mutesa. S. Odaka, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, belongs to the Bantu group and yet he supported Obote even in exile. There was also a wrong tendency to lump all the Northerners under the label of Nilotics.¹ And yet the Madi, for example, who are Northerners belong to the Sudanic Speakers.

We must now return to the discussion of the consequences of the Odingo motion. On February 17, 1966, Obote announced that a Judicial Commission had been set up to investigate 'the Odingo allegations'. The Commission consisted of Sir Clement de Lestang, the Chairman who came from the East African Court of Appeal, Mr. Justice Miller from Kenya, and Mr. Justice Saidi from Tanzania. The fact that the Commission consisted of the Judges whose integrity was not questioned, had the effect of helping Obote to recover from the stunning blow of the allegations which were

¹ Nilotics and Nilotes mean the same thing.

made in Parliament; for the appointment of such Judges implied that Obote was confident that he was innocent. The strange thing to note, however, is that he never published the findings of the Commission. And yet when the Report of the de Lestang's Commission was published after Obote was ousted, it did not, on the whole, indict him.

ABROGATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION

When Obote had ascertained that the army was behind him, he made a dramatic move by arresting five Cabinet Ministers assembled for a Cabinet meeting on February 23, 1966. These were: Grace Ibingira, M. Ngebi, E. Lusa, B. Kirya and G. Magesi. They all belong to the Bantu group. On the same day, he announced that he had taken over all the powers of the Government in order to safeguard public security, stability and tranquility. He cleverly appealed to the feelings of the Ugandans by emphasizing that the survival of the nation was at stake. In fact, it was the survival of Obote as the leader of the UPC which was initially at stake. Later on, however, the two were interlinked because of the forces which reacted strongly against Obote's extra-constitutional measures which he was ready to defend by the use of the armed forces. On February 24, 1966, he announced that he had suspended the Constitution in order to ensure stability, unity and order in the country. He said,

During my tour of the Northern Region early this month, an attempt was made to overthrow the Government by foreign troops. Some foreign Missions stationed in Uganda were requested for military assistance by persons who hold positions in the Government under the Constitution. These requests were made outside the provisions of the Constitution and were for massive military assistance consisting of foreign soldiers and arms.¹

Obote who must have been aware of the entrenched tradition of constitutionalism in Uganda, attempted to anticipate a strong reaction against suspending the Constitution by pointing out that his suspension of the document was temporary. When he announced that persons holding positions in the Government had requested for foreign troops, he was obliquely referring to Sir Edward Mutesa, the President of Uganda, and Kabaka of Buganda. This remark accelerated the long-awaited confrontation between Obote and Buganda, which we must now examine.

The Lukiiko denounced all Obote's extra-constitutional moves right from the beginning. It was joined by the Democratic Party which accused Obote of confusing his personal survival with the survival of the nation.² Sir Edward himself

¹ This public statement is reproduced in The Birth of the Second Republic (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1971), p.7. See also Uganda Argus, February 25, 1966.

² The Reporter, March 1, 1966, p.12.

played into Obote's hands when he admitted openly that 'he had scolded out the British High Commissioner and some African Ambassadors as to whether it would be possible to fly in troops if the situation got out of hand'.¹ Obote seized this opportunity to charge Sir Edward with treason and to take more dramatic extra-constitutional steps. And so on April 15, 1966, he abrogated the independence Constitution and replaced it with an interim one at gun point.² In order to legitimize his interim Constitution, he rushed it to Parliament where it was endorsed before it was read by the members of Parliament. As members of Parliament listened to him summarize what was in the Constitution, 'four air force jets wheeled overhead in formation and several truck loads of soldiers patrolled the streets'.³ In the end he said, "this is the document and fairly soon you will find copies in your pigeon-holes."⁴ 55 members of Parliament endorsed it and 4 voted against it.⁵

¹ This admission which appeared in the local newspapers, is also contained in the Kabaka's book, op.cit., p.186.

² For an account of his justification of his extra-constitutional steps, see Uganda Parliamentary Debates, April 15, 1966 especially pp.16-20.

³ Crawford Young, op.cit., p.8.

⁴ Uganda Parliamentary Debates, op.cit., p.16.

⁵ The dissenters were E.W.K. Mulira, Dr. P.Sambeguya and S.K. Nasemba-Kabali; all former members of KY who had joined UPC, and A. Kangahho, a former member of DP, who had joined UPC. By this time some members of KY who were also members of Parliament were in detention.

Obote had earlier relieved Sir Edward and Sir William Nadiope of the positions of President and Vice-President respectively, a move which was endorsed by this interim Constitution. He was now the President with a lot of powers which will be discussed under the 1967 Constitution. The angry Lukiiko which had denounced all Obote's moves in resolutions which were strongly worded, passed a provoking resolution on May 20, 1966, ordering Obote's "illegal Central Government to move its offices away from Buganda's soil by May 30, 1966". And thus Obote's extra-constitutional moves revived Buganda's quest for secession. Obote, who regarded this motion as an act of rebellion, moved decisively to crush it with force. On May 23, he arrested three County Chiefs and three other members of the Lukiiko, whom he regarded as the chief organisers of the rebellion. The County Chiefs included Sebanakitta and Lutaya who were close friends of the Kabaka. Henceforth, isolated incidents of violence started to take a more violent shape in Buganda. Police stations were attacked and a number of people rushed to the Kabaka's Palace to guard him against any possible harm. On May 24, the Uganda Army attacked the Kabaka's Palace on the orders of Obote. After some twelve hours of fighting, the troops entered the Palace and took charge of it. The Kabaka himself had fled during a spell of rain.

Eventually, he went into exile in Britain. Many people lost their lives. We must now examine Obote's centralisation measures which were eventually contained in the 1967 Constitution, a constitution which replaced the interim one on September 8, 1967.

The Revolution of 1966 which was enshrined in the 1967 Constitution, enhanced Obote's capacity to monopolize the power to direct who gets what, when and how, in the following respects: It destroyed Buganda's autonomy which was the cornerstone of resistance to central authority; it gave Obote power to appoint and dismiss senior and junior officials both in the national and district services; it gave him important legislative powers. Lastly, the detention and emergency regulations virtually gave Obote power over wider areas of people's lives.

ABOLITION OF MONARCHY AND LUKUNGU

One important source of Buganda's power was that Buganda's political coherence revolved around the Kabaka who continued to participate in politics while he enjoyed the advantage of being shielded from public political assaults because he was theoretically expected to be a constitutional Monarch since 1953 and because of the royal mystique which surrounded him and the Palace politics. Obote seems to have been aware of the royal mystique which surrounded the Kings

because in his public speeches he attempted to deflate the mystique by arguing that the Kings were after all commoners like other people and that there was nothing special about them. For example, when the proposals for the 1967 Constitution were debated in Parliament, Obote said:

... It looks to me odd that the personalities who were known as Kings were at the same time Knights of the British Crown. Mr. Speaker, I understand that the British Crown gives these Knighthoods to Commoners and I argue that if anybody said he was a King and took a Knighthood which is for a Commoner, he must be a Commoner.¹

Obote also attempted to consolidate his assault against the Monarchy by associating it with unwarranted privileges. He proceeded to appeal to the sentiments of the poor, the republicans, and even to those who came from the monarchical Kingdoms but who were not so privileged by declaring that he represented the common man in the struggle against the privileged group. To use his own words:

... the present crisis therefore, is one of a struggle between the interests of the common man and the persons who are highly placed and occupy positions of influence. The Constitution cannot therefore be allowed to be used to suppress the interests of the common man.²

¹ Uganda Parliamentary Debates, June 22, 1967, p.311.

² Uganda Parliamentary Debates, Vol.59, April 15, 1966, p.7.

He abolished Monarchy and established republicanism throughout Uganda. Among those who opposed this move was Abu Mayanja, a former Minister in the Kabaka's Government, and one of the oldest nationalists in Uganda. His major argument was that the Kings were the embodiment of African Culture and heritage. He argued:

Mr. Speaker, I do not at all agree that the existence of Kings would detract us from building a united nation, or that my loyalty to the Kabaka of Buganda would mean that I have, therefore, less loyalty to the Republic of Uganda...¹

Arguments of this nature did not persuade the anti-monarchists to change their minds. Indeed, there was a fundamental clash of values between monarchy and republicanism.

Another dimension of Buganda's power, was the existence of chiefs as ex-officio members of the local councils. The chiefs were part and parcel of the monarchical system and they tended to use their influence to obstruct radical reforms in the local councils. Obote abolished this system. He also abolished the system under which the Ministers and the Chiefs in Buganda used to get tribute and ground rent from the land which was attached to their offices.

Buganda's autonomy used to be fortified by the fact that the Kingdom had an independent Appointments Board and

¹ Uganda Parliamentary Debates, July 1967, p.652.

a Civil Service, which she controlled. People who felt politically insecure in the national Civil Service could always rely on joining the autonomous Kabaka's Establishment. As already noted, Buganda's autonomy was buttressed by her independent sources of revenue. All these aspects were entrenched in the 1962 Constitution. With the abolition of federalism, Buganda's independent sources of revenue and her independent Appointments Board, were abolished. The independent Appointments Boards throughout Uganda were replaced by district and Urban Service Committees¹ which were under the firm grip of Obote because he was henceforth to appoint members of these Committees which in turn had to obey his instructions to appoint and dismiss persons working in the districts. In practice, however, Obote was too busy to scrutinise these appointments. However, with the assistance of his political supporters, he managed to pay special attention to the appointments and dismissals in Buganda because this Kingdom had been the major source of his problems.

The last facet of the Buganda autonomy was the aggressive and militant Lukiiko which had ordered Obote to remove what it called his 'illegal Government from the soil of Buganda'. This too was abolished. Buganda was divided into four districts and each was to have a council whose members

¹ See Section 103 of the Uganda Constitution, 1967.

were nominated by the Central Government. The division of Buganda into four districts seems to have been aimed at destroying the corporate identity of Buganda and at reducing Buganda to the level of the other districts. This move was appreciated by the rest of Uganda because it established parity of esteem between Buganda and the remaining districts. Bulange, the seat of the Kabaka's Government, was given to the army which started using it as a hostel. The Kabaka's Palace was also turned into an accommodation centre for the military men. These two moves symbolized the final physical demolition of Buganda's special position. Some Ugandans construed them as the desecration of the Kiganda culture. Indeed, when Sir Edward Mutesa used the title the 'Desecration of my Kingdom' to describe these revolutionary moves, he was expressing the view that some of Obote's moves constituted an assault on the values for which the Kingdom stood.

Once Obote had destroyed Buganda's special position, the attendant pockets of power which in this context refer to the Kingdoms of Toro, Ankole and Bunyoro, and the Territory of Basoga, were easy to deal with. In fact the abolition of Monarchy was not physically resisted in these areas. Furthermore, the decisive manner in which he crushed Buganda's resistance with naked force, seared the attendant pockets of power. Hence these areas went to the extent of placating

Obote by sending him public messages of support for his measures.

OBOTE CENTRALIZES POWER

The rest of the Chapter shows that Obote centralized power and appeared to be the undisputed leviathan even in Buganda. It must, however, be pointed out that he lacked political legitimacy and viable institutions through which to popularize his new measures. That he lacked legitimacy was demonstrated by the fact that he kept Buganda under emergency from 1966 until he was overthrown in 1971. He also avoided touring Buganda in a bid to get support for his new measures. Furthermore, he did not hold fresh general elections when they were due in 1967. His party was very weak and it was not involved in discussing or implementing his revolutionary measures in Buganda. He depended more and more on the army and the use of the spying system in order to stay in power.

Under the revolutionary changes, Obote was empowered to appoint and dismiss not only senior officials but also junior ones who under normal circumstances would have been outside the concern of a busy Head of State. For example, he was empowered to appoint members of the Teaching Service Commission and members of the District and Urban Service

Committees.¹ In most cases, the exercise of his powers was precluded from being inquired into by any court.² The hitherto executive Public Service Commission became advisory to him. The importance of these powers should be appreciated by remembering two points. Uganda is a poor country which has few independent organizations that can offer lucrative and secure jobs such as are found in the Civil Service. The retail and wholesale trade was monopolised by Asians until 1972.³ Consequently, the indigenous people tend to look to the Government which is the biggest and most powerful employer in the country. When Obote was thus given the powers to recruit and dismiss senior and junior officials in the public service, he was given the power to control a big section of the Ugandans. Furthermore, he was seen and heard exercising these powers. For example, I. Musasi, who had been one of the greatest opponents of the Kabaka's Government was made Chairman of the Central Land Board which had taken over powers which belonged to the districts before the Revolution. Abdulla Anyara, a strong member of the UPC, was made Chairman of the Public Service Commission. Nkombe-Npankura, an outspoken supporter of the UPC, was made Chairman of the National Trading Corporation. Some of the appointed members of the

¹ Section 66 of the 1967 Constitution.

² See, for example, Article 78 of the 1967 Constitution.

³ In 1972, most of them were expelled to Britain.

four district Councils in Buganda could barely write and they had been taxi-drivers, not previously a qualification for political office there. Their qualification now was their outspoken support of the UPC. Over ninety-eight per cent of the County Chiefs who had served under the Kabaka were dismissed and they were replaced by supporters of the new regime. It must be pointed out that some of Obote's appointees were very capable men who were required to profess openly that they supported UPC. We have to stress that our major point is not to show whether it was good or bad to appoint only supporters of the party. Rather we wish to argue that after the Revolution, people who used to depend on the Kingdoms and districts for their livelihood, were now decidedly angling for Obote's favour because he had acquired the power to decide who gets what, when and how.

Obote's legislative powers were also important. He was authorized to promulgate ordinances having the same force as an Act of Parliament.¹ When promulgating the ordinances, he was required to act on the advice of the Cabinet which he appointed and had the authority to dismiss. He was also authorized to make treaties and conventions between Uganda and any other country in respect of any matter.² If the treaty related to armistice, neutrality or peace, then it

¹ See Section 64 of the 1967 Constitution.

² See Section 76 of the Constitution.

required the ratification of the National Assembly.

Whereas most of what we have discussed so far enabled Obote to control 'bread and butter', the Detention and Emergency Powers enabled him to control the movement and liberty of the people and virtually their existence. We should note that since the Emergency Powers were used in Uganda from 1966 until Obote was overthrown in 1971, he found it superfluous in most cases to use the Detention Act since the Emergency Powers could be used to detain people without trial. One of the most memorable opponents of the Detention Act who later on became a victim of detention was Abu Mayanja. He said in Parliament:

Mr. Speaker, detention without trial corrodes. It corrodes, it eats into all the other rights and freedom, which we are trying to guarantee to the peoples of Uganda under Chapter III, in such a manner as to make them meaningless...¹

He made some interesting clarifications which are lengthy but which are worth quoting. He said:

Those of us who are Muslims believe this. We believe that on the day of Judgement, we shall be called and the Angels will read out a record which will be an indictment before God, who will know, because God is Omniscient. He knows

¹ Uganda Parliamentary Debates, July 5, 1967, p.613.

everything. He will know beforehand that Mayanja is guilty or not guilty, but God who is Omniscient, on the day of Judgement will get the indictment read out by an accusing Angel and a man will be given an opportunity to defend himself. (Laughter).¹

Mayanja's persuasive point was that even God would not condone detention without trial.

It is interesting to note that A. Nakyon, a cousin of Obote, who had resigned from Obote's Government but who remained a member of the UPC, complained that some of the Powers which had been given to the President were excessive.² He recommended that they be reduced. The Emergency Regulations were used quite extensively. Those detained under the Regulations ultimately included Benedicto Kiwanuka, the first Prime Minister of Uganda, and the then leader of the DP, Sir William Nadiope, the Vice-President of Uganda, and Kyabasinga (ruler) of Busoga, Cuthbert Obwangor, a Minister, and J.W. Kiwanuka, a member of Parliament, as well as the five ex-Ministers who had been arrested during the Cabinet meeting in 1966.

¹ Ibid., p.613.

² Uganda Parliamentary Debates, July 29, 1967, p.473.

At this juncture, we wish to point out that the revolutionary changes were mostly hated in Buganda because they affected it most. To a lesser extent the changes were also resented in the former Kingdoms because they lost their Kings. However, in the remaining parts of Uganda, the changes were generally warmly received, inter alia, because they reduced the hegemony of Buganda which was a constant source of irritation and resentment to the less privileged districts. Although many Baganda covered up their hatred because they feared reprisals, the Government became aware¹ that its policies were not popular in Buganda. Consequently, it started relying on the General Service, a Department which was concerned with political spying.

Obote's abrogation of the 1962 Constitution and his adoption of the 1966 interim Constitution which was replaced by the 1967 Constitution, cleared the legal tangles which had been created by his extra-constitutional actions.² In a civil Suit No.206 of 1966, the Buganda Government had sought a declaration from the High Court of Uganda that the assumption of all the powers by the Prime Minister Obote

¹ Through the reports of the District Commissioners all of whom I interviewed and who admitted that the ordinary Baganda was still greatly attached to the Kabaka.

² See also Sir Edward Mutesa II's Appeal to the United Nations On the Buganda Question, April 22, 1966. It was not responded to.

was a violation of the 1962 Constitution and that the Kabaka was still the President of Uganda. All these constitutional complications were overcome when the High Court of Uganda ruled that the 1966 Constitution which had replaced the 1962 Constitution, was a valid one. The questioning of the validity of the 1966 Constitution arose when A.K. Mayanja, a former Minister in the Kabaka's Government, applied for the habeas corpus on behalf of Michael Matovu, a County Chief of Budda, who had been detained on May 22, 1966.¹ The application for the habeas corpus entailed questions of the interpretation of the Constitution.² The Uganda High Court raised the question whether the 1962 Constitution and not the 1966 Constitution was the valid Constitution of Uganda.³ The High Court of Uganda inter alia ruled that there had been an abrupt political change not contemplated by the 1962 Constitution and that there could be no doubt about the efficacy of the changes.⁴ They concluded that the 1966 Constitution was valid, a judgment which cleared the legal obstacles which Obote was facing.

¹ Judgment in the matter of a Writ of Habeas Corpus and in the matter of an Application by Michael Matovu. It was delivered on February 2, 1967. Miscellaneous Application No.83 of 1966. Hereafter referred to as the Matovu Judgment.

² The Matovu Judgment, Ibid., p.40.

³ Ibid., p.41.

⁴ Ibid., p.47.

One last extra-constitutional piece of legislation which is part of the Revolution and which enhanced Obote's capacity to monopolize political power remains to be mentioned. The five ex-Ministers whom Obote had detained, applied for a writ of habeas corpus to the High Court of Uganda which was dismissed. When, however, they appealed to the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa in Nairobi, Kenya, the appeal was allowed.¹ The Court ordered that the appellants were to have their costs. Obote moved these Ministers to Buganda where Emergency Regulations were operating, he freed them and re-arrested them under the Regulations. Obote's next move was to pass the Deportation (Validation) Act which started operating retrospectively from July 27, 1946. The Act² indemnified the Government from all penalties and liabilities arising out of the deportation orders which were served to the ex-Ministers. It outraged the cause of litigation fundamentally because it demonstrated that if the Central Government was successfully challenged through litigation, the Government was resolved to assert its power through the use of Emergency Powers and special legislation. The Act in effect deprived those people of their property.

¹ Grace Ibingira and others v. Uganda, Criminal Appeal No.63 of 1966. It is reported in the Eastern Law Reports, 1966, pp.306-310.

² See Act 14, Deportation (Validation) Act 1966.

By now the futility of litigation had been demonstrated by this case and people were scared of challenging the validity of the Act.

BUGANDA IS REDUCED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL OF
OTHER DISTRICTS

Following the Revolution of 1966, Obote introduced through his Minister of Regional Administrations, the Local Administration Bill of 1967. Its major effect was to reduce Buganda to the administrative status of the other districts. Furthermore, the Government centralized more powers.¹ J.W. Lwamafa, a former Minister of Regional Administrations, said in Parliament:

There was a time when we had almost no say over Buganda matters, they dealt almost directly with the Minister of Finance in the Central Government. So because of that, people were confused, they could not see where the Source of power lay and now, I am happy that my colleague the Minister of Regional Administrations is going to administer the whole of our Local Administrations in the country and this, I am sure, will bring about a sense of oneness, a sense of loyalty to the Government and a sense of

¹ For a discussion of disengaging the Missions from the administration of education, see Apolo Nsubambi, "The Politics of Education in Uganda, 1964-1970", The Uganda Journal, Vol.38, 1976.

understanding that power lies
at the centre.¹

The Central Government reclaimed the following
services which had been run by the Local Administrations:-

- (i) Water Supply: The major services reclaimed were the drilling of boreholes and the making of valley tanks and dams.
- (ii) Forestry: under statutory instrument 151 of 1967, all Local Forest Reserves were declared Central Government reserves. Henceforth all revenue from royalties went to the Central Government. Forests are remunerative. For example, the direct revenue which the Central Government realized from only the sale of timber and wood fuel was as follows:²

<u>Year</u>	<u>Income</u>
1966/67	4.7 million shillings
1967/68	5.7 million shillings
1968/69	4.9 million shillings
1969/70	5.1 million shillings
1970/71	5.4 million shillings.

Rich concentrations of valuable wood, such as mahogany, are commonly found in Buganda, Bunyoro and Toro.

¹ Uganda Parliamentary Debates, Second Series Volume 78, September 21, 1967, p.2053. The emphasis is mine.

² Source: Forestry Economist, Entebbe.

This resource was a major source of income to the Local Administrations endowed with valuable wood.

(iii) Veterinary services: The major services under this heading include operation of dips, spray races and crushes and the supply of veterinary drugs.

(iv) Courts were integrated in 1965 except in the case of the then Federal Kingdom of Buganda which refused to give Central Government the necessary consent under the 1962 Constitution.¹ Buganda's Courts were integrated after the Revolution.

(v) The Central Government used to give Local Authorities cotton bonus in order to encourage them to expand the cotton industry. Under the new changes, this arrangement was abolished.

(vi) Buganda had enjoyed a large measure of autonomy which had not been extended to other areas. It was also allocated more services than the other Local Authorities. Indeed as early as 1955, seven years before Uganda achieved independence, the Protectorate Government permitted the Kabaka's Government to run primary and junior secondary schools, rural dispensaries, aid posts and rural health services, and the field services for the improvement of stock breeding and keeping (other than disease control) and Community Development which

¹ See Section 74 of the 1962 Constitution.

was administered concurrently with the Protectorate Government. During the 1961 Constitutional Conference, the following services were transferred to the Kabaka's Government in addition to the ones transferred in 1955. Senior education, technical education, teacher training, hospitalization and two police stations or posts at Tondora. Following the revolution of 1966, Buganda was reduced to the level of the other districts which lost the services which we have already noted.

All the Local Administrations retained only the following mandatory services:¹

(1) Education services:

Primary schools up to the first seven years of education.

(2) Medical and health services:

(a) dispensaries, health centres, sub-dispensaries and aid posts;

(b) maternity and child welfare services;

(c) school health services;

(d) the control of communicable disease, including leprosy and tuberculosis, subject to the overall responsibility of the Government Minister of Health for the control of the disease

¹ See Schedule I to the Local Administrations Act, 1967.

throughout Uganda;

- (e) rural ambulance services, hygiene services and health education.

(3) Water services:

The maintenance of water supplies subject to the international obligations and to the approval and supervision of the Government.

(4) Road services:

The construction and maintenance of roads other than roads maintained by the Government.

(5) Prison services:

The prohibitive costs of integrating the prisons services made the Central Government decide that Local Administrations should retain them.

Schedule 2 of the Local Administrations Act, 1967, contained services which might be performed by Local Administrations. These included the control of vermin and trading centres, the registration of births, marriages and deaths and any function which the Central Minister may by order prescribe.

Stringent Financial controls were imposed on the Local Administrations.¹ The weak inspection of the Local Adminis-

¹ For details see Apolo Nsubambi, "Increased Government Control of Uganda's financial sinews..." op.cit.

trations by inadequate supply of staff at the Ministry, was remedied by raising the number of Inspectors from two to five.

At the local level the power of the District Commissioner was revived. Since he represented a strong Government, he acquired a greater capacity to act firmly and decisively knowing that he could be backed by an effective Government at the Centre. He was an Inspector of the local finances and he had ample powers to stop payments which he deemed to be improper.¹ All cheques had to be countersigned by him. This enabled the District Commissioner to deal with any irregular expenditure on the spot. As an Inspector, he had full access to the records and deliberations of both the Council and the Administrations and all the correspondence between the Government and the Local Administrations went through him. Before the suspension of the Councils in 1971, he had the right to attend them and the Finance Committees. This right facilitated his capacity not only to ensure that the policy of the Government was understood and followed at the local level, but it also enabled him to identify 'difficult' Councils on the spot.² The District Commissioner's control of the financial affairs

¹ These powers are still being exercised by the D.C.

² District Councils were abolished in 1971. Cf. Colin Lays, op.cit.

of Local Authorities was also enhanced by his other crucial roles. He was the Chairman of the District Intelligence Committee and had the overall responsibility of ascertaining that law and order were obeyed in the District. As Chairman of the District Planning Team, he co-ordinated the functions of the Local Administrations. He registered marriages as well. These multi-functional roles enhanced his grip over the Local Administrations.

Article 98 of the Local Administrations Act, empowered the Central Minister of Regional Administrations to nominate the Councillors in the District which comprised the former Kingdom of Buganda whose Lukiko had been abolished in 1967. The figures involved were, East Wango 49 councillors, Masaka 39 councillors, Mubende 21 councillors and West Wango 39 councillors. The total number of the councillors was 148. All the nominated councillors were members of the UPC. The act of nominating councillors which was extended to other districts whenever vacancies arose, reduced Local Administrations to Government Patronage. It is ironical that the Central Government which abolished the right of the chiefs to sit in councils as ex-officio members, resorted to the practice of nominating the councillors in Buganda from 1967 to 1971.

REACTION OF DIFFERENT GROUPS TO THE CHANGES OF 1967

One basic change which Obote made was the abolition of Monarchy not only in Buganda but also in Toro, Ankole, and Bunyoro. The Kyabazingaship of Busoga was also abolished. The respondents were asked to respond to the statement that 'the Central Government had no right to abolish Monarchy in Buganda'. In the rural area, 80 per cent agreed with the statement, 8 per cent were neutral, 6 per cent disagreed with the statement and 6 per cent did not know what to answer.¹ In the urban area, 51 per cent agreed with the statement, 13 per cent were neutral, 23 per cent disagreed and 13 per cent did not know what to answer. The results clearly show that the overwhelming majority in the rural area, believed that the Central Government had no right to abolish the Monarchy. In the urban area, the majority held a similar view but it was a smaller majority than in the rural area. This discovery can be explained by the fact that on the whole, people in the urban area, are more exposed to other ethnic, cultural, educational and political influences than the rural dwellers who tend to stick to the traditional norms of which Monarchy was fundamental.

It is however, significant to note that even in the

¹ Survey data, 1979 - 1980.

rural area, as many as 6 per cent disagreed with the statement. The percentage of the respondents who disagreed with the statement in the urban area, was greater than in the rural area. When we probed the group which accepted Obote's measure, we discovered that it consisted of younger people whose age ranged from 30 to 40 years. They were less attached to Monarchy and they declared that the institution was divisive in the Uganda setting in which the majority of the Ugandans came from a republican culture. Since the Kings were Protestants, we expected the Roman Catholics to form a majority among the group which supported the removal of an institution whose incumbents were Protestants. This was not born out by our results. On the contrary, the majority of the people who supported the abolition of Monarchy, were Protestants. The overarching characteristic of Monarchy which we noted in our earlier discussions, appear to have diffused the religious differences on the issue of Monarchy in Buganda.

The percentage of people who were either neutral or did not know what to answer was relatively important. Consequently, this group was exposed to further questioning. Our major discovery was that there were genuine cases of people who found it difficult to analyse political issues. Others pointed out that their view on Monarchy was irrelevant

to their immediate pressing economic needs.

At this point, we must assess more closely how the different political groups viewed the changes. The chiefly traditionalists were totally alienated and petrified by Obote's political and constitutional measures. In particular, the abolition of the Kabakaship incensed them. Obote's centralisation measures, especially of Buganda's financial resources, were regarded by them as an act of plundering Buganda's wealth. The modernising monarchist constitutional elites of whom Katikkiro Mayanja-Nkanji was a good representative, were outraged by Obote's method of abolishing Monarchy and by his extra-constitutional measures. A Uganda solicitor General in the Central Government, who had been very critical of the policies of the chiefly traditionalists, summed up the feelings of the educated Baganda who were hurt by Obote's destruction of the Kingdom. He said:

When I saw the palace burning and heard the shots which were being inflicted on the Kabaka's palace, my heart bled and my support for Obote's ideals vanished.¹

Kanyehamba, a Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Law, who represents some republican constitutional lawyers, argued

¹ Interview with the Solicitor-General of the Central Government.

that Obote suspended the independence Constitution not that he loved it less but because he loved Uganda more.¹ He does not elaborate upon this statement. But even Kanyehamba who in effect supported Obote's measures, admitted that Obote's act of suspending the Constitution was unconstitutional.²

Although the common men in Buganda were psychologically disturbed by the measures which assaulted their masters with whom they had enjoyed reciprocal patron-client relationships, they were not materially affected by Obote's measures. Here will be said about the reciprocal relationship between the landlord and the tenant in Buganda in the next Chapter. What we must note here is that the peasants enjoyed security of land tenure in Buganda. Obote's measures failed to capture the peasants and the workers in Buganda because apart from his frequent assertion that he was fighting against the chiefly traditionalists whom he alleged to be exploiting the common men in Buganda, there were no credible measures which he made for them. The Councils which had replaced the Lukiiko in 1967, were not directly elected. To this extent, the new measures meant less political participation for the common men in the vital process of electing their councillors. In 1962, they had at least participated in electing their

¹ Kanyehamba, *op.cit.*, p.89.

² *Ibid.*, p.89.

members of Lukiko apart from the County Chiefs. In 1967, this participation was wiped out. The relationships which had existed between the landlord and the tenant under the Busulu and Eruvujo Law of 1928, remained intact. The tenant still paid tribute and ground rent to the landlord who was being attacked on the radio as an exploiter. The clan system remained intact despite the fact that the Kabaka, the Head of all clans, was removed. The economic and social welfare of the workers was not improved. The UPO was divided and weak and could not mobilise the common man. Because of all these observations, Obote's measure cannot be regarded as being fundamentally revolutionary. His new model was characterized by being more pre-occupied with centralisation of power than with carrying out revolutionary changes to benefit the common man. The Youth Wingers were on the whole happy with Obote's moves but the party through which they would have articulated their views, was virtually dead. They thus felt excluded from participating in the revolutionary measures. The Republican nationalists were on the whole happy with the changes. However, their worry was Obote's increasing tendency to monopolise power and his heavy dependence on the forces of coercion. As already noted in this Chapter, Nakyon complained that some of the powers which were given to the President were excessive.

MILITARIZATION OF UGANDA'S POLITICS

ALONG ETHNIC LINES

One major consequence of failing to solve Buganda's problem politically was that Uganda's politics was militarized along ethnic lines. The army which had been decisive in helping Obote to crush Buganda's hegemony, realized its importance. In return it made important demands on the political system of Uganda. In June 1969, Nakyom, Obote's cousin, was moved to complain in Parliament that Obote was spending too much money on the army. Complaining about eight million shillings which were to be spent on the army, he said that Obote was spending on the army as if Uganda was at war.¹ He added:

Expenditure is becoming too much. It must be remembered where this money is coming from; it comes from the poor hard working individuals having a difficult time.²

The army was also purged in such a way that it excluded groups which were deemed to be disloyal to Obote. Professor Ginyera-Pinyowa who specifically examines the Buganda and the army informs us:

Another ground for Obote's support in the army was an aftermath of the 1966 crisis. As we suggested, the few months before the crisis were

¹ Uganda Argus, June 23, 1969, p.2.

² Ibid. See also Uganda Parliamentary Debates, Second Series, Second Session, June 1969, p.477.

months of intensive contacts between politicians and the army men. In the process army men took sides in the quarrels of the politicians and earned themselves the label of being pro this or pro that man. It was thus inevitable, if regrettable, that after the crisis a purge of the army should be committed by the victors at the end of the crisis. In this way, several army personnel suspected of not being with Obote came to lose their jobs.¹

This quotation is self-explanatory. Since Buganda was to be contained by force, it became politically untenable to encourage the Baganda to join the army in big numbers especially at a senior level. Otherwise they would acquire the military capacity to challenge the policy of containing their area by force. It should also be remembered that historically the Baganda and other ethnic groups from the Southern part of Uganda were more keen on joining the Civil Service and commerce than the army whose status was kept low by the Colonial Powers. The ethnic domination of the army by the people from the Northern part of Uganda acquired more political importance in 1966 because the army was now a significant arbiter in the resolution of political

¹ Ginyera-Pinyowa, Apple Milton Obote... op.cit., p.244

conflict.¹ The dichotomy between the army and Baganda became more pronounced because of absence of linguistic communication between the two groups. The army was mostly using Kisuahili, a language which was hardly understood by Baganda. And thus the confrontation between Baganda and the army became linguistic, ethnic and physical. Meanwhile the consequences of containing the centrally placed Baganda by force, spread beyond Baganda and contributed significantly to the erosion of the civilian supremacy.

Conclusion

The abolition of Monarchy showed that Obote had clearly dropped the pragmatic-pluralist approach under which Monarchy and republicanism had been allowed to co-exist. Republicanism was now extended to all parts of Uganda. This was Obote's new model of depluralising Uganda, a model which suspended the direct political and cultural confrontation between the ancient Kingdoms and the non-centralised districts. His method of removing Monarchy by attacking the Kabaka's palace, alienated and frightened the Baganda.

¹ The issue of the ethnic imbalances in the army and its consequences is also discussed by J. Ravenhill in his "Military Rule in Uganda: The Politics of Survival" African Studies Review, volume XVII, Number 1, April 1974, especially pp.240-241.

The narrow escape of the Kabaka who fled to Britain where he narrated his adventures in the British press, made him a martyr, especially in the countryside. A newspaper which carried his narrow escape cost at least ten times its normal price. Obote could have weakened Monarchy by depriving it of its economic power and by democratizing the polity of Buganda. Our survey clearly shows that he had some sympathisers in Buganda who believed that the Central Government had authority to abolish Monarchy. He could have mobilised these forces politically.

The party which Obote would have used to mobilise the people was weak and divided. He also failed to gain the support of the various political groups. He alienated the chiefly traditionalists by abolishing Monarchy and Buganda's special position. The constitutional monarchist elites were disturbed by his unconstitutional measures. The uncompromising republicans like Nekyea, were annoyed by his centralisation measures. The common men were not mobilised to accept the republican changes which were too radical for their level of political consciousness. The revolutionary republicans felt that he was not radical enough because he had not even nationalised land, a resource which still gave some economic power to the chiefly traditionalists over the peasants.

Our overall assessment is that Obote's measures alienated Buganda and the different groups were retribalized. We should remember that from 1962 to 1966, Obote allied himself with the chiefly traditionalists and he missed the opportunity to forge direct links with the common men in Buganda. This was the formula by which he forged transethnic integration between Buganda and the rest of Uganda. From 1966 to 1971, he confronted the chiefly traditionalists and he attempted to appeal to the common men to support him in his struggle against the chiefly traditionalists. His failure to capture the support of the common men in Buganda meant that he lacked an effective political group in Buganda to assist him to forge transethnic integration between Buganda and the rest of Uganda. All the groups in Buganda were now retribalized as they sought for security. Secession was re-kindled. The resolution of the Lukiko requesting Obote to remove what it termed his 'illegal government' from the soil of Buganda, was a clear indication of the revival of isolation in Buganda.

Obote's use of the army to crush Buganda's autonomy enabled him to attain some degree of territorial control. But political legitimacy eluded him in Buganda as a result of which he had to use Emergency measures and force to contain Buganda. But the ascendancy of the army posed

special problems of encouraging it to take over power. He had to re-assert civilian supremacy. He attempted to solve these problems by introducing a socialist ideology which is the subject of our next Chapter.

Insufficiency was still troubling him in 1930. This was evident because he was depending heavily on the use of emergency powers all the way in order to maintain regime. This Chapter attempts to show that there might be two other socialist ideologies in order to have social integration, (transcending class and territorial integration). He also attempted to use the ideology to legitimize the political institutions as they were and to be more responsible to the power of the army. It is our contention that the ideology was rejected for a number of reasons of which the major ones were the following: It was impractical to build on what it lacked significant support outside the army and it was opposed to the very basis of the military institutions and the nation state and the use of the army to expand and protect the national territory.

Charaf's attempt to adopt a revolutionary-socialist ideology was unsuccessful. He said in Chapter I that this could be accomplished with an ideology the content of which is revolutionary regarding the socio-economic organization of society. It is our contention that this

CHAPTER VI

INTEGRATION THROUGH IDEOLOGY

After using force to remove Buganda's hegemony, Monarchy and the Lukiiko, Obote realized that political legitimacy was still eluding him in Buganda. This was evident because he was depending heavily on the use of Emergency Powers and the army in order to contain Buganda. This Chapter attempts to show that Obote sought to use the socialist ideology in order to forge social integration, transethnic integration and territorial integration. He also attempted to use the ideology to legitimize the political institutions so that they might act as counterweights to the power of the army. It is our submission that the ideology was rejected for a number of reasons of which the major ones were the following: It was implemented in such a way that it lacked significant tangible benefits to the common men; it exaggerated the gap between the chiefly traditionalists and the common men; and the UPC was too weak to spread and popularize the socialist ideology.

Obote's attempt to adopt a revolutionary-centralizing model was unsuccessful. We noted in Chapter I that this model is pre-occupied with an ideology the content of which is transformative regarding the socio-economic modernization of societies. It is our submission that this

transformation was not realized. The Baganda whose pride was wounded, were hurt by an ideology which described their abolished institutions as being feudal, anti-national and exploitative. They became re-tribalized. In this Chapter we shall also show that the nationalisation measures were not regarded as being beneficial to the enhancement of the welfare of the common man.

The Common Man's Charter was known as policy document number I, On the 'Move to the Left'.¹ This document was followed by four other documents which were as follows: Proposals for the National Service, document No.2, Communication from the Chair of the National Assembly of 20th April 1970, document No.3, the Nakivubo Pronouncements on Nationalisation, document No.4, and Proposals for New Methods of Election of Representatives of the People to Parliament, document No.5. The five documents constituted Obote's ideology on the Move to the Left.

A working definition of ideology can be obtained from Sigmund. It is defined as:

a systematic scheme or co-ordinated body of ideas about human life or culture... In common usage, however, the word has additional connotations - of commitment (both

¹ A.M. Obote, The Common Man's Charter (Entebbe: Government Printer 1969).

emotional and intellectual), of action - orientation (the maintenance of the status quo which may be the goal of conservative ideologies, is itself an action)...¹

This is a generous definition of ideology. On the other hand, Mannheim defines ideologies as "more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of the situation."² An ideology can be a source of national integration by providing a sense of identity. This happens when the ideology defines clearly the goals of a society and the roles of the individuals. And thus each individual is shown how he fits into society in relation to another person. Ideology can also enhance national integration when it shows that its actions are not particularistic but universal.³ For example, if Obote could convince all the Ugandans that his actions of abolishing Monarchy were not aimed at victimising the Baganda, Batoro, Banyoro and Banyankore, and that they were aimed at achieving universal goals of egalitarianism and justice, he would have gained the support of the people even in the former Kingdoms.

¹ P.E. Sigmund Jr.(ed.), The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p.3.

² K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1954), p.49.

³ Cf. D. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp.16-30.

OBJECTIVES OF THE SOCIALISTIC IDEOLOGY

Why did Obote choose a socialistic ideology? He did so for three reasons. It was an ideology which he used to justify the abolition of Monarchy.¹ Henceforth, he argued that the universalistic and egalitarian principles of socialism were against heredity which was a major tenet of Monarchy. He associated the egalitarian principles of republicanism with socialism. Secondly, he used the socialistic principle of equality to justify abolishing Buganda's special and privileged position and of centralizing the powers so that he could re-distribute resources equitably. Thirdly, socialism was used to justify reducing the dominance of the Asians and Europeans in Uganda's very commerce and trade.

Attempts to integrate all the Ugandans under the republican institutions

One of the major messages of the Common Man's Charter was the rejection of Monarchy which was linked with feudalism. Henceforth, Obote sought to integrate all the Ugandans under the republican institutions and values. Obote

¹ Apter suggests that Socialism enables political leaders to repudiate prevailing hierarchies of power and prestige associated with traditionalism or colonialism. Apter, Ibid., p.23.

who was still aware that the Monarchy which he had abolished by force was still attracting a lot of loyalty in Buganda, launched an ideological assault on the institution.¹ The dramatic manner in which the Kabaka had escaped from his palace when it was attacked by the Uganda's troops on Obote's orders, and the suffering which the Kabaka endured as he went through the jungles of Uganda and of the Kingdom of Burundi before he reached Britain, made the Kabaka a martyr in Buganda. His adventurous escape hit the headlines in Britain and the neighbouring country of Kenya.² The adventures of the Kabaka and the rough manner in which he was humiliated by Obote had the effect of re-kindling ethnicity in Buganda. Even some Baganda who had been very critical of Buganda's Monarchy, became attached to it, partly because they felt insecure by Obote's policies and so they rallied behind the institution they knew. Obote used the Common Man's Charter to disparage Monarchy. He associated it with exploitation, subservience, feudalism,

¹ All the District Commissioners in Buganda who were interviewed, revealed to the author that they informed Obote of the intensive secret plans which the Baganda who were very attached to their Monarchy, were making in order to restore the Monarchy.

² See, for example, The Times, London, of May 25, and 27, 1966. The Times of May 27, 1966, reported the "amazing escape of the Kabaka and the merciless attack on his palace". Cf. The East African Standard, Nairobi, Kenya, of June 21, 23, and 24, 1966. The East African Standard of June 24, carried a photograph of the Kabaka in Burundi carrying a battered suitcase. This paper which used to cost 50 cents in Uganda was bought at Shs.60/= by the incensed Baganda.

and the suppression of the interests of the common man.¹

Akena Adoko, Obote's cousin and political supporter, accused the 'feudalists' of collaborating with the 'imperialist forces' to fight nationalism. To use his own words:

The Imperialist Forces, and the Feudalist Forces were united together to fight Nationalism.²

Article 3 of the Charter declared:

We subscribe fully to Uganda always being a Republic and have adopted this Charter so that the implementation of this strategy prevents effectively any one person or group of persons from being masters of all or a section of the people of Uganda, and ensures that all citizens of Uganda become truly masters of their own destiny.

Obote attempted to sell republicanism to the Ugandans by associating it with making people masters of their destiny and the removal of exploitation.³ The Charter declared that henceforth no citizen of Uganda would enjoy any special privilege, status or title by virtue of his birth, descent or heredity.⁴

¹ See The Charter, op.cit., Articles 4 and 9.

² Akena Adoko, op.cit., p.7.

³ The Charter, op.cit., Articles 7,9 and 10.

⁴ Ibid., Article 6(vii).

The gap between the common men and the chiefly traditionalists

Another aspect of Obote's ideological thrust was to declare that there was a major gap between the common men and the chiefly traditionalists. He declared that under the republican culture, the privileged groups were to be removed and that the gap between the common men and the rich would be removed. This issue was discussed in Chapter I under social integration or the elite - mass gap. It was pointed out that national integration entailed closing the vertical gap between the masses and the elites. Obote adopted the strategy of explaining the Revolution of 1966 in terms of the class struggle between the common men and what he termed the forces of feudalism. The feudalists were the chiefly traditionalists and the Kabaka. His argument was that by removing the feudalists, he was removing the elite mass gap. He declared:

To sum up, the Uganda revolution was a revolution of the masses against the forces of feudalism and tribalism whose design was to divide Uganda into personal domains with the aid of imperialist forces outside Uganda.¹

The very title of the Charter included the words Common Man, an inclusion which suggested that Obote was preoccupied with

¹ A.M. Obote, "The footsteps of Uganda's Revolution", op.cit., p.113.

and Imperialist Integration. The need to improve the conditions of the common man in Uganda. Akena

Adoko continued to assist Obote's appeal to the common men and to slur the Kabaka by claiming that the Kabaka did not value life and that most of the common man's tax went into the Kabaka's pocket.¹ He continued to estrange the common men from the Kabaka by saying:

The Divine right of Kabaka was Mutema's sole belief. Commoner's like Obote, were not fit to be rulers; And Buganda his Kingdom was to precede Uganda.²

He added;

The eighth characteristic of the Uganda crisis resulting from the conquest of the feudalists forces, was the ascendancy of the common man Socially and the Supremacy of his interests and his freedom.³

Later on in this Chapter, we shall appraise why Obote's appeal to the common man was not responded to.

Ideology is used to appeal for national integration

Obote now used ideology to appeal for transethnic

¹ Akena Adoko, op.cit., p.7.

² Ibid., p.7.

³ Adoko, Ibid., p.111.

and territorial integration. The need to have one Parliament, one nation and one Government, was reiterated in the Charter. This message was calculated to reject the 'old days' when Buganda's legislature used to challenge the authority of the Central Parliament and pose problems affecting territorial integration. The days were gone when Buganda used to act as an electoral college to elect Buganda's representatives to the Central Legislature. The Charter declared:

When the UPC proposes a policy or programme on behalf and for the benefit of the people of Uganda, the meaning of the phrase 'people of Uganda' is always clear and definite. It is One People, One Government, in one Country.¹

The aims and objectives of the UPC were stated to include the need to 'build the Republic of Uganda as one country with one people, One Parliament and One Government.'²

REJECTION OF THE SOCIALISTIC IDEOLOGY

A major hypothesis which we must test postulates that if a national political ideology is widely accepted among a group of people, this is a measure of a high degree of national integration. In Chapter I, we suggested to use the range from 60 per cent to 100 per cent as constituting a high percentage. In this discussion, this percentage will

¹ Article 12 of the Charter. The emphasis is mine.

² Article 6(1) of the Charter.

be regarded as a manifestation of a high degree of national integration. According to our survey, 56 per cent had heard of the Charter in the rural area and 77 per cent had heard of it in the urban area.¹ 44 per cent had not heard of it in the rural area and 23 per cent had not heard of it in the urban area. 96 per cent who had heard of it, opposed it in the rural area and 81 per cent opposed it in the urban area. Those who supported it in the rural area were 4 per cent and in the urban area there were 19 per cent supporters. These figures suggest that the Charter was overwhelmingly rejected, more so in the rural area where the chiefly traditionalists had a greater grip over the people than in the urban area. Furthermore, the rural areas were far less penetrated by the UPC than the urban area where visible politics of holding political rallies was concentrated.

Why was the Charter rejected in Uganda?

The Charter was rejected because of the following reasons: First, it was associated with the abolition of private property. In turn, this was linked with the introduction of Communism, an ideology which was unpopular in Uganda. The anti-communism struggle was spearheaded by the religious leaders and the chiefly traditionalists. Second,

¹ Survey data, 1979 - 1980.

it was linked with the abolition of Monarchy and the legitimization of republicanism. Third, Obote and his supporters overstated the economic and political gap and the conflict which existed between the chiefly traditionalists and the common men in Buganda. The common men whom Obote claimed to have come to rescue from the exploitation of the chiefly traditionalists, were economically more prosperous than their counterparts in other parts of Uganda. Fourth, the Charter lacked important tangible measures either to uplift the welfare of the common men or even to solve the immediate problems which affected the peasants under the Busulu and Envujjo Law, the Lint and Coffee Marketing Boards and the corrupt co-operatives. Fifth, Obote lacked effective political institutions to popularize the new ideology. Lastly, unlike Nyerere of Tanzania, Obote did not institute a leadership code in order to check the exploitation and anti-socialistic practices. Consequently, the leadership lacked credibility.

Empirical evidence of why the Charter was disliked

To the statement that the 'Charter was about destroying private ownership of the property such as land', we got the following responses:¹ Those who accepted the statement

¹ Source: Survey data, 1979-1980.

in the rural area were 80 per cent, 10 per cent disagreed with it, 5 per cent were neutral and 5 per cent did not know what to answer. In the urban area, 70 per cent agreed with the statement, 25 per cent disagreed with it and 5 per cent were neutral. In the Charter itself, there was evidence of the Government's commitment to the nationalisation of enterprises which were privately owned. It said:

... no citizen or person in private enterprise should entertain the idea that the Government of Uganda cannot, whenever it is desirable in the interests of the people, nationalise, any or all privately-owned enterprises, maille and freehold land and all productive assets or property, at any time, for the benefit of the people. The party, therefore, directs the Government to work along these lines.¹

Land was specifically mentioned among the lists of things which were liable to nationalisation. The opponents of Obote were therefore able to get direct evidence of a commitment to the nationalisation of private property by the Government. The notion and practice of private ownership were institutionalized in Uganda especially in Buganda where since the 1900 Agreement, several people were buying land under either perpetual ownership or customary tenure which was secure.

¹ Obote, The Common Man's Charter op.cit., Article 39.
See also Article 38.

It was a custom in Buganda for adults to own a house and some land. People used to mortgage their land and get loans for developmental purposes. Any ideology which threatened the abolition of private property, was likely to be hated especially when the religious leaders and the chiefly traditionalists were also stressing the ugly consequences of the ideology. In other parts of Uganda where private ownership of land did not exist, and where the level of economic advancement was not as pronounced as in Buganda, the Charter was welcomed because they had nothing to lose. On the contrary, the Charter promised reducing the privileges of the rich areas and distributing resources equitably.

On May 1, 1970, Obote declared 60 per cent nationalisation of 80 firms and he also abolished strikes. The commitment to the nationalisation of private property, was now concretised. The chiefly traditionalists pointed out that the next move was the nationalisation of land and the introduction of communism. According to our survey, in the rural area, 85 per cent associated the Charter with the introduction of communism and 15 per cent could not offer any interpretation.¹ In the urban area, 65 per cent associated the Charter with the introduction of communism, 34 per cent disagreed with the view and one per cent were

¹ Survey data, 1979-80.

neutral. When the respondents were asked to explain the meaning of communism, 65 per cent associated it with the abolition of land, religion, monarchy and the family life, and 35 per cent said that it was an evil system which they could not describe. They admitted that although they could not describe it, the religious leaders had informed them that it was an evil ideology which must be rejected.

One interpretation of communism in Uganda is, 'Nakalyako ani'. This expression literally means that everything is to be shared. In equating socialism with communism, the chiefly traditionalists, were assisted by the religious leaders who disliked Obote's educational measures of 1964 under which he formally disengaged Religious Missions from the administration of schools. The educational system in Uganda owes its inspiration and cultivation to the religious Missions whose contribution to the growth of education was notable. However, the educational system tended to divide people along religious lines. Obote sought to centralize and integrate the educational system, a measure which according to his policy, entailed excluding the Religious Missions from the administration of education. The Religious leaders resisted being excluded from the administration of a system which they had nursed for several decades. In some respects, the Central Government was not able to implement its new educational policy because the civil

servants who had imbibed the values of the religious education, were not fully committed to the secular changes of 1964.¹ In 1969, the same religious leaders who had resisted the changes of 1964, were suspicious that communism was being introduced by the politicians under the guise of socialism. Gingyera-Pinyowa has demonstrated that the anti-communism crusade was spearheaded by the Roman Catholic Church.²

In the rural area, 98 per cent associated the Charter with the abolition of monarchy, 2% were unable to interpret it. In the urban area, 92 per cent associated the Charter with the abolition of monarchy and 8 per cent disagreed with this interpretation. Associating the Charter with the abolition of monarchy was not surprising because the author of the Charter had abolished Monarchy in 1967. From this date, Monarchy which was linked with feudalism, was frequently attacked on the radio, television, in the newspapers and in the Charter itself. The manner in which the Kabaka's palace had been attacked and his narrow escape, had as already noted,

¹ For details, read E.L. Gumisiriza, "The Policy of Centralisation of education in Uganda from 1964 to 1971", Makerere Historical Journal, Vol.3, No.1, 1977, pp.58-75 and A.R. Nsubambi, "The Politics of education...", op.cit., pp.58-82.

² Gingyera-Pinyowa, Apolo Milton Obote... op.cit., especially pp.42-43.

made the Kabaka a political martyr in Buganda. While some young Baganda were now quietly succumbing to the idea of the abolition of monarchy, the matter was still a sensitive one in Buganda. The manner in which monarchy was attacked, made the Baganda insecure and sensitive. Twelve of the forty four articles attacked 'feudalism' of which the Kabaka was said to be the pinnacle. Akena Adoko, Obote's ideological ally, described Monarchy as a 'pernicious vitriolic, enslaving and evil' system.¹ Article 12 of the Charter noted with satisfaction the liquidation of the 'fendal' forces which were described as anti-national. The Charter expressed the view that there was rejoicing at introducing a Republican Constitution which was associated with progress, justice and democracy.² This method of undermining monarchi-
cal attachment in Buganda, tended to make the Baganda defen-
sive and irritated.

Was Buganda a feudal system? The Colonial capitalistic system had destroyed the basic foundations of feudalism in Buganda. The wide-spread practice of acquiring land in perpetuity and the incorporation of the peasants³ in the

¹ A. Adoko, op.cit., p.107.

² Read Article 3 of the Charter op.cit.

³ For details, read Jorgenson, op.cit. Chapter II. Cf. C. Leys "Political implications of the development of peasant society in Kenya" in P. Outkind and P. Waterman (eds.), African Social Studies: A Radical Reader (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), pp.352-356.

capitalistic global system to grow cash crops, are important examples which showed the penetration of the capitalistic system in Buganda. The residual element of 'feudalism' was the system of paying tribute and ground rent to the landlord. But even this system was undermined by the Bugulu and Envujjo Law of 1928 as we shall show later on. And so the rhetoric of attacking a 'feudal' system in Buganda tended to be meaningless to the Baganda and even to the non-Baganda who studied the Kiganda system seriously.¹

Empirical evidence of a reciprocal relationship between the landlord and the tenant in Buganda

The third reason why the Charter was rejected is that on the whole, there was a reciprocal relationship between the landlord and the tenant. Obote seems to have missed this point and he overstated that there was a major economic gap between the chiefly traditionalists who were landlords and the common men who were tenants. We must state that there were unequal exchange relationships between the landlord and the tenant because of the special esteem and economic position which the landlord enjoyed. However, the unequal exchange relationship was mediated by reciprocal arrangements which were built in the patron-client relationship, and which

¹ See for example, D. Nabudere, Imperialism and Revolution in Uganda (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1980), pp.267-8.

were in turn safeguarded by the Buzulu and Enwujjo Law of 1928. Since we were aware that the landlord was the privileged person, we focussed our attention on how he was viewed by the tenant.

If the relationship between the landlord and the tenant is reciprocal, we expect the tenant to believe that he derives benefits from the landlord and vice-versa. For example, one of the benefits for a tenant is protection. He needs to be protected from summary and unexpected eviction. Furthermore, the tenant needs to be assured that during difficult times such as death and famine, he has a trusted and resourceful friend. This insurance is important in developing countries such as Uganda, countries which lack effective institutions to come to the rescue of a peasant during difficult times, especially in the remote areas. If, however, the relationship between the two is not reciprocal, we expect the tenant to believe that he gets no benefits from the landlord and vice-versa. To the statement that 'The tenant gets protection from the landlord', we got the following responses:-¹

¹ Source: Survey data, 1979-1980.

Table VIII

What the tenant gets from the landlord

Statement	Response	Number	Percentage
The tenant gets Protection from the landlord	I agree strongly	26	9.03
	I agree	193	67.01
	I am neutral	53	18.40
	I disagree	9	3.13
	I disagree strongly	0	0
	I don't know	7	2.43
Total		288	100

76% of the respondents agreed that the tenant gets protection from the landlord, 18% were neutral and only 3% disagreed with the statement.¹ This response clearly demonstrates that the majority of the tenants believe that they get protection from the landlords.

To the statement that 'The landlord mistreats his tenants' we got the following responses:

Table IX

Evaluation of the landlord by the tenant

Statement	Response	Number	Percentage
The landlord mistreats his tenants	I agree strongly	9	3.1
	I agree	20	6.9
	I am neutral	40	13.9
	I disagree	104	36.1
	I disagree strongly	51	17.8
	I don't know	64	22.2
Total		288	100

¹ Source: Survey data, 1979-1980.

54 per cent of the respondents disagreed with the view that the landlord mistreats the tenant, 10 per cent agreed and 22 per cent did not know whether or not they were mistreated. The complaints of those who felt that they were mistreated fall under four major categories. First, some tenants hated being fenced within the farms of the landlords. They felt that they were enclosed like animals. When they were asked whether they preferred to be evicted to being enclosed within the development project, the tenants replied that they did not accept any of these options. The second aspect of mistreatment concerned landlords who did not mix with the villagers. The author pointed out that this was not mistreatment per se.

The third category of mistreatment concerned absentee landlords who allowed their children or agents to look after their land. Some of these agents were not particularly interested in conforming with the customs of the rural dwellers. A case was given to the author of a son of a landlord who 'relieved himself' on the grave of a peasant. This action shocked the rural dwellers. The grave was overgrown with grass and it appears that the landlord's son could have been forgiven of his mistake but he was basically hated because he was arrogant. The absentee landlord was blamed for sending to the village people who violated the norms of the rural dwellers.

Lastly, there were some landlords who 'mistreated' their tenants through being inconsiderate. For example, one Dairy Farmer had weak fences which were frequently broken by his cows as a result of which the cows ate and destroyed the food of his tenants. Sometimes the animals of the landlord were injured because of his inconsiderate behaviour.

Mistreatment appears to have been largely associated with the failure of a landlord or his agents either to mix with the rural dwellers or to conform to the norms and customs of the rural dwellers. Despite these cases, the overall picture clearly shows that a reciprocal relationship existed between the landlord and the tenant.

To the statement that 'Nobody should pay any person for the use of land because it is a gift of God which belongs to the whole country' we got the following responses:

Table X¹

Evaluation of payment for using land

Statement	Response	Number	percentage
Nobody should pay any person for the use of land because it is a gift of God which belongs to the whole country	I agree strongly	21	7.29
	I agree	133	46.19
	I am neutral	76	26.39
	I disagree	40	13.89
	I disagree strongly	10	3.47
	I don't know	8	2.78
	Total	288	100

¹ Sources: Survey data, 1979-1980.

54 per cent agreed with the statement, and 17 per cent disagreed with it. It is surprising that there were as many as 17 per cent who believed that they should pay something for the use of land. Their major reason for accepting to do so was that the payment legitimized their claim on the land and that it also gave them a sense of lawful ownership of property in a society in which there is widespread payment for services rendered and for acquiring property. The majority of the respondents held the view that under ideal conditions in which the land is a gift of God, they would prefer not to pay for using it. This was not necessarily a reflection of an antagonistic relationship between the landlord and the tenant. For example, although taxes are necessary for the government to provide basic services to the people, many people would be happy if they could avoid paying them.

What are the major factors which created a reciprocal relationship between the landlord and the tenant from 1928-1974?¹

¹ We have deliberately included the year 1974 because in 1975, the Land Reform Decree created an antagonism between the landlord and the tenant, a subject which is beyond the scope of this work. For details, read Apolo Nsubambi, "From symbiosis to antagonism: The case of the relationship between the landlord and the tenant in the rural development of Uganda" in Apolo Nsubambi and J. Katorobo (eds.), Proceedings of the Conference on Rural Rehabilitation and Development Organized by the Faculty of Social Sciences at Makerere University Kampala, Vol.I, September 14-18, 1981, pp.287-302.

First, the potential capacity of the chiefly traditionalists to exploit the peasants had been curtailed by the Busuulu and Envujjo Law of 1928. The peasants who did not possess certificates of title, owned land under the customary land tenure. The Busuulu and Envujjo Law gave a large measure of protection to the peasants against eviction from the land which they owned under the customary tenure. In the few defined cases¹ where a tenant could be evicted, the eviction could not take place unless a Court having jurisdiction had tried the case and had made the order of eviction.² However, the Court ordering the eviction of the tenant had to compensate him for the improvements on the land.³ The ground rent, Busuulu, which a tenant had to pay to his landlord was Shs.10/- per annum. The tribute, Envujjo, was Shs.4/- for the first acre of part of the economic crops to a maximum of three acres.⁴ And thus the ground rent paid was very small compared to the increasing value of the

¹ These were either for public purposes or for good and sufficient cause which might arise when a change of ownership of mailo land occurred and the new owner desired to occupy the land of the tenant for purposes of residing and growing crops. See Sections 11, 12 and 16 of the Busuulu and Envujjo Law.

² Busuulu and Envujjo Law, Section 11.

³ Ibid., Section 13.

⁴ The Busuulu and Envujjo Law, Section 5. The tribute was also payable on the manufacture of bark-cloth at the rate of one tree out of 5 as well as on each brew of banana wine.

land, and the decreasing value of the shilling, and the economic benefits which the tenant received through selling cotton and coffee.

In addition to the Busulu and Buvujjo Law, there was the possession of Land Law of 1908. This Law provided that any person who became the owner of mailo land, should not think that he had become the owner of the running waters which were drawn by the people for ages and of springs which people had drawn of old. It added that if running waters should arrive upon his mailo land and if springs and ponds should come upon it, the land owner should not think that he becomes the exclusive owner of these waters.¹

Second, the common man in Buganda regarded himself as being more prosperous than his counterpart in other areas of Uganda. There were many factors which were responsible for creating this view. The major one was that even some relatively prosperous peasants were able to employ labourers from other areas of Uganda and the neighbouring countries. This fact has been fully documented elsewhere and it is unnecessary to labour it here.² If the majority of the common men in Buganda had been destitute, they would have been inclined to respond to his clarion call that they had nothing

¹ The Possession of Land Law, 1908, Section 2(h).

² See, for example, Richards (ed.), op.cit.

to 'lose but chains'. However, Obote's call was effectively interrupted by the chiefly traditionalists who reminded the peasants in Buganda that they were no better off than their counterparts that some of them were even in a position to employ the migrant labourers from outside Buganda.

An economy of affection

What we have discussed so far can be linked to what Hyden who discusses the problems of capturing peasants in Africa, calls the economy of affection.¹ Hyden says:

The peasant mode gives rise to an economy in which the affective ties based on common descent, common residence, etc., prevail. We refer to it here as an 'economy of affection'. In the absence of contradictions that characterise social action in capitalist and socialist modes of production, familial and other communal ties provide the basis of organised activity.²

We must observe that the relative security of tenure which the peasant enjoyed, the social ties based on ethnicity and the relative prosperity which the peasant enjoyed in Buganda, constituted an economy of affection. Obote who also lacked a widely understood language, was unable to penetrate this economy of affection.

¹ G. Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an uncaptured peasantry (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1980), pp.18-19.

² Ibid., p.18.

Consequences of the reciprocal relationship

The reciprocal relationship was missed by Obote who continued to castigate the chiefly traditionalists without getting any warm response from the peasants. The ordinary peasant in Buganda has been difficult to mobilize especially for collectivist and radical causes.¹ Since 1928, he has been socialized into the capitalist mores of private ownership of land and he has enjoyed some measure of success by growing his own food, cotton and coffee on his land. He does not regard the chiefly landowner as his enemy. To this extent, class antagonism and crystallization have been marred by the special relationship which has existed between him and the landlord. Certainly, the degree of deprivation of the tenant in Buganda has been far less than that of say of the peasant in Ethiopia under the last deposed Emperor.² The ethnic bond in Buganda has thus tended to override class divisions.

The fourth reason why Obote failed to capture the support of the peasants in Buganda was that his Charter

¹ Some of the methods used to mobilize him have been unrealistic and wrong. Cf. Hutton and R. Cohen, "African peasants and resistance to change: A reconsideration of sociological approaches" in Oxaal et.al., Beyond the Sociology of development (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).

² For details on the plight of the peasants in Ethiopia, see Markakis, op.cit.

lacked tangible benefits to the peasants. The Bugulu and Envujjo Law of 1928 can be regarded as the first Common Man's Charter in Buganda. This is so because it contained concrete and substantial measures which reduced the capacity of the landlords to exploit the peasants. In contrast, Obote's Common Man's Charter of 1969 lacked concrete and substantial proposals to improve the lot of the peasants. Indeed, we shall show that there were objectionable aspects of the Bugulu and Envujjo Law of 1928 which were not even discussed whenever Obote and his supporters attempted to use ideology to show the basic conflict between the common man and the chiefly traditionalists. The issue of nationalising the land itself was avoided when the Central Government nationalised other things less basic to the peasants than land. We shall show that even the nationalised banks and other properties did not benefit the common men and that it was the petty bourgeoisie who exploited them.

Some aspects of the Bugulu and Envujjo Law which required changing in favour of the common men

There are a number of changes which could have been made in order to improve the lot of the common men in Buganda. But even these changes were not made by Obote. The first one was the practice of paying ground rent and tribute to the landlord. Although this payment was small, it was obnoxious

to the fully-fledged socialists especially to the UPC Youth Wingers. The Youth Wingers argued that land was such a basic means of production that it was contrary to the egalitarian principles of Socialism to make the common men pay their landlords anything for utilizing it. The idea of paying tribute and ground rent was to them a feudal practice which had to be abolished.

Second, the tenant was protected from paying high ground rent and tribute up to a maximum of three acres. What was to be paid to the landlord beyond three acres, was a matter for mutual agreement between the landlord and the tenant.¹ It is a fact that many of the peasants did not have the capital and the skills to use more than three acres.² Besides, if the three acres were utilized with maximum care and scientific knowledge, they would yield a lot of wealth to the tenant. However, it must be admitted that the few versatile common men who wished to exceed three acres, were sometimes overtaxed by their landlords. If the Central Government was serious about rescuing the common men

¹ Busuulu and Envujo Law, 1928, Section 6.

² This is a complex subject... Some rewarding views on the subject can be obtained from G. Dalton (ed.), Economic Development and Social Change: The Modernisation of Village Communities (New York: The Natural History Press, 1971) especially pp.1-62. Cf. Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa... op.cit., pp.15-16.

from exploitation, it would have at least increased the protected acreage from three acres to at least ten or more. For the increased acreage would have facilitated mechanical cultivation.

And thus whereas Obote's radical documentary radicalism of his ideology antagonized the chiefly traditionalists who were presented as parasites and enemies of the common men, the ideology was devoid of fundamental and concrete advantages which would have benefitted the common men in Buganda.¹

Failure of Obote to tackle the basic land problems

Since land was a basic issue to the common men, Obote's ideological appeal to the common men would have acquired credibility if he had addressed himself to the existing problems of land ownership and utilization. Land was basic to the common men because if they were denied use

¹ Ironically, the ground rent and tribute were abolished by the military regime in 1975, a regime which did not claim to be socialist. The regime also nationalised the land. See the Land Reform Decree, Uganda, 1975. It must, however, be stated that the Decree greatly reduced the security of tenure of the peasant. For details, see Apolo Nsibambi, "From Symbiosis to antagonism: The Case of the relationship between the landlord and the tenant in the rural development of Uganda", in Apolo Nsibambi and J. Katorobo (eds.), Proceedings of the Conference on Rural Rehabilitation and Development Organised by the Faculty of Social Sciences at Makerere University, Kampala, September 14-18, 1981, Vol.I, pp.287-300.

of it, they could not earn their living.¹ In February, 1969, Obote had spoken of the dangers of the emergence of wealthy landlords and a landless group.² However, no concrete steps were taken to analyse this critical issue and to rectify the existing land problems. It will be recalled that following Obote's revolution of 1966, District Land Boards were abolished and that the 1967 Constitution provided for the establishment of a Uganda Land Commission consisting of 5 members. I. Musazi, a persistent critic of the Buganda establishment, was made its Chairman. Issues which needed tackling by the Ugandan leader included rationalisation of the differing systems of land ownership and the utilisation of the land in Uganda. For example, in Buganda, the 1900 Agreement had introduced private ownership of land, a system which was hailed by the Report of the East African Royal Commission of 1955 on the grounds that it had facilitated access to land for economic use and development. However, Buganda was faced with the problem of some absentee landlords who were neither willing

¹ This is one of the basic reasons why Nyerere was strongly in favour of the land belonging to the Community and not to the individuals. For details, see J. Nyerere, Uhuru na Umoja (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 166-171.

² The People, a state controlled newspaper, Kampala, February 12, 1969.

to sell their land nor had the resources and the skills to develop the land.

In most of the remaining parts of Uganda, there was communal ownership of land.¹ For example, in the district of Lango, all members of a village who are usually also fellow clansmen have equal rights as regards cultivation, grazing and water rights.² The communal system of land ownership tallied with the institution of communal labour groups in Lango and Acholi.³ However, the communal ownership of land posed serious problems to progressive farmers like Nekyon, who wished to fence their farms. Apell explains the cause of opposition to fencing. He says:

Reference has already been made that the less progressive Lango Farmers are strongly opposed to any one fencing any piece of land. They all wonder what will happen to the younger generation if all land is allocated to some individuals. They cannot also imagine what use will be put to the land which will be left over after such allocation. There have

¹ There were private freeholds in Toro and Ankole.

² B. Brock, "Customary land tenure, individualisation and agricultural development in Uganda", East African Journal of Rural Development, Volume 2, No.2, 1969, p.8.

³ Ibid.

already been cases of physical clashes between people who want to fence their land and people who are opposed to it.¹

Obote should have addressed himself to these basic land tangles which affected the 'physical basis of all human activities'.² The hard core socialists were disappointed when Obote declined to nationalise the land. Obel-Ochola declared:

The implementation of the Charter cannot be achieved with the desired efficacy unless the existing land systems and institutions are made to agree with the aims of the Charter. This is a basic problem.³

In the same paper, he castigated private ownership of land.

He wrote:

The dangers of a freehold system, therefore, are as follows: It creates a class of indolent and haughty landed gentry - parasites who have no social obligations; it creates social and economic disparity, inequality and insecurity; it leads to the creation of a meek, humble and subservient

¹ Quoted in Brock, Ibid., p.20.

² J. Obel-Ochola, "The Implications of the Common Man's Charter for existing land tenure institutions in Uganda", East Africa Journal, Vol.8, No.2, February, 1971, p.17.

³ Ibid., p.17.

class of human beings which
is treated and regarded by
the landed gentry as inferior...¹

He added that that freehold system was the main citadel and
pinnacle of feudalism, a statement which was incorrect.
Obote's reluctance to nationalise the land might be attributed
to the fact that he was not yet ready to tackle this sensi-
tive issue soon after antagonising the Kingdom areas which
had been deprived of their Kings. He must have also noted
that he lacked effective political institutions and committed
socialists to assist him to tackle more unpopular issues
such as nationalising land. However, Obote's failure to
tackle at least certain issues such as the abolition of
ground rent and tribute, undermined the acceptability of his
ideology. He could therefore not use the ideology for
integrative purposes.

The workers in Buganda remain unpersuaded by
Obote's ideological appeal to them

The points which we have made to account for Obote's
incapacity to get the support of the peasants in Buganda,
are also pertinent in explaining his failure to get the
support of the workers in Buganda. There are, however,
additional points which should be pointed out concerning

¹ Ibid., p.20.

the workers. Scott makes an important observation which is lengthy but which is worth quoting. He says:

In 1955, Mr. Tom Mboya visited Uganda and assisted the birth of the Uganda Trades Union Congress (UTUC)... In his memoirs he recalls being told that: The Baganda were quite satisfied and do not look on themselves as workers, and so there would be no possibility of organizing a trade union in Uganda. To some extent, these warnings were correct for in many Ugandan Unions, the leadership had to come from Kenya workers resident in Uganda.¹

The point to grasp here is that workers in Buganda were not fully-fledged workers in the Marxian sense. Many of them had their basic roots in the rural areas where they grew food and owned residential houses. The majority of them were not even staying in the urban areas of Uganda which were until 1972 dominated by the Asians. The working class was dominated by the Kenyans and other immigrants from Ruanda and Burundi, who were politically insecure. This was so because they were frequently threatened by Ugandans who reminded them that they were foreigners and that they should not sabotage Uganda's economy.² The feelings of the Baganda

¹ Scott, op.cit., p.17.

² For example, in 1963 Nekyon, the Acting Minister of Labour, claimed that Kenyans controlled most of the Uganda unions and he accused them of trying to sabotage the new nation of Uganda. Scott, Ibid., p.163.

workers towards Obote were similar to those of the Baganda peasants. They both viewed Obote with suspicion and scepticism. Obote's ideological appeal did not offer any substantial and concrete advantages to the workers. The Baganda workers lacked a class consciousness because they were not fully fledged workers. For they had their interests both in the urban and rural areas. The immigrant workers were difficult to cultivate because they were temporary and the degree of their turnover was high. For these reasons, Obote's ideological appeal to the workers, which was couched in the Marxian terms that envisaged a major conflict between the workers and the owners of the means of production, failed to persuade the workers. When he banned strikes in 1970, this was yet another move which disenchanted the workers.

Obote fails to solve the exploitative aspects
of the Lint and Coffee Marketing Boards and
the Co-operatives

As a strategy of Obote's socialist ideology, he sought to use para-statal bodies and co-operatives to control the economy of Uganda.¹ In particular, he wished to demolish the Asian domination in collection, processing and marketing of Cotton and Coffee. Coffee and Lint

¹ Article 39 of the Common Man's Charter.

Marketing Boards had been created during the colonial era in order to ensure that the process of processing and marketing of these crucial crops was properly controlled by the Colonial Government. The Colonial Government had also a paternalistic attitude of protecting the peasants from the fluctuating world prices. The two Boards enjoyed statutory powers to function as export monopolies and stabilization institutions. They fixed minimum prices to be paid to Farmers for all grades of cotton and coffee. They also fixed allowances payable to processing and marketing agents. The Price Assistance Funds had been introduced after the second world war in order to insulate the growers from the effects of the fluctuations in the world price of coffee and cotton. The funds would be used to cushion the farmer during the periods when the prices of cotton and coffee were low.

The common men especially the peasants who dominated the production of cotton and coffee, believed that the prices of their crops were not fixed by the laws of demand and supply but that it was the Government which was responsible for this task. This erroneous economic attitude was caused by the existence of the two price stabilization Funds. The politicians had attacked some exploitative aspects of the Boards, an attack which made the ordinary Uganda peasant believe that the Boards were not giving him a fair price for his cash crops.

The following were the exploitative practices of the Boards. First, it was argued that the Cotton and Coffee price Assistance Funds were used for purposes which were not for the price stabilization. For example, the General Secretary of the Uganda Co-operative Alliance said in a press release that between 1949 and 1957, about £27.7 millions were taken from the coffee and cotton Funds for various development projects, projects which were not directly related to the price stabilization. He added that between 1957 and 1962, the farmer had been subsidised to the tune of £14.8 millions while he had been made to pay £27.7 millions into the fund. These sums were exclusive of direct taxation and export taxes which the farmer paid.¹ Obote did not solve this exploitative practice of the Boards and thus the ordinary peasant in Buganda remained unhappy. Alibaruho who studied the Lint Marketing Board, 1945 - 1969, also showed that the money from the Price Assistance Fund was used to subsidise the Government's fiscal programmes.²

¹ Okereke, The Economic Impact of the Uganda Co-operatives (Nairobi: East Africa Literature Bureau, 1974), p.53.

² G. Alibaruho, "The Impact of Marketing Board Policy On the level and viability of cotton producer prices in Uganda, 1945-1969", Discussion paper No.199 Institute For Development Studies, University of Nairobi, Kenya, March, 1974, p.21.

Second, Alibaruho observed:

The Farmers who in the final analysis are responsible for producing the cotton seed, are rarely aware that in selling seed cotton, they are selling lint and seed as two products potentially marketable separately. These factors have given the Lint Marketing Board a strong hand, and the Board has in the past appropriated for itself most of the value of cotton seed.¹

We should add that cotton seed is extremely important because it is the raw material for the manufacture of edible cooking oil, an oil which is in great demand in Uganda.

Lastly, Alibaruho demonstrates that the formula for determining the price of cotton is such that the price of the farmer is a residual item. Again to use his own words:

In determining the price of cotton, the Board deducts the ginner's allowance, export duty, the local government bonus, transport costs and the Board's expense. To the balance is added a profit derived from the sale of cotton seed. The sum is multiplied by the unit output ratio in order to convert it to a price per pound of seed cotton. Thus one observes that the minimum produce price fixed is essentially a residual item.²

¹ Alibaruho, *Ibid.*, p.6.

² *Ibid.*, p.21.

The thrust of our argument is that as far as the common man in Uganda was concerned, the major exploitation did not emanate from the chiefly traditionalists as Obote claimed. It originated from the Lint and Coffee Marketing Boards which fixed the prices of the two major crops which they grew. The common man resented the practice of using money from the Assistance Funds for other purposes.¹ And since Obote's ideological appeal to the common man did not solve their immediate economic grievances, they regarded it as being an empty measure. His ideology was thus not perceived by the common man as serving the political integrational task of reducing the gap between them and the elites.

The paternalistic practices of protecting the farmers from the fluctuating world prices, contributed to the incapacity of the peasants to understand market forces and to haggle successfully with the intricacies of the price fluctuations.² It is suggestive to note that when the price of Kiboko Coffee was reduced from 48 cents per pound to 45

¹ Kiwanuka, the leader of the Democratic Party, and other politicians attacked this practice. However, when Kiwanuka was in power, he did not abolish the paternalistic practice. He merely increased the prices of coffee and cotton, a measure which was politically popular.

² For an assessment of the price Stabilization policy, consult D. Walker and C. Ehrlich, "Stabilization and Development in Uganda: An Appraisal", KyKlog, Vol.12, 1959, pp. 341-353. See also C. Ehrlich, "Some Social and Economic implications of paternalism in Uganda", Journal of African History, Vol.IV, No.2, 1963, especially pp.280-283.

cents during the 1962-63 coffee season, some Baganda peasants refused to sell their coffee. In Bugerere County, some growers were beaten up for accepting the new prices.¹ To make matters worse, the co-operatives which had taken over the processing and distribution of coffee and cotton were inefficient, corrupt and highly politicized.² Consequently, many farmers in Buganda were disillusioned with the exploitation of the Ugandans by the Ugandans, a problem which remained unsolved. The Common Man's Charter became meaningless to the frustrated peasant in Buganda who sold his coffee and cotton, which were not paid for for several months.

Obote lacked effective political institutions
for spearheading his socialistic measures

The fifth reason which explains Obote's failure to sell his socialistic ideology to the workers is that he lacked effective political institutions to spearhead his ideological call. Arrighi and Saul emphasize the importance of political institutions in legitimizing socialism. Their observations about Ghana are pertinent to Uganda. They write:

¹ Okereke, op.cit., p.54.

² Brett, E.A. "Problems of Cooperative Development in Uganda", UN Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva (Mimeo), 1970. See also Okereke, op.cit., pp.122-124.

Having over the years cut itself from the mass support, the CPP became increasingly a town organisation... The political instruments themselves were excessively bureaucratized with their cadres marked by opportunism. They could master little support either for socialism or against those 'labour aristocrats' of the state bureaucracy (including the military) who were progressively more alienated from the regime by its overtly socialist drive, however much this was found to be halfhearted in practice.¹

Whereas in Tanzania, Nyerere used his party TANU to mobilize people to accept his socialist ideology, in Uganda Obote merely issued the socialist ideology as a personal political order. This was so because his party was very weak. Although the UPC is claimed to have adopted the Common Man's Charter as a party policy on December 19, 1969, it is a fact that the party was hardly involved in the formulation and popularization of the socialist ideology. Mandani has aptly observed that the UPC was but an empty shell, a formal organization whose function was limited to being a pipeline for patronage.²

¹ G. Arrighi and J.S. Saul, Essays on the Political Economy of Africa (Nairobi: East African Publishing House Ltd., 1974), p.31.

² Mandani, op.cit., p.270. Cf. Peter Willets, "The Politics of Uganda as a one-party state", African Affairs, Vol.74, No.296, July 1975, pp.278-299.

On the same day that the UPC was claimed to have adopted the Common Man's Charter, Obote who was known by the Party to be the chief architect of the Charter, was shot at and he was rushed to Mulago Hospital where he was operated on. This incident increased Obote's distrust of the party. The Opposition Party DP was banned. More arrests occurred. They included that of B. Kiwamuka, the leader of the banned DP. It was evident that Obote and his socialist ideology lacked popular support.

Obote's failure to institute a leadership code in order to check anti-socialistic practices undermines the credibility of his socialist ideology

Following the introduction of the Arusha Declaration of 1967 in Tanzania, Nyerere instituted a leadership code in order to check anti-socialistic practices. The code was supposed to prevent people in the leadership positions in government, the party, and the para-statal bodies from holding shares or accepting directorships in private enterprises, from receiving two or more salaries and from owning houses which are rented by others.¹ The introduction of this code demonstrated that Nyerere was earnest in implementing the socialist ideology and in checking anti-socialistic practices.

¹ For more information on this issue, see Shivji, op.cit., pp.79-80.

In contrast, Obote did not institute a leadership code despite the fact that there was wide-spread corruption in the country which was even complained about in Parliament. For example, as early as June, 1969, Nekyon complained in Parliament about the activities of the National Trading Corporation, a para-statal body which Obote utilized in order to ostensibly spearhead the distribution of essential commodities such as sugar and salt to common men. Nekyon said in Parliament that since the Corporation had been formed, over one million shillings had been embezzled. He advised, "Business should be separated from politics..."¹ He urged the Minister to take action before he was faced with an irretrievable situation. Glentworth and Hancock have aptly remarked:

The strictly ideological dispute about the desirability of socialism took second place. Indeed the issue was hardly debated at all. It proved easy enough to declare oneself on the side of the Common Man, while continuing to amass private wealth and to live ostentatiously, easy because Obote's socialism could not be effective at least until the power struggle was over.²

¹ Uganda Argus, June 25, 1969, p.2.

² G. Glentworth and I. Hancock, "Obote and Amin: Change and Continuity In Modern Uganda Politics", African Affairs, Vol.72, No.288, July 1973, p.247.

They also observed:

The conflict between the leadership's rhetoric and life-styles was not lost on the 'Common Man'. One of the authors vividly remembers a political meeting held by William Kalema in 1970 at the foot of Tank Hill, an exclusive residential suburb in Kampala. Questioners were not slow to point out that it was all very well for the Senior Obote Minister to talk about sacrifices and equal opportunities when he owned and rented at least four of the opulent houses seen above them.¹

OBOTE NATIONALISES PROPERTY

Our major argument here is that contrary to Obote's claim that his nationalisation measures put economic and political power in the hands of the majority of the Ugandans, the measures enabled Obote to monopolise power. Indeed, the measures gave Obote more patronage which he distributed to the Ugandan petty bourgeoisie. The common men who were claimed to be the main beneficiaries of nationalisation, did not gain any substantial gains from the nationalisation. On the contrary, they suffered from the shortages of essential goods and increased prices. Another related

¹ Ibid., p.247.

argument is that the nationalisation did not lead to socialization of the economy and that the economy of Uganda remained linked significantly to the capitalist powers which worked closely with the bureaucratic para-statal bodies.¹ Consequently, Obote's 'socialistic' measures did not bridge the gap between the elites and the masses. They were thus not integrative.

The observations of Arrighi and Saul are pertinent to our discussion. After examining the link between Socialism and economic development in Tropical Africa, they conclude:

One may be forgiven the suspicion that jockeying for political control rather than the logic of development strategy has dictated much of the interventionism that has taken place.²

They explain that the character of take-over of the trade sector in Africa is revealing and that it promises a proliferation of jobs and sources of advantage to the leadership cadre.³ They also explain that state ownership of the means of production does not necessarily solve the

¹ Shivji has shown that a similar thing happened to Tanzania, op.cit., especially Chapters 7 and 8.

² Arrighi and Saul, op.cit., p.33.

³ Ibid., p.32.

problem of 'perverse growth' because the labour aristocracy¹ continues to use its power in state-controlled modern sectors in order to appropriate a considerable share of the surplus in the form of increasing discretionary consumption.² All these points applied to the Ugandan situation.

The Common Man's Charter had given a hint that there would be nationalisation. Article 29 of the Charter said, "The heart of the move to the left can simply be stated. It is... that the political and economic power must be vested in the majority..."

On the Labour Day which fell on 1st May, 1970, Obote announced that the Government had taken over sixty per cent of the shares of a wide range of business concerns. These included banks, insurance companies, industries and transport companies. The Uganda Development Corporation which was a para-statal body was directed to increase its share-holding in the Kilembe Mines to sixty per cent. All import and export business would henceforth be transacted by Para-statal Bodies only.³ Whereas the Government would acquire

¹ By labour aristocracy they refer to workers who enjoy incomes three or more times higher than those of the unskilled labourers. Arrighi and Saul, *Ibid.*, pp.18-19.

² *Ibid.*, p.21.

³ For the actual text, See A.M. Obote, "Labour Day Speech" Kampala, May 1, 1970 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1970).

sixty per cent of the shares of every oil company operating in Uganda, the oil companies would, however, continue to import and distribute oil and other petroleum products.

The President who was accompanied by the Chief General Service¹ Officer, made his speech at Nakivubo stadium which is surrounded by slums.² His speech was punctuated by wildly cheering crowds of workers some of whom were shouting "give us some more". Obote appealed to the feelings of the workers when he stressed that his move was aimed at ensuring that the production of wealth and its distribution should be controlled and managed with the active engagement of the people. He popularised the Common Man's Charter by quoting Article 38 of the Charter and by emphasising that his nationalisation measures were logical consequences of the principles of the Charter which was aimed at putting the economic and political power into the hands of the common man. Article 38 of the Charter said:

In our Move to the Left strategy, we affirm that the guiding economic principle will be that the means of production and distribution must be in

¹ This Department was in charge of political spying for the Government.

² This is why the nationalisation measures are also known as the Nakivubo Pronouncements. The Nakivubo Pronouncements were known as Document No.4 on the Move to the Left.

the hands of the people as a whole. The fulfilment of this principle may involve nationalisation of the enterprises privately owned.

Reactions of the foreign Investors

The owners of the nationalized concerns were startled to learn that compensation would be paid to them "over a period from the profits made by the Companies concerned".¹ This formula of compensating businessmen was regarded as being outright robbery, more so because there was an implication that if the profits were not realized, there would be no compensation. It is worth noting that on the 1st of November 1969, foreign banks and credit institutions were required to be incorporated in Uganda with a working capital of twenty million shillings and two million shillings respectively. This measure increased the control of the state over these banks. For example, before the banks could transfer capital, they had to get official clearance. For our discussion, the relevant point to note is that Obote publicly assured the businessmen that he would not nationalise banks. Six months later, the same leader of Uganda, openly violated his assurance when he nationalized the banks. The same Obote who had in 1962 assured the Kings that he would safeguard their position, had abolished monarchy in 1967.

¹ Obote's Labour Day Speech, op.cit.

The Confederation of British Industry urged the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to assist Companies which were being denied their rights under the international law to adequate and effective compensation.¹ The Confederation was determined to make sure that Obote should not set a precedent which would impair the British interests in other parts of Africa. The Association for the Promotion and Protection Of Private Foreign Investments also met in Zurich and resolved to keep the 'Uganda situation under review'.² Sir Frederick Seaborn, The Chairman of the Barclays Bank, said:

No one questions the right of Governments to nationalise within their territory... But to nationalise by instant decree and without any prior consultation is, to say the least, an unfriendly gesture which is not likely to create a feeling of confidence among potential investors.³

In fairness to Obote, it must be pointed out that prior consultation with foreign investors would have probably enabled them to take out of Uganda more capital than they

¹ S.D. Ryan, "Economic Nationalism and Socialism in Uganda", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol.XI, No.2, July 1973, p.144.

² The Times (London), July 6, 1970.

³ Uganda Argus, March 27, 1971.

were able to take out when the nationalization took them by surprise.

The Shell BP and Agip Oil Companies successfully rejected Obote's formula of compensation to be made out of profits. They also successfully urged the Government to accept the repayment period of five years. Shell BP also insisted that it would appoint four Directors, one of whom would be the Managing Director. Uganda would appoint four Directors including the Chairman of the Board. But the management and consultancy services were to be provided by the Company for a fee equivalent to one per cent of the net profits.¹

Despite stringent exchange control, capital outflow continued to increase. This fact demonstrated to Obote his administrative and economic incapacity to control the international Capitalists who indulged in other subtle methods such as over-invoicing in order to extract surplus capital from Uganda. A few figures will illustrate the point.

Table XI
Capital outflow

<u>Year</u>	<u>Out flow in million shillings.</u> ²
1966	28.0
1967	57.6
1968	159.7
1969	194.0
1970 over	300.0

¹ Ryan, op.cit., p.145.

² Source: Bank of Uganda Quarterly Bulletin, December, 1970.

Capital outflow was caused by the fact that since the publication of the Common Man's Charter in 1969, there was no clear policy about the role of the private sector. Furthermore, there was no clear policy about the future of the Asians who were scared by the nationalization, the Trade Licensing Act of 1969, and by the Immigration Act. The Trade Licensing Act which was aimed at Africanizing trade, and which created a class of African petty bourgeoisie excluded non-citizens from trading in certain trading areas.¹ The Immigration Act required non-citizens to obtain work permits by May 1, 1970.

Table XII²

Empirical evaluation of the nationalization measures

<u>Statement</u>	<u>Response</u>		<u>Rural</u>		<u>Urban</u>
When the Central Government nationalized some industries in 1970, the Common Man was uplifted economically.	I agree strongly	25	8.68%	3	2.81%
	I agree	12	4.17%	7	6.79%
	I am neutral	5	1.74%	2	1.94%
	I disagree	84	29.17%	10	9.70%
	I disagree strongly	157	54.41%	79	76.69%
	I don't know	5	1.74%	2	1.94%
	Total	288	99.91	103	99.87

In the rural area, 13 per cent agreed with the view that when the Central Government nationalized some industries in 1970,

¹ For details, consult J. Parsons, "The Africanisation of trade in Uganda: Background to and perspectives on Government Policy", Kampala, unpublished paper which can be found in the Library of Makerere University.

² Source: Survey data, 1979-1980.

the common man was economically uplifted, 2 per cent were neutral, 84 per cent disagreed with the statement and 2 per cent did not know what to say. In the urban area, 10 per cent agreed with the statement, 2 per cent were neutral, 86 per cent disagreed with the statement and 2 per cent did not know what to say. In order to ensure that the respondents understood fully the statement, we asked it in another way by requesting them to state what they benefitted from the nationalisation measures and we received results which were very close to those we had already tapped. The nationalised industries were more likely to benefit directly the elites who had the necessary credentials to man them. But if the common man had been mobilized to hate colonial and foreign domination of the Ugandan industries, they would have regarded the exercise of nationalising them as being beneficial to them at least in the long run. However, the failure of the regime to popularize national policies, weakened its capacity to enjoy the support of the people. More fundamentally, the abolition of strikes alienated the workers who were deprived of a powerful weapon through which they could make their demands more effectively. In Chapter I, we argued that if the Government pursues national policies which enjoy the support of the citizens, this is an indicator of a high degree of national integration. The

Central Government's policies were not supported by Buganda which had to be contained under Emergency Regulations for five years.

The nationalization measures serve the purpose of monopolizing power instead of the claimed aim of re-distributing resources to the common man

We must now demonstrate our contention that the nationalisation measures served the purpose of enabling Obote and his supporters to monopolize power instead of the claimed aim of re-distributing resources to the common men. Obote's choice of J. Madhvani, an arch-capitalist, to be in charge of the Export Import Corporation, disappointed dedicated socialists, especially the Youth Wingers, who pointed out that Madhvani would assist the process of frustrating the socialist cause. The Minister of Foreign Affairs openly encouraged the capitalists to flourish when he said in Parliament:

We appeal to people not to put wrong interpretations on the Common Man's Charter. It does not stop a person from building ten houses if he does it properly.¹

More fundamentally, the National Trading Corporation which must be discussed briefly, showed clearly that para-statal

¹ Uganda Parliamentary Debates, Vol.99, April 28, 1970. p.179.

bodies were not used to re-distribute resources to the common men. On the contrary, the bodies enabled Obote to starve his opponents into submission. What the National Trading Corporation (NTC) did, was similar to what Lasswell describes. He says:

Through rationing, it is possible to withhold supplies from the "undesirable" elements, and to starve them out of existence or into submission.¹

The 'undesirable' elements were the chiefly traditionalists who were called 'feudalists' and those who were not committed to the UPC. The limited supplies included salt, sugar, and trading licences over which the NTC had complete control. The wealthy Baganda who had hitherto either defied or ignored Obote, were gradually discovering that if they did not declare themselves to be on his side, they were denied access to the trading licences and the essential goods. The Chairman of the NTC declared openly that those who were not members of the UPC would not be given trading licences. A commission of Inquiry which probed the affairs of the NTC in 1971, enabled the public to gather staggering information concerning its conduct.² It consisted of Justice

¹ D.H. Lasswell, Who Gets What, When, How (Illinois: The Free Press, Glencoe, 1951), p.346.

² See for example, Daily Nation, Nairobi, April 11, 1972, p.1.

Y.V. Phadke, a High Court Judge, who was its Chairman, and two Commissioners who were S. Sebageraka, The Chairman of MacKenzie Technical Services Ltd., and P.W. de Haast, the Financial Adviser to the Uganda Development Corporation.

B. Greene, Counsel to the Commission, said:

It must be seldom that public funds have been squandered with such wreckless prodigality.¹

The Commission revealed, for example, that one lady² who was a staunch supporter of the UPC, was given a loan of Shs. 80,000/- on flimsy financial grounds. When she failed to pay, no effort was taken to recover the money. By February 1971, there were over 160 people who owed the NTC 13.6 million shillings of which 8 million had been written off because apparently the people could not be traced. E.K. Bismunyu, a Member of Parliament, and the General Manager of the East African Harbours Corporation, nicknamed the National Trading Corporation 'the National Trading Corruption'.³ The word 'Corporation' was replaced by 'corruption'. He argued that the experience of the NTC illustrated the fact that:

¹ Ibid., p.1.

² The author who was shown a Confidential file containing even more staggering cases of financial irresponsibility, was requested not to disclose the name of the lady.

³ The People, Kampala, May 3, 1972, p.1.

... public commercial organizations, unless properly organized along socialist lines, can degenerate into a dangerous instrument of the bourgeoisie that militates against the whole concept of socialising the means of production and distribution.¹

Ryan who was a visiting Senior Lecturer at Makerere University, and who experienced the consequences of the activities of the NTC and the activities of the Export - Import Corporation, wrote:

The general complaint against the NTC and the Export - Import Corporation was that they broke up the 'normal lines of trade', thus generating increases in prices which were then passed on to the consumer.²

We must add that the increased prices affected essential goods such as sugar, salt and edible oil, goods which the common man could not afford to forego. The NTC is a case study which illustrates how para-statal bodies were not used to benefit the common man. On the contrary, these bodies benefitted the Ugandan petty bourgeoisie who created artificial shortages of the essential goods as a result of which the prices of essential goods went up. The Agencies were also only given to the UPC supporters. F. Onama, the Minister of Defence, made what was in effect a public confession of

¹ Quoted in Ryan, op.cit., p.150.

² Ibid., p.154.

what was going on in the NTC. He said in Parliament:

But I must speak in the spirit of the Common Man's Charter that public funds should not be misused to make the rich richer without doing any work. Agencies of the NTC were given out to certain individuals including a good number of us here... I think we shall have now to examine whether a few of us in our position should be taking Agencies, using the NTC's name to be middlemen which the Common Man's Charter intends to eradicate.¹

One Professor at Makerere University who was a member of the UPC, was made a Chairman of one Bank and a Director of many Companies.² He disclosed that apart from getting allowances for being a Chairman and a Director of so many companies, he acquired power which enabled him to get loans much more easily than before he assumed his new role. He belonged to the Ugandan petty bourgeoisie who benefitted directly from the nationalisation measures. The nationalised resources conferred on Obote and his supporters more power to enjoy the nationalised resources and to starve the opponents into submission. Some business men in Uganda who thought that they could ignore Obote, realized that they were denied

¹ Uganda Parliamentary Debates, Second Series, Vol.99, April 27, 1970, p.147.

² He requested to remain anonymous.

Agencies and other facilities. They were starved into submission.

The issue of disengaging the Ugandan economy from the grip of the international capitalism was neither discussed nor even attempted. Uganda remained a capitalist country which was squarely in the grip of the international capitalists. Socialism was merely recited and it was not implemented. It is suggestive to note that while there are 14 occasions on which the Charter uses the words 'feudal' or 'feudalism' and 13 references to 'nation', the word 'socialism' only occurs three times.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHAIR

It remains to discuss three other documents which were issued by Obote as part of his strategy on the Move to the Left. So far we have discussed the Common Man's Charter which was document No.1 and the Nakivubo Pronouncements concerning nationalization which was document No.4. The Communication from the Chair of the National Assembly was document number 3.¹ This document affected the interests of the civil service fundamentally as we must show. Obote abolished salary increments during the first two years of

¹ A.M. Obote, Communication From the Chair of the National Assembly On the Occasion of the ceremonial Opening of Parliament April 20, 1970 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1970).

the probationary employment, car loans, overtime pay, acting, duty and disturbance allowances. Annual increments were replaced by bi-annual increments. The definition of a Public Body was widened to include persons employed in the Government, District Administrations, Urban Authority and Para-statal Bodies. Promotion was to be made not on the basis of seniority and length of service, but on the basis of merit. There would be compulsory retirement of officers who had outlived their usefulness.

Obote's attempt to politicize the civil service was evident when he said:

Among other things, the Public Officers will no longer remain anonymous to the people of Uganda, and the people will thereby be enabled to appraise the degree of the commitment and dedication of the men and women they pay.¹

Obote's subsequent actions showed that by commitment, he meant that the civil servants had to join the UPC. Civil servants were henceforth allowed to join the UPC.

F. Kalimuzo, the Head of the Civil Service, openly wore UPC shirts, a practice which was copied by his subordinates. During the UPC Annual Delegates Conference which took place at Mbale in August, 1970, all the top civil servants who

¹ Obote, "Communication from the Chair", Ibid., p.33.

had been made Directors and Chairmen of the nationalised bodies were made to stand up, face the audience and recite various sections of the Common Man's Charter. In particular, they recited article 38, which legitimated the nationalisation of the property. This action amounted to a public pledge to the Party and the Charter by the civil servants. Clearly, the principles of anonymity and of being apolitical, were now rejected under the new 'socialist' culture.

It is interesting to note that although the civil servants were expected to be totally committed to the UPC, they were not encouraged to contest political elections. This was so because the politicians who were on the whole less educated than the Civil Servants, were uneasy about competing with the civil servants in the political arena.

How did the civil servants react to Obote's Communication from the Chair? In general, they resented it. Public transport was so irregular and unreliable in Uganda that the provision of car loans was essential if the civil servants were to perform their duties efficiently.¹ The abolition of increments and other allowances, greatly impaired the morale of the civil servants.² The Permanent

¹ Getting loans from businessmen through private arrangements was a cumbersome procedure.

² Interview with the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Public Service And Cabinet Affairs, a Ministry which was in charge of the Civil Servants.

Secretaries were less affected by the abolition of annual increments, overtime pay, acting, duty and disturbance allowances, because in general these allowances did not apply to the civil servants who had reached the top of their career. However, they felt that if Obote could abolish these important 'rights' of the Civil Servants, he would continue to abolish others. Promotion on the basis of merit and not seniority, gave the Government a chance to promote young men whose major 'merit' was that they were political supporters of the Government. The abolition of increments and other allowances for the civil servants did not bridge the gap between them and the common men in any important manner because there was no evidence to show that the money which was saved by these measures, was used to uplift the common men. The civil servants rightly pointed out that the politicians and the businessmen who were exploiting the common men more fundamentally, were not even touched by any socialistic measure.

The reactions of the Baganda Civil Servants at the Central level

Since we are primarily dealing with the problem of integrating Baganda into Uganda, a word must be said about the reactions of the Baganda civil servants to Obote's changes. However, before we do so, we must clarify one

point. In Chapter II, we argued that Buganda's financial resources, her geographical centrality, plus the fact that her posts enjoyed prestige, tended to attract many Baganda elites to work in the Buganda civil service rather than at the central level. We must, however, point out that there were two factors which started discouraging the Baganda elites from working in Buganda. The manner in which the chiefly traditionalists had discredited and in some cases humiliated the educated Baganda nationalists, tended to offend the educated Baganda civil servants. It must be noted that the chiefly traditionalists tended also to be suspicious of the commitment of the educated Baganda Civil Servants to the Monarchy. We must also note that after 1967, Obote abolished Buganda's autonomy, the independence of her civil service, and that he centralized Buganda's financial resources. These two factors started to lure the educated Baganda to work at the central level instead of working in the Buganda Government. Since the Baganda got a head start in the field of education, they also possessed credentials which entitled them to hold key positions in the Central Civil Service. Kasfir who probed the ethnic composition of the Higher Civil Service in Uganda, demonstrated that between 1959 and 1967, the Baganda were still over-represented in the Higher Civil Service. He showed,

for example, that in March 1967, the Baganda represented 36 per cent of the Higher Civil Servants.¹ He argues:

The Baganda cannot claim they are being discriminated against, and others can take satisfaction in the rise of percentage of Higher Civil Servants from their respective ethnic groups.²

The major point to grasp is that those Baganda who identified with the governing party especially when Obote was confronting Buganda from 1966 to 1967, stood a fair chance of retaining their jobs. Most of the top Baganda Civil Servants who were interviewed accepted this assessment. As already noted, they pointed out that the rejection of the educated people by the chiefly traditionalists at Mengo, had alienated them from the politics of the Buganda Kingdom. Moreover, they saw better prospects of working at a national level than working at Mengo which had been reduced to the level of a local government. For these reasons, they either gave Obote lukewarm support or supported him overtly as he confronted the Kingdom of Buganda. The major thing over which they were united in opposition to Obote, was the manner in which the Kabaka was attacked in 1966 and the way his

¹ Kasfir, op.cit., pp.126-127. Crawford Young estimates that in 1967, of Uganda's 200 top civil servants 150 were at this time Baganda. Quoted in Low, Buganda in Modern History, op.cit., p.239.

² Kasfir, op.cit., p.125. Cf. Uganda Government Directory, 1959-69 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1962).

palace was used. We should recall that the army occupied it. Like their colleagues, the Baganda Civil Servants did not like the changes contained in the Communication from the Chair for reasons which we have already discussed. But they were aware that they were not in a strong position to oppose the changes more so because the Baganda were more vulnerable¹ than their colleagues to being accused of trying to restore what Obote called the pre-revolutionary 'feudal' era.

The Baganda Civil Servants who were either suspected of being sympathetic to the abolished regime of Buganda or to the banned Democratic Party, were subjected to subtle but effective administrative tactics which frustrated them. For example, they were frequently transferred from one Ministry to another, a practice which frustrated many who resigned from the Uganda Civil Service. These included T. Makumbi, A.K. Ntate and Dr. Katongole. It must be pointed out that following the revolution of 1966, Obote created a political Ministry of Public Service and Cabinet Affairs which handled Civil Service matters. There was also another frustrating tactic under which the distrusted Head of a Department was by-passed and effective power was seen to shift to his

¹This was so because the revolution of 1966 concentrated on demolishing the hitherto most defiant and robust Kingdom of Buganda.

subordinates who were politically trusted. Some of these allegations might have been unfounded. But the important point to grasp here is that the majority of the Baganda Civil Servants believed that they were more vulnerable than their colleagues. Consequently, the Baganda Civil Servants felt a sense of insecurity and they concluded that unless they appeared to over-identify with Obote's new policies, they were in danger of being victimized and of being accused of collaborating with people who wished to restore monarchy. This is the major sense in which the Baganda Civil Servants felt that they were treated less generously than the other indigenous Ugandans. In other words, the burden of the proof was upon the Baganda Civil Servants to prove that they had mastered the following message which was contained in Article 10 of the Common Man's Charter:

With the removal of the feudal factor from our political and economic life, we need to do two things. First, we must not allow the previous position of the feudalists to be filled by neo-feudalists. Secondly, we must move away from circumstances which may give birth to neo-feudalism or generate a feudalistic mentality.

'Neo-feudalists' included civil servants who were sympathetic to the abolished Buganda establishment.

ELECTION PROPOSALS

Document No.5 concerned election proposals.¹ These proposals showed Obote's concern to achieve national integration by deflating the forces of ethnicity. A candidate who stood in his tribal or 'basic' constituency was also required to get votes in three other constituencies from the remaining parts of Uganda. The three remaining constituencies were 'national' in the sense that they were outside the tribal area of the candidate. Since Obote was removed from power before these proposals were implemented, we shall only briefly discuss the possible implications of the proposals for national integration. In the election proposals, Obote was grappling with transethnic integration. In most cases, Ugandans who contested for elections to Parliament used to stand in their tribal areas. And thus they tended to be 'tribal' representatives of their areas. They tended to lack the capacity to focus their attention beyond their tribal areas. The proposal to make a member of Parliament stand in four constituencies, was aimed at sensitising him to the issues beyond his tribal area. The aim of the proposals were summed up in these words:

¹ See A.M. Obote, Proposals for New Methods of Election of Representatives of the People to Parliament (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1970). Hereafter referred to as Obote's Election Proposals.

The sum total of these proposals is to foster the unity of the country and enhance the confidence of the people in the members of the National Assembly as true representatives of the interests of all parts of Uganda and the aspirations of Uganda as a whole.¹

The major weaknesses of the Election proposals were mainly four. Canvassing in four constituencies was going to be so expensive that the poor people would find it hard to stand for elections. This complex system was likely to confuse the masses who were already finding the existing simple system of standing in one constituency difficult to comprehend. The new system was likely to favour those who were already known at the national level. As already noted, Uganda still lacked a widely understood national language. Consequently, the task of canvassing for votes was going to be extremely difficult. Despite these problems, the election proposals constituted a major innovation. It is a pity that they were not implemented.

NATIONAL SERVICE

The proposals for the National Service were contained in document number two.² Camps were to be organized at four Regional centres, in each Parliamentary constituency and in

¹ See the introduction to Obote's Election Proposals.

² A.M. Obote, Proposals for National Service (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1969).

each sub-county. People to be recruited into the camps included primary school leavers who had not obtained further education. The teachers would include University students, post-secondary institutions and the higher levels of post-primary institutions. These proposals were unpopular because rumours spread widely that people would be required to desert their homes and that they would be huddled in camps. It was feared especially in Buganda that these proposals would break homes and that the camps would be used to torture the political opponents of Obote. Giving the civilians some rudimentary military credentials in order to defend their country in the event of a grave problem, was omitted. In Tanzania, such skills are given to the population. This arrangement would have also upgraded the influence of the civilians. The National service proposals should not detain us because they were not implemented.

Some people have argued that if Obote had been given more time, he would have implemented the socialist ideology. It is argued that he introduced the ideology in 1969 and that in 1971, the army grabbed power from him. This argument is hypothetical and it is therefore difficult to give a definite answer to it. Our view is that there is no evidence to suggest that he had laid a solid foundation for the implementation of the ideology as Nyerere of Tanzania

did. As already noted, the key people who surrounded him, were some of the key people who violated the implementation of the ideology. The party itself was too weak and divided to popularize the ideology. We have also noted that the ideology misdiagnosed and exaggerated certain issues in Buganda such as the conflict between the common man and the chiefly traditionalists. It is therefore unlikely that giving Obote more time would have made it possible for the implementation of the ideology which was in any case massively rejected in Buganda as we demonstrated. The ideology can best be described as an excellent example of radical documentary radicalism which was not implemented.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this Chapter, it was suggested that Obote wished to use ideology in order to revive political institutions which might be counterweights to the power of the army over which he was too dependent. Willets has argued that Obote's greatest failure, and the one that made all his other achievements look somewhat hollow, was his unwillingness (or his inability) to tackle the privilege of unbridled power held by the army.¹ What must be remembered is that during the political crisis of 1966, the army was

¹ Willets, op.cit., p.298.

the single decisive factor which enabled Obote to win the struggle for power. When he kept Buganda under emergency from 1966 until he was overthrown, he had to pay the army twice its salary. The point which must be grasped is that Obote failed to create through ideology political institutions which could act as counterweights to the power of the army. He missed the opportunity of selling the ideology to the common man. He did not attempt to give military training to the civilian in his national service proposals. It is possible that he was not prepared to give military credentials to the people whom he was containing by force. And yet giving military training to the civilians would have made the army realize that it does not have monopoly over the means of coercion.

We have attempted to show that Obote failed to use ideology to popularize the republican institutions and values partly because the ideology was abusive instead of cajoling the Baganda to accept the changes.

It has also been shown that Obote's attempt to win the common man by declaring that there was a major gap between them and the chiefly traditionalists was largely unsuccessful because his ideological call lacked exemplary behaviour from the leading politicians. Furthermore, the ideological call was not supported by tangible actions to

uplift the economic and political lot of the common man. Obote's failure to grapple with the exploitative aspects of the land system, and of the corrupt Co-operatives and parastatal bodies, which were supposed to spearhead socialism, undermined the credibility of his ideological message. It has also been shown that his nationalisation and centralisation measures did not benefit the common man and that it was the petty - bourgeoisie who benefitted from these measures. The weakness of his party aggravated its capacity to spread Obote's ideological message. The study has shown that an ideology which lacks credibility and which lacks virile institutions to spearhead it cannot foster national integration.

We have shown that to the extent that the national political ideology was widely rejected, the Government failed to forge national integration.

By 1969, Obote's grip over the political system was weak. He had antagonised a wide section of the Ugandans. The republicans were deprived of participating in the crucial decisions largely because the political institutions through which they would have participated in decision making were very weak. The Baganda Civil Servants at the central level who did not desert Obote when he confronted Buganda in 1966, were angered by his Communication from the Chair measures of

1970; the common man had rejected his ideological call which exaggerated their plight without solving their existing problems; the modernising monarchist elites were antagonised by Obote's abolition of monarchy and by his extra-constitutional measures of 1966; the chiefly traditionalists were outraged by Obote's abolition of monarchy and Buganda's establishment; and the Youth Wingers were disillusioned with the socialist documentary radicalism which was not implemented. Obote was thus an isolated man who must have realised that the problem of integrating Buganda into Uganda was still slippery.

In January 1971, the army, the very instrument which he had utilised in order to crush and contain Buganda, seized the political power from him.¹

¹ For an assessment of the causes of the Coup d'etat, consult the following: M. Twaddle, "The Amin Coup", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol.X, No.2, 1972, R.First, "Uganda: the latest coup d'etat in Africa", The World To-day, March 1971, Glentworth and Hancock, op.cit., Amin, The Birth of the Second Republic: The First 365 Days op.cit., M. Lofchie, "The Uganda Coup-Class Action by the Military", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 10,1, 1972. J.D. Chick, "Class conflict and Military Intervention in Uganda", Journal of Modern African Studies, December, 1972, and I. Gershenberg, "A further comment on the 1971 Uganda Coup", Journal of Modern African Studies, December 1972. We do not accept Lofchie's submission that the 1971 Coup was caused when the Military acted as class and attempted to protect their economic interests which were challenged by Obote's 'socialist' Move to the Left. Lofchie's analysis presupposes that Obote's Move to the Left was taken seriously and that it was seriously implemented. Furthermore, ethnicity tended to prevent the crystallisation of class consciousness among the Ugandans.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we shall assess the significance of our study and make suggestions for tackling the existing political problems. We shall grapple with the question: 'Was Obote a victim of Uganda's circumstances or did he play his political cards poorly?' Finally, we shall discuss further lines of research. The thesis has shown that although there were religious and social differences in Buganda, Obote's methods of attempting to integrate Buganda into Uganda, reinforced ethnic solidarity in Buganda and that the bond of ethnicity overshadowed the class and the religious differences in Buganda. In particular, we have discussed Obote's method of using force when he tried to use the revolutionary-centralising model in order to crush Buganda's Lukiiko, monarchy and hegemony. We have shown that the Baganda became insecure and that as they groped for security, their ethnic solidarity was enhanced. The study has thus shown that although class analysis is important for understanding African politics, ethnicity can also, under certain circumstances, have decisive influence. For example, we have shown that if an ethnic group is confronted with policies which make it insecure, ethnicity becomes an

important rallying point and that as the tribe gropes for social and economic security, ethnicity tends to overshadow class differences. This is what happened to the Baganda of Uganda from 1967 when their cherished traditional institutions were confronted and demolished by the Central Government. It is pertinent to note that even during the general elections of 1980, the Baganda voted as one coherent ethnic group and massively rejected UPC, a party which they associated with the demolition of their monarchy and special position in 1967.¹ In other words, the elections were not viewed in class terms. Once again the survival and security of the Baganda appeared to be the major issues which preoccupied the Baganda.

What is the significance of this finding? Whereas our approach suggests that we must focus our attention on the realisation of transethnic and territorial integration, the Marxists like Mamdani, Jorgensen and Nabudere, who seek to explain Uganda's politics in terms of classes, must focus their attention on social integration. Mamdani writes:

¹ Out of 35 seats, the Democratic Party got 34 seats and the Uganda Peoples Congress got 1 seat. For more details on the 1980 elections, read The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group on Uganda Elections, December, 1980 (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1980) pp.15.1 to 15.4. Since 1962, Uganda had not held elections until 1980.

The object of this book is to explain the politics of Uganda in the period between independence (1962) and the Asian expulsion of 1972. To do so we have found it necessary to trace the formation of all those social forces - classes or fractions of classes - which achieved a measure of independent political organization during the decade.¹

In order to remove contradictions and work towards national integration, the Marxists find it necessary to organize the oppressed classes so that they may overthrow the comprador classes which represent imperialist interests that exploit the masses. A violent revolution is claimed to be inevitable because the exploiting classes cannot accept giving up their economic advantages voluntarily.

Interpreting Uganda's politics in terms of classes assumes that a peasant in Buganda relates to a peasant in Acholi in terms of the role which they play in the relations of production. If this is true, this development represents a significant degree of national integration. However, our study has shown that ethnicity interferes with the crystallization of the class consciousness. We have shown that during

¹ Mandani, op.cit., pp. 13-14.

the 1966 crisis, the peasants in Buganda rallied with the petty bourgeois Baganda as the two groups groped for the security of their tribe. The significance of our finding is that the formula for integrating Buganda into Uganda must concentrate on realizing transethnic integration. Whereas the Marxists seek to realize national integration by advocating a violent overthrow of the exploiting classes and by emphasising the reduction of the elite mass gap, our approach focuses attention on realizing transethnic integration.

We propose the following measures in order to reduce ethnicity. All tribes must be assured of social, political and economic security. Objective criteria must be used especially in the allocation of scarce resources. The policy of correcting historical economic and other imbalances must be a comprehensive exercise. It must also be systematically phased out in order to avoid one ethnic group being overwhelmed by so many dramatic changes taking place at the same time. A comprehensive exercise would, for example, preclude correcting over-representation of an ethnic group in the army while leaving an over-representation of another ethnic group in the civil service.

The study has shown that mere abolition of traditional institutions does not necessarily enhance national integra-

tion. On the contrary, if focal traditional institutions are confronted and destroyed, the measure tends to enhance ethnicity. An alternative way of reducing the efficacy of the traditional institutions which appear to complicate the process of national integration, is to undermine their economic and political power in measured stages as Nkrumah of Ghana did. These measures should not preclude giving the traditional rulers ritual and customary respect. The late President Nkrumah of Ghana did not abolish traditional institutions. In fact, he declared at public rallies,

I am not in the Gold Coast to abolish chieftaincy. All that the people expect our natural rulers to do is to respect the wishes of their people. I plead for mutual respect between chiefs and people.¹

However, he proceeded to reduce the economic and political foundations of the traditional rulers. For example, the houses of chiefs which he set up in 1958, were purely advisory bodies which dealt with only customary matters in the area of a chief. He also deprived them of the power of enstoolment. The focus of attention shifted from the traditional centres to the central institutions. Some chiefs

¹ P. Lloyd, "Traditional rulers" in J. Coleman and Rosberg, *op.cit.*, p.410.

began vying for national posts. For example, Nana Kwabena Kenna was made Ghana's Ambassador in Delhi.¹ Nkrumah himself surrounded himself with traditional rituals which enjoyed political legitimacy with the masses. For example, when he became the President of Ghana in 1960, the House of Assembly had a throne modelled on the traditional Akan stool. In Nigeria, the traditional rulers have retained a respectable role.² Equally Obote could have undermined the political and economic power of the Kings without necessarily abolishing Kingdoms, a measure which created insecurity and enhanced ethnicity in Buganda.

In Chapter VI, we noted that the workers in Buganda were not fully-fledged workers inter alia because many of them retained their basic roots in the rural areas. Elkan who carried out a study on workers in Kampala found that 20 per cent of the African workers in Kampala had been there as long as five years. He was tempted to conclude that urban Africans were essentially transitory migrants without lasting commitment to town residence and therefore did not form a proletarian sub-culture.³ The point to grasp for our dis-

¹ Ibid., p.410.

² For details see Lloyd, op.cit., pp.386 - 403.

³ Elkan, op.cit., pp.1-3.

cussion is that Buganda was so predominantly rural that it was difficult for a Muganda to escape the primordial influences of rural life. This setting provided a good environment for ethnic solidarity to thrive.

A systematic programme of urbanization and industrialization might create a new environment which might not be so hospitable to the growth of ethnicity. We must not urbanize Uganda in such a way that a few people own the land and the peasants are forced to come to the cities where there are no jobs. We would merely create a lumpen proletariat. We propose a systematic programme of urbanization which is supplemented by industrialization. Initially, our industrialization should focus on light industries for which Uganda has shown a capacity to make. These measures are likely to produce a class of fully fledged wage earners who would be held together by functional inter-dependence. A programme of full democratization of Buganda and the creation of strong trade unions to guard the interests of the workers, would create new criss-crossing relationships which might weaken ethnicity. We are aware that ethnicity can thrive in cities. However, if job and social insecurity are reduced, the case for creating tribal organizations to fend for the insecure ethnic groups would be weakened.

The study has also shown that the failure to solve the Buganda problem politically contributed to the militarisation of Uganda's politics along ethnic lines. From 1962 to 1967, Obote sought to use a political formula for integrating Buganda into Uganda. The UPC-KY alliance, the making the Kabaka of Buganda the President of Uganda, the adoption of a semi-federal constitution under which Buganda's autonomy was recognized, were political measures under which Buganda was persuaded to join national politics under a pragmatic-pluralist approach. Monarchy and republicanism, traditionalism and modernity co-existed. However, the disappearance of political toleration, the straggle for power within the UPC, and the surfacing of the conflicting objectives under which the UPC-KY alliance was made, created a national crisis in 1966. Henceforth Obote used the army to crush Buganda. He hoped that this was a temporary measure but as he faced more problems of political legitimacy, he had to depend more on the use of force and Emergency Powers in order to contain Buganda. Consequently, the army became increasingly an important arbiter in the resolution of political conflict. In 1971, it seized power from him.

What is the significance of this finding? Many parts of Africa are still groping for a formula to restore the

civilian supremacy. For example, when Nkrumah of Ghana was overthrown by the army, subsequent events showed that the army had failed to solve the problems which were afflicting the country. A civilian Government under Busia was given a chance to grapple with the problems only to be overthrown by a military regime. It was replaced by a civilian regime which was overthrown by yet another military regime. Is Uganda likely to face similar problems? Although Amin's military Government was overthrown in 1979 and was subsequently replaced by a civilian Government, full restoration of the civilian supremacy is still eluding Ugandans who are grappling with a devastated economy and dissident groups which have refused to accept the authority of Obote's Government. Buganda has been declared by the Government to be the major area which is harbouring dissident groups.¹ While it is difficult to verify whether or not this statement is entirely correct, it has serious implications not only for Buganda but for the rest of Uganda. As the army is unleashed on Buganda in which dissident groups are said to be operating, the role of the army is being upgraded. Indeed, the army retains the ultimate power of deciding who

¹ Uganda Times, January 26, 1981, p.1 and Munno, March 29, 1982, p.1.

of the contending groups shall remain in power. The complications of sending such an army back to the barracks under these circumstances are self-evident. Drawing lessons from our study, we wish to propose the following:

One major condition of restoring fully the civilian supremacy in Uganda will be the resolution of the Buganda question politically. In turn, this will facilitate restructuring the army so that it reflects at least some degree of parity of ethnic representation. Solving the Buganda question politically entails agreeing on a constitution which devolves some meaningful powers to the local units so that they can handle the immediate problems confronting Uganda's plural society. The constitution could be either a quasi-federal one or a unitary constitution. Powers could be decentralized under a unitary constitution as it is done in Britain. It is also essential to agree democratically on the traditions which should be preserved and those which should disappear. Buganda should, like the rest of Uganda, be completely democratized so that people may participate in the process of building primary consensus. Following the abolition of Monarchy, there is a power vacuum in Buganda, political ignorance and insecurity. A programme of giving people political education so that they may acquire

civic competence is essential in order to ensure that people understand and exercise their democratic rights.

While the policy of containing Buganda by force is existing, it has not been logically tenable to encourage the Baganda to join the army in big numbers and at a senior level because they would acquire the military capacity to disrupt the policy of containment by force. And yet if we are to get an ethnically integrated army, it is essential to ensure that every ethnic group is at least proportionately represented in the army.

Another method of restoring the civilian supremacy, entails giving military training to the civilians as part of the national service. Tanzania adopted this formula and it had the consequence of creating political counter-weights to the power of the army.

Our army is also under-politicized. This means that it does not seem to work out the political consequences of its actions. It is essential that Uganda should work out a widely acceptable ideology and the army should be socialized within the framework of the adopted ideology.

We have shown that Apter exaggerated Buganda's response to modernity. We have, however, accepted his important observation that the Baganda were able to tradi-

tionalize innovation. It was not his intention to analyse the integrational consequences of this observation and we have attempted to analyse them. In Chapter III, we argued that Obote's failure to ally modern institutions with the traditional ones was caused by the fact that there was a survival of many traditional values which were not reconciled by the courts and the weak nationalist party. We have also shown in Chapters III and IV that the success of the Baganda to accept modernization along their own terms, did not undermine their ethnic solidarity. Consequently, modernization did not lead to the detribalization and to a greater degree of transethnic integration. Absence of political toleration also arrested the process of reconciling the differences between Buganda's traditional institutions and the national institutions.

The study has thus demonstrated the complexity of incorporating different patterns of modernization into a national mould. The mere removal of Kings and the attendant traditional institutions, did not necessarily enhance national integration. A vigorous programme of modernization entailing planned urbanization and democratization supplemented by a gradual system of undercutting the economic power of the traditional institutions would reduce the power of the traditional institutions without exciting the ethnicity

of the affected tribal groups. This approach has the advantage of not overwhelming an opponent with radical and taxing changes on sensitive traditional issues.

One important indicator of national integration which we tested was the acceptance of inter-tribal marriage. It was shown that 68 per cent in the rural area and 60 per cent in the urban area accepted it. It was also shown that because of the limited objective opportunities for inter-tribal marriage to take place, 23 per cent in the rural area and 26 per cent in the urban area had actually practised it. What are the implications of this finding? It falsifies the view that the Baganda are difficult to integrate. If more objective opportunities are created for more inter-tribal marriages to take place, it might encourage greater transethnic interaction. However, the realization of transethnic interaction would depend on striking a balance between the conflicting values of the patrilineal and the matrilineal societies. Additionally, if the Government does not pursue policies which make the Baganda insecure, they show an important potential for national integration.

A word must be said about the models of integration. We noted that Obote tried to use the pragmatic-pluralist and the revolutionary-centralizing models. We suggest that

in a country like Uganda which enjoys ethnic and religious pluralism, the pragmatic-plural society is the best model of integrating it. This model minimizes the necessity of using force in order to integrate the various ethnic groups and it allows each ethnic group to contribute to the cultural vitality and variety of Uganda. The process of depluralising the Ugandan society by force, postpones the restoration of the civilian supremacy.

Was Obote a victim of circumstances or did he play his political cards poorly? Our position is that to a certain extent Obote was a victim of circumstances and that while credit must be given to him for having established territorial control, there are some important political mistakes which he made. The Ugandan socio-political terrain which he inherited from the British was harsh. For example, the controversial and delicate issue of the lost counties was created by the British who evaded solving it. Although Obote handled it objectively and firmly, it alienated the centrally placed Kingdom of Buganda. Whatever formula Obote would use to solve the issue of the lost counties, it was bound either to alienate the Baganda or the Banyoro who were supported by the rest of the non-Baganda.

When Obote pre-empted Buganda's capacity to secede from the rest of Uganda, he enhanced the ability of the Central Government to exercise administrative control over the subordinate units. Other areas like Toro, Busoga, Ankole and Bunyoro, which emulated Buganda to resist central control, observed what had happened to Buganda and they accepted central administrative control.

Obote missed three great opportunities: the democratization of Buganda, the penetration of the common men and the creation of viable national institutions. It was essential to democratize Buganda in order to penetrate all sections of Buganda and to encourage them to participate in the national affairs. Democratization of Buganda would have justified the attacks which he made on the Kabaka's Government for excluding common men from participating in the national affairs. His failure to penetrate the common men through the process of democratization and through adopting concrete measures to benefit them rendered his clarion call for them to join him to fight the privileged people unconvincing. Having created a vacuum in Buganda by abolishing Monarchy, it was essential to create credible and virile national institutions to fill the gap. His imposition of the socialist ideology from the top was a failure. He also failed to create a widely understood national language.

Above all, his failure to solve the Buganda question politically, contributed to the militarization of Uganda's politics, a problem whose solution is still baffling Uganda.

Finally, a word must be said about future areas of research. Since the expulsion of the Asians in 1972, several indigenous Ugandans have started living in the cities. It is essential to investigate empirically the consequences of indigenous urbanization for national integration.¹ At least two major consequences could have happened. The first one could be that the people who have joined the cities have merely created 'urban villages' by simply transferring their traditional ways of life and village habits and values to the city. If this is so, this model of urbanization has not enhanced national integration.

On the other hand, these people could have been more exposed to modern experiences through the radio, newspapers, television and through being in an environment which is less bound by rural rigidities and taboos. If this is true, two things may have happened. A shared way of life and symbols may have been created and ethnic differences which are rooted in traditional norms may have been reduced. If the people

¹ Cf. A.G. Onokerhoraye, "The urban system and National Integration in Nigeria", Journal Of Black Studies, Volume 9, Number 2, December, 1978, pp.169-180.

have realized these changes, they are ready for mobilization and transformation for national integration. Empirical research carried out in Kampala and other cities in Uganda should throw more light on these issues. Comparative analysis with research which was done elsewhere on these issues would enhance frontiers of knowledge.

Following the devastation of the Ugandan economy under Amin's period of rule, new food habits appear to have emerged. The Baganda who are traditionally matooke (plantain) eating people, have started accepting Ugali (maize meal) as an important part of their diet. Equally, a number of non-Baganda from the Northern part of Uganda who were traditionally not accustomed to eating matooke, are doing so. This trend has been observed at Makerere University where food is sold to members of staff. The trend has also been noted in the markets outside Kampala. The research should indicate the extent of this trend and its consequence for national integration. For example, will the trend create a bond of economic and nutritional inter-dependence between groups which do not share linguistic intelligibility? Will these food habits disappear if the Ugandan economy recovers from its present problems?

As noted in our previous discussion, Deutsch measures integration using the system of communication. This approach

could be usefully tested in Uganda. For example, one could examine the flow of messages between the different areas of Uganda through the postal system, radio and television and assess its consequence for national integration. How does the absence of a widely understood national language affect this flow?

Finally, it would be rewarding to establish the extent and consequences of the inter-tribal marriages which take place between ethnic groups which do not share linguistic intelligibility.

APPENDIX

CONFIDENTIAL

Makerere University
P.O. Box 7062,
Kampala.

November 1, 1979.

To the Respondent.

Dear Sir/Madam,

Questionnaire on Political Integration of
Buganda Into Uganda, 1962 - 1970

I am Apolo Nsibambi and I teach in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Makerere University. I am carrying out research which will be used purely for academic purposes. Through a process of random selection, your name has been picked as part of my sample. The information you give, will be treated with strict confidentiality. The individual responses will be pooled together in the analysis and the reporting will be done in such a way that no individual identities will be revealed. In a few cases where it may, however, be necessary to reveal identity, express permission will be sought from the individual concerned.

Our major interest is to get your honest views about the issues in question. You are free either to answer the question or to reject to do so. We repeat that it is entirely in your discretion to respond to our questionnaire.

Yours faithfully,

Apolo Robin Nsibambi,
Associate Professor of Political
Science and Public Administration,
Makerere University.

CONFIDENTIAL

Questionnaire on 'Integrating Buganda Into Uganda, 1962-1970'.

This questionnaire is to be administered to the head of the household or a responsible member of the household.

1. When were you born?.....
2. Are you male or female?
 1. Male
 2. Female
3. What is your tribe?
 1. Buganda
 2. Acholi
 3. Banyarwanda
 4. Banyankole
 5. Mukiga
 6. Musoga
 7. Other (Specify)
4. What is your clan?.....
5. What is your occupation? (State your most important occupation)
 1. Teacher
 2. Cultivator
 3. Central Government Official
 4. Local Government Official

3. Labourer
 6. Trader
 7. Church official
 8. Doctor
 9. Other(Specify)
6. Where do you stay? 1. Urban
2. Rural
7. How long have you lived in your place of residence?
.....
8. What is your county ?.....
9. What is your sub-county?.....
10. What is your parish?.....
11. Are you married, or single?
1. Married
2. If married state the number of wives
3. Unmarried
4. Divorced
12. How many children do you have?
.....
1. None
2. Number
3. Not applicable
13. What level of Education did you attain? (Tick what
is applicable)
1. Not gone to School (ie no formal schooling)..

2. Some primary education
3. Full primary education (P.7)
4. Some secondary education below 'O' level
5. 'O' level or equivalent
6. 'A' level or equivalent
7. Diploma (ie short of University degree)
8. University Degree
9. Post-graduate (specify)

14. To which party did you belong between 1962-1970?

1. None
2. Kabaka Yekka (K.Y.)
3. U.P.C.
4. D.P.
5. Other (Specify)

15. To which party do you belong in 1980?

1. None
2. U.P.M.
3. D.P.
4. U.P.C.
5. C.P.
6. Other state

16. What religion do you believe in?

1. None
2. Traditional

3. Protestant
4. Roman Catholic
5. Moslem
6. Other (Specify)
7. State any changes in your religious beliefs
from 1970 to 1980

17. Would you encourage inter-marriage between the
various tribes of Uganda?

1. I agree strongly
2. I agree
3. I am neutral
4. I disagree
5. I disagree strongly
6. I don't know

18. Would you encourage inter-marriage between the Baganda
and other tribes of Uganda?

1. I agree strongly
2. I agree
3. I am neutral
4. I disagree
5. I disagree strongly
6. I don't know

19. Would you encourage inter-tribal marriage for your
children?

1. I agree strongly

2. I agree

3. I am neutral

4. I disagree

5. I disagree strongly

6. I don't know

20. Are you married to a person of another tribe?

1. Yes

2. No.....

21. If you are married to a person of your tribe, would you marry outside your tribe if you were given another chance to marry?

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

22. When you listen to the news on the radio, do you tune to the English version or to your tongue?

To the English version

To my mother tongue

Other Specify

23. Which newspaper do you read?

24. What language do you use at your job?.....

25. It is necessary to have a national language.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

26. Which of these should be a national language?

Kiswahili

English

Luganda

Luo

Other(Specify)

27. Have you ever lived outside Buganda?

Yes

No.

28. If yes, for how long?

29. If you lived outside Buganda, were you happy?

..... very unhappy

..... unhappy

..... happy

..... very happy

The Common Man's Charter of 1969

30. Have you ever heard about the Common Man's Charter of 1969?

Yes

No

31. If yes, from where?

32. The Common Man's Charter of 1969 was about uplifting the common man economically.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

33. The Common Man's Charter of 1969 was about destroying monarchy.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

34. The Common Man's Charter of 1969 was about destroying private ownership of property such as land.

34. The Common Man's Charter of 1969 was about
distribution of goods and services among the
different parts of Uganda.
Very strongly I agree strongly
I agree
I am neutral
I disagree strongly
I disagree
I don't know

35. The Common Man's Charter of 1969 was about equitable
distribution of goods and services among the
different parts of Uganda.
Very strongly I agree strongly
I agree
I am neutral
I disagree
I disagree strongly
I don't know

36. The Common Man's Charter of 1969 was about introducing
Communism in Uganda.
I agree strongly
I agree
I am neutral
I disagree strongly
I disagree
I don't know

37. The Common Man's Charter of 1969 was about uplifting economically the rich people.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree strongly

I disagree

I don't know

38. Did you support the Common Man's Charter of 1969?

Very strongly

Strongly

Opposed

Strongly opposed

Not applicable

The Abawajere (Common man) Movement of 1963

39. Have you ever heard of the Abawajere Movement of 1963?

No.

Yes

40. If yes, what was your main source of information?

.....

41. The Abawajere Movement was about uplifting the common man economically.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

42. The Abawajjere Movement was about destroying Monarchy.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

43. The Abawajjere Movement was about abolishing ground
rent payable to the landlords.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

44. The Abawajjere Movement was about removing Mr. Kintu
from being the Katikkiro (Prime Minister) of Buganda.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

45. The Abawajjere Movement was about abolishing tribute payable to the landlords.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

46. The Abawajjere Movement was about uplifting economically the rich people.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

47. The Abawajjere Movement was about destroying private ownership of property such as land.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree strongly

I disagree

I don't know

48. The Abawejjere Movement was about electing directly all the members of the Lukiiko (Uganda's Parliament).

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

49. The Abawejjere Movement was about introducing Communism in Uganda.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree strongly

I disagree

I don't know

50. Did you support the Abawejjere Movement?

Very strongly

Strongly

Opposed

Strongly opposed

Not applicable

The Landlord and the Tenant

51. The tenant gets protection from the Landlord.
I agree strongly
I agree
I am neutral
I disagree
I disagree strongly
I don't know
52. The tenant gets new ideas from the Landlord.
I agree strongly
I agree
I am neutral
I disagree
I disagree strongly
I don't know
53. State other benefits which the tenant gets from the
Landlord.
54. The Landlord mistreats his tenants.
I agree strongly
I agree
I am neutral
I disagree
I disagree strongly
I don't know

55. If you agree state how the Landlord mistreats the tenant.

56. Although the payment of tribute to the Landlord was abolished in 1975, the Landlord has still too much influence over the tenant.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

57. I disagree strongly

I don't know

57. If you agree, state the way in which the Landlord has too much influence over the tenant

58. It is fair for a tenant to pay ground rent to the Landlord because the tenant gets benefits from the owner of the land.

I agree strongly

59. I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

I am neutral

59. Nobody should pay any person for the use of Land because it is a gift of God which belongs to the whole country.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

60. When the Central Government nationalized some industries in 1970, The Common man was economically uplifted.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

61. When the Central Government nationalized some industries in 1970, it used this measure to reward its supporters.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

62. State any other consequences of the nationalization
measure of 1970

63. The National Parliament should always have more
legislative powers than local councils.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

64. A Central Government Minister should be given a
greater Kitiibwa (prestige) than a Minister in
Local Government.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

65. Buganda has the right to secede from the rest of Uganda if it feels that its traditions are being destroyed by the Central Government.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

66. The Central Government had no right to abolish Monarchy in Buganda in 1967.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree strongly

I disagree

I don't know

67. The Central Government reduced Buganda's prestige (ekitibwa) when it abolished the 1962 Constitution in 1967.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree strongly

I disagree

I don't know

68. The Central Government was right in 1964 to return
Buyaga and Bu angaisi to Bunyoro.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree strongly

I disagree

I don't know

69. The making of the Kabaka of Buganda the President of
the whole of Uganda in 1963, brought the Baganda
closer to the Central Government.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree strongly

I disagree

I don't know

70. The making of the Kabaka of Buganda the President of
the whole of Uganda in 1963, quickened the abolition
of Monarchy.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree strongly

I disagree

I don't know

71. Should Monarchy be restored?

No

Yes

I am neutral

I don't know

72. Between 1962 and 1966, the Central Government had authority to direct Political prisoners held by Buganda to be released.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree strongly

I disagree

I don't know

73. From 1962 to 1970, the Central Government gave to Buganda its fair share of the national wealth.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree strongly

I disagree

I don't know

74. The Central Government has authority to sell Buganda's
Coffee and to redistribute it as it sees it fit.

I agree strongly

I agree

I am neutral

I disagree

I disagree strongly

I don't know

75. What do you understand by Communism?

Thank you very much for your co-operation, and let me
assure you again that the information you have given me will
be treated in the strictest confidence.

Date completed

Time completed

Signature of Interviewer

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