African Perspectives on Development

Edited by Ulf Himmelstrand
Kabiru Kinyanjui & Edward Mburugu

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Controversies, Dilemmas & Openings
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INTRODUCTION

In Search
of New Paradigms?

ULF HIMMELSTRAND, KABIRU KINYANJUI & EDWARD K. MBURUGU

Like so many other book projects undertaken with a large number of co-authors, the editor launching this project, Ulf Himmelstrand, had some overly ambitious ideas of what was to be attained – ideas which have turned out to be only partly fulfilled. This project took off from an understanding that social scientists studying African development have found themselves in a 'paradigmatic crisis' in recent years. Consequently, it became the aim of this book to get involved in a search for 'new paradigms'. This gave the name to our project: In Search of New Paradigms for the Study of African Development (ISENPAD).

We are aware of the fact that the very term 'paradigm' is problematic in this context in view of the fact that Thomas Kuhn who made this term such a catchword in the history and philosophy of science was considering the development of the natural sciences, not the social sciences.[1] A paradigm, according to him, consists of all the theoretical and methodological assumptions and operations which prevail in a period of 'normal science' during which scientists usually do not disagree about their conclusions, once they are derived and tested from within the rules of the prevailing paradigm. Meanwhile a number of empirical and theoretical anomalies may accumulate, however, which makes it impossible to retain that old paradigm in the long run. Toward the end of such a paradigmatic crisis a 'scientific revolution' takes place and the old paradigm is replaced by a completely new one which augurs in a new period of 'normal science' dominated by one and only one paradigm. Paradigmatic crises occur rather rarely in the natural sciences, and only after long periods of 'normal science'. Among the social sciences only economics would seem to come close to such a 'normal' trajectory. In the other social sciences, however, we do not seem to have a 'normal' state of affairs characterized by such an overall agreement among social scientists about the very nature of scientific research within the framework of one single and predominant paradigm. Disagreements and 'paradigmatic crises' seem to be the order of the day among the social sciences, and they are often resolved not by a Kuhnian revolution, that is by the emergence of a completely new paradigm, and the complete rejection of the old one – but rather by a search for a 'synthesis of past perspectives' where old ideas can be combined in a new manner.[2] Therefore, when we use the term 'paradigm' we are using it in a softer Mertonian sense – as a special emphasis on certain concepts and objects of knowledge, an emphasis which does not necessarily imply the discarding of any other emphasis. The main emphasis could be expressed in terms of (a) a specific selection of variables or objects of knowledge; (b) a specific selection of analytical and empirical research methods; and perhaps (c) in terms of the kind of praxis or application favoured. It is in this sense that the name of our project must be understood when we call it 'In Search of New Paradigms for the Study of African Development'.

In order to provide guide-lines for this search, six queries were formulated and distributed among all the prospective co-authors. Implicitly most of these queries have been dealt with in most of the chapters of this book; explicitly only in some of them. An explicit and systematic attempt to answer all of these six queries in a complete and well-rounded manner

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remains to be done. However, it is the hope of the Editors of this book that its chapters will provide significant material for pursuing these queries even further. Progress in scientific development is rarely attained in just one single attempt. More than one step must be taken. In order to provide some food for thought, and for further scientific development in the study of African development, we will in this chapter repeat our six queries, and later attempt to relate some of them to other chapters. These are our queries:

1. First of all it was our ambition to assess whether the subject covered in a particular chapter was *a particularly controversial subject* compared to other subjects.

2. Given a specific controversy, *what is the nature of the controversy?* Is it a controversy of fact, or of theoretical interpretation? Or are different ethical concerns involved? Or even different 'perspectives' or 'paradigms'?

3. What is the *nature of the different 'perspectives'* and *'paradigms'* possibly involved in a controversy?

4. What is the *nature of the kind of 'recognition' or 'non-recognition'* of potential objects of knowledge which seems to be implied by different paradigms and perspectives?

5. What is the *nature of the relationship* between competing or otherwise diverse paradigms and perspectives in the social sciences that endeavour to understand and explain African developments? Are they 'incompatible'? In what sense?

6. Finally, we asked whether it seems possible to *move beyond the controversies found in the literature on African development, in search of new, more comprehensive, relevant and empirically sound approaches?*

The six queries indicated above could hopefully continue to guide future theoretical interpretations, discussions and empirical studies of various aspects of African development beyond the covers of this book. In the following section we will discuss their relevance to some of the chapters in this book – with particular emphasis on the first two or three queries. Queries 4–6 are of a more general nature which we cannot discuss with specific reference to chapters in this book, but they will guide our steps in making the concluding remarks of this chapter.

A Discussion of the Significance of Our Six Queries

1. When considering the question of whether the subject covered in a particular chapter was *a particularly controversial subject* compared with other subjects, we have noticed that controversies abound in the more theoretical chapters – for instance in the chapters by Chambua, Chachage, Hydén and Amin which deal at length with controversies concerning the so-called modernization approach, and the dependency and world-system approaches. However, several of the more topical chapters also focus at least implicitly on controversies. For instance, the chapter by Mamdani with its critical analysis of the IMF Programme in Uganda contrasts this Programme and its emphasis on 'structural adjustments' to the *global* economy, with alternative conceptions, for instance of a *domestic* Ugandan market economy. Adesina's chapter on unions, workers and the development process focusses a great deal of attention on theoretical and empirical controversies surrounding the concept of 'labour aristocracy' as used by some writers to characterize the African worker. Mbilinyi's and Nzomo's chapters unavoidably deal at length with controversies relating to a gender perspective on development. Gitonga's chapter concerns the controversies involved in understanding and prescribing the roles of public administration in Africa, etc.

2. But what is the *nature of these controversies?* Are they controversies of fact, or of theoretical definition and interpretation? Or are different ethical concerns involved – in spite of the still disputed notion of 'value-free' social science? If matters of alternative interpretation are involved, are the alternatives simply different possibilities left unresolved within one and the same paradigm, or do these alternatives spring from completely different and perhaps even opposite 'paradigms' with different 'perspectives'?
   In the more theoretical chapters of, for instance, Chambua and Amin, where the world-

system and dependency approaches are contrasted with modernization theories, it is obvious that matters of *defining the very objects of knowledge* constitute significant aspects of the controversy – if not all of it. Whereas the world-system and dependency approaches define their objects of knowledge as requiring long-term historical studies of centuries of economic transactions between the North and the South, the modernization approach is relatively non-historical, and is concerned mainly with objects of knowledge of a cultural rather than economic nature, contrasting the allegedly universalist, and achievement-oriented Western culture with the supposedly 'traditionalist' cultures of developing countries even today, and pursuing the question of how these 'traditionalist' cultures can be 'modernized' and penetrated by Western values through processes of inter-cultural communication.

Obviously these contrasting 'paradigms' are not researching the same objects of knowledge. At least in principle one might then conclude that these 'opposing paradigms', far from contradicting each other, could be seen as supplementing each other since they focus on different objects. When we recognize the existence of different objects of knowledge, it usually seems that their study could be pursued side by side without involving any contradiction. For a genuine contradiction to emerge, one and the same object of knowledge must be in focus. Only on a highly superficial level could these two paradigms be considered to have the same object of knowledge in focus, since both pretend to deal with 'development' – this fluid, and often not fully defined concept which conceals as many different objects of knowledge as there are schools of thought (compare the attempt to define 'development' in Chapter One).

We will return later to the question of whether 'opposing paradigms' in fact always 'contradict' each other, or rather supplement each other. Suffice it to emphasize at this point that even a dependency theorist like Samir Amin can find good reason to recognize, in his chapter, how the communication of values inherent in Western cultures have an impact on the Third and Fourth Worlds, a recognition which he shares with modernization theorists. But modernization theorists look upon such communications as an important and necessary component of modernization – that is as something 'good' for development, whereas Amin in his chapter is voicing considerable scepticism about the virtues of Western social norms in such communications. Why? Here we can identify another source of controversy which also concerns the chosen objects of knowledge, but in a different manner from merely the sheer recognition of different objects. The bone of contention, as we have understood Amin's scepticism about the developmental virtues of Western communications, concerns the issue of whether the messages transmitted in these 'modernizing' communications are addressing the problems and predicaments of underdevelopment, or if their impact fosters a neglect of these predicaments, and generates a 'false consciousness' – the concept which tends to be so ridiculed in mainstream Western academic thought. Behind Amin's scepticism we discern an *ethical* concern with the kind of human predicaments involved, the kind of 'development' emerging, and also with the role of the social sciences which are studying development and global communications.

Different kinds of ethics can certainly contradict each other, and if so, they are certainly not alternatives supplementing each other. If we reject the wholesale notion of value-free social science, then the kind of ethical contradictions indicated above deserve further treatment. This is a matter to be discussed in more detail next under point 3. Meanwhile let us return for a moment to definitions of objects of knowledge as a source of controversy.

In the latter part of his chapter Samir Amin attempts a detailed definition of the 'national bourgeoisie' with reference to four conditions required in Europe to establish such a bourgeoisie in a nation. From that vantage point he rejects the possibility of a significant national bourgeoisie emerging on the African continent, due to the overwhelming competition from the already established Western bourgeoisie operating on a global scale. Now, Amin's definition of a 'national bourgeoisie' is rather demanding in that we may find many cases where only some of the four criteria are met, but where some scholars still would like to identify the existence of a national bourgeoisie in some African countries. Furthermore, it seems to us that Amin's definition is rather 'Eurocentric' (in spite of his often repeated criticism of Eurocentrism in the study of African development) simply because his scrutiny of the origin of and socio-economic conditions for the rise of a national bourgeoisie takes off from *European* history. Nevertheless, by being so clear, detailed and explicit, Amin's

definition performs a great service to scholarly discussion of the controversies involved. Starting from this kind of definition, and perhaps amending it to fit African conditions better, we can expect several of the controversies involved in debates about the possible roles of a national bourgeoisie in Africa to be finally resolved.

Here it is interesting to note that Amin, while being highly sceptical about the possibility of the 'national bourgeoisie project' in most African countries at present, given his own demanding definition of this kind of bourgeoisie, still is willing to recognize the possibility of a *local* bourgeoisie oriented not to the global market but to entrepreneurial activities geared to producing what is needed in domestic, national markets where competition with global capitalism can be assumed to be less devastating. Others may wish to recognize such a 'local' bourgeoisie as the kind of 'national bourgeoisie' they have in mind when they use that particular term in the African context. This, again, proves that resolutions of controversies sometimes are basically of a definitional nature to which Amin's very precise definition of 'national bourgeoisie' is an important contribution.

In his chapter Amin also contributes greatly to the clarification of other definitional controversies, for instance by discussing Hydén's notion of 'no shortcuts to progress', and his own concept of 'delinking'.

But as we have indicated already there are other controversies which are not so easily resolved – particularly those which reflect different *ethical* concerns which basically seem to be generated by concerns for different kinds of *human predicaments*, and by different kinds of action, or applied science in attempts to eliminate such predicaments. In our discussion of the third query we have more to say about these matters.

3. What is the *nature of the different 'perspectives' and 'paradigms'* involved in a controversy? As suggested already a particular paradigm could be defined in terms of (a) its specific selection of variables or *objects of knowledge*; (b) its selection of analytical and empirical research *methods*; and perhaps (c) in terms of the kind of *praxis or application* favoured – reformist or revolutionary, or emphasizing structural designs and manipulation from above versus concerned action from below. The notion of 'perspective' adds a humanistic dimension to what otherwise may seem a rather academic way of choosing paradigms, namely by acknowledging 'human predicaments' as determinants of one's choice of objects of knowledge, methods and practical application. Different kinds of predicaments generate different perspectives. In the context of social science, as distinct from natural science, this humanistic dimension is inescapable whether or not it is made explicit. Once you take the point of view of a particular class of human predicaments, this provides you with a perspective and sensitizes you to particular problems, facts, methods of research and practice which are not recognized by somebody not sharing that perspective.

Dictionaries say that a 'predicament' is a 'dangerous or trying condition or state', or a 'condition or situation, especially one that is dangerous, unpleasant, embarrassing or sometimes comical', or 'implies a complicated, perplexing situation from which it is difficult to disentangle oneself'. That these situations are 'sometimes comical' indicates the social perspective involved. What is dangerous or embarrassing to one person sometimes looks comical to an observer looking at matters from above, with a perspective generated by a socially protected and dominant position.

The predicament of a poor African peasant growing tea for export whose seven children perhaps are starving because they cannot eat tea, and because the government-controlled marketing boards are lagging a year behind in paying for the tea produced, he or more likely she, will certainly find it difficult to 'disentangle' herself from this 'perplexing situation'. For most of us this is not 'comical'. It is quite easy to find a great number of predicaments of this nature in the African context – not the least with regard to the position of women whether they are peasants, academics, government servants, or are among the very few female members of parliament.

We often find the term 'predicament' used in literary essays, but less frequently in the treatises of social scientists,[3] except perhaps implicitly in describing an exploited position in a class structure. Most of the chapters in this book are using this notion implicitly. We contend that it should be used more explicitly and systematically since the recognition or

non-recognition of specific predicaments, and related action, would seem to constitute the very core of many controversies in the analysis of underdevelopment and development.

We believe that a 'predicament-free' analysis is closely associated with so-called 'value-free' science which, usually, is not value-free at all but is studying social and human reality from the vantage points of those who stand high above the predicaments, and who represent the hegemonous value-systems of ideological establishments, Western or indigenous. In this perspective 'from above' the main task of a social scientist seems to involve an explanation of causal mechanisms generating a particular state of affairs so as to enable a manipulation by 'social engineers' of relevant causes to attain certain valued effects. This is a paradigm of explanation, and a type of application closely modelled on the shape of the natural sciences, and related technologies.

By contrast a predicament-oriented social science approach endeavours to attain two kinds of knowledge – first a local understanding of the nature of given predicaments among those actually facing these predicaments in their everyday lives, a type of knowledge which perhaps could be best attained with some kind of participatory action-research, and secondly a knowledge of the broader historical, structural and/or ecological causes generating such predicaments. In the ideal case this second kind of knowledge should be fed back to the local level to illuminate the understanding from below of the predicaments confronted there, and to provide guide-lines for local action and struggle.[4] This second type of knowledge is the type which is sought in world-system and dependency approaches, and in Marxist analyses, as illustrated foremost in the chapter by Samir Amin in this book. Unfortunately the notions of 'predicaments' and 'perspectives' do not appear explicitly in most of our chapters, and therefore we cannot make more detailed references to chapters in our book with regard to this topic. In other chapters these concepts are more implicitly than explicitly present.

Can the two paradigms contrasted above – the predicament-oriented approach and the social-engineering approach – ever be reconciled? Since different ethical concerns seem to be involved in these two paradigms a reconciliation between them may seem impossible. Yet not impossible in every respect, we believe.

Once a set of basic and shared human predicaments have become reasonably well understood both locally, and in a broader historical and cultural context, what remains to be 'put into practice' is predicament-motivated action. In order for such action to take effect, at least some aspects of this action must be based on knowledge regarding causes and effects. Other aspects of action may rather involve discourse and debate with possibly more receptive and empathizing people close to the ruling elite, or with the ideologically hegemonous academic or political elites. In the latter instance it is crucial for predicament-oriented social scientists to contribute to such a debate. However, as we have just indicated, a social-scientific analysis of causal mechanisms is not completely irrelevant even in a predicament-oriented approach. There are human elements and material conditions which are not receptive to discourse and debate, but which must be causally manipulated even if your analysis is predicament-oriented. But an understanding of local predicaments, and their historical and structural contexts, comes first; then comes whatever causal explanation and manipulation are needed. In this restricted, sequential sense the causal approach, and the understanding of predicaments can be reconciled.

Whether you take account of a specific predicament, or fail to do so, is a matter of recognition. Our question to fellow social scientists in the study of African development on this point is: What kind of potential objects of knowledge are they prepared to recognize as objects of social-scientific discourse and empirical study? In our next query we turn to some aspects of this crucial question.

4. What is the *nature of the kind of 'recognition' and non-recognition* which seems to be implied by different paradigms and perspectives? It goes without saying that a particular theoretical model of development, by definition and for obvious practical reasons, must exclude certain objects of knowledge, facts, methods and practical applications which in that sense are left unrecognized by that model. As a rule no scientific research project can be undertaken without delimiting a particular field of study. But if this is the rule, what is the nature of the 'rule'? Are the rules of admission and recognition simply convenient ways of tentatively simplifying

the research task at hand, 'other things' being non-recognized and assumed equal (ceteris paribus) – rules that can be changed at a later point when you are ready to move on to new tasks of inquiry and research – or is it considered 'unscientific' or academically inadmissible to consider what is seen as residing outside those limits? Is it considered 'scientifically inadmissible' also to recognize as real and possibly significant what the given model cannot recognize? Among some doctrinaire neo-classical economists the second alternative seems to have been chosen; moving into socio-economic areas beyond those covered by established theoretical models of mainstream economics is considered 'unscientific'.

In our study of the literature on African development, it was particularly difficult to answer this fourth query regarding the nature of the 'rules of admission and recognition' of objects of knowledge, methods and practical applications. The previous three queries can usually be answered by close reading of what is contained in given texts. Answering the fourth query requires an interpretation of the 'generative rules', the 'motives', 'interests' and other formative factors which could determine both the choice of rules of admission and recognition, and the extent to which these rules are seen as absolutely binding or as tentatively convenient. Can we ever expect anyone doing his research within the confines of one perspective, motivated by one kind of 'interest', to understand and admit the validity of findings and practices obtained from another perspective?

Here we must go beyond the texts we are going to scrutinize, and rely on concepts borrowed from the sociology of knowledge and philosophy of science. Here there are also challenging opportunities for anyone participating in this kind of project to test each other out on how we individually look upon the nature of different perspectives and rules of recognition. These questions of recognition are implicit rather than explicit in this book; and we will not in this context make any attempt to explicate what kinds of recognition may have been involved in the writing of these chapters.

5. What is the *nature of the relationship* between competing or otherwise diverse paradigms and perspectives in the social sciences that endeavour to understand and explain African developments? Are they 'incompatible'? In what sense?

Let us assume that some of the competing paradigms and perspectives, for instance Marxist and non-Marxist or anti-Marxist theories, indeed are 'incompatible'. One interpretation of this assumption is that none of the theoretical or empirical accomplishments of one paradigmatic approach is of any value or interest whatsoever for those working within an opposing paradigm. Criticism advanced by proponents of one paradigm against findings and conclusions within another paradigm can be completely disregarded since they are bound to be irrelevant. Only criticism from within a paradigm is worthy of attention. What is being done within one paradigm can never be fully understood, only misunderstood by those working within the framework of the opposing 'incompatible' paradigm. This means that knowledge produced within any one paradigm is esoteric. No genuine communication or understanding is possible across this paradigmatic chasm.

If this interpretation of the assumed 'incompatibility' of paradigms and perspectives is accepted, then different schools of social science would seem to appear as just so many different and competing fundamentalist religious creeds. If the word scientific is to retain any common meaning, this interpretation of the term paradigmatic incompatibility cannot be accepted. One of the basic assumptions underlying the very concept scientific endeavour, in contrast to the endeavours of fundamentalist religion, or politics or, on a more vulgar level, of certain types of incorrigible journalism, is the notion of the fallibility of human judgement, and the notion of error in theoretical analysis and logic as well as in empirical observation. One of the foundations of scientific work is therefore the systematic and persistent operations set up to reduce error, and to ascertain the direction and magnitude of errors which for various reasons cannot be completely eliminated but at least can be estimated in such a way that these estimates can influence the conclusions drawn from scientific work.

If there is a case for following the fundamental canons of scientific work in social science, as we believe, then another set of interpretations are necessary regarding the nature of the relationships between seemingly incompatible paradigms and perspectives. Paradigms and perspectives in social science are not esoteric. Criticism from outside a given paradigm is

always interesting, and should be taken seriously as an antidote to possible fallibility and error in our own approach while, of course, we must realize that such criticism could be based on misunderstandings or blind spots on the part of our critics. Clarification of such misunderstandings as well as the acceptance of reasonable criticism through open intellectual discourse must be seen as part of scientific development.[5]

Basically, we suggest that the problem of 'paradigmatic incompatibility' can be reduced to the *difficulties of recognition* of different objects of knowledge, different methods of research and of application (see Point four above). We assume that these difficulties are of a psychological and sociological nature, and not due to the fundamentally esoteric nature of the knowledge produced within any given paradigm. The visibility and acknowledgement of different human predicaments is the heart of the matter, we believe. A colonial administrator with a colonialist mentality confronted with the imperfections of administrative implementation, and the resistance and assumed ignorance of his subjects is bound to make the predicaments of peasants and small-scale entrepreneurs in the colonized territory virtually invisible. That this lack of visibility, acknowledgement and recognition is a sociological and psychological phenomenon is demonstrated by the admittedly few cases where local colonial administrators did come so close to their subjects that they found it necessary to leave the ranks of administrators, unable as they were to accept the rulings from above, and even the colonial relationship as such because of its non-recognition of the predicaments of the colonized.

A neo-liberal economist writing a treatise on African development may have great difficulties in admitting and recognizing scientifically well-documented findings of authors pursuing world-system or dependency approaches, and may be inclined to reject those findings as expressions of 'guilt-feelings' among the Western Africanists pursuing these approaches, and therefore as unworthy of a pursuit of value-free science.[6] But such a neo-liberal inclination is of a psychological nature, we maintain, and could perhaps be overcome by an open intellectual debate (or by psychotherapy in more extreme cases); it is not due to the esoteric nature of world-system or dependency approaches. Similarly, a serious and scientific proponent of a world-system approach could be made to understand the limitations of his or her approach, and its failures to account for a number of internal cultural and political conditions in African countries, by an open intellectual debate.

In short, we believe that the fundamental reason why different paradigms appear 'incompatible' is that they are based on the recognition only of a certain limited class of human predicaments, and the non-recognition of other human predicaments which however are recognized by some other 'incompatible' paradigm. And since different human predicaments constitute different objects of knowledge which call for at least partly different methods of research and application, we get the full picture: different *recognitions* of human predicaments, objects of knowledge, methods of research and application stand against each other.

These 'incompatibilities' can be at least intellectually overcome when a researcher, due to his wide-ranging life experiences and his indeterminate class position, his empathy and wish to understand even rather alien human conditions, can recognize and acknowledge many different human predicaments, and the need to apply different methods of research and application in relation to them. Having intellectually overcome the so-called paradigmatic incompatibility in this manner, you do not necessarily have to remain a 'free-floating intellectual' of the type described by Karl Mannheim. You can still decide for yourself as a human being and a social scientist that your own work will be 'partisan' in that it takes its point of departure in some particular human predicaments rather than others, and involve the methods of research and application relevant in that perspective rather than in any other. The main difference between this kind of partisan research, and partisan research based on the assumption of esoteric knowledge and practice assumed to be incompatible with other approaches, is its greater openness to mutual criticism and discourse with social scientists representing quite different perspectives, as long as they also allow themselves this openness.

Whether the 'auditors' or 'architects' of African development (see Göran Hydén's chapter, this volume) can allow themselves such greater openness, is also largely determined sociologically and psychologically. There are periods in the building-up of a new dissenting approach when a greater openness may seem inconceivable in relation to the closed hegemonic

establishment trying to strangle you. There are periods of crisis, however, involving all or most of the different approaches, when greater openness not only is more possible but indeed may help to trace some of the sources of the crisis of theory as well as of development itself. It would seem that we are in that kind of crisis situation at present; and the present project proposes that we take advantage of this situation.

6. Finally, we ask whether it seems possible *to move beyond the controversies found in the literature, in search of new, more comprehensive, relevant and empirically sound approaches?* This is not only a question of interpretation but of judgement and creative reconstruction. To prevent any misunderstanding of what we mean on this sixth point, we are not advocating theoretical eclecticism as an ideal, that is a mix of the 'best' elements from various paradigms into one framework. In such an eclectic framework these 'best' elements usually remain only loosely coupled, or may even turn out to be contradictory. The world around us may indeed be contradictory, but a theory, while recognizing contradictions in the world, should not itself contain logical contradictions. However, experiments in eclecticism may be worth pursuing. We could use eclecticism as a method, namely a method of theoretical reconstruction which enables us to open up a discourse between different paradigmatic approaches, and thus also allowing us to discover what remains contradictory even after such a discourse has been brought to a conclusion, or what 'foreign' elements may turn out to enrich logically our own approach, and to expand its area of theoretical, empirical and practical relevance.

Yet we have recognized that there are scholars representing even 'opposing paradigms' who are sufficiently open to discourse and to debate with their opponents to be able to lay aside, at least temporarily, their non-recognition of certain objects of knowledge, and to empathize with alien conditions and predicaments. This alone is sufficient reason to engage in the kind of discourse and debate to which, hopefully, this chapter and the book as a whole will contribute.

In other cases the fact of non-recognition of certain objects of knowledge seems to be so deeply ingrained in the psychology of some opponents, that there is little one can do in the way of discourse and debate. At the workshop in Nairobi in July 1989 where the first drafts of chapters in this book where debated, one voice was raised against two papers pursuing the topic of demographic transition in Africa which, in revised versions, have been included as chapters in this book. The very choice of this object of knowledge, and of the quantitative statistical methods used to pursue this topic was considered by this one voice to be an expression of sinister manipulations by the CIA and related imperialist forces, in order to under-populate Africa. To pursue a discussion along such lines would not seem very meaningful. The controversy involved in that case would not seem to have been of a scientific nature.

By way of summary of this discussion of our six queries it would seem that different ethical or politico-ideological concerns offer the most intractable sources of controversy in the study of development. Such diverse ethical or political concerns may significantly hamper a reconciliation between different approaches – unless a philosophical discussion of such concerns, with empathy, could create a more overarching universal ethics palatable at least to most academics in the world – if not to spokesmen of economistic, political, or various fundamentalist cultural or religious creeds acting on the global scene.

The Global Context of Debate on Development

In his chapter in this volume Göran Hydén has indicated some ways in which global ideological perspectives on development may have influenced publications on African development from 1955 to 1990. These approaches have shifted from those emphasizing, first the 'trickle down' of modernizing impacts from 'progressive elites' to the common man, secondly those emphasizing the 'basic needs' strategy, thirdly the notion of 'small is beautiful', and finally those approaches emphasizing the concept of 'enabling environment', with their various concerns for growth, management, equity or participation, respectively. Many of the publications articulating these different ideological perspectives were written by 'architects' of development, and not by the 'auditors', as Hydén calls them, that is by policy-makers rather than by social scientists trying to analyse conditions and efforts of develop-

ment. Academic social scientists all over the world rather took their lead from shifts in development theory, first in the fifties from structural functionalism and modernization theory, then from neo-Marxist political economy, and then from neo-liberal doctrines (mainly among economists close to the World Bank), and finally from neo-institutionalism. Of course it is possible, as Hydén has done, to trace similarities of emphases between these shifts in development theory and corresponding shifts in ideological perspectives over the period 1955–90. But neo-liberal doctrines never gained a significant foothold among African social scientists, and until recently neo-Marxist approaches seem to have had a significant impact among many of them. The chapters by Wamba-dia-Wamba and Samir Amin in this book are examples of this approach, Wamba-dia-Wamba's chapter having an interesting, somewhat anarcho-syndicalist twist.

But now in the early nineties other shifts in global politics might have a greater impact on the 'search for new paradigms', or on the resurgence of old paradigms among social scientists than the theoretical controversies listed by Hydén. The collapse of Eastern European 'real socialism', and the debacle of command economies, imply that no longer is there a Godfather around to support, and underpin the analyses and thoughts of Marxist development theories. Remaining Marxist or Marxicizing social scientists have been left alone to pursue their thoughts without the example or the enigma of that Godfather. Will they be able to persist in their approach? Or will we now find ourselves in a theoretical vacuum in which old supposedly defeated paradigms will emerge again?

There are already signs of a resurgence of the old modernization paradigm; and some aspects of the neo-liberal doctrine based on neo-classical economics can certainly be found in the now often repeated references to 'sustainable growth' with its emphases on the benefits of a market economy. This emphasis seems particularly salient in the donor perspective today. There is also a growing concern about democratization of African politics, and about the meaning of democracy in the African context. To the extent that this debate about democracy is taking its lead from what can be gained from the examples of European, and North American democracies, this is perhaps another example of the resurgence of the modernization theory.

Those African social scientists who cannot feel at home with this resurgence of old paradigms, and who also have become doubtful about the significance of Marxist approaches, find themselves in a theoretical void which must compel them to think anew for themselves from the vantage points of African experiences, including the experiences gained from the struggle against Apartheid, and the current attempts to negotiate a transition from Apartheid to a multi-racial democracy in South Africa. It is not enough to take the lead of Western theoretical approaches, or simply to criticize and discard them. African social scientists have a task of their own quite apart from what can be discarded or gained from outside.

It would take us too far in this context to speculate about how progress can be made in these attempts of African social scientists, beyond the covers of this book. But we like to venture a few points which it seems necessary to remember in making these attempts.

First of all we refuse to accept the notion that old modernization paradigms, and neo-liberal notions of market mechanisms can emerge again, spick and span, without any changes whatsoever. If the notion of modernization reappears among African social scientists it must be a notion of modernization quite different from the concept of Westernization in every respect which was dominant in the old modernization paradigm. That new concept of modernization must be formulated from the vantage points of African predicaments, as an analysis of ways for overcoming the barriers which so far have brought stagnation, inefficiency and increasing inequalities rather than progress into more efficient, and socially acceptable economic and political practices in Africa. For instance, such a new modernization approach must come to terms with questions of how we should increase the efficacy of food production and other types of productive enterprise geared to supplying domestic African markets. This is also where common neo-liberal approaches fall short of enlightening us on what is needed. As Mahmood Mamdani has emphasized in Chapter Ten the domestic markets for mass-consumption goods must be given priority, and export markets come next. It is not sufficient to offer glowing depictions of the magic and rationality of the market in general terms. We must specify what kinds of markets are conducive to what kind of development, as Mamdani does.

With regard to democratization which could be conceived as another aspect of modernization we must again take African experiences into account, with due consideration of the different experiences gained in different African countries. In Uganda, for instance, where multi-party systems of the past were associated with tribalist violence and civil wars, and with highly authoritarian rule from whatever party was in power, it is understandable that there are doubts about the possibility of re-introducing a multi-party system in one stroke. Meanwhile other ways of promoting democratic participation and the impact of the common man from below must be sought and found. In other African countries, such as Kenya, the internal dialectic of opposition to a more or less dictatorial one-party rule seems to have created popular movements of a national character across ethnic boundaries; and there the steps toward multi-party politics may be more easy to take now that this has been allowed. As Masipula Sithole seems to imply in Chapter Twelve it is also conceivable that ethnic loyalties can be shorn of their destructive or violent aspects under certain conditions so that only the community-building aspects of these loyalties are retained; and in such cases largely ethnic political parties may not necessarily be a destabilizing factor. Obviously it is necessary for African social scientists to focus more attention on multi-party democracy in various African settings. It has been suggested by some cynical African commentators that multi-party democracy only will bring about a change in the incumbants who are able to 'eat' the fruits of corruption rather than create a wholesome democracy bent on issues of development. What do African social scientists have to say about this possibility? Is such a reproduction of corrupt practices in building a new multi-party democracy only a transitional stage in the progress toward a more transparent and accountable democratic rule? Under what conditions can such a cynically conceived transitional stage be shortened? What can we learn from the struggle against corruption and 'political machines' in North American politics of the recent past? African social scientists have a lot of questions to answer regarding the democratization process in African nations as Wamba-dia-Wamba emphasizes in closing his chapter.

In thinking for themselves, rather than accepting without question the Western notions associated with the old paradigms, it is also necessary for African social scientists to reassess the very use of the term 'Western'. It has become rather common among some dictatorial or authoritarian political leaders in Africa to defend their policies, particularly with regard to their neglect of human rights, as being African in contrast to Western. The notion of human rights and multi-party democracy are said to be 'Western' and non-African. But are human rights not universal, and therefore also African? We may also ask whether it is part of so-called African tradition to enrich yourself in a corrupt manner by 'eating' Western donor grants, or loans, and then to use the money you have embezzled by riding an expensive Mercedes imported from the West without paying duties at an African customs desk?

Obviously the terms 'African' and 'Western' are often used within African establishments in a most opportunistic manner to defend repression, ill-gotten wealth and unwarranted privileges. If some African social scientists sometimes succumb to the temptation to short-circuit an intellectual argument by using the term 'Western' in this manner, then this use must come to an end. Western thought and practice should certainly be critically scrutinized and evaluated from the vantage points of African predicaments, but as a result of such scrutiny we may find it less necessary to neglect or reject Western thought in some cases than to supplement it with notions acquired from African experiences.

Returning to a question raised above: Are Marxists, neo-Marxists or Marxicizing social scientists, whether in Africa or the rest of the world, able to persist in their approaches, while retaining their intellectual honesty and openness, in spite of the fall of Marxist-Leninist 'real socialism'? Does not the collapse of 'real socialism' carry with it the final collapse of Marxism as such? Those who answer this last question in the affirmative are confused, in our opinion. Marxism as a theoretical tradition is one thing. The political system of 'real socialism' is a completely different matter; it certainly borrowed certain simplified tenets of Marxism but in a manner which finally made these tenets into a doctrinaire ideological window-dressing in order to justify a repressive order very far from what Karl Marx himself envisaged.[7]

The Soviet Empire has fallen, but many questions raised by Karl Marx – most of them neglected by the Soviet 'intellectual' establishment – will survive as long as we are allowed

freely to pursue these questions, simply because they are good questions raising crucial problems of social science. Some of these questions and related concepts are less relevant in Africa than in the European or North American context; others are very relevant also in Africa, as illustrated by chapters in this book.

In concluding this section we also wish to indicate, as editors of this book, that unfortunately, none of its chapters have illuminated the problems of delinquency, criminality and violence in the African context. These social aberrations exist everywhere in the world but in Africa they manifest themselves in particular ways due to the social and economic circumstances which characterize the African situation. As regards violence we must distinguish two kinds: (1) the violence from above – state violence in the shape of torture, police brutality, detention without trial, so-called 'ethnic' violence politically manipulated from above etc. – which is part and parcel of dictatorial and authoritarian regimes, including the Apartheid regime of South Africa, but which can be reduced or eliminated with the kind of democratization of regimes which is being launched in most African states today; and (2) the more intractable violence with robbery which is born out of rising expectations, relative deprivation and unemployment, a violence often aggravated by the increasing use of deadly weapons which seem to become more and more common as a result of diffusion from the internal strifes which take place in many countries such as Sudan, Somalia and Angola. The amount and technical level of the armaments involved in these internal strifes, however, have external sources which can be traced back to the Cold War period when the so-called Great Powers were competing for influence and for military bases on strategically significant, contested parts of the African continent, and tried to gain strategic advantages by providing challenged governments, or strong rebellious groups with weapons.

Some overall aspects of violent criminality, and other kinds of violence can be illuminated statistically and sociologically. But from the point of view of the victim such violence is always unique since it deals with the sufferings of the single individual struck by violence. Literary authors from Africa such as Nadine Gordimer, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, and Wole Soyinka have rendered much more forceful and vivid evidence of such unique aspects of violence than social scientists ever can do. Having made this reference to African literature – novels, biographies, short stories and essays – we would like to stress that such literature can and should be used to enlighten social scientists about the predicaments of Africans, predicaments which, as we have emphasized above, should be a starting point for the efforts of social scientists to recognize significant social problems in the first place, and to understand, explain and suggest ways of overcoming barriers to profound social change in Africa. This is one way of regenerating African thinking about development to which this book has aspired to contribute in its own way.

There is also another topic which, as editors, we feel has been treated too briefly, that is the topic of civil society, the relationship between state, society, non-governmental organizations and the individual citizen. Fortunately the chapter by Peter Ekeh does tackle many aspects of this topic, for example, he makes the important distinction between the primordial public, and the civic public, and he emphasizes that the 'path of reform in Africa . . . lies with the state retracing its steps and embracing the individual' in order to overcome the fact that 'the civic public of state institutions have continued to be distant from the individual in the postcolonial era'. By definition the primordial public cannot reach the individual citizen as such, and defend his universal human rights; it only reaches individuals which are part of that primordial community, and only with respect to certain aspects of economic individual well-being, not with respect to basic legal and human rights. But this remark by Ekeh is only a pointer to draw our attention to a crucial problem; how the problem should be solved is not part of Ekeh's chapter, that is another significant problem for African social scientists to resolve.

Must African Social Science be Different from Western Social Science? Concluding Remarks

Western sociology, political science and economics deal mainly with Western societies. This is only natural. To put it in the most simple terms, Western societies are basically

bourgeois societies. Therefore Western social science is a bourgeois social science. While Marxists often use the term 'bourgeois sociology' as a polemical term this is not our intention. We use this term in a purely descriptive sense to take account of the fact that the bourgeoisie in a broad sense, and bourgeois life styles completely dominate Western societies. As a result of rationalizations of agricultural production the farming population of these societies has been reduced to a very small minority, and their patterns of consumption, their viewing of television, their use of transportation, media etc. have become highly similar to the life styles of the bourgeoisie. The industrial working class has also diminished in size as a result of automation and robotization of industry. In terms of dress, consumption patterns etc. it is difficult to detect any great differences between workers in advanced industrial countries and the middle stratum of the bourgeoisie. Even where such differences remain, the aspirations of workers are said to be of a bourgeois nature. The sharp increase in the number of white-collar occupations and skilled professions in the private and public sectors further amplify bourgeois patterns of life.

All this is of course a highly simplified image of Western societies. Marxists certainly would have highly justified objections to this image of a bourgeois society by pointing out that objective class differences remain large, not so much by a pauperization of the working class as by the accumulation of wealth among a few capitalists and their close aids. But even a writer with a Marxist background such as André Gorz has recently published a book where he bids farewell to the proletariat and to socialism. Labour parties in politics increasingly must pay attention to middle-class bourgeois values if they wish to gain the support of voters in elections. Bourgeois sociologists take exception to notions of exploitation, and to the notion of a working class in itself or for itself, as Marxists would have it, and instead maintain that workers simply constitute a stratum in a system of stratification distinguished by different levels of skill, and related levels of power and authority, rather than by degrees of exploitation. Therefore, in spite of our simplifications, we maintain that Western societies are mainly bourgeois societies, and the social scientists studying these societies therefore are mainly bourgeois social scientists.

By contrast African societies are of a much more complex and composite nature than Western societies. There is certainly an emerging bourgeoisie in Africa, and an increasing number of white-collar employees; but the great majority of African populations are peasant smallholders with a sprinkle of big farmers very much like Latin-American absentee latifundistas living in urban centres, and employing farm-workers and managers to maintain their farms in the countryside. An industrial working class is also emerging in Africa with living conditions much poorer than for European workers, and with much greater inequalities between themselves and the small entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, or the ruling elites.

Another source of complexity in African societies is the great variation in cultural and religious terms. Ali Mazrui, the Kenyan social scientist, recently spoke in a series of BBC broadcasts about the 'triple heritage' of Africa involving the heritage of indigenous cultures, Christian culture and Islamic culture. In view of the complex and composite nature of African societies, including all the historical and cultural differences between them, it would seem to us that the concepts and basic assumptions offered by bourgeois Western social science are insufficient, and only partly applicable in African settings. This again poses a challenge to African social scientists to think anew for themselves, and to develop concepts not only to reflect the various facets of this complexity, but also to conceptualize the relationships between these facets of society, and the dynamics or dialectics involved. In doing so it may turn out that Western social scientists in the future will have something to learn from African social scientists, and this for the following reasons.

At present there is a debate among social commentators in Europe about the emergence of a so-called two-thirds society in the West. Two-thirds of the populations of Western societies may, in the near future, live a reasonably good life, with work which is becoming increasingly skilled and interesting, but not particularly demanding in physical terms due to automation and robotization, and with increasing hours of leisure used in the consumption of entertainment, in touristic travelling, or in interesting and creative hobbies. But the remaining one-third of the population will live under very different, not always very rewarding conditions. A lot of them will be more or less permanently unemployed and receiving

a 'guaranteed minimum income' (GMI) or a social wage for their subsistence, or be occupied in what we in Africa call the 'informal sector' with an uncertain and fluctuating income – but without the 'economy of affection' which according to Hydén is helping Africans to stay alive outside the formal capitalist orbit. This 'informal sector' will also include criminal or shady semi-criminal activities to earn one's living.

If this forecast of the future of highly advanced Western societies is anything to go by, then we can discern the emergence of so-called 'dual economies' in Western societies just like those dual economies in Africa which have been referred to except that the proportions of the two halves of this duality is inverse in Africa compared to that of the prognosticated future of Europe. Since the so-called informal sector plus the rural population, and the emerging working class will constitute the majority of populations in African countries – perhaps two-thirds of the populations concerned – we can expect democratic politics to be able to solve many of their problems, while Western democracies may be less prone to attend to the problems of the minority one-third of the electorate in the emerging informal sector of Western societies. We can also expect a widening chasm in terms of culture and values between the two-thirds and the one-third in Western societies. A cultural dualism can thus be expected to emerge on top of the coming dual economies of the West. It remains to be seen how the majority two-thirds will respond in political terms to the discontent and protests from the one-third across this widening cultural chasm.

But it is not only in terms of the variety and scope of structural ingredients that African sociology and social science requires a broader spectrum than contemporary Western bourgeois sociology. Also with regard to the variety of dynamic historical processes which must be taken into account in order to understand contemporary Africa, and in predicting likely futures of African societies, a broader spectrum of processes must be taken into account. Western social science is concerned mainly with short-term equilibrating processes of a rather ahistorical nature – on the micro level with status crystallization and rank-equilibration, and on the macro level with a so-called dynamic equilibrium which allows for change, but always with a return to a state of equilibrium, whether on markets or societies at large. But such an ahistorical approach is not sufficient in a social-scientific analysis of African societies.

World historians have drawn our attention to the fact that most of Europe was a continent of barbarian peoples with a most primitive culture and no written language at the time when the ancient civilizations of Egypt, India and China, and somewhat later the Graeco-Roman civilization flourished. The later stagnation of these ancient civilizations, and the fact that they were overtaken and surpassed by the once barbarian peoples of Central and Northern Europe can be attributed to a number of factors[8] which should also be of great interest in assessing alternative future trajectories of African development.

Both ancient Chinese, Indian and Roman civilizations suffered from the onslaught of barbarian invasions – China and India to a lesser extent due to their vast land areas which allowed large portions of their populations to escape with their culture toward the south when barbarian nomads and pastoralists attacked from the north, while the remainder could endure and culturally absorb, and survive the attackers. Still these barbarian attacks did of course weaken those ancient civilizations; but their final stagnation was due mainly to internal factors such as the costs of maintaining certain cultural and political patterns. To be burdened by an old and ornate culture would seem to have been a cost not only in terms of new and innovative thinking in these ancient civilizations, but also in economic terms. Maintaining the imperial courts of Egypt and China in all their gold and glory, with their expensive bureaucracies and defence forces, probably deprived technology in these countries of the large resources required for its further development. These cultural, human and economic costs of ancient civilizations, and the related stagnation of technological development, would seem to be the main factor responsible for the stagnation of those ancient civilizations.

The classical civilization of Rome, however, under the onslaught of barbarians from the north and the east, was permanently over-run and submerged due to its much smaller territory, and then succeeded by 'something fundamentally new', the free men from the Germanic north, and the Huns from the east. The very destruction of classical Rome, and thereafter the entry on the stage of history of peoples without the complex and costly cultures

defining any multi-faceted concept, like 'development'. Since 'development', however understood, is a multi-pronged process, possibly with several stages of 'development', it is tempting to include in the *definition* of that concept several or some of those conditions which in fact *explain* development, at least to the extent that they are setting the stage(s) for later stages in the process. If too many such *explanatory* notions are incorporated in the very definition of development, then we may either be left with a very small remainder of ways to explain development once we have finished defining it, or we run the risk of involving ourselves in logical circles in explaining it. To steer free from such logical dangers we will attempt to make our concept of development as simple and elementary as possible. This does not mean that I will always succeed in eliminating from its definition factors which some readers would prefer to have among the factors explaining development. In such cases my definitional strategy is due to the fact that I happen to prefer having a certain element *explained* as an aspect of development rather than to have it explain development. The reasons for this preference will hopefully be clarified in what follows.

First of all, I want to make my position clear with regard to some structural notions which have been prevalent in sociological treatises on development and evolution. Talcott Parsons (1966 and 1971), for instance, has pointed out that 'structural differentiation' of various social functions is an important aspect of social development. Furthermore he has drawn attention to the shift from 'traditional' to 'modern' value-orientations in terms of his so-called pattern variables, as a fundamental characteristic of development. In by-passing these Parsonian notions in my following discussion concerning the concept of development, I am not saying that these kinds of shifts and changes are unimportant in the study of development. But they are not historical and basic enough for *defining* development, in my view. These notions may still turn out to be significant in pointing out some accompanying features of development, or the lack of it.

Theories of dependency, world-systems and underdevelopment (Wallerstein 1974) certainly have their limitations, particularly in neglecting the role of contemporary internal political and economic conditions, but this does not justify a complete abandonment of those theories, and their underlying historical observations. I contend that statements about the outdated character of dependency theories, and the single-minded promotion of theories which only emphasize the faults of contemporary internal politics in African and other Third World countries often are more ideological or political than scientific. External dependency, in the past and at present, is a necessary but not a sufficient factor to reckon with in explaining lack of development. In pursuing this line of study, internal politics must certainly be added to the analysis of external impacts, but always with a historical approach, and with some methodological stringency in defining development, and underdevelopment, before attempting to explain them.

The first two or three properties or attributes of development which are mentioned below, and which are required in order to speak about development in my structural sense, do certainly relate more to the basic economic foundation than to the sociological factors, or aspects involved in development. But first things must be mentioned first. The reader should notice that my sequence of criteria for defining development reflects certain underlying but so far not absolutely firm assumptions about the sequence of genuine development itself. However, to avoid stifling our argument with preconceived notions which turn out to rule out real cases discovered later, or noticed in the course of the argument, I hesitate at this juncture to make a trajectory or temporal sequence part of the very definition of development. Notions of sequence can be made explicit at a later time even if they are implicit already at this time.

Now to the six criteria of development, as I would like to see it defined. To begin with my attempts at defining development will be focussed on its structure rather than on the level of development in a quantitative sense. Obviously the choice of my six criteria must be largely normative in character, referring to an idea of *telos* (Kimmerle, 1992: 173). Development is a normative concept, but must also be defined on the basis of a scientific understanding of processes of historical change. I believe that this concept has often been elaborated in a Eurocentric manner – whether to the Left or Right – and partly not elaborated at all in the relevant literature. Therefore it is necessary to return to what is elementary and fundamental.

Six Criteria of Development as Structural Change

1. A property or attribute which in my view is a basic prerequisite and criterion of 'development' is the capability of a given society, increasingly, to use its own resources of land, minerals, and man-power to feed its own people – even in a situation of population growth.

More indirect and in that sense less satisfactory empirical indicators could deal with results of food-sufficiency, or insufficiency, such as the status of health of the population, or levels of child mortality, which could be assumed to be correlated with food availability – without, however, being able to indicate the extent to which the health status is due to own, internal production.

2. Another property required for satisfying my concept of development is that a given country is capable, increasingly, to produce or make available to farmers/peasants the basic tools needed in food production, or, in countries with a lack of arable land, the tools needed in other production necessary for the importation of food.

3. To speak about development also implies that there is, or emerges through consent or struggle, a set of shared transaction rules regulating relationships between the main actors involved in economic or other important social activities, and accepted by the majority as legally and/or morally binding.

The very process of development itself cannot take place without some kind of trusted agreement between the main categories of actors in society about how to transact business, and other social relations. In the absence of accepted and effective transaction rules, and in the presence of actor conflict, transactions are likely to be hampered by chaos and struggle. However, struggle is usually necessary and unavoidable in attempts to rectify unfairness and injustice emerging in processes of social change. As already indicated, the struggle for greater fairness and justice of transaction rules is one aspect of the development process itself, unless such rules can be agreed upon by consent.

4. Without indigenous entrepreneurs and labour there is no further development. The existence of labour, and of indigenous entrepreneurial and innovative activities to manage labour, and to manage other resources in production and sales not only of agricultural products and tools but other products as well, is a necessary element in defining the very process of development.

5. A development of export/import relationships but with a reasonably balanced transaction of this trade so as to avoid too much of 'unequal exchange' is another criterion. This could perhaps be considered as an effect of development, or in some theories as the forerunner and precondition of development rather than a criterion to be used in defining development. However, in my argument I am including it as a rather late criterion in the sequence of criteria suggested for the definition of development.

6. Finally I think that the growth of a considerable measure of autonomy, self-rule and democracy is required in a given national, or other political unit in order for it to qualify as clearly developing or developed. A country is therefore not developing, or may even be *defined* as hindered in its development process, if it turns out to be a colony, or a country who's economy and politics is overwhelmingly determined by donor countries, or by outside agencies such as the World Bank (WB), or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which, for instance, may impose 'structural conditionalities' on that country to make it eligible for further loans.

The Structure of Development Defined in Terms of a Property Space

If you dichotomize six criteria – each criterion fulfilled, or not fulfilled – and look for all possible combinations of these six criteria, you have $2^6 = 64$ logically possible combinations, or cells in the relevant property space. However, a great deal of these combinations do not appear in reality, or in very small numbers due to the fact that several of the criteria used are associated, causally or logically.

If we had chosen our criteria in order to obtain a scalable, cumulative pattern, as in a so-called Guttman scale, then we would theoretically attain only 7 frequent combinations (0–6) with the remaining 57 combinations, out of the possible 64, being virtually empty empirically, or appearing in some stray cases as infrequent 'scale errors'. On the uni-dimensional cumulative scale thus generated we could then rank countries from the least to the most developed. However, due to different historical starting points, and different historical trajectories, such a uni-dimensional scale of development is not likely to emerge empirically.

If we had quantitative, empirical data on the six criteria, and other related or relevant variables, for each of a representative sample of all countries of the world, including all Third World countries, and if we performed a factor analysis of these variables we would most probably find a multi-dimensional rather than a uni-dimensional reality, with at least two factors accounting for the total variance involved.

In the absence of such factor-analysed quantitative data for our criteria we must satisfy ourselves with the much cruder operation of reducing our 64-cell property space by way of conjecture and logic.

In doing this we are well advised to take account of some already existing distinctions – for instance the simple distinction between developed, underdeveloped, and less developed or undeveloped societies. A society satisfying all the six criteria is clearly a case of a 'developed society'. If we go beyond the simplifying dichotomizations of our six criteria, and introduce more quantitative indicators, we could further rank the societies involved in terms of their level or degree of development.

Societies which do not satisfy any of the six criteria are unlikely to survive for more than a short time span, but could be found for shorter periods of draught, internal or external war, or general catastrophe. An 'undeveloped', or 'less developed', so-called simpler society would at least satisfy the first two or perhaps rather the first three of our criteria but only at a subsistence level, if quantitative indicators are brought into the picture. And quite possibly such a society could also satisfy the sixth criterion.

'Underdeveloped societies' are societies which, as a result of colonialism or later neo-colonial dependency, have increasing difficulties in solving some of their basic problems of subsistence without foreign inputs. Indigenously and historically grown transaction rules are partly replaced with rules which mainly take the interests of foreign colonial, or neo-colonial actors into account – rules which therefore cannot be considered completely legitimate and morally binding by most of the indigenous population. There has developed a trade with export products, but in an unbalanced way which hampers indigenous abilities to reap the benefits of such export trade in imports and in expanding indigenous entrepreneurial activities in agriculture and industry, through worthwhile indigenous investments. Furthermore our sixth criterion, autonomy and democratic self-rule, is not at all satisfied, or severely limited in underdeveloped societies. Even after political independence there could be such limitations, as a result of dependency on foreign donors, or banks which impose so-called structural condi-tionalities, or due to the fact that colonial autocracy is being succeeded by indigenous autocratic rule more responsive to the needs of external forces, and to the needs of a corrupt personal accumulation of wealth among indigenous rulers than to the needs of the population at large in that underdeveloped society.

We thus have crudely defined three typical cases out of our property space. More refined, quantitative appraisals are of course possible within and between these three types; and in an empirical study such refinements would be necessary. In this entirely taxonomical argument, however, I will take the simple and rather well-known threefold typology mentioned above as a starting point for the remainder of this chapter.

It is of course also possible to pursue the analysis of our property space further by looking for the possible meaning of other combinations of our criteria than those implied in our threefold typology. To simplify this exercise I will take the advice of Lazarsfeld and Barton by collapsing closely related criteria – the first two – into one criterion, the criterion of mass-survival from own resources. Mass-survival from own resources implies sufficient indigenous food production, and tool production, and roads which assure a reasonably effective distribu-tion in the indigenous population of the goods produced. If we further combine criterion

3 – reasonably fair transaction rules in economy and society – with criterion 6 – reasonable degrees of autonomy, self-rule and democracy – we will have only four dichotomous criteria, and a totality of only $2^4 = 16$ theoretically possible combinations, some of which will turn out to be unlikely or less frequent in the African setting, and therefore possible to neglect in this chapter. In Figure 1.1 these 16 combinations of our new simplified property space are characterized, interpreted and labelled.

Underneath the 16 cells (a–p) in this simplified property space I have briefly indicated my interpretation of each cell. Certain cells, however, require somewhat more detailed comments than those found in the figure.

The combinations indicated in Figure 1.1 only represent the overall qualitative pattern or 'structure' of fulfilment of our criteria of development; they offer no information about more detailed, quantitative aspects of criteria fulfilment. This also reflects my basic approach in that development is defined primarily, not by any particularly excellent quantitative performance or level with regard to any of the six criteria suggested, but rather by the 'pattern' or 'structure' of criteria-fulfilment as a whole.

To the kind of societies indicated in Figure 1.1 we could add further historical examples of pre-colonial African societies which were 'developed' or 'fairly developed' according to the interpretations introduced in this figure, counter to the terminology and concepts of development fashionable today. But is it not misleading to call such pre-colonial African societies 'developed', or 'fairly developed'? Does not such a classification indicate that my classification and typology completely fail to grasp the essential features of development? Or that the historically grounded 'African perspective' I claim to represent is completely lacking in realism and contemporary relevance?

In spite of these highly justified and critical questions I would like to persist in my approach for the time being, not only for the sake of theoretical provocation, but also because it will result in a stand-point, which hopefully will become more palatable even to some highly critical readers. My main point, again, is that it is crucial to distinguish on the one hand the over-all *structure* of development, and on the other the *level* of development; and the level of development cannot be ascertained without first establishing the structure of development as conceived in contexts which enable us to take note of what is (was) *possible at given historical junctures*.

In my argument so far, as summarized in the property space of Figure 1.1, the structure of development has been at the forefront. Structures of undeveloped, less developed, developed or underdeveloped societies provide the bases for calculating levels of development. Such calculations obviously cannot be performed simply by adding up various quantitative indicators of the extent to which the four criteria of our property space have been fulfilled – unless these criteria are scalable in the sense of Louis Guttman; and they are not. In Figure 1.1 the bold plus-signs (+) form structures which comply to Guttman's scale model; but we find several other actually existing structures which do not comply to this model.

In an additive multi-dimensional measure of the level of development very high quantitative values of one or two criterion variables could easily compensate for very low levels of criterion fulfilment with regard to remaining criteria, and then the whole idea of a structure of development or underdevelopment would be lost. I am not prepared in this chapter to discuss at length other more adequate ways of calculating levels of development, but the first solution which comes to mind is a multiplicative rather than an additive index. In a multiplicative index any non-fulfilment of any one criterion would bring the index to zero. However high the magnitude of fulfilment of some particular criterion, this high magnitude will be worth nothing when multiplied by zero; the total index will then attain the value zero. If this mathematical property of a multiplicative index is considered to be too insensitive to high values of single criteria, it might be possible to combine multiplicative and additive indexes into a composite index.

However, this chapter is not devoted to a discussion of mathematical properties in index construction of levels of development, nor to a full comparison of quantitative and more qualitative notions of levels and structures of development. Such index construction has been attempted by others, more or less successfully.[2] My main purpose has been to define development primarily in terms of qualitative structures conceived with due consideration

Figure 1.1: A simplified property space of developmental types

The structure of criteria-fulfilment (+) should be read vertically.

Criteria: Types:

1: Mass survival from own resources.	+	+ + + −	+ + + − − −	+ − − −	−
2: Indigenous entrepreneurship.	+	+ + − +	+ − − − + +	− − − +	−
3: International trade significant.	+	+ − + +	− + − + + −	− − + −	−
4: Political autonomy, democratic self-rule; reasonable transaction rules.	+	− + + +	− − + + − +	− + − −	−
	a	b c (d) (e)	f g h (i) j (k)	l (m) n (o)	p

a: **Developed society** – extremely rare or non-existent in contemporary Africa.

b: **Fairly developed society** under foreign colonial rule (less likely) or indigenous undemocratic rule.

c: **Less developed country under democratic self-rule,** solving its basic problems of mass-survival and internal, simple entrepreneurship, but with no significant international trade; probably rather isolated. Rather common in the pre-colonial history of Africa – and probably also in some peripheral European countries in their earlier, pre-industrial history.

d: **Unlikely combination** (bracketed) – international trade under democratic rule is unlikely to exist without an indigenous entrepreneurship involved in such trade.

e: **Unlikely combination** – only possible for a very short period of catastrophic events in a developed society.

f: **Less developed autocratic country,** probably not colonial, or only early colonial, since no significant international trade is involved but only an internal agricultural and entrepreneurial economy. A few instances might be found in African history.

g: **Typical colonial situation,** at least in earlier phases of colonialization, with no indigenous entrepreneurship but significant international colonial trade (probably involving unequal exchange) and a still sufficient indigenous production of food etc. for mass survival.

h: **Undeveloped society** with autonomy and self-rule – with sufficient production of food etc. for mass survival but with no further entrepreneurship: isolated with no significant international trade. Common in pre-colonial periods of African history – at least in the interior.

i: **Unlikely combination!**

j: **Underdeveloped, 'dual' society,** non-democratic, entrepreneurial, and therefore not under external colonial rule, yet external-oriented in its own trade, exploiting its own masses, not solving the needs of mass survival. Unlikely in Africa South of the Sahara except perhaps in the Apartheid system of South Africa.

k: **Unlikely combination.**

l: **Undeveloped society,** isolated, non-democratic, no popular participation in self-rule, no entrepreneurship; may turn out to be unstable over long historical periods.

m: **Unlikely combination** – except as catastrophic, temporal transformation of undeveloped society, type h.

n: **Colonial or neo-colonial situation of underdevelopment** – could possibly be interpreted as early, internationally trading port-havens completely dominated by an immigrant, colonial bourgeoisie, with no indigenous entrepreneurs, and neglecting the mass-survival needs of the indigenous port-city and hinterland populations. Later, in a neo-colonial situation, a comprador bourgeoisie can step into the shoes of the colonial bourgeoisie. But still an indigenous, national entrepreneurship is missing. Cases found in earlier colonial, and later neo-colonial periods in the history of Africa.

o–p: **Unlikely combinations.**

for what was possible at a particular historical juncture, and then to suggest that an assessment of levels of development could be pursued given such structures of development or underdevelopment. When I have mentioned developed or fairly developed societies with reference to cases from sixteenth- or eighteenth-century Africa, this has been done with due consideration for what was historically possible at that time. Was Portugal of the sixteenth century really more developed than some of the most developed African societies which Portuguese sailors encountered along the West African coast at that time?[3] This is the crucial question. If my readers still maintain that 'European superiority' was quite obvious already at that time, we must ask ourselves in what ways Europeans were superior at that juncture, and whether this superiority was a mark of higher development as I have defined it. To this question I will return shortly.

Before attempting to answer this question, however, I will turn from the question of how to define structures and levels of development, to the question of historical causality. What were the influences which transformed African societies after their first encounters with Europeans? In my attempt to answer this question I will not bring any new observations or analyses into the picture, but refer to what is already known by the accounts of historians.

Historical Causes of African Underdevelopment

It is imperative to note what nearly four centuries of trans-Atlantic slave trade, and later colonialism, has implied for the 'development' and 'underdevelopment' of African societies. This should be well known by now, but bears repetition in view of some unhistorical but now fashionable assertions that the lack of current 'development' of African societies is a result mainly of the poor internal politics of African countries today, and that historical explanations of so-called underdevelopment are nothing but excuses for present-day shortcomings (Bauer 1981).

The slave trade of course implied a gigantic demographic drain on African populations. But the main long-term effects on African societies of the nearly four centuries of trans-Atlantic slave trade, and the less voluminous but more enduring Arab slave trade across the Indian Ocean were a brutalization and demoralization of human relations, and the implicit breakdown of fair transaction rules, and ensuing social disintegration. The brutalization of political culture, and of common morality was most pronounced in coastal African societies where this slave trade was administered, on the African side, by rulers and kings of African societies who waged wars against more or less friendly neighbouring tribes to appropriate human beings into slavery. The European captains waiting in their ships at the coast often paid for these human captures with shot-guns which further escalated these inter-tribal wars. Basil Davidson (1966: 217) has provided several examples of how the buying of fire-arms from European sailors necessitated even more extensive slave-capturing wars to pay for those fire-arms – hence a vicious circle was established.

Some pre-colonial centralized kingdoms in Africa came into being historically through military control and/or conquest, and thus had developed a style of political domination (particularly when there was also a history of slave capture and trade, European or Arab) which frequently spilled over into neighbouring territories of segmentally organized societies which therefore had to organize for self-defence, or submission. British colonialists, on taking over the control of such kingdoms with neighbouring territories, often made use of existing pre-colonial structures of political domination, and military mobilization, to establish so-called 'indirect rule', thereby in the long run strengthening rather than eliminating already existing pre-colonial lines of conflict once generated by the internal African wars of the slave trade.[4]

If we make the reasonable assumption that centuries of past ill-fated history cannot fail to have repercussions on contemporary societies, then it is obvious that contemporary Africa has had to carry a terrible burden from that past history of the slave trade. Those who wish to belittle this externally imposed burden by referring to the fact that patterns of indigenous African slavery existed even before the slave trade began thereby only demonstrate their inability to perceive the immense differences in quantity as well as quality between the slavery involved indigenously in Africa, and in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. For such a comparison

in brief the concerned reader is referred, for instance, to the world historian Stavrianos (1988 b: 563 f.).

The history of colonialism also left its imprint on African societies, and not only by amplifying some of the politically and morally destructive effects of the previous slave trade.

In Eurocentric accounts of colonialism, and its contributions to development, we are told about the processes of 'modernization' and 'diffusion of innovations' – the 'civilizing mission' – which supposedly were the positive aspects of colonialism, even when its uglier aspects are admitted as well. We seldom hear the counter-factual historical argument that both processes –'modernization' and 'diffusion of innovations' – might have occurred without colonialism, as a result of more frequent non-colonial, balanced and multi-directional international trade, and the more frequent inter-cultural contacts accompanying such trade.

The most visible effects of colonialism in Africa after the slave trade can be stated in terms of the four criteria which constitute the property space in Figure 1.1:

● First, we must take note of the lack of significant and needed improvements in the capacity of colonialized territories to solve problems of mass survival in response to population increase, and in response to the rising expectations which were the results of exposure to changes in the rest of the world. Manpower was increasingly absorbed in the economic and tax-raising endeavours of the colonialists, and later the neo-colonialists, at the expense of continuous and otherwise natural, historical improvements of production for mass survival.

● Secondly, we note the interruption of otherwise natural improvements of indigenous entrepreneurship and mercantile capabilities as a result of the fact that such entrepreneurship and mercantile endeavours were virtually monopolized by the colonialists. At political independence, therefore, virtually no indigenous, national bourgeoisie was in existence in African countries.

● Thirdly, we take note of the creation not only of the well-known pattern of 'unequal exchange' in colonial international trade, but first and foremost that international trade became geared to the satisfaction of overseas metropoles rather than to the needs of indigenous populations of colonized territories. To some extent this pattern has survived in the neo-colonial system after political independence due to the relative advantages, and greater competitiveness of European and North-American business and trading enterprises.

● Fourthly, the temporary but long-term discontinuation of self-grown improvements and struggle for greater political autonomy and democratic self-rule is by definition a basic attribute of colonialism. With political independence these processes have been launched anew. But development toward genuine democratic self-rule takes considerable time as we know from the lessons of European and North-American history. In Europe the political and administrative structures of democracy came about as a result of a prolonged struggle which also involved successive changes in mentality and transaction rules. Structural changes, and changes in mentality proceeded simultaneously, more or less. Democratic structures without needed concomitant changes in mentality may produce only a half-baked democracy, and corrupt politics. So far, this would seem to have been the course of events in many African countries.

One factor already mentioned – the lack of an entrepreneurial or merchant national bourgeoisie – would seem to have played a crucial role in disfiguring the potentially democratic political and administrative structures which many African countries borrowed from Europe at independence. In most if not all African countries it was impossible for African citizens to accumulate wealth through indigenous entrepreneurial or merchant activities in the colonial period preceding independence, and therefore also less likely in the years following independence. But after independence they could accumulate wealth corruptly in politics and in public administration, and later in the parastatal corporations which were supposed to launch economic growth in African countries, particularly in domains receiving great amounts of donor grants, or loans. This encroachment of private economic incentives upon national politics and administration gave the institutions adopted from the West a slant different from that which was intended. National purpose and responsiveness to popular needs were replaced by a race for private wealth which in a genuine and entrepreneurial market economy could have found a more healthy expression in the growth of the economy rather than

in the corruption of politics and the public sector. Counterfactually a flourishing indigenous entrepreneurial sector at the time of political independence could have contributed to inhibit the post-independence growth of increasingly corrupt political systems. Fervent wealth-seekers could then have turned to private enterprise rather than to politics and government, whereas those concerned with promoting a national purpose and democracy rather than with accumulating great personal wealth might have been more frequent than is the case now among those recruited into politics and public administration.

Secondly, the historical fact that borders of formerly colonial, recently independent African countries often came to circumscribe multi-ethnic agglomerations of peoples which often in the past had been involved in military conflicts originally triggered by the slave trade, or the fact that these borders have come to enclose peoples otherwise exhibiting considerable cultural differences, must be taken into account in understanding some features of African politics. Together with the corrupt 'privatization' of African governments, we must also acknowledge the need emerging among politicians and administrators to strengthen and consolidate their power by recourse to communalist, so-called 'tribalist' appeals. But again this must be understood historically. The history is not one of tracing tribalism back to some kind of primordial, traditional, communal loyalties. Tribalism is a modern phenomenon resulting from modern competitive politics and wealth accumulation, in settings originally created by the slave trade, then by colonialism and later by colonially circumscribed borderlines of new nations.[5]

What I have said about the historically generated African predicament must be repeated more than once in view of the alleged debacle of the historically based dependency and world-system approaches. These approaches no doubt are oversimplified and much too narrow in their conjectures – particularly in their neglect of the contemporary dynamics of African countries – but the concern of these schools of thought with African history, from the slave trade through colonialism to political independence under more or less of neo-colonialism, has highlighted some crucial historical facts without which Africa and its lack of 'development' cannot be explained and understood. Facts are facts and their significance cannot be denied without proving them wrong, or without ruling out the role of history in shaping the contemporary world altogether.

A polemical argument sometimes advanced against attempts to historically explain and understand contemporary Africa has it that such historical explanation and understanding is nothing but a futile attempt at providing rather poor excuses for the political immorality, and the poor economic performance of African countries today. Certainly there are those who are intellectually incapable of making a clear distinction between explaining and excusing. However, it is possible to maintain the validity of assertions that history has generated a great deal of the political immorality and poor economic performance manifested in some African countries today without therefore being logically or morally forced to accept and excuse immorality and inefficiency, or forced to be uncritical of them. On the contrary, it would most probably become easier to break away from inherited or otherwise historically generated predicaments, if you understand how these predicaments were generated in the first place. Such knowledge and understanding without excuses are, in my view, fundamental to an innovative and constructive African perspective on development.

Another common polemical argument against attempts to understand and explain current African predicaments historically implies a serious charge particularly against those concerned with the history of colonialism in Africa: they are aimed at fostering a sense of guilt among Europeans, it has been maintained, particularly among nations previously colonialist, in order to promote large-scale penitential aid to African countries. Be this as it may – still we must admit that the truth, validity and therefore the practical relevance of a historically based diagnosis of a current situation is quite independent of the kind of motives or aims implied in pursuing such a historical diagnosis. To assess the truth of a statement by assessing the motives for making that statement is known by philosophers as the genetic fallacy – one of the most simple errors of logic you can make in an argument. Such errors of argument in their turn may also be motivated – for instance by a belief in European superiority, and the racist myth that Africans are more stupid and narrow-minded than Europeans thereby causing Africa to remain less developed. Here I will not question the validity of these beliefs

on the grounds that they are motivated by racism or Eurocentrism – the genetic fallacy I will not commit – but evaluate their validity simply on the basis of historical facts regarding the trajectory and ingredients of so-called European superiority.

Africans often shy away from exploring the various facets implied in notions of European superiority. Once, when I presented a draft of this chapter at an African workshop, I was accused by an African colleague of being racist simply because I paid attention to notions of European superiority. But in my view it must be part of an African perspective on development to come to terms, dialectically, with notions of European superiority. Otherwise this notion will always re-emerge or suggest itself unexpectedly and illogically from its repressed state in our sub-conscious.

So-Called 'European Superiority' – Its Ingredients

The question of so-called 'European superiority' in development, in comparison with, say, Africa, and the question of why, and how Europe developed this 'superiority' so as to influence and dominate so many different parts of the world in fact helps to throw light on the impact of non-racial, geographical, demographic and sociological factors on what is commonly called development. I think that a concentrated effort to tackle this kind of question will generate answers which are relevant for the causal explanation of several other kinds of historical change – including the development of underdevelopment.

Even if early European travellers along the African coast, and sometimes into the interior, found no evidence to convince them of the 'natural African inferiority' which much later became a myth cultivated by many Europeans, Europeans were in fact superior to Africans in at least three respects already at the time of the first European–African encounters – that is in ship-building and related 'wood technology', in the military technology of violent destruction, and in the use of written language. Our question about so-called European superiority can perhaps be reduced to these particular aspects of 'development' – if indeed all three aspects should be sub-sumed under that label. Military technology – the technology of killing human beings on a large scale – has certainly not been included in my definition of the structures of development.

(a) The building of ships which can negotiate the roughness of oceans, and sail against the winds is a technology which everywhere around the globe developed where the challenges of the open sea were not too great to begin with – that is where great gulfs or inland seas with openings toward the oceans can be found as in the Chinese Sea between mainland China and Japan, as in the Persian Gulf, and in the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Baltic Sea in the north, and where great rivers were flowing into these gulfs or great inland seas with their openings toward the oceans. By successively mastering the smaller challenges of great rivers, gulfs, or internal seas being the recipients of those rivers, ship-builders and sailors could later take on the greater challenges of the oceans with which these gulfs or internal seas were connected. In fact many of the innovations in ship-building and navigation originated at the Chinese coast, and in ancient Arab and Persian civilizations, and were then improved in the Mediterranean. In the Baltic Sea and the North Sea the Vikings developed ship-building rather independently, and were the first to cross the North Sea and then the Atlantic, first to Iceland, and later perhaps even to the North-American coast. Later the Hanseatic traders with their extensive shipping in the Baltic and North Sea combined the lessons from several parts of Europe.

The improvement by Europeans of sailing ships, again, was not a mark of any racially superior intelligence among Europeans, but was the result first of their closeness to other, mainly Arab civilizations, and also a result of geographically inter-locking, successively greater physical challenges – rivers, inland seas and then the oceans.

The African mainland, however, does not have any great gulfs or inland seas with openings toward the ocean. Those who lived along the African coast confronted the over-powering force and challenge of the oceans without any initial protection, and without the smaller challenges of rivers flowing into inland seas or gulfs connected with the oceans which made it possible for Europeans to successively develop the arts of ship-building and navigation

on the basis of earlier experiences of Arab and Chinese sailors and navigators. If we assume, counterfactually, that the interior of the African continent actually had been equipped with one or two great inland seas like the Mediterranean and the Baltic sea, with openings toward the oceans, then African history might have turned out quite differently.

The world historian Stavrianos (1988a: 264) has also noticed that Europeans in contrast to the Chinese seemed to have a much greater estimation and taste for trade and business. In China and India merchants were traditionally looked down upon. During the Southern Sung dynasty in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries China was well on its way to becoming a great maritime and commercial power – but this potential was never realized (op. cit. 245). The greater European inclination for trade and business was more than a 'taste', however, at least in some parts of Europe; it was a matter of survival due to climatic conditions which made it impossible to grow crops for subsistence all the year around – needed food had to be imported for part of the year – whereas in Africa hunting and gathering, and later a sedentary agriculture could supply enough food most of the time before the slave trade and colonialism.

I have given space to these examples in order to indicate the great importance of geography as a crucial component of the causal nexus of certain historically highly significant aspects of development. Sociologists often emphasize the role of mentality, attitudes and value-orientations which certainly may be crucially important at certain stages of social change and development; but they often forget the even greater importance of quite material, geographical, meteorological and other similar conditions for the earlier stages of development which set the stage for later progress.

(b) The development of the military technology of violent destruction is another domain where Europeans have excelled – after initially having borrowed certain components such as gun-powder from the Chinese and Arabs. This technology and related organizational structures developed further in the course of the Hundred-Year War between the French and the British for most of the fourteenth, and early fifteenth centuries, and also during the Wars of the Roses in England, and other subsequent wars.[6] Here again geographical but also demographic factors are significant in the causal nexus. Europeans were living closer together, with more friction and competition for land and other natural resources than the peoples widely scattered and separated by natural barriers on the continent of Africa. African history has also witnessed wars, but not of the same magnitude and violence as in European history.

Another aspect of war is the systems of political domination which are associated with it, and the 'culture of violence' which was generated and maintained by war-lords and warring governments in Europe, and which came to terrifyingly brutal expressions in the history of colonialism.

(c) There are other aspects of so-called European superiority which may seem less destructive, particularly in a European or 'World History' perpective. Climatic conditions, particularly in the north, compelled Europeans to develop more advanced types of shelter and buildings. This was part of the 'wood technology' which also manifested itself not only in ship-building but also in early urbanization. Written language, knowledge of mathematics, and an emerging natural science – borrowed from Fenicians and Arabs – were encouraged by the needs of political domination, military technology, and the trade by ocean-going ships which were the core elements of European superiority; but these cultural innovations which were generated as some kind of 'multiplier effect' by these core elements were amenable to more peaceful, intellectual and spiritual uses as well. Again, geographical conditions are prominent in understanding these aspects of cultural development. The geographical closeness of Europe to Arab civilization, and the trade routes connecting Europeans with such cradles of culture were largely absent in interior Africa. Until recently the coasts of Africa were more influenced by the destructive impact of the slave trade, and later by colonialism than by the humanistic aspects of Arab and Western civilization.

To sum up this account of so-called European superiority, the military technology developed by Europeans, in combination with the culture of violent political domination, and the technology of ship-building and sailing against the winds, were not generated by any

superior racial characteristics of Europeans but by the closeness of Europe to other cradles of civilization, and to the particular geographical, demographic and meteorological challenges of the European continent and its surrounding waters. Obviously these aspects of so-called European superiority had devastating effects on the societies and peoples of Africa, the Americas, and Asia, and on their ability to pursue social development at a pace and with an orientation fitting the conditions of these continents themselves.

Finally it should be pointed out that our account of so-called European superiority has been focussed mainly on events in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. But if we look at world history several millenia earlier we find that Europe was a barbaric and very undeveloped continent compared to the ancient civilizations of China, India, Egypt and large parts of the Middle East. Historians have speculated as to why these ancient civilizations stagnated and eventually were overtaken by the previously barbaric Europe. Stavrianos (1988a: 145-7, and chapter 8) has summarized these speculative but still quite reasonable conjectures by pointing out that the rising costs of maintaining and defending the ruling classes of these ancient civilizations with their learning and highly aesthetic culture, and their over-extended bureaucracies, together with the historical cycles of dynastic degeneration among their rulers, prevented investments in the further development of existing technologies and in the living conditions for common people. The barbaric European peoples, in the initial stages of their development, did not have to pay those over-powering costs; and when, after a few centuries, they had developed their ocean-going ships, their military technology and their 'taste' for global trading they could rather easily over-run those stagnant ancient civilizations. This is a historical lesson well worth remembering in considering the potential future development of African societies.

The costs of maintaining some contemporary African governments, and their encumbents, is of a completely different nature to the costs involved in maintaining rulers in ancient civilizations – there are the costs of buying and maintaining luxury cars, luxury houses and other items of conspicuous consumption plus the costs of siphoning off great amounts of money to foreign bank accounts; and add to this the formidable costs of paying the military well enough to prevent them from getting involved in mutinies or military coups, and add the costs of maintaining a network of secret police to trace dissenters, and other real or imagined threats against the rulers, that is against 'national security' (to use the political language of the establishment). Exorbitant costs of this nature also severely limit investments in what common people need according to the various criteria of development indicated above.

An African Perspective on Future Development

Given my definitions of the structures and levels of development it is not difficult to portray the desirable processes and changes for development in Africa. Development must take off from the peculiar historical deformations which are found in African societies due to their particular historical experiences. These deformations are certainly somewhat different in African countries with different colonial histories.[7]

For the purpose of this chapter I will, without systematically taking into account the peculiar differences existing between African countries, simplify my argument by now concentrating on the over-all question of how to improve the capabilities of contemporary African societies to solve the problems of mass survival, indigenous entrepreneurship, international trade, and democratic self-rule.

The three first criteria mentioned above, and in my property space of development and underdevelopment structures, all refer to the functioning of the economies of African countries. On all of these three points it is necessary to consider the operation of a market economy as opposed to a centrally planned, political and bureaucratic regulation of the economy.

Fortunately, with the lessons derived from the recent collapse of Eastern European economic and political systems, most ideological strictures about the superiority of centrally regulated economies have been washed away. A highly respected Marxist African social scientist like Mahmood Mamdani (1985 and 1989a) expressed his views about these matters even before the events in Eastern Europe of late 1989 which plunged these countries into

a transition to market economies, and toward a more democratic political order in that part of Europe.

The market economy, and the solution of problems of mass survival

The real question before us today in Africa, according to Mamdani, is not of capitalism or socialism: 'It is, instead, of the reform of the archaic structures that are blocking the development of peasant productivity'. I am not quite sure what Mamdani means by 'archaic structures'. In view of his position on the impact of colonialism he cannot possibly be referring to a heritage left from 'traditional' pre-colonial structures alone. Be that as it may, Mamdani is not rejecting smallholder property in favour of societal or state ownership of land, neither is he rejecting the so-called market forces in favour of bureaucratic 'central planning'. But he urges us to make up our minds about the 'kind' of markets that are needed, which markets must be used or created – neo-colonial markets for international export primarily, or markets for mass-consumption goods and tools aimed primarily at domestic consumers and based on domestic resources in the first place?

The choice between the markets to be encouraged or created is a political choice with far-reaching effects for long-term development. The creation of markets cannot be left to the 'magic' of market forces themselves, or to the all too visible hand of the international economy. On a continent where the great majority of the population consists of smallholders on agricultural land, and where starvation is still rampant, the improvement of productive forces in agriculture for the production of domestic mass-consumption goods should be the first priority, according to Mamdani. He is quite aware of the failures of socialist-oriented efforts at improving agricultural production in Africa and elsewhere, and acknowledges the incentives for development of productive forces provided by domestic markets for agricultural products, and the multiplier and linkage effects which may enhance other relevant production on top of agriculture within such a domestic market economy.

Will Mamdani's proposals help to unfetter the growth of those productive forces which are most relevant for overcoming underdevelopment, namely those which assure that African nations can feed their own populations and, as the case may be in countries with a lot of fertile land, the populations of less fortunate neighbours through an export to them of agricultural products? I believe that such 'unfettering' will occur with the use or creation of more effective market mechanisms for agricultural products and other mass-consumption goods – but the result will not be 'socialism'. This does not seem to disturb Mamdani very much. His main concern is the solution of the basic problems of mass survival, and he realizes that private smallholder property, and the incentives of a domestic market economy are crucial for solving these problems.

A return to a consistent and effective market economy is often assumed to imply a privatization of parastatal corporations to reap the assumed benefits of capitalist enterprises selling their products in an open market. We can certainly find parastatal corporations which perform very bureaucratically, and badly, and which might improve with privatization. Parastatal corporations could possibly make their most important contribution by launching production in areas which are lagging, and which do not provide sufficient incentives for private investments (Grosh 1988).

In his chapter in this book, and in other publications of his, Mamdani does not make privatization a great issue. His main concern is the fact that so many indigenous enterprises, for instance in Uganda, fail to use readily available indigenous resources, and prefer to spend foreign currency on importing foreign materials which are 'assembled' or mixed in Uganda, for instance the mixing of Ugandan water with imported milk powder into so-called reconstituted milk when in fact Ugandan natural resources are excellent for the production on a large scale of Ugandan milk from Ugandan cows. Uganda's neighbour, Kenya, has indeed succeeded both to produce, and to distribute milk for its own domestic market.

Mamdani's argument has been prompted largely by a polemic against World Bank/IMF strategies for 'recovery' of African economies. WB/IMF also attach great importance to a return to a market economy, and to improvements of agricultural production – but in contrast to Mamdani they have not been inclined to specify that the most important 'enabling environment' for development are domestic markets, and food production. As regards

Mamdani's analyses of the programmes which WB/IMF have advanced to promote a national entrepreneurial bourgeoisie in Uganda, I refer the reader to his chapter in this book.

Among African, or Africanist social scientists there are disagreements both about the desirability and the possibility of creating a significant and productive 'national bourgeoisie' in African societies, in order to bring about a 'take-off' in economic growth, or – as a Marxist would put it – in the development of productive forces. I am not sure whether Marxist scholars like Mahmood Mamdani or Samir Amin happen to find it less interesting to devote serious scholarly attention to the potential role of a national bourgeoisie than to the potential role of popular movements. Karl Marx himself wrote glowingly in the Communist Manifesto about the historical role of the bourgeoisie in creating 'more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together' – but that was with respect to European history in the early stages of capitalism. Samir Amin is sceptical about the feasibility of 'the national bourgeoisie project' in most African countries, due to the extra-ordinary strength of international capital in late capitalism. It is interesting to note that he explains the emergence of mafia-type political leadership in some African countries with the absence or 'impossibility' of having a national bourgeoisie. Wealth is therefore sought in the political and public spheres thus transforming the political systems of such countries into 'cleptocracies'. This is also my hypothesis. But I maintain that we must qualify the thesis about the impossibility of 'the national bourgeoisie project' in African settings. On this point I come closer to Göran Hydén (1983) than to Samir Amin. I do not believe that this project is equally 'impossible' in all African countries, and at all levels of African economies. Small-scale entrepreneurship in the so-called informal economic sector might offer fertile ground for the emergence and perhaps slow but steady growth of a genuine 'national bourgeoisie'. In some countries, for instance Kenya, a national bourgeoisie is already emerging (see G. Ikiara's chapter in this book). Empirical research is needed on the kind of conditions which make 'the national bourgeoisie project' possible and beneficial not only for the economy but for politics as well (cf. Lubeck 1987).

Unfortunately the kind of economists to whom IMF/WB have been listening most of the time have demonstrated very little sense for such empirical research. They are convinced by abstract neo-classical economic models that all good things will happen – including the emergence of a truly enterprising bourgeoisie – if only a 'freeing of markets' is brought about thereby setting the 'right prices' for every commodity and service. However, Mamdani points out that in African countries there are not always pre-existing markets simply waiting to be 'freed' – and there are rather few seeds of real productive enterprise. Instead we find a wealthy ruling class, and middle classes – the *mafutamingi* – bent on 'money management', luxury consumption and personal security rather than on production. However, if markets and genuine entrepreneurs are not there to be 'freed', they must be created.[8] But which markets? As I have indicated already, Mamdani emphasizes the creation of domestic markets in contrast to the IMF – and this of course requires political decisions not totally subject to the commands or 'conditionalities' of the IMF.

I certainly share Mamdani's sceptical attitude toward the IMF/WB; but these international economic agencies have previously gone through several stages of relearning based on new experiences of development, and therefore we should perhaps not give up hope. This relearning process of the IMF/WB has been exceedingly slow in the past, however, creating a lot of suffering meanwhile, so we must also hope for more rapid relearning. If the IMF/WB made use of advisers other than only neo-classical economists – for instance political scientists and sociologists knowledgeable about Africa – more rapid relearning might be possible.

The further development of a market economy, whether oriented toward domestic or international markets, will generate social class differences, and some class struggle in Africa just as it has done in Europe, and North America.[9] It is an open question as to how parastatal corporations, domestic private capital, and international capital will respond to such aspects of class development in Africa – particularly in countries with a very high inflation rate.[10]

An African perspective on ways of waging, and of responding to a working-class struggle has not yet been explored in a sufficiently undogmatic fashion, but could perhaps be more fruitfully debated now after the present break-down of Eastern European centres

propagating highly ideological, non-reformist and often unrealistic dogmas of class struggle. Jimi Adesina's chapter in this book provides an excellent background for such a discussion.

The international market economy and the debt crisis

We cannot know whether international trade in an ideal state, without any remnants of past colonial, or present neo-colonial distortions really would be as balanced, and devoid of exploitation as the idealized models of international economists predict. We cannot know whether the 'comparative advantages' of African economies identified by economists are measured by them with the same scale of 'advantage' as the 'comparative advantages' of other, say, Western countries. However, we know that virtually all African countries carry remnants of past colonial distortions, and are subject to present-day European, and North American advantages, in trade, industrial production, transportation, information – and in secrecy.

Looming large over these differentials in 'advantages' is the debt crisis which necessitates an over-emphasis on export markets when in fact the development of domestic markets should be the first priority in recovering the development potential of African countries. The debt service for most African countries, that is the percentage of GNP to be set off for paying interests, not to mention the repayment of the loans themselves, is extreme, and it chokes most efforts at launching sustainable indigenous development.

Here we must be reminded of the banking boom of the seventies when Western bankers were chasing Ministers of Finance from Third World countries, perhaps particularly the more corrupt ones, in order to get rid of their petro-dollars; 'selling loans was like offering crates of whisky to an alcoholic', wrote Anthony Sampson in a vivid journalistic account of world banking during that period which contained the origin of the debt crisis of the eighties.[11] Of course the repayment of debts legitimately and necessarily must be a main concern for IMF/WB, unless international opinion can be made to demand writing off most African debts. After all these debts account for a relatively small percentage of international debt. Writing them off will therefore not cause havoc in Western banking.

Since many of these debts were probably incurred in order to make money available to corrupt rulers and politicians who used it for conspicuous private consumption and/or transferred significant portions of it to their private bank accounts abroad, it has been suggested that the writing off of these debts could be made conditional upon the repatriation of the private wealth kept by corrupt African politicians and bureaucrats in their foreign bank accounts. This would not only diminish the debt crisis, but also increase the likelihood of investments in productive domestic enterprise at home.

We must also be reminded that the ability to earn foreign currency to liquidate prompted and misused loans (the word 'prompted' refers to so-called sales-promotion) cannot legitimately be called 'recovery for development'. The very fact that loans quite frequently were prompted, and provided by Western banks on the basis of quite unrealistic assumptions, puts a very heavy responsibility for the African debt crisis, and its consequences, on these banks. Only if this responsibility is taken seriously, and African debts are written off[12] in the conditional manner suggested above, and internal structural changes effected to give a boost to domestic markets first of all, only then can African governments with reasonable and responsible independence launch a sustainable economic development, including an indigenously motivated, necessary international trade.

It has been maintained (Karlström 1991: chapter 10, and p. 126) that an improved international trade, helped by the removal of custom duties in industrialized countries, could furnish an income to African countries comparable to the amounts presently received as donor aid. But again and again it must be reiterated that international trade as such, that is without a previous establishment of a vital domestic market, contributes little to genuine development among common people in African societies, and in fact may impede such development if pursued without the existence of such vital domestic markets.

Democratic self-rule in Africa

As I have already indicated African politics has been somewhat distorted as a result of two factors:

• One factor is the encroachment of private economic incentives upon politics as a result of the fact that wealth accumulation in private hands was hampered by colonial policies which made significant and growing indigenous entrepreneurship in the market place impossible or extremely difficult. After independence wealth was sought therefore in the political and public sphere. The role of a *compradore* bourgeoisie which otherwise has attracted most of the attention of radical commentators of underdevelopment should not be forgotten. The compradore is well served by keeping close to government decisions on import licenses, currency exchange, and donor financing.

• The need to consolidate political power by exploiting tribalist themes in multi-ethnic societies has also helped to disfigure African politics, particularly in countries which combine large ethnic groupings competing for cultural and economic advantages. We should consider the interaction of these three sources – modern economic incentives, modern political incentives and the usefulness of ethnicity as a means of modern popular manipulation – as mainly responsible for the tribalist disfiguring of contemporary African politics rather than attributing the causes of tribalism to a 'cultural lag' of patterns of affection deriving from so-called traditional society.

If this diagnosis is correct, we can expect an improvement of the political situation in African countries if they are able increasingly to encourage the emergence of a productive national bourgeoisie – not a wealth-seeking political or bureaucratic class, not the kind of largely non-productive, money-consuming *mafutamingi* described by Mamdani in his chapter on the Ugandan situation in this book, and not a predominantly *compradore* bourgeoisie. Such a development of an entrepreneurial national bourgeoisie – a topic already dealt with above – would also successively give rise to a significant industrial working class whose demands, and 'interest articulation' might serve to generate counter-forces to the now dominant forces from above in African politics.

The role of one-party rule in a number of African countries is another topic which must be discussed in any analysis of the prospects for more democratic self-rule in Africa. The chapter by Masipula Sithole in this book discusses this topic at length. We must also take into account the fact that several *de jure* one-party states in Africa, after 1991, have succumbed to a combination of internal pressures, and external pressures from donor countries, by changing their constitutions to allow a multi-party competition in the near future. This process has just started, and we do not yet know whether this transition to multi-party democracy will be smooth and peaceful everywhere. However, the successful launching of multi-party democracy in recently independent Namibia, and the successful transition to multi-party democracy in Zambia certainly provide useful lessons for the rest of Africa. Whether the multi-party elections held in Kenya in December 1992 were sufficiently free and fair is still being debated at the time of editing in January 1993; but the fact that 88 parliamentary seats out of 188 now will be occupied by opposition parties promises a much livelier parliamentary debate, and more of accountability and transparency in the running of the Kenyan government.

The 'real' socialist model of a one-party state was adopted by only a few African countries such as Tanzania and Mozambique in the past, while most other African one-party states were based on a rather different philosophy. The predominant official reason for creating one-party rule in African countries has been that this would overcome destructive ethnic rivalries and conflicts within those countries, and establish national unity and peace. In my view this justification cannot be so easily discounted – even if advanced, in many cases, as an excuse for 'patrimonial' or dictatorial rule. In African countries which have experimented with multi-party systems such as Nigeria the tribalist factor has indeed proved to be very strong.

However, even if the anti-tribalist motive for one-party systems in multi-ethnic societies with large and powerful ethnic groups[13] cannot be so easily discounted, the debate on one-party versus multi-party systems in some of these countries has raised some very important issues. One-party systems often are combined with severe restrictions on free speech, on open debate and on serious criticism of government policies, and with a politicized judiciary and a general lack of respect for universal human rights. This is an empirical fact. Where this

unfortunate combination of one-party rule and a lack of respect for human rights is prevailing, due to what appears to be a paranoiac fear among political leaders of articulate dissent, there the long-term stability of that political system may be jeopardized. In such one-party states we find that multi-party systems increasingly have become a public demand – in spite of the dangers of being accused of sedition or treason, and in spite of the dangers of being detained without trial for questioning the legitimacy of the one and only party.

In Kenya it would seem that past authoritarian one-party rule, justified by its leaders as a means to prevent tribalist conflict, had its own dialectic generating a national rather than a tribal opposition. The original Kenyan opposition (FORD = Forum for the Restoration of Democracy) which spearheaded the struggle for multi-party politics in Kenya in 1991-2 was split into two parties in 1992 – FORD-Kenya and FORD-Asili; and several other opposition parties – the largest being the Democratic Party (DP) – were also registered in 1992 as new political parties, in addition to the previously monopolistic KANU. The nation-wide character of the original FORD Party was indeed quite obvious. After the split, and with the addition of several other opposition parties, which seemed more ethnic or 'tribal' in composition, it might now be more difficult to completely reject the assertion that Kenyan opposition parties have, finally, become 'tribalistic'. But I question this assertion, considering it only as a piece of political propaganda, not to be taken at face value by social scientists. The term 'tribalist', as used to characterize political parties, has much broader implications than the mere fact that opposition parties, in their struggle to win votes in an uneven competition against the former, well-established one and only party, tend to be supported particularly by voters from certain communities, and provinces. At least two of the major, allegedly 'tribalist' opposition parties in Kenya have leaders from a rather broad spectrum of ethnic groups; their philosophy and their roots in contemporary history, and their political programmes are of a clearly national character.[14]

Even if we were to accept, for the sake of discussion, that a one-party system is indeed a way of preventing the tribalist conflicts of the past from reappearing, this line of argument cannot be maintained for long unless the one and only party in power, and its President for Life can show themselves convincingly able to enhance free speech and open debate, and to maintain an independent judiciary, and human rights. Only then might we possibly find that a one-party system could retain its legitimacy, and contribute to the peace and national unity which is a basic condition for development. In an increasingly differentiated society with an increasingly specialized division of labour, national unity will certainly not be achieved by pressures toward uniformity but only as 'unity in diversity', with an increasing tolerance of diversity within the network of interdependencies which are part and parcel of any highly developed division of labour.[15]

The emergence of multi-party systems out of non-party or one-party systems probably could exhibit as many trajectories as there are countries, or historical situations. Whatever the trajectory, in order to make an emerging multi-party system really conducive to a peaceful and constructive resolution of problems, and conflictful situations, certain basic rights would have to be satisfied. For many African countries not only the legislation of such basic rights, but also strict implementation of such laws are lacking, yet are absolutely essential for moving toward a more democratic order.

The politics of peace and national unity is closely interlinked with economic development. Where politics has been unable to attain peace and national unity in diversity for most of the post-independence period, the personal wealth accumulated by the upper strata of society is unlikely to be invested in entrepreneurial activities in that society. It is more likely to be transferred to foreign bank accounts in countries with greater stability and predictability, and used for the consumption and personal security of the wealthy as demonstrated by the *mafutamingi* of Uganda, and corresponding groups in other conflict-ridden countries such as Nigeria. Wealthy people must believe in the future of their own country in order to invest a significant proportion of their wealth there.

Unfortunately, historically generated conditions are much too different in different African countries to enable us to give definite and similar answers to the question how a full-fledged democracy is to be achieved for every country. Western experiences, and ideological predilections for multi-party democracy can certainly tell us what is desirable, in what seems

to be a universalistic language; but the political universe taken into account in Western political theory does not always include the African universe.

Western political theory does not, for instance, include the concept of 'Zairization' suggested recently by Samir Amin (1989). In introducing this concept Amin was not primarily concerned with a detailed critical account of politics in Zaire, but rather with a criticism of some neo-Weberian notions suggested by Richard Sandbrook (1985) in his attempt at understanding the 'patrimonial' politics of Africa's economic stagnation. 'Personalized patrimonialism' derived from 'traditional' societies, as understood by Sandbrook, or modern mafia-rule as Samir Amin understands it, is discussed in detail in Amin's chapter in this book, 'The Issue of Democracy in the Third World Today'.

I wish to raise a final question, perhaps marginal but still significant: Is foreign aid necessary for the development of Africa, if not for its ruling mafia, or its 'patrimonial' leaders? Or to formulate the question in a more general but still provocative way:

Is foreign aid good for African development?
It has been said that foreign aid to Africa is drying up due to the fact that donor countries increasingly are focussing on former socialist Eastern Europe, including the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which has replaced the Soviet Union, and due to the fact that the Cold War is over. Therefore, it is said, there is no longer a need for Western powers to use foreign aid to counteract the incursions of the Soviet Union in influencing African nations. But presently this seems true only to a limited extent. More significant is probably the fact that foreign aid to Africa has been so ineffective. To a large extent donor money and foreign loans have been 'eaten' by the 'nomenclatura', the dignitaries of African states rather than invested in worthwhile development projects. Foreign aid and foreign loans have been good for these dignitaries rather than for development – even if there are many exceptions to this statement.

As a result of these experiences regarding the lack of effectiveness of foreign aid in Africa, a new debate has started in many donor countries not only with regard to the need for foreign aid, but also with regard to new ways of making foreign aid more effective. It is realized that such aid, in order to reach the most important locations of indigenous development efforts, may have to pass by government agencies and ministries in Africa, and be transferred more directly to non-governmental organizations and budding entrepreneurial projects involved in worthwhile development efforts.

A dilemma on this point is that most aid agencies in foreign countries are governmental; and by definition they are supposed to relate primarily to other governments, namely those in developing countries. Therefore an increasing emphasis in donor countries is placed on reforming and restructuring governments in Africa to make them more democratic, and more accountable and transparent. Another dilemma on this point is that governments in donor countries and recipient countries are supposed to respect the sovereignty of each other. In spite of this a meeting of donor countries held in Paris in November 1991 took the decision to pressurize the Kenyan government to carry out political, legal and economic reforms within a period of six months, in order to remain recipients of foreign aid. Some African commentators have labelled this as a resurgence of past colonialism, a lack of respect for national sovereignty. Labels apart, it is noteworthy that most of the African countries involved are exposed not only to those external, supposedly 'colonial' pressures but also to very strong internal pressures to allow the informal, or already formalized and internally registered opposition groups or parties a significant voice in the politics of these African countries. In an African perspective it would seem natural to attribute greater significance to this internal dialectic, and to view external pressures only as a support to these internal organized forces. In the past a donor country like Sweden has given support to liberation movements in countries such as Guinea Bissau, Angola and Mozambique toward the end of their subjection under colonial Portuguese rule. Supporting attempts to democratize African countries under so-called internal colonialism – supporting what is often hailed as a 'second liberation' (Anyang' Nyong'o 1987) – would not seem to be significantly different from giving support to liberation movements in territories colonized by foreign powers.

Be this as it may – the discussion about these matters among African and Western

commentators will certainly continue – it should be strongly emphasized that foreign aid to development efforts in Africa is necessary and needed, if only it could be made more effective in reaching those who actually need it. A particularly needy group are those rural women who are in charge of about 70 per cent of Africa's food production. According to my definition of the structure of development it is absolutely necessary to improve the capability of these women to produce food as well as export crops such as tea, coffee and perhaps horticultural products, and to be profitably renumerated for this. Maria Nzomo and Marjorie Mbilinyi, in their contributions to this book, devote a great deal of attention to the position of women, non-rural and rural, in the development of Africa.

Aid is also much needed for budding indigenously entrepreneurial efforts, and for road-building, water, sewage disposal, health services, education and academic research, hopefully through less corrupt intermediaries than some present African governments. Accounting for the size and location of corruption in such a manner that agents of corruption can be pin-pointed, and so that corruption can be significantly reduced, thus allowing donor money to reach its intended destinations, should be the main conditionality for aid in the future. Several of the conditionalities now being imposed by aid donors, and by the World Bank/IMF, are in fact questionable, and much less important than the condition that corruption is eradicated.

Concluding Remarks

From my previous definition of development, the main fetters upon development can be identified in three areas: (1) solving the problems of mass survival (food production, and related areas of production of agricultural tools, roads, markets etc.); (2) creating an indigenous, entrepreneurial national bourgeoisie, and a well-organized working class; and (3) improving democratic self-rule. There are other contradictions which are usually mentioned in the context of development, such as the contradiction between rulers and popular movements. But these are subsumed under the three headings already suggested. Class conflicts between actors representing capital and labour are inevitable once an indigenous entrepreneurial national bourgeoisie has emerged, as Göran Hydén has emphasized, and conflicts between rulers and popular masses are a central focus of democratization. The contradiction between international capital and indigenous economic development is com-posed of a complex of forces imposing fetters, some would also say openings, on each of my main three areas.

In this chapter I have used the adjective 'self-grown' both as an analytic, and a honorific term. It is my belief that Africa must be left to find its own ways toward more democracy, and an economic system fitting African conditions. Outside pressures to support such efforts should not impose designs for such efforts, but only provide moral support, perhaps backed up by some economic pressures, and of course contribute ideas to be discussed in conjunction with ideas ventured by Africans themselves. Essential for a 'self-growth' of more democracy is *glasnost* from above, and what has been called an 'enabling environment' which also implies an environment conducive to the creation of domestic markets and entrepreneurship. African politics and bureaucracy must not remain the primary domain for accumulating wealth as is now the case in many African countries, with a consequent corruption of politics and administration. Not only a privatization of corrupt and inefficient parastatal production is needed in Africa, but also a 'de-privatization' of the African state to stamp out private exploitation of its financial resources, thus making the state more able to provide good services in communications, health, primary and secondary education, and academic training and research, thus also counteracting some of the less desirable effects – the generation of great social inequalities – of a market economy.

Africa is rich in unused natural and human resources. Its underdevelopment is largely a result of deformations resulting from past global history. During the next few decades we will see whether these deformations can be eliminated by better food production, through the rise of productive entrepreneurship – first for domestic and then for international markets, and through processes of democratization.

Let it be said, finally, that the carrying-out of relevant social science research must be made part of *glasnost* on the African continent. There is still a great lack of such research. The

predicaments of African scholars and researchers, in Africa itself, are frightening not only in terms of the lack of basic research equipment and research grants, but also in terms of the lack of time and occasion for independent, scholarly work, due to the need to take responsibilities for family subsistence, by engaging in anything from consultancies to taxi driving, chicken feeding and vegetable gardening.

Notes

[1] By 'fresh' attempt I do not mean an attempt un-influenced by other scholars, but an attempt at odds with what development seems to mean in common Western parlance, under the hegemony of neo-classical economics. However, I prefer to approach the topic in common, non-scholarly language. Once that is done, the best possible methodological tools should be used in structurally combining our simple but basic notions. My thinking about development owes a great deal to a paper by Samir Amin (1974). The reader is invited to look up the word 'development' in books about this topic, and will find that this concept is defined in quite a number of ways, if at all. A recent attempt to understand the notion of development in a philosophical African context, with references to African philosophers, can be found in Heinz Kimmerle (1992: 173–86).

[2] One of the most convincing attempts to construct a quantitative index of levels of development can be found in the *Human Development Report 1990*, published for the United Nations Development Programme by Oxford University Press, 1990. See particularly Table 1, pp. 128-9, and the definition of human development on p. 10.

[3] The main references to my accounts of early African history are to books by Basil Davidson, primarily *Old Africa Rediscovered. The Story of Africa's Forgotten Past* (1959), *The African Past. Chronicles from Antiquity to Modern Times* (1964), and *A History of West Africa to the Nineteenth Century* (1966).

[4] In the south-east of Nigeria some of the ethnic conflicts found quite recently can probably be traced to these kinds of historical trajectories. In Uganda, for instance, the British relied heavily on the structures of the Buganda kingdom for their indirect rule, while recruiting their soldiers mainly from the segmental north, thereby reinforcing a conflict between south and north which had developed earlier as a result of the Arab slave trade, and which after independence found violent and destructive expressions under Idi Amin, and in Obote's second period of rule.

[5] This interpretation of tribalism differs from the one suggested by the political scientist Göran Hydén (1983) who assumed that tribalism is a kind of cultural lag from a pre-colonial 'economy of affection'. My interpretation comes closer to the one suggested by Mahmood Mamdani (1985) in a polemical exchange of views with Göran Hydén. See also Peter Ekeh (1983) and Himmelstrand (1988). In many other respects, however, I do agree with Hydén's analysis as manifested, for instance, in one of the final chapters of this book.

[6] To understand the development of the organizational and political aspects of military power in parts of Europe, we must remember the brutal experiences of populations and feudal lords who were ravaged by unpaid mercenaries transformed into brigand bands during lulls in the Hundred-Year War. Toward the end of this period armies became more centralized and controlled by the state structures of absolutist kingdoms, in response to the brigand anarchy of the past.

[7] Samir Amin (1972) has suggested a historically derived typology of African societies which would have been useful in structuring the content of such a book.

[8] Compare John Toye's remarks in the first chapter of his excellent book *Dilemmas of Development. Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in Development Theory and Policy*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1988, particularly pp. 19 f.

[9] This development of class conflict is seen clearly, and with approval by Göran Hydén (1983) who otherwise is a proponent of 'the national bourgeoisie project' – in contrast to scholars like Amin and Mamdani.

[10] Mamdani (1989) has pointed out that inflation in African countries rarely is a result of excessive demand, but rather a consequence of deficient supply. But demand-management is easier to bring about than improvements on the supply-side, and therefore the WB/IMF has required a lowering of already low demand. Thereby poverty among African poor is increased even more.

[11] For this quote, see Richard Swedberg's illuminating article on 'The impact of an exogenous event: the oil shocks, the private banks and the origin of the debt crisis', in *International Social Science Journal*, August 1987, pp. 323–36.

[12] Unfortunately, the writing-off, or renegotiating of loans accruing to the World Bank/IMF is currently impossible due to the statutes of these organizations. But these statutes are the result basically of political decisions. Their change first of all requires a political debate about the relevant parts of these statutes – a debate which will not occur unless member countries launch it.

[13] In African countries such as Tanzania, with many small ethnic groups who cannot on their own build, consolidate and perhaps abuse political power, this argument for a one-party system is less significant, I believe.

[14] However, President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, as a leader of the recent KANU one-party state, continued to allege, even after opposition parties were allowed from late December 1991, that the opposition to KANU was completely tribalist in character, and bent on throwing the country into civil war and revolution. This he said in a speech reported in *The Daily Nation*, and other Nairobi newspapers, on 26 February 1992. To a non-participant observer of Kenyan political life, these allegations seem vastly exaggerated, proving that the Kenyan president, in preparing himself for multi-party elections, had been transformed from His Excellency the President of Kenya to a propagandist for his party KANU. Fortunately the kind of allegations voiced by Moi against Kenyan opposition parties did not turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy throwing the country into violent confrontations jeopardizing the processes of democratization. But when such prophecies were not fulfilled simply by themselves, it was quite possible for the KANU political establishment to organize 'ethnic clashes' in some sensitive districts, in order to prove the prophecy and the dangers of 'tribalism' allegedly inherent in multi-party politics. This indeed happened

in some Kenyan provinces in 1992. To those who knew how this was made to happen, it was obvious that these clashes were political, and not 'ethnic' in character.
[15] This statement concerning 'national unity' within a relatively pronounced division of labour is derived, as every sociologist would acknowledge, from Emile Durkheim's theory of 'organic solidarity', and from Erik Allardt's (1970) elaboration of this theory to take account of the 'legitimacy crises' which are likely to emerge when a high division of labour is combined with strong pressures toward uniformity.

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2 The Development Debates & the Crisis of Development Theories

The Case of Tanzania with Special Emphasis on Peasants,

State & Capital   SAMWEL E. CHAMBUA

Introduction

The first decades of independence have been a period of endless experimentation with various policies and strategies, aimed at bringing about rapid and sustainable socio-economic development in less developed countries (LDCs). Surprising, however, is the fact that irrespective of the particular paradigm or school of thought that has informed the particular policies, strategies pursued by a specific sub-Saharan LDC, the end result has been the same, i.e. the failure to liquidate underdevelopment. Indeed the development for the majority of sub-Saharan LDCs has changed radically (for the worse) from the end of the 1960s to the mid-1980s. For example, between 1980 and 1987 sub-Saharan African countries recorded a zero economic growth, while per capita income kept on regressing and by 1989 was 'back at the level it was some fifteen years ago . . . the 1980s have been a lost decade for development' (Emmerij, 1989: 19).

This situation has led some social scientists to conclude that development theories in general are in crisis or in a state of bankruptcy especially in respect to Africa. Consequently, a paradigmatic shift is urgently called for in African studies (Hydén, 1983). In other words, since development theory constitutes practice, then, the socio-economic crisis facing African countries cannot be divorced from the theories, policies and strategies adopted by these countries to bring about development.

The different development strategies pursued by LDCs including African countries can be broadly grouped into two: (a) Strategies that call for integration with the world capitalist (market) system (integration strategies) and (b) those which call for disengagement from the world capitalist system (disengagement strategies). The former are largely based on theories associated with the modernization paradigm while the latter are mainly based on the dependency/world-systems paradigm or perspective. Both paradigms have influenced the development strategies pursued by Tanzania, and thus the focus of this article. However, a brief discussion of the two paradigms seems to be in order at this point before turning to the case of Tanzania.[1]

The Modernization Perspective

The theoretical basis of integration strategies is mainly associated with the modernization perspective or paradigm. According to this paradigm the present and past state of LDCs is an original stage of development, i.e. the stage of traditional society, through which the now advanced capitalist countries (ACCs) had also passed. Consequently the process of

development in LDCs is viewed as essentially consisting of moving from traditional society through several stages of development mainly derived from the history of Europe and North America. To put it differently, the goal of development is regarded to be the achievement of modern society which supposedly has the following typical features:

• social patterns of demography, urbanization, and literacy;
• economic patterns of production and consumption, investment, trade and government finance; and,
• psychological attributes of nationality/calculability, ascriptive identity and achievement motivation (see Toye, 1987: 11).

Given the above assumptions, the state of underdevelopment was defined in terms of observable differences between rich and poor countries. Development implied the bridging of these gaps by means of an imitative process (Blomström and Hettne, 1987: 20). The internal obstacles to this process were seen as being, *inter alia*, the following: (a) capital shortage, (b) prevalency of crude technology, (c) high birth rates and hence high proportion of dependants per adult, (d) high rates of illiteracy, (e) insistence on traditions, and the attitude of the population towards necessary changes, (f) lack of modern industries and low capitalization on land (see Szentes, 1971: chapter 2).

On the basis of the above and other internal obstacles, the following, at one time or another, have been regarded as solutions to the problem of underdevelopment, according to Ghai (1977: 1): capital accumulation; availability of foreign exchange; industrialization (first of the import substitution variety and then of export oriented character); population control; human resources development; employment oriented strategies; redistribution with growth – to mention only the star contenders.

The implications for strategy of such solutions were, for example, foreign investment, foreign aid, export led growth, and removal of factor price biases. In short, more integration into the international capitalist market system. That is – capitalism was to be the modernizing agent due to its deemed power and ability to eliminate automatically other forms/modes of production in any society which adopts it. However, the private and voluntary sectors in African countries were regarded as weak, and because of this the state had to play the dominant role in both social and economic development. This should take place through active state involvement without nationalization of property.

In this connection the editors of *Development Dialogue*, 1987: 2 have this to say:

> . . . the first decades of independence have been a period of endless imitation and experimentation . . . with a view to bringing Africa into the mainstream of economic development . . .

> . . . the timespan of a generation later, . . . today . . . rather than being closer to the industrialized world, it is further away, rather than being more self-reliant, it is more dependent, and rather than being more stable it is more volatile and conflict-ridden (p. 1).

Thus, the experience of African countries which pursued policies based on the modernization perspective confound and contradict that paradigm. This is also true of other LDCs with perhaps the exception of the Newly Industrializing Countries of Asia: Hong Kong, North Korea, Singapore and Taiwan.

Methodologically, Skocpol (1977) has listed the following objections associated with theories based on the modernization paradigm: reification of the nation-state as the sole unit of analysis; the erroneous assumption that all countries follow a similar path of development from traditional to modern (capitalist) society; disregard of the transnational structures that affect change in LDCs; and the employment of historical ideal types in their explanations. Empirically, Blomström and Hettne (1987: 24) have observed that efforts to classify societies using indications of transition and modernity have not been successful. However, the most devastating critique came from the dependency/world-system perspective to which we shall turn shortly.

Although the dependency/world-system perspective aspires to replace modernization theories and actually, 'in the academic world . . . modernization theory became outdated in the early 1970s' (p. 24), such theories have also, as we shall see, been criticized by Marxist

oriented social science theorists. Hydén's (1980 and 1983) works, although based on the assumption that (i) a paradigmatic shift is urgently needed in African studies and, (ii) that Africa is so much different from other LDCs of Asia and Latin America that recent theoretical advances in the understanding of development processes there are of limited value when applied to Africa, is, in our view, still based on the modernization perspective. But it is modernization theory clothed with Marxist political economy. Thus, the Marxist central concept of 'mode of production' is employed as well as the insistence on internal factors as primary and external ones as secondary. It is to Hydén's (1980 and 1983) work that we now turn.

Hydén and the Peasant Mode of Production

It has been argued that a peasant mode of production (PMP) prevails in much of Africa south of the Sahara and that this mode is resistant not only to a significant penetration by capitalism but also to any changes that might bring about modern development or modernization.[2] Hydén's (1980 and 1983) analysis provides one of the most controversial contributions in support of the above argument. A brief summary of his major argument can be presented as follows:

First, the roots of Africa's underdevelopment are not found in the international capitalist system but rather they are found in the resilience or persistence of the pre-modern and pre-capitalist structures of the continent's rural areas (1980: 3, 4).

Second, although the peasantry in Africa is the creation of the colonizing powers, African peasants are more integrated into the cash economy than peasants elsewhere. The PMP is still the predominant mode in African societies (1980: 10–12; 1983: 6–8).

Third, the PMP is characterized by a rudimentary division of labour and small independent units of production with no structurally enforced co-operation. Consequently, nature plays a central role in peasant production and there is also very little exchange between the various units of production (1980: 13; 1983: 6).

Fourth, the use of rudimentary technology, i.e. crude techniques of production, and the lack of variety of production among the units has the following implications: production of basic necessities is both a full-time occupation and a primary concern of every peasant household – hence the domestic orientation of each unit of production; the peasants invest so much time and effort in producing the basic necessities that they become reluctant to take any chances including that of adopting new innovations even if this holds out the promise of financial gains. Herein lies the conservation and the so-called anti-modern behaviour of the peasants. This is also the reason offered as to why the peasantry should be viewed as a fetter to development efforts. In other words, the peasantry operates according to the law of subsistence rather than the law of value.

Expressed differently, one can say that the needs of man rather than those associated with the development of the means of production take precedence . . . This law of subsistence still permeates much of rural Africa . . . these societies are more human than those where the law of value prevails, but they are at the same time less efficient. The cost of reproduction is high and it leaves the peasant with limited interest in adopting practices that may raise agricultural productivity. Agricultural modernization is a threat to the domestic orientation of the peasant household (1980: 14).

Fifth, soil fertility is maintained through shifting cultivation and bush fallowing. Thus, farming depends on natural resources endowments rather than on modern inputs (pp. 14–15).

Sixth, the prevalence of PMP gives rise to a specific economy, the 'economy of affection' in which 'familial and other communal ties provide the basis for organized activity' (p. 18; see also 1983: 8–11).

According to Hydén, the above characteristics are the root causes of underdevelopment and its perpetuation in Africa. He further argues that for its own reproduction, the PMP is independent of the state since it does not pre-suppose social classes. Yet, the state collects taxes from the peasants and various mechanisms have been employed to try to capture the peasantry (remove their social autonomy) so as to increase the surplus to be extracted from them, but without success. Consequently, 'the principal structural constraints to development are the barriers against state action created by the peasant mode of production'. This implies

that modern development can only take place if the social autonomy of the peasants is removed. But to achieve this, Hydén argues, the use of coercion is inevitable.

The main problem with Tanzanian policies, e.g. *Ujamaa* and self-reliance, is that the government tried to capture the peasantry without coercion. The method used was that of bribing them into producing a marketable surplus in exchange for free social services. But in actual fact no deal was struck. Whereas the government provided free social services (education, health care, clean tap water, etc.), the PMP or the economy of affection continued to be predominant. Hence, the failure to produce a marketable surplus. The result was the series of economic crises of the 1980s. Weaver and Kronemer (1981) have also come to the same conclusion.

Not only does the Tanzanian peasantry remain uncaptured but it has been able to capture other local social classes: workers/employees and the petty-bourgeoisie:

> By virtue of having an alternative livelihood and by being involved in the economy of affection, most public sector employees can remain indifferent to demands for devoted services to the nation. (Hydén, 1980: 170)

The above analysis suffers from, *inter alia*, the following limitations:

Methodologically, the explanations based on the concept of PMP are reduced to a historical ideal type of modernity versus tradition as employed by modernization theories. Here the PMP and/or the economy of affection is depicted as the traditional society. True to classical Marxist analysis, great emphasis is placed on internal factors. But except for the political economy approach employed, these internal factors emphasized by Hydén turn out to be the same ones emphasized by modernization theories, such as crude technology, insistence on traditions, passive attitude of the population towards necessary change, i.e. the characteristics of the economy of affection.

Empirically, it is erroneous to state that the Tanzanian peasantry is uncaptured or independent of capital. The mere fact that it is a creation of a colonialism and hence the world capitalist system indicates that it is not pre-capitalist, and was subsumed by capital from the moment of its birth. Indeed there is considerable evidence offered by the dependency/world-system approaches which contradicts not only the above explanations but also challenges the explanations based on the modernization paradigm in general. In the next section, therefore, we employ the dependency/world-system approaches to show how the peasantry in Africa is and continues to be subsumed under capital, with particular reference to Tanzania.

The Dependency/World-Systems Perspective

The World-Systems Perspective on Social and Economic Development, in which we include the dependency approach, was formulated in opposition to theories associated with the modernization paradigm. These theories, as we have already pointed out above, look exclusively for external fetters to development in LDCs. The WSP theorists instead insist that (i) it was, and still is, of little and limited value to study the development process in LDCs in isolation from the development of the now advanced capitalist countries (ACCS), (ii) the world has to be treated as one single system as a starting point, and that (iii) the problem is, therefore, that of analysing and discovering the manner in which LDCs were incorporated into this world (capitalist) system, its implications and consequences insofar as the historical pattern of their development is concerned (Bach, 1980; Frank, 1969; Roxborough, 1979; Wallerstein, 1974). It rejects as a myth the notion that underdevelopment can be liquidated merely through economic growth or modernization promoted by capitalism through foreign aid or foreign investment, capital inflow and other diffusions from ACCS (Frank, 1969; Szentes, 1985: 296).

This is so because underdevelopment of the LDCs is seen as a product of this world capitalist system:

> Colonialism, poverty, war, hunger, racism and genocide – all these and more have been both cause and effect of the worldwide spread of the capitalist mode of production . . .
> Despite its early period of tremendous vigour, however, capitalism *contained within itself*

an anticipated dynamic of underdevelopment. By underdevelopment we refer to the present peculiar conjunction of productive forces and production relations among the 'poor' countries, which at the prevailing levels of human technological development constitutes the objective basis of their poverty and of the growing inequalities of income and wealth which the world system of production and exchange naturally reproduces. (Thomas, 1974: 25)

Seen in this light, WSP is more than simply a critique of modernization theories. It actually consists of a particular school of thought or paradigm. The following are the basic assumptions shared by most of the world-system theorists:

1. Capitalism arose only once and it was a world-system from its inception (Bach, 1980: 295; Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1977: 1230). Of course this is too general. But it implies that the so-called external factors have to be treated as internal factors.

2. The appropriate unit of analysis is a world-system[3] defined in terms of economic processes and links, and no units defined in terms, for example, of juridical, political, cultural or geological criteria (Wallerstein, 1979: 123; Chase-Dunn, 1981: 3).

3. Change in LDCs has primarily been 'the consequence of the externalization of Western European capitalism through the formation of a world market and through various forms of imperialism and colonialism' (Roxborough, 1979: 42).

4. Sovereign states or multiple political sovereignties are one of the many kinds of organizational structures within the system and no one of them can subsume the whole (see Skocpol, 1977: 1086).

5. The (world) system is based on a geographically differentiated (vertical) division of labour featuring three main zones, core, semi-periphery and periphery tied together by or with the world market. Notice, however, that dependency theorists talk of centre and periphery, or metropole and satellite instead of the three zones.

6. The law of value rewards the three zones differently, i.e. surplus flows disproportionately to the core (i.e. metropolitan) areas (Amin, 1973).

7. Although the economic structures differ according to the mix of economic activities and forms of labour control, they all give rise to a state and a dominant class[4] within that state, oriented towards the world market (see Skocpol, 1977).

8. The core states (the ACCs) dominate the system more than they are constrained by it and this difference in strength is essential for the maintenance of the system (Stinchcombe, 1982). That is, the strong (core) states use their power to perpetuate and maintain those mechanisms and structures that allow the differential flow of surplus to their regions.

The WSP theories maintain that the core-periphery hierarchy and the exploitation of the periphery by the core is necessary to the reproduction of capitalism as a world-system. This subordination and exploitation took and takes place through various mechanisms: capital accumulation, class alliances between different countries, and through the division of labour in the world (capitalist) economy. Thus, some socialist countries are seen as capitalist while others are seen as constituting an unconquered territory.

From the moment of its inception, the accumulation of capital on a global scale has been central to capitalism. Historically this accumulation can be traced to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries during the hey-days of merchant capital. The so-called primitive accumulation of capital was not only the process through which the direct producers were deprived of their means of production in the now ACCs, but also the process of robbing and commercially exploiting other countries through the worldwide expansion of merchant capital (Szentes, 1985: 17). Indeed, mercantilism regarded foreign trade (through unequal exchange) as a vital source of a country's wealth. This was therefore the main economic motive of the open cruelties, plunder, looting and piracy, etc. so characteristic of this period. Similarly, the subsequent slave trade and slavery was part and parcel of the so-called primitive or primary accumulation of capital (Marx, 1962: 751; Frank, 1979). Initially then, this is how the core exploited the periphery.

However, primary accumulation should not be seen as only constituting a temporary set of mechanisms through which the core exploited the periphery at the time of the inception of the capitalist world-system. Some of the mechanisms, especially those facilitating unequal exchange between the zones, are in place to date and are one of the prime ways which permit the continuation of both the exploitation of the periphery by the core and expanded reproduction in the core states (Chase-Dunn, 1981: 10).

This phase was followed by an era of international (vertical) division of labour as embodied in the colonial system. Under this international division of labour, the colonial countries were assigned the role of (i) producing and supplying cheap primary products to the core areas, (ii) acting as extensions of the home markets of the core countries for certain commodities, and (iii) providing for and allowing profitable foreign investments (Szentes, 1971: 139).

In those places where the peasant economy had both links to markets and also obligations to pay tributes, the accumulation of capital was effected through several mechanisms, such as forced labour in plantations, and the imposition of taxes to be paid in cash, thus forcing the peasants to engage in cash crop production or wage labour. Hence, the household units were compelled to produce a surplus product on a regular basis. This surplus entered the circuit of capital via trade. The implications of these arrangements are that the peasants concerned with production of cash crops were victims of double exploitation: First the mere act of paying taxes to advance the interest of a ruling class constituted exploitation since the tax payers did not (directly) benefit from the taxes they were forced to pay. Furthermore, the prices they received for their cash crops were very much below those offered on the world market where they were finally sold – hence the second exploitation. On top of this, some family members became wage-labourers in the so-called modern sectors of the economy, but the wages they received were so low that they were not enough even to meet the costs of the day-to-day restoration of their labour power. The extended family of the labourer or worker was therefore obliged to provide unpaid services to the worker to subsidize his wage. As a matter of fact, it is the presence of such subsidies up to this day which makes not only (i) low wages both economically and socially possible, but also, (ii) provides capital to conserve the so-called non-capitalist forms of production provided that they make a positive contribution to capital accumulation. That is, the rationalization of the accumulation process in the periphery makes capital both a conserver and a destroyer of the so-called non-capitalist forms of production at different times and in different places depending, of course, on the prevailing concrete situation.

It is obvious from our discussion so far that both the slave trade which emerged in Africa during the expansion of the capitalist world-system and the *form that the so-called pro-capitalist change affected as a part of capitalism*, significantly shaped development at least in the periphery. We therefore do not agree with those who argue that village economies or home production are outside the capitalist mode of production (cf. Laclau, 1977). On the contrary, we are in agreement with Chevalier (1982: 117–19) who argues that, 'production for household consumption may have nothing to do with the preservation of a natural economy' but may be regarded as essentially constituting the subsidized production of subsistence commodities 'that never enter the sphere of circulation not because they are not exchangeable' but because the simple commodity producers obtain the greatest value from them (their produce) through household consumption. This means that the subsumption of labour under capital takes place both within and outside wage labour.[5]

The rapid development of science and technology in the core after the Second World War, the fall of the colonial system, etc. has made the old colonial type of division of labour undergo substantial changes. But, despite these changes, the periphery still bears the marks of the old international division of labour. For instance, although the prices of many raw/primary products from the LDCs have gone down considerably, partly due to the use of artificial raw materials, many peripheral countries are heavily dependent on the export of these primary products. On top of this, the post-colonial development programmes of the LDCs have put special emphasis on import substitution industrialization. These policies have, *inter alia*, led to industrial relocation or redeployment (mainly of certain consumer goods) to the periphery. The problem with this type of industrialization is that the assumed benefits (e.g. reduction of external dependence, imports, balance-of-payments problems, etc.) were more than offset

by the importation of capital goods, spare-parts, experts, patents, licences and trademarks. Consequently, to the majority of LDCs, the exports of primary products, despite their downward fluctuating prices, continue to be the major source of gaining foreign exchange and hence the financing of industrialization. Of course, the periphery has gained some advantages from such developments such as production experience, but so has capital. Perhaps the greatest benefit to international capital was/is to reap the benefits of unequal exchange as well as low wages offered by the periphery. Other benefits to capital include the capturing of the homemarkets of LDCs concerned and gaining entry to other markets, whether in other LDCs or through exporting back to the core countries. This is especially true of textiles, footwear, and the manufacture of electronic components industries respectively.[6]

At this juncture, there is need to point out that in most cases capital is invited into the periphery by the peripheral states. The direct use of force is no longer used and it is hard to visualize how capital can operate there without the approval of the state concerned. Both the post-colonial state and international capital are interested in extracting surplus from the labouring classes for accumulation purposes. Differences and conflicts between the two are centred on the issue of how much of the surplus extracted is to be retained locally. Thus, when the peasants resist surplus extraction from them (say by withdrawing from the cultivation of export cash crops), they are accused of fettering national development efforts. And when workers continue to have ties with their extended families in the rural areas because of the services such ties provide to subsidize their low wages, they are accused of being anti-modern, less committed to their jobs, and hence inefficient, of low productivity etc. But when they demand higher wages and better working conditions so as to enable them to terminate the ties with the rural or traditional sector, they are portrayed as saboteurs to the economy of their respective countries since higher wages will mean low levels of accumulation and loss of the so-called competitive advantage of LDCs (cheap products) in the world market. But it is precisely because of low wages that unequal exchange between the core and the periphery is possible. In addition to this, unequal exchange is one of the main mechanisms which the core uses to exploit the periphery thereby perpetuating underdevelopment. However, since the major concern of this paper is the peasantry and not the workers, there is need to discuss how the African states are working hand-in-hand with international capital in the subsumption of the peasantry under capital. It is to such a discussion that we turn in the next section.

Capital, African Peasantries, and the State

African peasants are not the same everywhere. What and how they produce and share in what is produced depends mostly on how both the state and capital seek to extract surplus labour from them. Generally, however, the peasantries of sub-Saharan Africa (today) are mainly exploited through relations of commodity production and exchange which also integrate them with the international capitalist economy (Bernstein, 1979: 422; Ng'ang'a, 1981: 16). The actual mechanisms employed vary from country to country and even within the same country. Even so, the degree of resemblance between them is also very high as the end product is the same everywhere, namely:

• the withdrawal of the labour force from the sole production of use-values;
• the drawing of more and more small peasant producers into the cash market economy as both buyers and sellers; and,
• the post-colonial state serves as a vehicle for the subordination of the peasantry to the requirements of capital accumulation on a national scale and worldwide.

The implication of all this is that it is erroneous to regard African peasants south of the Sahara as autonomous rural cultivators outside the modern world. 'On the contrary we speak of them as peasants just because they have been subordinated and incorporated by that world, by forces outside their own communities' (Beckman, 1977: 1). Notice that the imposition of export cash crops by colonial powers broke up the traditional natural economy of pre-colonial Africa. This process is irreversible and today's African peasantries are not only differentiated along class lines,[7] but they are also integrated into the market for both their

production and reproduction (Buch-Hansen and Marcussen, 1982: 15). To show how the above process was accelerated during the post-colonial period we now turn to the case of Tanzania.

Peasants Capital, and Development Strategies in Tanzania

The colonial period
The peasantry in Tanzania was integrated into the world capitalist system during the colonial period.[8] There is need for us to recall that in order for the colony to be a viable economic unit the colonialists had to invest in various economic activities: cash crop production, extractive and primary processing industries; roads and railways in order to facilitate the movement of people and commodities. These activities employed African labourers. Concerning the production of export cash crops, there were two levels of organization: the plantation system and small-scale production by individual peasant households. The latter was predominant in Tanzania.

It must be remembered that the establishment of plantations necessitated the eviction of people from their land in order to make room for the plantations. The peasants so evicted, as well as others living around the plantations, were forced to work in the plantations or join wage labour in other sectors such as mining and construction (Iliffe, 1969: 136–64). In Tanzania, forced labour was one of the major causes behind the Maji Maji war between the colonialists and the people which left more than 120,000 natives dead (Iliffe, 1969: 23). After this war, direct forced labour was abandoned in favour of wage labour. Furthermore, alongside plantations and in those areas where the plantation system was seen as being not feasible, the natives were encouraged to cultivate cash crops, especially cotton, coffee, tea, and tobacco. Yet, to achieve this objective the colonial government had to impose a 'Poll and Hut Tax' to be paid by every adult male or head of any household in cash (Austern, 1968: 54; Iliffe, 1969: 158–62). The imposition of taxes was also aimed at intimidating the Africans into accepting wage labour. But harsh treatment, poor working conditions, and low wages (sometimes far below subsistence) made wage labour very unattractive to the majority of the people (Rweyemamu, 1973: 19). This resulted in the creation of 'labour reserve' areas in which the people living in them were forbidden to grow cash crops. Hence, male adults or heads of households in these areas had to enter the labour market if only for the purpose of paying taxes.

The post-colonial period
Tanzania became independent of Britain in 1961. But the British did what they could to ensure the continuation of their policies, partly through the independence agreement (Coulson 1982: 120, 139; Chambua, 1985: 131). Actually the post-colonial government adopted the recommendations made by the World Bank in 1960 which called for the following strategy if the country was to develop quickly.

First, rapid agricultural development through the transformation approach to the traditional agricultural systems rather than their improvement (Coulson, 1982: 120) through settlement schemes.

Secondly, the establishment of industries processing agricultural products for export through the provision of suitable incentives to foreign investors: monopoly over local markets; tax holidays; government involvement but with guarantees against nationalization; etc. Indeed, the World Bank reports formed the basis of the first post-colonial Development Plan of 1961/62–1963/64. It was further planned that for the entire period of this three-year Development Plan, external finance would amount to about 85 per cent of the total capital expenditure (Chambua, 1985: 132, 133).

The above development strategy was definitely in line with the modernization perspective. However, things did not go according to plan:

1. Although the government adopted and extended the colonial policy of 'settlement schemes', by 1966 the policy as a whole proved a failure and it was abandoned (see Cliffe and Cunningham, 1973). These post-colonial government-supervised settlement schemes ran

into many difficulties including low productivity despite heavy mechanization, because of poor planning, and failure to repay loans due to the fall in prices of export cash crops the cultivation of which was the main emphasis of these schemes.

2. Worsening terms of trade which began in 1963 and have continued ever since implied that the country (i) had less money than anticipated to finance its development projects, and (ii) a deterioration of rural income (Nnoli, 1976: 99). The peasants had hoped that independence would mean higher prices for their cash crops and perhaps less state interference in their own affairs. These hopes were, however, frustrated by the fall in world prices of their cash crops and by the policy of settlement through close supervision.

3. Conflicts with Western governments during this early period of independence led to a much smaller and inadequate flow of external resources than was earlier anticipated (for details see Nnoli, 1976: chapter 4; Rweyemamu, 1973: 38–57; Pratt, 1976).

   In summary, the post-colonial state in Tanzania, at least up to 1966, adopted policies which integrated the country and the peasants further into the international capitalist system. However, by 1966 Tanzania found herself in a socio-political and economic crisis. Not only had the 'settlement schemes', and the transformation approach proved a failure, but also wage employment was below the 1962 level (Chambua, 1985: 143). Conflicts with the West (Britain, West Germany, and the USA), forced the government to turn to socialist countries, and to Canada, the Scandinavian countries, and the World Bank, so as to augment foreign resources to finance agricultural, industrial, and other projects. It is against such a background that we should view the Arusha Declaration of 5 February 1967 which committed the country to the path of socialism (*Ujamaa*) and self-reliance.
   At the time of the Arusha Declaration, the first post-independence years in Africa in general had passed with mixed results and set-backs (for example, in Ghana, Tanzania and Zaire), Tanzania, therefore, drew much international attention because of her declared resolve to follow a policy of *Ujamaa* and self-reliance without copying any models, without undue reliance on external resources nor even close ties with the Soviet Union. As Nursey-Bray (1980: 57) puts it:

   > Here lies the fascination of the Tanzanian experiment. It lies in this attempt by a newly-independent, weak and vulnerable African state – one of the poorest 25 countries in the world – to develop a socialist theory that while opposing capitalism, eschews Marxism.

   Ironically, this international attention and fascination was translated into massive foreign aid from China, OECD countries and the World Bank, where, especially the World Bank and Nordic countries, became the major sources of external finance and influence. But precisely because of this stress on socialism and self-reliance and the concomitant flow of loans and grants even from the world capitalist system, there have been numerous theoretical and other debates concerning the development process in Tanzania (see Chambua, 1987; Nursey-Bray, 1980; Shivji, 1976).
   But during the 1980s, Tanzania and many countries in sub-Saharan Africa were, and continue to be, faced with serious socio-economic difficulties. For those theorists who favour integration strategies, the socio-economic crisis facing Tanzania is due to her disengagement (socialist) policies. The cause of the crisis is viewed either as emanating from the persistence of a free and uncaptured peasantry (Hydén, 1980; Weaver and Kronemer, 1981) or bad policies pursued by the Tanzanian state (Lofchie, 1976). In this connection (Martin, 1983: 117) argues that,

   > . . . the policies of the Nyerere government have effectively destroyed the possibility of Tanzanian capitalism, with socialism *not even conceived on the agenda*, the only possible result is what Tanzania has today – bureaucracy and stagnation.

As noted earlier on in this article, the theoretical basis of those who closely associate development with capitalism is the modernization paradigm which we have already discussed. Perhaps what remains to be pointed out is that in reality there is no evidence to support the view that the intention to pull out of the capitalist system was ever realized in Tanzania.[9] For

those who blame the peasants or the PMP, we need to point out that actually coercion was used to make them live in villages where the emphasis was and still is on both export cash crops to the world capitalist system and food crops. The decline in the production of these export crops which occurred during the 1970s and early 1980s coincided with the decline in food crop production. Thus, other factors were responsible for this decline rather than the assumed disengagement policies pursued by the Tanzanian state.

For those observers who call for rejection of capitalism and hence disengagement from the world capitalist system, Tanzania's socio-economic problems are a consequence of her heavy dependence on aid from and integration into the world capitalist system or her utopian socialist policies (see Shivji, 1976; Freyhold, 1977; Mueller, 1980; Chambua, 1987: 5–7). In opposition to those who see the Tanzanian peasantry or the PMP as the chief cause of development problems in Tanzania, Mueller (1980) argues that the chief culprit is the state which has:

• confined labour and capital to their most primitive state while the middle peasants are increasingly squeezed out as the state intensifies the production of cash crops;
• brought about the separation of the peasants from their means of production;
• fettered the Tanzanian peasantry by legally restricting its freedom of movement, confining it into villages, and re-introducing minimum acreage requirements; and the result is primitive productive forces, overwork and under-consumption, a pauperized and trapped peasantry.

This argument may not be very accurate, but its merit lies in correctly putting the blame where it belongs, i.e. with the policies pursued by the state.

Shivji (1987: 126) also shares the view that the roots of the (agrarian) crisis in Tanzania lie in 'the relations of exploitation engendered by imperialist domination of the small peasant as mediated through local classes and the state'. He further argues that the state controls the peasantry at both the levels of production and marketing:

> . . . the double function of control over the peasantry on the production and marketing levels was no more separated. Both these functions had come to rest in single hands, the hands of the neo-colonial state. The 'logic' was carried to its conclusion when in 1976, the cooperatives were abolished . . . while their property was confiscated without compensation . . . State Boards, now called crop authorities, were brought in direct contact with the peasant, through the village governments which acted as their agents.

This was also the time when the economy was entering a deep crisis . . . in desperation, the cooperatives were re-introduced in 1982. But, . . . the crisis continues unabated, institutional changes notwithstanding (p. 125).

At this point, there is need to point out that not only is the state involved in post-colonial African countries involved in (i) siphoning surplus out of the peasantry, and (ii) in affecting the divorcing/separation of the peasants from their means of production, but also the world-system through 'contract farming' schemes. In these schemes, the peasants are compelled to sign a contract with a certain multi-national corporation which commits them to cultivate and deliver a specified (export) cash crop on a specific time (date) at a fixed price (Buch-Hansen and Marcussen, 1982: 16). In this way, the international firm concerned (or capital) is able to maintain control over the product and its production without incurring the costs of organizing production as is the case with direct ownership of plantations; better still, there is nothing (land) to be nationalized. In such a situation is it not correct to argue that the peasants are not simply participating in, but rather they are part of, that (capitalist) world-system? Having said this, let us conclude this section by pointing out, albeit briefly, some of the issues raised against the dependency/world-system perspective which we have employed in this article.

First, the critics point out that the emphasis of the WSP is on *exchange and commercial* labours rather than on production. To those analysts who see exploitation taking place only at the level of production (see Roxborough, 1979: 47) this is a serious limitation since (in their view) no value is created at this level. The implication of this is that it is not correct to explain underdevelopment on the basis of core–periphery exploitation. In addition to this, the argument goes, most of the surplus accumulated in the core is produced within the core itself. Our view is that this is not a serious objection since production and exchange are

intimately connected and even within the core states capitalism is still based on unequal exchange between capital and labour. Concerning the latter objection, it appears to be irrelevant, since at issue are the effects of draining out even the small surplus produced within the periphery.

Second, there was the problem of communist countries (China, USSR, etc.). To regard them at that time as having been incorporated within the world (capitalist) system (see Wallerstein, 1979: 33, 35, 68–9) was contrary to reality.

Third, there is the case of the Newly Industrializing Countries (NIC) of Asia which seem to contradict the dependency paradigm. Perhaps, but in our view they neither entirely support the modernization paradigm since there is a lot of evidence to show that 'the myth of the Asian NIC as the triumph of untrammelled private enterprise is quite false' (Toye, 1987: 87).

Fourth, there is too much emphasis on external factors and hence overdetermination. The world is seen as so determined by those who control core states that it becomes difficult to see how any part of it can possibly break away (Worseley, 1980: 305).

Of course, no theory can explain everything. Thus, the above issues and other objections notwithstanding, in this article we still maintain that WSP has a much wider explanatory power and offers a much more realistic explanation of the problems of development/ underdevelopment in LDCs than the modernization perspective.

But, there is a serious problem at the level of finding solutions to the problems of underdevelopment. How can underdevelopment be liquidated? Here, the dependency/world-systems perspective is really in crisis. To simply regard the rejection of capitalism and hence to regard socialism as the answer runs into two problems: one, is socialism something that countries can simply opt to pursue? According to socialist theory, socialism is not simply a matter of choice, but the result of social revolution; hence LDCs are faced with the problem of underdevelopment or revolution (socialist); and, two, the economic performance of socialist countries has not been very impressive.[10] Poor performance of central planning, failure in productivity and in sound allocation of economic resources in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe are now widely known. This was threatening even their otherwise good performance in social services: health care, education and housing. These countries – the former USSR and the other formerly socialist countries of Eastern European and China – are now engaged in heavy domestic reforms which on the surface can be seen as confirming the superiority of the market.

Yet, it should not be forgotten that most of the criticism of 'the market' in the 1960s and later was not ideological, but analytical. For example, the inability of the market to handle long-run structural changes based on lumpy investment programmes. These objections are still valid today. Consequently, although in the 1990s the solution to the serious socio-economic difficulty facing the LDCs is seen at least by international organizations as lying in market forces, such as the IMF which call for structural adjustment programmes aimed at releasing market forces, this belief in the market has to be viewed with suspicion. As we pointed out above this strengthening of the 'market ideology' is also due to the re-structuring of the economies of the former socialist/communist countries which is now taking place, but heavily biased towards the release of market forces.

Consequently, the crisis in developing theories lies in this: while theories emphasizing 'the market' as the solution to development problems were criticized and found wanting during the 1960s, the economic performance of those countries which pursued policies which put less weight on 'the market', but rather stressed (central) planning and state intervention has been poor, so much so that they are now forced to restructure their economies and abolish one-party rule.[11] In other words, there is a lack of correspondence between theory (theories) and practice. Of course, the solution to these two extreme positions can simply be to call for a 'mixed economy' but all economies are mixed in one way or another. Thus, there is need to specify the nature of this mixed economy and what in concrete terms would be the role of the state in processes of developing such 'mixed economies' once they have been specified. This, however, is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to point out that we are highly sceptical as to whether this can be done within the existing paradigms.

In Africa, the above scepticism may even turn into impossibility if only because of the fact that the current paradigms – modernization dependency and/or world-systems

perspective – were developed by theorists from outside the continent. In the case of the modernization paradigm, this was done at a time when African societies were still under colonial rule while the other perspectives were developed at a time when most of the African countries were just emerging from colonialism. Today, after more than 25 years of independence for most of African countries, there are many lessons to be drawn from this experience. Now since each of the dominant paradigms has its own limitations especially when applied to problems of African development, we think the time has come for African scholars to carefully study the development processes in African countries after decolonization and come out with original theories to account for that development and how Africa can overcome the underdevelopment.

Hydén's works (1980 and 1983) are an attempt to break through the deadlock of both modernization and dependency theories. Even if one does not agree with him it is still our view that he should be commended for what he has done.

Conclusions

The peasant question occupies a special place in the existing theories of development/ underdevelopment. All the theorists, irrespective of their ideological bent, share the view that without transforming the peasant economy, the entry of LDCs into the ranks of modern societies and a liquidation of underdevelopment would not take place. However, they differ in how this transformation is to be undertaken.

The strategy advocated by theorists working within the modernization paradigm requires the denial of subsistence to the peasants so that they are forced to buy their necessities in the commodity market and thereby also forced to sell their labour in the labour market. In short proletarianization of the peasantry. But, the material conditions existing in LDCs – i.e. lack of capital, the character of modern labour-saving technology, over 75 per cent of the population being outside the regular commodity labour market, etc. – dictate that full proletarianization of the peasantry is impossible if it is to avoid very high rates of unemployment with no employment benefits.

The alternative strategy, one emanating from theorists who argue for the rejection of capitalism, also involve proletarianization of the peasants. This would involve the creation of state and collective farms to absorb and liquidate the peasants. But the experiences of Tanzania and Ethiopia suggest that this is very difficult if not impossible to achieve and might as well be counter-productive. The experience of the USSR where this process was accomplished, is also not an attractive possibility. Not only was this process accomplished with very high social and other costs but also the performance of the state and collective farms in raising labour and land productivity was not very impressive.

Thus, let us conclude this article by asserting that if we are to take Hydén (1983) seriously that a paradigmatic shift is urgently needed in African studies, this shift lies in developing a development theory and strategy that would *transform the peasant economy without proletarianization of the peasant, but at the same time guaranteeing them higher and higher living standards.* This would also entail the specification of what role the state should play in such a process. The other issue which must also be dealt with is the relationship between the state and civil society. Other chapters in this book deal in more depth with this crucial problem.

Notes

[1] There have been many theoretical and other debates concerning the development process in Tanzania (see Nursey-Bray, 1980; and Chambua, 1987).

[2] The implication of this is that underdevelopment is seen as caused by the impossibility of capitalist expansion brought about by the persistence of pre-capitalist modes of production. But these pre-capitalist modes actually reduce to what is commonly referred to as 'traditional society'.

[3] But Szentes (1985: 297) has cautioned that, 'However correct it is to reject the unit of analysis . . . namely "national economy" and "national society" assumed to be independent and self-developing entities . . . the replacement of it by the world capitalist economy . . . as the only, exclusively appropriate unit of analysis, may also be a source of false or contradictory conclusions.'

[4] In this connection it has been argued that the local class which controls the state in the periphery is not a ruling, but simply a governing class. The (true) ruling class (in the periphery) is the metropolitan bourgeoisie (see Freyhold, 1977).

[5] This implies that so long as the peasants have been compelled and continue to produce for the world capitalist system, it makes no sense to claim that they are simply participating in but not being part of that system.

[6] These industries are capital saving, i.e. much more labour-intensive. Their relocation in LDCs helps to keep labour costs down.

[7] For this differentiation see Beckman (1977); Bernstein (1979) and Leo (1981).

[8] Historically, the incorporation of Tanzania into the world-system can be traced to the sixteenth century when the Portuguese established settlements along its Indian Ocean coast. From that moment only, this coast became one of the prizes and arenas of conflict in the mercantile expansion of Europe. For example, the Portuguese had to hold their settlements against Arab attack for about 200 years (Svendsen, 1969: 35-7). In the nineteenth century, the protracted Portuguese–Arab rivalry succumbed to the competition of the most advanced industrial powers of Western Europe. Following the 1884/85 Berlin Conference on the partition of Africa, Tanzania (then called Tanganyika) fell under German colonial rule (1884–1918). After the First World War, Tanzania was mandated to Britain by the League of Nations. Tanzania became independent of Britain in 1961.

[9] In this regard, Freyhold (1977: 83) maintains that at all levels of the Tanzanian state apparatus, 'the annual plans for direct production are plans for the expansion of the state economy financed and assisted by metropolitan capital in one way or another'. She further went on to argue that whatever the anti-capitalist nature of the ideology propagated by the state and whatever well-meaning intentions and activities of the socialist intellectuals, the process of building *Ujamaa* in Tanzania has only served to strengthen the domination of the ruling class – 'the metropolitan bourgeoisie'.

[10] This is true of both the advanced socialist countries and socialist oriented LDCs cf. Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Mozambique, to mention but a few.

[11] This is also true of the socialist-oriented LDCs such as Tanzania which have adopted IMF sponsored structural adjustment programmes.

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Discourse on Development among African Philosophers

C.S.L. CHACHAGE

Introduction

This chapter is a modest contribution to a review of the way philosophers have discussed the question of development and underdevelopment of Africa and the kind of proposals suggested by them for a way out of underdevelopment. It is necessary to examine the way philosophers have treated this question given that one hardly finds its full reflection in the theories of development in general, which are on the main heavily dominated by economism, technologism and structuralism.

Broadly speaking, the philosophical tendencies discernible over the years are as follows: (1) Ethnophilosophy (Bantu Philosophy). This was systematized by the colonial agents. It aimed at the re-appropriation of 'African Cultures' for colonial use; (2) Africanism (African Civilization, Negritude, Pan Africanism, African Socialism, African Humanism, Authenticity, etc.). This emerged as a protest against Eurocentrism and a celebration of the African personality; (3) Theory for African Revolution (mostly found in Fanon, Nkrumah and Cabral). The attempt here was to search for a theory to guide the African Revolution. Emphasis was on the radical break with the West and a refoundation of African history. In the case of Cabral, class clarity in partisanship was of paramount importance; (4) Professional philosophers. These were/are non-Marxists who criticized ethnophilosophy. They advocated an intellectual renaissance as the basis of any meaningful development; and, (5) Critics of the professional philosophers. These, while upholding the democratic spirit of the professional philosophers, criticized the elitist idealistic thesis of renaissance by the intellectuals. What has occurred since the 1950s is that 'from Nkrumah to Cabral, from Eboussi Boulaga to Towa, from Sheikh Anta Diop to Theophile Obenga; etc., attempts are being made for good or for worse, to take up the challenge to equip theoretically the anti-imperialist resistance'.[1]

The Discovery of 'African Philosophy'

For many African philosophers, Placide Tempels' *Bantu Philosophy* forms a watershed in the endeavours to come out with what could be considered as African Philosophy.[2] This is the case because his work came out at a time when African intellectuals were busy searching for an African identity. For the colonial agents, this search for an African world-outlook began on the main, in the inter-War period, within attempts to resolve the crisis of the civilizing mission in the colonies. This search began with the missionaries and the anthropologists as a result of what happened to the African masses, the rebellions, the impact of World War One and the secularizing impact of the philosophies of natural sciences in Biblical studies. The War had shattered the faith in the superiority of the moral values of Europe: 'Imperialism in general and the mission in particular fell sharply in the esteem of a public opinion which no longer felt that Western civilization had incalculable benefits to confer upon inferior

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races, and which was being stimulated by the discoveries of social scientists in the revival of the romantic cult of the noble savage'.[3]

The resistance of the African masses had made the missionaries become aware of the fact that Africans could not be moulded anyhow by colonialists. Increasingly, Western civilization was being viewed by the missionaries as destructive despite its superiority in science and technology. While Africans needed to benefit from the latter, it was necessary to reconsider the effects of that civilization, for it gave 'birth to boundless egoism which threatened to annihilate society itself'. Western civilization atomized societies, something which was undesirable. In the inter-War period, it became increasingly clear that early missionaries had been, in the main, uncritical.[4]

The anthropologists, for their part, had come to the conclusion that it was useless to go on searching for the 'missing link'. What was required was the study of human institutions and their function. Condemnation of 'savage' religions had to be abandoned, for primitive religion and magic fulfilled specific functions at work like other aspects of culture. They had economic advantages, and could be used for purposes of control and organization of societies.[5]

It was within this context that Tempels was to write for his fellow colonials of 'good will' after World War Two. He was asking them to abandon the former views with respect to Africans, as it had been discovered that the Muntu (= Bantu) had a philosophy. For him, this opened new avenues with full hope for the civilizing mission: 'hitherto we have been building on the sand . . . we have at length discovered the true point of departure. We shall rejoice at having found "within" the Bantu something to render them more noble, without feeling ourselves obliged to kill first the man already existing.'[6]

For Tempels, Bantu ontology is a theory of forces: being and its essence is power which, unlike in Western societies, is dynamic. Where the Westerner sees concrete beings, the Bantu sees forces; and what the Westerner regards as being distinguished by their essence or nature, the Bantu sees as *forces* differing by their essence or nature. These forces are both a reality and a value, and the Bantu's entire effort is devoted to increasing the vital force.[7] These forces interact, and the interaction is based on the principle of 'hierarchy of forces: God is at the top, followed by the forefathers, founders of clans, the dead of the tribe in order of seniority and finally the living'. Even the European is within this hierarchy as a powerful force:

> . . . the Bantu have considered us whites . . . from the only point of view possible to them, that of their Bantu philosophy. They have included us within their order of forces, at an exalted level. They think we must be powerful forces. Do we not seem to be masters of natural forces? . . . The natural aspiration of the Bantu soul was therefore to be able to take some part in our superior force . . .[8]

Tempels reached a position whereby he considered the African as having become a proper candidate for 'civilization' and 'christianization', though himself unconscious of this. All that was required for the colonialists was to 'invest in the terrain of the enemy: to get the Muntu swallow and internalize the idea that his own way of viewing the world, his own outlook has no other ultimate objective than that of the European civilizing mission. For him there is no other future history'.[9] Tempels was advocating this at a time when the Marshall plan was in preparation and the Atlantic social scientists were beginning to systematize the 'modernization theories/models'. This was at the beginning of the era of 'modernizing imperialism' which stood for a fast tempo of capital investments in the colonies to encourage Import Substitution Industrialization.[10] Import Substitution Industrialization has been taken as a political strategy in handling colonies, given the pressure of nationalism, as a means to bind the colonies to the colonizing countries even after attainment of self-rule.[11] This 'modernization' was nothing more than, what Tempels termed the mastery of nature, a vital force which Africans wanted to share with the Europeans.

The nationalists who emerged within this context were very much influenced by their intellectual milieu. While accepting the idea of modernizing African countries, for them, this also entailed the rejection of Eurocentric conceptions about Africans, in favour of African values, and the development of the idea that to be civilized was essentially to be African.

After all, Tempels and others had acknowledged that the African was a human being with a civilization which had the same objectives as Western civilization, and was capable of sharing the universal views of development. Essential was to defend the African social structures and values, while at the same time accepting modernity – in terms of technology, law and economics.[12]

Tempels' Bantu Philosophy became influential among African intellectuals. The works of Frobenius, Griaule and Tempels were very influential on Senghor in his elaboration of the philosophy of Negritude. Senghor was to postulate a distinctive African mode of apprehension which had a vitalist emphasis. He aimed at demonstrating the distinctive African spirituality and world-view. His conclusion was that 'Emotion is African, as reason is Hellenic'.[13] Other intellectuals, such as Alexis Kagame, were to seek to verify Tempels' ideas in relation to the question of ontology, by a reconstruction of the philosophical system of the Rwanda people through linguistic analysis. His was both a continuation and a partial critique: instead of particularizing Bantu philosophy, as Tempels did, he emphasized its universality.[14]

Beyond continuation, there were attempts to demystify Tempels' work. Early reactions came from Aimé Césaire[15] and Sheikh Anta Diop. The former reacted politically: his target was the use of the philosophy itself rather than its theoretical problems. For Césaire, the reconstruction of a Bantu philosophy was nothing more than an attempt to create a deception among Africans, given the political problems in the colonies. Tempels was simply safeguarding the colonial order and exploitation while at the same time breaking the resistance of the African masses. What Tempels was implicitly consenting to was the plundering, torturing, seizure of natural resources, stamping of freedom, crushing the pride of Africans and finally going away in peace:

> But take care! You are going to the Congo? Respect – I do not say native property (the great Belgian companies might take that as a dig on them), I do not say freedom of the natives (the Belgian colonialists might think that was subversive talk), I do not say the Congolese nation (the Belgian government might take it much amiss) – I say: You are going to the Congo? Respect the Bantu philosophy! . . . Since Bantu thought is ontological, the Bantu only ask for satisfaction of ontological nature . . . The Bantu are pure spirits, I tell you: 'What they desire first of all and above all is not improvement of their economic or material situation, but the white man's recognition of and respect for their dignity as men, their full human value.' In short, you tip your hat to the Bantu life force, you give a wink to the immortal you are getting off cheap.[16]

Sheikh Anta Diop regarded the false struggle of ethnophilosophy (that of Tempels and those who continued his project) as useless. The duty of the young philosophers in Africa was to grasp and develop the essential infrastructure which would enable them to re-establish themselves with the home of philosophy in Africa. Under such circumstances, it was necessary to re-establish the connections with ancient Egypt and integrate it with modern thoughts. History could not be restricted by limits of ethnic groups, nations or culture. The West had all the time falsified African history. Therefore, committed African intellectuals needed to explore and elaborate the idea of Black Egypt, which in turn had to be transformed into an operative scientific concept.[17]

In his view, a people's personality had to be regarded from the psychic, historical and linguistic point of view. It is necessary to demonstrate the laws which govern the evolution of Africa in order to explain the direction which historical evolution has taken in Africa, and project the image of a modern Africa reconciled with its past and present for the movement into the future. One needed to demonstrate what is common to African civilization: for, it is simply impossible to write a firmly grounded African history until connected to Egyptian history.[18] Under those circumstances, it would be clear that Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Dialectic, Theory of Being, Arithmetic, etc. are not foreign to Africa as they are derived from her:

> Universal knowledge runs from the Nile Valley towards the rest of the world in particular to Greece which serves as the intermediary. As a result, no thought, no ideology is foreign to Africa which was the land of their birth. Consequently, Africans must draw from the

common intellectual heritage of humanity, guided by notions of what is useful and effective.[19]

From here, development is a process of transformation from the clan to monolinguistic ethnic groups to nation or nationality. The key motor of history is in the laws which govern clan development, and it is there that the different forms of states are discernible within influences of the environment. Important factors in this process are socialization (clan), production (division of labour), accumulation (surplus) and militarization (classes). The failures of revolutionary movements in Africa in the past have been due to the complexity of the state and the bureaucracy and the size of the territory.[20] The liberation of Africa can only be conducted along three lines: (1) Linguistic: Selection of one language to a continental language. (2) Political: The unity of Africa as in the past. Colonial and neo-colonial states are false as they do not have the material capacity for the transformation of Africa, hence the need for a federated Africa. (3) Industrialization: The need for an industrialization plan in which all the resources of the continent (Thermo-nuclear, oil, etc.) can be fully utilized, and thereby combat the problems of investment and research which must accompany the plan.[21]

Diop shared the spirit of cultural nationalism with other Africanists. He also aimed at a universal history of which Africa is a part. The way out for Africa was viewed in terms of a renaissance by African intellectuals: If the bourgeois world was created by total cultural transformation which involved the reconstruction of history, then Africa needed to do the same. In that case, it was necessary to return to Egypt (as Europe returned to Greece and Rome for re-awakening and renewal) in all domains, as a condition for reconstructing the present in order to advance in the future. It was this which would enable the building of a body of human sciences, and the revival of African culture.[22] Unlike the other Africanists, Diop countered the evolutionist conception found among anthropologists and ethnophilosophers who viewed Western civilization as the apex of human development. Diop's critique also remained partial.

Professional Philosophers Versus Ethnophilosophy

The critique of ethnophilosophy which resurfaced after independence seems to have drawn its inspiration from Fanon. This is especially the case with those philosophers who took a radical stance. As a theoretician of independence, Fanon had already broken off from the philosophies of Africanity by the late 1950s. For him, Africanity was one of the pitfalls of national consciousness as it championed the interests of the bourgeoisie. The task of independence was to complete the liberation of Africa, in terms of total transformation of society rather than harping about the 'cultural unity of Africa', or the cult of the permanence of Egyptian civilization. It was not a question of a model offered by the past; rather, a reality lying in the future as a perpetual creation. Culture was apprehended as a process of becoming, rather than a state of affairs. In fact, Fanon seemed to suggest that the issue of African identity should be laid to rest so as to clear a new ground of thought:

> To believe that it is possible to create a black culture is to forget that niggers are disappearing, just as those who brought them into being are seeing the break-up of their economic and cultural supremacy. There will never be such a thing as black culture because there is no single politician who feels he has a vocation to bring black republics into being. The problem is to get to know the place that these men mean to give their people, *the kind of social relations they decide to set up and the conception that they have of the future of humanity*. It is this that counts; everything else is mystification, signifying nothing . . . Adherence to African–Negro culture and the cultural unity of Africa is arrived at in the first place by *upholding unconditionally the peoples' struggle for freedom*.[23]

While Fanon was talking about the total transformation of society after independence, the politicians and other intellectuals adhering to Africanity were busy harping about African socialism, African humanism, African culture, authenticity, etc. blending it with modernization thinking. With the institutionalization of such ideas in the state and party apparatuses,

the central issue became that of struggles against poverty, ignorance and disease. Within these conceptions which summarized the modernist thinking, the most effective organ to use against the trio of enemies was the state: only the state had the capacity to bring about modernization by encouraging, for example, unity among the people, industrialization and development in agriculture.

For the nationalists in the newly independent governments, conflicts and opposition were foreign elements in Africa; they were also a break for change. To avoid these, it was necessary to strengthen the state power and make it monolithic on the one hand, and weaken the civil society in terms of its organizational capacities on the other. Thus starting with Ghana from 1954, official opposition was refused under the claim that it had no national basis. This was followed by other measures, such as the control or abolition of independent trade unions, cooperative associations, women's associations, etc.[24] The same measures were to be followed by other African countries, in some instances in the name of Africanity and African Democracy, as was the case with Tanganyika, for example, where the President was given more sweeping powers than the President of the USA.[25]

Broadly speaking, what took place after independence in many African countries was the concentration of powers in the executive arms of the state, and within that, in the presidency. This was in response to the profound conflicts which were taking place within these countries. The conflicts brought to the fore the social, economic and political questions in relation to the meaning of self-determination, as grasped by the different social classes within attempts to control social processes. The nationalist leaders were committed to modernization, and the general tendency was to view the mass of the people as ignorant, primitive, lazy, superstitious, resistant to change and backward. Thus, for development to take place, it was necessary to defeat the working masses by concentrating the powers in the state and eroding the independence of the civil society. The workers were not to ask for more wages as this endangered capital investment and accumulation, and the peasants were to ask for better prices and better conditions of production for the sake of development. The powers of the parliament were also being broken alongside the independent mass and political movements and all the autonomous regional and district entities, so as to create unity and tranquillity.

Fanon saw all this by 1961. He saw that the tendency for the newly independent states was to disarm everybody politically, bully them and institute the single-party system which was the 'modern form of dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, unmasked, unpainted, unscrupulous and cynical':

> . . . Such a dictatorship does not go very far. It cannot halt the process of its own contradictions. Since the bourgeoisie has not the economic means to ensure domination and throw a few crumbs to the rest of the country; since moreover, it is preoccupied with filling its pockets as rapidly as possible, the country sinks all the more deeply into stagnation.[26]

This position was proved correct. By the end of the 1960s, it had become apparent that modernization as envisaged by the nationalists was not taking place. The modernist conception of development had reached an embarrassing situation, and a few regimes had been toppled by armies – including Nkrumah's regime which unleashed the process of disarming the civil society in Africa. The situation became even worse from the early 1970s as a result of the world economic crisis.

Nkrumah had in the 1960s adhered to the Africanist position of the classless Africa. After being overthrown he affirmed that class struggle is one of the contemporary features of Africa, and this was on an international scale.[27] His philosophy of Conscientism, which initially stressed the continuity of pre-colonial Africa into the present and the future Africa, was to be revised by 1970. Henceforth, the view of 'African Socialism' which projected a classless pre-colonial Africa was simply a 'fetish of the communal African society'. It had no historical or anthropological evidence, and utmost, it was a simplification of 'somewhat more sordid' societies.[28] Although stressing that productive forces are the motor of history, even Cabral was to put emphasis on class struggle as an important feature of the African Revolution. His problem was that like Nkrumah he took seriously the Leninist conception of a vanguard party around revolutionary intellectuals.[29] This was basically an elitist notion.

As a result of the aftermaths of independence, there was a renewal of the critique of Africanity which was viewed as static to the extent that it could not account for the diverse forms of concrete African realities. Africanity was condemned in the spirit of Fanon, Cabral and Nkrumah as a system of imperialist ideas. The critique of Africanity, therefore, called for a renewal of the critique of Tempels' enthophilosophy which inspired the ideas of Africanity. Ethnophilosophers were judged and condemned as wrong to imagine that they were restoring an African traditional philosophy.[30] With this new spirit, it was no longer a question of viewing African philosophy from the point of view of the geographical origins of the authors; rather, a question of specificity of a particular content. African philosophy was being broadened in terms of its horizon and being treated as a 'methodical inquiry with the same universal aims as those of any other philosophy in the world'.[31]

This was taking place in the 1970s, when philosophers were demanding a rigorous reflection on the conditions of philosophy. The spirit of critique had been transformed to a vocation, and philosophy, according to P.J. Hountondji, was to be regarded as essentially history, rather than an absolute system, or a doctrine of truths. From the 1970s onwards the focus was on the question of 'philosophical ideal versus contextual determination, scientific authority versus socio-political power, and scientific objectivity versus cultural objectivity'.[32] The result was a discourse on the foundations and justification of social sciences. This was done from the point of view of a 'cultural renaissance', and the new sciences vocation of developmental applications. Hountondji's premises which are dominated by scientism of the Althuserian tradition under which he was trained, insisted on: (1) Philosophical critique of the lies, illusions and mystifications which continue in, and about Africa; (2) The need for rigorous studies, understanding and assimilation of 'international philosophy' – including 'Marxism', as a means to analyse the exploitation of Africa; and (3) 'Stepping out of philosophy in order to meet and dialogue with the social reality'.[33]

Broadly, the philosophers in the 1970s offered alternatives in terms of practical policies which insisted on: (1) A socio-cultural renaissance (in language, literature, values, etc.), which amounts to critically grasping the past victories and defeats so as to act differently in the future; and (2) Treatment of science as a vocation and its application to developmental issues. In this regard, politicians and bureaucrats were viewed as the major source of contradictions, as they marginalized the intellectuals who had the capacity to deconstruct the 'existing system of economic, political and ideological control'. Thus, the prime task of philosophy was seen in terms of contribution to the development of science. It was regarded that it was essential to have instructions in 'those philosophical disciplines most likely to foster the development of scientific thought in Africa: Logic, the history of sciences, epistemology, the history of technology, etc. – and of course, the indispensable study of the history of philosophy'.[34]

The critique of Africanity and ethnophilosophy was taking place at a time when the dependency 'school' (dominantly neo-Marxist) had on the whole successfully replaced modernization thinking.[35] Without going into details, while dependency thinking was dominated by economism and technologism, emphasizing economic development, this was not necessarily the case with the philosophers. Although the question of scientific development was dominant among them, the philosophers attributed the major obstacle to any meaningful transformation in Africa, and hence its socio-economic hardships, to the fact that the civil societies in Africa have been socially and politically demobilized organizationally in the post-independence era. Simultaneous with this process was the strengthening of the state apparatuses. In other words, the socio-economic crisis facing Africa, as Nzongola-Ntalaja has put it, 'is a crisis of the state and that the neo-colonial state itself constitutes the major obstacle to development'.[36] People have been left defenceless *vis à vis* these states, and hence they cannot fight against the arbitrary actions of the states, or defend their living standards, wages, prices of their produce, or working conditions. Thus the issue being that of the creation of democratic forms of governance in Africa.[37]

Thus, the moral philosopher Oruka was to point out that the average man and woman in Africa is today a citizen of an 'uncivil republic', who does not have the right to liberty which embraces, 'freedom of thought and opinion, freedom of speech and assembly and freedom of emigration'. These do not exist for the average man or woman in Africa:

Those who live below the economic base line of humanity are denied the right to liberty. The average person in the uncivil republic has no complicated thought and opinion. They have but one concern: they are hungry and jobless. This is what he or she wants to express but which they cannot express because they lack the means and right to liberty. Those who stand up to speak for them are easily silenced or wiped out by the tools of legal terrorism.[38]

That is what is seen by most philosophers, as the main problem facing Africa. For Hountondji, for instance, 'the necessity of freedom of thought and freedom in general for development of science' is absolutely important.[39] They regard that it is simply impossible to philosophize without freedom of expression; and freedom of expression is the condition for the development of science, theoretical development and real economic and political progress. To achieve any meaningful development, it is necessary to 'begin at the beginning; we must restore the right to criticism and free expression which are seriously threatened by our regimes of terror and ideological confusion'.[40] Underlying all this lack of freedom is the fact which is pointed out by Oruka, that all rights to work, to minimum standards of life, fair wages, social security, freedom from hunger, and freedom to form or join trade unions, etc. have been eroded. Instead, the only right guaranteed is the right to property, which is meaningful to the few who are wealthy.[41]

Critique of Professional Philosophers

While philosophers like Hountondji have been quite successful in their critique of ethnophilosophy and Africanity, their tendency is to regard the efforts of rigorous intellectuals as also being required in the renaissance which they aim at. But to assert that philosophy is the condition for development in Africa today, as Hountondji does, is to suggest that ideas have an independent material efficacy. In other words, what they are suggesting is: if any meaningful development has to take place, then the most important thing is to settle accounts with certain forms of illusions and mystifications. Within this context, the history makers of today's Africa are assumed to be the intellectuals who are capable of dealing with those illusions and mystifications. Unfortunately, it turns out that the intellectuals have been marginalized instead of being taken seriously. Certainly, philosophers (like Hountondji) have declared the autonomy of philosophy from politics; but still politics is not assumed to remain autonomous and uninfluenced by philosophy.

The issue remains: What is it that prevents free thinking in Africa? And why is it that it is only the intellectuals who should be accorded that freedom to engage in debates when we know that Gramsci once proclaimed that everybody is a philosopher? Is it not an elitist proclamation which divorces theoretical work from practice, and hence upholds the centralist bureaucratic conception which defends the state as finally the leading element in development or transformations? What about the fact that 'the hungry and the jobless' would like to express themselves: Are they not entitled to engage in debates or palavers? In a nutshell, from Sheikh Anta Diop to Houtondji the dominant tendency has been to see the primacy of the theories of intellectuals for any successful practice. Thus development or underdevelopment processes, although correctly grasped perhaps, are not seen as processes founded on social struggle, but as a matter of choice of theoretically derived policies or strategies. This is an idealist problematic.

It is in this respect that a critique of professional philosophers emerged in around the 1980s. This critique, upholding the point of view of the African masses in their resistance against domination and exploitation, maintains that if there has been any real philosophical combat which compelled even the missionary Tempel to philosophize the way he did, it was the cultural resistance of the African masses. The same cultural resistance compelled the African intellectuals to take up the challenge to arm the African resistance theoretically from the point of view of the various class interests of the dominated masses against those colluding with imperialism.

In this critique of idealist philosophizing in Africa, it is recognized that philosophy arrived

in Africa as part and parcel of imperialist domination and within attempts to justify the 'civilizing mission'. It was a real reflection of the struggles for imperialist hegemony, which demonstrated the European cultural superiority. One should not, therefore, be surprised that, the 'theory of resistance against imperialism is often expressed as anti-philosophy by the masses of African people'; it is expressed in terms of a permanent critique of philosophy from the point of view of liberation from domination in all its forms. It develops as a critique of philosophy as idealism (i.e. as separation of ideas from practice). In this respect, intellectuals in general and philosophers in particular are urged to become organic thinkers serving the resisting masses, and dealing with the question of theoretical self-organization of the working people for complete liberation:

> Either philosophy unites with the popular masses of the people who make authentic national history, and it is thus liberating; or it is separated from the masses – idealizes itself – and looses its creative foundation and thus becomes oppressive. In today's Africa, to think is increasingly to think for or against imperialism . . .[42]

Central to this position is the question of social struggles in processes, and the need for class clarity, since it is recognized that revolutions/transformations are a matter of the broad masses. Within this context, crucial issues are dealt with. What is the motive force of society? Is it the intellectuals? The bureaucracy? Productive forces? Social struggles?

If the societies we are living in are uncivil republics, riddled with crises, then one needs to know how they landed in such a mess. To know this, one needs to examine the 'capacity or lack of capacity of [the] masses of the people to make . . . history . . . under the present conditions'. This is possible if one examines the 'whole history of the people [in question] as a political subject'.[43] Of utmost importance, within this examination, is the history of the advanced social class – which in Cabral's[44] formulation is the working class as a socio-economic and political force in the process of transformation: 'We need to analyse the history of development of that political force to examine its weaknesses and strengths and seek for ways of strengthening it further, not from outside, but from within.'[45]

What is being suggested by the critics of the hitherto idealist philosophizing is that philosophers and intellectuals in general would do well to renew the search for a theory of African Revolution and stand for a politically organized knowledge, rather than championing for an autonomous theoretical practice. A theory of society which is really committed to transformations should be able to answer questions such as: In what way is the production of the means of life organized in today's Africa? Who produces the surplus and who expropriates it? Do workers and peasants have any views about how society and production should be organized? What kind of rebellion and self-organization are relevant?[46]

The critics of idealist philosophizing are calling for a collective philosophy: they are calling for the union of theoretical criticism and practical criticism, which is refused by most of the critics of ethnophilosophy. They uphold that the unfreedoms expressed by Hountondji or Oruka can be transcended only if one takes into consideration the whole question of genuine democratic struggles under the conditions of neo-colonialism, and this is a matter of the broad masses.

To sum up, while development theoreticians have been concentrating on questions of development of productive forces, increased production, accumulation of capital, transfer of technology, ideologies and models, etc., the philosophers have broadly transcended most of that, and paradigmatically, they are proposing a radically different approach. They view the problems confronting Africa from a socio-political angle. To assert that freedom of thought is the basis for any meaningful development, even if couched idealistically, is to recognize the fundamental fact that the democratic forms which would make possible the socio-economic transformations in Africa are absent.

In other words, what is being suggested is that the way out of underdevelopment is through social struggles for broad democracy which will free public criticism, scientific creativity, and social and political self-organizational capacities of the working people, which will enable the total transformation of social relations in Africa. This is the conception of development/transformations discernible in the debates among African philosophers. This conception demands that one entertains less economism, technologism and structuralism

in the examination of processes; and concentrates more on the whole question of conditions for self-organization of the African masses for the total transformation of African societies.

Notes

[1] Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba (1983), 'Philosophy in Africa: Challenge of the African Philosopher', Department of History, University of Dar es Salaam, p. 4.

[2] P. Tempels (1969), *Bantu Philosophy*, Présence Africaine, Paris, 1969. According to L. Harris ('Romanticism and Scienticism in Africa', in *Présence africaine*, No. 113, 1980), the historic genesis of contemporary African philosophic approaches to evaluating traditions in relation to modernity is in the works of E. W. Blyden and P. Tempels. The former was published in 1908, while the latter was published in 1949.

[3] R. Oliver (1952), *The Missionary Factor in East Africa*, Longman, London, pp. 231–2.

[4] See J. H. Oldham and B. D. Gibson (1931), *The Remaking of Man in Africa*, Oxford University Press, London, pp. 9, 12, and 49–50. The same spirit guided the International Conference of Missionaries at Le Zoute in Belgium in 1926 (See E. W. Smith (1926), *The Christian Mission in Africa*, The International Missionary Council, Edinburgh House).

[5] B. Malinowski, 'Memorandum for Rockefeller Foundation Written for Embree in March 1927' and 'Memorandum on Colonial Research', December 1926, in Mss Brit Emp., S. 1829, Rhodes House, London. For an extended treatment of the changing nature of the colonialists in the inter-war period in general, see C. S. L. Chachage (1986), *Socialist Ideology and the Reality of Tanzania*, Ph.D. thesis, Glasgow University; and C. S. L. Chachage (1988), 'British rule and African civilization', in *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol. 1, No. 2.

[6] Tempels, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., pp. 178–9.

[9] Wamba-dia-Wamba, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[10] Among the famous modernization theorists are: T. Parsons, N. Smelser, D. MacCleland and W. W. Rostow. For a review of these theories see A. M. M. Hoogvelt (1985), *The Sociology of Developing Societies*, MacMillan, London; A. Webster (1984), *Introduction to the Sociology of Development*, MacMillan, London; M. Blomström and B. Hettne (1984), *Development Theory in Transition*, Zed Books, London.

[11] See J. Iliffe (1979), *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 437. Also Lord Hailey (1950), *Native Administration in the British African Territories*, HMSO, London, p. 50.

[12] C. S. L. Chachage (1987), 'Towards a critique of development theories in Africa', in *Utafiti*, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 17.

[13] These views were held by people like Leon Damas, L. S. Senghor, David Diop, J. K. Nyerere, K. Nkrumah, Martin Kayamba, etc. These outlooks are reviewed in Colin Legum's *Pan Africanism: A Short Guide*, Praeger, New York (1962). For Senghor, see his *Prose and Poetry*, Heinemann, London (1976).

[14] On Kagame, see P. J. Hountondji (1983), *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality*, Hutcheson University Library, London; Harris, *op. cit.*; and V. Y. Mudimbe (1984), *African Gnosis: Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge*, African Studies Association, Los Angeles. Other works which provide more or less a continuation of Tempels' project are those of John Mbiti (1969), *African Religions and Philosophy*, Heinemann, London; and *Concepts of God in Africa*, Heinemann, London (1970).

[15] Aimé Césaire (1972), *Discourse on Colonialism*, Modern Reader Press, New York, pp. 37–9.

[16] See L. Jeffreis Jr., 'Civilization or barbarism: The legacy of Sheikh Anta Diop', in I. Van Sertina (ed.) (1987), *Great African Thinkers*, Transaction Books, New Brunswick (USA), p. 149.

[17] Ibid., p. 146.

[18] See Sheikh Anta Diop (1974), *The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality*, Lawrence Hill and Co.: Westport (USA).

[19] Quoted by Jeffreis, *op. cit.* p. 149.

[20] These themes run throughout his work, for example, *The Cultural Unity of Black Africa*, Third World Press, Chicago (1987a); *Pre-colonial Black Africa*, Lawrence Hill and Co., Westport (1987b); *Black Africa: The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated State*, Lawrence Hill and Co., Westport (1987).

[21] See Diop (1987a), ibid. As far as the linguistic aspect is concerned, Diop translated Langevin's theory of relativity into Wolof to demonstrate that African languages are capable of handling any scientific materials.

[22] This is succinctly summarized in the interview between Diop and Finch in 'Conversations with the Pharao' in Van Sertina, *op. cit.*

[23] Frantz Fanon (1974), *The Wretched of the Earth*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, pp. 188–9. Another vehement critic of Africanity of recent is Wole Soyinka. See in Isidore Okpewho (1983), *Myth in Africa*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 237ff.

[24] For the various moves that were taken in Ghana before and after independence, see Ronald Segal (1963), *African Profiles*, Penguin, Harmondsworth.

[25] For the move undertaken in Tanganyika before and after independence, see J. Listowel (1965), *The Making of Tanganyika*, Chatto and Windus, London, p. 413. Also See C. S. L. Chachage (1986), *Socialist Ideology and the Reality of Tanzania*, Ph.D. thesis, Glasgow University, chapter 6.

[26] Fanon, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

[27] Kwame Nkrumah, *Conscientism*, Heinemann, London (1964 edition) and Panf., London (1970 edition).

[28] Hountondji, *op. cit.*, pp. 137–8.

[29] A. Cabral (1980), *Unity and Struggle*, Heinemann, London.

[30] Hountondji, *op. cit.*; Mudimbe, *op. cit.*; and Kwasi Wiredu (1980), *Philosophy and Culture*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

[31] Hountondji, ibid.

[32] Mudimbe, *op. cit.*, pp. 137–8.

[33] Ibid., pp. 142–3.

[34] Hountondji, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

[35] Among the famous dependency model exponents were: A. Gunder Frank, E. Laclau, Samir Amin, E. Wallerstein, A. Emmanuel, Walter Rodney, F. H. Cardoso, G. Kay, etc. Since the mid-1970s they met criticism from Bill Warren who, from a Marxist point of view, asserted that imperialism and capitalism are progressive in Third World countries.

[36] Nzongola-Ntalaja (1989), 'The African crisis: the way out', in *African Studies Review*, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 118.

[37] A quest for democracy has been one of the major features of the 1980s in Africa, though mostly taken to mean multi-party systems and tending to ignore other social and political organizational aspects. On the quest for democracy in Africa, see, for example, Nzongola-Ntalaja, ibid., Issa Shivji (1988), *Fight my Beloved Continent: New Democracy in Africa*, SAPE, Harare, and Chapter 23 by Samir Amin in this volume.

[38] Henry Odera Oruka (1985), *Punishment and Terrorism in Africa*, Kenya Literature Bureau, Nairobi, pp. 117–18.

[39] Hountondji, *op. cit.*

[40] Ibid., p. 69.

[41] Oruka, *op. cit.*

[42] Wambia-dia-Wamba, *op. cit.* Another of the professional philosophers is Youssouph Mbargane Guisse.

[43] E. Wamba dia Wamba, 'Is there a way out of the bureaucratic corruption process of the Zairean underdevelopment?', History Department University of Dar es Salaam, n.d. For an extended review see D.J. Gould's 'Bureaucratic corruption and underdevelopment in the Third World: the case of Zaire', History Department, University of Dar es Salaam, n.d., p. 7.

[44] Cabral, *op. cit.*

[45] Wambia-dia-Wamba, n.d., *op. cit.*

[46] Ibid.

POPULATION

4

Demographic Transition in the Context of Africa's Development

UCHE C. ISIUGO-ABANIHE

Population growth has only recently been viewed with some concern by development theorists and planners in Africa. Yet, the population factor seems ubiquitous in all aspects of development; population growth has an inexorable force which will neither disappear on its own nor by wishful thinking. Part of this realization has come from the failure of many African governments to achieve well-planned and well-intentioned development goals and objectives. The number of people to be provided for has increased enormously, stretching resources and the planning apparatus to their limits. Thus it is becoming increasingly obvious to many development planners in Africa that appropriate action to confront the flow of human reproduction is necessary.

During the past three decades, there has been an impressive volume of literature on the relationship between population and development. These are generated from both scholarly and public opinion discussions, debates and controversies on the advantages and disadvantages of population growth, the nature of the population problems, perceptions of their severity and solutions, and the role of population policy in these relationships and development generally. The considerable lack of consensus on the population issue culminated in the two-week long meetings of the representatives of 137 member states of the United Nations in Bucharest, Rumania, in August 1974, from which emerged, albeit after heated and often acrimonious debates and ideological battles, the World Population Plan of Action, a compromise of many views (Finkle and Crane, 1975).

In Bucharest, African countries were in the dominant pro-natalist camp, proponents of views such as: 'Take care of the people and population will take care of itself'; and 'Development is the best contraceptive'. However, ten years later, in Mexico City, where another United Nations International Conference took place, African leaders agreed, following their Kilimanjaro Programme of Action on Population (ECA, 1984) that 'current high levels of fertility and mortality give rise to great concern about the region's ability to maintain even living standards already attained since independence'. They recommended that measures to address population growth and distribution should be a central component of efforts to accelerate development.

The rapid growth of the population of many African countries since the 1950s follows from the revealed wisdom of the demographic transition theory. Hence, these populations are now said to be in 'population explosion' stage, resulting from rapidly declining mortality and continued high and stable fertility. In the face of these rapid increases in population, many African countries have been struggling in their development efforts. While some suggest that rapid population growth is the root cause of the development problems plaguing Africa, others hold that it appears to play only an accomplice role in many development efforts, exacerbating or magnifying the effects of bad management, poor planning, and scarcity or misallocation of resources. Still others believe that Africa faces no population problems at all; that rapid population growth is a necessary engine for growth and development. In this chapter, the relationship between population and development in Africa will be

reviewed in light of the demographic transition theory, together with the controversies surrounding its applicability and relevance to the continent.

Africa's Population Situation

Estimates presented by Bennett (1954), though largely conjectural, indicate that Africa formed close to 19 per cent of the world population between 1500 and 1600. Following the slave trade, however, Africa was estimated to have suffered reduction to merely 8 per cent of the world population in 1850 and about 7 per cent in 1900. Since 1900, the percentage share of Africa relative to the world population has been increasing, from between 8 to 9 per cent in the 1940s and 1950s to close to 12 per cent in 1985. According to the UN medium-variant projections (UN, 1986), about 20 per cent of the world population will reside in Africa in 2025. In other words, in merely 36 years time, 1 out of 5 people in the world will be an African. To many, a population size of this magnitude spells doom for Africa, while to others it is a cause for jubilation. The population size in a place is determined by three components: birth, death and migration. More important among the three are births (fertility) and deaths (mortality), or more specifically, the surplus or deficit of one over the other (natural increase or decrease). However, in Africa, massive movement of people across international boundaries is a perennial problem. These three components of demographic change are briefly summarized.

African fertility is the highest in the world, with a crude birth rate (CBR) of 45 per 1000 population and a total fertility rate (TFR) of more than 6 children per woman at the end of her childbearing. Since the 1950s the overall fertility in Africa has remained high and stable; there has been no significant and consistent decline in fertility in any African region except perhaps the recent declines in North Africa. In fact, many countries with relatively low fertility (mainly those in the Central African region) have experienced a rise in fertility. Fertility is consistently high among African countries; birth rates are above 40 per 1000 population except in a few countries; in many it is as high as 50 or more (see Table 4.1).

Although mortality has continued to decline in Africa since 1945, it still remains high by world standards. With a crude death rate (CDR) of 15 per 1000 population, infant mortality rate (IMR) of 101 deaths per 1000 live-births, and life expectation at birth of about 51 years, the mortality condition in Africa is the worst of the world's major regions. For the continent as a whole, the expectation of life at birth increased from about 37.6 years between 1950 and 1955 to 49.7 years between 1980 and 1985 (UN, 1984). This represents an improvement in life expectancy to the tune of slightly higher than one-third of a year annually, obviously the lowest improvement among developing countries which, as a whole, experienced an improvement of about half a year annually over the same period. Yet now, AIDS epidemics, which have been reported in many African countries, especially in eastern, southern and central Africa, may worsen these improvements in life expectation.

International migration in Africa is of both the voluntary and involuntary types, the former resulting mainly from economic motives and the latter occasioned by political upheavals or natural disasters (Hill and Isiugo-Abanihe, 1983). Voluntary (economic) migration results primarily from poor conditions in the country of origin and the expectation by migrants of better opportunities elsewhere. Nowhere is it as pronounced as in Southern Africa, where the South African mines have attracted massive numbers of migrants from neighbouring Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland, Malawi and Zimbabwe. Involuntary migration due to natural disasters, mainly the Sahel drought, led to large-scale movement of nomad pastoralists southwards and to the coastal towns from the mid-1970s. However, a greater flow has been that of political refugees, generated by liberation struggles, civil wars and political tumults in many parts of the continent.

On account of continued high fertility and declining mortality, Africa is the fastest growing continent, with a natural increase of about 3 per cent annually. If a 3 per cent annual growth rate continues to prevail, in 23 years Africa's population will double in size. Between countries there are disparities in the rate of natural increase from 1.7 per cent annually in Mauritius and 1.9 per cent in Sierra Leone, to 3.7 per cent annually in Botswana and 4.1 per cent in Kenya (see Table 4.1). However, the latest estimates in Kenya show that the annual rate

Table 4.1: Demographic Indicators for Selected African Countries: 1990

Population (in million)	Density (Per sq. km)		CBR	CDR	Natural Increase	TFR	IMR	Life Expectancy	Human Suffering Index
Africa	645282	21	45.2	15.1	3.01	6.22	101	51.3	—
Algeria	25494	11	41.1	9.1	3.20	6.15	74	62.5	67
Angola	10002	8	47.2	20.6	2.66	6.39	137	44.0	91
Botswana	1332	2	48.8	11.3	3.75	6.50	67	56.5	60
Burkina Faso	7923	29	47.7	18.6	2.91	6.50	139	47.2	84
Cameroon	11359	18	42.5	14.5	2.80	5.79	94	52.9	78
Central African Republic	2907	5	44.3	20.1	2.42	5.89	132	45.0	84
Chad	5668	4	44.2	19.9	2.43	5.89	132	45.0	88
Côte d'Ivoire	11658	36	45.2	14.3	3.09	6.60	100	52.5	73
Egypt	52536	52	32.8	9.8	2.30	4.30	85	60.6	55
Ethiopia	50087	41	49.3	22.3	2.70	6.70	149	41.9	82
Ghana	16072	65	46.9	13.4	3.35	6.50	90	54.0	87
Kenya	25413	44	54.2	12.4	4.18	8.00	72	55.3	77
Libya	4331	2	43.9	9.4	3.45	6.87	82	60.8	53
Madagascar	11575	20	44.1	15.2	2.90	6.09	59	51.5	68
Mali	9362	9	50.1	20.8	2.93	6.70	169	44.0	88
Mauritius	1140	558	22.8	5.8	1.70	2.45	23	68.2	39
Morocco	24616	55	32.5	9.5	2.30	4.31	82	60.8	66
Mozambique	15972	20	45.2	18.4	2.69	6.09	141	47.3	95
Niger	7109	8	50.9	20.9	3.00	7.10	135	44.5	85
Nigeria	113343	123	50.5	15.7	3.48	7.10	105	50.5	80
Senegal	7377	38	46.4	19.4	2.70	6.50	131	45.3	71
Sierra Leone	3968	55	46.9	27.6	1.93	6.15	169	36.0	76
Somali	5169	8	47.7	22.6	2.51	6.60	149	41.9	87
South Africa	36754	30	37.9	12.7	2.52	4.94	72	55.5	52
Sudan	24895	10	44.2	15.4	2.88	6.38	106	50.3	77
Tunisia	7894	48	30.4	8.7	2.17	4.10	71	63.1	56
Uganda	18425	78	50.1	15.4	3.48	6.90	103	51.0	71
Tanzania	26998	29	50.3	13.9	3.64	7.10	106	53.0	75
Zaire	34852	15	44.8	14.5	3.03	6.09	98	52.0	84
Zambia	7912	11	47.9	13.7	3.42	6.76	80	53.3	74
Zimbabwe	10511	27	47.0	11.0	3.6	6.60	72	57.8	69

Source: United Nations (1986) *World Population Prospects: Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1984*. Human Suffering Index from Camp, S. L. and J. J. Speidel (1987), *The International Human Suffering Index*. Washington, D.C.: Population Crisis Committee.

of increase has declined somewhat to 3.5 per cent, although this is a provisional figure. Some countries that now seem to have low rates of natural increase will definitely experience a rise as mortality continues to decline, unless fertility declines rather precipitously.

The Theory of Demographic Transition

European demographic transition refers to generalizations developed from the work of a number of scholars (Thompson, 1929; Notestein, 1953; Coale, 1975, and others) which sought to describe and interpret the shifts or transformations that took place in nineteenth-century European population patterns. Generally, the demographic experience of Europe was characterized by a transition from a stage of high birth rates and high death rates to one of low birth rates and low death rates, driven by economic and social changes resulting from the process of modernization. Hence, the demographic transition is a shift from slow population growth, consequent upon high birth and death rates, to slow population growth, with both birth and death rates at low levels. In between, population growth fluctuated; first, it rose as death rates started to decline while birth rates remained stable, but slowed down when birth rates also started to decline.

Many of the generalizations on which the demographic transition theory was built have been questioned with regard to their universal applicability. For example, Van de Walle and Knodel (1980) have shown that Europe's fertility decline began under remarkably diverse socio-economic conditions. Thus the classic explanation of a small family norm arising from the shift from a rural–agrarian economy to an urban–industrial one has many exceptions,

even in Europe. This has led to the search for other factors which could have been germane in explaining fertility declines, such as the spread of a new mentality, cultural attitudes and influences on childbearing, diffusion of the idea of birth control, the importance of improvement in women's status and the direction of inter-generational wealth flow (Davis, 1963; Merrick, 1986; Caldwell, 1976).

Although the causal model posited by the transition theory has proven to be more elusive in the empirical data than in the theoretical propositions, it remains the most widely accepted in demography, and the basis on which perhaps most scholarly work has been done in the field of population. In an attempt to generalize the demographic experience of Europe into a theoretical framework, it has been widely suggested that the principles drawn from the European demographic experience would be applicable to the rest of the world. Indeed, Van de Walle and Knodel (1980) have shown that the demographic transition appears to be underway or maturing in a substantial number of developing countries, and at an unprecedented pace relative to the European experience. From all indications, Africa will be the last world region to accomplish the demographic transition.

Demographic Transition in Africa

Despite its doubtful predictive and explanatory power, the theory of demographic transition has been applied to developing countries. According to Teitelbaum (1975), although it is notably lacking in such components of causation and definite time scale, it has proved useful in generating some very useful general hypotheses. For example, its proposition that mortality generally responds more quickly than fertility to the forces of development has been true of African countries, and so has been the prediction of large population increases taking place in Africa for some three decades or so.

Caldwell (1976) has attempted to restate the demographic transition as applicable to Africa, and to explain why and when the transition takes place. He argues that the fundamental issue in demographic transition is the direction and magnitude of inter-generational wealth flows or the net balance of the two flows – one from parents to children, and the other from children to parents. According to Caldwell, the flow of wealth in much of Africa, as in all traditional societies, is from younger to older generations. A reversal occurs as the family becomes more nucleated, both emotionally and economically, as evidenced by changing attitudes towards the family and children.

The policy relevance of demographic transition in Africa is of particular interest because of the controversies with which the population issue is held by governments and intellectuals, following on from their interpretations of the theory as originally stated. Conflicting views have been enunciated based on different understandings and interpretations of the European demographic transition. There are fundamental differences between twentieth-century Africa and nineteenth-century Europe that will either enhance or delay timely completion of demographic transition among African countries. According to Teitelbaum (1975), the situation is a mixed one: in some respects, the different circumstances in Africa suggest great obstacles to the timely completion of the transition by means of natural decline in fertility, that is by socio-economic development as happened in Europe. In other respects, these differences provide reasons to anticipate an unusually rapid completion of the transition among African countries. They are briefly reviewed below.

1. Differences in Mortality Conditions: Being mainly internally generated, mortality declines in Europe were gradual and generally related to social and economic development and modernization. By contrast, mortality declines in Africa have been very rapid, mostly as a result of imported health and medical technologies which are often marginally related to the pace and level of general development (Teitelbaum, 1975; Van de Walle and Knodel 1980; Piotrow 1980). As Merrick (1986) observes, rapid mortality declines were due mostly to 'the development of systems for delivery of existing medical technologies to large numbers of people through mass vaccination, immunization, insecticide-spraying, etc., much of it an outgrowth of war-time efforts to keep the armed forces of industrialized countries healthy in tropical areas'. Thus, whereas the European mortality decline was attributed mostly to improved

living conditions, better diets and sanitation which preceded medical advancement (McKeown, 1976), in Africa, medical and public health measures preceded substantial improvement in living conditions and level of development. Since death rates in Africa are declining at much faster rates than was ever experienced in Europe, mortality levels are generally lower in Africa relative to Europe at equivalent stages of the transition, though as the factors that brought it about are less indigenous they have less impact on fertility.

2. Differences in Fertility Conditions: Marital fertility in pre-transitional Europe may have been as high as today's in African countries. However, overall birth rates in Africa are substantially higher (Teitelbaum, 1975; Van de Walle and Knodel 1980). This is due to the characteristic European pattern of late marriage and large proportions of the population who remained permanently unmarried in Europe (Hajnal, 1964), compared with early and near universal marriage in Africa.

Kenya's fertility experience, and those of other countries, suggest that fertility in Africa may have increased, or may increase in future as the characteristic long breast-feeding and accompanying post-pactum abstinence are eroded, as polygyny is reduced, and as health and nutritional status improve thereby reducing sterility, improving fecundity and successful parturition. However, the European fertility transition took place in the absence of effective birth control technology. By contrast, the availability in many African countries of improved and highly effective contraceptives, and their apparently unrestricted accessibility to the populace, may very well enhance fertility decline in Africa, enabling some African countries to complete demographic transition faster than Europe did.

3. Differences in Population Growth Rates: Resulting from decades of declining mortality and high and stable fertility in high population growth rates, the excess of births over deaths. The population growth rates being recorded in Africa are staggering by Western standards. The rate of natural increase in Africa is about 3 per cent annually, a doubling time of 23 years. By contrast, the annual population growth rates in Europe during their transition rarely fell below a doubling time of 50 years.

At the same time, African countries have a younger age structure than Europe had, with 45 per cent or more currently under age 15. Thus, Africa faces high population momentum or a greater potential for further growth. Even in the unlikely event that fertility in Africa declined to the replacement level, where individual couples have just the number of children needed to replace themselves (roughly, a total fertility rate of about 2 children per woman), the African population would continue to grow for many decades because of the in-built momentum. The undesirable effects of too-rapid population growth can, in theory, be mitigated by international migration, as indeed happened in nineteenth-century Europe when the New World acted as a safety valve for the excess population in many countries. African countries now facing rapid population growth have nowhere to export their excess population; few countries now are inclined to receive large numbers of people and uninhabited frontiers are now scarce.

The sustained population increases of the magnitude currently being experienced in many countries raise important challenges as well as major opportunities. The former arise from pressures of increased numbers on resources, environment and livelihood; the latter from the belief that population pressures generate opportunities and adaptations which affect productive techniques and organizations positively. The realities and perceptions of the challenges and opportunities emanating from population growth have been subject to intense national and international controversy. A brief review of this controversy as applicable to Africa is attempted here.

African Population Growth and Development

The popular Malthusian prediction is that population growth will sooner or later overwhelm the limits of the earth's finite stock of resources. That same line of argument has now been extended or re-stated by many scholars and groups, the so-called neo-Malthusians, and applied to Africa. On the other hand, the claim of diminishing returns of resources has been criticized

for its failure to recognize that, as resources are depleted, rising prices reduce consumption and speed the search for substitutes, stimulating technological change (World Bank, 1983). In fact, according to Julian Simon (1981; 1982), natural resources are not limited because population growth itself brings the adjustment that continually put off the doomsday predicted by Malthus. To him, 'The ultimate resources are people – skilled, spirited, and hopeful people – who will exert their wills and imaginations for their own benefit and so, inevitably, for the benefit of us all' (Simon, 1981: 348).

Versions of these two viewpoints are now discussed in light of Africa's population and development. Certainly, there are more than two views on the issue. However, the two presented here encapsulate the arguments, although space does not permit their elaboration.

Population growth is Africa's problem

According to the World Bank (1984), the current population growth in Africa is a phenomenon for which economic and demographic history offers no real precedent. Rapid population growth has been associated with virtually all the problems facing Africa, but particularly lack of development. It is pointed out that population growth rates exceeding 3 per cent annually in many African countries (in 70 years the population grows eight-fold) are alarming when compared with rates a little over 1 per cent annually in Europe at their time of 'rapid' population growth. At that same time, it is argued, 'Europe's agricultural production was progressing well, and overall development including improvements in environmental sanitation, food production, nutrition and industrial development accounted for and supported much of the change' (Sai, 1984: 802).

In the case of Africa, these conditions stagnate upon the heavy burden of the population pressure, and per capita income declines in many places rather than increases. Thus, this 'population hawk position' (Teitelbaum, 1974) maintains that unrestrained population growth in Africa is the principal cause of poverty, malnutrition, environmental disruption, and other social problems. Because of it, both the natural basis for human life and the complex fabric of modern institutions are showing signs of strain, conflict and erosion (Piotrow, 1980).

The direct relationship between population growth and education is often cited as a classic example of how population can hinder the attainment of national goals. According to Sai (1984), practically all African countries have policies for providing education to all children of primary school age, yet only a few of them approached the 100 per cent school enrolment target. Whether it is primary school, secondary school or adult literacy programmes the story is the same: the growth rate of school-age population is so rapid that the eradication of illiteracy will be be a far-fetched goal well into the next century.

The food situation in Africa has led to a renewed interest in Malthusian pessimism, and population pressure is held responsible for the acute food shortages in Africa and the impending catastrophe on food and agricultural production. This concern has been accentuated by the decade of African droughts, famine and increasing food insufficiency.

By World Bank estimates, per capita food production in the 1970s failed to keep pace with population growth in the majority of African countries; in a few only a slight increase in per capita food production was recorded (World Bank, 1984). Piotrow (1980) has further argued that largely because the number of mouths to be fed has been increasing so fast, more and more people do not get enough to eat, and in areas where many people are already severely malnourished, even keeping food-production level with population growth leaves millions hungry or inadequately nourished.

It is argued that the traditional method of farming, slash and burn or shifting cultivation, was productive when population pressures were small and there was enough land to allow for a fallow period of several years. With increasing population pressure a piece of land is now cropped annually, or at best left for only 1 or 2 years which is not enough for full recuperation given the low input of fertilizers. Bringing more land under cultivation in Africa is difficult on other counts: land reclamation and irrigation are very expensive, and development of vast areas of land is precluded because of such diseases as river-blindness and sleeping sickness (World Bank, 1984).

While recognizing that population pressure may not always be the main culprit, some analysts believe it contributed in no small way to environmental or ecological damage in Africa

by exacerbating the problems of desertification, deforestation and urban congestion or 'over-urbanization' (Piotrow, 1980; World Bank, 1984, 1986). Apart from agricultural expansion, another major cause of deforestation in Africa is the demand for firewood used by almost all rural dwellers and a large proportion of the urban population. It is estimated that in The Gambia and Tanzania, population growth has made wood so scarce that each household spends 250 to 300 worker-days a year gathering the wood it needs; also, in Addis Ababa, the price of fuel wood increased ten-fold during the 1970s and currently claims up to 20 per cent of household income (World Bank, 1984).

Desertification, or the gradual spreading of desert, is caused by overcropping, overgrazing and deforestation, all of which strip vegetation cover from the topsoil, depriving it of nutrients and organic matter, thereby exposing it to erosion from the sun and wind. It is believed that these direct causes themselves stem from the pressure of rapid population growth.

With respect to employment it is pointed out that high fertility countries face large increases in their labour force. Africa's high fertility in the 1970s guarantees that its working-age population (15–64), growing at more than 3 per cent per year, will double by the end of the century. The people who will enter the labour force in a decade or two are already here, and because of their large size, governments are hard put to providing them with jobs. The situation is worsened because the age structure of African countries means that birth rates will remain high for some time even if each mother has fewer children because of the in-built population momentum. It also means that the number of young people entering the labour force will continue to increase and provision of jobs will continue to be a major problem in Africa.

The characteristic failure to achieve planned health objectives in Africa, deteriorating health and nutritional status are also linked with rapid population growth. The budgetary allocation for providing preventive and curative services cheaply to a large and growing population has been staggering for many countries. Even primary health care has not been an accomplished reality in Africa for the same reason. Rapid population growth makes it increasingly costly to develop the health infrastructure – to build enough facilities, train enough personnel and provide enough funds to meet the health needs of the country – or otherwise affects the ability of a country to develop adequate and comprehensive health services.

Since the 1950s the foregoing viewpoints and more have been marshalled by those on the pessimistic side of the population/development controversy. African leaders are told that the unavoidable effect of rapid population growth within their boundaries will be slow deterioration, a declining quality of life and increasing difficulty in attaining development objectives (Berelson, 1975). They are given to understand that population growth puts added pressure on all the material elements needed for human life which they plan for: food, water, air, fuel, shelter, etc. It also aggravates all the main economic and social problems of the future, such as the high cost of energy and natural resources, widening illiteracy, unemployment, overcrowded cities, and even inflation (Piotrow, 1980). It is further argued that because of these pressures, governments often fail to meet even the most basic needs of the people, resulting in mass suffering; when they meet minimum standards of welfare they are unable to fulfil popular expectations. The resulting strain, conflict and breakdown take the form of economic, political and social turmoil which takes a heavy toll on the masses.

Governments are advised to pursue vigorously a course of bringing fertility down from its high level by formulating population policies specifically aimed at affecting the demographic processes, mainly fertility. As for rationale, governments are warned to consider the inconsistency between private and public interests, which is rooted in the presence of negative externalities attached to individual fertility behaviour (Davis, 1967; Demeny, 1975). By this logic the birth of a child, perceived as a gain for a single family, imposes costs on all other members of the society. Failure to act may result in the 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin, 1968).

As a result of these learned reasonings many African governments now support family planning programmes as a means of controlling rapid population growth. However, they are also warned that such programmes will not solve the problem; they come too little too late (Davis, 1967). They are fine as far as they go, but are wholly insufficient in scope and

strength to meet the desperate situation (Teitelbaum, 1974; Berelson, 1975). They are made to understand that the desperate situation resulting from rapid population growth necessitates draconian action to restrain such growth that may go 'beyond family planning' (Berelson, 1969).

However, in spite of the expressed pessimism, many African governments will still appear to feel either that the control of population growth is not relevant to their development problems or to the quality of life, or that the issues are too delicate and politically dangerous to deal with in a hurry.

Population growth is not Africa's problem

This view had manifested itself in many forms, including a pro-natalist government stance at international meetings, scholarly articles and discussions on the benefits of large numbers, ideological positions decrying unequal exchange and the dependency position of Africa in the centre–periphery relationship, public declarations which hail human ingenuity as a sufficient match for anticipated population problems. In this viewpoint, rapid population growth in Africa is a positive force on political, economic and social grounds.

It is commonly heard that Africa has a low density population by world standards, only about 21 persons per square km. The low densities of African countries have often been compared with high densities among non-African countries, developed and developing, and the conclusion has been obvious. If these countries can cope with such high densities African countries can as well (Ayida and Chikelu, 1975). Thus, it is commonly argued that Africa is underpopulated and operating below the optimum population level (Amin and Okediji, 1971).

Amin and Okediji observed that progress in agriculture and food production is enhanced by population pressure rather than handicapped. They cite some region of high population density in Africa – the Ibo and Bamileke regions, for instance – which have an 'extraordinary, better developed potential than the vast underpopulated zones'. Simon (1981), agrees, but also states that as population density increases transportation networks increase and improve – which enhances agricultural production for market rather than for subsistence. As land is settled more densely, new and better ideas develop, disease enclaves are wiped out, and more people create more resources (Simon, 1982). In Simon's view, population growth increases the pressure for a solution with respect to food, and other supplies, and increases the probability of a solution at any given time because more minds are at work on the problem. Boserup (1965) had earlier shown that population pressure has, in the course of history, been a favourable and decisive element in the intensification of agriculture and increase in productivity. Hence, Simon asserts, population growth may be a short-term problem, but a long-term blessing; man's ingenuity can overcome the population problem (Simon, 1981).

Likewise, it is held that other problems commonly attributed to population growth – slow development and industrial growth, unemployment, resource depletion, etc. – 'arise for reasons which have nothing to do with population growth; that the mechanisms behind the dependency of the Third World are at the root of its underdevelopment, and that this underdevelopment is seen in the increasing marginalization of its people (revealed by unemployment, underemployment, etc.), which gives the impression of relative overpopulation, this being the case whether population growth is high or low' (Amin and Okediji, 1971: 411). In short, this Marxist-Leninist view considers Africa's colonialism, capitalism and dependency as the cause of underdevelopment, and sees 'surplus' and 'surplus' population as a creation of the capitalist mode of production.

From this viewpoint, the negative effects of population growth are falsely ascribed and can be avoided by a proper re-organization of the economic order. It is held that more people do not necessarily lower standards of living provided society is organized correctly. For Africa, then, it is not population pressure or rapid population growth that is responsible for the so-called population problem and lack of development, but corruption, misallocation of resources, exploitation of the masses, and disparities in the ownership of resources, or otherwise the predominance of defective social and political organization. Thus, if 'social organization, and not population pressure, is responsible for the Malthusian dilemma, a re-organization of society itself will lead to solution of the problem' (Macura, 1974: 372).

The pro-natalist position also sees more people as beneficial for economic development because a large population provides necessary economies of scale and a sufficient supply of labour, and at the same time protects underpopulated countries from covetous neighbours. Even the World Bank (1984) agrees that in many sparsely populated African countries, faster population growth shortens the time required to reach the population size that provides economies of scale in transport, communications, social services, and production. Most African countries could benefit from such economies of scale, especially in the rural areas. By the same token, the big ones can increase their economic, political and military power. The argument has been that because no African country, except perhaps Nigeria, could be said to be large, in a world of economic and military uncertainty, the countries are highly vulnerable. By contrast, developing countries like China and India benefit from the sheer size of their domestic market and military potential.

On account of these views, the optimists see efforts to limit fertility as misplaced. Such undue emphasis on population programmes is an attempt by the developed countries to 'push family planning down our throat'. Likewise, talks about population problems are misguided, diverting attention from problems that really matter. After all, the World Population Plan of Action, adopted in Bucharest in 1974, has revealed the great wisdom that, 'of all things in the world, people are the most precious . . . Mankind's future can be made infinitely bright' (WPPA, 1974).

It is argued that large families are rational to Africa because children contribute to the success of the household enterprise, especially in farm work (Caldwell, 1977; Boserup, 1985). They are the primary means by which poor parents can achieve security at old age. African high fertility is also seen as a response to continued high mortality. Thus, the African peasant acts rationally in the face of environmental and resource needs; hence a reduction in infant and child mortality levels or provision of alternative forms of social security would naturally lead to a reduction of fertility. Large numbers of surviving children are certainly advantageous to the peasant, not disadvantageous; parents work harder to maintain them, and the children for their part, service and maintain their parents.

In the same vein, fertility decline is seen as a natural concomitant of social and economic development as proven by the European demographic transition experience. Fertility will not decline, it is claimed, until the basic causes of high fertility – poverty, ignorance, and fatalism, for example – are eliminated through social policies which result in redistribution of power and wealth among the rich and the poor (Teitelbaum, 1974). Unless broad-based development takes root, unless education becomes widespread, and unless the status and role of women improve, African fertility will remain high; take care of the people and the population will take care of itself. Pointing to the examples of recent fertility declines in a number of developing countries in Asia and South America, it is argued that their fertility decline emanated from social and economic development rather than from population programmes. Hence, development is viewed as the best contraceptive.

Following from this, African political elites and intellectuals have questioned the motivations of Western nations for actively pushing and financing family planning programmes in Africa. It is alleged that such international assistance, heavily concentrated on population programmes rather than on development itself, is 'short-changing general development programmes', or selling population control as a cheap means of achieving progress.

On the fear of scarcity of resources in a finite earth, it is commonly heard that it is the over-consumption of the super-powers that is responsible for resources depletion and environmental pollution, not the high fertility of developing countries. Even if fertility is too high in Africa, and in the developing countries generally, it is a consequence of their poverty, which in turn results from the super-consumption of world resources by the rich nations which make up about one-quarter of the world population but consume more than three-quarters of its resources.

Summarizing these views, Africa is neither overpopulated nor does it face population problems due to rapid population growth. Rather, increasing numbers are potential for development, and given the enormous stock of resources in Africa, there should be little concern over the ability to accommodate a population increase of 3 per cent annually. What Africa needs is a viable social organization, a more equitable exchange in the international

market and accelerated development that affects the grassroots. With all these in place, population will naturally take care of itself.

Resolving Africa's Population/Development Dilemma

Having summarized the positions of both the population growth optimists and pessimists we now attempt a reflection on the views articulated. There is hardly any doubt that population growth in Africa today is very rapid, the highest the world has witnessed, barring data quality. Both the pessimists and optimists are in agreement here; what is in dispute is whether it calls for urgent action or whether development will take care of it naturally. Also, it seems that rapid population has inhibited development efforts in many countries, though the role of institutional factors or obstacles may have been as important, if not more so in some countries. These include poor management and organization, unequal distribution of wealth and political power, corruption and misappropriation of funds, massive military spending, and misallocation and misdirection of resources and efforts. 'Rapid population growth exacerbates many of the resulting problems, but slow population growth will not remedy the situation without positive steps towards change' (Merrick, 1986: 29). Thus, while development will proceed better under a more just and egalitarian society, the complementary role of a low-growth population will pay off handsomely with regard to government development efforts and plans as a whole. Viewed this way, population growth is perhaps more of an accomplice than a villain in the relationships.

Different perceptions of the relations between population growth and development also stem from the difficulty of establishing 'scientific' proofs even from past experience. Even now the story of this relationship, and the demographic transition itself, is still unfolding. However, here lies the dilemma of policy-makers in Africa. If they wait for sure proof of the adverse effects of rapid population growth, it may be too late to stop such effects from playing themselves out (Merrick, 1986). Hence as Teitelbaum (1974) warns, policy-makers who ignore the available evidence and empirical realities do so at their nation's peril.

One may, however, argue that such countries do not have much to lose, anyway. Increasingly, international responsibility behoves rich countries and international organizations to rescue poor ones when they face difficulties, be it drought, economic crisis or population problems. So if a government takes no action now, when and if the 'peril' comes, help will certainly come in some form. This is faith, but it enables governments or parents who cherish large numbers to have and enjoy them in the short-term; if problems develop in the longer term the burden may be shifted.

Interestingly, however, more and more African countries now view some intervention to slow population growth as a matter of good judgement and common sense, even if not yet fully warranted on quantitative scientific grounds. This new orientation may have resulted from the publicity which the population has received both nationally and internationally, especially since the International Conference in Bucharest, Rumania, in 1974. Since then more countries have started to formulate population policies and put them into operation due to the great concern for population growth and development.

Reflecting the same change in attitude, at the International Conference in Mexico City, Mexico, in 1984, African nations endorsed the principle that governments should, 'as a matter of urgency', make family planning services 'universally available' (Finkle and Crane, 1985).

Before the Bucharest Conference of 1974, only three sub-Saharan African countries, Mauritius, Kenya and Ghana, had formulated population policies with a clear expression of concern for the rate of population growth as a factor in economic development (Sai, 1984). Only about 5 others approve of family planning for health and welfare of mothers and children. However, since 1974 views of African leaders seem to have changed with respect to population growth rates. The countries currently worried about their growth rate now include small ones like Botswana, Lesotho, The Gambia, and big ones, like Nigeria who recently announced a comprehensive population policy whose goals include the achievement of lower population growth rates, through reduction in birth rates by voluntary fertility regulation methods.

However, the effect of population policies are characterized by exceptionally long time-

lags. This is particularly true among African countries who have experienced very rapid growth for a fairly long time. Moreover, no matter what happens to fertility, it will still grow substantially over the coming decades because of in-built momentum; there is no short cut to it. At the same time, decline in mortality may itself raise the level of fertility because of improved health, reduced number of sterile couples, and decreased number of marriages that end by early death of one of the spouses. Thus, some of the short-term effects of modernization may actually increase fertility, rather than decrease it, unless the increase in use of contraception intervenes to cancel them out. In the long-term, however, modernization or development could be expected to motivate people to have smaller families.

Evidence accumulated over decades demonstrates that population programmes can have significant effects on fertility if they are effectively implemented. Well-formulated programmes are necessary, together with strong commitment on the part of the government; weak ones might as well not exist as far as fertility reduction is concerned (Mauldin and Berelson, 1978). Given a certain level of motivation to reduce fertility, effective and visible programmes enhance its realization, in addition to increasing motivation to reduce fertility. So, family planning, which is a fundamental human right, may have an independent effect on fertility reduction, therefore, its introduction, which should be an integral part of development planning, may be rewarding.

High pace of social-economic development could substantially overcome the problem created by rapid population growth, but there are few countries in Africa experiencing high levels of development. Africa is easily the poorest region in the world; per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa in 1982 averaged only $482, or $354 if Nigeria is excluded (World Bank, 1984). So, waiting for development to do the feat may be counter-productive.

Indeed, rapid rate of Africa's population growth is not the root cause of Africa's development problem. However, it cannot be ignored in dealing with the complex developmental and resources problems plaguing the continent. Population programmes and development complement each other; the relationship between them is often mutually reinforcing.

Closing the Demographic Gap in Africa

The transformation in birth and death rates from high to low equilibrium which took place in nineteenth-century Europe has been termed the demographic transition. Similar changes have taken place in European populations outside Europe, and more recently in Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea etc. at a faster pace. African countries will be the last to pass through this process. Mortality has scarcely dropped from its high level. The resulting demographic gaps or time-lag have been marked by rapid population growth, at a pace clearly unprecedented in world history. It is our view that neither development as currently conceived, nor family planning programmes, as currently being pushed, are sufficient in closing the demographic gap in Africa.

Obviously the causes and pace of the demographic transition in Europe are different relative to Africa. Whereas the European morality and rationality brought about a more or less synchronous decline of mortality and fertility, with a short time-lag or a little gap between the two, the underlying social and mental realities in Africa are different. In Africa, the processes regulating death rates and birth rates do not exhibit the characteristic causal interconnection experienced in Europe, hence the wide gap between them – country after country, and consequently the longer the pace that would be required for the demographic transition to complete.

Because good health and longer life are desirable, Western discoveries in health and medicine were a welcome relief to Africa's high death rates. At the same time, they are conducive to the achievement of the characteristic African rationality for a large family. A large family size is rational in traditional African societies for social, emotional, cultural and economic reasons. It is evident from data from virtually all African countries that only the relatively few who have moved away from the traditional milieu seem to have experienced incipient declines in their fertility. It is no coincidence that this segment is the more affluent, urban, educated and elitist class. Those who have, by omission or commission, suffered most from the forces of the colonial and post-colonial African Development strategies, the masses

of the population, rural, poor and powerless, would be acting irrationally if they started to limit their families. Doing so is suicidal. After all, children are wealth, and the more one has the better off one is.

This rationale accounts for the low acceptance of birth control services, even in places where they are provided cheaply, or free. As for the build of the African population, only grassroots involvement in the development process will bring about a change in mentality and rationality in the desired direction, and also engender a high sense of belonging-ness and security. And as happened in Europe, this change in demographic behaviour should be within the calculus of conscious individual choice. This urgently calls for a progressive social change in Africa, and a more just and egalitarian society, where an individual's perception of his chances and opportunities in the new social order would guide his family decisions.

Since most Africans are tied to the land, dynamic and progressive social change should necessarily develop the agricultural base in ways that do not proletarize the masses; develop-ment efforts should be from the bottom up; and a large part of the African population should cease to be marginalized by government policies, most of which are externally advised. A radical transformation of the social and economic environment is necessary for a sustained reduction of birth rates. Under such a situation, once begun, the decline would be expected to proceed at a much more rapid pace than it did historically in Europe.

Cuba's recent experience bears this out, as do the experiences of Taiwan, Korea, and Thailand, capitalist countries who developed policies deliberately designed to benefit the masses of their population. Progressive social change is possible in Africa. All that is lacking are a clear ideological mentality, more inward-looking policies, proper management, and a high level of commitment and foresight on the part of the leadership. The necessary political will certainly goes beyond development strategies that simply maintain the status quo, as well as population policies and programmes that are put together with little consideration of the social realities of the masses for whom they are made. Such programmes are doomed to failure in a social milieu where a larger, rather than smaller family size is both rational and desirable.

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5 The Persistence of High Fertility in Africa & Prospects for Fertility Decline

EDWARD K. MBURUGU

Introduction

In the mind of many policy-makers around Africa, population and development are seen as inextricably interwoven. Consequently, development cannot proceed at a rapid pace if population growth rates are not regulated in a manner to allow higher economic growth rates. In recent years, authoritative bodies such as the World Bank have been quick to attribute the absence of economic growth and in some cases falling standards of living among African countries to the excessively high population growth rates.

The high rate of population growth in Africa is mainly due to declining mortality rates (especially infant and childhood mortality) when fertility levels have remained as high as they were traditionally, and in some cases risen above the traditional levels. This is particularly true of Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Uganda (World Bank, 1986: Table 1). Indeed some of these countries have become aware of constraints to development in areas of health, education, employment, and rural industrialization and agricultural production, arising from an excessively high population growth rate. Accordingly, these countries have directly or indirectly attempted to incorporate the population factor into their development plans, as well as encourage programmes of fertility control especially in Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Ironically, it is in countries experiencing relatively high socio-economic development in areas of education, non-agricultural employment, changes from subsistence to cash cropping, and increasing levels of urbanization along with expanding family planning programmes, where fertility is high and continues unabated (World Bank, 1986; Henin 1982: 28–9; Olusanya 1969; Olusanya 1967).

These observations in Africa and other developing regions are not in keeping with the expectations of the Western-based demographic transition theory, thus nearly ruling out its applicability in Third World countries (Caldwell 1976; Teitelbaum 1975; Freedman 1979). Meanwhile, Africa and the rest of the Third World, with more than 75 per cent of the world population, potentially stand to create serious economic and environmental problems at the global, regional and national levels. The increasingly loud cry for environmental preservation, though largely associated with industrial problems of the Western countries, has the Third World (including Africa) indicted on account of either large populations, and/or unbearably high population growth rates.

The high population growth rate in Africa is largely due to both the aggregative and cumulative record of fertility at the family level. And this is occurring despite socio-economic developments that were expected to influence fertility declines in keeping with predictions of the demographic transition theory. For example, if we take Kenya as an illustrative case, we note, that women in the childbearing years could not only expect to have about eight children at the end of their reproductive years, but they could also expect the number to rise in the future, if the record of the last three censuses is an indicator of a continuing trend. Thus the 1962, 1969, 1979, and 1989 censuses show total fertility rates (TFR) were 6.8,

7.6, 8.1 and 7.7 respectively (Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 1980: 89, and informal news on the 1989 Census).

It is further observed that in successive decades there has been an increase in the number of children born by women in their last reproductive years, i.e. 45–49-year-old women. Again, the three censuses of 1962, 1969 and 1979 show that the average number of children born by these women were 5.9, 6.7 and 7.9 respectively. Furthermore, it is shown that 76 per cent of the women in childbearing years desire six or more children, while 87 per cent of them have never used efficient contraceptive methods in an effort to limit family size (Dow and Werner 1982: 13, figure 2).

These observations based on the Kenya censuses represent patterns of demographic developments to be found in most sub-Saharan countries. By all measures, these are demographic developments that cannot be sustained in the long run without dire consequences to the economy and the well-being of the people. It is strange that in some areas where the land carrying capacity has been exhausted due to population pressure and land over-use, birth rates continue to be high even in absence of out-migration to other areas (Safilios-Rothschild and Mburugu, 1986). It is, therefore, in order to search for some viable explanations for high fertility in Africa despite evidence of significant socio-economic developments that have influenced fertility decline in Western countries.

Why does High Fertility Persist?

Reasons for persistently high fertility in Africa are largely due to the *form of development* that has the effect of generating social problems although, ironically, this development proceeds with the intention of solving these problems. In general it can be said that the kind of inputs that are brought to bear on this development are not compatible with the social and cultural systems in Africa.

If we take an obvious example, it can be said that the mortality decline in Africa is divorced from the process of socio-economic development to the extent that this decline is caused by the 'diffusion of death-control techniques' which do not depend on the 'diffusion of other cultural elements or changes in the institutions and other customs of the people' (Davis and Blake, 1956: 314).

The demographic transition theory, which in the West was predicated on economic development, saw mortality decline as a direct consequence of this development. In Africa and other developing regions, it is not now necessary that economic development be registered before mortality declines because death-control techniques can be transferred without institutional changes that were associated with economic development in the West.

Similarly, fertility decline (or lack of it) can be seen in this light. The decline of mortality in Europe, even if slow, still assured the society of a higher survival rate of children; and furthermore the industrial economic development which actually took place made it increasingly obvious that too many children would be incompatible with development. In Africa, however, the situation is different. Not only is mortality decline (especially infant mortality) rapid, thus leaving the society unaware of the increased child survival that would make it unnecessary to have many children, but there is no economic development that would increase the opportunity costs of children. The decline in mortality in absence of economic development results in increased poverty as more and more children survive to share the limited resources. On the other hand, failure to create economic opportunities for non-familial employment results in taking recourse to the only goals there are to promote, namely, family building goals.

The effect of inappropriately and externally induced development in the context of plural societies, which most African societies are, is to sharpen social and cultural differences between primary units of organization such as lineages, clans and tribes. By virtue of their differences in social organization, these units will respond differently to externally induced forms of development. The manner in which they respond will also have implications for fertility. For example, an ethnic group may internalize Western values of permissiveness, uninhibited communications between the sexes and non-observance of sex taboos such as sexual abstinence during lactation. The consequences of internalization of these values for

fertility can be far reaching. For example, the general social disorganization resulting in prostitution and adolescent fertility may largely be due to these values.

Fertility can also be enhanced if these groups (e.g. lineages and clans) exist as autonomous units when the form of development cannot reduce differences between them. It is a known fact that such small groups tend to heighten their fertility performance (if only unconsciously) as a form of challenge to other antagonist groups. There is reason to think that this is more the case in West Africa than it is in East Africa.

The fact that high fertility in Africa persists with no signs of downturn, has posed a serious problem for population theory. The demographic transition theory that was central in shaping many research undertakings for decades has now been relegated to a position of irrelevance with respect to the African demographic situation. But a number of perspectives have emerged in recent years and seem to address the population problem in Africa. Again, these perspectives seem to be flawed with either theoretical shortcomings or methodological weaknesses. In the case of one of the perspectives, its formulation and testing was done in Latin America although it could equally be placed in Africa. It is to these perspectives we now turn.

New Perspectives on African Fertility

Attempts to explain high fertility in Africa are recent and the explanatory models have not been fully tested to the satisfaction that would merit serious attention to these models. At best these approaches to the study of African fertility should be taken as insufficient first attempts to understand an unprecedented as well as an unexpected demographic behaviour. Furthermore, Africa, being a region of immense diversity in social organization, cannot be easily captured by a single model since fertility behaviour is an expression of the 'requirements' of each of these modes of organization. It should be emphasized that explanations of high fertility may not also exhaust possible variations in forms of community organization within a country. This then makes it difficult to generalize on the applicability of an explanatory model within a country, aside from generalizing at a regional or continental level.

• The first theoretical model that has been widely discussed and still continues to command attention is the Caldwell's theory of fertility decline. His theory is based on inter-generational wealth flows which in turn dictate whether high or low fertility is seen as desirable. According to this theory (Caldwell 1976; Caldwell 1982) it is believed that in all traditional societies, of which African societies represent the best living examples, the inter-generational wealth flow is directed to the older generation from the younger one. The wealth flow in this sense should not only be seen in form of economic goods but more fundamentally in form of social goods that include systems of deference, obedience and social guarantees for all manner of supports to the older generation, especially supports given to parents in old age.

Fertility in traditional societies is high because the wealth flow is directed to the older generation, away from the younger generation. Thus parents see no need to limit fertility because to do so is to deny themselves of this important resource. Therefore, fertility cannot be expected to decline until there is a reversal of this flow, in which wealth flows have to be directed to the younger generation. It is suggested that nowhere in Africa has this inter-generational wealth flow been reversed so that children, and not their parents, become the recipients of this wealth. When the wealth flow is reversed and directed to children, the downturn in fertility begins, according to Caldwell.

It is further thought that in traditional society the wealth flow to the older generation is only true of those societies operating with the system of the extended family because it is then that parents see the need to control and benefit from the youth. The extended family largely operates for the purpose of ensuring that social and economic obligations are maintained – and these obligations are nothing more than social and economic guarantees in support of the older generation. The extended family can therefore be perceived more in economic than in emotional terms.

Caldwell suggests that it might be useful to explore factors which would lead to the 'economic and emotional nucleation' of the family in Africa since the existence of the

extended family in traditional societies has been associated with inter-generational wealth flows from the younger to the older generation and that the factors that are likely to reverse this flow are also likely to predict a downturn in fertility (Caldwell 1976). His recommendation is that we examine the nature of the peasant economy with a view to locating decision-making units in the 'relations of production'. In Africa, economic and reproductive decision-making is done by elders, especially males. Noting that 'it is the internal economy and the relations of production of the peasant family which, in terms of production are dominant and, in terms of demographic decision-making, are central', he further concludes that 'power in economic decision-making means power in demographic decision-making' (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1978: 7–9).

In a recent review of the demographic situation in Africa since Caldwell formulated his theoretical perspective in 1976, it was observed that 'there is little evidence that polygamy has declined', and that 'the conjugal link does not appear to be strengthening in emotional and economic terms except among small urban elites'. Noting that women in African social systems are important not only because they bear children but also because they do most of the agricultural work, the authors think that 'the most likely source of change in fertility patterns is the growing determination of women to extend their very considerable economic independence into the reproductive domain' (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1990: 123–4).

This looks like a compelling approach to the study of African fertility although it has not been tested. However, the major limitation of the theory is the fact that no explanation of the reversal of wealth flow is given. Thus indicators as well as causal factors in fertility downturn are not specified. To be sure, Caldwell talks of the Western type of education and lifestyle as some of the factors that will promote economic and emotional nucleation of the family and thus force parents to value investments in education and thus lower fertility. But it is not clear how this fits with the theory of inter-generational wealth flow.

At this point it might be useful to point out that Caldwell's theory fails to recognize the importance of socio-cultural and economic changes propelled from above by African states – changes which have somewhat contradictory, both positive and negative effects. On the one hand these changes may foster higher levels of social security among families by integrating community institutions with social and economic structures at regional, national, or even global levels. On the other hand there are obvious social and economic constraints imposed on families and village communities from the higher regional and national structures. It will be shown a little later that choices of action taken by such local units are closely guided as a result of such types of constraints from above.

In the area of fertility, these higher level pressures thus could either be perceived positively (if they help to create conditions for secure family life) or negatively (if they militate against sound family life). The way these pressures are perceived can in important ways result in either sustained high fertility or declining fertility. As has been observed elsewhere, attempts to explain fertility changes, especially in developing countries, must reckon with the possibility that 'historically developed structures are processes that define people's options, and the motivations and strategies, conscious and unconscious, that actors employ to achieve their goals' (Greenhalgh, 1990: 95).

An important implication of the theory, however, is that women, like children in a traditional society, direct their efforts and resources to the upkeep of the older male generation. In this sense, women are as much controlled by men as are children. Therefore, whatever developments there are that enhance the status of women in society, they will also enhance women's autonomy in a manner to enable them to participate in both economic and demographic decision-making. When this happens, fertility is likely to decline since excessive childbearing which gains women status through approval by men will no longer be perceived by women in this manner (Safilios-Rothschild, 1982).

Suggestive signals pointing to potential fertility decline in rural Kenya seem to be associated with women's access not only to income-generating activities, but even more significantly to ideological changes which allow women to control their income. It is observed that higher contraceptive use in Kenya's rural areas is in areas where women are generating and controlling their income which, when used to hire labour, serves to decrease the need to use children for labour (Safilios-Rothschild and Mburugu, 1986).

• The second approach is one that has come to be characterized as the socio-economic threshold hypothesis that was developed by the United Nations bodies but found fuller expression in the work of Srikantan (1977). According to this hypothesis, there is a combination of development factors which operate jointly until a 'threshold' level is reached that forces fertility down.

An important provision in this theory is that these development factors must operate at a community level, therefore, the hypothesis cannot predict fertility at the individual level. It is further noted that demographic 'research should give more attention to the community as a structural setting for individual behaviour and for interaction with the environment'. A conceptual framework that was found useful in predicting demographic behaviour recognized three relative positions, constituting the social structure that influences individual behaviour. These three positions were (a) 'social classes and their roles in ownership and management of the production process; (b) social groups – their roles and influence in the distribution of output and social rewards; and (c) shifts in the levels and distribution of social output between the corporate and private sectors of society' (United Nations, 1977: 6).

The factors that have been considered to be critical in this hypothesis include: percentage of the population in urban areas, percentage of literate women, percentage of population reading newspapers, doctor/population ratio, nurse/population ratio, percentage of the labour force in non-farm employment, percentage of enrolment of school-age population and the level of infant mortality rate. It is clear that all these factors are indicators of socio-economic development, especially in developing countries. Any country or community that ignores these factors cannot be said to be on the right path in development.

It is hypothesized that in the joint operation of these factors, a threshold level is reached where the community finds it necessary to reduce fertility. It is then assumed that fertility in Africa remains high because the 'critical' threshold level in development has not been reached.

This is an approach which captured some interest initially, but now seems almost neglected on account of being untestable. According to the approach, different societies and communities can enter into the process of fertility decline at different threshold levels depending on the social and cultural idiosyncrasies associated with the development factors. However, it is impossible to state when the threshold level will be reached. Moreover, there would be no point in getting enthusiastic in undertaking these development efforts when the major goal is to reduce fertility if the critical level for fertility decline is left to chance – indeed the threshold level may never be attained, so to speak.

• The third approach, characterized as the 'theory of family change' has been formulated by Rosen (1982) and placed in the context of industrialization. It is observed that any social system must seek a 'fit' between the family and society. As industrialization proceeds, this 'fit' is always needed as forces that tend to disrupt the family increase. In the process of industrialization, the family offers emotional shelter in a society where individualism and alienation is widespread. The family becomes a haven in which to dispel the tensions created by demands of industrial life. It offers a safe social network in which to relax. Therefore, the social role of the family is its basic element.

Industrialization makes for changes in family roles by changing the behaviour of the personalities of the people who perform these roles. But most family roles survive the onslaught by giving new form and content to their roles as spouses, parents, children. The forces of industrialization that allow family change and in consequence fertility change can be stated in a number of generalizations.

First, industrialization strengthens kinship ties in a developing society which values the extended family. Secondly, with industrialization, the relationships between husband and wife 'become more demonstrative, communicative, and egalitarian'. Thirdly, the liberal sex role attitudes that arise with industrialization enhance the wife's power in the family which in turn lowers fertility. Fourthly, industrialization democratizes the relationship between parent and child and further increases achievement motivation of its members. The achievement motivation will tend to vary with the culture and social structure of different societies (Rosen 1982: 293–8).

It is further pointed out that the degree of industrialization varies with the size of communities although the relationship is not always there. It is possible, as in most societies of Africa, to observe large communities and towns with minimal industrialization.

It is also noted that although fertility in Western countries was found to decline with the increasing size of communities, this was in so far as the size of the communities was associated with industrialization. This makes it understandable why high fertility levels are observed in African towns and other large communities contrary to what one would expect. In Africa it can be said that urbanization is proceeding independently of industrialization, and that not until a relationship is forged between them will fertility decline. By implication, this means that there is need for increased rural industrialization if fertility is to decline in rural areas where the bulk of the African population resides.

Industrialization affects fertility through family structures, especially the power relationships between family members. Thus it is observed that fertility declines with a wife's power to make decisions. As a wife's power increases, communication with the husband increases resulting in joint agreement on the number of children to have.

It is questionable, however, how far the industrial approach to fertility decline is relevant to the African setting. Perhaps this is more a problem of methodology than a problem of theory. It is difficult to spell out instances of industrialization in Africa since the force of traditionalism could be equal to, if not stronger than industrialization in so far as this is seen from the standpoint of individuals or communities. In Africa it is perhaps the case that industrialization serves 'traditional goals' rather than traditional goals being influenced by industrialization.

A Possible Breakthrough for Fertility Decline

It is worth noting that while many scholars have provided perspectives on demographic transition in developing countries, only Caldwell has seriously focussed attention on African fertility. He has indeed been the most successful writer in advancing the thinking that the case of Africa's high fertility is unique and that its transition to lower fertility will have to be explained by factors different from those that explained fertility decline in Europe, or those likely to be associated with demographic transition elsewhere in the Third World.

In doing this, Caldwell has rightly sensitized us to the African social, economic, cultural, and more importantly, developmental context of fertility behaviour – a context constituting a combination of factors that are indeed different from those prevailing elsewhere in the Third World, or those that ever prevailed in Europe at the comparable stage of its demographic transition. Thus unlike other regions of the world, both currently and historically at the comparable stage of demographic transition, Africa holds an unenviable position of being the poorest region as well as a region whose national states have a long distance to travel on the road to being solidly viable national societies.

However, Caldwell in formulating his theory does not delve into these frustrating predicaments of the current situation in Africa. These two issues cannot be ignored in any theory of development, including the theory of fertility decline. Thus the 'intergenerational wealth flow' that is the pivot of Caldwell's theory suggests no developmental factors which will reverse the flow, nor does it recognize the importance of ensuring societal stability in a changing society based on the integration of local units with wider regional and national structures.

He also places great value on external influences, especially those that arise from education and exposure to Western values. The indigenous local forces and the question of how they are compatible or incompatible with developments in the larger society is an issue entirely ignored – yet in our view, this is a central issue in the attempt to predict fertility decline in Africa. Quite possibly, there are variations in levels of integration between local communities and regional and national economic-socio-political structures. Thus the social and economic life of some communities could be well synchronized with structural arrangements at the national level in terms of market accessibilities, political influence, degree of cooperation between local and national leadership, and so on. Other communities could be very poorly synchronized in such respects.

It is the view here that changes in the traditional mode of life that sustain the family

in Africa (e.g. the land tenure system, extended kinship obligations, attachment to ancestral spirits, and so on) create fear and uncertainty which has fertility implications in two ways:

(a) Fertility could increase in response to undesirable changes in order to maximize social insurance and survival.

(b) Fertility could decrease if the changes generate countervailing forces which serve to reduce insecurities and anxieties among families. These countervailing forces must strengthen the sense of national integration through extra-local interactions, use of common language, and access to national markets for locally produced goods.

It is important to emphasize that these changes must be internally generated although external facilitators may be a factor.

Basic to the concept of 'survival' that is the key to predicting fertility decline, is the perception by common people of how social institutions at higher regional or national levels actually help to control the forces of death at lower levels of family and community life. Thus, if as a result of regional or national neglect, a sense of insecurity, marginalization, and uncertainty is generated among local communities, due to blocked access to the market, failure of communication systems, incompatibility between national and local goals, and so on, then this sense of insecurity could result in heightened fertility since fertility is the basic form of social survival.

If a breakthrough is to be made for fertility decline in Africa, it must begin by recognizing the permanent existence of the kinship related units of social organization at the local level. These groups are family and kinship, lineages and clans. These units of social organization must be taken as permanent features in African social organization. The evidence is glaring that not even in the extreme form of social and cultural subjugation has it been possible to reduce their determination to exist or to exert their influence. In fact they seem to find their strength in situations of stress, whether this stress is generated from within or from without. Social differentiation of their members through education, occupation or migration generates resources that build into the strength of these groups (although some exceptions to this are inevitable).

The second admission that has also to be made is the inevitability of national states in Africa, now and in the future. National states are growing stronger year by year as they bend to their whim all the lower level groupings and organizations. In Africa, national states are relatively new, judged by the standards of western Europe or Asia. By virtue of their recency, they have to build themselves to a level where they are able to command national integration.

It could be said that the major social problems that can be identified, including population problems, poverty and crime, are new and are more of a problem to the national state than the local lineage and the clan group, who traditionally never had to contend with them.

An integration between these two levels is needed if African states are to work as viable states. There are no states without people, or rulers without subjects, but the relationships between them must be based on social and cultural congeniality between them. It must be emphasized that for most African societies, allegiance was first given to the local kinship groups before it could extend to other groups. Today, allegiance is expected to be given primarily to the state; much less is expected to be directed to the local groups. Yet, these local groups are the ones the individual knows and from which he benefits.

There is therefore a need for integration between the national and local organizational groups. This relationship should develop without compromising the interests of both, an exercise that is as difficult as it is necessary. The relationship should translate into observable benefits, the most important ones being security based on fulfilment of basic needs such as food and shelter. Higher goals and needs cannot be achieved in the absence of these primary requirements.

It is important to understand the nature of African social structure in the attempt to promote national integration between the two levels. Perhaps what we are witnessing in Africa today is a self-defeating exercise of pursuing our social goals through methods that are not legitimated in our social structure.

Indeed, it is one thing theoretically to perceive a way out of this dilemma, and quite

another to employ practical strategies for resolving the dilemma. While it may not be contested that countries in Africa need to increase their levels of integration between locally based organizations (whether families, lineages, clans and/or tribes) and national structures, it is quite debatable which form of political economic approach would best succeed in attaining this goal. The plural nature of African societies is perhaps the major impediment to the achievement of correctly defined developmental goals. This impediment is further strengthened through the often observable correlation between cultural plurality and inequalities in both the economic and political standing of groups of people within the polity. Consequently increased poverty with respect to some segments of national populations has tended to be associated with declining poverty among progressively smaller segments of the populations.

Viewed internally within the country, it would appear that increased poverty among an increasing number of African countries is a problem of distribution of resources, be they economic, social or political in nature. To some extent this is indeed the case, although it has been argued that economic inequalities for developing countries (e.g. in Africa) have long-term benefits if the richer entrepreneurial groups utilize their resources in investing for the future. Admittedly, this is not what is happening since hardly any African country has a modicum of what can be called a 'national bourgeoisie' that would be keen on making such investments (Hydén, 1983). Rather, it is an illusion to perceive the tiny (almost demographically insignificant) group of well-to-do as doing better than the poorer group in the context of national development. For the most part, the richer minority is tagged on to the global system where the terms of exchange (be they economic, social or political in nature) are increasingly unfavourable to the nations of sub-Saharan Africa (Amin, 1972). Perhaps the economic gap between Africa and the industrialized countries of western Europe and America is far greater than the economic gap between the rich and the poor within African countries. Yet, both of these gaps are widening with Africa drifting into increased marginality in the global context, and therefore experiencing increased poverty.

The point made earlier concerning prospects of fertility decline can now be repeated here; that not until Africa begins to experience higher levels of social and political development, can we expect fertility decline at an aggregate level. Fertility, being a game of survival, cannot decline in a setting where due to increasing poverty, the infant mortality rate is once again rising. Yet, all this is happening in Africa while higher levels of development are being experienced at the global level.

It is precisely due to this global generalization of development that a clear difference has to be made between (a) structure of development, and (b) level of development. Central to the idea of development is the structure of development, which is necessarily historical. Thus changes in structure of development must be accompanied by changes in mentalities and behaviours that allow for real integrated development. According to Himmelstrand, 'the level of development cannot be ascertained without first establishing the structure of development as conceived in contexts which enable us to take note of *what is possible at given historical junctures*' (see Chapter 1 in this book).

The idea of synchronization of development components was important for European development throughout industrialization. Demographically, declines in European birth and death rates were relatively synchronized with the slow developments in industrialization and innovations (as well as inventions) in sanitation, medical care and treatment. No such synchronization is discernible in Africa where death rates are externally reduced (through technological transfer) while birth rates are internally generated through the traditional social structures. In Africa the two causal processes affecting death rates and birth rates are not causally linked together in the manner in which they were in the demographic transition of Europe.

In absence of synchronization of development components through historical change, Africa must learn to synchronize the following immediate components of development (see Himmelstrand, 1990).

1. Creation of the ability of individual nations to use their own resources (e.g. land, minerals, and manpower) to feed themselves, even in the face of high population growth rate.

2. Promotion of the acceptance of shared transaction rules (through consent or struggle) regulating relationships between the main actors involved in economic and social activities and the general public who must see them as legally and morally binding.

3. Acceptance of the principle of indigenous entrepreneurship, ensuring sound management in food production, and production of agricultural tools, and other capital goods.

4. The development of an international trade based on export/import relationships while avoiding unequal terms of exchange.

5. Creation of the conditions for the growth of autonomy, self-rule, and democracy without external imposition of structural conditionalities which unfairly influence the direction of social and economic policies.

Given these components of development, it would appear that the most critical ones at present are those that hinge on indigenously organized abilities to promote higher levels of cooperation aimed at production and distribution of goods and services, primarily for domestic markets and only secondarily for global markets. Accordingly, acceptance of shared transaction rules regulating relationships between the main political actors and the general public's social and economic domains, and the acceptance of principles of indigenous entrepreneurship in managing production and distribution of goods and services, with food production given the highest priority, would greatly help to raise the levels of meaningful development. With this meaningful development, it is then easier to bargain for equal terms of exchange in international trade, as well as to strengthen conditions for the growth of autonomy, self-rule, and democracy without external constraints.

This is the kind of social stability the local units of social organization (e.g. families) need in order to perceive an assured level of survival that does not call for an excessive number of children. It is a level of social security based on functional social and economic integration between local and national structures.

Since in Africa there was no synchronized development of the above components historically, immediate solutions have to be found to face the current high population growth rates. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the masses should be made poorer in the short run in order for their income to increase in the long run. Thus there has to be 'a transfer of resources to classes which have a tendency to invest, from the majority of workers and peasants and civil servants to the minority of entrepreneurs . . .' (Mamdani, 1989: 34. See also Mamdani's chapter in this book). But as Mamdani has demonstrated empirically there is no guarantee that the well-to-do classes will in fact be entrepreneurial, and invest in needed production for domestic markets. In this case, the IMF policy is unlikely to bring about a synchronized development of the various components as indicated above.

Certainly, there are no 'shortcuts' to development based on long-term investments. This requires that trade-offs be made although the nature of the trade-offs has not been resolved. Whatever trade-offs are made, they must be seen to either directly or indirectly enhance local and national security, especially in economic terms. However, economic benefits should not be viewed in the simple tangible gains of the here-and-now. More importantly, they must be seen to feed into future hopes and promises. This then becomes economic investment not so much in economic terms as in social terms. This is the kind of development the various aspects of which need to be synchronized in a manner which will encourage the control of high fertility in Africa.

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6

Development Theory & Changing Trends in Sub-Saharan African Economies 1960–89
BENEDICT S. MONGULA

Introduction

Since attaining independence, countries of sub-Saharan Africa have pursued various economic and political policies with a view towards rapid development. Guided by the objectives of, amongst others, economic growth, social equity and nationalism, those countries followed at various times and scale the strategies of high capital formation, nationalist economic regulation, socialism, basic human needs and economic stabilization and recovery.*

Partly as the outcome of their strategies and processes, and partly due to the world political and economic climate, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa enjoyed a shortlived period of growth and social and political stability followed by economic crisis. While it is difficult to attribute exactly the roles of internal and external factors towards the situation that prevailed in those countries, there is no doubt that the Middle East crisis and more recently the Gulf Crisis, as well as the world trade and financial structures and trends, had a tremendous impact on those countries.

The economic crisis that has characterized sub-Saharan Africa over the last decade has opened the way towards major economic and political reforms. Those reforms were partly conditions set by external donors. The crisis, comprising a budget and balance-of-payments deficit, inflation, external indebtedness, shortages of goods in shops, overexpanded and inefficient state economic sector, corruption and a burgeoning second or parallel economy has led to reversals of a number of popular strategies and policies of the 1960s and 1970s, in favour of deflationary policies, trade and economic liberalization and support for the private sector of the economy. On the political front, the crisis has also marked a point of departure for multi-party democracy.

The idea of liberalization and support for the private sector represents a shift and in fact a reversal from dependency theory related policies, to growth theory based on policies. The shift was in part inspired by the achievements scored in South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan where unlike in Africa during the 1970s liberalization policies were actively pursued. However, the problem with the blind admiration of the performance in the countries of South East Asia is that it did not consider the specific conditions of those countries, including their colonial and neo-colonial relations with the US and Britain, their small geographical sizes, their dependent and foreign controlled economies, and their social instability and repression. In fact, the political context under which those countries achieved their economic growth is quite different from the one which the donors are recommending for sub-Saharan Africa.

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* A few countries like Kenya, Ivory Coast and Gabon did not try the socialist strategy, and remained unambiguously pro-capitalist.

Sub-Saharan Africa: From Economic Buoyancy to the Economic Bedrock

Statistics on sub-Saharan Africa reveal promising, sometimes impressive economic growth amongst the countries of the region during the 1960s and the early part of the 1970s. Many countries enjoyed growth rates of over 5 per cent, which was quite impressive when compared to other developing countries. There were a few countries which performed poorly, such as Ghana and The Sudan, and others which were particularly impressive, such as Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Kenya and Tanzania (see Green and Faber, 1985).

To say that a growth rate of around or just above 5 per cent is impressive, may sound like an exaggeration. And yet it is not when compared to what happened in the years that followed. For, commencing in the latter part of the 1970s and ever since, virtually all African countries slumped into the worst economic crisis experienced anywhere in the developing world. Passing through a relatively short period of stagnation, most countries, we might say, grounded to the bedrock. It is claimed that several countries are now recovering from the crisis; but whether this is true or not, depends on how recovery is defined. For the easing of inflation, improvements of exports and the arrest of the general downward trend of growth, has been accompanied by a balance-of-payments problem, greater external indebtedness, greater corruption, deterioration in social services and worse living conditions for the majority of the population.

The fact that sub-Saharan Africa has moved from a good to a bad economic situation is not debatable, though this has still to be qualified with more data evaluation especially of changes in economic sectoral set-up, improvements of resources, endowment in the physical infrastructure, in the ownership relations, and of their position as a whole in the international economic structure. For if such variables have improved it would be wrong to say that those countries have deteriorated, merely judging from the GNP growth index, trade performance, inflation and so on. Apparently there have been significant improvements only in one or two of those areas and therefore it seems to be clear that the economic situation in general in sub-Saharan African countries has deteriorated. The debatable points, however, are about the causes of deterioration and subsequently how this deterioration will be overcome. The debate here rests on whether external and natural factors beyond the control of those countries largely account for the deterioration, or internal policy-related factors and therefore bad economic management. Subsequent to this, the question is whether to arrest the situation requires a radical shift and reversal of the strategies and policies pursued hitherto.

A short list of some of the reasons advanced for deterioration includes:

• sub-Saharan Africa's poor price structure (which arose from extensive state intervention) provided inadequate incentives to agriculture and exports.
• bad trade and exchange-rate policies which also affected the incentive to export.
• over-extended bureaucratic machinery which both absorbed huge resources and introduced time-wasting red tape.
• extravagant use of scarce domestic and borrowed resources.
• asymmetrical and unfavourable economic and political relationships with the outside world, especially the countries of the North.
• unfavourable weather and climatic conditions.
• civil wars or inter-country wars.

The IMF subscribes to the first four reasons and throws the whole blame on the governments of sub-Saharan Africa, while those governments on their part hold the last three reasons as having been mainly responsible. Amongst African economists, there are some who share the view of the IMF, while others, including neo-Marxists, attribute almost the entire blame on the position of the region within an unequal world capitalist system. Among foreign scholars, a number share the view that external economic pressures are the greatest source of the problem (e.g. Schatz 1988).

Those two positions which are diametrically opposed to each other are still being debated. Even though under the UN Programme for African Economic Recovery and Development (1986), sub-Saharan African countries accepted responsibility for the economic decline, this was more an act of political expediency than anything else, mitigated by the need to convince

the advanced capitalist countries to increase foreign aid. The debate is apparently useful for one main reason, namely for the fact that it paves the way for more enlightened policy actions in the future. Two policy options were considered by most countries. The first one brought the views of the IMF and sought to redress the existing economic policies through deregulation of the economy, trade liberalization and reduction of the government parastatal sectors. The second rejected such views and tightened economic and trade controls along with using the law and police to curb shortages and corruption. But after a short time, because of external pressure from the donors and social tension, the second view was abandoned in favour of the first.

There are many people who nonetheless believe that the correct position is neither one which wholly attributes the problem to internal government-caused factors nor the one that throws blame wholly on world and natural constraints beyond the control of those countries.

In fact many people still give credit to a number of the policies pursued by sub-Saharan African countries and so recommend a middle-of-the road position which seeks to redress some of the policies but also recognizes the limits imposed by the international systems.

In the area of agriculture which often, bar a few exceptions such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, Zaire, Botswana and Gabon, is the 'Back bone of the economy', what we see is that both government-made problems and uncontrollable factors including external factors, natural factors and wars posed formidable problems. Government interventions which included taxation and price controls for agricultural produce, along with too high overhead costs because of inefficient crop agencies, led to a fall of the real value of the prices offered to the farmers or peasants and in fact the terms of trade between agriculture and the other sectors such as industry and trade. This has been verified by several studies comparing terms of trade in Tanzania, Kenya and Mali. Colclough (1985) and Ellis (1982) investigated price phenomena and compared the amounts farmers received with prices offered for the crops in the world market. For most countries 40–50 per cent of the price the crops fetched in the world market was not handed down to farmers, in a situation where farmers earnings in addition were being fast eroded by inflation, agricultural financing was declining and agricultural research and extension was deteriorating. Experiments to collectivize agriculture in some countries such as Tanzania, Ethiopia and Mozambique also affected agriculture.

But also, according to Green and Faber (1985) the world terms of trade of crops grown in sub-Saharan Africa had also declined sharply since the 1960s, sometimes to the order of 33–50 per cent. Which means in effect that it is not only local and government engineered factors which were at play. The end result of such trends was that for most countries there was either stagnation or decline of agricultural production. Food production was not spared as Williams (1985) and UN (1986) show.

The wars in Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Chad, as well as drought which periodically hit many countries, especially the Sahel countries, also had considerable impact on agricultural production.

In the area of mining, we see that as in agriculture the sector was affected both by government-engineered factors and also by factors outside government control, including world prices and wars. Nationalization of foreign-owned mines coupled by rigid foreign-exchange controls and unfavourable world prices of minerals such as copper, tin and iron considerably affected mineral production.

According to UN Statistical Year Book during the 1970s and 1980s, the production of gold, diamonds, tin, iron ore, copper and manganese all fell. Ghana, Zaire and Zimbabwe, the three leading gold producers experienced a drop in production, and all producers of diamonds with the exception of Botswana also suffered a similar drop. The only minerals where an increase in production was recorded were bauxite, phosphates and nickel: bauxite because of Sierra Leone and Guinea and phosphates because of Senegal and Gabon. Nevertheless, with the exception of Botswana and Namibia, which had all-round increase in the output of minerals, all sub-Saharan African countries experienced a general drop in mineral production. Referring to the short period of 1980–3 alone, Adedeji (1985) states in fact that mineral production in sub-Saharan Africa had dropped by as much as 13.2 per cent between 1980–1, and by 24.6 per cent between 1982–3.

In the industry and manufacturing sectors sub-Saharan African countries were affected

mainly by poor industrial planning, lack of entrepreneurial and managerial capacities, overdependence on imports of raw materials and technology, overprotection, factor and product price controls, exchange-rate controls and lack of capital and markets. Nationalization of ownership of industries, in terms of state acquisition of full or majority shares in industries, which happens in many countries also raises a problem in this sector.

The sector became a leading user of foreign exchange while it was unable itself to sell outside. Furthermore because of attempts to protect it, which in fact amounted to extended overprotection, coupled with the lack of adequate managerial capacities, it turned out to be inefficient and was partly responsible for inflation.

Industry and manufacturing expanded rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s. Kimani (1979) points out that by the period 1977–82, the share of manufacturing to GDP had reached in West, East and Central Africa respectively 7.8 per cent, 11.3 per cent and 7.9 per cent. In a few countries, especially those producing oil where capital was no major problem like Nigeria, Gabon and Congo it had in fact reached 15.8 per cent, 28.6 per cent and 15.2 per cent respectively.

But this tempo of industrialization could not be maintained. When the economic crisis arose, it was in fact very badly hit and many industries carried excess capacities ranging from 60–80 per cent. Others were shut down for several years. Even under the Economic Recovery Programmes and imports support schemes undertaken by donors, the sector still remains in big trouble.

The areas of transport and energy posed problems to the extent to which they were unable to cope with social and economic changes as a whole, for instance with industrialization; and they were capital intensive in character. In the years of world oil crisis, the two of them became particularly critical. By then oil imports alone for most countries absorbed over 60 per cent of exports earnings, thus affecting every other sector which relied on imports. The same phenomenon has recurred once again recently with the Iraq–Kuwait/US Gulf Crisis. Even though the capacities of these sectors had increased rapidly, including extension of tarmac roads and railway lines and development of hydro-electricity, in general they are still unable to satisfy the needs of the economies and the people. Indeed it is becoming increasingly realized that they are crucial for the success of the on-going economic recovery programmes too.

The fields of trade and commerce have been marked with a number of problems and they partly contributed towards the economic crisis. While efforts to diversify exports have failed and sub-Saharan Africa continues to rely on three main crops (coffee, cocoa and tea), the volume of exports in many countries remained stagnant, and the terms of trade exports deteriorated. At the same time imports rose rapidly, meaning consequently balance-of-trade deficits. Unfavourable crop prices for the peasants, inefficiency in crop collection and supply of farm inputs, and rigid exchange-rate controls were not making things any easier in attempts to raise exports. At the same time it was increasingly difficult to limit imports to match exports given the large needs of the economy for imports of oil, machinery, industrial raw materials, machine spares, and medicines etc.

Only a few countries were able to raise and diversify their exports significantly. The most outstanding were Kenya and Ivory Coast where apart from past exports they were able to significantly increase tea and cocoa exports respectively, as well as exports of canned pineapples and horticulture.

In the wake of the outlined sectoral problems above and unfavourable relations with the world economy, sub-Saharan Africa's expansionary economic policies fuelled an unprecedentedly high rate of inflation. Large government budgets and easy bank lending meant higher rates of government spending, investment and consumption, higher than the goods market could really sustain without a major rise in prices. Reaction to this by price controls only served to make things worse as it sparked black markets and smuggling.

Trade and commerce were the leading targets of the Economic Recovery Programmes. These largely IMF influenced programmes included trade liberalization and restraint in government spending, which were aimed at the problems of balance-of-trade and inflation. It also included similar aims of extensive and successive devaluations. In Tanzania for example, between 1985 and 1990, the exchange rate of the shilling had dropped such that

the dollar which then exchanged for 16 shillings now exchanges for 195 shillings i.e. a devaluation of over 83 per cent within a period of five years.

There are now questions about whether or not the Recovery Programmes are working to solve the economic crisis. What is very clear is that while exports have been quite slow to increase, imports continue to rise rapidly. At the same time inflation has been replaced by leaps in prices following successive devaluations, which is no improvement. Worst of all, indebtedness is increasing rapidly. Adebayo Adedeji, the Secretary General of the Economic Commission for Africa has openly expressed scepticism on those programmes, pointing out that weak demand and low prices of commodity prices on the world market undermined the huge sacrifices being made by African countries (Adedeji, *UN Chronicle*, 1989).

However, while the recovery programmes are economic experiments, it is true that the people are suffering greatly as a direct result of them. The experiments have affected the social service sector as well as the real incomes of the people. Mass impoverishment, unemployment and destitution are on the increase. The efforts by some donors to increase resources to the social service sector cannot of course be relied upon for too long. Nonetheless, notwithstanding such efforts, the living conditions of the majority of the population continue to decline.

Economic Policy Changes in Sub-Saharan Africa Since 1960

Much like the discussion of changes in economic trends, this discussion is going to be more of an overview than a detailed illustration of the different policies pursued by those countries. First, so numerous were the policies that if we should consider both the explicit and implicit ones, we could not possibly exhaust them all. But secondly, and more important is that we are really not interested in the policies for their own sake. Our intention rather is to show how the policies represented continuity or shifts in the development paradigms, and especially to expose their strengths and weaknesses.

Below we are going to look at the following policies or rather approaches/strategies which at one point or other have prevailed in sub-Saharan Africa:

• the capital formation centred approach
• the economic nationalism centred approach
• the socialist development centred approach
• the basic human needs centred approach
• the economic stabilization centred approach

Capital formation centred approach

When they attained their independence, the first economic preoccupation of the sub-Saharan African countries was to promote rapid economic growth. The governments were eager to close the development gap between their countries and the advanced countries, and they figured that they had to 'run while others walked'.

By then growth was perceived to be a function of increased capital formation. This view prevailed amongst growth economists as well as development economists (see, for example, the various works of Solow or Mirlees, and Nurkse, Lewis and Rostow). However, in view of the glaring economic structural weakness, notably almost a complete lack of an industrial sector, many countries simultaneously aimed at a rapid industrial growth based on their primary exports, and import-substitution. But also based on another prevailing theory, that rapid growth was equally dependent on the size of skilled labour, which was acutely scarce in those countries, many countries also focussed much attention on education and training.

Thus using the two instruments of government budget and incentives to investors, the governments of sub-Saharan Africa devoted considerably larger resources to industries and education. Most of them left industry to foreign private investors, as we saw above, while spending their budgets more on education and training. Transport which was highly undeveloped, and agriculture also received a good part of the budget.

This capital formation centred approach had a number of weaknesses, namely that:

• it placed too much hope on capital formation as the basis for growth.
• it overestimated the flow of foreign-based resources, private investment and aid.
• it overlooked the role of grassroot participation.

Consequently, many projects or schemes which were initiated became highly capital-intensive. This included the industries and rural schemes. Furthermore, many were faced with organizational and administrative problems.

This approach which can also be identified as a modernization approach took no consideration of the local community. Thus in some countries, schemes such as rural resettlement or irrigation and fishing, some of which involved quite heavy investments, failed miserably. For it was not realized that development cannot be forced upon people.

Taking note of the overcredulous hope placed on capital formation, Green (1972) for example writes:

> In Ghana, senior economists (both national and expatriate) favoured this policy. They advised that manufacturing raises exports and reduces imports enough to allow for self-financing of production and the balances of payments position could be transformed.

None of this happened, for manufacturing was neither able to finance itself nor to transform the balance-of-payments position for the better.

Economic nationalism centred approach

Economic nationalism in sub-Saharan Africa is the approach by which the countries of the region took increasing control of their economies by applying a variety of instruments. The first act of nationalism was the Africanization which sought to place public administration in the hands of the citizens. This was followed by attempts to have greater participation of nationals in the ownership of economic ventures and in managerial functions. That included the search for partnership between the governments of those countries and foreign investors.

The degree, speed and pattern of economic nationalism varied tremendously between countries. For example, while Tanzania emphasized active state participation as the major instrument of such process, Kenya, the Ivory Coast and Malawi encouraged more active participation of their apparently weak domestic petit-bourgeoisie to take shares in existing or new firms. Tanzania's strategy was basically one in which the state, through parastatal corporations, initially quite often took minority shares but was, therefore, represented in the directorships. In the case of Kenya, the approach involved advancement of loans to the local elite, usually top level civil servants, the commercial elite or rich peasants, who then took shares in the economic firms or bought the farms previously owned by the white settlers. Either way, this led to increased participation of domestic capital and/or state in the economy.

But over time the nationalist economic outlook became increasingly more radical in a number of countries. In others it was accelerated by socialism, the third common approach pursued in sub-Saharan Africa, which we are going to examine below. Thus, a great deal of foreign owned property was either partially or fully nationalized (but with compensation), and placed under state control. Even where socialism was not followed, however, as in Zaire, Senegal or Nigeria, sometimes widescale nationalizations were also common. In Uganda, during the rule of Idi Amin, this went in fact even further, to include the property owned by citizen Indians and thus to also nationalize it.

The economic nationalist strategy was justified not simply on patriotic grounds and the desire to see complete independence. Those countries which chose to implement it through a predominantly state owned economy, argued further that this was the only way in which those countries could either achieve truly nationalist economies, which served the people, or accelerate economic development. Green (1972) for example wrote:

> Given the very late start, weak private domestic sector capacity, poor domestic savings mobilization capacity and extreme openness to trade, African economic development (whether capitalist or socialist) will require large public sectors – both government and public enterprise . . . Without public-sector leadership African economic development will not take place.

Nyerere argued the same thing and even went further to suggest that Africa had no other choice but socialism.

When in the 1970s the neo-colonial economic structures of sub-Saharan Africa became increasingly attacked by amongst others, Clive Thomas, Justinian Rweyemamu, Anne

Seidman and Samir Amin, the path to economic nationalism went beyond simply ownership and administration. Governments now, albeit few of them, started also to consider economic choices on the basis of the extent to which integrated and self-sustained economic development could be achieved. There was an increased interest toward domestic production of capital goods, development of domestic scientific and technological capacity, and domestic-resource based industrial production. The question had then become not simply one of whether or not firms and production were controlled by nationals, but rather also, producing what in view of overcoming the problems of economic dependency and neo-colonialism as a whole. This is reflected in the Lagos Plan of Action; and in the specific case of Tanzania for example in her 'Basic Industries Strategy' (for details about BIS, see Wangwe and Skarstein 1986).

The instruments to effect economic nationalism thus included simple acts like legislation for nationalization or a requirement on foreign investors to go into partnership (which they were more than willing to do) and to reserve certain administrative positions to Africans, but also it induced the more complex task of public financing and economic regulation and control. As the public sector expanded over time, this brought a number of unprecedented problems, the size and complexity of which could not be handled with the existing managerial resource base, political and public administration structures, and above all the asymmetrical economies and low domestic technological capacity. While this was able to lead to the desired inward-looking economies in some countries, it was at the often underestimated cost of stagnation of exports and decline in the efficiency of use and allocation of resources. This was contributed subsequently to the twin problems of balance-of-payments and inflation. It is no accident perhaps that in countries like Kenya, Ivory Coast and Botswana, where the nationalist (economic) concerns were far more limited, there were less of those problems.

Rather than condemning this economic nationalism in total as the IMF and the World Bank seem to be doing, and recommending indiscriminate liberalization policies, perhaps here we could pose the following more modest questions:

• how could sub-Saharan Africa conduct a transformation of their present economic structures while maintaining growth in exports?
• how great should the size of the public sector be so as to have a reasonably efficient economy?
• how far should economic regulation and control go?
• how could those countries check the abuse often committed by the bureaucracy on the public sector.

Socialist centred approach

The third approach commonly followed in sub-Saharan Africa is socialism, which has often been described as African Socialism, a label that is most often used to distinguish it from orthodox Marxist-Leninist socialism. Only Angola and Ethiopia came close to the Marxist-Leninist type of socialism.

The wave of socialism in sub-Saharan Africa began as soon as Ghana and Guinea became independent, under the leadership of Nkrumah and Sekou Touré. It then spread rapidly throughout the region, through Mali (in 1960), Congo (1963), Tanzania (1967), Zambia (1967), Benin (1960s), Madagascar (in the 1960s but most decisively in 1975), Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola (during the liberation struggles against Portuguese colonialism and more substantively after their independence in 1974 and 1975), Ethiopia (1974), Somalia (1976), Zimbabwe (1980) and Burkina Faso (also in the 1980s). A number of other countries tried this approach too, at least for a short time, such as Uganda (under Obote's first regime), while others were openly sympathetic to it at one time or another, e.g. Senegal, Sudan and Lesotho. In other words few were those like Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Cameroon, Botswana and Zaire, which distanced themselves from the ideology.

Why socialism was fashionable is a question which has been asked so many times. Well, partly it was regarded as the logical continuation of anti-imperialist struggle, partly it was because the idea of equality and a classless society was appealing to the populace (so the politicians liked it), and certainly it is because it became increasingly identified with leading African personalities like Nasser, Nkrumah, and Nyerere.

From the development theory perspective, and asking the question why socialism appealed to sub-Saharan African scholars, it was because of the inherent inadequacies of 'periphery capitalism'. For, they regarded socialism as the only approach which could truly usher the neo-colonial countries out of the deep-rooted economic (and the underlying political) structures which nurture and reproduce the system of underdevelopment. Such scholars saw socialism as a state under the control of progressive forces – the revolutionary intelligentsia and workers and peasants – who would transform those economic (and political) structures. Furthermore, they believed that development through the bourgeois line would lead to nothing but compradorization of the weak domestic petit-bourgeoisie and therefore the domestic economies as a whole. Thus, the most important development project became to them how to elevate the progressive forces and bestow on them state power or rather the way to socialist revolution.

The history of trying to develop through socialism in sub-Saharan Africa has been far less successful than it was hoped. After an initial and relatively short period of success in equalizing opportunities and incomes, and raising the living standards of the people, the socialist oriented countries not only lost all other achievements, but also all of them without exception were very severely ridden by economic crisis. This contrasts with the non-socialists, where we see at least a few better-off countries, even though they are obviously not completely out of danger of getting into the same situation.

Analysis of socialist development in sub-Saharan Africa has revealed fundamental implementation problems. Shivji (1976), in analysing Tanzania's socialism, showed that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was apt at blocking socialist development in that country: the one place in Africa where there was a serious effort to build socialism. McHenry (1979) pointed out similar resistance, and also one from the peasants and foreign forces. Hydén (1980) went further to illustrate that the problem of building socialism was in fact rooted deep in the prevailing relations of production in those countries (within which the state could not 'capture' the peasants and neither cadre work nor planning could really be employed).

From the point of view of economics the legacies of socialist experimentation are rather overwhelming. The range includes capital intensive and ironically also overmanned public firms, a proliferation of non-productive and sometimes unrequired parastatal companies, an overextensive network of economic controls, suppression of labour movements and collective bargaining, extinction of economic incentive structures, disintegration of economic processes etc. Obviously these aspects later become targets for the IMF and the World Bank.

To socialists, the most discouraging thing is the fact that the experimentation with socialism is leaving behind neither a seriously committed socialist cadre, nor even structural foundations for economic planning and management. And obviously the fact is that it is alienating an increasingly large number of those who either had faith in it or were indifferent. Perhaps it is the realization of this fact which has led the CCM Party in Tanzania to work out what seems to be a far thought programme of cadre development and mobilization and the creation of a Planning Commission, amidst the ongoing very contrasting programme of economic liberalization. Nonetheless even this could not be carried on for long. Local failures with socialism, the collapse of socialism in eastern Europe and the ongoing liberalization programmes are doing great damage to socialism in sub-Saharan Africa.

The basic human needs approach
The fourth very common approach is that of Basic Human Needs. This approach which was pursued in almost all the countries, irrespective of ideology, is perhaps the one strategy which was agreeable to all political and social petit-bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, the workers, the peasants and above all also foreign governments and the different bodies of the UN etc. Even transnational corporations did not find any trouble with it.

The approach's philosophy was quite appealing – namely that any development should be first and foremost centred on man, not infrastructure. That was for example how Nyerere and Kaunda put it. Then there was the fact that the living conditions of the workers, especially the urban poor were very bad (this was the subject of the path-setting study on Kenya by ILO, 1972). The approach also had an apparent ideological neutrality.

Undoubtedly this approach was founded more on the moral justice of development than

on a theory of economic development. Some of the aid donors found it appealing, especially because they were happy that aid reached those who needed it the most immediately, and that it produced a relief of ignorance, pain and suffering from diseases, rather than being wasted on 'dubious' projects. Chenery *et al.* had come out with a publication called *Redistribution with Growth*, and some empirical studies were attempted to relate supply of basic needs with increase in productivity (e.g. Abdon Noor, 1981). But in all no coherent theory of economic development was ever brought forward to support this approach.

The approach was developed in the wake of growing impetus of the dependency theory of development which criticized the world capitalist system and the periphery capitalist status of the developing countries. At this time failures of the development approaches pursued in countries like Brazil, Argentina and Mexico had become very apparent, especially in the areas of poverty and mass destitution, and the disillusionment with their approaches contrasted with the achievements of countries like China and Cuba that pursued the socialist approach. The Basic Human Needs approach appeared ideologically neutral and was a compromise between the forces that called for socialist and capitalist oriented development.

The Basic Human Needs approach led to increased public expenditures on health, education, and on urban food subsidies, on the supply of clean water and housing. But it also fostered tremendous idealization of small labour intensive activities (at this time Small is Beautiful was a very popular slogan), including the notion of small industries, the informal sector etc.

The approach succeeded in raising basic education (in countries like Tanzania or Ethiopia the level of illiteracy was brought down sharply); in improving public health considerably; and generally therefore in raising living standards. This has not been disputed by most circles. However, to the extent to which the economies of those countries were not expanding rapidly, sometimes not even as rapidly as the population, meant that the strategy was in danger of coming to a halt. In any case the grace period was not too long, the weight of the economic crisis which arrived hardly a decade after the rise of the Basic Human Needs approach brought the whole thing to a halt, and what is more, threatened to reverse the few achievements scored especially in the fields of health and education. While as early as 1981 THE ILO JASPA Report talked of Basic Human Needs in danger, today the UNICEF had already sounded the alarm to the decline in health care, accentuated particularly by the present Recovery or Structural Adjustment Programmes.

Economic stabilization approach

This brings us to the last and latest approach, namely the current approach of economic stabilization. In 1980, in an attempt to cope with the merging crisis especially in the external sector of the economy, a number of sub-Saharan African countries adopted what we referred to as National Economic Survival Programmes. In essence those programmes were country programmes which were prepared to 'sell' to the Paris Club (apparently by then the major aid donors had formed a club), in order to solicit further aid or to avoid impending cuts. Their content varied tremendously depending on the individual countries perceptions, and especially the extent to which the World Bank and the IMF were involved in their preparation. The most outstanding objective was bridging the gap between imports and exports. However, the instruments used for that varied tremendously; some countries sought to control imports more rigidly while simultaneously imposing exports quotas, while others sought to restrict imports through currency devaluation and price adjustments. The other primary objective was elimination of food deficits, which was a very disturbing and often recurring problem. Other objectives though secondary were: reduction in price controls, control over the increasing government budgetary deficits, and restriction on bank lending.

After a year or two this approach gave way to what were commonly called Structural Adjustment Programmes. Once again, their content and instruments varied tremendously between countries; and they too were prepared as instruments for attracting aid. Some countries adopted quite radical and novel approaches such as 'two-window exchange rates' and/or extensive economic liberalization, while others still limited their programmes in either import controls and export promotion through largely administrative procedures. Their primary and secondary objectives were more or less the same.

However, towards the middle of the 1980s these programmes gave way to what were

referred to as Economic Recovery Programmes. And these are in fact what constituted what we are calling here The Stabilization Approach.

Unlike the NESPs or the SAPs, the recovery programmes were very similar in content across the countries, and their primary objectives were (1) to arrest inflation and (2) to solve the balance-of-payments problems (3) to stimulate efficiency in the allocation and use of resources and (4) to arrest decline in economic growth rate. The approach placed tremendous faith on the power of market mechanisms to solve the economic problems of those countries. Furthermore, the programmes included a series of austerity measures, which included cuts in government expenditure, freeze on wages and bank lending, rise in interest rates and complete scrapping of subsidies. Other measures were elimination of price controls, consecutive and extensive currency devaluations, and extensive trade liberalization.

The obvious but uninvited results did not take long to erupt, namely massive marginalization, impoverishment and destitution, which could not have come at a worse period, when the years of education, support for basic needs etc. had led to major changes in the people's tastes.

There has been a great deal of curiosity to find out whether or not the stabilization measures are working or not towards yielding expected results: i.e. in reducing balance-of-payments problems, reducing inflation, stimulating economic efficiency and arresting economic decline.

There are considerable measurement problems here. Instead of the previous sharp but smoothly rising price trends (which were judged as high rates of inflation), now we have a new phenomenon which is judged as a low rate of inflation, but is essentially worse than before. For what is happening now is that every time a devaluation is made, prices shoot up very rapidly, followed by a very slow rise. After another devaluation follows another round of price upshot, then slow price rise. So that now we have successive major price leaps instead of the ordinary inflation, which is no better. There are also problems in comparing GNPs under the present trends of exchange rates and prices.

As for the trade gaps, there is little evidence that it is closing. Exports have been slow to rise while imports have increased. Problems of transport and poor services to the peasants as well as problems in the supply of farm inputs and collection of crops have continued to affect trade. At the same time because of aid support, imports have continued to rise.

There has been widespread complaint from governments that the 'Recovery Programmes' are not receiving the much needed financial support which the members of the Paris Club and the advanced countries as a whole promised. Thus most of the burden of this project is borne by the sub-Saharan African countries themselves.

A Struggle for a New World Economic Order

Sub-Saharan Africa also tried along with other developing countries to wage a struggle to change the world economic system which functioned (and continues to do so) against them. The targets of that struggle included the deteriorating terms of trade for primary commodities, the malpractices of transactional corporation terms of technology transfer, terms and trends of capital transfer, the world financial structure and institutions (including especially the IMF), protectionism in the advanced capitalist countries and the growing problem of debt.

Initially the debate and campaigns for the new international economic order were quite inspiring. Backed by the efforts of such enlightened people as Willy Brandt and others, a North–South Commission was formed to prepare an agenda for discussion. Alongside the UN held a Special Session on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order in 1974; UNCTAD (1979) devoted special attention to the subject; and a number of other world bodies and meetings also discussed it, i.e. the Paris based Conference on International Cooperation, the Tokyo Round (1979) and the Club of Rome. A few encouraging results appeared, such as the creation of UN Centre for Science and Technology and Transnational Corporations and adoption of various special programmes by different UN agencies.

Apparently the discussion on new world order proceeded also at regional level. The outcome of this was amongst other things the Lagos Plan of Action and the formation of sub-regional economic arrangements such as SADCC, PTA and ECOWAS.

But overall the struggle for a new world economic order achieved little. Now that the whole thing is dead following stiff resistance from the North, the developing countries, including Africa, are exploring alternative approaches and ways to cope with the unfavourable world economic structure. The creation of a South Commission in 1986 by the Non-Aligned Movement Summit represents one of those efforts. The commission report is out and calls for policy improvements in the developing countries, while at the same time reiterating the issues of the old debate on New International Economic Order.

The Search for an Alternative Approach

There is a growing need for the countries of sub-Saharan Africa to redefine and to reaffirm what they conceive to be a desirable and realistic approach to future development. At the present time those countries have lost both control and direction as they seek to undertake adjustments to meet the demands of foreign donors.

The challenge before those countries is to achieve economic growth, to raise the welfare of their people, to restructure their economies, to attain rapid scientific and technological progress, to solve their debt problems, to achieve social equity and to achieve or retain national autonomy over their economies. Given the small size and distorted structure of their economies, the need to ensure that development is centred on the people, and the need to guard national freedom and sovereignty, each of those objectives is important. Though the objectives of economic growth and fighting against external debt, without which it will be impossible to undertake the rest, should perhaps receive greatest priority.

This means that the past approaches of economic nationalism and basic human needs will continue to be relevant, but to be pursued along with approaches aimed speeding up economic growth and debt service. For growth, those countries will need to combine both a high rate of capital formation and a suitable macro-economic framework which allows for efficiency in the allocation and use of resources, while for debt servicing they must strive to raise exports, minimize imports and restrain from further unnecessary borrowing.

The few gains made by the socialist and basic human needs approaches should be maintained by paying attention to the areas of health and education and improvements of management of public enterprises. To perform or achieve the above, sub-Saharan African countries will need to combine carefully the use of the market mechanism and economic planning. However, useless rigidities and controls must be avoided and if anything the attention of the government should be focussed primarily on crucial areas like social services, promoting certain areas of scientific and technological progress, promoting and protecting a few and selected economic branches (such as transport, energy and capital goods industries) and debt servicing.

The report of the South Commission, the contents of which relate to sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the developing countries, underscores the point about using the two instruments. But it fails to show clearly the role of planning, or to map out the territories of market mechanisms and planning.

The planning being proposed here is different from past planning in sub-Saharan Africa in three ways, namely (a) the plans are focussed on a few areas (b) they make use of market forces as much as possible rather than administrative controls and (c) they are economic plans meant to be implemented as economic guides rather than just government budgets or useless documents shelved and forgotten as soon as they are out. This planning will require greater awareness than at present amongst both the people and the governments of sub-Saharan Africa, about the economic realities of their countries and the world, and about the realistic options based on resource constraints and awareness of the working economies.

The proposed approach to economic development is therefore one that on the one hand avoids the past extensive and blind government controls on the economy as well as past huge public sector and expenditure, and on the other hand, limits the blind liberalization of the economy advocated by the IMF. This approach also offers opportunity for a sense of direction and control, rather than conducting things in a resigned and irresponsible manner. Furthermore, it takes care of the usually forgotten and underestimated debt problem.

To confront the unfavourable world economic conditions, sub-Saharan Africa will have to continue to use bilateral diplomacy and perhaps explore possibilities for collective bargaining.

Even though the global debate on the New International Economic Order is dead, there is still a chance to negotiate separate elements of the new order with the countries of the North.

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7 Of Large-Scale & Small Farms

A Comparative Paradigmatic Inquiry into the Agricultural Policies

of Zimbabwe, Malawi & Tanzania   ERNEST N. MAGANYA

Introduction

Southern Africa and indeed the whole of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been going through a period of unprecedented economic crisis since the middle of the 1970s. The crisis was particularly acute between 1979 and 1985. As the World Bank Report of 1981 (The Berg Report) pointed out, while agricultural production grew in volume by 2.3 per cent a year in the 1960s, a growth rate that was equal to the population growth rate, the 1970s saw the growth rate fall to 1.3 per cent a year while population grew by 2.7 per cent (World Bank 1981: 45).

As for food production, the same report points out that, 'In fact for Africa as a whole in the 1970s, growth of food production was not only well below the increase in total population, but also below that of rural population' (ibid.: 5). Mumbengegwi (1987) in a well-argued paper on food self-sufficiency among Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) member countries has been able to show the precarious situation that most SADCC faced at the turn of the 1970s decade. Almost without exception, the population growth rate of all SADCC countries outstripped by far the rates of agricultural production in general and food production in particular (Mumbengegwi, 1987: 64).

Faced by what was increasingly becoming an unmanageable economic crisis and the flow of outside financial resources that was increasingly being determined by cross conditionality imposed by multilateral institutions and traditional bilateral sources of external financing, most SSA began to implement Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) particularly after 1985. By 1988 about 18 of SSA's 45 countries had embarked on SAPs and about 14 other countries had borrowed to support sectoral reforms.

This significant 'acceptance' and implementation of the essentially free market determined stabilization and structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) by countries ranging from the so-called socialist oriented countries (Tanzania and Mozambique) to countries that openly profess and practise 'free' market economic policies like Malawi was also accompanied by intense paradigmatic discourses among the academic community of SADCC countries. These paradigm discources were essentially between the modernization paradigm of the 1950s and early 1960s and the dependency paradigm of the 1960s and 1970s.

The aim of this chapter is to undertake a paradigmatic discourse of the history of agricultural transformation in the Southern African Region since about 1960 with the final objective of assessing whether really at issue is an impending 'otherthrow' of the dependency theory by the modernization theory (Blomström and Hettne: 1984).

In doing so we have decided to undertake a case study of three countries from among the SADCC member countries, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania. This choice has been

based on the fact that this paradigmatic debate can be contextualized in the history of agricultural transformation of these three countries during the last three decades. Zimbabwe presents us with an interesting case. The colonial and UDI state had been used carefully first to support and then develop large-scale settler farming since 1980, and before that date; the new independent state has succeeded, to a considerable extent, in supporting the smallholder farmers of the communal areas to be much more productive. Malawi on the other hand has had an uninterrupted post-colonial history of supporting large-scale estate and progressive farmers to the near total neglect of the smallholder farmers. Throughout this chapter, it is implied that a transformation policy informed by the dependency school of thought is expected to be supportive of the smallholders.

The Tanzanian case is also interesting because the three decades of agricultural transformation have made a full cycle from the modernization theory informed agricultural transformation policies of the early 1960s to the dependency school informed policies of the mid-1960s to late 1970s, and back to the modernization theory informed policies of 1980s.

In the second part of this chapter, the global trends of agricultural transformation policies are reviewed and wherever possible specific experiences of the three case study countries are explored. The third part deals with the specific experiences of the three countries while the fourth and concluding part attempts a discourse between the two contending paradigms and to explore whether really at issue is the necessity for a paradigmatic shift in policy thinking and policy implementation.

In the conclusions we argue that while the on-going market place SAPs can in the short term increase agricultural production, their sustainability in view of the fact that they tend to by-pass the majority of the rural producers is questionable. We argue, contrary to conventional neo-classical thinking, that market place economic policies can also be effectively used by the state to protect and improve the agricultural productivity of the smallholders. In other words, there is nothing inherent in market place policies being anti-state. On the contrary, for the free market policies to be successful, state interventions are essential.

From Modernization to Modernizing Agricultural Transformation Policies, 1960s–1980s

In many ways, the paradigm that informs the SAPs is essentially that of modernization although, as we shall be pointing out soon, there are significant differences between the modernization theories of the past and those being implemented currently. The modernization theories of the 1950s and 1960s were greatly influenced by Keynesianism and they were, therefore, essentially statist. The centrality of the state in the Keynesian supply side economics coincided with the climax of nationalistic sentiments that reached their apex in the sixties. Riding high on the band wagon of nationalism, planning for the national economy became a prerogative of most of the newly independent states and the state became an important instrument of economic transformation (Mkandawire, 1988).

In the 1950s and 1960s, the World Bank supported the so-called progressive farmer policy of rural transformation whose objective was to concentrate financial and extension services on a few model farmers. The state was central in the identification, financing and offering of extension services. At the ideological level, this strategy was justified by the expected trickle down impact on the majority of the peasants – essentially smallholder subsistence farmers. To use Göran Hydéns (1983) formulation, the objective was to capture the peasants through the process of emulation – the poor smallholder peasants learning from the successful progressive farmers.

The efficacy of this rural transformation model differed from one African country to another. Those countries that pursued this model vigorously were able to produce a core of progressive farmers who greatly contributed to total agricultural production particularly that of cash crops. In our three country case study, as we shall soon show, Malawi came out the most successful. From a neglected 'imperial slum' Malawi adopted a two pronged rural transformation policy – the promotion of the 'Achikumbe' or the so-called progressive or master farmers policy and encouraged large-scale estate farming. In the short to medium

term, this transformation strategy established Malawi as one of the most productive rural economies in Southern Africa (Mkandawire, 1983; Mhone, 1987).

Tanzania also in the first five years of independence attempted to implement the progressive farmer policy with remarkable productivity results, although it was dropped by a regime that was increasingly becoming influenced by the equity concerns of the ideology of African Socialism that culminated in the Arusha Declaration of 1967. Table 7.1 below shows the growth in the volume, export earning and contribution to total export of selected export crops.

Table 7.1: Production and Value of Tanzanian Agricultural Product 1961–1967

	Sisal			Coffee			Cotton			Cashewnuts		
	a	b	c	a	b	c	a	b	c	a	b	c
1961	200	309	33	25	135	14	30	136	14	40	36	4
1965	213	286	19	28	172	12	51	256	17	64	83	6
1967	204	201	12	44	237	14	61	251	14	70	92	6

a = amount in 1000 tons
b = value in million shillings
c = percentage of total export

Source: Herzog, J., Geschichte Tansanias, VEB, Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaft, Berlin, 1986.

As for Zimbabwe or Rhodesia as it was then called, the UDI years saw the consolidation of an extremely skewed agricultural sector that was dominated by the white estate farmers. The settler model was not intended to have any trickle down effect on the smallholder farmers who, as it was in the case of Rhodesia, were concentrated in infertile so-called communal lands which operated essentially as labour reserve areas. The objective of a settler farming model is not to capture the peasant but to preserve the peasant sector as a source of labour.

An important observation in relation to the state managed progressive farmer policy of the 1960s is that it failed to capture and transform the majority of the rural population in spite of a wide network of community development officers who were supposed to prepare the peasants to receive the modern culture of farming that was supposed to trickle down from above. The socio-political consequences of this model of rural transformation, particularly in India where it assumed the form of a 'green revolution' and was implemented within a rural setting dominated by big land lords and capitalist farmers, was rather volatile. The extreme poverty that was a consequence of the skewed distribution of land and water wells was a fine breeding ground for political turmoil.

Partly to forestall possible social revolutions and partly also because of genuine concern for the fate of the rural poor, the World Bank conceived a new strategy of rural and agricultural transformation called the integrated rural development strategy (IRDS). Its objective was to launch a multi-faceted attack against rural poverty without necessarily questioning the existing status quo of land ownership. Initially based on India's background, its objective was to create more employment and provide essential social services like hospitals and schools for the rural poor (Wulf, 1979). This strategy, which is also referred to in the literature as McNamara's revolution, was going to dominate rural and agricultural transformation policies of most SSA countries in the late 1960s and 1970s although, as the case of Malawi clearly indicates, it was not received with enthusiasm everywhere because it tended to challenge the rural status quo.

While the IRDS addressed the poverty concerns of the rural poor in order to integrate them into the commodity producing economy, and unlike its predecessor that relied on the trickle down magic to achieve the same objective, the two strategies had one thing in common – they all relied on the state to achieve the intended results. It was therefore not surprising that in Tanzania, state intervention in the conditions of peasant household production reached an unprecedented level of notoriety during the decade of integrated rural development – the 1970s. This decade, it should be emphasized, saw the largest World Bank supported flow of financial resources to the rural sector of Tanzania in the post-independent era (Dinham and Hines, 1983). The World Bank was not only an accomplice of state interventionist policies but in many ways the architect of institutional transformations which were intended to capture the peasant.

In Tanzania, the famous decentralization programme that was adopted by an act of parliament in 1972 and that preceded the largest resettlement programme in Africa, commonly known as the villagization programme, was the brain child of the World Bank (Raikes, 1986). In fact McNamara's new found love for the rural poor saw in the resettlement villages the best institutional setting to experiment with the poverty oriented strategy of integrated rural development. Interesting in this context is the definition of an *Ujamaa* village given by the World Bank in an appraisal report on Kigoma (an administrative region in Tanzania) integrated Rural Development Project:

> Conceptually, the *Ujamaa* village may be thought of as a system through which inputs . . . most clearly in the form of technical knowledge, accounting and management systems on one side, and physical inputs like human labour, fertilizer and insecticide on the other – are, together with credit, combined to produce additional output, accruing largely in the forms of income for villagers. (World Bank, 1974)

In Malawi, the progressive farmer and estate farming strategies which were vigorously implemented in the 1960s left little room for poverty oriented policies. The intertwining interests of President Banda's private and official interests in large-scale farming through Press Holdings, in which he has a majority share, and the large presence of highly placed officials in the estate sector precluded any active support for the IRDS. In line with the domineering interests of large-scale farming, President Banda wanted to use the World Bank to finance estate farming. The Bank, then preoccupied with equity issues, was not particularly forthcoming and Banda's government had to resort to other sources of funding to consolidate and expand large-scale estate farming.

In spite of the reluctance of the Malawian state to support smallholder farming, the World Bank together with the European Economic Community went ahead and established four schemes, covering areas inhabited by 25 per cent of Malawi's population (Mkandawire, 1983:37). As expected, the lack of interest by the Malawian state to support smallholder agriculture contributed greatly to the failure of the pro-smallholder integrated rural development transformation strategy.

The failure of the smallholder agricultural strategy in Malawi is interesting in the light of the experience of Tanzania of the 1970s. As we pointed out earlier on, the introduction of IRDS by the Bank in Tanzania was wholly supported by the government and was characterized by unparallelled intervention of the state in the modern history of Tanzania in the conditions of peasant household production. Of theoretical interest to us is the fact that in Tanzania the IRPs failed mainly because of 'over-state intervention in the management of the rural economy whereas in Malawi the failure was caused, to a large extent, by the lack of it! It is also important to point out here that experience of independent Zimbabwe, as we shall indicate later, shows that a combination of market forces distribution mechanisms, and deliberate and targeted state intervention are extremely important in 'capturing' the peasants, to borrow, once more, Göran Hydén's formulation.

At issue, therefore, is not that state intervention is harmful to agricultural production, as the pundits of the neo-classical economic paradigm that has over the last eight years also (with the publication of the Berg Report) dominated academic debates and government policy-making in most of the Southern African countries would like to make us believe (Lipumba *et al.* 1986). It is to this aspect that we would now like to turn in the following section.

The liberalization of the modernization theory

The post-1979 deep economic crisis which engulfed most of the Southern African countries, including success stories such as that of Malawi, provided a fertile ground for the upsurge of the modernization paradigm that was dominant in the 1960s. It should, however, be pointed out that this was a new type of modernization theory because its practical implementation was to be left to market forces.

Thus, the same World Bank that was in the vanguard in the introduction of the modernization paradigm informed rural and agricultural policies, which depended largely on the active involvement of the state in the 1960s and 1970s, was again at the forefront in the introduction of the second round of modernization informed agricultural transformation policies. The

onslaught on the state as an agent of economic development was initiated by the World Bank Report of 1981 on 'Accelerated development in sub-Saharan Africa – an agenda for action' otherwise known as the Berg Report. The Berg Report formulated a set of macro-economic policies which have come to constitute the so-called conditionalities without whose implementation many Third World countries cannot receive any loans or grants from either multilateral or bilateral sources.

The objective of these conditionalities are to stimulate the production of tradeables and reduce government expenditure. They can be summarized as follows:

• Devaluation of the overvalued exchange in order, in part, to enable the government to offer higher producer prices to the peasants via the higher value of the earned dollar in local currency.
• Establish high interest rates in order to attract savings, rationalize borrowing and hopefully reduce inflation.
• Find and enforce credit ceilings in order to control and minimize government borrowing from the banking system with the main objective of releasing more funds to private enterprises.
• Liberalization of the international market including the removal of inputs subsidy.
• Institutional reforms which include the privatization of parastatals, introduction of the so-called user fees in hospitals and schools, and a wide ranging retrenchment policy in the area of public employment (United Republic of Tanzania, 1986).

The conditionalities constitute a set of short-term macro-economic policies whose objective is to restore both the external disequilibrium (remove balance-of-payment deficits) and internal disequilibrium (reduce budget deficit) and generally push up exports and food production to pre-crisis levels. In the literature these are referred to as 'stabilization' policies and are supposed to link up with structural adjustment policies. The latter are supposed to be of a medium- to long-term nature and provide the momentum for future growth.

This is the standard textbook and technical presentation of the stabilization and structural adjustment policies. In practice, however, there is little distinction between the shock-like stabilization policies and the growth-enhancing structural adjustment programmes. The two together provide a continuum of policies whose long-term objective is to marginalize peasant production and consolidate large-scale farming. Space does not permit us to go into the details of how each one of the conditionalities negatively affects the smallholder farmer even in the short-term context. Readers can refer to our earlier works for a much more comprehensive discussion of the possible medium- to long-term consequences of these policies on smallholder agriculture (Othman and Maganya, 1988; Maganya, 1990).

In order to contextualize these policies within the concrete socio-economic conditions of the case study countries, we shall provide a brief exposition of the relationship between these policies and smallholder agriculture on the one hand and large-scale farming on the other.

Against this background, a package of stabilization policies that includes an element of higher producer prices is bound initially to stimulate smallholder farmers to produce more. An example from Tanzania will elucidate this point. The structural adjustment programme (now conveniently known as the Economic Recovery Programme) adopted by Tanzania in 1986 promised to offer higher producer prices and for the last three years producer prices have been significantly increased. While the very good agricultural production performance of the last three years certainly was influenced by a new cycle of good rains, higher producer prices also played a significant role. Real output in agriculture for 1987 was estimated to have increased by 44 per cent and the proportion of GDP at current prices accounted for by the agricultural sector rose by 61 per cent compared to a ratio of 44 per cent in 1980 (TET, July 1988:1).

This improvement in agricultural production has been greatly influenced by the function of 'money illusion' and soon the peasants will be catching up with the realities of falling real producer prices. As the costs of imported goods escalate because of devaluation, and the smallholder peasants are unable to buy the un-subsidized inputs because they simply are too expensive, and borrowing interest rates are inhibitive because of the higher interest rate

conditionality, it is slowly beginning to dawn on Tanzania's policy makers that the Economic Recovery Programme was intended as a programme for progressive farmers.

At the time of writing this chapter, the Deputy Director of the International Monetary Fund, Mr Richard Erb was on a tour of duty to Tanzania to see how the conditionalities were being implemented in the last year of ERP. A summary of the discussion between Mr Erb and the President of Tanzania, on the one hand, and the first Vice-President and Prime Minister on the other, shows the tip of the iceberg of an otherwise major rift between the Fund and the Government of Tanzania. The discussion was summarized by a local newspaper thus:

> Among the issues covered in the talks [with the President] were transport problems, exchange-rate adjustment, credit ceilings imposed on crop marketing boards, bank loan interest rates as well as crop prices for the farmers.
>
> A government statement quoted the Prime Minister as telling the IMF executive that some economic measures affected by the government in implementing the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) were now becoming a disincentive to agricultural production. (*Sunday News*, 21 May 1989)

It is difficult to generalize on the impact of SAPs on the agricultural sectors of the countries of Southern Africa. The impact will tend to differ from one country to the other depending on existing socio-economic structures of the rural economy, the existing land tenure policies and whether a given country is implementing the whole package of the conditionality or not. As a general observation, however, it can be pointed out that the current agricultural policies which are, to a large extent, informed by the liberalization modernization paradigm are meant to by-pass the majority of the rural producers and create agricultural sectors in which large-scale farming will dominate. This theme will be taken up in great detail in the following section in which we shall discuss the socio-economic characteristics of the agricultural sectors of the study countries.

The Socio-economic Characteristics of the Agricultural Sectors of Zimbabwe, Malawi, Tanzania and the Structural Adjustment Programmes

The agricultural sector of Zimbabwe

The agricultural sector of Zimbabwe exhibits all the typical features of a bi-modal settler structure, although it should be pointed out right from the beginning that the 1980–9 independence period has made a number of improvements to this structure. Colonialism has enabled the white farmer to occupy the best and most productive lands whereas the African farmers were evicted on to less productive lands which were in turn transformed into labour reserves.

The racial–spatial allocation of farmers and labourers can be better understood if we divide Zimbabwe into agro-ecological zones and see how these have been distributed. The literature on Zimbabwe's agricultural sector identifies five agro-ecological or Natural Farming Regions (Moyo, 1986). This classification is based on the amount, reliability and variability of the rainfall (Zimanya, 1989: 9). The best land is found in Natural Region I and the quality of land decreases in the order in which this classification has been made so that Natural Region V has the worst type of land. Agro-ecological Regions I and II cover 1.8 per cent and 15 per cent of the country's land respectively while Region III covers 18.7 per cent and Region IV and V cover 37.8 per cent and 26.7 per cent of the country respectively. In terms of contribution to total agricultural production, Region II (the predominantly white-settler region) accounts for about 90 per cent of the country's total production.

The racial–spatial distribution of land becomes obvious when an account is taken of how the five ecological zones have been allocated. While 74 per cent of the communal land is located within Regions IV and V, only 49 per cent of the large-scale commercial farmland is located in these regions. About two-thirds of the land in Region I and three-quarters of that in Region II is located in the formerly white-owned large-scale commercial farming areas.

With this pattern of land distribution, it was not surprising that before 1980 when Zimbabwe achieved political independence, the contribution of the communal peasants to

total agricultural production was marginal. Before 1980, the small-scale farmers in the communal lands contributed about 10 per cent of total maize production and less than 25 per cent of the seed cotton. Eight years of political independence have enabled the small-scale farmers in the communal land and resettled areas to produce between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of maize and cotton. Thus, whereas the communal peasants marketed 84,300 tonnes of maize before independence, the amount had increased to over 500,00 tonnes annually to over 100,000 tonnes in the late eighties (Zimanya, 1989: 8). And this tremendous achievement, it should be noted, has taken place in spite of the very slow implementation of the resettlement programme.

It is important, therefore, to pose one important question – how has this been achieved? Through high interest rates, removal of inputs subsidies or rigid credit ceilings on banks? The most recent literature on the Zimbabwe's agricultural sector clearly shows that this 'miracle' has been achieved through a combination of factors such as: efficiently run marketing boards, credit facilities and subsidized inputs. For example, while up to 1978/79 credit to the communal sector was virtually non-existent, five years after gaining political independence the number of loan applicants had increased by 96 per cent and the volume of loans by 98 per cent. This phenomenal increase of loans to smallholder farmers was achieved not '. . . by the reduction of credit to commercial farmers but *its expansion* to communal areas' (Mumbengegwi, 1986: 215).

This positive assessment of Zimbabwe's post-independence agricultural development policy should not be taken to mean that the problem of neglecting smallholder farmers has been avoided altogether. Indeed, almost all the recent literature on Zimbabwe's agricultural sector points out the fact that most of these services have been directed towards rich farmers who are normally located in wealthier regions of the country (Mumbengegwi, 1986: 217; Zimanya, 1989: 9). Moreover, as long as the land question is not fully resolved, the intensive method of agricultural production can have only a limited impact both in space and over time. Having made this observation we would, nevertheless, like to emphasize that such a tremendous achievement in such a short period does, indeed, prove that fundamental transformations cannot be left to the magical powers of market forces alone.

The case of Malawi

Malawi inherited from colonialism a significantly different agricultural sector which was based on the demand of internal and external migrant labourers. Internally, a form of colonial feudalism known as *Thangata* was established, in which the white settlers apportioned land to Africans for which they paid rent to the land owners (Mkandawire, 1983: 30). The rest of the peasants were transformed into a huge labour market for South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

Post-colonial Malawi has seen a fundamental transformation of her agricultural sector, away from being a labour reservoir, to an agricultural sector in which large-scale indigenous and foreign farmers dominate. Large-scale estate farming is complemented by two other farming systems: that of the *Achikumbe* or the progressive farmers, and peasant subsistence farming, which applies to the majority of the rural population. While the first two types of farming systems consume most of the resources, peasant farming has been totally neglected. The structure of the Malawi agricultural sector has been aptly described by Mhone (1987: 75) as follows:

> The Malawi agricultural sector is tri-modal in a very complementary sense, for the deterioration of the third sector (the subsistence sector) is the precondition for the growth and expansion of the petty capitalist 'Achikumbe' sector and the capitalist estate sector . . .

The expansion of the estate sector since independence (1964) has been phenomenal. According to statistics given by Mkandawire (1983: 36–7), while at independence the Malawian estate sector occupied less than 1 per cent of cultivated land, by 1979 the number of estates had increased to 1,107 and estate land occupied 13 per cent of total cultivated land areas. By the same year, estates accounted for 15 per cent of total agricultural production and two-thirds of exports. When this performance is compared to that of the peasant sector, the neglect of this vital sector becomes obvious. At independence, the contribution of the smallholders

to total exports was 58 per cent. By 1976, however, the contribution had gone down to 37 per cent.

It is also significant to note that while in 1969 estates employed 42,600 workers, the figure had shot up to 143,000 in 1978, and all of this increase came from the peasant subsistence sector. The withdrawal of this huge labour force from the subsistence farmers' households must have affected the capacity of the household to produce enough food.

Even with the very high growth rates of both export crops and food crops such as those achieved in the 1970s to mid-1980s by Malawi, it is impossible to sustain sufficient levels of subsistence farmers' household food self-sufficiency over the medium- to long-term perspective under the conditions of a neglected subsistence sector. The capacity to maintain satisfactory levels of food self-sufficiency on the basis of household production is bound to be negatively affected by the neglect of the subsistence sector in terms of the supply of inputs, extension services and the continuous depletion of the household of the critical factor of production–labour. Malawi has been turned into a food deficit country by a brief spell of dry weather over the 1987–9 period, and this does indicate the unviability of an agricultural policy that by-passes the majority of the rural producers. This situation is unfortunately not going to be improved by the implementation of an Economic Recovery Programme such as that being carried out by Malawi. In the context of Malawi's agricultural structure, the ERP will marginalize even further the subsistence farmers.

The case of Tanzania

Tanzania exhibits a different agricultural structure from that of Zimbabwe and Malawi. At independence she inherited an agricultural sector dominated by plantation and peasant agriculture. The plantation sector was clearly dominant in the cultivation of sisal, while the few settler farmers were dominant in the cultivation of tea and to a lesser extent, coffee. During the last decade of colonial rule, the colonial state embarked on a large-scale campaign of consolidating and expanding smallholder cash crops production particularly that of coffee, cotton, tobacco and, increasingly, tea. At independence, the plantation–estate sector was the major foreign-exchange earner. This sector contributed up to 30 per cent of marketed output and 45 per cent of export (Maganya, 1984: 37).

The contribution of the plantation and estate sectors' total exports declined significantly after 1964 and 1969, respectively, due to the drastic decline in world market prices of sisal fibre, and the nationalization of both the sisal and coffee farms. The years after 1966, therefore, saw a significant consolidation and expansion of smallholder farmers although as we shall soon show, in terms of resources flow, the rather inefficient estate farm continued to consume a significant percentage.

Currently, the smallholder farmers account for 80 per cent of agricultural export earnings and over 80 per cent of the marketed cereal production. In spite of the centrality of smallholder agriculture both in the production of food and export crops, this sector was consistently neglected in the 1970s. A few statistics will demonstrate this negligence.

The share of agriculture in total government budget decreased from the relatively high level of 29.1 per cent in 1975/76 to the all time low of 7.8 per cent in 1979/80, and rose slightly to 8.9 per cent by 1981/82. The intra-sectoral allocation of the government development budget, while showing a heavy emphasis in food production, was unfairly distributed – favouring large-scale state owned farms.

For example, between 1974 and 1982, food crops received 45 per cent of the government development budget as against 2.7 per cent for cash crops, 2.1 per cent for pest control, 4 per cent for irrigation, 2.2 per cent for seed production and 17.3 per cent for other activities. Of the amount allocated to food crop production, however, 71 per cent was allocated to the stabilization and expansion of the state owned sugarcane estates and sugar processing industries – a product that is up to now consumed mainly by the urban population.

Elsewhere it has been pointed out that up to the budget session of 1982, the agricultural sector received 12.5 per cent of total investments, declining from 15 per cent of the Third Five Year Plan (1976–81). Significant, however, is the fact that 80 per cent of this went into supporting large-scale farming projects whereas only 20 per cent was allocated to peasant

production. Indeed, even the then Tanzania Rural Development Bank (now called Cooperative and Rural Development Bank), which was expected to support broad-based rural development projects, reduced the percentage of loans going into small-scale household production from 6.7 per cent of total loans in 1971–2 to 5.1 per cent in 1978–80, whereas the percentage for parastatals and private companies rose from a very low level of 6.4 per cent of total loans to 70.7 per cent (Maganya, 1984: 94–5).

   This skewed distribution of financial resources between and within sectors, in favour of the industrial sector within the national economy and in favour of large-scale farming within the agricultural sector, in spite of the fact that its total contribution to export and food crops was minimal, contributed greatly to falling levels of agricultural production in the 1970s and the first five years of the 1980s. The 1986 Economic Recovery Programme, as already indicated earlier in this chapter, promised to raise the percentage of government budget going to agriculture to between 28 and 30 per cent and significantly to raise producer prices. As pointed out previously, while the increased flow of resources to the agricultural sector is a positive development, some macro-economic aspects of the policy package contained in the ERP are bound to increase the already skewed intra-sectoral distribution of resources away from the smallholders to a new breed of progressive farmers. Certainly the ERP strategy of rural transformation can only 'capture' a small percentage of the peasantry.

Conclusion: Paradigmatic Conflict Between the Dependency Paradigm and the Neo-modernization Paradigm – A Shift to Which Paradigm?

As we pointed out in our introduction, the objective of this chapter was to review the history of agricultural transformation of the Southern Africa region over the last three decades or so. The on-going world economic recession, which has hit the SSA hardest, has provoked an intense paradigmatic debate as to the future development strategy for Africa and this debate has been carried out in the context of the dependency versus the modernization paradigms.

   It is not the aim of this concluding section to review the rich debate between the two contending paradigmatic forces that has been going on from the late 1970s. Suffice it to point out that this debate has at times bordered on the extreme and in many cases has failed to comprehend the correct meaning of a paradigmatic shift. While arguing for the adoption of the modernization strategy (capitalism) as the most effective paradigm for effective socio-economic transformation (Hydén, 1983: 26–7), few writers have identified the essential ingredients that help a social scientist to formulate a new paradigm, or as seems to be the case in the current debates, revive old paradigms and elevate them to a position of dominancy (Blomström and Hettne, 1984).

   I do, indeed, agree with Hydén (ibid.: 1983) when he argues, following Lenin, that the best way to comprehend social reality is to grasp the concrete conditions of a concrete situation. Understanding, therefore, the concrete conditions of the socio-economic processes going on in Africa is a pre-condition for a successful construction or reconstruction of a new paradigm of development. A new paradigm of development, in order to be effective, must encompass the existing concrete situation.

   For Hydén, this is the uncaptured peasant that has created the captive economy in most African countries. The solution suggested is the establishment of a functioning market economy. In his own words:

> A functioning market economy, therefore, by being able to attract the peasant farmers to join the 'system' through incentives rather than naked force, and thus make a contribution to the national development while earning more money for themselves, is likely to be the strongest candidate for reducing the significance of the economy of affection in contemporary African society. (Hydén, 1983)

The idea of the uncaptured peasant has been challenged elsewhere (Mamdani, 1985: 79–99). In my opinion, peasants have not been able to participate actively in the free market both in the so-called African socialist and capitalist countries not because they have not been sufficiently captured but precisely because they have been captured and used to further the interest of concrete social forces both from within African countries and from without.

   Our case study has just shown how the 'free market' can be used or misused. The significant

improvement in the contribution of communal peasants in Zimbabwe to total cotton and maize production in just about eight years shows how the state can use the market place to support formerly disadvantaged social groups. Post-colonial Malawi presents us with a different situation. In Malawi the 'free' market has been used effectively to establish a powerful estate and rich farmer economy at the expense of an increasingly pauperized peasantry. The prospect of maintaining the momentum of high levels of agricultural productivity amidst increasing poverty for the *majority* of the population is very limited indeed (Mwakasungwa, 1986).

It would seem to me that as Africa enters the twenty-first century, the question of the class character of the state (be it capitalist or socialist) will become increasingly central to constructing a paradigm that will be able to help academics and policy-makers formulate effective development strategies. Markets can be liberalized or even over-liberalized, but without having a state capable of harnessing the energies and advantages of liberalized markets well, these same institutions can turn into monsters that will devour the energies of the most productive rural force – the smallholder peasants.

It is important, finally, to point out that the dogma of the centrally planned economy (Hydén, 1983: 194) of many socialist countries is rapidly crumbling before our eyes, and it may not be very long before the socialist states begin to learn the rules of the game of the market place. Henceforth, the debate will shift the stereotype of the centrally planned economy versus the market place, to the nature of the state that will have the *political* will and *technical* capacity to harness the advantages of the market place and use it in the interest of the majority of the rural producers – the smallholder peasants. Any meaningful and effective paradigmatic shift will have to take this fact into account.

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8

Smallholder Credit for Rural Development in Kenya

Origins & Future Perspectives   PATRICK O. ALILA

Introduction

The emergence of institution-building in rural development

It is now well recognized among students of rural development that institution-building is a major, if not a key, factor in realizing the various objectives of development effort in the rural areas (Johnston & Clark 1982; Leonard & Marshall, eds, 1982; Eicher & Baker, eds, 1982). The local level institutions for development envisaged comprise government or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community organizations including indigenous based groups, cooperatives, etc. The essential roles of these various organizations would include, for instance, acting as catalysts for local development initiatives and projects, disseminators of new ideas and innovations, providers of critical information, most importantly, playing the role of intermediaries between the people and government.

The direct concern with institution-building particularly in the development of the rural areas is however due to a recent turn of events mainly in the 1980s. It can be said that it is at that point in time that institution-building started receiving forceful expression basically as a result of the shift of concerns in both the perceptions and practice of rural development.

A significant emergent trend, of which institution-building is part and parcel, is the present direct focus on the compelling necessity of sustainability of initiatives in rural development. The focus on sustainability, particularly in terms of implementation of rural programmes, has meant the development of the capacity of the rural people to manage their own affairs (Ackello-Ogutu, ed. 1989; SSRC 1986; World Bank 1989).

In the African context, sustainability of rural development has indeed become of urgent concern owing to seemingly endless crises of stagnation, poverty and famine which have increasingly thrown the lives and activities of rural dwellers into disarray. In the extreme cases of drought and war, whatever capacity these groups, famine victims and also refugees (mostly rural dwellers), had before, is ruined and their hopes for a future completely shattered (Kiros 1985).

It is a basic contention of the proponents of the institution-building approach to the rural development problem that, through strong local institutions, rural residents' capacity to determine and control their own affairs can be realized (Bryant & White 1982; Cernea, ed. 1985; Chambers 1983; Gram 1983). But it also needs to be emphasized that the types and range of institutions, and even their roles, have been changing depending on the perspectives on the development process generally, and in particular the perceptions of rural development (Alila 1989). The institutions for smallholder credit in rural Kenya are no exception and therefore need to be put into context, in view of these changing broader development perspectives and the specific relevant rural development perceptions. This should facilitate a proper identification and a useful understanding of the role(s) particularly of credit institutions in rural development.

Smallholder credit: an institution-building context

The conceptualization of institutionalization found in organization theory is a key theoretical source and should form the basis of an accurate and informative analysis of institution-building. In the institutional approach to the study of organizations, institutionalization is characterized as a *process*. It happens to an organization over time, reflecting the organization's own distinctive history, the people who have been in it, the groups it embodies and vested interests they have created, and the way the organization has adapted to its environment. An organization, therefore, becomes an institution when it takes on values, including ways of acting and beliefs valued for their own sake, thereby acquiring a distinctive identity. Thus in perhaps its most significant meaning, 'to institutionalize' is to *infuse with* value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand (Selznick 1957; Meyer & Rowan 1980).

As technical instruments, organizations are designed as means to definite goals and are therefore expandable. Institutions whether conceived as groups or practices are, however, not just technical instruments. They, in addition, have a 'natural' dimension, being products of interaction and adaptation and having become receptacles of group idealism. They are therefore less readily expendable (ibid.).

A fundamental argument made in reference to administrative systems but of relevance to other forms of organization, including institutions, should be noted here. The essence of the argument is that no single institutional or behavioural pattern can be said to characterize the process of political modernization, nor is there a single way to organize the administration and to staff the public bureaucracy of a developing society. The broader implication here is that no single form of institution can be presumed to be 'good' for all circumstances (Ostrom 1973; Diamant 1970).

The various institutions of smallholder credit in the rural areas should therefore be selectively viewed in terms of their suitability and effectiveness in serving the myriad purposes of a cross-section of the rural population, and in particular reaching the rural poor. The crux of the argument is that having preconceived notions of suitability of such institutions for any developing society as a whole, or across two or more societies, may only end up undermining rural development initiative(s). The critical point to make, therefore, is that non-indigenous and/or indigenous based institutions may be suitable for organizing smallholder credit depending on the particular circumstances.

Smallholder credit unsteadiness: development theory context

The origins, nature and implications of development have been widely debated among and within social science disciplines yielding various formulations of the concept 'development' (Bryant & White 1982, Chapter 1). A significant point in the debate for this discussion is the broad acceptance of an important role for institutions in the social, political and economic dimensions of development.

However, due to changing conceptualizations of development there have been widely varying perceptions of the specific roles and even the nature of institutions in the development process. A case in point is the political development process which for a long time has been equated with 'modern politics' and characterized as the organization of political institutions such as parties, public bureaucracy, parliament, judiciary, etc., as these have been known to operate in Western democracies. This, in brief, meant introducing similar institutions to those found in Western democracies or political systems and the 'modernizing values' that they embody. Yet this has not been borne out by the political development experience of most African countries (Tordoff 1984; Alila 1986). But the current heated debate on multi-partyism in Africa shows that concerns over modern politics have apparently gained new vigour from both outside and within the continent.

It should, however, be recalled that during the 1950s and 1960s it was economists who tended to dominate development thinking and hence the debate. This is clearly evidenced by the dominance, during that period, of economic perspectives using such models as dual sector, labour surplus and stages of growth, which later became notorious for their omission of non-economic or human factors in the process of development (Eicher & Baker, eds 1982: 30–5).

The key point for this analysis is at any rate that these economic models, as in the case

of modern politics, had a strong Western bias emphasizing the inevitable reliance, in the advanced stages of development, on Western-type capitalist economic institutions, notably the free market operating within a monetary economy. Economic policy focussed on importation of Western capital, technology and skilled manpower for purposes of growth and industrialization. The traditional and underdeveloped sectors, especially agriculture, were conspicuously neglected.

Thus, apart from the fact that these Western models had an excessively macro orientation, in the African context, they did not focus on her own resource endowments and institutions. The culture, attitudes, preferences and institutions of the African people were in fact viewed as obstacles to development. Planners and policy-makers therefore assumed that the indigenous population especially the rural poor needed to be led into modernity in virtually every aspect of their lives including culture.

In the same vein, in the initial stages of development-planning in newly independent countries, there was a dominant preoccupation with economic variables. The practice then was to have economists, in most cases foreign, draw up development plans while sitting in the capital. Their substantive concern was with the formal accuracy of their models and not with socio-political variables including input decisions by politicians, or even the administrators who were supposed to serve, and who were also expected to participate in the implementation. In other words, institutional development for planning and plan implementation was initially not part of the agenda for development-planning theory and practice.

It is therefore important for a proper understanding of the role of rural credit in development in the African context to bear two points in mind. First, policy and credit have been shaped by the foregoing development thinking which guided overall development policy and practice. A case in point to be discussed further below is the allocation of credit solely for production of cash crops for expert and/or domestic manufacturing industries to the neglect of rural sector food production.

Secondly, credit, being concerned with money or finance generally by virtue of the intellectual division of labour between academic disciplines, became automatically the preserve of economics where there is even a subdiscipline of monetary economics. But institutions, being concerned with social values and organization, fell outside economics, mainly in the disciplines of sociology and political science. The inevitable consequence has been to view credit and even specialized institutions created essentially for credit distributions in purely economic terms, for instance, investment capital, commercial interest rates, security, default, repayment rates, etc. In short, there is heavy reliance on market criteria considerations in the thinking and the actual design of credit and the attendant organizational arrangements.

Background to smallholder credit: an African context
The evidence of evolution of official smallholder credit in the African context can be traced to two major sources. First, is what can be referred to as credit ideology, whose origins are found in the views, mostly misconceptions, held over the years from the colonial period, regarding the African rural peasant's savings and credit behaviour. These ideas also originated mainly from Western economists. For instance, the long-held contention that Africans were not 'economic men' in the Western sense. This was in effect denying any form of savings and credit practices for the so-called 'economize' purposes. Hence the commonly held idea until recently that African rural peasants lack the propensity to save. The argument, advanced later to the contrary, is that the widespread belief among economists that saving and investment are rare, even as concepts, in indigenous African economic life, may occur because the economist does not know where to look for evidence of their existence (Hill 1966: 16).

Yet certain of the ideas regarding rural peasant credit behaviour have shown remarkable persistence. This is exemplified by 'the small farmer credit need creed' which is the belief that small, mostly poor farmers lack access to credit (von Piscke 1974; Shipton 1985).

Secondly, it is through policy initiatives, based on various perceptions and strategies of rural development that smallholder credit has taken shape, particularly in the post-independence period, and gained recognition as a major factor in rural development. An important, fundamental step in this connection was the change of focus in models of development, evidenced by the shift from agriculture and industry in dual sector macroeconomic

models using per capita income index, to farm level using the household unit standard of living index. Thus it became necessary to take into account rural farm and non-farm needs in the design, especially of development in the rural areas.

The main reason for the shift from the dual sector macro models was simply the realization that the resulting strategies for development were mostly oriented to the export of primary commodities and import substitution. Indeed the outcome of policies and programmes of such strategies has been a clearly apparent failure to provide dynamic forces for the structural transformation of the African economies, especially in the rural sector.

A significant and key consideration for this analysis is the enhanced understanding of the nature of rural society, especially its socio-economic structure, which has given rise to new perceptions of rural development. The crux of the matter is that there has now been the recognition of non-economic, mostly indigenous, factors and the major role they play in development especially in the rural areas. However, in the case of rural smallholder credit in the African context the role of the indigenous element has yet to be fully recognized.

In direct reference to smallholder credit evolution, it can be said that at first, when rural peasants were not considered economic men, there was obviously no thought given to smallholder credit needs by the colonial authorities and none was available in practice. Likewise, industrialization-led economic growth strategy virtually ruled out smallholder credit in the agricultural sector. In fact a popular broad policy prescription under this particular strategy was to encourage the transfer of labour and agricultural 'surplus' by turning the terms of trade against agriculture (Thorbecke, ed. 1969: 3).

The emergence of official smallholder credit was, therefore, closely linked to the much wider concern with modernization of the agricultural sector. In most sub-Saharan African countries historically this happened towards the end of the colonization period. In the case of Kenya it was at this point in time that the concern with agricultural modernization embraced the African farmers with a view to the impending political independence. This trend actually continued, basically the same, well into the early years of independence under the Swynnerton Plan.

The origins of official smallholder credit in Kenya

The colonial administration prohibited by law lending to Africans in Kenya for virtually the whole colonial period. Specifically, loans above KSh.100 were not permitted by law except in special cases authorized by the District Commissioner. This colonial attitude regarding credit opportunities for Africans essentially explains the origin of smallholder credit, from both public and private commercial sources, in Kenya. It was thus until much later towards the close of the colonial period that there were signs of the emergence of smallholder credit for Africans.

1. African Betterment Fund

The initial quasi-official credit arrangement for Africans was through African District Councils. The loans were provided by the African Betterment Fund created around the time of World War Two, and financed through cesses on agricultural produce. These loans took the form of manure or other inputs worth about £50. The recipients were normally personal acquaintances of a district-level agricultural or veterinary officer and a number were members of the councils themselves. In other words the recipients were part of the local elite by virtue of education and/or wealth (Shipton 1985: 98).

The loans were in effect administered to a few 'better farmers' most in Central Province. Later in the 1950s the fund was drawn upon to provide financial incentives to a class of improved farmers in Nyanza, whose grooming started about 1951 (Alila 1978: 139).

2. African Land Development (ALDEV)

The African Land Utilization and Settlement Board, later known as the African Land Development Board (ALDEV), gave the first loans from official sources to smallholders in Kenya. ALDEV started lending to smallholders in 1948 giving small sums, mostly between KSh.1,000 and KSh.2,000, to only a very small number of farmers (Heyer 1973: 5).

The loan period was generally for 5 years. An interest rate of 4.5 per cent was charged in 1948 rising to 6.5 per cent in the late 1950s. ALDEV extended, between 1948 and 1959,

a total sum of £77,500 to smallholders throughout Kenya. However, in that period, while Central Province received 349 of these ALDEV loans, Nyanza Province with a comparable population received only 21. The main underlying reason for this highly disproportionate distribution is that the loans were made available only to 'credit worthy' farmers with 'good investment proposals' (Vasthoff 1968; Heyer 1973).

The broad purpose of ALDEV lending to smallholders was for 'farm development'. The loans were initially for fencing; terracing; tools and machinery; and payment of labour. There was, however, a change. of emphasis in the late 1950s to fertilizers; grade cattle; planting materials for coffee, rice, pineapple and pyrethrum; and a few piped water supplies, tractors and farm buildings.

The responsibility for administration of ALDEV loans to smallholders rested with district agricultural staff who, in some districts, especially in Central Province, became increasingly overburdened over the years. A significant change came about in the loan administration arrangement with the setting up of the national statutory body, Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), in the years of Kenya's independence (1963) to succeed ALDEV. The 1969 Agricultural Finance Corporation Act gave the AFC powers, and it assumed the assets and liabilities of ALDEV.

The Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC)

The purpose for which the AFC was set up was to assist in the development agriculture and agricultural industries by making loans to farmers, cooperations, private companies, public bodies, local authorities and other persons engaging in agriculture or agricultural industries. The AFC from its inception has been a government lending institution depending upon the national treasury for its source of funds. The government, together with the board of directors, therefore, determine policy for the AFC.

The AFC divides its loan portfolio into two categories, large-scale and small-scale. This classification is according to loan sum as opposed to farm size. In the 1960s, AFC financed mainly land purchase and large-scale development. Also included was the seasonal Guaranteed Minimum Return (GMR) scheme for which applicants were required to have fifteen acres for maize cropping only.

In brief, in its lending operations, AFC had even by the 1970s placed greater emphasis upon financing large farmer or commercial agricultural projects than small farmer agricultural productivity. It was indeed admitted by the government as recently as 1976 that the AFC 'has been unable effectively to organize seasonal credit for small-scale farmers' (van Steenwyk 1981: 28-9; Republic of Kenya 1976).

The problem that AFC has with smallholder credit generally can be directly linked to two limitations. First, the AFC over the years could only focus on priority areas of the Ministry of Agriculture on whose field staff it has depended heavily for recruitment of loan recipients. Secondly, and even more limiting, has been the major requirement that prospective creditors must have title deeds. This has meant, in addition, that the AFC could only focus on areas where land registration has been completed. The major outcome of these two limitations has been a strong AFC bias not only towards larger farmers but also to districts of highest agricultural potential where it was government priority to complete land registration (Alila 1978; Shipton 1985).

However, the problems of AFC with smallholder credit need to be seen in the broader context of development thinking and strategies of the sixties and early seventies. It will be recalled that these were the heydays of industrialization-led development and export primary commodity production in agriculture in which the government assumed a spearheading role. Hence the origin of AFC credit from public funds and a government technical department, Ministry of Agriculture, being assigned a key role in the institutional arrangement for the distribution of the credit.

Furthermore, government priorities, in terms of target population and regional coverage, automatically became the focus for AFC. The argument, in brief, is that in line with government national development strategy, the AFC mandate was essentially geared to commercial projects aimed at the transformation of agriculture so as to facilitate industrialization, viewed then as crucial in overall economic development.

Kenyan smallholders

It is difficult, especially due to continuing agricultural transformation, to come by a straightforward answer to the question of who the smallholders are in the Kenyan situation. There has been, indeed, no attempt to identify them as a group so far in this discussion. It is, however, necessary for purposes of further analysis of credit focussing on rural areas, to at least provide a broad characterization of the smallholders of Kenya who are the specific group of concern for this discussion.

It is useful to begin with the historical basis of the emergence of smallholders as a group. The crucial starting point is European settlement in Kenya which gave rise to large-scale mixed farms, plantations or ranches. These farms were found in an area which became known as the White Highlands located mostly in Rift Valley, Central and Eastern Provinces of Kenya. A good indication of the importance assumed by the large-scale farms is that they dominated the agricultural market sector. In addition large-scale farms in their heyday in colonial Kenya accounted for about 20 per cent of all arable land in Kenya, and enjoyed certain privileges and protection from domestic and foreign competition.

In contrast Africans were relegated to subsistence agriculture in small-scale farms and in pastoral areas. This is essentially because the colonial administration imposed severe restrictions on the growing of cash crops and the rearing of exotic dairy breeds by Africans to the advantage of Europeans. A major outcome was the emergency of a dual character which remains a key feature of Kenya's agriculture (Leys 1974).

It was, therefore, possible to make a clear distinction between large- and small-scale farming in Kenya during the colonial period. The distinction closely corresponded to non-African owned farms officially labelled 'scheduled areas' by the colonial administration, and the African owned farms in contrast referred to as 'non-scheduled areas'. Thus in the colonial period smallholders were basically Africans residing in separated (non-scheduled) areas also known as African reserves (Heyer *et al.*, eds 1976).

A change in the official attitude towards African farming and hence smallholders came about in the mid-1950s. It was marked by the publication of the Swynnerton Plan outlining a new approach to African agriculture that immediately brought about the removal of colonial restrictions and inhibitions on smallholders. Specifically, African smallholders had the opportunity to start growing exports, high-value cash crops such as coffee, tea, pyrethrum, etc., and also engage in dairy farming.

Individualization of tenure was introduced in the smallholder farming areas to be accompanied by support services. The services comprised agricultural extension, training, credit and cooperative development. A significant emergent characteristic of these arrangements, involving mainly government ministries and statutory boards, is that the activities in the ensuing years remained by and large tailored to serve smallholders undertaking the export high-value cash crop production and dairy farming – in other words, a focus on smallholder in high potential areas in the provision of services. This is in conformity with government strategy of concentrating on cash crop production essentially for export in these particular areas.

The major point regarding these changes is that they brought about new dynamics to agricultural development. The different levels of agricultural development subsequently transformed the rural areas in different ways, so that there could no longer be homogeneous African reserves. The major outcome is that although smallholders have remained African, they have at the same time become less and less homogeneous especially in their framing activities. In brief, a differentiation process manifested by increasing individualization and disparities of wealth started taking place in the rural areas.

It should be noted, however, that in the immediate post-independence period, development involving smallholders, as in other sectors notably the public service, was simply referred to as Africanization. Thus, in the concern specifically over Africanization of agriculture the over-riding focus was on farming area *per se* and not the kind of African smallholder. In other words the differences in sizes of African holdings was for example not the major issue. Rather, Africans gaining possession of land in the former White Highlands and/or growing lucrative cash crops were of immediate and paramount importance. This was viewed as a sure sign that Africans were reaping the fruits of the struggle for independence.

All the same, relocation of the African population, particularly to farm European areas,

or more accurately to originally African-owned land, was instrumental in changing the spatial distribution of smallholders. They were no longer confined to the former African Reserves. Also the nature of operations of smallholders changed to include cash crop production not to mention the emergence of large-scale African farmers. Therefore, although the number of Africans engaged in subsistence production remained substantial, this became a residual group that continued to diminish over time due to increasing change to agricultural production for the market. All in all, the smallholders became a diverse group and the diversity was on the increase in subsequent years of political independence and enhanced agricultural transformation.

The identification of smallholders as African owners of small farms, relative to large European farms, at any rate posed no problems particularly around the time of independence in Kenya. Further, the actual size of a small farm, being defined in terms of a range of up to 20 hectares, was not considered anomalous either (Republic of Kenya 1965). However, due to various factors, notably subdivision of the small farms into even smaller parcels, mainly due to population pressure, this simple classification using a 20-hectare ceiling, increasingly became less appropriate in referring to smallholders, albeit in some areas more than in others.

It needs also to be borne in mind that not all the small-scale farming areas are suitable in terms of production of high-value products. The implication here is that a small farm in higher altitude areas, suited to the production of coffee, tea, pyrethrum or dairy products, may be quite different in terms of size and nature of operations compared to a small farm in a lower altitude engaged in pastoralism. As a matter of fact small-scale farms in the higher altitude ranges have generally experienced faster development despite being smaller relative to farms in the lower altitudes. The point again in brief is a wide-ranging diversity amongst smallholders in Kenya which is not captured by simply equating smallholders with small-scale farmers, especially if the criterion of grouping is holding size alone.

A broad characterization of the small farm sector advanced by Heyer therefore provides useful pointers to key features of smallholders. The small farm sector is defined, in contrast to the large farm sector, in terms of its relative scarcity of land, relatively large quantities of labour to apply to the land, relatively small quantities of capital, low incomes, small-scale business, and limited access to research, technical advice, skills, information, markets, transport and finance (Heyer *et al.* 1976: 189).

Smallholders are, therefore, first, rural folk mostly engaged in small-scale farming as their main occupation. Secondly, regarding factors of production, there is a constraint of land and capital which are in limited supply while labour is available to them in relatively large quantities. Thirdly, there is limited access to and utilization of technical and other support services notably innovation information and finance. Fourthly, low returns of smallholder farm operations necessitate non-farm activities to supplement low incomes from farming. Fifthly, in terms of location on the ground smallholders are typically found in large numbers in the former African reserves, where there are a good number engaged in just subsistence farming. However, small holdings in former European areas are also growing in numbers particularly with the continuing subdivision of large-scale mixed farms into small holdings, especially those owned by cooperatives.

The specific concern of this analysis will be mainly smallholders in the former African reserves where subsistence agriculture is still widespread and African social and cultural values on credit, for instance, are still predominant. These areas have now also assumed major importance in the development efforts of the independent Kenya government, implying improved policy and services. This relatively new reorientation is, however, basically a reflection of the problems encountered in the overall rural development efforts which have tended to be intractable in these areas of smallholder concentration. The question to be addressed is the prospect of institutionalization of rural development in these areas through initiatives of policy and services such as smallholder credit.

The government focus on Kenyan smallholders: post-independence beginnings

The government focus on smallholder credit particularly in the post-independence period in Kenya has to be viewed in the context of first, development strategies and policies of the Kenya government. Secondly, in terms of the government perception of the specific role of

smallholders in the development process. It is this perception of their role in particular which has directly influenced attempts to address smallholder needs, including credit, and in turn has determined the nature and extent of smallholders' involvement in the development process.

Kenya's development strategy

In devising a strategy for development, following the attainment of independence, Kenya concentrated on three major objectives. These were first, to achieve fast overall growth rates; second, to undertake Kenyanization of the economy; and third, to ensure that the benefits of development were distributed equitably. In brief, the emphasis, as in other sub-Saharan African countries, has really been on the twin objectives of economic growth and equity greatly publicized by the national development plans especially in the 1960s and 1970s.

The way in which the various factors come into play in efforts to achieve these somewhat conflicting objectives, however, very much depends on the role of the state in a particular country in the development process. In the case of Kenya, a government paper (1945), *Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1963–65 on African Socialism* remains the key authoritative reference on state participation in development.

To begin with, the type of society envisaged in the paper is one consisting of property-owning individuals, where individual consumption and accumulation are encouraged. Secondly, the state refrains from active involvement in the production of goods and services, and in the ownership of the basic means of production, distribution and exchange. Thirdly, the state uses public funds and institutions to create, sustain and encourage a group of private entrepreneurs or African capitalists. Therefore, particularly in the initial stages, Kenya opted for economic growth as opposed to more broadly based development. This, in turn, meant preference for a strategy of only developing those economic sectors which were already productive.

A further critical consideration was that existing economic structures should be tampered with. This, in the case of the agricultural sector, for instance, was revealed in a World Bank Report which the government received with enthusiasm (Government of Kenya 1963: 1).

> Within the agricultural development programme, the most favourable economic results will be forthcoming from continued development along the lines set out under the Swynnerton Plan. Accordingly we recommend a programme devoted mainly to land consolidation enclosure and development of cash crop production in non-scheduled areas. (IBRD 1963: 49)

Smallholders: landowners producing for the market

Thus, in view of the strategy adopted by Kenya, the major focus of post-independence government intervention in the sector was the Africanization of agriculture. This largely meant the transfer to African use of the farms previously owned by Europeans through various land transfer and settlement schemes in many cases involving subdivision of large farms. Also part and parcel of this process has been the on-going land adjudication and registration which started in the colonial period as land consolidation (Republic of Kenya 1983: 81–7).

It needs to be underlined that the government has over the years given high priority specifically to adjudication and registration, with the rationale that it is important in speeding up subsequent agricultural development. In the 1974–8 Development Plan it is stated that one of the requisites for successful farming is a system of land tenure that encourages investment in the land and enables it to be used as a negotiable asset for obtaining credit, both of which are inhibited by traditional tenure systems. The basic concern all along has been that under the traditional tenure system communal ownership governed by kinship inheritance is recognized, as opposed to individual land ownership and control. It is the latter which is supposed to encourage investment and even sale of land.

Indeed in line with the government strategy of development of cash crop production, the bias regarding the progress made to date in land adjudication and registration is unmistakable. The focus has clearly been on former scheduled (European) districts and the ecologically identical high potential districts in former non-scheduled (African) districts suited to lucrative

cash crops (Republic of Kenya 1983: 81–7). The specific concern of this policy is apparently that those in high potential areas, where land has been registered and title deeds are available, can have access to other benefits that go along with possession of titles, especially loans.

The post-independence trends in smallholder credit

The AFC was established at the time of independence apparently with the erroneous assumption that it would provide an answer to smallholder credit needs as well. As already indicated, with the commercial agriculture orientation of the AFC, it became the source of additional problems which only served to complicate the situation for smallholders. A case in point is the problem experienced with Guaranteed Minimum Return (GMR) which was temporarily modified in 1968 and 1969, allowing smallholders to apply in groups to offset the 15 acre minimum restrictive requirement qualifying the applicant to receive a GMR loan (Heyer 1973:6). Thus, the shortcomings of AFC to meet smallholder credit needs were recognized fairly early and gradually attention was directed to finding a workable credit arrangement.

A basic new trend in the post-independence period increasingly became an inherent feature of funding of subsequently created, smallholder credit programmes even for AFC. This was the provision of substantial external foreign loans. The origin of this practice was the widely held idea regarding newly independent states in the sixties that the key constraint in their development was lack of capital. A major, well-known result was the writing of development plans during this period with the expressed purpose of securing foreign funding. Therefore, in matters of credit which involved finance the option of foreign loans became the obvious choice. In the case of Kenya funding from foreign sources initially came from Britain, the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), the World Bank and the West German government.

Furthermore, the credit was tied to production of cash crops. In terms of distribution, credit has a bias for commercial production mainly for export. Thus, the trend established in the sixties was that growers of cash crops, such as coffee, tea, pyrethrum, wheat, maize, and cotton, as well as those undertaking dairy production, emerged as virtually the only beneficiaries of increasing rural credit. This, not surprisingly, meant benefits to only a few smallholders at this point in time as the majority of the smallholders were still engaged in subsistence oriented production.

The complex task of channelling credit to smallholders who were widely scattered in the rural areas also resulted in significant trends in terms of institutions for smallholder credit. First, due to the leading role the Kenya government assumed in development, and specifically in view of loan agreements with foreign governments, obviously the government had an interest in the distribution of credit and the ultimate beneficiaries of smallholder credit programmes. Therefore, government public bureaucracy literally took charge of the additional function of distribution of smallholder credit. However, the basic reason for such a move was the then prevailing view regarding institutions of developing countries, that the public bureaucracy was the only rational, efficiently organized institution that could successfully undertake modernization tasks (Alila 1978: 37). The distribution of smallholder credit was not an exception.

Secondly, mainly to supplement government effort, special credit organizations were instituted by the government, such as the AFC. Alternatively, the government channelled credit through organizations under its control, for instance, statutory marketing boards and even cooperatives. Therefore, following independence smallholder credit was in terms of distribution channels largely a government affair. This in itself is a useful pointer to the limited scope of smallholder credit, far more so in the sixties, since these 'government' organizations operated in only certain parts of the rural areas. In other words the government penetration of the rural sector was just beginning following independence (Coleman 1977).

It should also be emphasized that, apart from AFC, practically all these organizations had been instituted for specific purposes, notably the marketing of produce e.g. coffee, tea, pyrethrum and milk. Credit, therefore, was an added function just as in the case of public bureaucracy, and these were not, by nature, credit institutions established on the basis of credit felt needs of the intended beneficiaries. A good indication of this is the fact that credit terms, such as loan duration and activities financed, were tied to the specific enterprises of

particular crop organization, especially the production cycle. It is essentially in this light that, for instance, the distinction between short-term credit for up to 3 years for coffee, tea, cotton, maize, wheat etc., and medium-term credit of 3–10 years for dairy production can be understood.

It should also be underlined in this connection that policy-makers at the centre, in conjunction with foreign donors, determined which enterprises were to receive credit financing. The specific activities financed, notably seeds or fertilizers, and whether the credit was given in cash or kind, was essentially decided upon by the external donors making capital available. Kenyan policy-makers and implementors mainly took charge of responsibility for administration of the credit. In certain cases a donor could also set up a special credit administration machinery that for all practical purposes ran parallel to the established government arrangements for this purpose.

A major consequence of these various practices regarding credit availability and administration was extreme diversity in credit terms and conditions as well as coverage, both in terms of smallholder beneficiaries and the geographical spread. This is revealed by the different smallholder programmes which mushroomed in Kenya especially in the 1970s.

Conclusion

The examination of official formal credit in the African development context in this particular analysis has revealed that smallholder credit institutions emerging out of government initiatives have not first and foremost addressed themselves to the actual local problems of production by smallholder farmers. Secondly, these initiatives have not resulted in the creation of a broad-based suitable framework to accommodate overall credit needs of this particular group of rural households. The key to understanding these serious shortcomings is the fact that these particular institutions inherited a structure with an orientation towards cash crop production geared essentially to economic growth and not balanced all-round development.

The broad concern of this analysis is, therefore, the nature and extent of institution-building as a critical factor in realizing the apparently elusive goal of sustainable rural development, based on the experience with smallholder credit in Kenya. A major failing underlined is over-emphasis on public bureaucratic and technical production issues at the expense of the more critical dimensions of rural development. This was deemed to have negative consequences for institution-building for sustainable development. For instance, the informal, mostly indigenous, credit arrangements that have serviced rural sector farm and non-farm needs over the years are largely ignored. The requirement of individual land titles to be able to secure credit has meant that those not willing to use land titles for credit purposes, and more so those without titles, have not benefited from such credit schemes. Also until recently, agricultural credit programmes in Kenya have not catered for smallholder food production.

In looking at the future of smallholder credit in Kenya, therefore, an immediate concern should be the formulation of agricultural credit policy in order to streamline the official formal credit, first, by bringing food production credit requirements into focus; secondly, by removing wide-ranging inconsistencies in loan terms between the various official credit schemes, and between both formal and informal credit arrangements. Furthermore, smallholder credit programmes need to be sensitive specifically to the needs of smallholders, both in terms of organizational approach and focus, so that these activities are institutionalized at the grassroots resulting in sustainable rural development. The underlying argument in this perspective for the future is that sustainable rural development will only take an enduring form with the advent of a de-marginalization of the smallholders.

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9

Entrepreneurship, Industrialization
& the National Bourgeoisie in Africa

GERRISHON K. IKIARA

Introduction

The general underdevelopment of African countries and their slow industrialization is often blamed on lack of the critical mass of indigenous entrepreneurs and development oriented bourgeoisie. This chapter addresses this relationship, starting with a brief overview of economic performance of sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter discusses the role of entrepreneurship in economic development, the determinants of entrepreneurship and level of industrialization, and ends with a discussion of measures needed to create an enabling environment for a more rapid growth of entrepreneurship and industrialization in Africa.

An overview of African economy

Characterized by weak economic and socio-political institutions, Africa continues to occupy a peripheral position in the global economy. With the least diversified economy and relying heavily on production of and trade in primary commodities, Africa is heavily dependent on the developed world in technology, investment resources, physical and human capital. Africa is also the least industrialized of all the major regions of the world, with the majority of countries having a manufacturing share of gross domestic product of less than 15 per cent (Table 9.1), and has the largest share of foreign ownership and control of economic activities and resources. The continent is thus increasingly seen as 'the sick child of the international community' (OAU and ECA, 1986: 4).

Analysis of Africa's problem shows that dependency is one of its root causes and that until this major structural feature is changed, the continent will remain a peripheral appendage in the global economy. Africa's dependency syndrome is today easily observable in the nature of production; pattern and orientation of external trade; the sources of capital and financial resources; the nature of technology; the sources of skilled manpower; and the ownership and management of economic enterprises.

In the last two decades, Africa has generally been characterized by poor economic performance relative to most other regions of the world. One aspect in which Africa has compared poorly to other areas is in external trade. The continent has the smallest share of world trade as a whole, as well as that of less developing countries (LDCs) as a sub-category, and these shares have declined over time. As Table 9.2 shows, Africa's share of world non-fuel exports declined from 3.1 per cent to 1.4 per cent between 1960 and 1985 respectively, while its share in LDC's non-fuel exports fell from 18.0 per cent to 9.2 per cent during the same period.

In addition to continued poor export performance, sub-Saharan Africa's overall economic growth had the lowest regional growth rate of gross domestic product for the period 1980–8. Sub-Saharan Africa's GDP growth rate for this period was only 0.5 per cent per annum compared with 7.3 per cent for Asia and 1.7 per cent for Latin America and the Caribbean (World Bank, 1989: 21). During the same period sub-Saharan Africa experienced the most serious deterioration of per capita income, a decline of 2.5 per cent per annum. The growth prospects

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Table 9.1: *Structure of Economic Production in Sub-Saharan Africa: Sectoral Contribution to GDP (%)*

	Agriculture			Industry			(Manufacturing)*			Services, etc.		
	1965	1980	1987	1965	1980	1987	1965	1980	1987	1965	1980	1987
Sub-Saharan Africa												
Total	43w	30w	34w	18w	33w	28w	9w	9w	10w	39w	37w	39w
Excluding Nigeria	40w	34w	35w	20w	25w	24w	10w	9w	12w	41w	41w	43w
Low-income economies	45w	31w	38w	18w	33w	25w	8w	9w	8w	37w	35w	37w
Excluding Nigeria	42w	40w	42w	19w	20w	19w	9w	8w	9w	39w	40w	42w
1 Ethiopia	58	51	42	14	16	18	7	11	12	28	34	40
2 Chad	42	53	43	15	12	18	12	11	15	43	35	39
3 Zaire	21	29	32	26	29	33	16	3	7	53	42	25
4 Guinea-Bissau	n.a.	52	61	n.a.	20	6	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	28	33
5 Malawi	50	40	37	13	19	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	37	41	45
6 Mozambique	n.a.	n.a.	50	n.a.	n.a.	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	38
7 Tanzania	46	44	61	14	17	8	8	11	5	40	39	31
8 Burkina Faso	53	45	38	20	22	25	n.a.	n.a.	15	27	32	38
9 Madagascar	31	39	43	16	19	16	11	n.a.	n.a.	53	42	42
10 Mali	65	58	54	9	9	12	5	4	6	25	32	35
11 Gambia, The	35	31	35	9	13	11	3	4	6	56	55	55
12 Burundi	n.a.	62	59	n.a.	13	14	n.a.	7	9	n.a.	25	27
13 Zambia	14	14	12	54	41	36	6	18	23	32	44	52
14 Niger	68	43	34	3	23	24	2	4	9	29	35	42
15 Uganda	52	72	76	13	4	5	8	4	5	35	23	19
16 Sao Tomé and Principe	n.a.	45	30	n.a.	20	10	n.a.	9	n.a.	n.a.	35	51
17 Somalia	71	68	65	6	8	9	3	5	5	24	24	26
18 Togo	45	27	29	21	25	18	10	7	7	34	48	54
19 Rwanda	75	46	37	7	22	23	2	15	16	18	33	40
20 Sierra Leone	34	33	45	28	22	19	6	6	4	38	45	36
21 Benin	59	48	46	8	12	14	n.a.	6	4	33	40	39
22 Central African Republic	46	40	41	16	20	13	4	7	8	38	40	46
23 Kenya	35	32	31	18	22	19	11	13	11	47	45	50
24 Sudan	54	34	37	9	14	15	4	7	8	37	52	48
25 Comoros	n.a.	n.a.	36	n.a.	n.a.	14	n.a.	n.a.	4	n.a.	n.a.	50
26 Lesotho	65	26	21	5	25	28	1	5	15	30	49	51
27 Nigeria	54	26	30	13	42	43	6	9	8	33	32	27
28 Ghana	44	58	51	19	12	16	10	8	10	38	30	33
29 Mauritania	32	31	37	36	26	22	4	n.a.	n.a.	32	43	41
30 Liberia	27	36	37	40	28	28	3	8	5	34	36	35
31 Equatorial Guinea	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
32 Guinea	n.a.	42	30	n.a.	23	32	n.a.	2	5	n.a.	35	38
Middle-income economies	33w	25w	27w	21w	32w	30w	12w	11w	n.a.	46w	43w	44w
33 Cape Verde	n.a.	25	19	n.a.	23	20	n.a.	n.a.	4	n.a.	52	60
34 Senegal	25	19	22	18	25	27	14	15	17	56	56	52
35 Zimbabwe	18	14	11	35	39	43	20	25	31	47	47	46
36 Swaziland	35	30	24	33	25	30	9	n.a.	20	32	45	46
37 Côte d'Ivoire	47	33	36	19	20	25	11	11	16	33	47	39
38 Congo, People's Republic	19	12	12	19	47	33	n.a.	7	8	62	42	55
39 Cameron	33	28	24	20	26	32	10	8	13	47	46	45
40 Botswana	34	12	3	19	41	57	12	4	6	47	47	40
41 Mauritius	16	12	15	23	26	32	14	15	24	61	62	53
42 Gabon	26	7	11	34	60	41	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	40	34	48
43 Seychelles	n.a.	7	6	n.a.	16	17	n.a.	7	9	n.a.	78	77
44 Angola	50	43	46	7	30	23	4	3	3	42	27	31
45 Djibouti	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Six most populous economies	45w	28w	34w	16w	37w	30w	9w	9w	8w	39w	35w	35w
Sahelian economies	46w	38w	34w	14w	20w	20w	9w	9w	13w	40w	42w	44w
Oil exporters	49w	26w	27w	14w	41w	41w	6w	9w	9w	37w	33w	35w
All low-income economies												
Total	43w	33w	31w	27w	38w	37w	20w	22w	n.a.	30w	30w	32w
Excluding China and India	45w	31w	33w	17w	34w	27w	9w	11w	12w	38w	36w	40w
South Asia	46w	38w	31w	21w	25w	28w	14w	17w	18w	34w	37w	41w
Excluding India	43w	39w	35w	16w	20w	21w	11w	13w	13w	41w	41w	44w

Source: World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, World Bank, 1989: 224.
Notes: * : Manufacturing, the most dynamic part of the industrial sector, is shown separately.
   w: Weighted average.

Table 9.2: Africa's Share of Non-Fuel Exports, 1960–1985

Year	Africa's Share in Non-Fuel Exports of	
	World	LDCs
1960	3.1	18.0
1965	2.7	18.0
1970	2.4	18.6
1985	1.4	9.2

Source: World Bank, World Development Report (various issues), Oxford University Press.

of the region are also the most bleak relative to other regions. The decline in the per capita income is attributed to failure to expand external trade, low GDP growth and the high population growth in the region.

The recent poor economic performance and the bleak growth prospects in the 1990s have made Africa less and less attractive to foreign investors. By 1987, sub-Saharan Africa had the lowest foreign direct investments as a region. The volume of direct foreign investments to sub-Saharan Africa fell by more than 60 per cent between 1981 and 1987 (World Bank, 1989: 23).

Africa's economic performance is lower today than it was in the early 1960s when many of the countries attained political independence.

The continent's current production and external trade patterns were largely shaped by its colonial history. During the colonial period, deliberate efforts were made by the colonial governments to make African countries producers of the raw materials required by the metropolitan powers and the markets for their industrial goods. Thus many African countries came to depend on the production of cash crops like coffee, tea, cocoa, palm oil, cotton, groundnuts and sisal, and on minerals such as copper, diamond and gold. It was widely argued that African countries possessed a comparative advantage in the production of primary products, and this principle of 'comparative advantage' has tended to be used to justify the perpetuation of the existing pattern of production which has been so entrenched that in spite of its weaknesses, especially with regard to wild fluctuations of prices in international markets, low income elasticity of demand and deterioration in terms of trade, few countries in the continent have managed to succeed in creating a broad-based, more diversified economic production structure which would foster an enabling environment and offer opportunities for the development of entrepreneurship.

The doctrine of comparative advantage is no longer held as sacrosanct. It is not a static concept as used to be assumed. Experience, especially from the 'Newly Industrializing' countries shows that countries can deliberately change their comparative advantage in the international exchange market making today's primary producers tomorrow's exporters of industrial products. In other words, the principle of comparative advantage cannot and should not be viewed as a notion which permanently confines Africa to the existing pattern of global exchange relations. If African countries are to break out of their present low production trap and dependence, dramatic diversification of their economic production through deliberate action is a must.

This is, however, easier said than done, as Africa's Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Economic Development and Planning acknowledged in 1986: 'Twenty-five years after independence, in spite of all the efforts made, the basic economic structures of African countries have not fundamentally changed. Most African countries are still heavily dependent on the exports of a narrow range of primary commodities' (OAU and ECA, 1986: 4).

The heavy dependence of African countries on primary commodities is aggravated by the fact that many of the countries are also dependent on either one or two export commodities. There are many cases in the continent where a single export commodity constitutes more than 60 per cent of a country's foreign-exchange earnings.

Another dimension to the inappropriate patterns of trade for many African countries is the dependence on a limited number of trading partners. The most common case has been that the former colonial master continues to dominate the former colonies in terms of destination of exports from these colonies as well as in terms of source of imports. This pattern of trading partners has generally failed to stimulate diversification of trade items. The present-

day economic dependence of African economies can be traced back to the first economic enterprises which were created soon after the establishment of colonial rule. The operations of companies such as the British East India Company, the British East African Companies, the French *Compagnie Française de l'Afrique occidentale* and others sought to create links between the colonies and the mother countries. These companies depended on capital, skilled personnel and technology from the mother countries and thus introduced and perpetuated the dependency mentality in the colonies (Ghai, 1973: 15).

The external debt problem facing African countries is one of the most visible manifestations of the dependency syndrome and the extent to which the continent's resources can be said to be mortgaged. The external debt problem is also an important indicator of the poor performance of Africa in global trade. While the volume of Africa's external debts is not approaching that of Latin America, the rate at which Africa's debt is growing is a major area of concern.

The current poor state of the African economy cannot be attributed to lack or shortage of natural resources, as the continent is richly endowed with various natural resources. It is estimated to have the largest total potential reserves of iron ore of all the continents. Tropical Africa alone has the largest current production of copper especially in the copper belt of South and Central Africa. Other major minerals in the continent include tin, cobalt, columbites, uranium, chromite and petroleum. Africa also possesses about 50 per cent of the world's potential hydro-electricity but with only 0.5 per cent of this potential tapped compared with 60 per cent in Europe, 13 per cent in Asia, 5 per cent in Central America and 3 per cent in South America.

While large parts of the continent suffer from inadequate rainfall, the continent has a large irrigable potential if the river basins were to be effectively harnessed for irrigation purposes. Africa's major river basins include the Niger flowing through 10 countries, the Nile flowing through 9 countries, the Zambezi through 8 countries, while the Volta and Lake Victoria basins cover 6 countries each.

Thus, the existing underdevelopment in the continent cannot be explained by lack of resources but rather by the failure to tap the huge latent potential. The inability to utilize this vast potential can, to a large extent, be attributed to the shortage of entrepreneurs with adequate initiative and innovativeness as required for modern economic development.

Total external debt of African countries rose from US$229 billion in 1986 to US$261 billion in 1987. Between 1982 and 1988 alone Africa's external debt increased by more than 100 per cent. By 1987 sub-Saharan Africa had the highest proportion of total lending to GNP, at 85 per cent, compared to other areas (World Bank, 1989: 18). Africa's ability to repay the outstanding debt is low compared to other regions. For instance, while Latin America and Caribbean nations were able to repay US$20 billion of their US$431 billion in 1987, sub-Saharan Africa's net repayment was near zero.

Factors contributing to the rapid rise in the external indebtedness of African countries include reliance on imported technology and manpower resources, various economic crises, ambitious projects of militarization, a high proportion of deadweight or unproductive loans, and poor export performance.

The implications of rising indebtedness in Africa include considerable loss or compromise in the independence of running a country's economy; rising debt servicing charges which in turn reduce available resources for development; increased pressures on balance-of-payments position and economic instabilities. These imply that Africa must try as much as possible to control its level of indebtedness.

Technology has emerged as the key to the tapping of a country's natural resources for development purposes. Where countries have experienced technological revolutions either through innovation or adaptation, rapid socio-economic development has followed as in Japan, Southern Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Africa is, however, still characterized by one of the slowest rates of technological change. This can be attributed to insignificant primary research in the continent due to a combination of factors including inadequate priority given to research activities in terms of allocation of resources; lack of qualified personnel and other resources, and a dependence mentality which assumes that technological change can only come from the industrialized world. While adaptation of technology has been used by a number of countries in Asia to accelerate technological change for economic development, very little of it has been undertaken in Africa.

Thus the slow industrialization and modernization of the African economy in the pre- and post-independence periods cannot be attributed to lack of natural resources but to the lack of a critical factor of production: entrepreneurship. Successful development of commercial, industrial activities and general economies of Africa has been linked to the lack of critical mass of indigenous entrepreneurship (Marris and Somerset, 1971: 12).

Entrepreneurship and Economic Development

Entrepreneurship implies a willingness to take investment initiatives and risks, and to sustain the dynamic process of business enterprise through innovative utilization and management of available resources. The art of innovative managerial organization requires great acumen in combining the factors of production labour, capital and land in an investment undertaking. The entrepreneur is thus regarded as the prime mover of progress, the organization maker and the key to industrialization. The society that is able to breed the critical mass of such people greatly enhances its chances of economic prosperity. In development economics, inadequate entrepreneurship is now widely recognized as a critical bottleneck in the process of industrialization and overall development of the Third World. The entrepreneur is thus an indispensable agent especially in the development of commercial and industrial activities (Gerber, 1985: 3). He has a unique developmental role in business enterprises, different from that of being merely a manager or technician in industry. In a fast-changing world, the entrepreneur ensures the required dynamism, constantly moulding his business to suit the customers' changing preferences. The entrepreneur could, in short, be regarded as the innovator, the strategist, the creator or the purveyor of new methods of managing the business concern (Gerber, 1985).

The African entrepreneur has for a long time been marginalized, first by the colonial economic system and later by the hostile environment created by the African governments and the operations of transnational corporations. Lack of an enabling environment and opportunities forced the potential African entrepreneur to assume a low profile. This led to a misleading notion that Africa lacked natural entrepreneurs, due to various cultural, educational and historical factors. The notion is misleading because evidence arising from studies on the informal sector in Africa shows the sector to be a major reservoir of dynamic entrepreneurs. The sector is increasingly being viewed as the training ground for African entrepreneurs in the large-scale modern sector (House, 1990). A World Bank Report had the same view: 'The informal sector offers a striking illustration of the strengths and weaknesses of enterprise in Africa. Unregulated and largely unrecorded, its activities comprise the most accessible and competitive economies. These enterprises, many of them very small, a training ground for entrepreneurial initiative' (World Bank, 1989: 135).

These African entrepreneurs operating in informal sector and small-scale enterprises consist of mainly those individuals who are or, once were, in the civil service, private jobs, urban or rural petty bourgeoisie including artisans, craftsmen and traders.

The largest source of entrepreneurs is the middle-class modern sector wage-earning category of workers. The bourgeoisie class has been slow to take up the entrepreneurship challenge in Africa. The majority of African bourgeoisie, largely shaped by colonial rule, policies adopted by African governments at independence and the influence of transnational corporations and the African socio-cultural setting, largely remained in the modern public or private sector wage employment. Limited and ill-equipped educational and training facilities in the continent, and monopolistic economic structures, as well as regression in political, social and political spheres, have all combined to stunt the growth of bourgeoisie class.

Determinants of Entrepreneurship and Industrialization in Africa

The colonial influence
Africa is the last continent to break the fetters of colonialism. Whereas the origins of colonialism in other continents go back three to four hundred years, in Africa it has been a relatively modern phenomenon, in many cases dating back to less than a hundred years ago. In contrast to the Asian experience, colonialism in many parts of Africa was preceded by

the settlement of large numbers of Europeans from the metropolitan countries into the newly acquired colonies. The Europeans appropriated the rich agricultural land from local inhabitants who were compelled to seek livelihood as wage earners on the settler farms. This was for instance the case in Algeria, Tunisia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Zaire, South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique.

During the colonial and early independence period, indigenous entrepreneurship was stifled to give room to the colonial settler communities and other non-indigenous commercial and manufacturing concerns. These measures, however, did not completely prevent growth of some entrepreneurs. There were those salaried Africans – teachers, nurses and clerks, for instance, who used their meagre wages to start their own businesses either in farming or commercial enterprises. There were also the demobilized soldiers with small but vital pension funds. Indigenous entrepreneurship and development of a bourgeoisie proper remained limited during the colonial period because the African was not given opportunities to participate fully in the cash crop economy in some countries, such as Kenya and Zimbabwe. African farming was confined within the reserves and was mainly designed to compel the indigenous population to work on the settler farm to earn money to pay taxes. The colonial governments often used unrealistic licensing regulations and quality control to achieve their goals when restrictions on Africans' participation in cash crop farming were relaxed. The initial multinational corporations, which were mainly involved in commercial farming, mining and transportation, employed Africans only at the lowest level, mainly as labourers. Training of the African labour force was also highly inadequate. Consequently, the African who had been plundered by slave trade, forced labour and military conscription was largely illiterate, had limited vision, and had highly limited access to techniques of managing modern commercial or industrial enterprises.

During the colonial period, small indigenous traders operated in the African reserves acting as a link between foreign and Asian merchant firms and African commodity producers, especially in East Africa. The expansion of these traders was also controlled through licensing ordinances. Other problems that hindered the development of the African bourgeoisie and entrepreneurs during the colonial period were inadequate mechanisms of financing, and lack of African-owned institutions.

Impact of state intervention
Africans spent most of the 1960s trying to shed the political, economic and social obstacles created during the colonial period. The first thrust of state support to indigenous capitalism in some countries, such as Kenya, involved rapid transfer of land owned by colonial settlers. However, the prime agricultural land fell into the hands of a small group of African capitalists, while the remaining area of European farming was subdivided amongst small peasant farmers and squatters. The appropriation of land in the post-colonial period has been one of the most important sources of surplus value to African capitalists.

One of the major goals of the newly independent governments was the Africanization of the economies. Most countries were successful in Africanizing their administrative and executive posts in a fairly short period.

Equally important changes took place in the ownership and management of the economy. While these changes took many forms, in most cases the assets held by foreigners were transferred to nationals either through the creation of an indigenous business class or through complete or partial takeover by state enterprises. These changes were particularly dramatic in those African countries which had substantial non-African minorities controlling key jobs and sectors of the economy. In Algeria, for instance, the European population declined from over 1.1 million in 1960 to 60,000 in 1964, while in Kenya, it declined from 62,000 in 1962 to about 40,000 in 1969. During this period more than 1.5 million acres of land changed hands from European to African farmers in Kenya (Kilby, 1971).

However, in the 1980s and 1990s it became obvious that public enterprise had largely failed to meet the objectives. State participation had instead acted to suppress the entrepreneurial impetus among the African bourgeoisie who continued to be content with wage salaries and other benefits in the public enterprise. A number of African countries including Ghana, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Ethiopia that initially promoted state enterprise have shifted

in the 1980s especially following the adoption of World Bank and IMF supported Structural Adjustment Programme sector activities, and have new policies aimed at promoting private entrepreneurship. For example, Ghana has shifted its policy from reliance on state sector to one of encouragement of both foreign and local private investment. Uganda, which in 1970 nationalized all foreign enterprises, has reverted back to earlier policies encouraging foreign private investment. Many other African countries have already indicated their willingness to privatize parastatals with a slant towards indigenous ownership.

However, due to the speed with which Africanization of the African economies was implemented in many countries, the quality of administration and management of the economies was often compromised, leading to inefficient and corrupt bureaucracies which were later to become obstacles to the growth not only of entrepreneurship, but that of the economies in general. In the agricultural sector a similar deterioration in management was experienced as the new African agricultural owners and managers did not have the capacity to effectively integrate modern animal and crop husbandry. The industrial sector and large commercial enterprises dominated by transnational corporations remained foreign-owned except where nationalization was carried out. Development of an indigenous business class was slow as the state took an upper hand in partially taking over foreign enterprises and creating new ones.

In the industrial and commercial sectors, most African governments established state corporations to buy equity from foreign companies or start new joint ventures with foreigners. Consequently, the closing years of the 1960s witnessed concerted efforts to establish control over large-scale enterprises owned by international corporations. There was both partial and complete nationalization of mining companies, banks, insurance companies, large-scale manufacturing, processing and trading firms in countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, Algeria, Libya, Sudan, Zaire, Somalia and Uganda. The rapid wave of nationalization as well as establishment of state-owned enterprises was inspired by the desire to attain economic independence. African leaders seemed to have a strong conviction that rapid development in the long run was only possible in the continent if there was public ownership of key enterprises. The argument for public enterprise was also based on the fact that there were few private indigenous African entrepreneurs who had capital and experience to buy out or establish large-scale enterprises, therefore necessitating the government to play the role that such entrepreneurs would have played. There was also the argument that government participation was needed to redistribute income and assets in favour of the nationals and create the framework and structures for sustained growth in the long run.

The cultural influence

There is considerable debate on the extent to which culture has influenced the level and type of entrepreneurship and overall industrialization in Africa. A number of scholars have indeed used 'cultural determinism' to explain the differential in economic development levels to be found between and among developed countries and developing countries.

Why was Britain the first country in the world to industrialize? Why does the US have one of the highest standards of living in the world? Why was Japan the first non-Western country to industrialize? Why is Zaire, despite her enormous mineral resources, one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world? For many development economists, the answer to these questions are to be found partly in cultural factors.

While recognizing that culture influences economic development, there have been divergent views on how cultural factors can be manipulated to act as catalysts to fast economic development in the developing countries. There is one school of thought which argues that unless the less developed countries completely change their traditional ways, they have no chance of achieving fast economic development; in other words, maintenance of their traditional customs and modes are incompatible with economic development. For instance, J.L. Sadie says: 'A break with [their culture] is a pre-requisite to economic progress. What is needed is a revolution in the totality of social, cultural and religious institutions and habits, and thus in their psychological attitude, their philosophy and way of life' (Sadie, 1964: 218–19).

Similarly, Todaro argues that the modernization process, which encompasses notions such as rationalism, scientific thought, individualism, socio-economic mobility, the work ethic, etc., are to a large extent 'alien' to many contemporary developing countries' societies

except to their small educated elites, and that these countries are characterized by social and cultural fragmentation. Such fragmentation is likely to inhibit these countries' desire for accelerated economic progress (Todaro, 1977: 124).

Gunnar Myrdal, writing on the Asian development experience, says that Asian countries generally held the view that it was necessary to have social and economic revolutionary changes if the region was to achieve economic development. It was argued that social and economic institutions and attitudes must be changed so as to achieve higher labour efficiency, competition, entrepreneurship, equality of opportunities and overall development (Myrdal, 1972: 37).

But there are other schools of thought which hold the view that developing countries can achieve technological and economic advancement without undergoing revolutionary cultural change. Japan is often cited as an example of a nation which achieved phenomenal economic and technological development using, rather than discarding, its cultural factors. He argues that Japanese industrialization took place within the unchanged feudal system of the country: '. . . it would seem from this study . . . that the very success of the Japanese experience with industrialization may well have been a function of the fact that far from undergoing a total revolution in social structure or social relationships, the hard core of Japan's system of social relations remained intact allowing an orderly transition to industrialization continuous with the earlier social forms' (Abegglen, 1963: 134). Thus, the discipline entailed in the Japanese feudal system was used as the vehicle of industrialization.

Another Japanese cultural dimension which can be cited is the relationship between employees and their enterprises. It has been noted that industrial workers are fiercely loyal to their firms, a fact which is said to partly account for the country's successful industrialization. This loyalty can be partly attributed to the role of an employing firm in the total life of its employees. The firm takes almost a fatherly role towards the employees, being closely involved in their social activities such as weddings, burials, etc. The employees reciprocate this concern through their loyalty to their enterprises.

Higgins, summarizing evidence from a number of studies on the issue of whether developing countries need to have a cultural revolution before they can achieve economic development, says that virtually any society or culture is capable of experiencing economic development so long as policy-makers are able to recognize within a particular culture those elements which contribute to rising productivity and incomes. He argues that in fact efforts to force all societies into the same mould are likely to retard rather than accelerate economic development as far as developing countries are concerned (Higgins, 1968: 265).

Touching on the same issue, a UNESCO expert working-group on social prerequisites to economic growth concluded that there are no social prerequisites that should be fulfilled before economic development takes place (UNESCO, 1963).

African culture, modern religion and education, foreign capital, technology and Westernization have all played a part in shaping the African entrepreneur. The African entrepreneur often finds himself in a society where vices and cultural impediments abound. He has to grapple with the extended family system which threatens his savings or profit. He has to deal with or discard beliefs centred on witchcraft, superstition, and other negative cultural traits which would otherwise waste part of his time and money. He has to avoid lengthy rituals common in marriage, funeral and circumcision ceremonies. Whereas some of these are slowly dying out, new problems associated with poverty, bad government, civil strifes, red tape, and environmental degradation have set in.

The African conception of an ideal businessman is one who is hardworking and honourable, friendly and patient, unassuming and thrifty, contemptuous of extravagance, concentrating his attention to his business affairs, and above all, against the inseparable temptations of the market place – drink, women and the corrupting influence of idle, pleasure-loving friends (Marris and Somerset, 1971).

Most of the African businessmen who form the core of the national bourgeoisie have based their values on the colonial experience they or their fathers went through – their earlier education, employment, and the environment created by the modern institutions and civilization. Some of the African groups who have the greatest interaction with the white missionaries, and colonialists such as Kikuyu's of Kenya and Baganda of Uganda are today the relatively more successful businessmen in their countries (Marris and Somerset, 1971).

A notable advantage present in the African society is the absence of serious institutional and ideological barriers to modernization that are characteristic of some other parts of the developing world. Africa has a strong egalitarian tradition which does not encompass a hierarchical division of society. This is an important attribute in development as the entire society is open to innovations. However, this positive attribute has been threatened by tribalism, nepotism, corruption and unpopular regimes which when unchecked have tended to introduce discrimination similar to those found in class and caste ridden societies. The continent has a crisis of legitimacy of political regimes and has undergone endemic political instability. This has replaced the initial idealism and enthusiasm generated by independence with growing cynicism over widespread mismanagement and corruption. As a result, the entrepreneurial spirit has remained weak. The youthful leadership in many African countries has been more concerned with the pursuit of personal material accumulation and affluent and luxurious ways of living (Ghai, 1973: 12). Thus, the middle class in Africa is in real danger of establishing itself as a major obstacle to development. At the same time the flexibility of institutions stands in danger of being hardened and frozen into alien patterns imported from the West but largely inappropriate to the socio-economic needs of African countries.

Towards an enabling environment for African entrepreneurship and industrialization

The African entrepreneur and foreign investor alike are faced with new problems which have emerged from the independent government. These include excessive government regulation; bureaucracy in processing vital licensing documents; taxation which does not match the services provided; state monopolies which provide inefficient services; rigid price legislation; inefficient mechanisms of allocating foreign exchange; and corruption. The provision of vital facilities by the state is a necessary ingredient in the investment process. A regular supply of water, electricity, and maintenance of telecommunications services, access roads, bridges, sewage and garbage collection is a common phenomenon in most African cities. Whereas these services remain poor, licensing fees charged by civic authorities have grown faster and often unjustifiably, making investments uneconomical. The investment risks rise as a result of poor and inefficient infrastructure due to poor planning, urban congestion, corruption and limited individual freedom. In many African states today, it is not uncommon to find chiefs and their assistants harassing farmers, traders and other investors by unlawfully demanding money.

African governments need to re-examine fiscal incentives, operational costs and export and import delays at the entreports. The clearing process at the main harbours is slow and port charges are high. The loading time is too long and often leads to loss because importers are not willing to tie up their financial resources for seven or eight months because of administrative inefficiencies in the system.

A typical procedure in most African governments shows how lengthy and cumbersome the procedure could be. An exporter in Kenya, for instance, is required to obtain an irrevocable letter of credit and an export license from the export–import licensing division of the Ministry in charge of commerce. He is required to fill out foreign-exchange control forms (normally issued by the Central Bank through commercial banks) and present them to his commercial bank for verification. The commercial bank is expected to send the original to the Central Bank. The exporter is then required to take two copies to the Central Bank for stamping after which he forwards them to Customs, which retains one copy for submitting to the Central Bank. The exporter is expected to return the other endorsed copy to the commercial bank for certification and forwarding to the Central Bank. The exporter is also required to have certified invoices, packaging list, customs export entry form, health and movement certificate (for exports to the European Community market) and an airways Bill or Bill of Lading from the carrier or shipper. In addition, export consignments take three to six weeks to be cleared at the entreports (Kenya Association of Manufacturers, 1989).

It is evident that African governments have played a role in holding back the growth of national bourgeoisie entrepreneurship to take up their rightful role in the development process. To rectify this, the governments should implement more development oriented

licensing procedures to free the manufacturing sector from the restrictive effects of the current licensing system, rationalize licensing requirements and reduce levels of nepotism and corruption in the national fabric.

The relatively poor performance of the African entrepreneur and the disappointing record of the bourgeoisie class calls for fresh initiatives to revitalize entrepreneurship in the continent. These initiatives could come from either domestic or external forces. In support of the African entrepreneur, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank, already has two promising initiatives – the African Project Development Facility (APDF) and the African Management Services Company (AMSCO). The APDF was inaugurated in 1986 as a UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) project, with the IFC as the executing agency to help Africans identify and prepare viable projects. Its services include helping to bring local businessmen and investors together, finding technical partners, and offering advice to entrepreneurs interested in acquiring parastatals available for privatization. APDF's mandate is to assist projects costing between $0.5 million and $5.0 million. This programme, which has assisted projects in Kenya, Malawi, Botswana, The Gambia, Madagascar and Zimbabwe, has been more successful in Eastern and Southern Africa.

AMSCO has an innovative approach to tackling the dearth of well-trained African managers in the private sector, while at the same time helping to put ailing African companies on the road to recovery. AMSCO's two primary functions were to manage African enterprises under contract and simultaneously to train African managers to the point where they can take over.

The European Community, through its Lomé Convention, in particular Lomé IV, has also come up with some initiatives to assist the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states in the development of private enterprise and entrepreneurship through the Centre for Industrial Development (CID). Lomé IV acknowledged that the private sector needs to be made more dynamic and play a greater role, in particular through small- and medium-sized enterprises.

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10 A Critical Analysis of the IMF Programme in Uganda*

MAHMOOD MAMDANI

IMF is the most controversial ingredient of the broad base on which the Uganda National Resistance Movement (NRM) has been building its government. And yet it is one agency whose actions are seldom scrutinized; rather, there is a suffocating climate of celebration that marks all discussion of the IMF programme in Uganda. So much so that any analytical understanding of the IMF Structural Adjustment programme requires cutting through the orchestra of official acclaim as a first step.

This chapter is written at a university, not at an embassy or a government ministry. Here, it is our responsibility to analyse public events and policies, to match the deed against the word.

The IMF's Point of View

Before going to the heart of my subject matter, it is first necessary to understand the point of view of the IMF. The IMF's analysis of the economic crisis in African countries can be summarized in three simple statements:

First, the IMF argues that its analysis has a programmatic, and not an academic, bias. From a practical point of view, it is vital to underline the internal sources of the problem. This does not mean that the crisis in Africa has no external causes. No, the IMF accepts the reality of external causes; but it only argues that these are beyond the control of individual governments and therefore belong in the writings of academics, and not of policy-makers.

Second, the IMF argues that the short-term crisis of African economies is really budgetary. It is the result of a failure at good house-keeping, since government expenditures have exceeded revenues; as a result, the demand for foreign exchange has outstripped its supply. The IMF solution to this short-term problem is to cut demand drastically, by a sharp cut in incomes, through a freeze on wages, a cut in social programmes and subsidies. This sort of short-term demand management is what the IMF calls 'the shock'.

Third, the problem in the long or medium term, argues the IMF, is that of increasing production; in its language, it is a problem of increasing supply. How can this be done? By a transfer of resources from those classes which tend to consume to those classes which have a tendency to invest, from the majority of workers and peasants and civil servants to the minority of entrepreneurs, from the working majority to the propertied minority, from the poor majority to the rich minority.

How to accomplish this transfer of resources? By a set of what the IMF calls 'conditionalities'. Of these, three are central: devaluation, the squeeze of bank credits to the state and its

expansion to the private sector, and liberalization of trade (particularly of imports, what is called OGL: Open General License). This is what the IMF calls 'freeing the market'.

The Argument Outlined

In contrast to the IMF point of view, I shall try to establish the following:

First, that in the Ugandan case at least, the IMF is wrong about the source of the crisis, both the short-term budgetary crisis and the long-term crisis of productivity.
Second, that the concessions made by the IMF to the NRM government are marginal. The real significance of the IMF programme lies in its policy orientation – summed up by 'conditionalities' (devaluation, credit restriction, trade liberalization). And the conditionalities of the IMF have not altered one bit in the Ugandan case. The only difference is that they are phased. This is particularly the case with the OGL, which was unleashed all at once in the first IMF programme under Obote II, but is now being administered gradually.
Third, I shall try to establish that when fully implemented, the tendency of the IMF programme will be to undermine any attempt to create an independent, integrated and self-sustaining economy, and to undercut the momentum towards democratization in our society. It will, in fact, consolidate those forces unleashed by the Amin and the Obote II dictatorships. *And finally*, that for these reasons, it is vital for democratic forces to begin to think of an alternate strategy, and to do so in a public and democratic way.

I shall begin with a discussion of the 'conditionalities'.

Devaluation
We have been so preoccupied with the question of devaluation, and so sharply divided as to its intrinsic significance, that it is vital to grasp that in itself devaluation is neither good nor bad. Its significance depends on its overall context. And that context in Uganda's case for some time has been deficit financing. Let me explain by use of an example.

Imagine that we are a society of banana growers. We are a hundred persons. We export bananas and import bread. Say we have 100 loaves of bread circulating, and alongside it 100 shillings in circulation too, with a shilling in each of our 100 pockets. That shilling represents purchasing power equal to a loaf of bread. Now, imagine that I am the government. I want to take half of the money you have. How do I do it? One alternative is to tax you. But if I do that, if I take half a shilling from each one of you, you are likely to riot, even to throw me out. So, I look for a second way, one which will hide the real source of your oncoming poverty. That way is deficit financing: to print more money. I print another 100 shillings. Now, the money in circulation has doubled to 200 shillings overnight, while you have been asleep. With 100 breads and 200 shillings in circulation, the price of bread has gone up to 2 shillings and the shilling in your pocket is now worth only half a loaf! Without anybody breaking into your house and stealing your money, your shilling has become worth half a shilling!! Deficit financing, in other words, is the most sophisticated form of theft practised by governments on their people.

Now, let us introduce a complexity in our example. Let us divide the population of 100 into two classes: 95 peasants and 5 traders. When the price of bread doubles, from 1 to 2 shillings, all 100 lose. And all begin to think of how to reverse this misfortune, and some of even how to turn it into an opportunity. This, however, is not possible for the fixed income earners (peasants, workers and civil servants in real society). But it is possible for traders, who now increase the price of the bread they sell from 2 to 3 and even to 4 shillings. The result: the shilling in your pocket now equals a quarter loaf of bread.

What happens next? Some of the enterprising peasants (or workers, or civil servants) figure out that there is no point in continuing with their fixed income work. The only way of making ends meet in the new situation is to join the traders. Or they become part-time banana growers, and part-time hawkers. The point is that banana production begins to decline. Our society enters the phase of crisis.

The next step you know. Enter the IMF, the custodian of convertible currencies. The IMF tells the government: Look, last year a dollar was 10 shillings. But a shilling then was

one loaf of bread. Now a shilling is a quarter loaf. So, if we are to take into account the real value of the shilling and maintain real relations between the dollar and the shilling, you have to devalue from 10 shillings to 40 shillings to a dollar.

Who can disagree with such reasoning? Hardly anyone. This is the first type of devaluation, whose context is a history of deficit financing. It is an inevitable devaluation given that history. But things do not stop there. The IMF tells the government: to get our money and our seal of good housekeeping, you have to agree to a conditionality: no more deficit financing. No more printing of money, but then it adds in a whisper, except when you devalue. In other words, you can print money and continue to fleece your own people provided you devalue your relationship with the convertible currencies! So, the next time the government wants to print money, it devalues. And, in response, every class in society tries to neutralize the effect of the devaluation by increasing the price of what it has to sell. But not every class has the capacity to do so. So, while traders increase their prices, those with fixed incomes (workers, peasants, civil servants) can not.

My point is this: devaluation under the IMF is fast turning into a disguised form of deficit financing! That is what happened with the Obote II regime, particularly in 1984–5. And, with the recent devaluation from 165 to 200 shillings to a dollar, we have to ask ourselves whether we are now moving from the first to the second type of devaluation.

Remember that a devaluation is not only an external adjustment, in the value of currencies. A devaluation is also an internal shift when accompanied by liberalization. Unless the government combines a devaluation with a corresponding increase in fixed incomes, every devaluation turns into a redistribution of resources internally, from those with fixed incomes to those who are able to increase the price of what they sell.

Look at the last devaluation. The shilling worth of the dollar went from 165 to 200 – a step of 21 per cent. And yet, matatu prices in Kampala have gone up from 50 to 70 shillings, 40 per cent. But neither wages nor salaries have been adjusted. And peasant incomes for exports may be adjusted, but at a factor less than that of the devaluation! In other words, the devaluation became a transfer of income from matatu users to matatu owners, from the poor to the rich!

Devaluation is one way of transferring resources from the working majority to the *mafutam-ingi* minority. The other way is the second IMF 'conditionality': its demand that banks restrict credit to the state and expand it to the private sphere. In other words, that social savings in financial institutions also be put at the disposal of the *mafutamingi*.

Liberalization of imports: OGL

The transfer of resources to the *mafutamingi* is then followed by a third 'conditionality': Open General License (OGL). Its purpose is to give the *mafutamingi* group the right to use these resources to import anything that it finds profitable, regardless of its consequences to society. The IMF genuinely believes this is for our good, at least in the long run, arguing that the working people tend to consume, not to invest. Resources should therefore be in the hands of those who will invest them, increase output, thus increasing employment and eventually incomes of everybody. So, to increase the income of the masses in the long run, the IMF argues, you must decrease them in the short run! This is what it calls the 'bitter pill'!

Is this what really happens? Not if we taking into account the experience of the first IMF programme in Uganda. In its first programme, the IMF introduced OGL alongside its auctioning system for foreign exchange. The results are worth looking at. Let us take the figures for 1983/84. Of the foreign exchange auctioned to the *mafutamingi* in that period, nearly 20 per cent was used to import luxury items. And another 25 per cent was used to import mass consumption goods (textiles, soap, cigarettes) for which there was idle production capacity in local Ugandan factories.

Contrary to the IMF assumptions, the *mafutamingi* group has a high tendency to consume luxuries. And even when it invests, the structure of Ugandan markets is such that the most profitable investments are to be found in trade and in unproductive luxury ventures, not in productive enterprise. This is clear even from looking at what has been going on under the second IMF programme. Most private investment is either going into trade, or into private luxury housing or into the entertainment 'industry', like hotels and disco.

There is a longer point here, which is worth considering with some seriousness. Many of us think that all we need to develop is money, foreign aid. Many of us think that England industrialized because it looted the wealth of the colonies. This is part of the story, but not the whole of it, not even the most important part of it. If money (whether from the colonies or from wherever) is what explains industrialization, why did England industrialize but not Portugal? Portugal had colonies as England did, and from its Latin American colonies Portugal looted fabulous wealth. But that wealth was squandered in luxuries by the dominant classes of Portugal – landlords and merchants – instead of being invested in production. In fact, that wealth found its way to England as Portuguese merchants and landlords imported English products, and assisted in industrializing England!

We need to grasp one key issue: money is not necessarily capital. It is capital only when invested productively. If consumed, it is squandered as revenue. And if invested in luxury or other activities without a significant linkage to the local market, its positive significance is not for our economy, but for the economy with which it has significant linkages.

The real secret of English industrialization, from which we need to learn, was the internal character of English society. One major reason England could industrialize, but wealthier empires in history could not, was that unproductive classes lost out to productive groups who took control over the use of social resources, who could transform money into productive capital. That is why we need to ask ourselves: what is the nature of the *mafutamingi* to whom the IMF wants us to hand over the control over resources in society?

It should be noted that the NRM government does not deny the failure of the first IMF programme or the unproductive character of the Ugandan *mafutamingi*. The government's argument, however, is that the second IMF programme is different from the first. This time there has been no introduction of an open OGL. This time the OGL is restricted. In other words, this time, the *mafutamingi* do not have total freedom to import whatever they want to. They have to respect a list of government-set priorities. What are these priorities?

An OGL restricted to industry: a wasted opportunity

The main concession made by the IMF to the NRM government is to allow for a phased introduction of OGL. Currently, the OGL is restricted to industrial imports, and these imports are further prioritized as those for industries producing 'basic consumer goods and construction materials'.

Now, this is all fine, except that most industrial plants in Uganda that would fall under these headings are also extremely import dependent. They have little connection with any local raw material; they should in reality be considered extensions of foreign economies merely located on Ugandan soil. Their operation and expansion stimulates external economies, while they are essentially parasitical on Ugandan agriculture, for they require continuous transmission of resources extracted from agriculture, but without contributing any dynamism to the growth of the same agriculture.

Let us look at some examples of these industries, beginning with a few that produce 'construction materials'. Take *Uganda Baati*, which produces iron sheets for roofing materials. This firm simply cuts imported coils of metal sheet, coats them with imported zinc, and brands them 'Made in Uganda' – using an imported stamp! Another interesting example is that of *Uganda Clays* in Kajansi. These are actually two plants, one set up in the colonial period and the other in 1969. The older plant uses local clay from Kajansi, Mukono and Gomba. But the newer is heavily dependent on imported glaze from Italy and borax oxide from the UK. Even the bricks made there are European-type: they are made hollow for the European winter. In Ugandan weather, these cause discomfort, besides the fact that they cannot be joined using local materials.

Now let us look at some examples of industries producing 'basic consumer goods'. Begin with TUMPECO, which produces mugs, buckets, trays, basins, etc. It simply imports these in shapes, dips them in imported chemical solutions, and dries them locally for sales! *Vita Foam* is another such industry, which has just set up yet another plant. This industry mixes imported chemicals with Ugandan water to form blocks, which it then cuts into various matress sizes for sale.

Perhaps the worst example is *Dairy Corporation*, which produces milk in a country with

a higher cattle to human ratio than exists in most of Europe. It takes import dependence to truly absurd levels. This plant mixes imported powder with local water, pours the result into imported packing materials, and carries these in imported plastic crates for sale. So 'patriotic' are the packing machines they use, that the Swedish machines will only accept Swedish 'TetraPak', and the French ones will only pack in French cellophane sachets!

My point is that the NRM Government's Rehabilitation and Development Plan is taken straight out of a textbook. It shows no real understanding of the nature of Ugandan industry, of its heavy import dependence, and thus of the need to restructure it. As a result, the Plan lacks any concrete and relevant industrial strategy. This is why the temporary concession made by the IMF to industrial imports is being wasted and will come to nothing.

Meanwhile we shall soon be moving into an open OGL. And, as we do this, control over our economy and the direction of its development will slip fully into the hands of the *mafutamingi* locally and donors externally.

Increased foreign dependence

In spite of all the talk of 'freeing the market', the IMF programme is actually destroying local markets. For any programme which destroys the purchasing power of the local population cannot but lead to a shrinking of local markets.

Let us remember that the tragedy of Africa is that its internal markets are restricted not simply by size of population and of countries. A far more important restriction on its markets is the fact that its working population lives in squalid poverty, and represents no effective purchasing power. Internal markets in Africa are restricted to markets for luxury goods for small but affluent minorities. This is how matters were in Europe some 500 years ago, roughly at the start of the Slave Trade. One of Europe's major achievements over that period has been to create markets for mass consumption. My point is that there are no pre-existing markets, simply waiting to be 'freed'; the real need of the hour is not to 'free' markets, the real need is to create markets for mass consumption. Instead of contributing to that need, the IMF programme is busy undermining even the embryonic beginnings of such markets.

The significance of this development shall be enormous, not only for our economy, but also for our politics. It is worth looking at this briefly. You need to understand this to realize why IMF programmes everywhere have a tendency to lead to increased regional and social tensions.

Most of us are concerned about regional (and therefore nationality) tensions in our society during this century. We wonder how to create a single country, and we should know that the task of creating one country is also one of creating one economy, an 'integrated' economy. In a country where every region is increasingly 'integrated' with some foreign country, instead of with another region – one producing and exporting coffee, another tobacco, a third something else – no matter how much you preach to people about the need for thinking as one country, the real relation between regions will not be of interdependence, but of competition. The irony is that the more you develop such an economy, the more you tend to draw regions further apart.

Similarly with social groups. In England, workers are not simply the producers of wealth, they also represent an important market for capitalists producing mass consumption goods. If you reduce the wages of workers significantly, it will not only affect workers adversely, it will also have a negative effect on capitalists whose products these workers purchase for consumption. But for the *mafutamingi* of Uganda, peasants are only a source of exportable wealth and food; peasants are not a market for what these *mafutamingi* sell! This is going to be increasingly the case with the IMF programme, as popular consumption is being undercut and that of luxury-consuming classes is being subsidized. We are actually going to create two countries in one, a sort of informal apartheid.

The economy is not only becoming less integrated, it is also increasingly losing the little independence it has. Before the first IMF programme began, in 1980, Uganda's debt/service ratio was 18.9 per cent. After the first programme, in 1885, that ratio had jumped to 55 per cent. With the start of the second programme, in 1988, it was almost 60 per cent. And at the end of the second programme, in 1990, it was 90 per cent! In other words, 90% of our export earnings were needed to service our debt. The government lives on borrowed money, while local savings are being transferred to the *mafutamingi* who use it unproductively in the ways just indicated!

In what direction are we developing with such a policy? Are we not moving in the direction of countries like Sudan, Zambia and Mozambique, whose debt/service ratio is today greater than 100 per cent; who are compelled perpetually to request a rescheduling of debt, in return for both accepting policy 'conditionality' from donors, and agreeing to pay a higher interest rate on rescheduled debt? Who are solving their debt problem today by transferring it to the next day? Like an alcoholic who takes yet another drink to have stable hands for the next few hours?

Yesterday, the government balanced its budget by deficit financing. Now, it does so by external borrowing! Neither alternative is acceptable. The only healthy way to finance the budget of an *independent* government is to draw revenue from taxing those sectors of the population who are wealthy.

It is my view that before we become tied so completely with golden strings of debt, we should begin to think of an alternative to the IMF programme, and of an alternative rooted in Ugandan realities and not textbooks whose theories are derived from the economic experience of the Western countries.

Need for an alternative strategy

History is a rich soil for theory. A person who does not learn from his own past – who has lost his own memory – has also lost the capacity for finding direction for the future. To find direction, because we are in danger of being lost, we must return to our history.

Uganda's modern economic history can be divided into four periods: from the 1890s to 1928, then from 1928 to 1949, and from 1949 to 1972, and finally from 1972 to now.

In the first period, 1890s to 1928, the key question was: who was to be the agent of change in agriculture? There was a tug of war. On one side, pulling for state assistance and protection, were European planters and local landlords and chiefs. On the other side were peasants. The issue was resolved in favour of the peasants. First, because landlords and chiefs were parasitic, and because planters were semi-parasitic, neither could provide efficient and cheap raw materials for export. And second, because peasants organized politically as the Bataka movement to protect their own interests, they succeeded in getting the colonial government to address peasant concerns. The period ended with the passage of the 1928 Basulu and Envujjo Law, which both limited the rent landlords could extract from peasants and gave peasants security of tenure. It marked off Uganda as a land of peasant agriculture, unlike Kenya with its settler agriculture, and Tanganyika with its combination of plantation and peasant agriculture.

The law and the security of land tenure it gave to peasants is the main reason for the expansion of commodity agriculture in the second period, 1928 to 1949. In that period, Uganda's economy reflected a classic colonial division in labour, so far as Africa is concerned. Peasants worked the soil in small farms, while immigrant merchants and processors (from India) controlled the export trade and the processing of exports. This period ended with a political crisis, with an embryonic indigenous middle class organizing peasants against the control of export processing and export trade by an immigrant bourgeoisie. This crisis was the peasant uprising and the workers' general strikes of 1945 and 1949.

It was this uprising which forced the colonial state to reform the colonial economy. As a result, peasants were allowed to form cooperatives with the assistance of the middle class that had joined them in political protests. The cooperatives took over both the marketing and the processing of export produce. The immigrant Asian bourgeoisie was expelled from this sector by state policy, but was in turn enticed by the same state to move into manufacturing.

This was the 'golden age' of the colonial economy, the period when agriculture thrived and manufacturing developed beyond the simple processing of exports. The agricultural reforms of the period liberated the productive energy of the peasantry which toiled harder than ever before because it had the guarantee of retaining at least some of the fruits of that toil.

We need to learn the lessons of this period. We need to underline the key role of politics and state action in this shift. The Indian *mafutamingi* of that period did not move out of trade and into manufacturing voluntarily; if anything, the market kept on enticing them to continue with the same trading investments. Central to this movement was state action. That is a period pregnant with lessons for the contemporary relation between the state and the post-Amin *mafutamingi.*

That period, from 1949 to 1972, also had a negative side. This was the counter-movement. The middle class, which had previously united with the peasantry and formed cooperatives in common action, now began to control and use the same cooperatives for its own enrichment. In this, it was originally helped by the colonial state through legislation. An after independence, it used the law-making machinery to deprive peasants of any control over cooperatives, and in fact, to turn cooperatives exclusively into state-controlled bodies.

This reversal is marked by two developments during the Amin period. The first concerns land. With the 1975 land reform decree, the security of tenure granted to the peasantry in 1928 was repealed. The law turned every peasant into a squatter on his own land, who could be evicted by any local notable who could convince a District Land Committee formed of similar local notables that he intended to 'develop' that land!

The second development confirmed the control of cooperatives by anti-peasant elements. A Minister for Cooperatives now appointed key cooperative officials. The movement was statized, and robbed of any democratic content.

Defining Uganda's economic problem

With this background, we are now in a position to define the main causes of Uganda's medium-term economic crisis, its crisis of productivity. My point is that when cooperative officials can embezzle with impunity the whole of the peasant's export proceed, it is absurd to split hairs over whether that proceed should be increased on paper by another 10 per cent! That when the peasant lacks security of tenure and, therefore, lacks the incentive to invest any savings on the land, instead regularly investing it in petty trade, it is absurd to think that the price of agricultural produce is the main determinant of how much is invested in agriculture!!

History confirms that the task of development in the long run is a transformational one. It is not possible without the transformation of key social institutions. This is the experience of every country that has succeeded in industrializing, whether socialist or capitalist. For the real question before us today is not of capitalism or socialism. It is, instead, of the reform of archaic structures that are blocking the development of peasant productivity.

Just look at the examples of the most rapidly developing section of the globe today, the two Koreas, and the two Chinas. What they have in common, whether socialist or capitalist, is the capacity for institutional transformation of two types. One was a comprehensive land reform that removed a parasitic landed class from agriculture, freeing peasants and creating a local market for manufacturers. And the second was a state, both active and sensitive to the requirements of economic transformation, which did not capitulate to the short-term perspective of the proper-tied classes but instead directed their resources towards long-term priorities.

Just compare South Korea with Philippines. Enormous amounts of American money were poured into both. Both were brutal dictatorships. Both had regimes steeped in corruption. And yet, South Korea developed; the Philippines did not. Why? In my view, the major reason was the land reform in South Korea and its absence in the Philippines; and, as both cause and consequence, the fact that the Philippino state has remained captive to the interests of unproductive classes.

The history of economic development in South Korea confirms the same basic lessons thrown up by the economic history of Europe. There are no pre-existing entrepreneurs and markets, slumbering, waiting to simply be 'freed', IMF-styled. Markets, particularly in mass consumption goods, are the products of democratic struggles. Entrepreneurs are similarly created – particularly in countries like ours with a long colonial record of stifling any form of indigenous entrepreneurship – by a selective state policy combining the carrot and the stick.

Defining Uganda's budgetary problem

The IMF says that Uganda's budgetary problem is the failure to practise good housekeeping, that we are spending too much. The solution must thus be a shock, to cut down popular consumption drastically. This conclusion does not stand to analysis. But first, let us recognize that the problem has an important external dimension, even if we may have little control over our foreign environment. It is significant that Uganda has suffered a crisis of declining terms of trade of monumental proportions over the past decade: the purchasing power of our exports has declined from 100 in 1977 to roughly 14 in 1987!

The internal dimension of the problem is what is normally referred to politely as 'mismanagement'. It is a term which actually hides the real cause of the budgetary problem, for the problem is not really on the side of expenditure, at least not its absolute level. (I want to be clear here, I am talking about the absolute level of expenditure not being the problem; I am not talking about the specific items on which the state spends money.) State expenditure in Uganda, including military expenditure, is one of the lowest in Africa. Before the beginning of the second IMF programme, expenditure for 1986/87 was only 6.8 per cent of GPD! But state revenue was even lower. It was 4.2 per cent of GDP! One does not have to look far for an answer. While the *mafutamingi* stopped making any significant contribution towards the state budget, state revenues were drawn increasingly from taxation on peasants and workers and civil servants, the captive classes. Take one figure as an example. While in 1969/70, 13 per cent of budgetary revenue was drawn through different types of taxes levied on peasants, workers and civil servants, this figure had jumped to 82 per cent by 1985/86!

With revenue consistently lower than expenditure, how was the difference made up? The answer: open deficit financing before the first IMF programme; devaluation – or disguised deficit financing – with the IMF. With or without the IMF, the one group in society that has not been asked to contribute significantly towards the state budget is the *mafutamingi*. On the contrary, the IMF has put the squeeze on working people. Instead of looking for ways of increasing revenues, the thrust of the IMF's shock has been to reduce expenditure, by freezing wages and reducing expenditure on social services. The thrust of the policy is to blame and further victimize the very victims of the Amin and Obote II dictatorships in Uganda!

It is difficult to draw any other interpretation from the International Labour Office (ILO) statistics, which show that the index of real minimum wage in Uganda rose from 29 in 1957 to 100 in 1972, and then fell sharply to 9 in 1984. During the years of the first IMF programme, from 1981 to 1983, the real minimum wage declined by 26.4 per cent. In 1986, the ILO characterized Ugandan figures as reflecting the 'sharpest annual decline' in wages on the African continent.

In spite of these trends, the second IMF programme began in 1987 with the government pledging to 'limit the wage bill' in its 'Policy Framework' document. In accordance with that pledge, the Minister of Finance issued a decree in August of 1988 asking all government departments to cut down the wage bill for group employees by 30 per cent, whether by reducing wages or by firing workers.

True, government departments are full of non-existent paper employees on whose behalf bosses gather wages and salaries. But if you give these same bosses the right to choose how to cut the wage bill, you should not be surprised if they maintain the paper employees and fire the real employees!

In the first IMF programme, the IMF and the World Bank together advised the Uganda Posts and Telecommunications Corporation to sack 50 per cent of their employees without any detailed investigation of the manpower requirements of the Corporation. The result: five years later, the Corporation found itself in a severe manpower crisis and had to implement a crash recruitment and training programme. Yet today, as if that never happened, the IMF and the World Bank are asking Uganda Railways to sack a third of their staff!

Conclusion

It is important to keep in mind that we are in a period of transition. And it is in the nature of transitions that they exhibit contradictory features. One contradiction in our case is between our politics and our economy. Politically, the trend is away from the legacy of the Amin and the two Obote periods. That legacy has been of confining political activity to an ever shrinking group, whether defined by religion or nationality or region, eventually reduced to the form of a one-person dictatorship. The tendency today – in spite of problems and struggles – is to open up the political arena to expanding participation. And that trend is summed up by one single institution today: Resistance Committees.

In the economy, however, the very forces which have crystallized imply that the IMF programme has contributed to consolidate the grip of the *mafutamingi* internally and of the Western creditor countries externally. The IMF programme was originally presented as a

tactical retreat in a difficult situation. As such, it was justifiable. In 1986/87, the NRM lacked either resources or a concrete economic programme beyond broad goals. The attempt to get resources from Arab and Islamic organizations bore meagre returns. The IDRC Report failed to provide direction in economic policy.

But if tactical deviations continue for a long period they turn into a new strategic orientation. Strategically, there is today a contradiction between the democratizing tendency in our politics and the anti-democratic thrust of the economic policy reflected in the IMF programme. Given time, that contradiction is bound to surface, for the trend has already begun. If you read *New Vision*, you will have read of peasants attacking land surveyors (their presence is a sign that land grabbers are about to follow) in Mubende, cutting their heels, and throwing them out. And you will also have read of RCs (Resistance Committees) in Mbale imprisoning unscrupulous cooperative officials.

The struggle in our society is around the issue of democratization. That is the nature of the struggle within the RCs, and that is the nature of the struggle when RCs confront land grabbers or cooperative officials.

Democracy is not just political; it is also cultural and economic. My argument has been that in the economy the need of the hour is for large-scale institutional changes, for major democratic transformations that will give peasants security of tenure and control over cooperatives. The real issue today is not state ownership versus privatization. The real issue is democratization. We can now be tossed from the fire of state corruption into the frying pan of private speculation. That is why any conception of privatization, like that of the IMF, which leaves out of consideration the interest of the vast majority in society, has to be resisted. The property that needs liberation today is not that of the *mafutamingi* who continue to appropriate the labour of the majority for their own unproductive consumption, but that of the peasantry whose property is the result of the labour of that majority. Privatization, IMF-style, is anti-democratic.

11

Ethnicity in Africa or African Ethnicity

The Search for a Contextual Understanding

EGHOSA H. OSAGHAE

Introduction

> The terminological problem [in the study of African politics] arises from the fact that certain words which feature in political discourse have, within the contexts in which these words originated, come to acquire fairly standardized and acceptable connotations . . . which bear little similarity to the political reality of African societies . . . (Dudley, 1982: 13)

One such word (which actually refers to a phenomenon) is ethnicity. Ethnicity is perhaps the most popular concept used in the analysis of African politics. But in recent times, much of such analysis has fallen prey to the comparative-scientific 'trap' in the social sciences. The result has been the treatment of ethnicity in Africa in universalistic terms as one whose character is fairly standardized. This is an unfortunate development because it has drawn attention away from the unique features of ethnicity in Africa. This development was, however, inevitable, given the pejorative content of earlier treatments of the peculiarities of ethnicity in Africa. At the time, tribe and tribalism were used to describe primordial groupings and relations in Africa while ethnic group and ethnicity were exclusively used for 'modern' or advanced states. Later writers, especially Africans who 'naturally' wrote in a combative mood, rejected these distinctions for being pejorative and unscientific[1] (Mamdani, 1976; Nnoli, 1978; Young, 1965; King, 1976, etc.). As the emphasis shifted to comparison, and with the dramatic theoretical developments this afforded, tribe and tribalism were easily supplanted by ethnic group and ethnicity because the latter concepts have greater comparative relevance. For example, it has been argued, they allow the comparison of Hausa–Ibo relations in Nigeria, Catholic–Protestant relations in Northern Ireland, and Flemish–Walloon relations in Belgium, to mention only a few, as essentially the same kind of phenomenon (cf. Glazer and Moynihan, 1975: 18; Barrows, 1976: 140; Burgess, 1978: 271).[2]

It is perhaps the overriding consideration given to gross comparison that has partly blinded many scholars from giving serious attention to the peculiarities of ethnicity in Africa. The situation is further worsened by the fact that the impulses for theoretical developments in the study of ethnicity have mostly come from American and European experiences.[3] Indeed, many scholars are likely to see an attempt at analysing 'peculiarities' as unworthwhile because it will hamper over-all comparability by introducing too many systemic factors. But, this is not true, if we pin our intellectual confidence on the premises of the 'most different systems' design which holds that systemic factors facilitate comparison by accounting for differences in the same phenomenon in different systems (Przeworski and Teune, 1970: 34ff). This realization has led some authors to argue for the contextual analysis of ethnicity (cf. Porter, 1975; McKay, 1982). There have been a few attempts at contextualizing ethnicity in Africa but, as I shall argue, they have failed to account adequately for the peculiarities, especially the *continuities* and *changes*.[4] The most notable advance in this direction is to be found in

the works of Peter Ekeh (1975, 1983, 1985, 1986) whose expositions have informed my search for contextual peculiarities of ethnicity in Africa.

Ethnicity in African Studies; Definition and Etiology

Let us begin with general definitions. Ethnicity is a function of the ethnic group but it presupposes the existence of more than one ethnic group as it describes in-group/out-group relations. Specifically, it may be defined as individual or group behaviours based on ethnic group differentiation, usually in a competitive situation. To understand ethnicity then, we have to define the ethnic group and account for why and how ethnic identity and loyalty become crucial bases of individual and group behaviours. An ethnic group may be defined as 'primarily the political community . . . that inspires the belief in common identity' (Weber, 1968: 389). Another definition says that 'an ethnic group consists of people who conceive of themselves as being of a kind. They are united by emotional bonds and concerned with the preservation of their type. With very few exceptions, they speak the same language . . . and they have a common cultural heritage' (Shibutani and Kwan, 1965: 47).

These definitions indicate that an ethnic group has both objective and subjective aspects. In objective terms, an ethnic group has a common name, language, culture, territory, political organization and myth of common descent which foists a common destiny. However, these elements are necessary but not sufficient to define an ethnic group because it is basically behaviour-oriented and dynamic rather than static. Therefore, in subjective terms, an ethnic group exists when those who belong to it define themselves as such in relating with 'outsiders' who also recognize the group of identity. This subjective character of the ethnic group points to the importance of ethnic consciousness in defining it, and suggests that, to borrow the words of a class analysis, an ethnic group is one which has transformed from being an ethnic group-in-itself to an ethnic group for-itself (Nnoli, 1978: 7) or from ethnic 'awareness' to ethnic 'consciousness' (Giddens, 1973: 111).

These rather 'standard' definitions do not imply that there are no contextual differences in characterizing ethnic groups in different societies. For example, two American sociologists have defined an ethnic group as 'a group with a common cultural tradition and a sense of identity which exists as a sub-group of a large society' (Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969: 135). This means that in the American context at least, an ethnic group is synonymous with a minority group. What such Africaness can be said to exist? There seems to be an agreement on two elements. These are the primacy of language and the myth of common descent, both of which are consistent with the fact that many ethnic groups of the present time are 'new' creations which owed a lot to the 'ethnicizing' process of getting each one of them together. Language and myths were the major tools used in the process. In terms of language, the 'creation' of most ethnic groups was facilitated by the endeavours of missionaries and colonial officials who developed standard language from similar dialects. These standard languages provided the launching pads for the vanguard of ethnicity who were the 'nationalist' elites. As Ekeh (1975: 105) puts it: 'Even the languages by which some claim to identify the ethnic group in [the] modern day . . . are, to a large extent, a product of [the] domain-partition ideology [of elites].'

Where language proved insufficient to galvanize ethnic solidarity (and it usually was insufficient), it was (and has continued to be) complemented with the myth of common descent or what has been called 'charter myths' contrived and generalized by the elite. This notion of invention could easily mislead one to think that such myths never existed, or were unimportant before colonialism. They were of course far from unimportant, are found in many legends and folktales, and they contributed largely to the unity of pre-colonial groups. The true situation is that these myths were generalized to extend the boundaries of pristine groups, although a few of them may have been 'mere fabrications'. To this extent, charter myths, as they were refashioned, generalized, manipulated, or even fabricated by the elites, served the purpose of bridging the primordial group with the modern group, in the process transforming the ethnic group from one in itself to one for itself.

Any definition of the ethnic group in the African context should take account of the particular character of ethnicity which is not a static, all-pervading, ever-present phenomenon;

rather it is dynamic and intermittent, and its salience is often situational (Barth, 1969; Cohen, 1974; Kasfir, 1976; Young, 1976; Weingrod, 1979; Chazan, 1982; Mozaffer, 1985).

Having suggested the situational character of ethnicity, we can now tackle its whys and hows. This is what ethnogenesis, or the etiology of ethnicity is all about. From extant works, there are several schools of ethnogenesis. As it is impossible to consider all of these views and the theories they involve in a short chapter such as this, it is necessary to classify them into two broad perspectives – the Involuntary/Non-rational and the Voluntary-Instrumentalist, or what McKay (1982) calls the primordial and mobilizationist perspectives. It is hoped that my examination of these perspectives will do justice to the numerous schools which have been subsumed under them.

The involuntary/non-rational perspective

This perspective sees ethnicity in psychologically reductionist terms, as one of the 'givens' of life which flows 'more from a sense of natural – some would say spiritual – affinity than from social interaction' (Geertz, 1963: 110). This means that ethnic identity is not something the individual rationally decided to assume; it is 'natural', and the individual has no choice in the matter because it is an unchanging legacy of one's birth. There are two variants of the naturalness thesis. The first posits that ethnicity is the natural condition of a backward society which will, with increasing modernization, wither away through absorption and assimilation into a national culture, and be replaced by more 'rational' identities like class (Geertz, 1963; Gutkind, 1970; Doornbos, 1972). The second variant takes as a point of departure the fact that modernization often heightens rather than quietens ethnic conflicts (Cohen, 1969; Melson and Wolpe, 1970), and sees ethnicity not as a mark of under-development, but as a natural, no-choice identity which is permanent to the individual and which his biological existence endows as a major resource in his relationship with others (Shils, 1967; Lancaster, 1974; Isaac, 1975).

The involuntary/non-rational perspective has been severely criticized for various reasons. First, by assuming ethnicity to be a natural or given phenomenon and, therefore, an independent variable, it fails to recognize its dynamism and explain why it is important in some situations and not in others. Second, it underplays the political, social and economic milieu of ethnicity. This reduces its explanatory power because ethnicity is a function of social forces and impulses. Third, the approach stresses that ethnicity is a permanent form of moral obligation to one's fellow ethnics but overlooks the fact that many individuals have a relatively weak and diffused loyalty that imposes no particular obligation to help one's kin. For example, some studies have shown that at the height of the famous 'tribal unions' which were the rallying centres of ethnic identity and loyalty in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, there was less commitment by far than was assumed (*cf.* Cohen, 1969; also Parkin, 1969). One author has sought to resolve the problem this way: 'Allegiance to common values imposes no specific obligations between tribesmen; rather, it implies a generalized loyalty which can be mobilized in particular situations as a moral sanction or to legitimize a claim for support (La Fontaine, 1969: 187).

Notwithstanding these criticisms, the involuntary perspective of ethnicity has remained with important modifications a useful perspective for students of social change in Africa and other 'modernizing' societies of the so-called Third World, especially because ethnicity is seen as an adaptive mechanism in the alienating milieu which attends the process of social change.

The voluntary-instrumentalist perspective

This perspective has attracted scholars of both the 'bourgeois' and 'radical' schools. Its major premise, which cuts across the various ideological shadings, is that ethnicity is a *voluntary, rational, situational, functional,* and *pragmatic* response to socio-economic and political pressures as well as a basis for group action. In more specific terms, ethnicity is a dependent variable whose salience is attributable to the *conscious efforts* of individuals, classes and groups who mobilize ethnic symbols and support to further their competition with others for scarce resources. There are two major schools of thought in this perspective, namely, the scarce resources school (*cf.* Bonacich, 1972; Despres, 1975; McKay, 1982; Thompson, 1983; Van den Berghe, 1983) and the Marxian school (*cf.* Magubane, 1969; Nnoli, 1978; Barongo,

1983). The schools differ, not so much in terms of the circumstances under which ethnicity comes into play, but how it does, especially in relation to the role of classes in this process. There is agreement that ethnicity is instigated by competition for scarce resources which involves individuals and groups who are subject to 'structural inequalities' and perceive economic gain as the reward for political mobilization along ethnic lines.

On the role of classes in ethnogenesis, there are two discernible views which, in varying degrees, approximate the scarce resource–Marxian distinction. The first is that ethnic groups are similar to classes because they are rational interest groups which may lack primordial significance (*cf.* Vincent, 1974). But, while ethnic groups may be rational competitors, it is difficult to find any one which lacks primordial significance (Van den Berghe, 1976). A more extreme variant of this view holds that ethnic groups are in fact classes (*cf.* Patterson, 1975). What can be discerned from these views which intersect class and ethnic groups is that ethnic groups, being rational, are basically products of the competition for scarce resources, rather than primordial entities. But, while it is true that modernization heightens ethnic consciousness and conflict, the fact of competition does not remove their primordiality.

The Marxian view is slightly different. It holds that because all economic relations are primarily class relations, ethnicity is epiphenomenal and its character depends on the class configurations in society. This view, which Van den Berghe (1974) has called the 'sociology of dependence' position, does not amount to a denial of the importance of non-materialist forces like culture and language, but an argument that the salience of these primordial forces can only be understood within the context of class analysis (*cf.* Barongo, 1983; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987). In a typical African situation, ethnicity is seen as an interest-begotten ideology which is instigated and employed by the *bourgeoisie* to further their interests. This is one aspect of ethnogenesis that has been widely accepted and popularized by radical African scholars (Mugabane, Mamdani, Mafeje, Nnoli, Onimode, etc.). In point of emphasis, it serves an additional purpose of helping to distinguish ethnicity in Africa from ethnicity in say the USA where, in class terms, ethnicity is said to be a 'middle-class' or 'working-class' phenomenon (Gans, 1979). However, the major shortcoming of this Marxist approach is that it locates ethnicity only within the bourgeoisie, thereby suggesting that the masses are non-rational actors who cannot (also) use the ethnic resource. Nothing could be more misleading, because the ethnic resource, like any other interest-begotten resource, can be employed by any actor no matter his class, depending on his perception of any situation.

The instrumentalist perspective of ethnogenesis is very useful because it accords perfectly with the dynamics and situational characterization of ethnicity by specifying the conditions under which ethnicity is likely to be a salient force. However, by narrowing down the arena of ethnic competition and conflicts to the economic and political market and the class divisions which underlie it, the perspective tends to deny ethnicity any amount of independence or relative autonomy. It undermines the fact that there are ethnic manifestations that are primarily cultural, and perhaps not relevant at all to problems of conflict and competition. Ethnicity does have a relative autonomy, in some respects at least, because it always has a primordial pedigree. Elements like language and culture conflicts may not be as volatile as those instigated by competition for economic resources, but they exist and, in most cases, affect the totality of ethnic relations. In any case, if ethnicity does not have a certain amount of relative autonomy, it would be wiped out when the ethnic groups on which it thrives are frustrated out of their struggle by their failures in the competition!

The question of whether class is a more important tool of analysis than ethnicity, or whether ethnicity is a wholly independent variable is another contentious matter. To say that ethnicity does not exist outside of the class context is to deny it, as I have argued, any amount of relative autonomy. Yet, because both class and ethnicity co-exist in the same society and are often directed at the same ends, it would be inadequate completely to reject class in analysing ethnicity. As one author puts it: 'to the extent that a society is divided both into ethnic groups and into classes, neither of the two kinds of group can be reduced to the other. Ethnicity is *not* simply a minor complication or special case of class, nor can ethnicity be understood outside the total context of inequalities which include class' (Van den Berghe, 1974: 123). This, I think, is the best way to resolve the issues involved in class and ethnic analysis.

A synthesis

To conclude this section, the point should be made that the two perspectives which we have examined are not mutually exclusive. McKay's insight explains why this is so: 'ethnic tension or conflict which is purely ideal or purely material constitutes a minority of all cases. It is surely the case that all polyethnic societies are characterized by a *combination* of instrumental and effective bonds' (McKay, 1982: 401). Indeed, if there is no ethnic 'diacritic', ethnicity cannot be an instrumental force.

Having examined the wherewithal of ethnicity in general and in a specifically African context, let us now turn to look more closely at the character of ethnicity in Africa. Is it really ethnicity of a different genre? Why or why not?

Ethnicity in Africa; What is its Character?

In the last section, I tried to emphasize the critical factors both in the definition and etiology of ethnicity in Africa. Nothing in these efforts would however be sufficient to differentiate ethnicity in Africa from ethnicity anywhere else because, after all, every society has contextual peculiarities in ethnic terms. I believe that the best way to differentiate ethnicity in Africa, and account for its peculiarities is to see its pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial continuity, and secondly, as a phenomenon whose character continues to be determined by the distorted state–society relations which constitute the *damnosa hereditas* of colonialism. This is what I shall attempt to demonstrate in this section.

Colonialism and the emergence of contemporary ethnicity

Most students of African society and politics agree that colonialism is 'the cradle of ethnicity' (Nnoli, 1978). But this has not always been so. Originally, largely because of what Van den Berghe (1974) calls 'pro-native acculturation', pioneer Western scholars, especially anthropologists who opened the field, treated ethnicity as an endemic 'African Problem', the legacy of a backward past and the manifestation of a continuing backwardness. At best, ethnicity was seen as 'an inventory of cultural traits divorced of its political and economic structure' (Van den Berghe, 1974: 121). Later, the situation improved, with the advent of the theory of 'plural society' and the 'colonial situation'. Originally formulated and applied in the light of Asian colonial experiences, these theories were later extended to African societies where they sought to examine the ethnic phenomenon within the colonial milieu. This was perhaps their major failing as they have proven incapable of explaining the supra-individual consequences of colonialism in the post-colonial era (Ekeh, 1983: 4).

Basically, the new notions of colonialism posited an asymmetrical interdependence among ethnic groups based on a relation of dominance and dependence which also included stratification along ethnic lines and fragmentation into hierarchized ethnic and/or racial groups. In terms of emphasis and other details, however, plural society thesis differed from the colonial situation thesis. In a plural society, the ethnic cleavages were said to be mutually exclusive and this made ethnicity the hallmark of politics. The society was only held together by a culturally distinct and institutionally differentiated minority possessing superior skills and resources over the majority, and the stability of the society rested on this continued domination (Furnivall, 1939, 1948; Smith, 1965, 1971; Rex, 1959; Rabushka and Shapsle, 1972, etc.). Although efforts have been made since then to improve the analytical status of the plural society theory (*cf.* Kuper and Smith, 1971), it does not account for the ethnic process and the dynamics of ethnic relations because its conception of ethnic groups is static and rigid. Its major purpose, it can be argued, was to buttress colonial domination.

The colonial situation perspective, on the other hand, was developed by Georges Balandier in the French collectivist tradition. Balandier's argument was that any attempt to understand the realities of society under colonial rule had to be based on the interplay of the relationships between the colonizer and the colonized (Balandier, 1951, 1966). Of particular relevance to us is the view in this perspective that ethnicity, as a colonial-induced phenomenon, was not an unchanging inheritance of the African past, but something whose character, especially its interconnections with class and race could only be understood within the totality of the colonial situation (Van den Berghe, 1965, 1974). To this extent, the colonial situation thesis

offered a more useful analytical perspective than plural society because it recognized the actor-process dimension of ethnicity. But, as I have already indicated, its insights did not extend beyond the colonial situation. Now that this situation is over, it has become necessary to examine the profound changes which it brought about. Quite clearly, we need new perspectives to be able to do this.

Let us now return to the starting point of this section, that students of contemporary ethnicity in Africa trace its roots to colonialism. It is generally agreed that colonialism was a watershed, as it was the dividing point between pre-colonial primordial structures, most of which were not sharply conscious of their differences, and the present-day fully-fledged ethnic groups-for-themselves. As some authors want to say, the modernization process which attended colonialism transformed the rural 'tribesman' into the modern (urban) 'ethnic man' (cf. Mitchell, 1960; Wallerstein, 1960). How did this happen? By colonialism creating the wherewithal or 'infrastructure' for ethnicity through the creation of new and mostly artificial political structures which lumped together diverse people; through urbanization, improved transportation and communication facilities which opened up new abodes and acquaintances; through Western education, social amenities, new jobs, the monetization and integration of the economy, all of which instigated unequal competition for scarce resources. Over and above all of these, the modernizing influences brought about by colonialism penetrated groups in unequal degrees. On this complex situation was superimposed the 'new men of power' nurtured under colonialism who 'inevitably' (considering the inequalities among competing groups) became the vanguard of the ethnicizing process.

These popular insights certainly extend our knowledge of contemporary ethnicity beyond the colonial situation perspective, but I consider them inadequate to account for the peculiar character of ethnicity in Africa for three major reasons. First, they generally do not go deeper than colonialism for the etiology of ethnicity because they simply assume that it is a modernized primordial force, if the primordial roots are acknowledged at all. The result is that they do not adequately explain the continuities in ethnic relations in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. Second, because of the radical (specifically Marxian) inclination of many writers on Africa, ethnicity is treated primarily as a dependent variable, and the phenomenon is thereby denied any relative autonomy. For example, one of the most quoted phrases says that ethnicity 'is a mask for class privilege' (Sklar, 1967: 6). I shall however argue below that part of the resilience of ethnicity in Africa is attributable to some degree of relative autonomy. Third, because these insights have often underplayed the actor-process dimensions of colonialism, they erroneously lead to the conclusion that ethnicity will wither away or, at best, become inconsequential as society develops. This argument, as I pointed out in the first section of this paper, has not been validated even in the advanced industrialized nations.

I believe that these inadequacies exist because of inaccurate and narrow conceptions of colonialism and its effects on ethnicity in particular and society in general both under colonialism, and in the post-colonial period. The search for a new understanding of the peculiarities in Africa, then, should begin with a reformulation of the colonial origins of ethnicity. This reformulation should include (1) a conceptualization of the nature of colonialism itself; (2) a consideration of the differing effects of the various colonial policies on ethnicity; and (3) the responses of African societies to these changes brought about by colonialism.

A Reformulation of the Colonial Origins of Ethnicity and its Aftermath

Balandier's colonial situation perspective marked an advance in the conception of colonialism, as I pointed out above. Since then few efforts have been made to seriously analyse colonialism in a comprehensive manner, as a process creating enduring social formations. Most scholars are content with treating it either as an *episode* (cf. the Ibadan School of colonial history comprising Ade Ajayi, 1968; Kenneth Dike, 1956; A.E. Afigbo, 1962; Anene, 1966)[5] or as the *precursor* of modern African realities which requires no further examination beyond knowing that, amongst others, it instigated competition for scarce resources which elicited ethnicity. However, compared to all known conceptions of colonialism and its aftermath, Peter Ekeh's

recent *epochal* conception is one of the most perceptive in terms of its sociological profundity which explains, in novel ways, why the social formations emanating from colonialism have the characters they have (Ekeh, 1975, 1983, 1985, 1986; see also Sklar, 1985).

In a sense, Ekeh's perspective may, in historical terms, be regarded as an update of Balandier's colonial situation. But it is more than this because it goes beyond the colonizer–colonized relationships to consider the supra-individual and enduring formations over which neither had control. For Ekeh, colonialism is 'a *social movement* of epochal dimensions whose enduring significance, beyond the life-span of the colonial situation, lies in the *social formations* of supra-individual entities and constructs' (1983: 5). One such social formation is ethnicity. But first, let us elaborate on and tighten our reformulation of colonialism which again draws heavily from Ekeh's insights.

First, colonialism is an *epoch* which differentiates the present from the past not just in degree but also in kind. It led to the introduction of massive and enduring social formations which have outlived the colonial situation. Conceived in such terms, colonialism and its aftermath shade across historical dates and periods. Second then, while it may seem to be analytically useful to do so, it is not really useful to insist that, for example, colonialism began in 1884/85 and ended in 1960 when, in fact, its effects predate actual colonization and its effects linger on. Third, the major and enduring effects of colonialism did not result from *acts of creation* by individuals who were masters of the colonial situation, but from the *social formations* which, in supra-individual terms emerged by the force of their own existence, in response to existing impulses from the society.

On the whole, colonialism produced enduring social formations[6] which Ekeh (1983) has classified into three 'ideal' types. First, there are the *transformed* indigenous social formations which, though having existed already in the pre-colonial period, were transformed by the wider framework of social existence introduced by colonialism and imbued with new meanings and symbols.[7] Second, there are the *migrant* social formations which were imported wholesale from the colonial centre, and consisted mainly of the state apparati and modern institutions such as universities and banks. Most of the problems of state–society relations which sometimes manifest themselves in ethnicity have their origins in the moral vacuum within which these migrant structures were implanted, devoid of the moral orders within which they existed in the mother country.[8] Third, there are the *emergent* social formations which were neither indigenous nor foreign but evolved from colonialism. Ekeh points to urbanization and the formation of ethnic groups as well as ethnicity as good examples of emergent social structures. While urbanization in terms of 'modern' cities like Lagos, Nairobi, Kampala and Luanda may be said to be a good example of 'emergent' structures, the same cannot be strictly said, in my view, of ethnic groups and ethnicity.

Even though colonialism introduced new realities and needs which, at the individual and group levels, pre-colonial 'tribal' groups could not meet and which warranted the formation of new and larger groups, no ethnic group grew out of colonialism which did not have a primordial (pre-colonial) pedigree. It is true, as Ekeh says, that colonialism destroyed tribes because they 'were incompatible with the new widened integrated existence in colonialism', but created 'tribalism' based on the new ethnic groupings (1983: 21). It is also true that the character of present day ethnic groups and ethnicity are best analysed within the new political structures created under colonial rule. But it is simplistic and misleading to say that ethnicity is an emergent social structure unless this meaning is reserved exclusively for the ethnic relations attending the migrated social structure.[9] Even so, to say ethnicity is an emergent social formation is to raise the oft-repeated query of whether, to use Ekeh's words, 'tribalism can exist without tribes'. The answer as I argued in the early parts of this chapter is an emphatic 'no'. My point is that it is correct to say that contemporary ethnic groups and ethnicity are *transformed* as well as *emergent* social formations. If this point is not correct, we would run into the snare that most analysts run into: that of denying ethnicity any reality whatsoever. I would summarize by saying that ethnic groups, from the colonial perspective, are modern enlargements of indigenous pre-colonial groupings; and that ethnicity is both ancient and modern.

These categoric definitions do not however tell us all about the etiology of ethnicity in relation to colonialism. We also have the effects of the various colonial policies as well as

the responses of the Africans themselves to them, especially in the post-colonial period, to contend with. With regard to the former, the British colonies proved to be the most notorious theatres of ethnicity because of the prevalent indirect rule policy which consolidated, sometimes through extended dominance relations, pristine ethnic differences, and in some cases actually 'created' new ethnic identities. By contrast, in French, Portuguese and Belgian colonies where the system of rule was essentially direct and centrist, not much room existed for fully expressing ethnic differences. If statements of intentions are to be taken seriously (in most cases, as in the present example which I give, they turn out to be insincere), we may take the statement of the Colonial Affairs Minister in the Congo in 1958 as proof that the Belgians (like the French and the Portuguese) were for integration rather than differentiation: 'We have created the Congo and . . . given it highly centralized institutions . . . which have inevitably engendered over the long run among the inhabitants who were at one time ignorant of each other's existence, the concept of a nation and the building of a kind of nationalism' (quoted in Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987: 47). For the British on the other hand, the cardinal principle was differentiation (or better still, non-centralization) rather than integration. As Governor Hugh Clifford enunciated in the case of Nigeria in 1929: 'It is the consistent policy of the government of Nigeria to maintain and to support the local tribal institutions and the indigenous forms of government . . . which are to be regarded as the natural expression of (African) political genius . . . It is the task of the government of Nigeria to build up and justify these nationalist institutions' (quoted in Coleman, 1958: 194).

Not surprisingly, ethnicity has proven to be more pronounced in former British territories than in others. But in almost all cases, the coming of modernization, the capitalist penetration of the economy as well as the attendant enlargement of the scope of competition for societal resources have bolstered the utility of the ethnic resource.

Nonetheless, the reasons for the unequal intensity and salience of ethnicity in African states today, go slightly beyond the effects of colonial policies which more or less provided the theatre for ethnicity. Even in former British colonies where, we have said, ethnicity is more pronounced, we still have great differences in intensity. For example, ethnicity is by far more salient and pervasive in Nigeria than in Tanzania which became a British Colony after the First World War, or in Sierra-Leone and The Gambia which are also former British colonies. Similarly, the intensification of ethnic conflicts in Liberia which in part led to the civil war is not explicable in colonial terms because Liberia was never colonized by any foreign power. What then determines the intensity of ethnic conflicts in a country? There are several reasons, some general and others country-specific, but we would be concerned with the most important general ones here. First is the factor of the number, relative sizes and configuration of the groups. Crawford Young (1976) made the point a long time ago that ethnic conflicts are not very troublesome in countries with a large number of ethnic groups of small and relatively equal sizes (cf. Tanzania). By contrast, ethnic conflict is intense in countries with few groups, especially where the groups have unequal sizes and control of resources (cf. Rwanda). Ethnicity is most usually intense in countries where the groups are rather many, and have unequal sizes, and especially where they are unequally developed. In countries like Nigeria and Uganda where groups have markedly unequal sizes, access to resources and power, and because of the recursive nature of regional, religious, ethnic and class forces which make it possible for the large groups to dominate the country, ethnicity is often intense.

The second factor which in most cases heightens ethnic conflict is the unequal access to, and control over, resources among the groups. This factor is much more important than size; supposed minority groups often wield enormous political power because of their control of economic resources (cf. the Amharis in Ethiopia, the Bamileke in Cameroon and the Whites in South Africa and Zimbabwe). If we remember that the state is at the centre of the economic process in Africa, then we appreciate the crucial role which control over economic resources plays in inter-group conflicts. The third and final factor we shall consider and which is the most crucial in terms of the actor-process dimensions of ethnicity is the level of development of class forces, especially of the elite. In general, ethnicity is more acute in those countries which have a large indigenous bourgeoisie, partly because the larger the bourgeoisie, the more difficult it is for them to agree on the rules of the game. A slightly different scenario is to

be found in post-settler colony states like Zimbabwe and Namibia, as well as internal colonialist situations like that of pre-1980 Americo-Liberian dominated Liberia. Here, ethnicity is suppressed for a long time because of the hegemony of an alien bourgeoisie, but once the lid of alien domination is blown off, the incipient indigenous bourgeoisie arouse ethnicity in consolidating their positions. So, wherever an indigenous bourgeoisie has emerged, the intense competition for resources amongst its members has often exacerbated the ethnic problem by providing the necessary impulse for ethnicity to become generalized to the level of the non-elite.

Historical Analysis

In historical terms, it is an established fact that the character of present-day ethnic groups and ethnic relations evolved with the modern political structures. For example, the facts of Kikuyu preponderance in Kenya, and Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo preponderance in Nigeria, being emergent realities in their countries, can only be meaningfully understood within the context of the new state structures in which they exist. Most of these states created by the colonizers are not yet a hundred years old and have had far fewer years of independent existence.[10] However, this is not to say that contemporary ethnicity is less than one hundred years old.[11] Of course, many aspects of pre-colonial group relations remain crucial for present-day relations. Even the initial period of contact with Europeans (in the fourteenth century) affected the pattern of inter-group relations especially amongst coastal and semi-coastal peoples (*cf.* Dike, 1956). In a sense, these initial contacts were the precursors of transformations that were to take place under colonialism. In this regard, the slave trade deserves special attention because it laid the 'foundation' for the new phase of ethnicity by tightening kinship bonds:

> In a situation of generalized violence and ravages, with no state structures to protect individuals and groups, it must be expected that some social structures would emerge to provide some degree of protection. It is the case that during this historical period, no other institution other than kinship has performed this role . . . (Ekeh, 1986: 16)

The strengthening of kinship bonds did not only serve as a security mechanism. It also served to strengthen in-group/out-group consciousness, to foster enemy as well as friendly relations, and to create new superordinate–subordinate relationships, all of which proved even more significant when colonialism eventually took firm roots.[12]

The period between the end of the slave trade, and the colonization of Africa – the period which spanned African–European trade in so-called 'legitimate' goods and an increase in missionary activities – saw the gradual entry of the monetized economy, the redefinition of group relations and the sharpening of the inequalities and conflicts. In many parts of the continent, this was the era of the famous 'tribal wars' as the various groups struggled to make the best of the new opportunities offered by the trade with Europeans. In the hinterland where European influence took a long time in coming (in fact, it was not until the period of colonial conquest and acquisition that this influence reached some places), other significant transformations were taking place, including the strengthening of Islamic civilization. The unequal pattern of exposure to modernizing influences continues greatly to affect ethnic relations to this day.

Then finally came the 'colonial situation'. This brought about 'volcano-sized eruptions' which upturned African society in many ways, for instance by creating new and largely arbitrary political structures which lumped together ethnic groups some of which were strange bed fellows, opening new horizons and opportunities for competition for emergent scarce resources and, above all, nurturing an elite class which, as I have said, played the role of the ethnic vanguard because it was fragmented from the beginning.[13] Within this complexity, ethnic ties assumed new meanings in the urban centres which were the theatres of ethnicity. Furthermore, as the colonial state emerged, being basically a law and order state, with no welfarist pretensions, ethnic organizations also served as welfare agencies, awarding scholarships, building schools and hospitals, and so on. When the opportunities for political power came in the dying days of colonial rule, the ethnic associations quickly transformed

themselves into political parties and interest groups, thereby becoming the major claimants to power.[14] As the crisis within the fragmented elite class worsened after independence, so did the ethnic problematic.

In whatever way one looks at it, pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial *phases* of ethnicity have a ring of *change* and *continuity* which conventional historical analysis, with its reification of dates and events, cannot adequately explain. This is also why works which supposedly rely on historical analysis, including some Marxist versions of 'scientific' historical analysis, sometimes fail to recognize (or simply ignore?) the deep roots of ethnicity in Africa and, instead, argue that it is an instrumental phenomenon which will wither away or become insignificant as society becomes more 'rational', and less ridden with class conflicts. The sociological perspective which I next consider reveals how and why this expectation is wrong.

Sociological Analysis

Colonialism brought not only the changes already talked about but also a dislocation of state–society relations. It is this dislocation, as I shall demonstrate, that is responsible for the continuous character of ethnicity in Africa even after colonialism has nominally been terminated. If, indeed, colonialism were only an episode as some African historians argue (*cf.* Ade-Ajayi, 1968), then the social formations it brought into being should have terminated with it. The fact that ethnicity has refused to die and has instead worsened indicates that the locus of the problem has not been properly addressed. This locus is what I call the dislocated state–society relations which are aptly explained by Ekeh's theory of the two publics in Africa (1975, 1983). The analysis that follows draws heavily from this theory.

Most views on the origin of the state hold that the state evolved from society. This is true of both bourgeois and Marxian theories of the state, although, on the balance, while bourgeois theories hold that the state and society maintain an equilibrium in their relations, Marxists argue that the state dominates society and is an instrument of class domination (*cf.* MacIver, 1964; Weldon, 1962; Engels, 1978; Lenin, 1977). But this is not my concern just now. The important thing is the agreement that the state evolved from society. Accordingly, the state is expected to be built on the same moral foundation as society; whether or not this moral foundation is imposed by the ruling class does not matter in this context. If we conceive of the society as the private realm and the state as the public realm, as the tradition which dates back to the Greeks has it, we would say that both realms have the same *moral* order. If we further accept this as a rule, then state–society relations in Africa have been a deviation since the modern state was created by colonizers.

The modern state did not evolve from within society, but outside of it. It was, in fact, *imported* and *imposed* as the focal point of the migrated social structures. Moreover, the state structures were devoid of their moral correlates in the metropolitan country. To this extent, the state was founded on a *moral vacuum*. By contrast, the society retained a *moral order* which included the individual's basic commitment to his community. As this moral order was fragmented by the plurality of groups contained in the state, state–society relations produced not simply the public–private realm dichotomy, but also a dichotomized public realm. These are the *civic public* which comprises the alien, 'migrated' state structures which are supposed to operate in a migrated Western moral milieu (even though any such moral presence is usually absent in the African context), and the *primordial public* which comprises the pristine ethnic and related structures which operate on the foundations of an indigenous societal morality which, as I have said, emphasizes the individual's duties to fellow ethnics and the ethnic group at large.

It is this distorted growth of the public realm that has made ethnicity such a salient force in Africa because the same actors operate in the two publics. This problem however has a long history which dates back to colonialism. The manner of creation of the state by the colonizing power explains the historical dialectic evolving. The colonial state was created basically to ensure law and order which was a *sine qua non* for furthering the ends of colonialism; and in actual fact it was created quite independently from any honorific colonial ideologies regarding, for example, the 'civilizing mission'. In rejecting this kind of colonial government, people in some places were encouraged not to pay taxes and, in others, to

vandalize government properties. The sum of this anti-colonial ideology was the fostering of nonchalant attitudes towards the state and its apparati, and the conviction that nothing was wrong with 'stealing' from it.[15] But at the same time, the individual's identity with, and loyalty to, his transformed ethnic group not only served as a tranquilizer in the sea of jet speed social change, but also took on some of the welfare functions which the state failed to provide, due to its law-and-order character. The ethnic group therefore became something of an 'alternative state' or, in any case, a rival competing with the state for the individual's loyalty and support. But, as I have said, the ethnic group had the upper hand and, as it operated within the moral milieu, it was all perfectly normal for an individual to loot the state's treasury to benefit his group, to recruit his fellow ethics to fill positions over which he had control, and to concentrate government projects in his ethnic homeland if he was in charge of the responsible government department.

The coming of independence did not unfortunately change the situation because it merely involved a 'change of guards' rather than of the state apparati. Essentially, the state has retained its 'alienated' character, complete with its emphasis on law, order and violence (Ekeh, 1985; see also, Dudley, 1973; Osaghae, 1988). However, the primacy of the state has been greatly reinforced, especially as it is at the centre of the extraction and distribution of resources which is of primary interest to all groups and classes. This explains why ethnic politics centres around capturing the reins of state power. In Nigeria and the Congo at one time, inter-group competition for state power got so fierce that it resulted in civil wars. What however exacerbates the competition is the fact that the 'ruling' class in Africa is in the process of building a materialist base to match and give lasting effect to its privileged status (*cf.* Ake, 1978; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987). This process – that of primitive accumulation of surplus – basically involves using the instrument of the state to create the 'means of production'. It is in this process that ethnicity has easily become 'a mask for class privilege'. Perhaps then, after the means of production are fully established (if ever), and the local bourgeoisie has reduced its dependence on the international bourgeoisie,[16] ethnicity could become less conspicuous? But, this is unlikely to obliterate the ethnic problematic unless the dislocated state–society relations which instigated ethnicity in the first place are re-cast by another epochal event which robs ethnicity even of its relative autonomy, as I have explained above.

Without doubt, the sociological analysis of contemporary ethnicity is more profound, and possesses greater explanatory power than historical analysis. But this does not render historical analysis any less relevant. After all, colonialism, the cradle of contemporary ethnicity, is a historical fact, just as the continuity in colonial and post-colonial ethnicity is a historical fact. Therefore the two types of analysis should be seen as complementary rather than independent, one of the other, as they both together account for the character and peculiarities of ethnicity in Africa.

To bring this discussion to a worthy close, let us address the question of the consequence(s) of ethnicity for the development process in Africa – is it positive or negative, beneficial or dysfunctional? All that we have said so far would seem to suggest that it is dysfunctional, especially considering our last point that it is desirable for ethnicity to become less conspicuous. In fact, Ekeh's theory of the two publics in Africa from which we have drawn most of the theoretical lights in this paper suggests, in the manner of Geertz's (1963) integrative revolution thesis, that the primordial public – represented here by ethnicity and ethnic groups – competes with the civic public – represented here by the state and the nation-to-be – for the individual's loyalty. Posed this way, and following the trappings of political development theorists that the nation is the most desirable and advanced form of statehood, a nation being the product of the triumph of the state over the primordial public in the competition for the individual's loyalty, ethnicity is arguably dysfunctional for the process of (political) development.

Thus, the sectional character of party politics, the often volatile disagreements along ethnic lines over the allocation of national resources, including top government positions, and the frequent ethnicization of military *coups d'états* and regimes, all of which manifest and heighten ethnic conflicts, sometimes leading to civil wars, clearly point to the dysfunctionality of ethnicity for the process of national development. But still it may be worth asking whether

ethnicity really constitutes a drawback in the development process. We shall return to this question later.

Let us now turn to consider one interesting aspect of ethnicity in Africa which has generally remained unacknowledged, but which the global economic recession has brought to the fore in ways which can no longer be ignored. This has to do with the positive and functional dimensions of ethnicity. The functionality question requires us to specify the ends of ethnicity and the interests they serve – is it the state, or the individual, or the group? At the level of the state, situated within the desirable integrative revolution, ethnicity has been said to be dysfunctional, though I shall argue later that any integrative revolution which hopes to eradicate ethnicity and its uses for the individual and the group, is simply unrealistic. At the level of the individual and the group on the other hand, ethnicity, as an effective resource in the competition with others for limited resources, is functional rather than dysfunctional. However, while individual functionality is usually selfish, the group functionality is more generalized, and has potential for translating ethnicity into a positive force.

Earlier on in this essay, the point was made about ethnic organizations performing functions which make them 'alternative' states of a sort. At the present time, following the introduction of structural adjustment policies in the face of economic recession, governments have not only officially recognized the useful functions primordial groupings perform, but have also sought to integrate them into the development process as 'partners-in-progress'. This development fits in well with the policies of deregulation and rural development which are cardinal to structural adjustment. As it were, the shrinking of government involvement in the economy, coupled with the fact that primordial groupings constitute the most effective non-governmental agents that can be mobilized for rural development have served to make governments finally back self-help initiatives by these groupings. This is happening at a time when increasing immiseration has forced most urban and rural dwellers alike into their ethnic cocoons, and into greater ethnic consciousness. The form these have taken has centred around what the ethnic community can do for itself, with or without government support. In Nigeria, since 1985, communal fund-raising activities have been organized with active government support in furtherance of this objective.

Even though the contemporary situation has increased the importance of ethnic groups, especially the organized ones, all along they have performed functions which are beneficial to the state, especially in the area of legitimacy. It is well known that one critical problem the post-colonial state has faced in Africa, and which has made quicksand of its legitimacy, is the inability to meet the expectations of the people. In their own little ways, organized ethnic groups have met some of these unfulfilled hopes.

The point of all this is that ethnic groups in Africa, contrary to the extractive image pervading the literature, also have productive aspects which the state could harness in bringing development to the grassroots especially. But is it not likely that allowing ethnic organizations a free rein, as we seem to be advocating, will in the long run worsen the ethnic problem? This possibility cannot be ruled out considering that ethnic groups do not possess equal capacities for self development, and that government support cannot be equal. Nevertheless, the fact that the relevant ethnic groupings in this process are not likely to be the larger categories, but the more territorially discrete sub-groups, this implies that in the long run, it will be almost impossible to concentrate ethnic forces into large and dangerously powerful and threatening groups. As competition is taken away from the realm of the state into the intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic realm, so would ethnic disaggregation into smaller ethnic units serve to 'even-out' ethnic conflicts by creating an expanded scope for ethnic consensus as well as conflict. In the long run, this will serve to make consensual politics much more desirable.

Finally, what is the implication of this for the overall process of national development? It is the sensitization to the fact that the nation in Africa has to be built on ethnic groups and not without or in spite of them. That is to say, it ought to be recognized that anything that increases the capacity of the ethnic group to contribute to national production is positive for development because, in fact, ethnicity is dysfunctional only where ethnic competition is extractive rather than productive. Extractive consumption creates threatening zero-sum games, whereas productive competition could create positive-sum games. To come to more conclusive answers regarding these matters, however, more research into the positive aspects of ethnicity in Africa should be undertaken.

Conclusions: Towards a Contextual Understanding of Ethnicity in Africa

Ethnicity in Africa is similar to ethnicity anywhere else because it is heightened by modernization and is closely related to the class struggle. But like ethnicity elsewhere also, it has its peculiarities. These are what I have attempted to highlight in this chapter by examining the character of ethnicity in Africa as it evolved in the immediate pre-colonial period, then as it was transformed under colonialism, and has remained salient in the post-colonial period. I emphasized the elements of *continuity* and *change* in this character, which, I argued, most extant perspectives on ethnicity in Africa have failed to emphasize because of the limitations of their conceptual tools. In particular, I argued that while it is true that colonialism is the cradle of contemporary ethnicity, extant perspectives have failed to examine the sociological totality of colonialism, and its aftermath. My insights in this connection relied heavily on the writings of Peter Ekeh, who drew attention to the peculiarities of ethnicity in Africa from the prism of dislocated state–society relations, within which context the peculiarities of ethnicity in Africa can best be examined and understood. I should end this chapter by quoting Ekeh: 'Certainly, if we are to capture the spirit of African politics, we must seek what is unique in them. I am persuaded that the colonial experience provides that uniqueness' (Ekeh, 1975: 111). This is the case with ethnicity in Africa.

Notes

[1] As Mamdani (1967: 3) queries, 'what is it that makes two million Norwegians a people, and just as many Baganda a tribe? . . . There is only one explanation; racism.' To emphasize the primordial roots of contemporary ethnicity, however, Ekeh (1975, 1983) continues to use the term tribalism as a 'de-radicalized' concept, i.e. a term that has lost its root. This view is, however, unpopular although it points to one of the peculiarities of ethnicity in Africa as I shall demonstrate later.

[2] Burgess however makes the case for contextual definitions by querying unqualified comparison as follows: 'Does this usage help or obscure what is happening? Would it not be better to continue viewing such varied phenomenon as linguistic, tribal, political, racial or religious, depending on their nature? Should we not separate the very different concerns of old countries from those of the new, and of the developed world from those of the developing?' (Burgess, 1978: 271).

[3] One famous author has recently glorified the lead of the USA in this connection: '. . . since the USA is virtually the modern ethnic equivalent of Noah's Ark on the one hand, while its sociology dominates Western social science on the other, any impeccable revolution on ethnicity in America, whether from Harvard or some other oracle, will predictably exercise extraordinary influence on sociological thinking about race and ethnicity elsewhere in Europe, Asia and Africa . . .' (Smith, 1982: 3).

[4] This is largely because most such treatments are undertaken by Western anthropologists who are interested in 'primitive' tribes as these constitute a *problem* (*cf.* Buell, 1928; Also, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940). This is one problem with the theory of plural society which I examine later.

[5] The Ibadan school of social history was the pioneer school of African historians, who sought to reconstruct the African past and pride. For this reason, they argued that colonialism was just one of the many episodes in African history and denied it any special transformative role.

[6] Indeed, Ekeh (1983: 6) says these social formations could be called social structures in the sense used by Jean Piaget and Lévi-Strauss 'as supra-individual models, or ideal typifications of social existence'.

[7] The best examples of these are chieftaincy and kingship. In many places, colonialism bolstered the status of traditional rulers and gave them far more powers than they ever had in pre-colonial times because they were agents of the colonial regime. In some places where traditional rulers never existed before, 'warrant chiefs' were created (*cf.* Afigbo, 1962).

[8] The parliament, political parties, the police, Western legal system, universities and other institutions of Western education, the military, the civil service and many others were imported wholesale.

[9] In other words, in relation to the migrant structures which were never there before, ethnic relations were 'emergent'.

[10] Perhaps the only exceptions are Ethiopia, which is one of the 'ancient' states in the world, and Liberia which started as a slave settler state.

[11] This is because inter-group relations for proximate groups today crystallized in the pre-colonial era. For example, the relationships between the Binis and their neighbours in Nigeria date back to the fifteenth century (*cf.* Egharevba, 1968).

[12] For example in Nigeria, Binin–Urhobo relations became sour as a result of the slave trade. Even today, the two groups remain unfriendly because the Binis continue to be perceived by the Urhobos as an oppressive and wicked group.

[13] This is not the place to engage in what I consider to be a fruitless debate over whether or not ethnicity was a product of colonial policies of *divide et impera*. Of course it was, but only partly. What is of immediate relevance is that the colonial regime laid the foundations for ethnicity but the emergent African elites completed the process of ethnicization.

[14] Thus, for example, the *Egbe Omo Oduduwa*, a cultural organization of the Yorubas became the Action Group, while the *Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa* became the Northern Peoples' Congress.
[15] In some cases, a few of the elite were found by probe panels to be guilty of impropriety in the handling of public funds. Examples are the Foster-Sulton committee which probed Azikiwe's links with the African Continental Bank, and the Coker Commission of Enquiry which in 1962/63 found many Action-Group leaders in Nigeria guilty of financial impropriety.
[16] Of course, it is well known that the African bourgeoisie is highly dependent on the international capitalist class. See Nzongola-Ntalaja (1987) for the character of the bourgeoisie in Africa, and how this affects the crisis of the state.

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12 Is Multi-Party Democracy Possible in Multi-Ethnic African States?

The Case of Zimbabwe

MASIPULA SITHOLE

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss, in an attempt to answer, the question of whether multi-party democracy is possible in multi-ethnic African states. The focus will be on the Zimbabwean experience, but before discussing Zimbabwe it is perhaps necessary to summarize two contending schools of thought on the factor of ethnicity in politics, hitherto in vogue in African scholarship. This is necessary because it will clarify from which theoretical perspective we view Zimbabwe's experience and the question whether multi-party democracy is possible in this multi-ethnic state.

But for the reader who does not want to go through the discussion in order to appreciate how we arrived at the conclusions of this chapter, my answer is 'yes' – a multi-party democracy is possible in a multi-ethnic state. Ethnic homogeneity and ethnic pluralism, in and of themselves, do not produce or prevent democracy.[1] No social organization is as homogeneous as the family, yet some families are less tyrannically run than others. The argument advanced in this chapter is that, not only is democracy possible in a multi-ethnic state; multi-ethnicity, in fact, facilitates democracy.

Perhaps we ought to spell out our understanding and usage of the terms or concepts 'democracy' and 'ethnicity' or 'tribalism', right from the outset.

(a) Democracy

A lot of confusion and profusion surrounds the democracy debate in Africa. There is no consensus on whether the kind of democracy Africa should have is the Western libertarian type, or the Marxist-Leninist vanguardist type, or the Third World mass mobilizational type.[2] While it is not intended to have an elaborate discussion about these three types of democracy here, or which of the three would be preferable for Africa, suffice it to say that MacPherson's typologies, although of heuristic value, are not necessarily legitimate, nor is the implied suggestion that, *ipso facto*, Africa is experimenting with some kind of Third World democracy.

Democracy's universal character is that those who exercise political authority in society do so with the explicit consent and genuine mandate expressed at regular intervals by the governed through an open, free and fair electoral process. Thus, democracy must mean government with the consent of the governed, whether in the East, West or the Third World. The tendency to call every political system a democracy deprives it of meaning and interferes with its growth and development in those countries of the world under dictatorship and tyranny.[3]

In the contemporary setting, the free expression of the people's mandate on those who should govern and how they should govern is expressed directly and/or indirectly through representative structures or institutions that facilitate democratic expression. There are always going to be interests and groups to express those interests. Thus, those who represent the

people and their interests should, as much as possible, be those who are closely in touch with a felt community of interests whether race, ethnicity, religion, class, age or gender based. The most effective way of achieving group goals and interests is through organization. In a democracy, groups openly compete with each other. As such, group relations are governed by rules of competition, compromise, and give-and-take.

In summary, therefore, democracy is a form of governance in which the supreme power or authority in a society is vested in the people and that power is exercised by the people directly or indirectly through an institutionalized system of representation involving periodically held free and fair elections.

(b) Ethnicity[4]
Melvin M. Tumin (1964: 243) defined an ethnic group as follows:

> The term denotes a social group which, within a larger cultural and social system, claims or is accorded a special status in terms of a complex of traits (ethnic traits) which it exhibits or is believed to exhibit. Such traits are diverse, and there is much variety in the complexes that they form. Prominent among them are those drawn from the religious and linguistic characteristic of the social group, the distinctive skin-pigmentation of its members, their national or geographic origins or those of their forebears.

Thus, ethnic groups define themselves and/or are defined by others as having distinguishing characteristics either in a cultural or physical sense, or both. Usually physical differences have coincided with cultural differences. What is important to note, however, is that an 'ethnic group', and, therefore, ethnicity, can and does exist among physically similar groups. Thus, in general, ethnic groups in Sub-Saharan Africa are distinguished more by communal characteristics such as common language or dialect and common boundary than physical appearance. As such, the ethnic groups in this chapter are those which do not differ in appearance. And, of prime importance in distinguishing one ethnic group from another in the African context is the language factor. This observation was made by Okwudiba Nnoli (1978: 5) when he defined ethnic groups in the African context as follows:

> Ethnic groups are social formations distinguished by the communal character of their boundaries. The relevant factor may be language, culture, or both. In Africa, language has been the most crucial variable.

However, this cultural or language difference alone, or in itself, is not important to us; it is the 'psycho-social' dimension which cultural or language differences take on that is important. This point was made in a pithy statement by Hasu Patel (1973–4: 67) in reference to the political salience of race. He said:

> More than 'biological race', 'scientific race' and 'divine race' it is the 'psychosocial race' which is critical in understanding values, behaviour and policies. The former three kinds of 'race' are best and properly seen as nothing more than a rationalization of the latter, the 'psychosocial race'.

It is, thus, the 'psycho-social ethnic group', or the 'psycho-social tribe' that is of interest to us here. Defined culturally and psycho-socially, ethnic groups exist within the same physically defined racial group. In the African situation, ethnic groups are often not homogeneous entities; there are often sub-ethnic groups within larger ethnic groups. Nnoli (*op. cit.*: 7) observed:

> As social formations . . . ethnic groups are not necessarily homogeneous entities even linguistically and culturally. Minor linguistic and cultural differences often exist within the group, forming the basis for the delineation of sub-ethnic systems.

Thus, among blacks as a race in Zimbabwe, one distinguishes the Shona from the Ndebele as two different ethnic groups, culturally and psycho-socially defined. More importantly, they speak different languages, Shona and Ndebele, respectively, and further, among both the Shona and Ndebele one distinguishes sub-ethnic groups, similarly defined.

Ethnicity or the related term, tribalism[5], is thus a psycho-social phenomenon. But more

than this, ethnicity is conflictual; it involves conflicts among diverse communal groups. Nnoli (*ibid.*: 6–8) attributed to ethnicity four characteristics:

1. Ethnicity exists only within a political society consisting of diverse ethnic groups.
2. Ethnicity is characterized by a common consciousness of being one in relation to other relevant groups.
3. Ethnicity tends to be exclusive . . . Acceptance and rejection on linguistic-cultural grounds characterizes social relations.
4. Ethnicity is characterized by conflict.

Thus, ethnicity is a conflictual psycho-social phenomenon in which diverse ethnically conscious groups are competitively engaged.

Contending Schools of Thought

The persistence of politicized ethnicity in contemporary Africa cannot be over-emphasized. This is evidenced by the plethora of literature specific to this subject which has been produced in recent years. Moreover, a number of studies of the ethnic problem have currently been commissioned by African research institutions and are being undertaken by serious scholars from Africa itself as they become more willing to look at the problem of ethnicity, and to do so from increasingly varied theoretical perspectives.[6]

With regard to explanations of politicized ethnicity in Africa, there have been two dominant perspectives or paradigms, namely, the 'modernization' and 'Marxist' schools of thought, each holding sway at one time or the other. There was a time, not too long ago, when African scholarship in this regard was dominated by the Marxist paradigm in its analysis of African politics and society. This was due to the presumed failure of the so-called 'modernization school' to satisfactorily explain the ethnic phenomenon.[7]

The modernization school was dominant for a decade during the late 1950s and early 1960s. It suggested, in its optimism, that ethnicity was a product of traditional society, and as such, it was destined to disappear as 'tradition' gave way to 'modernity'. The 'charismatic' leader, and his mass movement or party, was identified as the catalyst (if not the engine) for this 'great leap forward' from tradition to modernity (Apter, 1965; Smith, 1981; Coleman and Rosberg, 1964; Eisenstadt, 1966).

The modernization school was followed by the intellectual hegemony of the Marxist or neo-Marxist schools which sought to explain the origin or cause of politicized ethnicity in African society in class terms; that ethnicity in Africa was a class invention, first by colonialists or imperialists ostensibly for the purposes of 'divide, conquer and exploit', and secondly, by the 'petty-bourgeois' element in the nationalist leadership, for the same ends and effects. The Marxist or class paradigm held sway in the decade from the early 1970s to the early 1980s. (Magubane and Mabugawe) 1969; Mamdani, 1976; Nnoli, 1977; Mafeje, 1977; Gordon, 1978; Nabudere, 1979; Saul, 1979; Cliffe, 1980; Babu, 1981; Shivji, 1986; Nzongola, 1987).

By the mid-1980s it had become clear that the revolutionary and charismatic euphoria and optimism inherent in the Marxian paradigm had turned out to be as mistaken as the hopes of the modernization paradigm with regard to the vanishing of ethnicity in African politics. States that officially used 'Marxism-Leninism' as a guiding ideology to problem-solving (Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe) were finding it just as difficult as their bourgeois detractors to solve the problem of ethnic conflict as it emerged and intensified within their borders.[8] To continue blaming 'imperialists' for this problem, which their 'running dogs' were also experiencing, became grotesque and obscene. Also, by the same logic, to continue blaming the 'petty-bourgeois' leadership for the persistence of politicized ethnicity on the African political landscape is unsatisfactory and scholarly permissive, to say the least.

Marxist-Leninist prescriptions in those states that had declared themselves to be guided by that dogma have failed to solve the problem of politicized ethnicity. To suggest that the persistence of ethnicity in a Marxist state is due to 'petty-bourgeois' influences is both illogical and testimony to the potency of bourgeois ideology. The Marxist 'petty-bourgeois' explanations end up explaining away the problem of ethnicity rather than explaining it. It is like the modernization school continually saying that 'there is tribalism in Africa because Africans

are not yet sufficiently modernized', or that 'the charismatic leader has not yet arrived', until well into the twenty-first century. We simply have not yet sufficiently diagnosed the causes of the ethnicity disease in African politics.

There are those, however, who, in sympathy with Karl Marx (and I am one of them) argue that revolutionary 'Marxist' kiliasm is not the foundation of Marx's own analysis; that the 'revolutionary optimism' of the Marxists is rather an 'ill-conceived and logically unjustified derivation from much more basic Marxian assumptions'.[9] We are not quarrelling with the 'foundations' of Marxist assumptions, but with the use to which the paradigm has been put by the 'believers'. But, fundamentally, we question whether we shall have arrived at an answer to the problem of politicized ethnicity even if we 'correctly' understood it as a manifestation of the 'false-consciousness' which 'bourgeois' politicians manipulate in bourgeois society. Was there ethnicity during the preceding epochs of slavery, feudalism, mercantilism, and capitalism? Karl Marx's answer is 'yes', and lays the blame on the ideology of the dominant class which purposely fosters 'false-consciousness' among ordinary citizens during all the four epochs.

Into which epoch would Marx put the contemporary African political economy? We do not know. But V.I. Lenin had an idea. In his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1964; 1917), he correctly links our fate with the fortunes of the metropole. The imperialists manipulate our 'false-consciousness' (ethnicity, religion, etc.), and thus, we behave politically the way we do. What are we to do about this situation? Lenin, again, wrote two booklets appropriately titled, *What Is To Be Done?* (1961; 1902) and, *The State and Revolution* (1964; 1918) both of which, not Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* (1976), in my view, have influenced and misguided African Marxists, whether in theory or practice. Did 'false-consciousness' exist before the advent of imperialism in Africa? Yes, Marx would say it did exist and the indigenous ruling classes did not manipulate it any differently. What is the point we are driving at?

First, it is that 'manipulation' is a universal technique which rulers and those who seek power often employ. It is not specific to any class, race, ethnic group, gender, religion, age, or personality. Even Jesus of Nazareth's relations with his twelve disciples had an element of manipulative techniques. Nor is 'manipulation' specific to any epoch. Manipulation started from Adam and Eve playing hide and seek with the serpent in the biblical Garden of Eden. Niccollo Machiavelli only put in writing what had remained unsaid throughout the centuries.

The second point derives from the first, and that is, we see no future epoch when mankind shall have rid itself of 'false-consciousness' – even assuming the unlikely millenium of a classless society. We see no basis for the implied belief that a worker-politician will not appeal to racial, religious, or ethnic emotions to gain advantage over another worker-politician just as his bourgeois counterpart would do. (We reject the thesis that only a certain section of the bourgeois element appeals to tribalism. All men who seek power appeal to it if they perceive a strategic advantage.) In fact, false consciousness is likely to form the basis of power struggles, since in a classless society, class antagonisms shall have been resolved!

There is, therefore, at present no paradigmatic hegemony of one school of thought over the other, at least in as far as solving the problem of politicized ethnicity is concerned. There are some who celebrate this apparent lack of paradigmatic dominance, preferring to 'let the five hundred flowers bloom'. I share in this celebration. We are in a period of 'epistemological anarchy', to borrow a pithy phrase from Archie Mafeje.[10] Such an intellectual atmosphere is the result of the present paradigmatic confusion or uncertainty, much in the sense of Thomas Kuhn's critique of the conventional philosophy of science (1962). Out of this intellectual confusion and uncertainty, more often than not, will come an intellectual break-through in the form of new paradigms or 'new openings', to borrow a phrase from the editors of this volume.[11]

Moreover, this writer questions the legitimacy of the distinction made between the 'modernization school' and the 'Marxian school'. The two should not have been viewed as mutually exclusive, in fact, the two perspectives are similar in that they both stress processes and sequences, or stages, in the development of society from primitive to modern forms of production and organization.[12] I believe that Karl Marx saw the logic in the argument that, with

Table 12.1: *Zimbabwe: Percentages of Ethnic Groups**[*]	
Ethnic Group	% of Population
Shona sub-ethnic groups	
Karanga	22
Zezuru	18
Manyika	13
Korekore	19
Rozwi[**]	9
Ndau	3
Total	84
Ndebele sub-ethnic groups	
Ndebele	14
Kalanga	5
Total	19
Other	
Tonga	
Sena	
Venda	
Sotho	
Hlengwe	
Total	4

Notes:
[*] Based on the 1969 Census. The 1982 Census enumerated the population regionally, not ethnically. But it is safe to assume that these percentages remain proportionately and approximately the same.

[**] The Rozwi were the ruling class during the Monomatapa Kingdom. They are scattered in smaller groups among the other sub-groups, and they have internalized the local political culture though generally cognizant of their past nobility.

modernization, ethnicity would wither away, mistaken though this assumption has turned out to be. Ethnicity, like the state, has shown no sign of withering away.

Marxism may, in fact, be modernization theory in disguise, or vice versa. Our dogmatic polemics may have blinded us to this point, and from taking the requisite 'two steps backwards' once we have realized the mistake. What this teaches us is that the avoidance of dogmatic and doctrinaire positions in the quest for knowledge and understanding is healthy. This perspective instructs our discussion of whether multi-party democracy is possible in contemporary African multi-ethnic states.

The Zimbabwe Case

The ethnic milieu[13]
There are principally two major ethnic groups which have been involved in ethnic conflicts in Zimbabwe, namely: the Shona and the Ndebele, making up approximately 77 per cent and 19 per cent of the population, respectively. Among the Shona there are five politically significant sub-ethnic groups: the Karanga, Zezuru, Manyika, Korekore, and the Ndau. Among the Ndebele are the Ndebele proper and the Kalanga. Table 12.1 shows the Shona/Ndebele and sub-ethnic groups' breakdown in the population. The regional/geographical distribution of Zimbabwe's sub-groups is as shown on Map 12.1 (p. 157).

Ethnic tensions, and at times open hostilities, have crept into relations between and among these sub-ethnic groups; for instance, the Ndebele versus Zezuru during the early 1970s, and the Manyika versus Karanga, also during the 1970s.[14] New tensions have been visible (though largely contained) between the Zezuru and Karanga, with a possibility of new sub-ethnic alignments and re-alignments.

Although the Shona versus Ndebele conflict pre-dates colonialism in that the latter came to Zimbabwe as a conquering tribe early in the nineteenth century, sub-ethnic conflicts in Zimbabwe politics emerged during the liberation struggle, and they seem to have persisted in the post-colonial state, though there have been no violent confrontations.

Map 12.1 Zimbabwe: Distribution of Sub-Ethnic Groups

1. Ndebele 2. Kalanga 3. Rozwi 4. Korekore
5. Zezuru 6. Manyika 7. Karanga 8. Ndau
9. Tonga 10. Venda 11. Hlengwe/Shangane 12. Sotho

The Zimbabwe debate

1. Academic Analysis

Some scholars and commentators on Zimbabwe have argued, as we have mentioned before, that ethnic conflicts in Zimbabwe nationalist politics were caused by a 'petty bourgeois' element which tended to dominate the leadership of the nationalist movement, but which lacked a revolutionary ideological outlook and a proletariat vision (Arrighi, 1967; Kapungu, 1974; Tshabangu, 1979; Saul, 1979 and 1980; and Cliffe, 1980). Employing this essentially neo-Marxist class perspective, this school of thought continued to see post-colonial Zimbabwe as a 'neo-colonial state' (Stoneman, 1988; Astrow, 1983; Sylvester, 1985; Mandaza, 1986; Gregory, 1981; and Herbst 1990).

While not denying the 'neo-colonial state' thesis, others have however argued that, thus far, the ethnic factor, rather than class, better explains the conflicts that have occurred in Zimbabwe nationalist politics during the liberation struggle, and during the eleven years of black majority rule (Dumbutchena, 1975; Breytenbach, 1977; Nyangoni, 1978; Ranger, 1979; and Sithole, 1980 and 1986).

This author (1984: 123) has made the following observation and criticism about those who have attempted to employ class analysis in their interpretation of conflicts and factionalism in the Zimbabwe nationalist movement:

> A Marxist interpretation of the factionalization of the Zimbabwe nationalist movement may be possible. Thus far, however, what has been written and said is unconvincing, to say the least. It borders on conjecture, innuendo and vilification. Marxists among us need to sharpen both the mind and the pen.

Commenting on this fixation with class, Otwin Marenin (1976: 136) once suggested that the step from ethnic group should not necessarily be to class. Lamenting the fact that the step to class is often taken, he said, rather poignantly, 'This seems neither obligatory nor necessary'.

2. The Gladiators

In 1965, one of the intellectuals of the Zimbabwe nationalist movement, Nathan Shamuyarira, then a 'firm believer in the two-party system', had his doubts whether this system could work 'yet' in Africa. He warned those who would force it on their countries that they would be destined for tribal warfare: 'if you force it [the multi-party system] on a country, the result is certain to be warring tribal factions'. Opting for the then (in the 1960s) popular one-party state, he argued that this system of governance in Africa was dictated by three factors typical of the African social environment :

> First, with nearly everyone belonging to the 'have-not' group of peasants or low-wage employees, there is little likelihood of division on economic policies such as you find in Britain or America. Secondly, the African tribal system has a single authority, with several checks and balances within it. The chief was the legislative, executive, judicial and religious head of the tribe; but all major decisions were taken by a unanimous vote of the tribesmen, even if it meant arguing all day to convince one man . . . Thirdly, there must be broad national loyalty before unbridled opposition is allowed. In older nations this loyalty has been achieved, but in younger countries, oppositions tend to be saboteurs and anarchists, instead of constructive critics.[15]

Today, some twenty-five years later, Shamuyarira, now Zimbabwe's Minister for Foreign Affairs and a leading theoretician in the ruling party, is unrepentant. He still is as convinced as ever that the one-party is a panacea for stability while multi-party governance is a blue-print for instability, if not for Africa as a whole, certainly for Zimbabwe. In a recent interview, Shamuyarira was asked the question: 'Do you personally believe in a one-party state?' He replied thus:

> Yes, I believe in it because it is the only way in which we can establish peace in African societies. The currents of tribalism and regionalism still run deep. The one-party state

wards off conflict and social tensions. I am not saying there is no tribalism in Europe, but they know when to sink their differences. Our nations are still young and torn apart by tribal differences. The 1982–83 conflicts in Matabeleland only died down when we united the two parties. Multi-party systems have not worked.[16]

This view contrasts with that of another leading and flamboyant personality in the same ruling party, Eddison Zvobgo, who was asked by the same interviewer why he was opposed to the establishment of a one-party state in Zimbabwe? He replied thus, and I quote him at length:

Well, first of all, a one-party state is said to be, or it has always been believed that the main benefit deriving from the one-party state is that in newly born and fragile nations tribal politics cannot be countenanced since each tribe may constitute itself as a political party and threaten political cohesion. But looking back on concrete realities in Zimbabwe, there has never been a tribal party here. The movement towards unity was even there during the war. We attended all political conferences as one. Sure there were misunderstandings from 1981–82 which caused distrust, but still Zimbabweans were committed to unity. The broad generality of our population has come together so what is the purpose legislating for a one-party state? Even taking ZUM (Zimbabwe Unity Movement) with which I disagree completely, it was supported in every region. Why should anyone be against a multi-party system if parties are national in character? While it is true that no particular system generates democracy, the fact is that the one-party state is more amenable to be used dictatorially. I would not mind a one-party state run by people known to be democrats, but what happens when those ones go? We would all become refugees. We create an instrument which can be abused. Having stayed abroad during the struggle, I would not want to have to face up to refugee status again.[17]

But why should Shamuyarira change his mind? Have there been some changes in the 'three factors' that 'dictated' the one-party governance on Africa which he saw a quarter of a century ago? If we are to believe the argument that during colonialism, 'nearly everyone belonged to the have-not group of peasants or low-wage employees', then the answer is in the affirmative. In post-colonial African society, and certainly in Zimbabwe, this conditioning 'factor' has definitely changed. Society has divided, *inter alia*, into 'haves' and 'have-nots' in the most glaring fashion, and both classes now have Africans.

Further, if we are to accept the 'single authority' thesis of the African 'tribal system' where 'all major decisions were taken by unanimous vote of the tribesmen', again the answer must be in the affirmative because there has been a substantial change in this 'factor' too, since colonialism. Most African chief executives have, since independence been intolerant of not only the 'one man', but a lot of men who remained 'unconvinced' by the chief executive's policies and line of argument. We no longer discuss until we agree. Those with different views are often made to disappear.

The answer on the third 'factor' must be a mixed response. Opposition parties still 'tend to be saboteurs and anarchists, instead of constructive critics'. But 'saboteurs' and 'anarchists', as well as 'destructive critics' are not the monopoly of this or that party system. They can be found in a one-party state as well as in a multi-party system.[18] Moreover, 'saboteurs' and 'anarchists' are often in the eyes of the beholder, and more often than not, the beholder is the man in office.

But Zvobgo dismisses the perception of both 'traditional' African governance and the 'have-nots' theses as 'nonsensical' and 'hogwash'. When asked to comment on the view that one-party state was 'African', he retorted: 'To say this is nonsensical. They [those who hold this view] do not know what they are talking about. It is the same kind of hogwash as "Zimbabwe societies were socialist in origin" '.[19]

Is Democracy Possible in Multi-Ethnic African States?

The ambiguity of multi-ethnic states
Most democracies today are multi-ethnic states, just as are most dictatorships. This is not a statement of faith but it is empirically true. If we look at countries of the world that are

considered practising democracies and dictatorships, many, if not all, are multi-ethnic or ethnically heterogeneous. Democracies such as Britain, Canada, France, Germany, the United States, etc. are culturally and ethnically heterogeneous. Dictatorships like Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy, Stalin's Russia, Ceausescu's Romania, etc. were not ethnically homogeneous either. The few 'liberal' states in Africa (Botswana, Senegal, Mauritius, now Namibia) have all been multi-ethnic states also. The same goes for the notorious dictatorships of Idi Amin's Uganda, Banda's Malawi, Bokassa's Central African Republic, Mobutu's Zaire, etc.

What this confusing 'mix' suggests is that democracy is not determined by the number of tribes or ethnic groups you have in a country, and neither is the stability of a country, as the one-party proponents have argued. (Although Tanzania is a relatively stable one-party state, but such states in Africa are rare.) The stability of Malawi, unlike that of Tanzania, could be sitting on very unstable ground.[20] Moreover, the case of Tanzania has been singled out for praise as a multi-ethnic society with less pronounced dangers of instability because there are no large tribes in Tanzania. Instead, there exist numerous small tribes. Ulf Himmelstrand noted:

> An obvious case would seem to be Tanzania where there are so many small ethnic groups, where no one ethnic group therefore, can be perceived as a real threat to any other, and where the potential significance of 'destructive tribalism' is further minimized by the relatively effective building of a Kiswahili-based Tanzanian nationalism.[21]

Examples of unstable one-party states in Africa abound (Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Zaire, Uganda, Zambia and Kenya, which was a *de jure* one-party state until December 1991, but where President Moi unwillingly allowed more than one party in response to the strong internal and external pressures generated in response to the rigged elections, and the repressive forces of the past one-party state etc.). Granted these examples are all multi-ethnic and multi-lingual states with large tribes. But the case of instability in Somalia should be instructive to those who might want to stretch the Tanzanian linguistic nationalism too far. Recognizing and even creating additional smaller groups could be a solution. Certainly, this is the assumption behind the Nigerian experiment that is hinged on the creation of many smaller states. Time will tell whether the experiment will provide a lasting solution.

On balance, countries that have enjoyed enduring stability are practising multi-party states as the examples of Western Europe and North America cited above show. Also, in Africa, the stability of the multi-party states of Botswana, Senegal, Mauritius, and now promising Namibia, could have more lessons to teach us than the single example of the intermittent instability of Nigeria.[22]

The cases of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, and the current demands for multi-party dispensations in Africa are graphic testimony to the inherent instability of the one-party political system. Although no issue has been made out of it, the fact that there have been practically no pressures or demands to introduce the one-party state in Botswana, Senegal and Mauritius is significant. It would seem strange for anyone to call for the introduction of a one-party state in Britain, the United States, or Germany. While some will attribute this to 'bourgeois' indoctrination, others will question the efficacy of the half-century of Marxist-cum-Leninist indoctrination in Eastern Europe and China, and almost a century of it in the Soviet Union. The one-party state has been in vogue in Africa for over a quarter of a century but has also failed to generate enduring excitement. Why is that?

Searching in the dark

There has been apparent failure of the one-party system on all fronts: economic progress, political stability, and on the democratic front. Why? Is it because there are *too many tribes* to feed? *Too many ambitious and opinionated ethnics* to manage?

A drunkard lost a dollar coin as he walked from a tavern one night. In sympathy a passer-by stopped to help him find it. They searched, but the dollar coin was nowhere to be found. Whereupon the Good Samaritan, apparently getting frustrated, asked the drunken man, 'where did you lose it?' 'Over there', came the reply, pointing into the darkness. 'But why are you looking for it over here?' asked the perplexed Good Samaritan, standing under a lamp post. 'But this is where there is light!', answered the drunken man. Might it be that

we have been like the drunken man, searching for democracy where we knew it did not exist, over here in the one-party state?

Yet, the drunken man knew where his coin had dropped. But what was he doing looking for it 'where there is light'? There are at least three possibilities. First, he may have been 'soft in the head'; after all this man had been drinking. Secondly, he may have been figuring out methods of getting the lamp post to where he had dropped his dollar coin. And thirdly, he may have made up his mind to wait for the first sign of day-break and, thus, was waiting in the security of 'where there is light'. What is significant in this story is the fact that when the Good Samaritan got tired and asked the strategic question, the drunken man told him the truth.

To blame ethnic heterogeneity for the absence of democracy and stability in Africa is to avoid the point that ethnic groups are a permanent feature of contemporary society the world over. Yet, some of these societies are both democratic and stable, others are not. To resist pressures or demands for competitive multi-party dispensations as some leaders have done (and Africa is not alone in this) betrays these leaders (Banda, Mengistu, Moi (until recently), Siad Barre, etc.) as convinced that they would find the missing coin by looking under the lamp post.

It is, however, encouraging that other leaders are facing the truth, though with varying degrees of reluctance (Chissano, Dos Santos, Kaunda, Mobutu, Mugabe, etc.). To leave the glamour of power is not that easy for mortals. Yet other leaders saw the pressure coming and accommodated to it in time (Senghor and Nyerere. Namibia's Sam Nujoma didn't even try the one-party option!).

The persistence of differences

The *de jure* (legislated) one-party state is inconsistent with democratic theory and practice, whichever way one looks at it. The human condition, today as it was in the past, is characterized by the existence of differences in many aspects of life. These aspects could be major or minor, or in between. Issues such as what system of government shall society have? What values shall we teach our children? Shall we be a secular or religious state? Who shall represent us in parliament? Are women equal to men? etc., are major issues in the sense that policy on any of these issues affects all and sundry now and for generations to come. Individuals have many and varied opinions and preferences on these and other issues, and these may change only to change again. This is the human condition today and in the past. We have no reason to believe this condition will change in future whether in heaven or in a classless Marxist state, nor do we find reason to lament this fact.[23]

The multi-ethnic character of our African societies, as that of other societies, is a given. That this condition will cease to exist is basing our optimism on an illusion, at least for the near future. Ethnic pluralism, like class pluralism, will be with us for quite some time. So what shall we do while we wait for the millenium? Shall we give up on the possibility of democracy in Africa, at least for now? A more modest approach to governance in Africa may be more desirable than the hitherto 'total strategy' approach of the 'one-party' and the 'one-ideology' approach, whether socialist or capitalist.

Multi-ethnicity as facilitator of democracy

Contrary to the argument that the existence of many ethnic groups in the policy gives rise to authoritarian rule, the multi-ethnic nature of our societies could, in fact, be a facilitating factor for democracy. What leads to dictatorship in both ethnically pluralistic and ethnically homogeneous countries is the tendency in men or women who are in positions of leadership to want power indefinitely. Every man or woman who has an appetite for power, in whatever country, when he or she gets it, wants to keep it till the workings of nature fail him or her. This phenomenon is universal. The fact that some countries do not have 'presidents for life' does not have anything to do with lack of motivation by those who seek political power in those societies, but it has everything to do with the institutional mechanism those societies have deliberately set up to prevent this outcome or tendency.

Ethnic homogeneity tends towards hereditary monarchy. But the history of hereditary monarchies is a history of dictatorships, benevolent or not. The history of constitutional

monarchies is a history of the overthrow of dictatorships and the triumph of democracy. The advent of republicanism was in turn the overthrow of hereditary governance in preference of government by popular consent. In the creation of the nation-state many ethnic groups came under a common authority and this authority was from an ethnic group. If the nation-state was ethnically homogeneous, the hereditary or military leaders came from a particular ethnic group or region.

Thus, the struggle for republicanism or democracy, the world over, is historically intertwined, or is one and the same thing as the struggle for ethnic and regional representation in institutions of government, whether at national or community levels. Viewed in this way, ethnicity and regionalism became the legitimate social pressures and concerns that they are. To wish away political ethnicity and regionalism is not only naïve, but irresponsible in that it is an attempt to reconstruct human nature and the history of mankind as it has never been since the Garden of Eden. What is worse, this could be a manifestation of disguised undemocratic impulses.

Ethnicity and regionalism historically represent pressures for representation. Looked at in this way both are democratic factors. It is failure to recognize them as such that often leads to negative ethnic and regional conflict. There is nothing wrong in having a person from one's ethnic group or region representing that entity in structures that authoritatively allocate value at various levels of society. In fact, that is only natural and it should be our normal expectation. Nobody knows the interest of a community better than one who belongs to it. It is the attempt to reverse this rational common sense that often leads to negative conflicts.

Towards a Solution

Many leaders, however, recognized this problem and sought to address it through many and varied schemata, yet these have failed. Okwudiba Nnoli (1978: 5) has observed:

> The persistence of ethnic politics and conflicts in the various African countries attests to the unsuccessfulness of remedies that have been applied to the problem. Central to these remedies are policies which are variously referred to as 'federal character', 'ethnic arithmetic', 'ethnic proportionality principle'. Underlying these policies is the principle of affirmative action for the underprivileged ethnic groups.

These policies, I submit, are definitely in the right direction. But why have they been unsuccessful? There are at least two possible answers. The first concerns the 'ethnic arithmetic' or 'balancing'. To these concepts should be added 'regional', 'class', 'gender', 'party', and 'religious', 'arithmetic' or 'balancing'. While the principle is right that they should 'add' and 'balance', many of our leaders do not add and balance properly, and they deliberately fail to do it correctly. It is not a matter of having an equal number of each ethnic group, region, class, gender, etc. represented, or following the 'proportionality principle'. That alone is only a recognition of the problem of representation, and not a solution to it. The real solution concerns the question of which candidates are to be added together, selected or appointed, and to what post? More often than not, it is personalities without political clout in the ethnic group or region who are hand-picked and factored into the equation. Or should he have clout, he is not given any post near power.[24] In these circumstances the equation does not balance. The problem of power is not arithmetic: it is often algebraic, geometric – a matter of calculus.

The second possible reason why the policies noted by Nnoli have not worked is, probably, the ultimate reason, but derives from the problem of the first reason. This is the problem of perpetual incumbency, 'president for life' whether *de jure* or *de facto*. Often, African leaders appoint people they consider non-ambitious for Vice President, and frustrate the ambitious by either appointing them to obscure posts or not appointing them at all. Without a constitutional option to come to power, seeing those constitutional options almost non-existent, the frustrated politician then resorts to desperate measures. Ethnic or regional mobilization is one of these desperate measures.

Any political activist or organizer who tells you the masses are easy to mobilize into action is either joking or does not know what he or she is talking about. To the extent that the

frustrated politician succeeds in moving the masses (whether from his ethnic group or nationally) into action, they themselves would have met with the same frustration and come to the same conclusion that they must act communally, otherwise you cannot move them. This idea that the masses are manipulated is true to an extent, but often it is a reciprocal process with the masses also manipulating the ethnic leader to 'lead us may be we also can get something out of this independence'.[24]

The point is that, thus far, African governance (life incumbency) leaves no alternatives, real or perceived, for those out of power who would also want to taste it. That being the case, there can be no rest from troubles for the African polity. In this respect, Namibia and Zambia (under Chiluba) have started well for having a constitution that limits the term of office for the office of the President to two five-year terms. This constitutional mechanism was not self-imposed by Sam Nujoma, but was imposed on him by those within SWAPO and outside it who realized power was too tasty to be left only to one person either to exercise it forever or to give it up.

It is the real possibility that he can constitutionally get into office in his lifetime that motivates the ambitious to play the game by the rules. In the years that lie ahead, particularly if the Namibian experiment succeeds, our optimism in the eventual taming of political power in Africa shall not have been in vain.

Notes

[1] The Arab Emirates, and regimented North Korea and former communist Albania are some of the cases in point. Despite ethnic and religious homogeneity, there is relatively little democracy.

[2] These typologies were suggested by C.B. MacPherson in his book, *The Real World of Democracy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966).

[3] See the contribution by this writer, 'Zimbabwe: In Search of a Stable Democracy', in Larry Diamond, *et al.*, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa*, Vol. 2 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), pp. 217-18.

[4] This section is borrowed from my article, 'The Salience of Ethnicity in African Politics: The Case of Zimbabwe', in *Journal of Africa and African Studies*, Vol. 20, Nos 3-4 (1985), pp. 181-3.

[5] A dictionary definition of tribe is, 'a group of barbarous clans under a recognized chief'.

[6] Two continent-wide research institutions, the Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA) based in Dakar and the African Academy of Sciences (AAS) based in Nairobi have currently commissioned research on 'Ethnic Conflicts', and on 'Internal Conflicts' respectively. African scholars of varied theoretical perspectives are involved in both.

[7] Another possible reason was the fixation with 'oppositional politics' (opposition mentality) and the popularity of the Soviet Union and China during the period since World War Two up to the 1970s, rather than from a careful analysis of what the modernization school may have been saying.

[8] Although in the cases of Angola and Mozambique, instability has had the support of the USA, and of South Africa respectively, the ethnic overtones in the respective countries can not be explained by simply referring to them as 'imperialist' or 'racist' in their inspiration. The conflict in Ethiopia has been glaringly ethnic.

[9] This view was expressed by Professor Ulf Himmelstrand to the author in a letter of 13 February 1991.

[10] Professor Archie Mafeje used this phrase in conversation with the author during a CODESRIA sponsored symposium on *Academic Freedom and the Social Responsibility of Intellectuals in Africa*, Kampala, Uganda, November, 1990.

[11] Originally the phrase was 'new paradigms' but was later dropped because it was felt that 'paradigm' conjured a concept too big for our efforts. We were only looking for 'new openings'. Should these lead to 'new paradigms', then well and good.

[12] Ulf Himmelstrand, *op. cit.* objects. 'Yes,' he says, 'this point may have some synoptic value when seen in a larger perspective. But as far as I am concerned, these two interpretations – in spite of arriving at overall developmental perspectives which seem superficially similar – are very different in their assumptions about starting points, and about the basic dynamic/dialectic character of the processes and agents of change.'
But the point we are making is that both schools of thought advocate a secular outlook or world-view. Such an outlook would eliminate false-consciousness (ethnicity, in this case). Both schools of thought have been wrong on that score.

[13] This section borrows from my earlier essay, 'Ethnicity and Factionalism in Zimbabwe Nationalist Politics 1957-79', in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 1980).

[14] Because both these conflicts occurred in exile during the liberation struggle, some have blamed them on the 'nature of exile politics' (Kapungu, 1974).

[15] Nathan Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia* (London : Andre Deutsch, 1965), p. 171.

[16] In Tandike Nkiwane, 'The One-Party State in Southern Africa: State of the Debate' (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, unpublished dissertation, 1990), pp. 59-60.

[17] Ibid., pp. 61-2.

[18] Many a time, men who rise to form opposition parties are high ranking personalities in the single party before

they split to form their own parties. Oginga Odinga was Vice-President of Kenya and KANU; Oscar Kambona was the Secretary General of TANU in Tanzania; Simon Kapwepwe was Vice-President of Zambia and UNIP, and in Zimbabwe, Edgar Tekere was Secretary General of the ruling ZANU (PF) before he was marginalized and frustrated into forming his own party.

[19] Nkawina, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[20] Malawi is one of the few countries in the world that have efficient repressive regimes. Information about politics in that country is difficult to get. Thus, it is hard to 'guess' what is going to happen when its constitutional 'life President' dies.

[21] Himmelstrand, *op. cit.* (see note 9 above).

[22] While the military coup of 1966 could be directly linked to ethnicity, successive coups in Nigeria were not. They seemed to have been 'intra-ethnic' coups.

[23] A junior Marxist once commented that he would not want to go to heaven because life there was so dull. 'Without the class struggle, without the dialectic, heaven ought to be dull. Don't you think so Professor?' he asked, rather sarcastically.

'Heaven and the communist society ought to be boring, indeed. For communism too pictures a classless society without class struggles, without the dialectic', was my equally sarcastic reply.

[24] This way, the masses actually force leaders of the same ethnic group to become more 'ethnic'. They start saying the other fellow tribesman is a sell-out to the tribe in power. 'We hear of dams being built at such and such a place. Why not here? Maybe we should try so and so. He seems clever and is always here every week-end', one often hears. Manipulation of the masses and leaders is a two-way street. It is a reciprocal process.

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13 Restructuring Gender & Agriculture in Tanzania*

MARJORIE MBILINYI

Introduction

Tanzanian agriculture developed through a complex process of interaction between peasant and capitalist growers, and between employers and workers, involving the state, transnational corporations (TNCs), white 'settler' farmers, smallholder growers and farm workers. Embedded in gender, race/ethnic and national relations, peasant–capitalist relationships have affected, and have been affected by, changes in household gender relations and the specific struggles of women peasants and farm workers. In this article I will explore the impact of changing gender relations on the development of peasant and capitalist farming systems, emphasizing women's struggles at household, local and national level, and the contradictory policies which the state adopted towards women and agriculture. State refers here to the territorial government (the colonial and post-colonial regimes) and to the increasingly centralized apparatuses of the global donor system led by the World Bank and IMF.

The aim of this article is to clarify 'what is "really" happening' with the 1980s/90s policy of SAP, by de-centering mainstream discourse about 'peasant agriculture' and its discourse of silence about gender, patriarchal farming systems and capitalist plantations. I believe that SAP is a policy of counter-reform and recolonization, a conscious attempt by big business and their state agencies to reverse the process of decolonization which occurred during the 1960s and 1970s in Tanzania. Eicher's (1982: 161) polemic against African states, and Tanzania's post-1967 reforms in particular, illuminates what is at stake in our reassessment of the 1970s: 'the failure of Tanzania to feed its people explains why Tanzania is no longer taken seriously as a model which other African countries want to emulate'. As I will show below, Tanzania has been one of the strongest grain producers and exporters in the SADCC countries, and Eicher has been forced to 'eat his words' (Rukuni and Eicher 1988), but his 1982 diatribe is regularly used by mainstream critics of decolonization strategies.

My time frame extends from 1921 through to 1984, which includes the period of British rule, the era of post-Arusha reform (1967–78), and the post-1978 crisis years. A historical analysis has been adopted in order to (1) understand the significance of changes which occurred in state policy and in gender relations at household and enterprise level during the 1970s, and (2) explain the rationale for Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) in agriculture which were implemented after 1984. The scope of this chapter does not allow

further analysis of SAP here, but detailed information is provided elsewhere (Mbilinyi 1990a, 1991b).

I present three major arguments in this chapter. The first is that a significant reform occurred of government farm policy during the 1967–84 period, when resources were diverted from the largely European-owned capitalist sector to indigenous and smallholder (peasant and capitalist) growers in the form of state support and subsidies backed by social welfare services.[1] The second is that both peasant and capitalist farming systems depended upon the patriarchal farming system as a source of cheap labour and social control of the labour force, and shared common interest in enforcing women's oppression and dependency on men. The third is that women's opposition to the intensification of female labour in agriculture was instrumental in undermining development strategies based on export agriculture.[2]

In the second section of this chapter, I analyse the shift in state policy away from support for foreign growers in the post-Arusha era. The construction of the patriarchal farming system based on the exploitation of family labour (women and children) is emphasized here. In the third section I focus on the feminization of the agricultural labour force and women's resistance in the 1970s and 1980s, including their successful manipulation of openings created in education and employment. The mainstream view that Tanzanian agriculture stagnated and declined during the 1970s is challenged in the fourth section by re-examining the same crop data in disaggregated form. In the concluding section I examine the implications of my analysis for understanding the present policy of SAP in agriculture.

Official Farm Policies in Colonial and Post-Colonial Tanzania, 1921–1978

Tanzania's complicated agrarian history has been distorted by colonizing imagery about 'traditional', 'subsistence' farming, which isolates supposedly homogeneous peasant households and communities and ignores their interaction and conflicts with capitalist growers. In the next section I analyse the role of state intervention in establishing capitalist agriculture and actively suppressing an emergent indigenous class of smallholder growers in Tanzania.

State support for capitalist growers: 1921–1967
The British colonial state encouraged the development of capitalist farming systems owned by European-based corporations and local white settlers.[3] Capitalist growers monopolized the most fertile land and received price subsidies and other supports, including preferential crop and transport prices, soft credit, and research and extension services. The state successfully blocked an emergent class of indigenous yeomanry and capitalist growers by means of a coherent system of racial and gender separation and discrimination associated with 'indirect rule'. Indigenous Africans were denied credit; individualized ownership of land was considered to be 'untraditional' and forbidden. Only a few indigenous men were able to acquire credit, fertilizers and other modern farm inputs in the late 1950s in conjunction with 'progressive' farm policies. Peasant crop production for export and domestic markets increased in spite of state neglect and sometimes open repression. Exports of cotton, coffee and cashew nuts and domestic sales of maize and rice were heavily dependent on indigenous growers.

Most white settlers left Tanzania after independence in 1961, and others began to diversify or disinvest in agriculture. The resulting decline in capitalist agriculture and the 1960s crisis of world commodity prices made it economically imperative for the state to intensify peasant production. The new nation-state also faced political pressures emanating from demands by indigenous growers that they receive the same resources formerly enjoyed by European growers. Indigenous smallholder production increased rapidly in the early 1960s in peasant and small capitalists farms, and helped to offset the decline in the large capitalist sector, but unemployment grew and state revenues dropped because of capital flight from agriculture. The general economic malaise helped to trigger the adoption of the *Arusha Declaration* strategies in 1967 (central planning, state ownership in the economy, universal social welfare programmes, major support for indigenous agriculture, including peasant, small capitalist and large-scale parastatal farms and ranches).

The major issue confronting agrarian capital during the colonial period had been the acquisition of a steady supply of cheap labour. In the next section, I discuss the development

of patriarchal farming systems to support both migrant and casual labour systems, as well as indirect rule.

Cheap labour and the 'patriarchal farming system'

Cheap labour does not exist naturally or automatically (Bujra 1986); capitalism has relied on the state to help construct social relations which reproduce cheap labour throughout its history, in advanced and underdeveloped economies. In the early colonial period, the German government used armed repression against local peasants, workers and landed aristocrats, whose resistance against forced crop production and forced labour culminated in the Maji Maji War of 1905. A scorched earth policy was carried out against the peoples in southern Tanzania who had fought against colonial rule in a united front, devastating local economies overnight and creating a massive labour 'reserve' which persists to the present.

Forced labour and taxation of adult males became the primary levers to extract labour from local communities after the Maji Maji War, and throughout the German and British colonial periods. By the early 1920s when the British seized control from the Germans, certain characteristic gender divisions of labour had emerged. Men grew export crops for cash in areas with adequate roads, railways, and marketing infrastructures, or migrated to rural and urban areas in search of waged employment. Women's labour was intensified in the production of food crops for domestic consumption and sale, and in the production of export crops, as well as in other economic activities. During the 1930s depression, and thereafter, low producer prices forced both men and women to seek cash incomes in wage employment, expansion of cash crop production, and non-farm informal sector activities. Wages and producer prices were regulated by the state and kept superficially low. The peasant household was increasingly incorporated into the colonial and global economy as a source of cheap labour and cheap products.

Four types of 'cheap' labour systems emerged, in response to different kinds of employer demands and different local conditions: migrant, casual, peasant and family labour. The state intervened in particular ways in support of each labour system. The Masters and Native Servants Ordinance, for example, helped reproduce the migrant and casual labour systems by enforcing short-term contracts and 'repatriation' to workers' 'homeplaces' after completion of contracts (Shivji 1986). Policies associated with 'indirect rule' like the codification and enforcement of 'customary' marriage, inheritance and property systems helped reproduce systems of family and peasant labour, and are the focus of this chapter.

Most scholars have focussed on the predominantly male systems of migrant and peasant labour and ignored the casual and family labour systems where women prevailed, as well as the gendered construction of all four labour systems. The refusal by most male scholars to take feminist analysis seriously is remarkable and counter-productive, given the feminization of the agricultural labour force and the visibility of female resistance, beginning in the colonial period. Sexist analysis and practices have led to major errors in analysis and reinforced the invisibility of women scholars as well as the women producers they study (Imam and Mama 1991).

A new, patriarchal farming system was created, based on the exploitation of unpaid family workers (mostly wives and children) under the supervision of male household heads.[4] The modern patriarchal farming system was constructed in the process of transformation of earlier, pre-colonial modes of production. Male household heads took control of the land and most of the labour of household members, and deprived wives (and male/female members of extended families) of former rights and powers (Amadiume 1987, Etienne and Leacock 1980). Government officials and peasant cooperative leaders excluded married women from membership in cooperatives and access to markets, farm inputs and farm proceeds. Resources were distributed to male household heads, including credit, extension advice, improved seeds, and farm machinery.

Rural people were forcibly administered by a local government apparatus consisting of male chiefs, village leaders and household heads empowered to control movements of women and youth by means of a variety of administrative mechanisms. Women had to acquire 'letters of permission' from tribal leaders to travel from 'home' areas, and single unmarried women were officially not allowed to settle in urban areas or the labour camps of plantations and

mines. The white colonial authorities imposed their own Euro- and male-centric vision of gender relations on African people, which devalued women and denied their often powerful position in local societies. 'Customary' marriage, property and inheritance systems were constructed which effectively dispossessed women from usufruct rights formerly held in land, other resources, and proceeds of labour, and enforced a new, dependent and inferior status in 'tribal' marriages.[5] The colonial construction of gender relations at household and tribal level was a central foundation of the colonial state, and forced most women to stay 'on the farm', 'in the countryside' and 'in marriage'. Many others resisted 'customary' marriage and tribal rule, however, and flocked to towns and other employment centres where they created new, more autonomous relations with men and other women (White 1990).

The ultimate beneficiaries of the 'politics of custom' (Fields 1985) were not poor male peasants, however, but local merchants and employers of African labour, the colonial state, and big business. Nevertheless, male household heads were privileged by this system and extracted surplus income from the female labour under their control. Mystified by male privilege and bought off by mini-power, men ended up supporting a highly exploitative patriarchal farming system which brought them meagre rewards. As a result, their consciousness of class, race and colonial relations was often underdeveloped compared to that of female peasants and plantation workers, whose militant, 'unruly' protests periodically inspired mass movements and anti-colonial insurgency (Rogers 1980).

The 'invisible' capitalist grower

Capitalist agriculture provided more than half of the export earnings and officially marketed produce during the colonial period, led by the sisal industry which earned some 61 per cent of total export earnings at its peak in 1951 (Bolton 1985). Subsidiaries of transnational corporations (TNCs hereafter) expanded their investments in tea, pyrethrum and wattle plantations during the 1950s, and individual European and Asian farmers expanded their holdings in coffee, wheat and maize. The British government represented the situation in an entirely different way, however, in order to deflect world criticism of the way it administered the trusteeship of Tanganyika on behalf of the United Nations. It adopted a peasant discourse, insisting that only 1 per cent of the mainland was controlled by non-Africans. In reality, less than 5 per cent of the total land surface was under cultivation by anybody. Some 20–40 per cent of all cultivated land and the most fertile agriculture areas in the Highlands were controlled by non-Africans by 1956.[6]

The British stereotype about 'peasant-based agriculture' has persisted to the present, and blinded scholars and practitioners from perceiving the significance of capitalist growers and non-indigenous people in the history of Tanzanian agriculture. In the next section, I analyse the contradictions which emerged as a result of state support for indigenous growers in the 1970s, focussing on class, gender, 'race' and imperial relations, and the contradictory nature of the villagization policy.

State support for indigenous growers in the post-1967 era

A variety of support systems were created and/or strengthened during the 1967–78 period on behalf of indigenous growers by the government, with donor support. Market and transport systems were constructed to reach formerly isolated regions in the south and southwest on an all-year basis. Crop schemes and rural development programmes channelled cash, extension services, farm inputs and equipment and other resources to indigenous people on a mass basis for the first time in Tanzanian history. These developments were highly conflictual and contradictory, but they did result in increased production of many export and domestic crops, as shown below. Around 1978, however, the foreign exchange crisis reduced growers' access to fertilizers and other inputs and weakened the state's capacity to carry out marketing and distributing functions, as well as to provide social services. Contrary to mainstream imagery about agricultural 'stagnation' in the 1970s, substantive declines in crop output date from this period, not earlier.

The independent state continued to rely on patriarchal household heads for administration of peasant production and labour reserve systems at the household level, but the former system of village headmen and tribal chiefs was replaced by a semi-representative system of

village government (Mbilinyi 1991a). Sub-layers of 'old' lineage systems persisted beneath the veneer of the new village assemblies and councils, however, especially in the Highlands where no resettlement had occurred (Moore 1986). Elsewhere, some 13 million people were resettled in new or different villages consisting of different lineages and tribes during the 1973–5 period.

Resettled or not, rural people became members of the 8,000 villages registered under the government at this time. The contradictory nature of villagization policy is explored in the next section.

Villagization

The villagization programme was highly controversial, especially in the non-Highlands areas where force was frequently used (Coulson 1982, von Freyhold 1979, Mbilinyi 1974). Resettlement disrupted local farming patterns and led to the loss of income and short-term famine in some areas. A variety of 'silent' forms of resistance were adopted by women and men, including the boycott of official state marketing agents and the refusal to grow export crops. In reply, the state was compelled to adopt further coercive measures, such as the renewal of colonial by-laws forcing villagers to grow certain crops, to use certain farm and livestock practices, and to sell products in official markets.

Positive incentives were also created in the villagization programme, however, which were especially effective in the more impoverished and disadvantaged areas of the country. The village government provided an efficient administrative structure for state funding of local enterprises and household farming and the provision of social welfare services. The policy of universal primary education (UPE) was administered through village governments and led to the doubling of the enrolment rate during 1976–84; some 95 per cent of school-aged children were enrolled in school by 1984 compared to 49 per cent in 1974. The villagization programme facilitated the creation of improved water system and rural health services through the rural areas. Women were specifically targeted as beneficiaries, and most women did benefit from and support villagization by contributing labour, equipment, and raw material like clay and wood. The government's main input was imported materials like aluminium roofing material, and the salaries of teachers, nurses, agricultural extension agents and other extension and administrative staff.

Per capita social welfare expenditures rapidly rose during the 1970s and peaked in 1978/79, with the most marked gains in the rural areas (URT/UNICEF 1990), on the basis of government and donor support and local contributions of labour, land and other resources. Donors and the government have mis-represented these as 'free' social services in the current debate on cost-sharing, thus trivializing the significance of popular material support and accumulation of (surplus) value which occurred in the past. By the end of the 1980s, Tanzania's rural superstructure of social services was superior to that of most other low-income countries and many medium-income countries (ibid.: Table 15).[7]

Significant economic changes occurred as a result of, and in conjunction with, the villagization programme, with contradictory outcomes for different classes, genders, 'tribes' and nationalities. Villagization fostered further commoditization and monetization in the rural areas, which increased the cost of living but also fostered diversification of local economies and increased opportunity for non-farm sources of income. Women took advantage of new possibilities in production and trade by manipulating the 'socialist' ideology of the state and the 'women in development' (WID hereafter) ideology of the donors, as shown below. Local differentiation increased, and village society was increasingly polarized into a class of women and men entrepreneurs, and a class of young women and men forced to work as casual labour in farm and non-farm activities. At the same time, household and village economies were developing and were able to absorb local labour more than in the colonial past. Poor and young women and men were no longer forced to migrate in search of work on plantations and mines, which resulted in the 'crisis of casual labour' for capitalist growers during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Mbilinyi 1986, 1991b).

Smallholder crop programmes enhanced the changes noted above and are discussed in the next section.

Smallholder crop programmes

A variety of crop programmes based on 'Green Revolution' technology (improved seeds, fertilizers and pesticides) were administered locally by village leaders and government technical staff.[8] Farm inputs and equipment were provided to villagers on soft credit terms by the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB, later renamed CRDB), with external finance provided by the World Bank and other donors (Baltzersen 1986, Payer 1983, World Bank 1981). Loan repayments were deducted from the crop payments that state marketing boards or cooperatives paid peasant and small capitalist growers, and measures were adopted to ensure growers continued to produce the given crop and to sell in official markets.

Peasant resistance in general, and women's resistance in particular, grew against many of these crop programmes because of low returns; delayed payments; corruption and inefficiency of market agents and village leaders; the authoritarian relations between the state (including donor functionaries) and the peasants; and gender-based oppression and exploitation of women and youth in peasant household farming and on large farms (Mbilinyi 1974, 1988b, 1991b). Nevertheless, for the first time, indigenous growers gained access to credit, farm equipment, markets, all-weather roads and railways, mass consumer goods, and social services on a massive scale. The largest share of TRDB/CRDB lending, for example, went to smallholders rather than industrial agribusiness in the 1970s (Shao 1988: 19, 3). Foreign and local large-scale capitalist farming was funded during this period by other financial institutions including the National Bank of Commerce, the Tanganyikan Farmers Association (established by white settlers in the colonial period), and the Tanzania Development Finance Company. More than half of total CRDB lending was for seasonal farm inputs like fertilizers and insecticides. Some 90 per cent of total lending in 1983 went to indigenous smallholder households, covering half the total number of registered villages (some 4,300 out of 8,700), compared to 15 per cent of all peasant households in 1976. A rapid decline in peasant access to credit followed SAP, reaching only 2,000 villages (23 per cent) by 1986.

Inequalities grew at the household, village, district and regional level, reflecting in part the official bias towards export crops. Women received consistently less credit compared to men, including female heads of households (Mbilinyi 1990b). Rich peasants and small capitalists received more credit than others at the local level, and growers in the Highlands absorbed more than their share nationwide. In 1984, for example, tobacco and tea growers received 60 per cent of loans for seasonal inputs, and growers in Iringa and Tabora regions received 60 per cent of all tea/tobacco loans (Shao 1988). The Highlands producers remained the strongest producers of export crops, enhanced by powerful positions in the government, greater control over productive resources, and relative freedom from the disruption caused by mass resettlement elsewhere. By the late 1970s, some 50 per cent of export earnings and 30 per cent of total value of agricultural production was produced by Highlands producers (peasant and capitalist, national and foreign, private and public), see Boesen *et al.* (1986: 107).

The CRDB, state marketing boards and peasant-support programmes were almost completely dependent on donor finance from the World Bank and other donor agencies. Conversely, the World Bank invested a growing portion of capital in agriculture: by 1975, some 40 per cent of total World Bank funding was to the agriculture sector (Dinham and Hines 1983: 125). In the 1970s, the World Bank funded support for smallholder production of flue-cured tobacco, smallholder tea, cotton, cashew, maize and smallholder pyrethrum (Baltzersen 1986). The World Bank also funded crop components within its integrated rural development projects. Most donor finance was allocated 'big' capital, however, a point discussed in the next section.

Donor Support for Transnational Agribusiness

The World Bank and other donors continued to finance industrial agriculture in both the private and public sector in the 1960s and 1970s. It supported the Kilombero Sugar estates, large-scale dairies, and private farmers and companies funded by the Tanzania Development Finance company. Contrary to the mainstream myth that agriculture was 'starved' of finance (Eicher 1982, World Bank 1981), there was a steady growth in capital circulation

to and within agriculture, beginning in 1974 (Hyuha 1984), especially to the large-scale agro-industrial sector (Hanak 1982).

Although nationalization of 'the commanding heights of the economy' had been a major part of post-1967 Arusha reforms, many private plantations, farms and ranches were not touched. The weakest sisal plantations, coffee estates and mixed farms were nationalized, whose owners had fled or begun to disinvest. Foreign corporations like Brooke Bond and George Williamson continued to own huge tea plantations which produced 70 per cent of officially marketed tea in 1980. TNC also became major partners in public crop schemes and enterprises including the sugar plantations and ten-thousand acre wheat farms, as well as smallholder tea and maize schemes. They controlled feasibility studies, management contracts, turnkey factories and held joint ownership in many large-scale ventures (Halfani and Barker 1984; Mbilinyi 1986, 1991b). Donors adopted mechanisms of tied 'aid' and loans to ensure that external funding was used to purchase TNC goods and services from the 'home' country (including farm equipment, inputs, vehicles, factory machinery, seeds, seedlings, expatriate experts and managers).

By the end of the 1970s, the large-scale plantation/estate sector still produced nearly 50 per cent of total export value and 25 per cent of total domestic value of agricultural commodities (Tibaijuka and Msambichaka 1984: 68). In 1980, private estates produced some 50 per cent of the sisal and 70 per cent of the tea, and public estates some 95 per cent of the wheat, 85 per cent of the sugar and 50 per cent of the rice and sisal, circulating in official markets. Large-scale producers (owning more than 100 hectares) also produced a significant portion of coffee, maize, seed beans and legumes (Msambichaka 1984: Table 2, from World Bank 1983).

Both smallholder and industrialized farming were dependent on foreign exchange for farm inputs and equipment, and 'hard cash'. They also depended on the continuation of patriarchal farming systems locally, and were undermined by the contradictions which emerged within household gender relations and between peasant and capitalist growers. In the section below I return to a discussion of efforts by the government and donors to strengthen patriarchal farming relations and women's growing resistance.

State construction of patriarchal farming relations after 1967

Donor-funded, government-administered crop programmes constructed patriarchal relations at the household and family level and were reinforced by other state mechanisms. 'Customary' laws were maintained after independence, with certain aspects reinforced by the 1971 Marriage Act. Dualism in personal and property laws separated women from men, and rural 'tribal' people from the rest of society. Dualistic laws were an anomaly, given the state's swift action to abolish other forms of racial separation and discrimination after independence.

Customary or tribal patriarchal relations and practices pertaining to property, land tenure, marriage, and rights to the labour of wives and children and to the offspring 'paid' for by bridewealth, were reinforced by male bias in the provision of credit, crop payments, farm inputs and other resources. Modern farming systems increased the demand for female labour, and probably augmented the supposedly backward institution of polygamy in many areas.[9]

Economists and state officials took the continued presence of unpaid, compliant female family labour for granted and assumed zero labour costs in peasant farming, or only counted wages paid to non-family hired casual labourers. The availability of unpaid family labour and its perpetual elasticity were regarded as 'natural' and 'essential' aspects of peasant farming. False notions of 'low-cost' peasant farming and invalid economic analyses resulted, which led to miscalculations of the expected returns to household heads while reproducing oppressive ideologies. Patriarchal, ageist, kinship and tribal ideologies were all used to strive for and maintain social control within the household, family and wider community. TNC buyers and the government benefited by being able to pay lower producer prices because most family labour (of wives, grown children, other dependants) was not paid. An unholy alliance was thereby forged between donors, the Tanzanian state, big business, and peasant household heads (largely, though not entirely, male). Women and youth resisted these developments, and eventually succeeded in undermining many smallholder crop programmes and challenging big capital as well, as will be seen below.[10]

Villagization programmes used laws like the Village Act and 'customary' 'laws' and practices to reconstruct and strengthen patriarchal relations. Land was allocated to household heads on the basis of the number of 'dependants' in each household, and village governments defined women as appendages of men (as wives, daughters, widowed mothers). Villagization was contradictory, however, in that women were able to independently pioneer new farm plots on the periphery of village boundaries in many non-Highlands areas (see Koda *et al.* 1987).

The increased production of crops by peasant and capitalist growers depended on the intensification of female labour in crop production for home consumption and for the market. Universal primary education also accentuated women's labour burdens because of the loss of child labour. A growing proportion of peasants and farm workers were women, and an increasing proportion of crops were grown and marketed by women producers. In the next part of this chapter, I analyse the feminization of agricultural labour and also women's resistance.

Women Entrepreneurs, Peasants and Farm Workers

According to the 1978 census (Tanzania 1982a), most economically active women (63 per cent) and men (83 per cent) in rural areas were independent own-account producers; the majority of other rural women were classified as family workers (35 per cent). The situation in urban centres was entirely different: most men (71 per cent) were wage-employed, compared to only 24 per cent of women, although 55 per cent of women worked in the informal sector as producers or traders, compared to 28 per cent of men (see Tripp 1989). Many women and men in the informal sector were actually wage-employed, usually on casual terms which meant they lacked any form of legal protection. Wages were lower, and casual workers lacked worker benefits such as maternity leave, annual leave, illness benefits and retirement pension schemes.

Our analysis of rural or agricultural producers should be situated in the context of the changes which occurred in settlement and employment patterns at the national level. After independence, there was a significant increase in the number of indigenous African women migrating to town, partly because of the removal of colonial 'urban influx controls'. Women took advantage of the increased employment opportunities and wage increases which accompanied the removal of the 'colour' and 'gender' bars in the labour market and formal education. Sales and services jobs were opened up to indigenous women in the private and public sectors, and a significant number were employed on regular terms as nurses, secretaries, clerks, teachers and factory workers. The majority of waged employees were employed as unskilled, low-income workers, however (Mbilinyi 1991b, Tripp 1989).

In spite of the high rate of female urbanization, the majority of women remained at least part-time in the rural areas, whereas the majority of young men in many areas left home in search of employment. A growing proportion of waged and unwaged agricultural producers were women in the 1970s and 1980s, as shown in the next section.

The feminization of agricultural labour
Women outnumbered men in most rural areas, especially in the most economically active age groups (i.e. 15–39). Some 63 per cent of all waged and unwaged agricultural labourers in Tanzania aged 15–29 were women in 1978 (Mbilinyi 1988b, 1991b). Feminization of agricultural labour was partly caused by earlier changes in the sexual division of labour, especially when slavery became a dominant production mode in many areas and the slave trade was internationalized during the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries. Gender replaced slave/pawn relations as the major organizing principle within many communities after the European conquest in the late nineteenth century, strengthened by 'raced' capitalist relations (Etienne and Leacock 1980).

In the second part of this chapter I discussed the colonial construction of gendered systems of migrant, casual, peasant and family labour. As men entered the migrant labour system or grew export crops women intensified their labour in food production and worked as unpaid family labour in export crop production. Women outnumbered men by 50 per cent or more

in many of the areas which functioned as labour reserves in the colonial period. After independence, labour migration to the South was stopped by the government, and a growing number of people found work in local enterprises and farms, but rising costs of production and reproduction forced people to intensify their labour in market-oriented work in the 1970s and 1980s. Men devoted more time to activities with higher cash returns for men, including export crop production (male household heads) and petty trade and casual wage employment (male youth). Women worked as seasonal casual waged farm workers on nearby plantations and peasant farms, and in off-farm informal economic activities like beer brewing, petty trade, and prostitution.

Contrary to generalizations about 'female farming systems' in Africa, women and men spent about the same amount of time farming in many areas; sometimes men even worked longer hours on household farms (Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi 1983, URT/UNICEF 1990). Their time was not always allocated to the same crops and tasks, however. More male time was spent on export crops and female time on food crops, but both were essential for family subsistence, though valorized differently in modern capitalist society. Nevertheless, women's working day was twice as long or longer than men's in many households and villages because of 'female' work in agro-processing, in transport by head-loads, non-farm market activities and unpaid domestic labour (Mbilinyi 1991b, ibid.). An average of six hours was spent daily in only four essential tasks: cooking, processing food-stuffs, collecting water and fuelwood. Men also performed unpaid domestic work, including house and fence construction; heavy logging for firewood; basket and mat weaving; livestock grazing, hunting and fishing. These were often sporadic, however, and required less time and daily drudgery, though they were absolutely essential.

Gender conflict appears to have grown during the 1970s over the distribution of farm proceeds and other income, as women's cash earnings became a growing proportion of total household income (ibid., see Whitehead 1990). Women were forced by patriarchal ideology to provide for household and family needs from their cash earnings, bound by patriarchal construction of 'motherhood' and 'wifehood'. Men were able and likely to prioritize personal consumption desires, especially for alcohol and sex (Koda et al. 1987, Mbilinyi 1991b). As male incomes declined and women became significant 'breadwinners', their consciousness of gender oppression grew, leading to intense struggles over income consumption and distribution in peasant households (see below).

Rural proletarianization

An increasing number of poor peasants were transformed into a worker/peasant class of casual workers, absorbed into local labour markets which expanded with the mushrooming of informal economic activities in villages and neighbouring rural towns, side by side with the capitalist farming sector. Plantation management employed casual rather than regular workers because they were less costly, especially after independence, and because a permanent cheap labour force was no longer available. Another employer strategy was to purposefully hire more women, due to their generally lower wages, and greater availability and 'regularity' as tea and coffee harvesters, weeders, and factory workers on plantations and large farms (Mbilinyi 1986, 1989a, 1991b).

Employment patterns varied by region and district as recent census data on 20–24 year olds has shown – this age group had the highest rate of wage employment at the national level (Mbilinyi 1988b: Table 3, 1991b). In the most commercialized areas, up to 40–50 per cent of young men and up to 12 per cent of young women were wage employed, compared to the national average of 12 per cent and 2 per cent respectively for rural men and women. Female ratios were higher in commercial agriculture zones than national rural average, with women outnumbering men by half as many or more.

Women's resistance against patriarchal farming relations grew, as discussed in the next section, where I focus on women's actions in peasant tea production and the proletarianization of female labour on plantations and peasant farms.

Women's resistance and household change

As real values of wages and producer prices fell in the 1970s and 1980s, male household heads were unable to purchase most of their 'male' commodity responsibilities and women

were forced to provide a growing share of total household income. The commoditization of female labour increased women's consciousness of gender and class oppression, and they rebelled along with male youth against patriarchal household heads.[11] In the Rungwe smallholder tea scheme funded by the World Bank, younger women (married, unmarried) escaped the low returns, drudgery and humiliation of unpaid family work by becoming seasonal casual labour on plantations and large farms (JUWATA 1989; ILO/JASPA 1986; Mbilinyi 1989a). Even though casual workers lacked worker benefits like paid maternity leave and pension schemes, they were paid a higher wage than most family workers, if the latter were paid at all. As a result of their 'strike' actions, wives and children successfully forced household heads to pay them on a piece-rate basis for harvesting 'family' tea. Village leaders intervened in support of family workers when household heads refused to pay for tea harvesting, or failed to provide household needs, a sign of the growing significance of female and youth labour in smallholder tea production (Mbilinyi 1989a). Many were daughters or young wives in middle and rich peasant families, whereas most migrant workers were single household heads coming from poor families in their home areas. Many local women workers only worked for two or three months each year on the plantation, in order to raise start-up capital for small ventures like home brewed beer manufacture or trade. Others worked periodically in order to purchase consumer goods like cloth, sugar, and maize, which the plantation company sold to workers at official prices, far below local parallel market prices. In the middle-aged group, however, only landless or extremely poor women continued to work on the plantation; others worked as casual labour on local peasant farms.

The growth of female-headed households was another sign of female resistance and economic poverty in the community. Some 29 per cent of all Tanzanian urban households were already headed by women in the late 1970s (Mbilinyi 1991b), compared to some 33 per cent of Zambian rural households (SADCC Women's Study Group 1986). In my 1989 study of plantation and village workers, I found a relatively large number of unmarried/ divorced mothers with children who lived 'at home' with their parents, but were independent financially; indeed they were often the major cash earners in the 'household'. Many explained that they had married and gone to live in towns nearby, but were forced to leave their husbands/partners because of wife-beating, neglect or marital conflict. Village elders noted their young men were not interested or not able to marry as early as they had in the recent past, because they no longer could afford to build their own homes, pay bridewealth, marry, and support themselves on the basis of peasant farming. Moreover, I think that the decline of the peasant household farm as a viable production unit reduced the marriage incentives for both women and men.

The meaning of being a female household head depended on women's wealth and class position.[12] Businesswomen owned lucrative farms, transport and trade enterprises, built hotels and expanded into other commercial activities. Wealthier women increased their control over productive resources, including credit and modern technology acquired through Women in Development (WID) programmes. In contrast, farm workers and poor peasants were barely able to maintain their families, and others were driven out of employment because of modern technology (Koda *et al.* 1987).

Women peasants led the way in shifting labour, land and farm inputs like fertilizers from export crops to locally high-value domestic crops such as maize, beans and peas in the Highlands and in other commercial agrozones. Food crops were preferred because women had more control over their proceeds, and more flexibility and autonomy *vis-à-vis* male household heads and the state with respect to markets and timing of sales. Both peasant and small capitalist growers were likely to respond to local and parallel market prices rather than official 'national' and 'global' prices, as well as to the probable timing of cash payments. Caught in local networks of usury, the poor usually had little choice but to 'sell' crops to their local creditors as debt-repayment.

In some areas of Rungwe district, cooperative block farming of tea succeeded largely as a result of enthusiastic support by women growers. Following resistance by male growers to cooperative schemes, and female family workers to unpaid labour, village leaders adopted a different gender policy from that of the government and donors. They allocated plots, seedlings, fertilizers and other resources to women and men on an individual basis, rather than

through the household structures, and many women became regular and productive participants (Mbilinyi 1988b, Odgaard 1986). Similar developments occurred elsewhere; cooperative farming and non-farm activities and the entire *'Ujamaa'* village movement often depended on women's leadership and general participation (Koda et al. 1987, Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi 1983, Mbilinyi 1991a). The implications for policy, action, and theory have yet to be explored; they suggest that many women peasants and other villagers benefited from collective and cooperative activities in the context of post-Arusha reforms in the 1967–78 period, and may be hurt by SAP policies which prioritize private business and individualism.

The increased female non-farm activity was another innovation which dramatically changed the rural landscape – male villagers insisted in 1989 that 'the wealthy people in Rungwe are women!' Women became active in long-distance trade in bananas and other foodstuffs, and in 'down market' smuggling and trade of manufactured commodities like sugar, soap, and second-hand clothing (Polisya 1984, Mbilinyi 1988b, 1991a). They dominated home brew beer manufacture and sale, beer drinking being the major recreational activity in most rural towns and villages. The rural demand for prepared meals and snack foods was met by mini-enterprises situated in people's homes and at the small tea- and food-stands set up in market places and on plantations and other centres of wage employment.

A strategy many women adopted to overcome gender barriers and acquire more control over productive resources was to organize themselves into separate women's groups and cooperatives. In the next section I explore examples of women's collective strategies in Tanzania.

Women's grassroots organization

Rural women's groups took advantage of spaces created by state programmes (including WID and rural development strategies) to organize themselves and establish their own 'projects'.[13] The most common were farming; handicrafts and cottage industries; shops, bars, restaurants, and home brew beer clubs; hotels; agroprocessing mills; and vocational training. More than 7,500 organized women's economic groups were identified in mainland Tanzania alone in 1979 (Bryceson and Kirimbai 1980). These figures probably excluded many informal groups such as the many 'savings and loan' associations which women created in rural and urban areas (Koda et al. 1987).

According to studies in Tanzania and elsewhere in southern and eastern Africa, women's groups/projects were usually small and multipurpose and members realized little or no cash income (see Note 13). Researchers discovered many other advantages and benefits which were substantive and potentially more revolutionary than short-term income-earning goals, however. In many cases, members prioritized increased access to productive resources such as land, financial credit, imported inputs, raw materials and equipment, education and travel. During the 'shortage' periods, women used cooperative consumer shops to acquire scarce commodities; the Tanzanian government allocated scarce goods such as sugar, soap, cloth, maize meal and cooking oil to women's shops and other cooperatives as first priority in the early 1980s, rather than to private wholesalers and retailers. Reduction of household drudgery was realized by acquiring imported labour-saving technology such as mechanized grain mills and improved water sites. Women valued free time, leisure and 'escape' from the household. Meetings provided them with a chance to discuss common problems with supportive women; female solidarity was the most frequently mentioned advantage of membership, though rarely a stated goal in project proposals.

Group participation, therefore, enabled women to get increased control over the production and reproduction process and more autonomy from men, especially household heads and other authoritative figures. Kin and affines found it difficult to claim earnings or assets considered part of group property. Groups still had to overcome envy, resentment, and takeover bids from local leaders and competing private interest, but the legitimacy of their organization gave them greater leverage. 'Ordinary' members were highly critical of undemocratic and corrupt behaviour among leaders, and in several recorded cases succeeded in ousting corrupt and/or undemocratic leaders or forcing them to adopt less authoritarian and condescending practices (Koda et al. 1987). Grassroots organizations provided women

with a valuable training ground for political and economic democracy. Women's resistance and their organizations helped to establish the dynamic democratic movement in Africa today at all levels.

Given the predominance of women in rural areas, and the feminization of agricultural labour, women have a stake in the debate over agricultural performance during the 1970s. In the next part of this chapter, I briefly examine production trends for separate crops, and compare the generally positive trends for many crops to the mainstream discourse about agricultural stagnation and/or decline and 'crisis'.

Agriculture in the 1970s: Discourse and 'Reality'

Output increased for many peasant and capitalist crops during the 1970s, as indicated by data on cotton, coffee and cashew exports produced by Bryceson (1988: 38). Coffee growers were a mixture of smallholder (peasant and capitalist growers) and large-scale capitalist estate growers, whereas most producers of cotton and cashew nuts were peasant and small capitalist growers. Coffee was largely grown in the Highlands and West Lake regions, whereas cotton and cashew nuts were grown in Mwanza and Shinyanga, and the coastal belt, respectively. Bryceson's data is invaluable because of her use of a long time frame including the colonial period (1920–84), and her choice of 1963 as the baseline for her index. Most mainstream observers used a peak year in the early 1970s, which exaggerates the level of decline in later years.

Contrary to the prevalent notion that 'things were better in the colonial days', or that 'we have wasted the last 25 or 30 years', exported volumes of cotton, coffee and cashew increased after independence. They fell below independence levels in the case of cotton and cashew only after the 1978 foreign-exchange crisis (1979 for cotton, 1980 for cashew). The peak years of coffee exports were 1973 and 1976; exports remained significantly above the 1963 base line throughout the 1978–84 period of foreign-exchange crisis. Cotton exports remained significantly above 1963 levels throughout the villagization period (1967–76) with the exception of 1975, in spite of consistently lower real world prices compared to the 1950s. The 1975 and post-1976 decline corresponded with a sharp decline in world prices (shown in Bryceson's data), and the growing foreign-exchange crisis beginning in 1978. In the case of cashew, exports steadily increased during the 1967–74 period, with 1974 the peak year, and they remained significantly above the 1963 baseline until the sharp decline began in 1980 (long after the resettlement years).

In contrast to Bryceson's generalization that 'peasant agricultural performance in Tanzania over the past decade and a half has been exceedingly poor' (ibid.: 37), her own data indicates increased export volumes for each crop until the end of the 1970s and better 'performance' than that of the colonial era. I interpret the evident conflict between the data and the author's conclusion as the result of 'the power of ideology'. The assumption that Tanzanian/peasant agriculture declined in the 1970s has become a totalizing truth among scholars, donors and even government officials in the 1980s/90s.

Part of the problem with knowledge produced about agriculture performance is the tendency to use aggregated crop data, combining plantation and peasant crops. For example, the World Bank (1981: 26) argued that exported volumes of the top seven Tanzanian export crops declined during 1965–80. It aggregated plantation of sisal, tea (70 per cent), coffee (50 per cent?), tobacco and cloves with peasant and small capitalist production of cotton, coffee, cashew, tea, cloves and tobacco. The positive growth of crops like tea and coffee was hidden by the significant decline, indeed 'collapse', of the sisal industry, and decreased cotton output. Aggregated data was used to generalize about stagnant or declining *peasant* production and poor state policies towards the *peasant*, even when the growers were capitalist corporations on plantations (e.g. Eicher 1982, Hydén 1980).

Observers also emphasize data which appears most negative. During the 1969/71–1977/79 period, the Bank found a negative growth rate for non-food export crops of −0.5, compared to a positive growth rate for food of 1.9 (ibid.: Table 25). The positive performance in food

production was generally ignored, or queried on the basis of reliability and validity of statistical data, whereas the evidence indicates that most statistics are underestimates given the volume of food (and export crops) which is marketed through unofficial channels.

Another approach is to use per capita production rates, especially for food production, instead of measuring performance according to the number of producers, a fairer measure of productivity. Fewer producers (capitalist and peasant growers, family/waged workers) with less labour time succeeded in producing more output, in a relative sense, indicating a growth in production and a changed labour process. Many people had migrated to urban areas by the late 1960s and early 1970s, and many rural people had become part-time farmers, relying on labour-saving technology to increase labour productivity and free them for non-farm work (Low 1986).

Ellis's (1982: appendix) disaggregated data confirmed a complex record of growth and decline for different crops during the 1969/70–1979/80 period (although the author chose to use aggregated data as the basis of his critique of the 'food-first' bias in Tanzanian government price policy in the 1970s!) He found a 162 per cent increase in plantation tea sales and a 649 per cent increase in smallholder tea sales, for example, hardly 'stagnation' or 'decline'! Official sales of drought crops (sorghum, millet, cassava) rose by 483 per cent (1722 per cent for sorghum alone), due to increased prices and the opening up of state markets for 'female' crops, in particular, for the first time. State support for drought crops and legumes was shortlived, partly as a result of Ellis's own influential work. He argued (ibid.: 272) that 'Agricultural price policy had converted a group of hitherto subsistence crops into marketed cash crops for which there was no commercially viable market either domestically or internationally'. The prioritization of 'traditional' export crops rather than local domestic crops was a politically motivated choice, which was directly harmful to the interests of women growers. Finger millet was the major raw material for local beer, bullrush millet was used to produce animal feeds (a potential high-value export commodity), and cassava could have been processed for domestic consumption.

Another invalid measure of performance was food imports. Food was regularly imported as a result of donor 'push' factors, even during boom years when food surpluses rotted in the more remote regions because of inadequate marketing, storage and transport infrastructure.

I agree that there was a crisis of sorts in agriculture during 1967–78, but not that it was one of declining or stagnant production, in general. Instead, output of some crops grown by capitalist and/or peasant growers declined, and others increased; the intensification of female labour and female resistances was part of the story in each case. Donors and the state had a crisis of control, however, because producers did not always sell in official markets, or they decided to grow food crops instead of the export crops which officials preferred. Family workers rebelled and waged farm workers baulked at low wages and poor working conditions, leading to a 'crisis of labour' for employers and household heads (URT 1982b).

After 1978, however, both peasant and capitalist growers faced a general crisis associated with the crisis of foreign exchange, which caused a severe shortage of fertilizers and other farm inputs, of diesel and other fuel, the drop in real value of producer prices, and the state's growing inability to provide basic services and infrastructure. Eventually the government was 'starved' of finance by the donors in order to force its compliance with IMF/World Bank conditions, namely the acceptance of SAP policies.

SAP in agriculture is structured around the rehabilitation of the large-scale plantation and large farm sector owned by foreign, and to a lesser extent, national entrepreneurs and TNCs, and the provision of a regular supply of *cheap* labour by impoverished peasants and farm workers (Mbilinyi 1990a c, 1991b).

Agricultural output increased at the rate of 3 per cent per year during the 1985/86–1987/88 period, mainly due to expansion in the large-scale capitalist sector (URT/UNICEF 1990: 10). According to a 1987 report of the National Productivity Council (reported in *Daily News*, 28 October 1987), the productivity rate of the plantation sector grew by 2.3 per cent during 1986/87, with an average annual rate of productivity growth of 3.4 per cent a year during 1980–7. The increase resulted from 'government policy, whereby more resources are being shifted from other sectors into agriculture and the provision of incentive goods'.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that control over women's labour has become a central terrain of struggle in Tanzanian agriculture, partly reflecting growing conflict between indigenous smallholder and largely foreign agro-industrial growers. The state and donor institutions promoted patriarchal farming systems in peasant communities as a means of producing/reproducing cheap labour and cheap agricultural commodities and as a mechanism of social control. Beginning in the colonial period, women resisted the worst aspects of patriarchal relations. Women's resistance increased during the 1970s and 1980s as a result of heightened levels of exploitation in both peasant and capitalist farming, and contributed to the 'labour crisis' in plantation agriculture, a fall in peasant and plantation output after the foreign-exchange crisis, and the resulting loss of state revenue and foreign exchange.

The existence of positive growth in output and in official sales during the 1970s resulting in part from the post-1967 Arusha reforms was hidden by the discourse adopted by the World Bank and other mainstream critics. According to the FAO (1984), Tanzania had the highest potential for growth and intensification of capitalist production in agriculture in all SADCC countries, because of its *past record*, fertile acreage, plentiful rainfall and high irrigation potential. A major objective of the World Bank and other donors is to challenge Tanzania's 'Food First', income redistribution, and 'women-friendly' agriculture policies, and to shift development strategies back to prioritization of the export-oriented large-scale capitalist sector (e.g. World Bank 1981: 63–4, Rukuni and Eicher 1988).

At another level, SAP includes official efforts to counteract women's movement out of peasant/capitalist agriculture into non-farm informal economic activities. Alternative employment possibilities have been undermined, real wages and producer prices lowered in real terms, and the costs of living increased. The most probable outcome is that more women will be forced to work as low-paid casual seasonal farm workers in plantations and large farms and as unpaid family workers in peasant farms. At the same time, the renewal of 'traditionalist' ideologies and politics in Tanzania and elsewhere in Africa threatens women's efforts to liberate themselves from all forms of bondage (AAWORD 1985). Violence against women in the home, the school, the streets and the workplace, and institutionalized sexism have increased, partly as a result of economic immizeration and growing stress, and a backlash against women's emancipation.[14]

In this chapter I have stressed the contradictory nature of the agrarian change process, and would like to end on a positive note. Many changes discussed here resulted from women's initiatives and resistance. One of the greatest challenges scholars and activists face in Tanzania and other African countries is to 'catch up' with the 'ordinary' women. We need to learn from women peasants and farm workers about *their* needs, strategic interests and priorities, and support *their* struggles to be free, to be full citizens, and to have economic and political democracy in the household, the nation and worldwide.

Notes

[1] I have deliberately adopted the term 'indigenous' to refer to 'native' Africans whose ethnic 'origins' are on the continent of Africa. Tanzania like the rest of Eastern and Southern Africa consists of people with diverse origins, from Arabia, Asia and Europe, in addition to more than 120 ethnic groups originating in Africa.

[2] More detailed discussion of issues raised in my chapter can be found in the following references: ILO/JASPA (1986), Koda (*et al.*) (1987), Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi (1983), Mbilinyi (1985, 1986, 1988a/b, 1989b, 1990a/b/c, 1991a/b).

[3] For more detailed analysis of colonial farm policy, see Bowles (1980), Mbilinyi (1986, 1991b), Raikes (1978).

[4] Henn (1988) provides a succinct analysis of patriarchal social relations. In contrast to her wider temporal frame, I prefer to restrict the concept to the patriarchal farming systems which became characteristic of smallholder farming systems during the mercantilist capitalist era in colonial Africa.

[5] For analysis of colonial and neo-colonial laws and the invention of 'customary' marriage, see Armstrong and Ncube (1987), Hay and Wright (1982), Moore (1986), Parpart and Staudt (1989), Rwezaura (1985), *Signs* (1991), Stamp (1991), and the forthcoming collection by Megan Vaughan and Annie Whitehead, based on the Nuffield Conference on Colonial Marriage (1989). Women's resistances against 'customary' marriage are studied in Mbilinyi 1988a, 1989b, and in some of the other works cited.

[6] My calculations are based on data provided by Bowles (1980) and Taylor (1963: 117). See more detailed discussion

in Mbilinyi (1986, 1991b). Non-indigenous people numbering some 123,000 people controlled some 3 million acres, compared to some 4.5 million acres under the control of 8.7 million Africans in 1956. The European population nearly doubled between 1948 and 1957, and by 1957, the European population alone controlled some 2.25 million acres or 109 acres per capita, compared to half an acre per capita in the indigenous population.

[7] In 1987, for example, Tanzania had achieved a 75% adult literacy rate, compared to 42% in Malawi, 60% in Kenya, and 43% in Nigeria; and a life expectancy of 54 years compared to 48 years in Malawi, 59 in Kenya and 51 in Nigeria. I am indebted to Mackintosh and Wuyts (1987) for their analysis of social accumulation on the basis of local, 'self-help' programmes.

[8] See Boesen and Mohele (1979), Boesen *et al.* (1986) – especially chapters by Raikes, Rasmussen and Odgaard; Friis-Hansen (1987), Mbilinyi (1986, 1988b, 1991b).

[9] There have been few studies of polygamy in Tanzania, in spite of its significance. In Zambia, men began to marry more wives on crop schemes 'for prestige purposes and for expanding their economic activities' (SADCC Women's Study Group 1986: 16).

[10] For references and further details on patriarchal farming systems at the household level, see Henn 1988, Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi 1983, Mbilinyi 1988b, 1991b, Muro 1985, Parpart and Staudt 1989, Qunta 1987, Robertson and Berger 1986, Stichter and Parpart 1988.

[11] Bryceson and Kirimbai 1980, Koda *et al.* 1987, Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi 1983, Mbilinyi 1985, 1991b, Muntemba 1985, Robertson and Berger 1986.

[12] Koda *et al.* 1987, Mbilinyi 1985, 1991b, Muro 1985, Polisya 1984, Robertson and Berger 1986.

[13] Bryceson and Kirimbai 1980, ILO 1984, Koda *et al.* 1987, Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi 1983, Mbilinyi 1991a/b, Mbughuni and Mwangunga 1989, Muntemba 1985.

[14] The recent suicide of a first year Tanzanian student at the University of Dar es Salaam in protest against sexual abuse and harassment by a male-dominated student group illuminates the extent to which institutionalized sexism 'penetrated' even the most progressive arenas in civil society and the state (Mbilinyi and Mbughuni (eds) 1990).

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Abbreviations Used:

CRDB	Cooperative Rural Development Bank
ERB	Economic Research Bureau
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
SAP	Structural Adjustment Policy/Programmes
TNC	Transnational Corporation
UDM	University of Dar es Salaam
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
WID	'Women in Development'
WRDP	Women's Research and Documentation Project.

14 Unions, Workers & the Development Process
Controversy, Dilemmas & New Openings
JIMI O. ADESINA

Introduction

If the decades of the 1960s and the 1970s were periods of optimism for Africa's social and economic development, the 1980s have been marked by intense reversals and pessimism. While development studies, in general, have fallen into disrepute in European and North American academic establishments, the imperative of dealing with the worsening socio-economic crisis raises for sub-Saharan Africa the profile of these areas of inquiry. It is as much a question of asking what went wrong as it is of finding new grounds for a better appreciation of the socio-economic forces in African's development process. This chapter addresses the issue from the perspective of the roles of workers and unions in the development process, with special emphasis on Nigeria.

Two broad intellectual traditions are addressed, namely (a) Left-socialist paradigms, and (b) liberal-bourgeois paradigms of Keynesian and neo-classical extractions. The paradigmatic locus of these currents, and the dilemmas immanent in the constitution of their problematique are examined. In conclusion, I argue for a paradigmatic reconstitution based on the socialist-project.

A working definition of development is necessary for a paper concerned with the issues of development. We can work with a *soft* definition of development as a societal shift from a state-of-being to a desired-state; and see this as multi-dimensional, i.e. economic, social, political. I should emphasize that no assumption is being made that the process of shift is one of 'becoming', 'attaining' or 'arriving' (Ohiorhenuan 1988; Ohiorhenuan, Mbanefo and Adesina 1988). An insular segmentation of development is also not being suggested, i.e. the 'economic' from the 'social' or the 'political' (*cf.* ECA 1983: 1). Their *conceptual* separation is, however, important.

The Left: Union, Workers and the Development Process

The category: the 'Left' is problematic in the discourse of the working class in the development process, not only in methodological terms but in the starting point and objective of discourse as well. Perhaps, we should talk of competing discourses of the Left. Its unity lies in their subscription to at least some aspects of Marx's analysis, and a commitment to a radical re-ordering of society. The vital dimension of development which pre-occupies it may be the political or the economic. Against this background, we can examine the current of Left discourse(s) in terms of what Saul called 'proletarian messianism' of the pre-1970s (1975: 305), the pessimism of the 'labour aristocracy' thesis (LAT) and the re-discovery of the mode of production after the decade of dependency thesis.

Unions, workers and the labour aristocracy thesis: orthodoxy challenged
Two currents of LAT, in the assessment of workers' and unions' role in Africa's development process, can be identified. One is in Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*, and the other

in a series of articles, jointly or separately, by Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul between 1967 and 1969.[1] While contributors to the debate have noted the twin pedigree in Africa of LAT, the subtle but important distinctions between the two have not been properly specified.

First, Fanon was *principally* concerned with 'political development' either in the decolonization or post-colonial context. Second, Fanon's Marxism should be placed within the context of militant existentialism. Central to this are its approaching the discovered 'humanist' and philosophical young Marx, hostility to Stalinism and the 'determinism' of Marx, the economist. It also rejected the notion of the revolutionary working class in the context of Europe–North America of the 1950s. Third is the context for Fanon's intense hostility to colonialism. The latter is most crucial in appreciating Fanon's perception of workers, unions and their viability as agencies of (socio-political) development. His passionate concern for the psycho-cultural effects of contacts with colonialism on the indigenous population defines his attitude to groups and institutions which owe their existence to the colonial process, and whose labour runs the colonial machinery (p. 88). By contrast, the relative distance of the peasantry defines Fanon's *a priori* endearment to them.

The necessity of violence on the other hand as the means of purifying the colonial society (1965: 46–50) defines the intense contempt with which Fanon viewed all groups and institutions which had to compromise with the colonizer. Unions – with their mixture of conflict and compromise (p. 52) – workers because of their proximity to the colonial machinery, the colonial intelligentsia, and the national bourgeoisie constitute the pariah bloc. Unions are particularly dangerous: 'Stoppages of work in a few industries . . . mass demonstrations to cheer the leader, and the boycotting of buses or of imported commodities . . . allow the people to work off their energy' (p. 52), without actually challenging the colonial apparatus. For Fanon there can be 'no compromise, no possible coming to terms' with colonialism which for him 'is violence in its natural state' (p. 48). These rather than the alleged 'privileges' of the 'embryonic proletariat' (p. 88), define both his crude assemble of groups tagged as the labour aristocracy, and his polemics.[2] Furthermore, in spite of his polemical use of class categories, Fanon was more concerned with the nation – if not the race – than with class.

Arrighi and Saul were, by contrast, more concerned with the 'economic' aspects of development; the brake that the structure of the economy, subordinated to international capital, and the pattern of income distribution or surplus appropriation, imposed on rapid economic development (1973b: 12). This pattern not only drains the peasantry which generate the surplus, but is also counter-productive for economic development. The pattern of resource appropriation is a disincentive to the peasants, discouraging expanded agricultural production and accumulation (pp. 14–16). They identified the haemorrhage in terms of 'the repatriated profits of overseas firms, or [the consumption of surplus] by self-indulgent elites' (p. 12). It is the identification of these elites that is important for us. 'Workers . . . together with the elites and sub-elites in bureaucratic employment in the civil service and expatriate concerns, constitute . . . the labour aristocracy of tropical Africa' (pp. 18–19). Furthermore, 'it is the *discretionary consumption of this class* which absorbs a *significant proportion* of the surplus produced in the money economy (ibid., emphases mine). Arrighi and Saul's labour aristocracy is therefore much wider than Fanon's 'tram conductors, taxi drivers, miners, dockers, interpreters, nurses and so on' (1965: p. 88), i.e. the *embryonic proletariat*.

They differentiated these 'labour aristocratic' workers from the 'unskilled', 'semi-proletarianized peasants'; mainly migrant workers, who have not cut their links with the peasantry (Arrighi 1973: 120–1). African proletarianization is devoid of the violence, misery and ejection from land that characterized the English working-class experience. The option of wage employment, the sufficiency of wage income to fund current and post-employment consumption defined Arrighi and Saul's hostility to the African working class (*cf.* Arrighi, 1973: 12–121; Arrighi and Saul, 1973c: 69). The preponderance of non-durable consumer goods production in African industrialization locks the working class and unions into a situation where they have to defend its persistence (Arrighi 1973: 122, Arrighi and Saul, 1973b: 21). Whatever political muscle the working class possesses is therefore, anathemic to rapid (capital goods-based) industrialization. The disproportionate income of the proletariat puts it in alliance with other urban-based elite, and in opposition to the semi-proletariat and the peasantry.

To paraphrase Arrighi and Saul, this proletariat would not make any revolution. If anything, the imperatives of socialist development will hurt this class since its interests are detrimental to any re-structuring of the neo-colonial dependent capitalism. The authors felt constrained to overcome the prevailing 'failure of analytical nerve', on the nature of role of the African proletariat. In other words 'the crude and unrealistic proletarian messianism' of 'much of the radical literature on Africa' of the 1960s.

Labour aristocracy thesis challenged

The first wave of response to Arrighi and Saul's LAT involved empirical refutation. Peace (1975) challenged the thesis on the grounds that the African working class constitutes an economic, status or political elite. While at first glance the Lagos workers earn well above the per-capita income of Western Nigeria of the early 1970s, the real wage situation, Peace urges, compels one to agree with the 1970–1 Adebo Wage Review Commission that the condition at or near the bottom of the wage system was intolerable (pp. 286–7). The computed real wage figures in Table 14.1 (see below) show that in 1969, an artisan with the Federal Civil Service, and resident in Lagos, earned over N100 less than he did in 1956, while his counterpart in Ibadan earned N86.4 less. An unskilled worker resident in Lagos would have experienced a drop in earnings of N57.2 over the same period.

Other studies in Northern Nigeria by Hinchliffe (1974) and Lubeck (1975, 1986) deny any significant income differential between workers and other segments of the urban subordinate social bloc. If anything, most workers earn less than some 'informal sector' petty artisans, traders and penny capitalists (Peace 1975, 1979, Lubeck 1986), which partially explains the entrepreneurial aspirations of some of the workers. The figures for 1973/75, in Table 14.2, show the unskilled worker at the bottom of the income pile. While the average semi-skilled and skilled/clerical worker earned more than street vendors, tailors and mechanics, this was far less than the average earnings of a small shopkeeper or taxi operator. Relative to the 'professional' Nigerian and the entrepreneurs, even the income of the skilled worker pales into insignificance. Among low-income groups in general, Table 14.3 shows that in 1978 while the average earnings of a street vendor was about 43.2 per cent of the average earnings of an unskilled worker, the disparity within the low-income groups in the 'informal sector' is even larger. The average unskilled worker earned just N2 more than the low-income peasant. Equally when we look at the earnings differentials within the industrial private sector and the Federal Civil Service,[3] in Tables 14.4 and 14.5, differentials between the different categories of the proletariat are nothing compared with the differentials between the workers and the 'elites' and 'sub-elites' they were supposed to identify with. 'Only a very

Table 14.1: Consumer Price Index & Public Sector Wage Movement

Years	Consumer Price Index		Public Sector Real Wage (£N/annum)			
	Lagos	Ibadan	Lagos		Ibadan	
			Artisan	Unskilled	Artisan	Unskilled
1956	89	86	296.6	204.5	307	211.6
1957	90	89	293.3	202.2	296.6	204.5
1958	90	83	293.3	202.2	318	219.3
1959	94	85	280.8	193.6	310.6	214.1
1960	100	100	264	182	264	182
1961	106	109	249	171.7	242.2	167
1962	110	117	240	165.4	225.6	155.5
1963	110	109	240	165.4	242.2	167
1964	112	108	235	162.5	244.4	168.5
1965	117	112	266.	186	278	194.6
1966	127	125	209.4	146.4	222.4	155.7
1967	122	120	218	152.5	231.6	162.2
1968	123	116	216.2	177.2	239.6	167.7
1969	136	126	195.6	136.7	220.6	154.4

Source: FOS, Lagos Economic Indicator Consumer Price Index. 1960 = 100
Real Wage computed from Federal Civil Service nominal wage levels.

Table 14.2: Income Distribution in Urban Nigeria, 1973/75

Group	Number ('000)	Average Income (Naira/annum)	Percentages Number	Percentages Income
Unskilled Workers	390	320	10.9	2.2
Informal Sector I (Street Vendors)	700	374	19.6	4.7
Informal Sector II (Tailors, Mechanics, Carpenters)	1000	538	27.9	9.7
Semiskilled Workers	337	700	9.4	4.2
Skilled/Clerical Workers	470	1500	13.1	12.7
Informal Sector III (Small Shopkeepers, Taxi Owners)	300	2181	8.4	11.8
Professional Nigerians	55	4500	1.5	4.5
Formal Sector Entrepreneurs	300	8310	8.4	44.9
Professional Non-Nigerians	27	11000	0.8	5.3

Adapted from ILO/JASPA (1982, p. 14).

Table 14.3: A Comparison of Income Among Low-Income Groups (1978)

Group	Income (Naira per annum) Average	Income (Naira per annum) Median	Percentage Earnings Less Than: Average Agricultural Income %	Percentage Earnings Less Than: Average Informal Sector Income %	Percentage Earnings Less Than: Average Unskilled Income %
Agriculture	785	650	37	40	46
Informal Sector:	740	350	75	80	65
Street Vendors,	350	260	90	95	100
Tailors, etc.	1000	700	50	55	70
Unskilled Workers	810	710	21	55	35

Source: ILO/JASPA Estimates (1982: 11).

Table 14.4: Inter-Occupational Earning Differentials in Nigeria's Industrial Sector: 1963-1974

	Professional & Managerial Non-Nigerians Naira	Professional & Managerial Non-Nigerians Diff.	Professional & Managerial Nigerians Naira	Professional & Managerial Nigerians Diff.	Manual Operators Clerical Naira	Manual Operators Clerical Diff.	Manual Operators (Skilled/Unskilled) Naira	Manual Operators (Skilled/Unskilled) Diff.	Manual Operators All Naira	Manual Operators All Diff.
Years										
1963	4406	1088	1701	420	469	116	244	60	405	100
1965	4510	1007	1835	410	511	114	287	64	448	100
1967	5329	1009	2270	430	600	114	358	68	528	100
1969	5165	1099	2256	441	569	111	325	63	512	100
1971	6747	1099	2494	406	778	127	403	66	614	100
1973	7663	1054	3276	451	890	122	459	63	272	100
1974	7470	886	3117	370	913	108	572	68	843	100

Adapted from Fajana (1981: 208).
Source: Industrial Survey of Nigeria, 1963-1974 (Lagos, FOS, 1976).
Diff. = Differential in pay as a percentage of average earnings of all employees.

naïve conception of primitive capital accumulation as the sole foundation of development' as Kassalow (1978: 11) notes 'could seriously conclude that what most union members earn above the average national income . . . could be utilized to speed development appreciably'.

The idea of a 'semi-proletarianized' unskilled worker which oscillates between the peasant economy and the urban wage labour market has limited validity in Nigeria of the post-1960. Even where workers reside in the rural area and commute to the urban area (*cf.* Lubeck 1986, Adesina in press), it does not suggest the absence of full-proleratarianization. Farming on the outskirts of the urban areas is a strategy for coping with declining real earnings rather than evidence of incomplete proletarianization. In any case unskilled workers, as well as the '(sub) elites' engage in such agrarian effort. On grounds of the 'status of workers', my own experience and many of the reported community studies fail to support the idea of residential

Table 14.5: Structure of Salaries & Wages in the Federal Public Service of Nigeria (1954–1988)

Status	1954		1965		1975		1979		1983		1988	
	Naira	Diff.	Naira	Diff.	Naira	Diff.	Naira	Diff.	Naira	Diff.	Naira	Diff.
Permanent Secretary	5280	3616	5880	2697	12696	1763	13970	1173	15080	959	15080	945
Medical Officer	1776	1216	2232	1024	4368	607	6448	817	6768	431	6930	434
Engineer	1693	1159	1944	892	3564	495	4860	617	5598	356	5760	361
Administrative Officer	1248	855	1440	791	3264	453	3710	470	4374	278	4524	283
Clerical Officer	300	205	396	182	1164	162	1290	164	1878	120	1920	120
Artisan/Craftsman	234	160	312	143	900	125	1015	129	1698	108	1740	109
Unskilled Labourer	146	100	218	100	720	100	788	100	1572	100	1596	100

Source: 1954–75 Figures Adapted from Fajana (1981: 215). 1979–1988 Figures from several editions of *Recurrent and Capital Estimates of the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria*. Lagos: Federal Government Printers.
Diff. = Salary as percentage of the unskilled labourer's wage.
N.B. Since figures refer to basic salary, income differential is grossly underestimated.

exclusivity of the working class *vis-à-vis* the 'semi-proletarianized' or other 'urban poor'. However, studies show sharp differences in the 'social status' of workers – a notorious Weberian concept, if ever there was one in Lagos it would seem that workers, younger and more educated;

> frequently form the focal point of an urban network comprising of kinsmen in less fortunate circumstances who constitute a drain on whatever financial surplus permanent workers may accumulate. (Peace 1975: 288)

Saul (1975) has argued that this is indicative of a patron–client relationship, but there is no doubt that it undermines a vital segment of the LAT.

A number of studies, including that of Peace's (1975: 297), have indicated the precarious nature of economic security that the LAT imparts to the emergent working class. Wage-employment is more tenuous than imagined. This is by no means a phenomenon of early proletarianization, the current economic crisis, or exclusive of the core (primary) labour market (*cf.* Adesina 1988, in press). Jobs in the multi-national firms could be insecure indeed (*cf.* Peace 1979: 113). Yesufu (1962) has noted the extent of workers' dependence on urban ethnic organizations for financial aid in periods of economic need. Peace (1979) also noted that dependence on credit from petty traders increased during the periods of industrial action. In Kano, Lubeck's study (1986) suggests that wage-earners and factory workers even more so, occupy a lower status position and, furthermore, have a lower perception of their work *vis-à-vis* other occupational groups. These, and other studies, suggest that both at the level of interaction and orientation, workers identify themselves 'downwards' towards the other segments of the urban poor, rather than upwards with the (petty-) bourgeoisie. This dimension, Saul (1975: 306) later agrees is a major flaw in the LAT.

The question of the political character of the working class is a vital segment of Fanon's LAT and a strong undercurrent of Arrighi and Saul's. Peace (1975) and Waterman (1983) have demonstrated that rather than being politically conservative the Nigerian working class is the most articulate segment of the subordinate social bloc.

> Of all socio-economic groups created by the colonial situation, the Lagos wage-earners were most immediately and enduringly cast in the role of concerted opposition . . . [And] by comparison with the peasantry, the wage earning class is continually involved in developing and refining those organizations which reflect a growing class consciousness determined by consistently subordinate relation to the industrial mode of production. (Peace 1975: 291 and 300)

The evidence, both in and outside Nigeria, suggests that the LAT is grossly mistaken in its political characterization of the working class.[4] Saul (1975), however, contends that what all these indicate is populism not revolutionary class consciousness. Sandbrook has argued that populism is 'a mentality of the under-privileged' rather than 'a specifically working-class consciousness' (1982: 139). Even if this is correct (and I have my doubts), showing that African workers possess such consciousness and practice in opposition to the

dominant social bloc and economy, it is damaging to the LAT. Onimode (1988: 105) went further than most that African workers' involvement in anti-colonial struggles and since, 'testify to the long stirring of revolutionary consciousness of the . . . working class'. This may, of course, be an issue of contending paradigms and discourses, which we will come to in a moment.

So far we have been concerned with *empirical* challenges to the LAT, but even if contrary empirical evidence may refute aspects of a paradigm, it does not prove its limitation as an analytical tool. The latter is surely a pre-requisite for overcoming the LAT. For this we have to turn to the structure and procedure of the paradigm. In methodological terms Sandbrook notes that the LAT is 'too crudely materialist in drawing an unmediated link between objective conditions and political behaviour' (1982: 130). The evidence from a similar debate in the UK suggests that the more 'affluent' segment of the working class has provided the more revolutionary activists of workers' movements (*cf.* Gray 1981; Hobsbawm 1984: 244, 267). Saul (1975: 305–8) has further admitted that the LAT:

- 'may still freeze reality in a misleading manner, masking . . . the contingent nature of such workers' vested interest in the status quo' (p. 306).
- '*dichotomized* too schematically [the] work force' as between 'labour aristocrats and semi-proletarianized elements, rather than merely to emphasize the placing of all workers . . . on a *continuum* between urban and rural settings and identification.' This 'makes it easier to analyse *the process* which affects the emergence of class solidarity, or the reverse' (p. 310, fn 13).
- 'has indeed encouraged analysts, by *definition* as it were, to underestimate the level of consciousness and revolutionary potential of the proletariat proper in contemporary Africa', (p. 306).
- that 'the African working class should not be *prematurely labelled*' (p. 308) (all emphases in original).

These criticisms do not, however, go deep enough into the limitations of LAT. First, as Waterman (1975, 1983) points out, the LAT is indicative of a dilemma in Marxist analysis. How do you handle the working class when it does not make revolution or even aspire to one? The response, going back to Engels and Lenin, has been to designate it *en bloc*, or a segment of it, as aristocratic. LAT is therefore not an invention of Fanon, Arrighi or Saul (*cf.* Hobsbawm 1964, 1984, Gray 1981). As Waterman (1983: 1–25; 321–59) notes, it reflects a tendency to impose categories on the working class rather than a sociological understanding of it. I am less inclined to think that this is analytically fatal.

One can reflect on this at two levels: (a) methods of analysis (or theory) and (b) practice. At the level of analysis the issue is to re-emphasize the essentials of Marx's method of abstraction. In other words, that social analysis must commence from concrete reality and re-validate itself within that reality (*cf.* Adesina in press: ch. 1).

Second, and more directly to Arrighi and Saul's LAT, the dilemma – for two Marxists – is that their discourse is at best Left-Keynesian and at times stridently neo-classical. In the first instance, there is a *decentralization of production*,[5] and by implication, the relations of production (Cohen 1987). It is only on this basis that one can argue that workers expropriate the surplus produced by peasants. While some commentators on the LAT have alluded to this, its significance was never explored. It is seductive to think that if the main source of state revenue was surplus generated by the peasantry then the horde of administrative workers paid from the Treasury must be partaking in that expropriated surplus. First, as evident in Table 14.6, this distorts the labour force distribution. In spite of the acknowledgement of workers in the transnational firms (*cf.* Arrighi 1973) it acquired no analytical significance. There is no apparent recognition that the surplus-value, the source of the repatriated profit, is extracted from these workers. Table 14.6 shows that between 49.3 per cent and 55 per cent of the formal labour market employees falls within this category. Second, even in the case of the public sector – and we momentarily exclude workers in industrial or commercial capitalist sectors – it is difficult to argue that surplus-labour is not expropriated from administrative workers simply because they are not involved in direct commodity production. Exploitation, beyond its sociological meaning (*cf.* Shaikh 1981), does not preclude 'unproductive' labour process.

Table 14.6: Number Employed By Type of Employer (1956–1981)

Employing Units	1956	1959	1960	1981
Federal Government (Civil Service)	113,600	49,800	43,800	123,322
Regional/State Governments (Civil Service)		70,700	79,000	247,981
Local Government	83,900	89,100	89,900	106,777
Public Corporations (Federal & State)	76,100	67,100	73,100	239,363
Private Enterprises & Commercial Joint-Ownership with Governments	167,200	146,600	179,600	354,592*
Voluntary Agencies		10,200	34,500	15,095
Others	NA	NA	NA	11,656
Total	440,800	433,400	499,900	1,098,808

Source: National Manpower Board Surveys. NA = Not Available.
* Private Firms Account for 81.23% of this figure.

Third, a significant proportion of the public sector has always involved commodity production or commoditized services. The rapid expansion of state investment in heavy industry in the 1970s substantially increased this dimension of public sector activities. One cannot argue that surplus-value is not being extracted because there are no company reports, or profit is not declared at the end of the year (*cf.* Adesina 1988). This decentering of production is shared with Keynesian/neo-classical paradigms.

Fourth, characterizing working-class action as purely populist if it does not involve the throwing of Molotov Cocktails, thus tearing down capitalism by a revolutionary party, is analytically unhelpful. This is a major conceptual limitation in much radical discourse. As I argued elsewhere, the notion of populism,

> begs the issue and rests on the assumption that there is *pure class consciousness . . . Consciousness is a process of constitution within definite socio-cultural contexts.* A working-class self definition as 'poor people' is . . . no less evaluative than another's self definition as 'working-class'; the difference may be one of vocabulary. (Emphasis in original, Adesina, 1989: 317)

The intellectual task is in understanding these contextual expressions of consciousness.

Finally, almost all the key concepts used by Arrighi and Saul in developing their analysis are Keynesian rather than Marxist: 'Demonstration effect', the zero-sum contradiction between consumption and investment, the undifferentiated idea of national (investment) fund, etc. Concepts such as elite, sub-elite, etc., and the distinction between traditional and modern economies are borrowed from the Weberian and modernization paradigms. So is the tendency to contrast wage-earners' income with that of the rural dwellers. My objection is not against cross-breeding in social science, *per se*; it is against making eclecticism virtuous. The dilemma of the LAT paradigm is in its adoption of decidedly anti-Marxist paradigms to push a socialist project. These paradigms are in undisguised hostility to Marxist analysis.[6] Further, as Waterman advises:

> The problem for social analysis – at least for socialist analysts – is . . . one of overcoming concepts that reflect rather than penetrate, obscure rather than reveal, and that express the capitalist project rather than attempting to suggest a socialist one (1983: 327).

Given the political project of Arrighi and Saul, some dilemmas are apparent at the level of practice. First, as Peace (1975: 229–300) notes, LAT directs 'attention away from important areas of exploitation'. The primary contradiction, hence political confrontation, is among the elements of the subordinate social bloc.

Second is the implicit position that a modernizing elite – ascetic and able to impose the necessary discipline of re-allocating resources – is necessary for development. Curiously, and unlike Fanon, the 'national bourgeoisie' or the 'political class', in Arrighi and Saul's schema, seem set for this modernizing role. In this they finally capitulated to the political agenda of the militant Right. In the late 1970s and the 1980s, their thesis has become a potent weapon in the hands of the New Right counter-revolutionaries organized around the World Bank and the IMF. The current wave of repression of the labour movement and the decimation of the social welfare landscape is justified on the ideas of two socialists!

However, by committing the equivalent of Left apostasy, the proponents of the LAT have forced us to re-examine:

• the role of the working class, qua class in the anti-colonial and post-colonial struggles, and questions about its viability as a revolutionary class.
• the nature of trade unions and their internal relations.
• the issue, when linked with the LAT debate in the UK (*cf.* Hobsbawm 1964, 1984, etc.), of working-class segmentation (gender, etc.), and segmentation between workers and other members of the subordinate social bloc.

Competing Left paradigms

I noted earlier that some of the controversy on the LAT may in fact derive from an alternative paradigm about, for instance, the context from which workers'/union role in the development process is being considered. While the idea of a socialist society as the objective, and workers' struggle as the means are implicit in most Left discussions, the link in a developmental sense is often muted. In this, Onimode provides the clearest statement:

> development means fundamental structural transformation from an outmoded social system to a new one through a determined struggle against the conservative retrograde forces of the *status quo*. (1981: 166)

Class struggle, essentially political (p. 166), 'will determine the course of Nigeria's development' (p. 167). Hence the significance of workers' struggles and other forms of class struggle. While, as Waterman (1983) notes, there has been relatively little written by the Left on labour in Nigeria, especially in the pre-1970s, what exists is concentrated on episodes of workers/union struggles. Hopkins (1979), Hughes and Cohen (1978) and Mason (1978) examined the emergence of the Nigerian working class, its early militancy and attempts at erecting autonomous organizations. Mason was concerned with the formation of the working class in the context of forced labour and communal revolt, while Hughes and Cohen highlighted fledgling autonomous class ideological activities; but what this and the Hopkins' study reveal is the extent of workers' dependence on petty-bourgeois elements. Although class struggle *by itself* cannot be denied, working-class autonomous reaction to colonialism was limited. In that sense its contribution to the direction of Nigeria's development – as outlined by Onimode – was quite muted.

In the post-1939 period there were two aspects to worker–union struggles. First worker oppositional activities were more permanent and organizationally coherent. This was unlike any other group of the subordinate social bloc. Second, the readiness to take 'positive action' distinguished workers' actions from those of the emergent petty-bourgeoisie (Hughes and Cohen 1978, Adesina in press).

The post-1939 period and the episodic instances of the 1945 and 1964 General Strike, and union demands in 1946 and between 1957 and 1959, have been celebrated as evidence of militant workers' struggles. The period between 1939 and 1945 witnessed the emergence of militant unionism and a folk-person, namely Michael Imoudu (Cohen 1970, 1977, Darah 1986). The period culminating in the 1945 General Strike is distinct and has been widely celebrated as central to the anti-colonial struggle. The 1949 shooting of protesting mine workers, in the coal valleys (Iva) of Enugu, has also been celebrated in terms of the 'spontaneous anti-imperialist solidarity it evoked among Nigerians throughout the country' (Onimode 1981: 177). The petty-bourgeois 'nationalist', however, successfully hijacked the agenda. The Lagos municipal elections of 1950, in which worker-candidates won seats on the platform of the Nigerian Labour Party, was the high point of direct union/worker political activism (Cohen 1982, Darah 1986, Berg and Butler 1966). A silent dimension of workers' struggles was the effort within the labour movement to take on board the grievances of other urban subordinate groups in their protests. This was also one of the most celebrated aspects of the 1964 General Strike (Braundi and Lettieri 1964, Toyo 1967, Cohen 1982).

The immediate pre-independence labour activism, notes Otobo (1983: 305), 'render[ed the] nationalist politicians more susceptible to persuasion and sensitive to urban workers' votes'. The prelude to and the 1963/4 General Strike remain for many the high point of post-1960

radical workers' activism. For Braundi and Lettieri (1964: 598), the 1964 General Strike represents the flowering of working-class consciousness 'free from the mist of nationalism'. For Toyo (1967) it was the pre-condition for revolutionary transformation of society. In terms of the working-class organization giving expressions to grievances of other subordinate (urban?) classes, the 1964 Strike is a watershed (Cohen 1982, Adesina 1988). Apart from being a direct challenge to the dominant bureaucratic bourgeoisie/political class, the General Strike pre-figured the crisis of 1965-6. The violence of that period, as Williams and Turner (1980: 86) point out, 'did not simply involve people in the politics of resource allocation. It was also a popular rejection of the rule of the politicians' (*cf.* Post and Vickers 1973).

In terms of the Leninist conception of the working class playing the vanguard role, the pre-1967 period will seem to point to the existence and possibilities of proletarian-led popular revolution (Toyo 1967). The failure of the revolution to materialize figures prominently in the Left reflections on workers'/union roles in the Nigerian development process. Okoye's (1981) bitter attack on Azikiwe and the mainstream of the NCNC political party for betraying the revolutionary current in the anti-colonial struggles – many of whom were based in the labour movement – pre-figures Ken Post's comment on the limitations of workers' autonomous role in the anti-colonial struggle.

The nationalist revolution, Post argues, was bourgeois to the extent that the petty-bourgeois nationalists controlled the indigenous agenda of devolution (1964: 171). The failure to successfully challenge the bourgeois elements, argues Post, lies in the structure of the Nigerian proletarian class. Workers, usually scattered in three or four main cities, 'lacking . . . any real feeling of class solidarity, were not sufficient to produce a really revolutionary situation' (p. 171). Toyo (1967), however, emphasized the crisis of union leadership, while Waterman (1976: 336) points to the tendency towards 'heroic myths, or equally heroic simplification' within the labour movement. Post by contrast was concerned with ethnic and regional consciousness. The issues raised by Post are a major dilemma for a class-only paradigm.

First, in conceiving of workers only in class terms, there is a problem in explaining the prevalence on non-class behaviour, especially at the level of political practice. The problem, as in the 1964 Federal Elections, is one of explaining how 80 per cent support for the Imoudu-led Labour Party translated into only 20 per cent actual support at the polls (Offiong 1983: 22). Second, an assumption that all forms of worker militancy are indicative of a drive-to-socialism cannot explain parochial, employment-unit forms of workers' struggles. Take the 1964 strike, it was the rumours of a 'Republic Day bonus' that galvanized shop floor interest rather than a revolutionary stand against the 'rule of politicians'. That, in the process of the strike, unions came to embrace the interest of other subordinate groups is ambiguous in its source and implication. Perhaps this is a result of the radicalizing impact of strike action, or radical activities/leaders pushing for popular revolt rather than something emanating from the rank-and-file members.

Taking on board the grievances of other subordinate fractions might also have been a purely tactical move to ensure broad support. One should note that the militantly anti-socialist union leaders were the first to write to the politicians in 1961 about a 'better deal for the workers' (*cf.* Cohen 1982, Offiong 1983, Otobo 1983). These unionists were at the heart of the strike. It is difficult to argue that unionists like Adebola and Borah were striving for socialism. The complexity of these phenomena being studied demand a creative sociological understanding rather than a rehash of Marxist orthodoxy.

Finally, there was a failure to understand the limits to the strength of trade unionism. Lenin's distinction between trade union and revolutionary class consciousness is of significant heuristic value, but one that is easily glossed over in our celebration of the working class. In doing so, the Left may be in danger of creating heroic myths or equally heroic simplifications of its own.

It is, however, necessary to put much of the Left writings in perspective. The celebration of working-class struggles and workers' folk-heroes stands against the backdrop of the dominant Nigerian historiography. This reduced the emergence of post-colonial state-hood to the story of the dominant petty-bourgeois and feudalistic elements. Our independence was won for us by the Ziks, the Awos, the Sardaunas and the Macaulays. These become the

anti-colonial and post-colonial substitutes for the Lugards of colonial history. Here, popular peasant and workers' struggles are abstracted away from the collective consciousness, and we end up with the indigenous equivalent of 'Mungo Park discovered the River Niger'. The celebration of the Michael Imoudus, the Nduka Ezes and the Mokwugo Okoyes is a re-assertion of working people's contribution to Nigeria's political development. The need to instil confidence in the working people – that they are makers of history, rather than its object – is vital to the socialist process. The pitfall is the reproduction of the dominant historiography, substituting our folk heroes for theirs, instead of undertaking a project of social history – i.e. showing people making their history, not just relating their leaders' deeds. Myth-making may in the process replace necessary 'hard-headedness'.

A new set of writings on workers' organizations and struggles has emerged since 1970, both as a continuation of the pre-1970s and a surpassing of it. Peace's work focussing on autonomous shop-floor activism and neighbourhood-community relations does not point in the direction of segmentation but a symbiosis of workers and other subordinate groups. In this and other studies (Lubeck's, and Waterman's, for example), the stirring of worker consciousness of a sort was identified. While Peace recognized the ethnic dimensions of workers' behaviour and interactions, its implications were not clearly explored. Lubeck, on the other hand, explored the religious aspects of working-class identity and activism and how religion can become the vehicle for worker protest. The problem – beyond exploring the different forms of worker consciousness – is the extent to which this can be projected to class politics of a transition-to-socialism phase. The outcome in Kano, in December 1980, was a millenarian revolt of the *Yan Tatsini*, not socialism (Lubeck 1986).

The need to overcome the Leninist dichotomy of trade union/revolutionary consciousness, economism/political consciousness is explored by Baylies *et al.* (1980), Cohen (1980) and Adesina (in press, and 1989). This is significant in assessing the 'hidden forms' of worker consciousness and conceptualizing consciousness as a continuum rather than as binary opposites (Waterman 1983: 322). We, nonetheless, still face the problem of ascertaining the point at which we can talk of the (class) struggle in socialist-project terms. First, not all forms of workers' revolt are progressive: Luddism was not! Second, not all working-class political struggles contribute towards socialism; they may create elbow room for socialist ideas, but not socialism itself. As Marx (1976) and Fine (1978) noted, the struggles for improved conditions of labour in the UK – culminating in the Factory Act – precipitated the decisive shift from the extraction of absolute surplus-value to relative surplus-value, as the basis of capital's valorization. With the emergence of *real subsumption of labour*, capitalism finally became a historically distinct mode of production. A case of working-class politics stimulating capitalism development!

From a deficit-model perspective, Waterman has noted 'the extent to which grassroots political struggle by workers has obstructed the development of peripheral capitalism, to such a point that the state has been obliged to attempt to incorporate their organizations' (1983: 347).

The status of unions in the post-1966 writings has been ambiguous with respect to its contribution to the socialist project. Toyo (1967) illustrated the extent to which union leadership, especially the 'socialists' undermined the gains of the 1964 strike. Studies oriented towards the internal workings of the unions have also shown a depressing image. Most union organizers operate purely on an entrepreneurial basis (Cohen 1982). Waterman studies the gap between revolutionary rhetoric and political practice (1982, 1983). Peace also highlighted the paradox between the high profile of unions at a national level and their absence or irrelevance to the shop-floor. I have also noted how pre-occupations with national-level political horse-trading in the labour movement, and insensitivity to shop-floor grievances, sparked off the instability within the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC)[7] (Adesina in press). The movement, however, remains the most consistent and organizationally coherent centre of opposition to unpopular policies of the various regimes in Nigeria. The dilemma for a Marxist paradigm is getting beyond the deficit-model of union-worker role in development to a positive overcoming of peripheral capitalism. To the extent that certain factions within the labour movement have provided alternative visions of national development, they can be said to have gone beyond the deficit-model of unions' role in development. *The problem is that few studies have examined this side of the contribution of unions.*

It is, therefore, important to appreciate both the immanent limits and strength of trade unions once the imperative of pluralism is accepted (Allen 1975; Blackburn and Cockburn 1967; Panitch 1981). By its nature unions combine compromise with conflict (Hyman 1971, 1975, 1979, 1984), and reflects the contradictory duality of labour at the point of production (Adesina in press). This might limit the capacity of unions to lead a positive struggle for overcoming peripheral capitalism. The minimum requirement for this, however, is that unions have to overcome their definition by the functionaries of state and capital as objects of routinized industrial relations.

The strength and limitations of unions are emerging as points of reflection within the labour movement itself. This includes re-examining the role of the labour movement in the anti-colonial and post-colonial struggles, and the extent to which what passed as socialist agitation was mainly leadership activism – never percolating to the membership.[8]

Keynesian Liberals and the Neo-classicists

Against the pre-occupation of Left paradigms with the revolutionary re-ordering of society in an anti-capitalist direction, the next set of paradigms are more pre-occupied with the enhancement and survival of capitalist development. They can be grouped into three currents; (a) what Osadchaya (1983: 12) calls 'neo-classical synthesis', (b) mainstream Keynesian consensual liberal pluralism; and (c) a resurgent neo-classical paradigm. The ambiguous and patchy manner in which Keynesianism was incorporated into the post-1945 development theory and practice should alert us to the limit of this classification (*cf*. Preston 1982, ch. 3). It is only an analytical device. A shared viewpoint is the idea of a common goal or good of society although some sections of that society may, for parochial reasons, not recognize it or accept its paramountcy.

Initially, development was conceived as a growth of GNP/GNI (into take-off and self-sustaining stages), with the proliferation of certain indices of development, e.g. per capital televisions, cars, etc. By the late 1960s and early 1970s the Left Keynesians shifted concern to the question of 'basic needs'. The tone in recent years has, however, altered radically (*cf*. Ohiorhenuan, Mbanefo and Adesina 1988). With the ascendancy of the New Right – currently in control of the IMF and the World Bank – emphasis has shifted back to the Lewisian growth model. The emphasis of the New Right is on GNP/GNI growth, the expansion of private ownership and a vociferous market fetishism. This neglects issues of basic needs and the democratization of national life. Political development is concerned less with the spread of 'democratic ethos' and institutions, and more of the need for governments that are 'bloody minded' enough to push the agenda of the New Right. A concern for the distinction between 'growth' and 'development' was never a strong point in much of the early literature (Caire 1977).

Unions, workers and political development
One of the more enduring concepts to emerge from Liberal Right analysis of union's role in the developing countries is 'political unionism'. For Millen (1963), it defined the dominant trend in unionism in these countries, in contrast to the development of 'responsible' business unionism of the United States (mythology, I dare say). Political unionism is defined by:

> The amount of time and thought [the political union leaders] invest in direct political work . . . The frequent use of direct mass action . . . in support of non-industrial objectives . . . [Requirement of] ideological conformity in the leadership . . . [A] marked tendency towards 'movementism' . . . [I]n the early stages . . . a political union often closely resembles a political party. (Millen 1963: 9)

While the extent to which political unionism is the norm in the Third World has been disputed[9] as have Millen's predictions,[10] the concept of political unionism was the starting point for most Right commentators. While Berg and Butler (1966) voiced the need for a 'severe qualification' of the concept *vis-à-vis* Tropical Africa, they suggested its validity in Nigeria, if qualifiedly so. Three criteria of political unionism were adopted; (a) 'the structural relations between trade unions and parties', (b) the 'concrete political acts . . . [the] trade

union movement engaged in, and how effective were they'? and (c) 'the union position after independence' (p. 341). The radical politics of the 1950 NLC, its involvement with the militant Zikist movement culminating in the 1950 municipal elections was the high point of political unionism (pp. 344–5, 358–9). The situation since had been radically different; the political link terminated with the decline of radical politics. While the link between the unions in the Jos (Northern Nigerian) tin mines and the Northern Peoples' Congress was more enduring, this was the exception.

At the level of 'political acts' engaged in by unions, Berg and Butler also argued 'that strikes for *well defined political goals unrelated to the short-term interests of wage earners* are the exception in pre-independence Africa, not the rule' (p. 365, emphasis mine). Trade unions that ventured in this direction often end up in destruction. '[T]he record', they insist, 'is one of failure' (ibid.), a position Fashoyin (1984) later echoed. In the post-independent situation, unions 'remain free of government control' (p. 369).

Most non-Left treatment of unions in the pre-independence period have adopted largely the same view as Berg and Butler. The role of union-based or worker oriented activists was 'ancillary' to mainstream political development (Sklar and Whitaker 1966; Olusanya 1973, Fashoyin 1981). Alternatively, the emphasis is on the recurrent crisis of union schisms (Yesufu 1962, Ananaba 1969, Fashoyin 1980, 1981, Tokunboh 1985). In the post-independence period the workers'-union political role is considered 'ancillary' or only in terms of individual unionists who contest elections under the umbrella of the 'mainstream' parties (Fashoyin 1981). To the extent that most of the post-1985 period was under military rule, the issue of union-worker participation in the political process is deemed irrelevant. Herein lies the crisis of such liberal bourgeois conception of 'politics' or 'the political'. Politics is defined either, in a pedestrian fashion, as things politicians or those in control of state power do, or in institutional terms, rather than processes involved in everyday power relations. The institutionalist perspective creates paradigmatic difficulty in explaining the impact of unorganized 'public opinion'. The same applies with explaining why the functionaries of the state (military or civilian) have to respond to non-institutional forms of public protest and revolt.

The underlying (moralistic) basis for rejecting union involvement in 'politics' was most openly expressed by Fashoyin (1984: 11). As the debate on the ideology of liberal pluralism in industrial relations reveals, this moral stand is a strong undercurrent of liberal Keynesian ideology most clearly expressed in the Schumpeterian re-definition of democracy (Hyman 1978, Schumpeter 1943).

A similar dilemma confronts Berg and Butler's attempts to define what is political about a strike in terms of 'well defined political goals unrelated to the short-term interest of wage earners' (p. 365). If politics is about everyday power relations, a straightforward demand for wages is no less political. This is profoundly so in a colonial context where racial division, the high visibility of alien rule, etc. are integral to every day shop-floor or work-place relations. As Berg had earlier noted 'simple' strike actions quickly reveal and articulate deep racial polarity (1959: 226). Under any regime, but especially the colonial, employment relations are shot through with (political) power relations (*cf*. Otobo 1988, Adesina in press). This may of course be a problem of confronting Berg and Butler with an alternative paradigm, not the dilemma of their own. But as I argued elsewhere, unless we conceptualize worker consciousness as often sublime but persistently present even in the most serene of days, we would be left with a 'big bang' explanation when suddenly our 'political' working class starts storming the Bastille of Management or the State (Adesina 1989).

The methodological crisis of this perspective is its crude empiricism and historiography (*cf*. Cohen 1982, Offiong 1983, and Otobo 1986). Even the example used to illustrate failed politicization of industrial relations contradicts a vital aspect of the argument. The 1946 UAC African workers' union (UNAMAG) strike *was about wages and conditions of employment*! (*cf*. Ananaba 1969, Otobo 1983). As one suspects the concern of political unionism theorists is with the level of radicalism not the issue of dispute. Finally, one would have thought the intellectual challenge is not to assert 'the destruction of participating unions' (p. 365), but to explain why a British firm could destroy a representative organization of its employees. As Cohen (1982), Otobo (1983, 1988) and Offiong (1983) have noted, state power was

interlocked with the power of European private capital and readily available to the latter. To move in this analytical direction of course brings politics to the fore, demonstrating the weakness of the political unionism 'paradigm'. The same problem of empiricism underscores the tendency to equate control with open and institutional exercise of power over trade unions (*cf*. Lukes 1974).

As a heuristic devise, the concept of political unionism is a piece of ideology-pretending-to-be-intellectualism. It is difficult to 'measure', for instance, what proportion of time a union leader has to devote to 'political' action before qualifying for the tag. How much of a critique of society-as-it-is will be required before one union is non-political and the other political. Millen's (1963) discussion is shot-through with the same anecdote-laden empiricism, prevalent in most US based discussion of unions around this period (e.g. Galenson 1959a/b and Kassalow 1968). Political unionism thesis is essentially a variant of modernization theory, and 'overt politicization' of industrial relations was identified as a feature of underdevelopment. Since the West experienced a routinization of industrial conflict[11] after an extended period of labour militancy, development is taken as a movement along this linear path. Development is the process of becoming like the West (here the USA), in the best of Dahrendorfian tradition. The emergence of business unionism is suggested as the quintessential model of a modernized society. This process of becoming, defined in naturalistic term, runs through most of US writings.[12] The limitations of this paradigm are too well known to delay us here. That the argument is still being hawked around Nigeria's Industrial Relations scene is a testimony to the crisis of bourgeois academia in Nigeria (*cf*. Adesina 1988, chapt. 1).

The role of unions in nation-building provides a basis for a slightly different perspective. Kassalow sees union capacity to embrace members regardless of ethnic origin as a positive factor in nation-building in a primordially segmented society (1968: 60). The national coverage of union membership allows it to transcend – or at least weaken – primordial ties and loyalties, and promote post- or supra-ethnic consciousness. The history of Nigerian labour movement attests to its being the only national force remarkable for its high degree of freedom from ethnic and religious crisis, if unevenly so. But Kassalow's comment makes *analytical* sense only when we transcend his paradigm, i.e. the centrality of (proto) class relations to a union's frame of reference. Even the most anti-socialist of union leaders premises his/her action on proto-class concerns of their constituency.

Unions and workers in economic development

The role of unions and workers in the economic development, more than the preoccupation with the political has defined most of the literature in this area. For analytical purpose we can identify three main currents. These are (a) labour market formation/labour force commitment, (b) skill and manpower development as inputs into the production process, and (c) the functions of unions as the organized representation of workers in production process (*cf*. Galenson 1959b, Kassalow 1968). In these currents workers are taken either as the objects of economic development, or as subject-actors. This defines the degree of neo-classical commitment on a continuum of pre-Keynesian neo-classicism to Left-Keynesianism.

Most of the literature on labour market and skill formation fall within the neo-classical tradition. Lugard (1918, 1920), Orde-Brown (1967), and Kilby (1969) were concerned with the emergence of a wage labour-force as part of a wider discussion, for their discourses were neo-classical in instinct. In the 1960s the attention shifted more to the provision of the necessary skill for the development process (*cf*. Yesufu (ed.) 1969, Kilby 1969). The concern was not so much with workers as subject-actors but as objects of planning. Workers enter the consciousness of the development planner as factors of production. This is against the strident defence of the centrality of (bourgeois) economic development as the *raison d'être* of the state (*cf*. Yesufu 1966). The position of trade unions, however, presented a sinister dilemma. As Fashoyin puts it;

> Because many of the developing countries depend heavily on a small though crucial industrial sector, the role of workers, especially when they organize, in the growth of the sector, is very important. A relatively small strike can have a damaging impact on the economy. Besides, the action of the organized workers indirectly affects the conditions

of the unorganized, either in the provision of social services or in the general improvement in living conditions. (1984: 2)

This dilemma at the heart of liberal/neo-classical paradigm is what Gladstone (1978: 1) calls the 'preordained and inescapable' role of workers/unions. Unions by their very existence are bound to affect economic performance, and by extension, the development process of their countries. This is one step removed from the original debate popularized by de Schweinitz's 1959 paper.[13] The dilemma was posed in terms of the Keynesian conception of investment and consumption as binary opposites. De Schweinitz sought to demonstrate the substance of this dilemma in history. Development in the Western hemisphere and the Soviet Union suggests a negative correlation – if not a casual relationship – between union militancy, for improved wages, etc., and rapid economic development. Alternately, rapid economic development took place in the absence of improved conditions of employment. This binary opposition between improved social consumption and economic development became the paradigmatic primitive. Managing the dilemma (danger?) posed by existing Third World unions became the only area of contention. Resolving this dilemma divided the writers into the neo-classical or (Left) Keynesian camps. Interestingly, the consensus remains in spite of the doubts cast on the empirical and analytical assumptions of de Schweinitz's thesis (*cf.* Freeman, 1960, Caire, 1977).

Yesufu (1966) resolved the dilemma in terms of civil society's subordination to the state while the latter gets on with the business of economic development. Dunlop had earlier made the case for not having unions at all – or delaying their formation for the duration of moving from the take-off stage to that of self-sustained growth (cited in Caire 1977: 31, fn. 2). While Yesufu's argument was made over two decades ago, the position is returning into prominence (*cf.* Damachi 1985, 1988, Damachi and Fashoyin 1986)). Since unions cannot be wished away they are now requested to subordinate their demands of improved employment and social conditions to the agenda of 'national' economic growth. This can be in the form of increasing subordination of their demands of improved employment and social conditions to the agenda of 'national' economic growth. This can be in the form of increased participation in corporatist structures of the state: what Damachi commends to us as tripartism (1988: 20–1). As in Dunlop's argument, unions and workers should suspend their demands for wage rises for the time being.

This falls short of Asoka Mehta's (1957) neo-Keynesian prescription. Unions are to be incorporated into administering social welfare as compensation for their abandonment of their role of representing workers. A less strident variant of the corporatist solution involves unions conforming to the incoming guidelines set by the state, without asking unions to, *a priori*, abandon their members (*cf.* Fashoyin 1988b). The objective is a more limited one of restraining inflation.[14] Either way the subordination of unions is required: 'that the unions exert self restraint in their demand for wage increases' (Sturmthal 1960: 203).

Within the mainstream liberal-Keynesian current, the corporatist solution poses a few dilemmas. The first dilemma concerns unions' principal role of 'representing the interest of its members . . . by seeking higher wages and fringe benefits' (Galenson, 1959b: 12); an essentially market definition. Asking unions to play the role of subordinate-factor in the development process violates its *raison d'être* and limits the workers' market position as 'consumers'. In any case, consumptionism is not by itself counter-productive (*cf.* Freeman 1960, Sturmthal 1960, Kassalow 1968).

The second dilemma is one of prudence. To ask 'democratic' unions to abandon their consumptionist role may undermine the overall objective of US foreign policy: asserting US imperial hegemony by keeping the communists at bay. Militant unions will seize the ideological middle ground and displaced pro-US 'responsible' union leaders (Galenson 1959b: 13). Sturmthal and Kassalow were at one with Galenson on this.

Finally, Dunlop's option of suppressing unions did not make historical sense. 'Permanent suppression of unions,' Galenson points out, 'has not been achieved' (p. 14). That only leaves us in a Catch-22 situation and with more dilemmas. The solution, Galenson tells us, is modern 'creative statesmanship' (ibid.). State functionaries should encourage the moderate unionist, 'augment trade union stability', allow unions to perform (*à la* Mehta). '[A]bove all . . . accept

the principle of collective bargaining' (pp. 14–15). Sturmthal (1960: 204) admonished us all to moderate our dreams of economic development and settle for some middle-ground compromise of reduced economic growth for union gains. At other times, unions should delay their demands for (national) economic goals. While not totally resolving the problem it allows us to live with our disappointment. '[A] great many social problems', Galenson argues, 'cannot be resolved in any clear-cut manner . . . but may be reduced in their acuity to a degree that make tolerable our failure to solve them fundamentally' (ibid.). Kassalow (1968) went further by suggesting that 'drawing unions and union leaders into a process of planning . . . should help to divert or sublimate union concentration on wage increases' (p. 70). Here, union members are conceptualized as mere extensions of their leaders!

One of Galenson's suggestions which has found fertile soil in Nigeria is the role of collective bargaining as a tool of economic development. This has recently been pushed by Fashoyin (1983, 1984). Working from the Webb's definition of a trade union's role as a more permanent organization for 'maintaining or improving the conditions of [its members] *working lives*', (cited in Fashoyin 1984: 6), Fashoyin defines the union's role in terms of workplace concerns, hence the primacy of collective bargaining allows the individual management to consider the implication of granted wage increase for profitability. Neo-classicism, it seems, is in the liberal pluralist subconscious. While making a pluralist case for tolerating trade unions, this was conditional on union abstention from 'politics'. Fashoyin justified this on personal moral grounds (p. 11) as the obviously reasonable thing to do. Personal moral preferences – apart from the obvious regurgitation of the British Industrial Relations liberal pluralists – is essentially arbitrary and often irrational. This is discussed further below.

The neo-classical (counter-revolutionary) revival remains at present largely disparately expressed. It is more in practice than in theoretical discourse. This is partly because neo-classical economists consider labour as a factor-of-production. It therefore requires no more mention than other factors. However, Professor Ukandi Damachi's Presidential Address to the First Africa Regional Conference on Industrial Relations (1988) represents a hesitant projection of the neo-classical counter-revolutionary position. The attempt, to have an academic conference ratify the dismantling of the national public sector union remuneration system,[15] was argued for on the basis of a return to local government and state governments' ability to pay. This was essentially a return to the free market operation of the price of labour (-power). The idea of dismantling the machineries of collective bargaining from the shop-floor was muted by Nigeria's President in his 1989 budget speech. In the 1991 budget speech, it became public policy, however.

The liberal-bourgeois perspectives: a critique
A central theme cutting across the literature surveyed in this section is a general de-centering of production. In spite of the use of productionist categories, the shared problems of different branches of bourgeois economics is the limited or non-comprehension of the locus of, and the historical specificity of, the capitalist (mode of) production. This should have been the starting point of a quest for worker-union roles in development. Analysis rooted in the origin of value, and the value relations imminent in work or at the point of production, will not only emphasize the historic distinction of labour and labour power but the origin of class relations and class conflict. What the liberal-bourgeois analyses deal with are the epiphenomenal reflections of the hidden abode of capitalism (*cf.* Adesina in press). This is the starting point for highlighting the limitations of these perspectives. A failure to locate the 'wealth of nations' in the appropriation of surplus-value of the workers is central to the assumption that improved wage (consumption) diminishes the stock of investment fund. The rise of 'kleptocracy', the massive proportion of national revenue diverted to private pockets, huge capital to transnationals through repatriation, over-invoicing, undelivered services, etc., gives lie to this neo-Keynesian position. Most stolen national revenue can hardly constitute primitive accumulation since it is repatriated or goes into financing externally sourced consumption.

Second, the class struggle that unions in contradictory terms express is seen only in functional–dysfunctional terms. There is no recognition that society is not a homogeneous entity with obvious supra-sectional interests. Since these writers share the modernization

instinct, what we end up with is the abstraction away of the very problematic nature of the 'modernizing elites'. Yet this is crucial to the source and nature of the Nigerian socio-economic and political crisis. The dominant class bloc has not behaved in the ways outlined for it by the modernization theorists.

Third, the advocates of collective bargaining or tripartism as the vehicle of the union leadership's role in development are in a minor though mortal analytical danger. Union members are not synonymous with their leaders. The experience in Nigeria is that shop-floor workers will veer out on their own and the union leader may risk his or her position (*cf.* Adesina in press). Furthermore, the idea of collective bargaining as truncated 'politics of production' is not properly appreciated. What collective bargaining deals with is a stifled form of value relations, i.e. excluding issues of 'management prerogative' and consultative items. Collective bargaining can only deal with the *alienated expression* of the contradiction between capital and the bearer of labour-power. This is given in (a) the contradiction between the concrete expression of labour and abstract labour, (b) the subordination of concrete labour to the logic of abstract labour under capitalism, and its expression in the authoritarian character of work.

Finally, even within the liberal-pluralist paradigm it is illogical to assume that it is wrong for worker/union pressure groups' behaviour to become political. Neither Sidney nor Beatrice Webb, Fabians that they were, would suggest that unions be confined to the workplace or the collective bargaining table. Social concern was central to their discourse, even when some of their theoretical 'inheritors' would rather not speak in such terms (*cf.* Hyman 1987). It is, therefore, absurd to argue that unions should not engage in politics, even if politics is what politicians do. The moral preference for union abstention from politics is, therefore, irrational and arbitrary, with no analytical basis.

Concluding Remarks

I have surveyed the literature on workers' and unions' roles in the development process by drawing a distinction between the Left and the liberal bourgeois perspectives. I end this contribution by putting forward five tentative bases, and new openings, for a socialist paradigm for this aspect of African development.

First is the re-centering of production. This does not involve, however, a retreat to the factory or the village farm. We need to conceptualize production here not in productionist terms but as the *production and reproduction of social life*, in all its diverse forms.

Second, while the LAT exaggerates intra-dominated bloc segmentation, it would be naïve to brush such differences aside. This segmentation may indeed become the basis of intra-dominated bloc antagonism, and requires further elaboration.[16]

Third, that we need to take on board the many faces of social life: class, ethnicity, gender, religion, etc. This is not to suggest that we are dealing with analytical equivalents. In the same way the concepts of lower levels of abstraction mediate, not displace, concepts of higher levels, so also do relations and identities of lower level mediate those of higher levels. While class relation remains the most fundamental, it is not always the most potent or dominant form of articulated constituency of interest. Class relations can also take on strong racial/national forms. In using this as the basis of a renewed popular social history and social enquiry we are better able to grasp the limits of an exclusive working-class constituency for social action and the strength of a broad based struggle. I am not suggesting a paradigm of rainbow alliance nor its politics. Class analysis and politics remain the most promising basis for a renewed socialist agenda. In any case a socialist society cannot wish away gender or nationality issues, they have to be understood and confronted.

Fourth is the need to focus specifically on gender segmentation within the working class. Its neglect is both counter productive and unprogressive. Domination and exploitation of the subordinate social bloc does not preclude internal exploitation and domination. There is the need to take on board and confront different forms of oppression.

Fifth, we need to confront the nature of the socialist society envisaged. What will be the nature of political practice? The question of *socialist plurality*, the position of the working class or the peasantry etc., need to be raised afresh. It is one thing to talk of a society in which workers are in theoretical control, it is another to recognize the dangers of bureaucratic domination of civil society and stifling of autonomous popular socialist aspiration. For

some of these issues, there are no answers outside of practice, but recognizing them facilitates identifying the dilemma in the socialist working paradigm and overcoming them. We require, in Gramscian terms, pessimism of the intelligence, and optimism of the will.

At the level of practice, the imperative of the socialist project seems to me more urgent today than at any previous time. Perhaps wrongly, I am increasingly pessimistic of even the possibility of a capitalist development in Nigeria – and the continent. The current economic and socio-political crisis in Africa involves a reversal in many areas of even the minimal gains of the past decades. While the discussion of capitalist development (*cf.* Phillip 1977, Fine 1978, Taylor 1979) focussed on the growth of the capitalist mode of production, it is clearer now that planning capitalist production outfits in the Third World does not amount to its capitalist development. One has to think in terms of the capacity for capitalism, within the framework of the nation-state, to reproduce itself autonomously. Turning nation-states into the territorial extension of *transnational capital* does not guarantee that kind of reproduction. The prospect of the Nigerian capitalist class evolving this form of auto-kinetic (not autarkic) capitalism is in doubt. What we are left with is paying the political and socio-economic costs of stunted peripheral capitalism. Even if capitalist development were possible, I am less inclined to line up behind the 'bloody minded' cost that it requires in socio-political terms.

I am also least persuaded that the collapse of East European neo-Stalinist socialism translates into the irrelevance of Marx's paradigm or the socialist project. The Western intellectual environment of the 1950s and early 1960s involved the same claim of irrelevance, end of ideology, etc. only for the pundits to swallow their words in the 1970s. The resurgence of US led imperialism and the decimation of the Sub-Saharan socio-economic and cultural land-scapes will generate their own antithesis. The imperatives of freedom, economic, cultural and political sovereignty – devoid of gun boat diplomacy and IMF/World Bank supervision – will make urgent the analysis of contemporary social relations, and the outlines of the society we desire.

In talking of new openings in the study of Africa's development we have to remind ourselves that development is (conscious) social intervention on whose terrain there are no neutral grounds. Our analyses and action commit us to the side of our people or that of their dominators!

Notes

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[1] These were later published with other essays as *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa*, 1973a (all references to this volume).

[2] His more sensitive discussion of 'spontaneity', however, reveals some ambiguity in his perception of workers.

[3] The Tables only reflect the basic salary. This grossly under-estimates the differentials between the various groups when we consider that the bulk of managerial remuneration (public or private sector) comes from perks, allowances, provision of official accommodation, vehicle, generous entertainment allowances, etc.; the differentials then become quite massive. See my *State-capital and Labour in Nigeria's Oil Industry*, and *Labour in Nigeria's Development Process: Beyond Conventional Wisdom*, for further discussion of this issue.

[4] *Cf.* Lubeck (1975, 1986), Hinchcliffe (1974), Waterman (1983), Jefferies (1975); Sandbrook (1982) and Onimode (1988).

[5] 'Decentering of production' refers to the abandonment/non-recognition of the mode (or more appropriately, the sphere) of production as defining the modes of appropriation of surplus and reproduction of social life. Instead the preoccupation is with the sphere of circulation and modes of distribution/appropriation. Weberian sociology, like neo-classical and Keynesian economics, has the decentering of production as its defining character.

[6] *Cf.* Poulantzas' (1972) critique of Miliband, and Shivji (1975, 24–6).

[7] Nigeria's sole central labour organization since 1978.

[8] S. O. Z. Ejiofor, General Secretary of the Civil Service Technical Workers Union of Nigeria, as a guest speaker at the Master of Industrial and Labour Relations Seminar (Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria), 20 April 1989.

[9] *Cf.* Berg and Butler (1966), Kassalow (1968), Galenson (ed.) (1959a).

[10] *Cf.* Kassalow (1978), Kassalow and Damachi (ed.) (1978).

[11] At least until the late 1960s and early 1970s when the French, Italian and British workers threw the spanners into the theory machine by 'rediscovering' militant class struggle at the national and plant levels.

[12] See the collection in Galenson (1959a); Millen (1963), Kassalow (1968); Beling (1968).

[13] *Cf.* Caire (1977, ch. 2) for an overview of the argument. De Schweinitz also brought together a number of arguments in vogue at the time.

[14] *Cf.* Berg 1966 for an earlier version of this argument.
[15] National Conference on Uniform Remuneration in the Public Sector, funded by the office of the Secretary to the Federal Military Government, was held in March 1988 at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
[16] Both the World Bank and the Nigerian regime have placed considerable political emphasis on rural-urban segmentation. The urban/rural differential has been used to justify bashing the labour movement in implementing the programme.

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15 Women in Politics & Public Decision-Making

MARIA NZOMO

Introduction

> Progress in the area of political participation for women . . . remains slow. In almost all countries, women have the right to vote on paper, to be eligible for election appointment to public office, and to exercise public functions on equal terms with men at local, national and international levels. In most countries, women participate only marginally at the highest levels of decision making.[1]

> The higher one goes in either party or the state hierarchy, the fewer women there are, and when women are found in policy making and administrative positions, they typically hold 'soft' positions . . .[2]

> . . . a government has yet to stand or fall on its policies towards women.[3]

The principle of equality of men and women, as enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the majority of national constitutions, and numerous international instruments such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), the Covenant on Human Rights (1976), the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) and the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies (1985), provides generally accepted standards of legal equality between men and women. The awareness of those standards among women worldwide was significantly raised during the United Nations Decade for Women (1976–85), although to varying degrees, depending on the region, cultural and educational background of women, and the socio-political climate in the country. With or without the United Nations conventions and declarations on behalf of women, it goes without saying that full and effective participation is a responsibility of all citizens. Effective solutions to international, national and local problems can best be achieved only when citizens can exercise their equal human rights to participate fully in the decision-making process. Indeed, it is imperative that any society that claims to be just, democratic, representative and progressive, must of necessity ensure women's significant presence and participation in the high level public policy decision-making positions. Furthermore, it is now generally accepted that women constitute a key national resource, whose ideas, creative solutions and concern for cohesiveness of the social fabric can help change the quality of life and society at large. But to do that, their participation in public decision-making roles is essential. And yet, despite all the official national and international declarations affirming the legal rights and equality between men and women, everywhere, the latter remain severely discriminated against and deprived of their right to influence decisions determining the present and future of society. Even in the countries with the highest percentages of women in decision-making positions in legislative and executive bodies, such as the Scandinavian countries, the participation of women in the top echelons of private boards, companies and other influential institutions is extremely low. For example, one study notes that even in the highly industrialized countries of the North such as Britain,

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women make only 7 per cent of the senior managers in industry, 5 per cent of the under secretaries in the civil service, 3 per cent of university professors and 2 per cent of Vice Chancellors in British universities. In Australia, in 1989, women occupied 5 out of 35 positions in the Australian Council of Trade Unions, while only one out of 80 members of the Business Council of Australia was a woman. In the USA, there are some 17 per cent women in the legislatures, only 0.5 per cent on the board of corporations that control much of the country's economy and 9 per cent on the executive committees of the American Federation of Labour. Indeed in 1989, only 3 per cent of top American and 8 per cent of top British managers were female. For Europe as a whole there are only 11 per cent women in the top of various establishments (Willis 1991: 5–6).

As of today, there are only eight elected women heads of state or government. While we can be encouraged by the fact that the eighth, the Prime Minister of France, assumed her office in 1991, we should note that the number eight is the largest that has ever existed in history. In fact, there have only been a total of 18 elected women heads of state or government in world history and of these, all but two are still alive. In 1989, less than 4 per cent of the ministerial positions worldwide were occupied by women. In that year, in 90 countries there were no women ministers at all. Most of the women ministers occupied the portfolio 'social affairs', a stereotype in itself. The situation at sub-ministerial decision-making levels in government is, of course, better. If vice-ministers, departmental directors and other higher civil service decision-makers are included, the percentage of women in decision-making rises to an 'impressive' 5 per cent on average (Sellami-Meslem 1991: 2).

The paucity of women in politics and public decision-making positions is therefore a global phenomena. Throughout history, men have monopolized and dominated strategic decision-making positions. Indeed, women who in the past have wielded great political power in their own right were so rare that they have acquired a legendary status. It is also interesting to note that the majority of women who have in recent years held the highest offices of state have initially derived at least part of their political legitimacy from their association with a prominent male politician, for example, Mrs Peron of Argentina, Mrs Bandaranaike of Sri Lanka, Mrs Indira Ghandhi of India, Mrs Corazon Aquino of the Phillipines, and Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan. A few however, such as Margaret Thatcher of Britain, have risen to a position of political prominence despite the absence of such political affiliation.

Women's struggle for gender equity has made some major achievements thus far, but has still many hurdles to overcome. Despite the achievement of universal suffrage, increased education and incomes for women, and greater participation in public life, women everywhere remain marginalized and grossly under-represented in those areas of public life, where important decisions and policies are made. And yet women form at least half of the population of all countries of the world and perform many important productive and reproductive roles. Because of their incidence in the population, women make up at least half of the electorate in all countries. By their numbers, women have the capacity to decide on the political leadership. But women are not elected to political office and very few are put up as candidates. But why is this so? Is it because women do not put themselves forward? Is it because women voters believe that men can represent their interests adequately? Is it because male political leaders see no advantage in making an effort to recruit, and elect women leaders? Presumably, all of these factors are inter-related and must be explored. In an attempt to answer these questions, I will briefly examine some perspectives on barriers to women's participation in public life.

Some Perspectives on Barriers to Women's Participation in Public Roles

Scanning through the literature on women in politics and other public decision-making roles, some dominant factors become apparent in regard to the major barriers women face towards and in top decision-making.

The most important barrier identified in almost all the literature is the socio-cultural system of beliefs and myths, which inform the socialization process and the gendered education and training most men and women are exposed to from childhood. The sex-stereotypes and gender

segregation in employment and allocation of roles in private and public life are primarily a product of the early socialization process, the indoctrination of the societal environment. In this regard, many women's hang-ups and lack of confidence in their ability competently to execute public leadership roles arise from this socialization for subordination. Another aspect of the socio-cultural constraint to women's participation in high level decision-making takes the form of multiple roles. In the African context for example, socio-cultural traditions tend to assume that women's public roles are secondary and are just an additional activity to their 'primary' (domestic) roles. Literature on women is replete with the woes of the 'double day' that working career women have to bear, especially in Africa, where support services are few or absent (Stichter and Parpart 1990, Imam *et al.* 1985, Boserup 1970, and Dorsey *et al.* 1989). Even where support services exist, they do not alter the existing unequal gender division of labour. In other words, socio-cultural attitudes die hard. For example Parpart (1990) notes that given the existing gender division of labour, there are no easy solutions for a woman who wants to succeed in her career: 'Most working women juggle harried schedules – but there are few solutions except the drastic ones of having fewer children or becoming single, separated or divorced in order to reduce time spent on husband-care' (p. 6). Kaufman (1984) shares a similar viewpoint, stating that: 'Even when women have been able to achieve high-pay, high-prestige positions within the professions, the costs of such success have been high. Many have had to give up or delay marriage, family and significant relationships. Those who have not given up family have had to add to their demanding career commitments the major responsibilities of managing home and child-care tasks' (Freeman 1984: 366). In the United States for example, by the age of 40, 90 per cent of executive men have children compared to only 35 per cent of executive women (Willis 1991: 23). A 1987 UN study further notes that even in the rare occasions when a woman has fought her way into a top decision-making position, further barriers are often erected that contribute to disempowering her and eroding her effectiveness in that position. This problem is again explained within the sex-role socialization theory. In this respect, it is argued that because people rely on stereotypes to evaluate observed behaviour, there may be perceived conflict between the behaviour that the high position requires and the behaviour generally expected of women (UN 1987: 35). And because most leadership positions are filled by men who are used to relating to women as mother, sister, daughter or secretary-assistant, many professional male managers may never have had a woman 'boss' as top executive. Moreover, due to the deep rooted traditional beliefs about the subordinate role of women in society, both men and women may find it difficult to accord the top female public decision-maker the respect and cooperation she requires to be effective.

Related to this is the isolation that comes from being the only one or one of the very few highly placed women in senior decision-making capacity. The 1987 UN study cited above notes that 'women are isolated in all high managerial positions, even in those so-called female professions such as nursing. Not only does this "token" managerial status cause loneliness, it can result in decreased effectiveness' (p. 37). Another study (Willis 1991) advances a similar view about the minority behaviour of women in high positions in public life. The study argues that minorities, such as women who are successful in a male world, absorb the dominant culture to such an extent that they tend to disassociate themselves from other women, to under-rate their success and to perceive any discrimination they meet as a result of their own shortcomings. A lone woman in a high office cannot therefore be expected to bring distinctly female values to her office. She therefore suggests that in politics, to effect fundamental change to the dominant male culture, it would require a female *critical mass* of at least 30–35 per cent. Her argument is that if the minimum critical mass of women in politics was attained, this would mean more emphasis on family matters, the environment, equality between the sexes, policies to deal with child care and violence against women, with child care and family issues taking priority (Willis 1991: 5).

In addition to the attitudinal dimensions arising from socio-cultural engineering, lack of access to adequate quality and quantity of formal education in itself acts as a major barrier to a woman's advancement to top decision-making level. Research has shown that the more education a woman has, the more likely she is to be employed. Moreover, women's occupational advancement is more closely linked to their educational attainment than it is for men.

Men use their educational credentials for entry to jobs and then rely on job-related experience for advancement. For women, however, formal credentials remain critical throughout their working lives (Freeman 1984: 238). In political terms therefore, *individual resources* which include education, personal income, age, marital status, number of children, view of the spouse etc. are important determinants for the woman's participation in politics.

Another factor which is viewed as important is *The Political System*, as it can promote or hinder women's political activity. For example, the party structure can impede the participation of women. Information about politics can be disseminated through channels that men have more access to than women and the language of politics can be a decidedly male jargon which appears alien to women. Political ideology can reinforce the traditional division of work by gender, with politics being linked to the activities of men rather than women (Haavio-Mannila *et al.* (eds) 1985: 48).

The second most important barrier arises from the first – namely, the policy and the institutional framework governing the gender division of labour, terms and conditions of employment and promotions. Since men have traditionally dominated policy-making and the institutional structuring, it is the male ideology that is reflected in policy structures and all institutions. This ideology rests on the premise that women are the weaker sex, best suited for the domestic roles of motherhood and housewifery. Public tasks, especially those involving governing and important decision-making, are assumed to be suited for men who possess the appropriate 'natural' credentials for leadership tasks, namely toughness, aggressiveness, decisiveness, risk-taking and self confidence.

In specific reference to women's participation in politics, another barrier cited in addition to the ones discussed above is the lack of adequate amounts of money. The argument is that many women are poor, and even wealthy ones may not be *independently* so. Hence, they may not be able to afford the enormous amounts of money required to fund an electoral campaign. (Willis 1991: 22). The overall argument then being made in much of the literature of this subject is that socio-cultural, economic, political, educational, legal and organizational factors are related to the level of participation of women in political and bureaucratic decision-making positions. Duverger summarizes the constraints to women's political participation appropriately as follows:

> If the majority of women are little attracted to political careers, it is because everything tends to turn them away from them; if they allow politics to remain essentially a man's business, it is because everything is conducive to this belief: tradition, family life, education, religion and literature . . . The small part played by women in politics merely reflects and results from the secondary place to which they are assigned by the customs and attitudes of our society and which their education and training tend to make them accept as the natural order of things. (Duverger 1975: 129 and 130 c.f., Freeman 1984: 402)

Given the existing man-made barriers to women's political participation most of the literature on the subject suggests, as a matter of strategy, the development of a strong women's movement in each country, in an attempt to overcome obstacles to participation. Women need to support and work for each other to overcome systemic discriminations. Even where gender equity policies are in place, women need to monitor their implementation as complete reliance on the goodwill of policy-makers and employers, many of whom are men, may bring some reforms but not fundamental change (Willis 1991: 24).

Bearing in mind the universal barriers to political participation identified and discussed above, we now examine the Kenyan case, under four broad areas of women's participation in public life:

(i)   Parliamentary and party politics
(ii) Women's organizations
(iii) Public employment decision-making
(iv) Trade union movement.

The participation of women in parliamentary and party politics in Kenya

As elsewhere in the world, participation in national politics in Kenya generally requires that one be a member of a recognized political party as well as be eligible to vote and contest

Table 15.1: Membership of Kenya National Assembly by Year of Election and Gender, 1969–1983

| Year of Election | Elected Members | | | | Nominated Members | | | |
| | Male | | Female | | Male | | Female | |
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1969	154	99.35	1	0.65	11	91.67	1	8.33
1974	152	99.82	5	3.18	10	83.33	2	16.67
1979	155	98.10	3	1.90	11	91.67	1	8.33
1983	157	99.37	1	0.63	9	81.82	2	18.18

Source: Supervisors of Elections: Attorney General's Chambers, 1985, also cited in Republic of Kenya (1985), *Women of Kenya,* Nairobi, July, p. 42.

political office. All women of eighteen years and above have been eligible to vote and contest for elective political positions since 1963 when Kenya attained her independence. Kenya African National Union (KANU) has been the ruling party since independence. However, between 1963 and 1969, Kenya had two opposition parties in succession. Following the proscription of KPU in 1969, KANU remained as the only political party, although the constitution of Kenya continued to allow for a multi-party political system until 1982. It was in 1982, that Kenya's constitution was amended to make the country a *de jure* one-party state. Since then, up until December 1991, anyone wishing to vote or contest political office had of necessity to be a member of KANU. At the end of December 1991 President Moi, under heavy internal and external international pressures, had the constitution changed so as to allow multi-party politics and elections. These were held one year later on 29 December 1992.

Many women from the grassroots to the national level were members of KANU, and participated as voters in the national electoral process that takes place approximately every five years. Many studies carried out on electoral politics in Kenya affirm that women are the majority of voters, but very few present themselves as candidates for political office and even fewer succeed in becoming members of parliament. For example, between 1963 and 1969, there was not a single woman as a member of parliament, and the government did not nominate even one token woman as a symbol of affirmative action. In November 1969, the first woman was elected into the National Assembly and one more was nominated to sit in the legislative body, along with eleven male nominated members. Thus, between 1969 and 1974, of the total elected members of parliament, women formed 0.56 per cent and 8 per cent of the nominated members. Except for the period 1974–9, when women's representation improved slightly, the general trend has been one of women's marginalization in political decision-making at the national level and, by implication, lack of inclusion of women's concern in the legislative agenda. Table 15.1 above, details this scenario between 1969 and 1983.

In 1991, out of 188 elected and nominated members of parliament, there were only two women elected MPs, and one nominated woman MP. Of the three women MPs only one sat on the front bench as an assistant minister for Culture and Social Services. Indeed, since 1974, when the first woman was appointed to the front bench, the position of assistant minister is the highest position a woman has ever held in Kenya's National Assembly. Furthermore, there has never been more than one woman holding this post at any time. More significantly, the lone woman assistant minister has consistently been appointed to serve in the Ministry of Culture and Social Services. Within the KANU party hierarchy, women have had even more difficulty participating at the national executive level. Indeed, until 1989, when the KANU secretariat created the position of Director of Women and Youth Affairs, no woman had ever been elected or appointed to any of the national executive positions within the ruling party. Women's involvement in KANU was relegated to that of mere rank and file members or officials of the low-key KANU Women's Wing. Women's representation in the national executive of KANU may, however, increase if the government implements its pledge made to women in February 1990, to the effect that 'the KANU – *Maendeleo ya Wanawake* Organization will *soon* be represented in the party's National Governing Council

and the National Executive Committee' (*The Standard*, 9 February 1990, p. 2). But so far this pledge has not been implemented.

Constraints to Parliamentary/Party Participation

The paucity of women in national political decision-making positions described here is, as pointed out earlier, not unique to Kenya. Indeed, the factors often cited above as constraints for women's political participation globally, namely, socio-cultural attitudes, low levels of education and economic status, are also applicable to Kenya and hence, are not a major focus of the analysis in this chapter. It is my view however, that, in the Kenyan context, the role of the established *male dominated political system (state)* is one of the most critical for participation in parliamentary and party arenas. In addition, the *nature of the women's movement* which I discuss in a subsequent section, is also crucial in understanding the dynamics of women's participation in public life and decision-making in Kenya.

It is common knowledge that in a largely patriarchal world, there are no cases where men have given up without a fight the privileged positions they have historically enjoyed as the authoritative decision-makers in the private and public spheres of their countries. While in the private domestic sphere men may concede sharing some decision-making roles with women, in the public, especially the political arena, the male gender employs every possible strategy to keep women out. This is the situation that prevails in Kenya, whereby, even when a woman surmounts all the typical socio-cultural and economic constraints to participation, she still has to prove herself to be better than the men candidates to gain entry into parliament. And if she does enter parliament, she is likely to be allocated a position of relative powerlessness. Being overwhelmingly outnumbered by men, her loudest voice is treated like a whisper and hence, ignored.

As noted earlier, between 1964 and 1969, there was not a single woman as member of parliament in Kenya. This was not because there were no women who contested parliamentary elections. There were a few; the most notable documented case being of Ruth Habwe, a former chairperson of *Maendeleo ya Wanawake*, who had demonstrated leadership abilities, backed up by a relatively good education. She also had the courage to stand for political elections while other women were still content with being mere voters. She failed to become a member of parliament primarily because the male dominated KANU denied her support. She was consequently suspended from KANU (Wipper 1971(b): 476). Later, the government justified its failure to nominate any woman to parliament by arguing that women were not yet qualified for political office – hardly a convincing excuse, given the fact that the male politicians themselves had just entered political office for the first time. At any event, women were accused of lacking qualities of political leadership. They were, for example, not considered aggressive enough and hence, were depending on the government to allocate them special seats. This caricatured image of women's unfitness to hold decision-making positions has been used repeatedly to keep women powerless and justify the perpetuation of their subordination and exploitation. Indeed some Kenyan politicians have in the past gone as far as blaming the women for their subordinate status. Thus, one Kenyan minister while closing an International Women's seminar found it quite appropriate to tell an all female audience that:

> I am forced to believe that the woman is lazy in her mind. She is too lazy to think. You women think and believe that you are inferior to men. This is what it is all about. It is a psychological problem and 99.9 per cent of women suffer from it. (*Sunday Post*, 25 May 1975: 1; also Nzomo 1987: 123)

To some extent, it may be true that some women do suffer from an inferiority complex, born out of years of socialization for subordination. But it is a gross exaggeration to put the figure at 99.9 per cent. The majority of women in Kenya no longer regard themselves as inferior to men. Indeed, their basic problem is lack of opportunities and access to resources that would improve their status and hence, their capability to compete on an equal basis with men. These opportunities and resources continue to be disproportionately controlled by men, through their domination of the machineries where allocation and distribution is done. The point to be underscored, therefore, is that men employ the outdated socio-cultural excuse as a

ploy for excluding women from political and other public decision-making positions. Ultimately, the objective is to keep women in a subordinate status. As Christine Obbo (1980: 4) has noted: 'the need to control women has always been an important part of male success in African societies'.

Ruth Habwe also advanced a similar explanation for the male resentment to her parliamentary candidature:

> I am aware of the difficulties which men face when they consider the possibility of women gaining positions of influence. They harbour the inevitable fear that men being superior to women, if women reached the same level, they would fall from the exalted stature they have exploited for so long. (*Sunday Post*, 23 August 1964, and Wipper 1971a: 465)

Despite women being the majority of voters in Kenya, they do not sponsor or lobby for fellow women candidates to represent them in parliament. This is in part due to the nature of the women's movement, discussed below. It is also due, in some cases, to male control over their wives's voting preferences. This was particularly the case during the last general election in Kenya, when the 'queue voting' method was employed. A husband could then successfully order his wife and other members of his family *not* to line up behind a female candidate. Mrs Ndetei, one of the elected women members of the previous parliament 1988–92, affirmed this to have been her experience:

> My experience in the field was that a lot of women do not have the final say, especially at home as to whom they should vote for. I had a woman who was badly battered by her husband and she had to run away from him simply because she was going to vote for me . . . I confronted many other cases where women were not free. (*Daily Nation*, 30 April 1988: 6)

The only other elected women MP in the Kenya Parliament 1988–92 echoed Mrs Ndetei's sentiment and summarized her experience as follows:

> If men find it difficult to come to parliament, the women's situation can be explained by paraphrasing a biblical saying, it is easier for an elephant to go through the eye of a needle than for a woman to come to parliament'. (*Daily Nation*, 30 April 1988: 6)

The male politicians' response was merely to dismiss the two women's concerns, by stating that women's representation in Kenyan parliament is good enough (ibid.). Others expressed doubts about Mrs Ndetei's capability to discharge her duties as MP (*The Standard*, 19 April 1988: 11). However, she was re-elected on an opposition party ticket in the multi-party election, December 1992.

While male domination of political, as well as decision-making structures, is generally a major determinant for women's chances of political participation in parliament, it is still the case that very few women present themselves as candidates in Kenya, even though the number increased significantly in the multi-party election, December 1992, where the opposition parties had the larger number of women candidates. Here it needs to be remembered that men also control the political structures for election recruitment, principally the, until recently, only political party – KANU. In this regard solid party or other group support is vital for a potential candidate to feel confident about contesting a parliamentary seat. The paucity of women candidates may also be due to a combination of factors which include: (i) women's multiple roles that consume all their time and energy, (ii) lack of adequate money capital to invest in the election campaign, given that very few women in Kenya are *independently* wealthy, due to the patriarchal system of property ownership, (iii) lack of interest in politics at national level, and (iv) lack of support from an interested group such as the women's organizations. The latter have the potential to form the basis for enhancing women's political participation, if they could overcome some of their structural problems which are discussed below.

Political participation through women's organizations
Although Kenyan women have no cohesive women's movement with a common vision, there are numerous women's organizations, some of them dating back to the colonial era. Given

the fact that the channels for political participation through political parties and other govern-
ment machinery are closed for the majority of women, sex solidarity groups form the major
forum for political expression and participation. Many of these women's organizations,
however, have social welfare as their major objective. But though basically welfarist, these
associations can also be viewed as political, if conceived as 'collective strategies in which
individual women combine resources to cope with changing structures – structures that
increase women's need for cash while disproportionately excluding them from acquiring it
compared to men' (Staudt 1981: 14). Thus far the sex solidarity of women's groups, as they
operate outside the political systems, do not sponsor women candidates to political office,
though they serve as a good training ground for the few women who do participate in
politics. Through their participation in these groups, these elite women receive training in
informal networking, citizenship ethics and character building (Smock 1977: 11).

The most influential national women's organizations such as the Women's Bureau,
KANU–MYWO and National Council of Women of Kenya, by virtue of the role bestowed
upon them are expected to provide leadership and guidance to other women's organizations
affiliated to them. They should indeed spearhead the formation of a cohesive women's move-
ment capable of influencing the national decision-making process and lobbying for women's
representation in the political arena. The fact of the matter in the Kenyan context is that
the national organizations for women have largely been ineffective in empowering women
and in facilitating increased participation of women in public decision-making. The male
dominated political system has succeeded in co-opting the conservative leaders within the
women's organizations, while marginalizing the radical ones. Patricia Stamp argues that this
is not entirely an experience unique to Kenya but is a common phenomenon in African coun-
tries, whereby nationally sponsored women's organizations, such as MYWO, serve as safe
show cases of the government's formal commitment to women's interests and allow them
to co-opt national feminist efforts and ideology (Stamp 1989: 69–70). 'In most cases, the
organizations are deeply divided between the elite women who run them and the alienated
local women who are not served.' (ibid.).

For example, events between 1989 and the present, regarding KANU–MYWO and Pro-
fessor Maathai's 'Green Belt Movement', clearly illustrate the point that national women's
organizations in Kenya are manipulated and politically controlled to enhance and legitimize
the male-dominated status quo. Those women's organizations that are acquiescent are
accorded formal support and made to feel special and powerful in comparison with others.
Further, such acquiescence gives legitimacy to any punitive measures meted out to those
women who challenge the status quo. It is within this context that we should understand
the conduct of the outcome of the first KANU–MYWO national elections held in October
1989 to elect its own officials. The male politicians were officially not supposed to interfere
with the elections. But as it turned out, these elections provided the opportunity for the
key male politicians in the government to ensure that their wives, sisters, etc. captured the
leadership of this women's organization. Despite ordinary women's cries of 'rigging' and 'male
interference', the powerlessness of the majority of women in this organization was once again
affirmed (*Kenya Times*, 31 October 1989: 16). The sentiments expressed in all the three local
daily newspapers were succinctly summarized in *The Weekly Review*:

> From the very beginning, whether we were dealing with simple problems of an election
> time-table or the eligibility of those who should vote, the plain fact has been that Kenya
> women have little or no say in what the election process was all about. In fact, the original
> idea of merging MYWO with the ruling party was not taken by women but men
> leaders in the ruling party. Since then, women have become mere pawns in a political
> game that is aimed at benefiting the male player . . . Women in Kenya are in danger of
> becoming appendages of men, with their fate determined by men with little or no reference
> to women. (*The Weekly Review*, 3 November 1989: 1)

Despite the blatant interference by male politicians in these elections, the government con-
gratulated the women of KANU–MYWO for successfully conducting their own elections
and assured them of a hegemonic position *vis-à-vis* women's organizations. The recent KANU
national Chairman, Peter Oloo Aringo assured the women leaders that: 'KANU–MYWO

would remain supreme on matters relating to women's development to avoid conflicts and duplication on duties among women leaders and KANU–MYWO officials' (*The Standard*, 9 February 1990: 2). He further promised them that KANU would appoint two KANU–MYWO representatives to serve at the governing council and National Executive of the Party.[4] Another government minister went as far as sounding an alarm on his male colleagues, to the effect that the KANU–MYWO women could now grab power from the men any time:

> I will strongly advise my parliamentary colleagues to be aware that women in *Maendeleo ya Wanawake* Organization will soon be standing against them in the next elections. We (men) should be aware that we are sitting on a time-bomb that can explode any time . . . Where women had been in position of leadership, they were known to be hard, decisive and very difficult to deal with. (*Professional Lady*, December 1989–January 1990: 14)

These statements about women's power need to be taken cautiously, as they could make women develop a false sense of power and hence, complacency, thus deflecting them from struggling for substantive influence in decision-making positions in parties and in government. KANU–MYWO, for example, should insist that the party honour its 1990 pledge for the latter's representation on the governing and executive positions in KANU – even though the link between MYWO and KANU has now been cut. In this connection, Wipper has stressed the fact that male politicians are not keen on sharing power with women and hence, 'the promise of women's representation in the decision-making positions of KANU, may never materialize, unless women themselves push for it'.

> as practising politicians bent on keeping themselves in power, they were not about to allocate resources needed for other goals to a group seen as powerless, and hence, of no immediate threat to their positions . . . Their tactics – ceremonial affirmation, tokenism, verbal ploys, and promoting the conservative elements – have apparently subdued a potentially disruptive movement. (Wipper 1971b: 468–79, and 1975: 112)

Furthermore, the strategy of focussing support on one or two women's organizations and denying it to others, is likely to weaken and further fragment an already divided and fragile women's movement in Kenya. The conflicts and rivalries that have been so common among the leadership of the national women's organizations are likely to increase, thus, postponing indefinitely the development of a relatively cohesive women's movement that could form the basis of effective women's participation in public decision-making.

The experience of Maathai and her Green Belt Movement, especially during her 1989/90 confrontation with the government over an environmental issue, further affirms that Kenyan politicians are not receptive to criticism, especially from a woman who challenges state decisions. Unlike in the past, where Maathai had challenged the state and society on issues of gender equity and social justice, in 1989, she was opposing the government's decision to build a skyscraper in the middle of one of the largest recreational parks in the middle of the city of Nairobi. Her opposition was based on a genuine environmental concern that clearly cut across gender, class or race. But when she decided to seek a high court injunction to restrain the government from implementing its decision, the entire membership of parliament descended upon her, attacking her personally as a 'sentimental, frustrated divorcee' who has no credentials or mandate to challenge a state decision. What was a *national* issue was then reduced to a *personal*, gender issue between Maathai and male members of the political system. Significantly, there were no women who came out openly in support of Maathai's crusade. Indeed, some women's groups affiliated to KANU–MYWO held a demonstration to condemn and to disassociate themselves from her action (*Daily Nation*, 15 December 1989). This show of disassociation, coming from fellow women, gave legitimacy to the punitive measures that were then meted out to Maathai and her Green Belt Movement (*Daily Nation*, 15 December 1989 and 9 January 1990). The only solid show of support for Maathai came from international environmentalists and the external donors of the building project who vindicated her by refusing to fund it (*African Business*, March 1990: 49). It seems therefore, that, while the merger of MYWO into KANU has enhanced state support by the large female constituency under *Maendeleo*, it has also facilitated the disempowerment of other

women's organization, especially those that have a record or history of militancy within their leadership rank, such as the NCWK and the Green Belt Movement.

In general, therefore, while women in Kenya are highly mobilized into groups, their effectiveness at the national level is minimal. They remain marginalized and unable to penetrate high levels of power and central decision-making. On this score, I share the view of Parpart and Staudt, that: 'While organizational affiliation is high among women, their gains from pressurising states have been minimal.' (Staudt and Parpart 1989: 1). Indeed, as other studies have shown, the typical response to women's policy issues by African governments in general is to scapegoat them, by deriding and punishing pregnant school girls, castigating women prostitutes for ruining the moral fabrics of society and stigmatizing women who are divorced and/or are single parents for having lost sight of African customs (Staudt 1981: 9–10; c.f. Nzomo 1987 and 1991a & b).

That women's groups and organizations have failed to make an impact on the national political decision-making arena is best exemplified by their passivity on issues and policies that directly affect their status and welfare. Examples include: (i) the abolition in 1969 of the *Affiliation Act* that required fathers of illegitimate children to provide some financial support to their offsprings (*East African Standard*, 17, 18, 19 June 1969); (ii) the *Law of Marriage and Divorce Bill*, which has twice come up for debate in parliament and been defeated by the male dominated parliament, without any significant protest from women; (iii) the retention of the law that continues to deny housing allowance to married women in public service; and (iv) lack of provision for paid maternity leave (Ghutto 1976: 53). Other gender issues for Kenyan women failed to respond include: (i) the 1986 government directive that women teacher trainees who got pregnant refund government money spent on their education, (ii) the 1987 Wambui Otieno's protracted legal battle, seeking to be granted the right to bury her dead husband (*Daily Nation*, May 1987, and *Viva*, June 1987: June 1987: 16–17 and 36). The latter case presented a good opportunity that Kenyan women could have seized to insist on the harmonization of Kenyan laws, into one set of laws, to avoid future manipulation of the now contradictory customary and common laws that are conveniently used to victimize women. Significantly, it was only Wangari Maathai who came out forthrightly in support of Otieno's case. Wambui, however, did not reciprocate in 1989, when Maathai was herself under siege over the environmental case cited earlier. Another issue that the women of Kenya, especially the women MPs, could have proposed improvement in, is the government's meagre financial allocation to women's programmes, many of which have failed to take off due to lack of adequate financial and technical inputs. In this context, it is significant to note that between 1978 and 1982, the government allocated to women's programmes the equivalent of 0.1 per cent of total government expenditure. In the meantime, the government's grants to women's groups have continued to drop significantly from K.Sh 3.3 million in 1986, to K.Sh 2.6 million shillings in 1987 and to K.Sh 1.7 million in 1989 (Nzomo 1989: 15, and *Economic Survey*, 1990: 181).

It is apparent from the above analysis that the political environment in which women's organizations operate is a major constraint to their effectiveness. In addition, the constitutions upon which these organizations are based do not permit them to engage or get involved in matters deemed to be political. This further constrains their political participation. This was the reason cited for MYWO's failure to sponsor women candidates to elective political positions:

We at Maendeleo would like to actively support all the women candidates we feel deserve to go to parliament. But as Maendeleo (MYWO), we are non-political and cannot therefore, be involved. I can only support candidates as an individual and my lone vote cannot do much.' (*The Standard*, 16 September 1983: 12–13; see also, Nzomo 1987: 124, and 1989: 15)

The ineffectiveness of women's attempts at political participation under the umbrella of national organizations should not be construed to mean that women of Kenya have not been active political participants at other levels or on other issues both in the past and present. Women in Kenya often employ informal channels of political expression. First, as noted earlier, sex solidarity groups are used to achieve socio-economic needs that women fail to

obtain through the formal political mechanisms. Secondly, women at the grassroots have a long history of political participation, dating back to the pre-colonial era. In the colonial era for instance, women actively participated alongside men in the struggle for political independence. While some women went with men to the forest to fight colonial armies, others provided strategic back-up as food and accommodation providers for those fighting in the forests, and yet others converted their homes into armouries for storing guns smuggled from the colonizers. For women as for men, the major issues then were national political liberation and the creation of a democratic society. The latter, at the level of gender and class, has yet to be attained.

Furthermore, in the post-colonial era, despite the socio-economic and political constraints already noted, a few courageous women have kept the fire burning, acting as it were as the voices of the silent majority. For example, Wangari Maathai's persistent and courageous crusade for women's rights, social justice and environmental conservation is recognized internationally, as evidenced by the many prestigious awards she has received in recent years. Such courageous women need moral support not isolation, by all persons committed to social justice and gender equity.

In addition to the scattered voices of protest from individual women, a few women's groups have devised ways of converting their group power into political power which they efficiently utilize to extract resources out of male politicians, in return for political support. A good example is women's groups in Kiambu District of Kenya, where one study has shown that the *harambee* movement has become the focus of reciprocal support between the women's groups and the local MP. The study explains that in some constituencies in that district,

> The decision of a group of women to 'get up and dance' for a candidate means that they intend to vote for the person in question. This is how these women express their political preferences. (Economic Commission for Africa 1972, cited in Wamalwa 1987: 8)

In some cases, however, it is difficult to assess the extent to which women are benefiting, in the course of trading favours with male politicians, and the extent to which they are being used to achieve broader political goals of a local MP (*Viva*, December 1989: 25 and 38).

Women's participation in public employment decision-making

In Africa, the concept of 'housewife' is a misnomer as there are extremely few women (if any) whose sole activity is confined to the private/domestic sphere alone. Most women, including middle-class women, play many diverse public roles, in addition to the domestic ones. The problem, however, is that many of these roles, be they in the waged 'modern' sector or the non-waged sectors, are undervalued and highly marginalized. In other words, the majority of women in Africa actively participate in the public and private sectors of their economies and contribute significantly to the GNPs, but without the benefit of decision-making power.

In Kenya, a 1988 study showed that between 1967 and 1984, 80 per cent of all women in formal employment were concentrated in two fields, namely, agriculture and services. Even there, women were concentrated in low-paying, routine and unskilled activities. Thus, for example, by 1982, 93 per cent of all persons engaged in secretarial work were women (Zeleza 1988: 60). Indeed, only 20 per cent of women in Kenya are employed in the formal sector. The rest of the women are either small-scale agriculturalists or making a living in the ubiquitous informal sector. The latter is the melting pot of all women who cannot find employment opportunities elsewhere.

I have argued elsewhere that, what position women occupy and what role and status women are accorded in contemporary Africa is to a significant extent determined by the quantity and quality of formal education they have access to. Indeed, that women remain underprivileged and underrepresented in all important decision-making positions in African society is primarily a function of the institutionalized and structural bias in the educational system, which ensures that the amount and type of education made accessible to the majority of women is inappropriate and/or inadequate for participating or occupying hegemonic positions in public life (Nzomo 1987: 188). This argument remains valid as there are many

problems to be overcome before sexism in the curricula and gender equity in education can finally be achieved. However, it is no longer true in 1991 to argue that there are no qualified women to occupy key decision-making positions. Although there are relatively fewer women than men with high level education, significant progress has been made. In 1989 for example, about 30 per cent of the students who completed the sixth year of high school were female and almost the same percentage qualified for admission to one of the four public universities in Kenya (Republic of Kenya 1990: 74). The problem therefore, goes beyond the amount of education females have obtained. It appears that there are certain subtle barriers in the employment structure that discriminate against women, despite the level of their education especially in jobs that carry power and authority. To redress this trend, it would require among other things deliberate affirmative action on the part of the government.

The presidential appointment of a number of women to some key decision-making positions, starting from the early 1980s, is an example of affirmative action. Thus, the first woman judge of the high court was appointed in 1982, the second one in 1986 and the third in 1991. In 1983, two women were appointed to head public parastatal organizations and at least fifteen others were appointed in 1986, seven as heads and eight as members of boards of parastatal bodies (*Daily Nation*, 17 January 1986: 1). During the same year (1986) President Moi also appointed two women to senior diplomatic positions. One was appointed to become the first woman High Commissioner in charge of Kenya's Mission in Britain. The second one was appointed as Kenya's Representative to the Nairobi based United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), replacing another who had earlier resigned from this post. And in 1987, the president appointed the first ever woman Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (*Daily Nation*, 2 June 1987: 1).

There is no doubt that the positions listed above, to which women were appointed, carry authority and decision-making power. What is in doubt is whether the women appointees have used these decision-making platforms to influence national policies in a manner that benefit other women who have no such platform. It appears that many of them have not. There is no evidence that these women for example, have even attempted to appeal to the government to remove the many legislations that discriminate against women on such issues as property ownership, employment, inheritance, marriage and divorce. The increasing violence against women, including numerous cases of child rape, is an issue one would have expected women in positions of authority to speak out about and to insist that the law be changed to make rape a capital crime and not a minor offence, as is currently the case. Perhaps, the only time in recent years that women leaders have publicly come forward and taken a position on a national issue with a gender dimension, was on the St Kizito tragedy where a large number of school girls were victims. Significantly, the St Kizito murder and rape cases received condemnation from a wide cross-section of the Kenyan society, although without due attention being given to the gender dimension of the rapes and the broader issue of violence against women. Therefore, women leaders should go a step further and seize the opportunity presented by the Kizito case and insist that relevant laws be amended or created to ensure protection of women against violence by men. They should also initiate training programmes to sensitize the public on gender issues and the merits of gender equity.

Understandably, women in top decision-making positions in Kenya, as elsewhere, remain few and their minority status impinges on their effectiveness. But there should be some indication that they are at least making some attempts to initiate change, however modest. The situation at present, however, suggests that individual women in public decision-making roles have not significantly influenced social change in favour of the majority of disadvantaged women in Kenya.

We have noted from the preceding analysis the paucity and marginalization of women in parliamentary and party politics, their disempowerment within women's groups, and their passivity in public executive roles. The only other potential channel of political expression and participation would seem to be the Trade Union movement, in which, as I explain below, women's performance has been dismal.

Women in the trade union movement
Kenya had at least 33 trade unions by 1988. Women's membership in trade unions has always been low. In at least four unions there was no female membership by 1985. Even in the

few unions where women's membership was relatively high (up to 30 per cent of total membership) women do not hold leadership and/or decision-making positions. Zeleza summarizes this situation:

> . . . if women's share of trade union membership was low, their presentation in national trade union leadership positions was pathetic. In 1985/86 women took a mere 3.1 per cent of trade union positions, up from 2.1 per cent in 1970 . . . of the 33 unions on the register in 1985, 17 had never had a woman on their executive board at least since 1970. (Zeleza, 1988: 129 and 131)

Zeleza's study clearly shows that because of the low representation of women in the trade unions and decision-making positions therein, females have been unable to challenge the many forms of discrimination and harassment they encounter in the area of employment. And not surprisingly, male trade union leaders ignore or belittle the employment issues of specific concern to women, such as sexual harassment, promotion, housing allowance and time off (Zeleza, 1988: 126). The sex-stereotyped attitudes of men towards women's leadership have been a major barrier to women's participation in executive positions in trade unions. Zeleza's study notes that when a group of Kenyan male trade unionists were asked in a 1986 interview whether they could elect a woman to the highest position (of Secretary General) of the national umbrella organization of all trade unions, their response was typically sexist.

> . . . the question caused laughter. Some of the men covered their faces in disbelief. But at the same time they agreed that women in the paid labour force had problems which the unions have not handled adequately. In the elections the men did not deem it right to have the 'spare ribs' by their side. (Zeleza, 1988: 132)

This study also suggests that men may not only be blinded by the gendered socio-cultural prejudices that they have internalized, they may also be feeling threatened by the potential power women represent, which, if given institutional legitimacy, could destroy the structure of male dominance (Zeleza: 128). Furthermore, this study confirms the view advanced earlier, in respect to the ineffectiveness of only a few high-ranking women:

> Women trade union leaders were too few to have much impact on trade union policy formulation and implementation. There can be little doubt that the vast majority of women who sought office and got elected were unusually ambitious, dynamic and dedicated individuals who were deeply committed to the trade unionism and the wider struggle for women's equality. But their numbers were struck against them.

It would seem, therefore, that the trade union movement has to date not served as an effective instrument for women's participation in decision-making that affects both their survival and status.

Conclusion

The above analysis has argued that, while women of Kenya participate in public life in various capacities, few of them occupy important political and other public decision-making positions. The few who do are often unable to make an impact, whether in the public sector or in the trade union movement. The women's movement is where Kenya women excel at the level of organizing themselves into groups. Although there are some socio-economic gains that accrue from membership in these groups, these organizations have failed to become an effective lobbying forum capable of sponsoring women candidates to represent them in parliament. In other words, the numerous groups remain divided and lack a common vision and strategy that would enable them to attain unity in diversity, due to the socio-economic factors discussed earlier. However, women's groups in Kenya, especially those engaged in income-generating activities, have received significant publicity in the local media, especially the government owned television network. Though the actual material benefits from women's projects have been minimal and the projects have increased women's workload, the publicity received has given women public visibility and confidence to continue their struggles. Apart from the media, researchers doing studies on gender issues are playing an important role in raising public awareness on the rights and status of women in the country. Kenyan women

researchers, especially those working under the auspices of the Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD) for example, are playing an active role in highlighting and bringing into public focus the different areas of concern, and priorities for Kenyan women that policy-makers should address. In a recent issue of the association's newsletter the major event highlighted was the horrifying incidents of rape victims, many of them young girls under the age of 12 (AAWORD *News Kenya*, 1991: 9, 14, 15). A special issue of the Newsletter focussing on the St Kizito tragedy is to be published soon.

Given the major issues addressed above, the following recommendations are suggested as possible areas where policy and societal interventions could facilitate women's greater participation in politics and public decision-making:

(i) A concerted effort by women to get greater representation by women of their choice at the political decision-making levels. Women must be participants in the legislative body in large enough numbers for their concerns to be heard and be registered on the national development agenda.

(ii) Greater efforts must be made to create unity in diversity between the numerous women's groups. These groups remain weak because they lack a common vision and strategy that would enable them to act in unison, lobbying for change in the policies and structures that perpetuate their subordinate status.

(iii) Training programmes should be created to sensitize the society at large about the linkage between gender equity, development and democracy (Nzomo 1991b). The few women in the media, academia, legal and other professions that have spearheaded the promotion of change at this level need encouragement and support from other women.

(iv) Women in waged employment should seek greater and more effective participation in the trade union movement, in order to influence policy change in the discriminatory employment practices that obstruct their professional advancement.

Notes

[1] Steady, F. C. (1985), 'African Women at End of the Decade', in *African Report*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (March–April), p. 6.
[2] Charlton, E. M. *et al.* (eds) (1989), *Women, the State and Development*. New York: State University of New York Press, p. 187.
[3] Papanek, H. (1977), 'Development Planning for Women', in Wellesley Editorial Committee (eds.) *Women and National Development: The Complexities of Change*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[4] In 1986, the same pledge had been made to women by President Moi. See, *Daily Nation*, 20 February, 1986, pp. 1 and 28.

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16 The State in Tanzania

Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow

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Introduction

Tanzania provides an interesting case study of the state because it offers us an opportunity to compare and assess two processes of social and political developments which are still co-existing and overlapping in many ways. Nyerere, the party chairman, and President Mwinyi find themselves caught up in a political drama, with the new processes assuming their own momentum, challenging the state to redefine itself.

The end of Nyerere's years in the government was scarred by severe economic crisis. From 1979 onwards Tanzania began to experience economic imbalances which reached crisis proportion in the 1980s and punctured the social development that had been achieved in the first and a half decade (1961–78). The economic policies failed to generate growth or development and the ensuing economic crisis eroded the purchasing powers of most social groups, creating immense social and economic insecurities. For instance, real wages fell by 65 per cent from 1974 to 1988 (ILO 1982: 264).

The change in the economic conditions also coincided with changes of leadership. In 1985 a new government under President Ali Hassan Mwinyi came to power and a major re-ordering of the state apparatus occurred. The separation of the party from the government took place, Nyerere became the party chairman and President Mwinyi became the head of the government. This political arrangement introduced a new political discourse and new political arrangements.

The Mwinyi government, faced with a chronic balance-of-payment problem, a budget deficit, debt servicing (which curtailed the state's capacity to expand its development activities), budgetary constraints (which have imposed severe limitations on development projects and on transportation) and the deterioration of social services, especially health and educational facilities, responded by adopting the Economic Recovery Programme in 1986. This programme involved a package of reforms aimed at liberalizing the economy. Measures included a strong devaluation of the shilling, the liberalization of trade, and the encouragement of private, local and foreign capital, producer incentives and market forces. These new reforms have created the conditions for the emergence of various social classes heavily connected with trading activities and business.

These new changes have introduced a different scenario in Tanzania. Different processes and new identities as well as new political alignments are developing. The liberalization policies conflict with the strong statist economy and with the ideology of socialism of the ruling political party, Chama cha Mapinduzi. The separation of the two major state institutions, the government and the party, headed by two different leaders who have different philosophies of development, has created competing political groups and fractionalism in the state. How is the state responding to these new changes and how is the state re-ordering its own political agenda in the light of these changes? How is society re-organizing itself in

relation to these changes? What new state–society patterns are emerging and what do they tell us about the future development of Tanzania?

Literature Review

The state
Without entering into the huge debate on the meaning of the state, it is important never-theless to give some reference to the concept of the state. As a legal concept, the state delineates a territory within which given state institutions/apparatuses have jurisdiction, for example, the monopoly of the use of legitimate violence. It is also a political concept. Territoriality and political authority are the principal criteria of a state. But it is also important to see the state in relation to society. Here Azarya's definition would be fruitful. He defines the state as 'an organization within the society where it co-exists and interacts with other formal and informal organization from families to economic enterprises or religious organiza-tions. It is however distinguished from the myriad of other organizations in seeking predominance over them and in aiming to institute binding rules regarding the other organiza-tions' activities (cited in Bratton 1989). This definition will serve as a working definition. It sees the state as part of the society where it interacts with the different parts of the society, but at the same time, the state stands slightly above the society in the sense that it has to guide the other organizations' activities. In relation to Tanzania, I would include the party and the government, because both have powers, legitimacy and authority and both institu-tions seek to give guidance and directions to the society.

The nation or ethnicity
Another important concept is that of the nation. The concept of a nation involves other factors – such as common language, customs, culture, religion – a common consciousness that its people belong to a specific community which sets them apart from other communities. In many African countries there are multi-nations or multi-ethnic groups and the state reflects this aspect; it is a multi-nations state formation.

The nature of the African state
The development crisis which African countries have been experiencing since the 1980s have forced many social scientists to rethink and reconsider the problem of development from a political dimension. Sandbrook (1985: 38) writing on Africa argues that states are 'over-whelmed by their own incoherence, indiscipline and shrinking fiscal base'. Political variables such as state actions, policies, relations among the political leaders, political traditions or patterns of state structures are now known to have relevance for our understanding of development problems. To this end, a number of studies on the state have emerged with the primary objective of explaining the peculiar problems of development which are being experienced by many African countries. Concepts such as the soft state, the personalistic state and the neo-patrimonial theory of the state, which sees the personal rule of the leader with its strong patron–client ties as the central factor behind the political decay and the failure of the state to provide appropriate conditions for capitalist development, are attempts to under-stand the development of these countries via the state.

The comprador nature of the elite
The peculiar nature of the state is shaped both by historical development and the social classes. Beckmann (1988), while agreeing with concepts such as the soft state and the neo-patrimonial state, argues against the gloom and the picture of decay which is portrayed by many of these writers. Although the class in power uses the state as a mechanism for its class develop-ment through various devices and although it is riddled with internal divisions and ethnic loyalties, nevertheless, he argues that the class in power is also fairly cohesive and integrated through networks of alliances, of links with different associations and groups as well as with foreign capital and aid donors. Despite its comprador functions, it is a national bourgeois class. Beckmann is more optimistic of this class; he sees it as a 'hungry and ambitious class', spurred on by the demands and expectations of vast numbers of dependents, hangers-on,

clients and protégés. They represent a dynamic force, geared to expansion rather than decline (1988: 30).

It is difficult to share Beckmann's optimism. The national bourgeois class in Africa may be geared to its own (individual) consumption-expansion but it is definitely not geared to strengthening the state. We can pose the question: Why has this class not tried to make the state more efficient and the economy more productive so as to ensure its own class reproduction? Indeed, it would seem that this class merely exploits and uses the state to ensure its own individual expansion rather than strengthen its class expansion and reproduction, which would also imply strengthening the state, forcing and enhancing rules and ethos which were conducive for such a development.

This gap is probably filled in by Crook's (1988) analysis of the Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire). Although a patrimonial state subverts organizational goals and values, and undermines the authority of the government, nevertheless in Ivory Coast, Crook found that both economic growth and stability were achieved, rather than the usual story of economic crisis and decay. Crook identifies the following as important factors in the formation of state capacity: the formation of a highly educated elite, improved discipline and the distribution of benefits derived from economic growth to a wide group of important rural and urban social groups. This helped to broaden the basis for the support of the regime and thus enhanced the accountability demanded of administrative agencies as well as to the president. This system created a cohesive *bourgeoisie d'état* with a strong commitment to modernized values and lifestyle and, in this way, the political order created the parameters for administrative effectiveness, according to Crook.

Crook's analysis gives us an understanding of the twin problem of development, that is, the relationship between state formation and class development. It is important that the ruling elite have a stake in the viability of the economy as well as in an efficient state. It would seem to me that the policies of Houphoët-Boigny (and probably of Moi in Kenya) tried to wield together the material benefits and the need for an efficient state so that the interests of the class and of the state can coincide with an efficient administration. The class interest of the *bourgeoisie d'état* would then keep in check divisive tendencies and conflicts (ethnic, religious etc.). Whether this was actually achieved is doubtful, in view of developments after 1988. In Tanzania, socialist policies were instrumental in turning the class that served the state into its victim; then this class used the state merely for plunder and personal gains, rather than for its development as a class conscious of its historical mission.

The retreat of the state
The structural adjustment policies which many African countries have adopted as solutions to the economic crisis have precipitated a debate on the retreat of the state (IDS 1987). It is argued that the privatization that is entailed in many of these policies has meant that the state has had to give up many of its functions and roles to the private sector. But the problem is more complex, and indeed, given the nature of the African economy and society, the state in Africa is an important institution and its retreat to sustainable levels of operation has to go hand in hand with the development of the civil society.

The civil society
As our understanding and disillusionment of the state has become greater, our optimism and interest in the civil society in Africa has grown. Two views prevail. The civil society is seen either as a buffer against the state or as a step towards facilitating state development. In both cases, the civil society must be sufficiently developed. Gramsci described the civil society as an array of educational, religious and associational institutions that guarantee the ideological ascendancy (hegemony) of a ruling class. Here the civil society is viewed as a step towards facilitating state development. But pluralist political scientists also view the civil society as a buffer against the state, where the civil society formulates laws to protect itself, its interests against those of the state.

The concept of a civil society denotes a certain degree of common consciousness and awareness, like Durkheimian collective consciousness. Something which binds together

the society, a common rationality which allows for common rules of the game to be accepted, is required in the making of the civil society. Christianity and the Roman Law gave Western European countries this basic framework, which would allow even opposing and conflicting perspectives to accept certain premises and values as binding.

A recent definition drawn from the experience of Latin America is given by Alfred Stephan (1978), who views the civil society as an arena 'where manifold social movements and civil organizations from all classes attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests.' He distinguishes the institutions of civil society to include, 'neighbourhood associations, women's groups, religious groupings, etc.'.

The civil society in Africa

The concept of the civil society in Africa is highly problematic. Both state and society were artificial entities brought together by the forces of colonialism and the imperatives of the modern economy. More important, the processes were transposed in time, collapsing many multi-ethnic nations and concentrating them into the formation of a state and society, but not transforming them sufficiently. Such a transformation, which would have taken years and probably centuries to evolve and develop, was instead carried out within less than a century. To take an example from European history, in Scandinavia, the Christian religion domesticated Viking culture to the extent that it completely transformed the people's attitudes, behaviour, values etc. This transformation enabled the state to penetrate its own values and create cohesive state–society relations.

In Africa, the civil society lacks a common identity and an awareness of itself; it does not yet have a sufficiently developed collective consciousness. It is not sufficiently developed as a civil society to manage its affairs and become independent of the state. Indeed, the African civil society can only exist because of the state, thus indicating its vulnerability and weakness, leading to the disintegration of the civil society and to civil war, as has happened in Nigeria and Uganda.

Secondly, it is a society still dominated by ethnicity and a strong ethnic consciousness and loyalty which hinders the development of a stronger supra-loyalty. Politics, alliances and many other issues tend to be mediated through ethnicity. I would hesitate to include ethnic associations and ethnicity as part of the definition of the civil society because ethnicity in Africa and in many Third World countries work against the state formation. The particularistic nature of ethnicity is unable to incorporate the common goods or a common rationality which both the state and civil society have to adhere to. Ethnicity also opposes and weakens the state, because the state is composed of multi-ethnic nationalities. As a result of this, I would argue that ethnicity needs to be postulated as an independent variable.

Thirdly, although the state is important for the stability of the (civil) society, the state itself also mirrors the problems within the (civil) society. As Bratton (1989), Skocpol (1985), and Kohli (1986) have argued, we can only understand the state if it is seen in relation to the society, in relation to the 'socio-economic and socio-cultural context' rather than in isolation from the society. The state itself is in a flux, lacking a cohesiveness because of the absence of hegemony. The African state is still characterized by ethnicity, ethnic rivalries and ethnic power struggles. As a result, the African state finds it difficult to impose its hegemony on the civil society; rather the conflicts and ethnic rivalries become reflected and reinforced in the society.

For these reasons, the concept of the civil society either as defined by Gramsci or by the pluralist political scientists do not apply to Africa. Should we therefore reject the concept of the civil society because of its inapplicability to the African scenario or should we accept it, but with modifications, knowing that the conditions that prevail in Africa are historically different from the Western ones but that these differences, while important, can only add to the enrichment of concepts and to our understanding of social processes? I would argue that we should use the concept of civil society because it denotes a teleological vision of the way African societies are developing, especially since, nascent characteristics of civil organizations are already taking place in many of these societies. The concept of development

cannot be totally free from a teleological perspective because development does imply a strong element of human intervention.

I suggest the following modifications. First, the problem of ethnicity should be postulated as an independent variable rather than be incorporated into the concept of the civil society; second, the development of the civil society in Africa should be seen in relation to state-making. The relationship between the state and civil society can take different forms – conflict, cooperation, withdrawal etc. What effect these struggles have and how they are combatting the negative aspects of ethnicity are important for our understanding of how both the state and civil society in Africa are developing and shaping each other. Bratton (1989) has said that we need a view of civil society which can incorporate both engagement and disengagement in its relationship with the state; that is to say, relations can be both congruent as well as conflictual. But the degree of conflicts is important, if the conflicts in civil society are so intense as to undermine the state formation, then we have to question whether such interests should be incorporated into the concept of civil society.

I argue that ethnicity in the manner that it operates in Africa undermines state formation and the civil society. As a result of this argument, I have postulated ethnicity as an independent variable. (If ethnicity is sufficiently domesticated by both the state and civil society, indicating a Gramscian model, then it would be possible to include ethnicity as part of the civil society, but until this is done, I think it will have to be given a separate analytical category because of its centrality.) An interesting phenomena about ethnicity is that it overlaps with both the other two categories, that is, in both the state and civil society. Empirically, therefore it is possible to isolate it and study how it functions in state and civil society relations. This means that we have a triangle – the state, the civil society and ethnicity. The future development of Africa will be fought and determined as a result of the struggles and dialectics between these three categories.

The Nyerere Era

'Who are the components of "the whole?" If you destroy all the individuals by taking away their rights, for whom do you keep the "interests of society as a whole?" The idea that society is an end in itself must have caused the French King to ask: "The State? Who is the State? I am the State!" (J.B. Danquah cited in *Kwame Nkrumah* by T. Peter Omari 1972)

Julius Nyerere, who ruled Tanzania for three decades, created a unique political system in Tanzania, which to a large degree did ensure the country its peace and stability. As head of both the ruling political party (TANU, later *Chama Cha Mapinduzi*), and the government and enjoying immense power under the republican constitution of 1962, Nyerere had the powers and benefits of a parliamentary, presidential and political party supremacy at his disposal. In this respect it was indeed Nyerere's state. But this was not only because of love for personal power or grandeur. An important fact is that Nyerere had to create the state, consolidate it and institutionalize it so that it would give him the tool to develop a political community with a common political culture within a new state formation. This process involved homogenizing the consciousness and identification of a multitude of ethnic identities and moulding these identities into a political culture which accepted the state, its power and its legitimacy.

Early political scientists writing on Tanzania (Tordoff 1967, Pratt 1976) recognized this role of nation-building, of inculcating the citizenry (rights and duties) of that particular state with a sense of loyalty and identification with that state. They recognized the fragility of the African state, because the African state lacked social and political cohesion as a result of its multi-national nature of state formation.

Nyerere's ideas of the state
In the One Party System, Nyerere argues that if there was one party and that party is identified with the nation as a whole, then the foundation of democracy is firmer than it can ever be under a multi-party system which creates factionalism, so that the unity of the nation

is undermined (Bienen 1967: 229). The state is seen as an expression of the unity and general will of the nation, of the people. It represents the organic moral general will of the community whose interests it interprets. Thus, order and unity are paramount. In the One Party System, Nyerere states that '. . . a national movement which is open to all – which is identified with the whole nation – has nothing to fear from discontent of any excluded section of society, for there is then no such section' (cited in Tordoff: 1967 *xvii*). Here the party's objectives becomes synonymous with the nation, representing one people, one country, one nation. Thus Nyerere views the nation not in terms of the heterogeneous interests and divisions that exist, but in terms of homogeneous and common goals, and a people who were bound together by a common political culture, struggle and need.

It is important to pause here. Nyerere appeared to be very suspicious of factionalism and sectarianism, and especially of organized disagreements, which can take the form of a multi-party system or unions. According to Bienen, Nyerere felt that such disagreements could undermine the nation. The corporatist structures he evolved for the political system in Tanzania were meant to enhance order and unity and to eliminate all forms of cleavages – particularistic, pluralist and class – because conflicts and dissensions were viewed as threatening.

The Nyerere state

The unitary political structures which developed to include a One Party System *de jure* and which incorporated diverse groups into its organs were a logical development of this thought. The party channelled group participation and demands along predetermined lines. This gave the Tanzanian state its organic-statist patterns. The role of the state here was to mould the society and direct it towards achieving objectives defined by the state, the state did not play a mediatory role between the social forces and did not negotiate with any groups. Thus in 1961 Nyerere abolished chieftaincy and tribal associations and there was not a murmur from the society. Nyerere's response to Chief Fundikira's request for special consideration to Moslems, a petition presented to parliament in 1963, was met with rebuke. National symbols, the role of the party, the language of Kiswahili, which was taught in schools and became the official language, education, especially secondary education which involved many young people to live in different regions and to be inter-ethnic, were all attempts to break down ethnic barriers and to create a nation. Nyerere hoped to create a strong state which would be sufficiently autonomous both from internal societal pressures and from external ones to enable him to implement policies. Indeed, a highly autonomous state is a state that can act with almost complete independence from societal pressures in formulating and implementing its policies (see Skocpol 1985).

Another important though less studied feature in the Nyerere's state was the type of neo-patrimonial patterns that existed. As head of both the party and the government, Nyerere was able to project his personality, his charisma, his intellectualism, and his policies and influences on to these institutions. Like Nkrumah, Nyerere was 'essentially a politician . . . he was shrewd, his timing was perfect, and his touch sure. He had a rare gift for perception and assimilation, and a good memory' (Omari 1972: 144). These gifts and skills were however facilitated by the neo-patrimonial tendencies that existed within the state. A patron–client relationship existed between Nyerere and his appointees which ensured that Nyerere's policies and his ideas would become projected at all levels of the two administrations and in the society. Nyerere gave greater value to the principle of loyality than to any other principle. Those politicians who carefully adhered to this principle ensured their continuous re-election, irrespective of their competence. Though Nyerere tolerated and even welcomed diverse opinions, nevertheless, his style of governance was exclusionary; he appointed to his cabinet only those persons he knew would implement his policies to the end, irrespective of their consequences to the economy. It was this small group of people that he nurtured throughout the years and who provided a loyal if mediocre leadership. The practice however tended to discourage people (Hayas, Chaggas, Hehe, Coastal) from the more developed regions and who have been exposed to the influences of modernity to compete in such closed politics. As a result, the Nyerere's state enjoyed a cohesive normative structure, a greater focus, coherence and a sense of leadership to undertake drastic changes, which often far surpassed

the capacity of the economy to sustain. We could say that his style of governance was consistent with his view of the state and his political philosophy.

The Arusha Declaration, 1967

The policies of the Arusha Declaration were meant to enhance the powers of the state even further and to make the state strong. This was done in two ways. First, nationalization of local and foreign capital changed the ownership of capital in Tanzania. In 1965 the private sector accounted for 60 per cent of all monetary fixed capital formation, by 1970 its share had fallen under 30 per cent and by 1973 the public sector was responsible for more than three quarters of monetized fixed capital formation (World Bank 1977). This meant that the state was in a strategically important position to exercise a great deal of control over the functioning of the economy and the direction of economic development.

It also meant that there would be no other independent bases of economic and political reproduction other than the state. The government administration, the party structures and the 400 parastatals ensured that the leaders and the middle class became dependent on the state for their reproduction. Secondly, potential pressure groups such as women, youths, students, workers organizations were brought under the control of the party, which became the supreme organ and the institution in the country. This meant that the state could co-opt· domestic dissensions and neutralize any organized lobbying if it so desired. Thirdly, the ideology of socialism stressing equality and egalitarianism was used to legitimize the income distribution, low wages and salaries, the leadership code, nationalization and the policy of *ujamaa vijijini*. All these policies retarded the development of the social classes and tried to homogenize the various ethnic groups. In this way, Nyerere was able to weave together the ideology of socialism, the political structure and the economy, in an attempt to create a strong state and to homogenize the people into a unified political and national culture.

The civil society under Nyerere

The Tanzanian society under Nyerere was basically a peasant society with very strong patrilineal values (Hopkins 1971). It was also not very urbanized. Thus in 1967, only 610,000 of its total population of nearly 11.5 million lived in towns of a population of 10,000 or over. In 1961, the proportion of African civil servants in the middle and senior ranks of the civil service was low, only 26 per cent of the posts were held by citizens. But by 1974, this had increased to over 94 per cent. The urban social classes that existed during this early period were mainly Asians and Arabs, while only 383,000 African workers were in non-agricultural employment. Its per capita annual income was only about $US150, indicating the poverty and low standard of living in which most of the people were living (Mwansasu and Pratt 1979). Nyerere's perceptive analysis of the social classes forced him to conclude that most of the leaders were first-generation members of the middle class and were still well integrated in the peasant society from which they came (cited in Mwansasu and Pratt 1979: 9), and though they 'might dislike the restrictions placed upon their earning opportunities they would not oppose the policies'. This explains the absence of overt opposition to the policies and the relative stability which the country enjoyed.

But at the same time, Nyerere's policies suppressed the development of the middle classes. The impact of nationalization discouraged savings and investments, especially by the Asian commercial class. Many embarked on conspicuous consumption. Once the Asian community, which was the first tier of middle-class strata in Tanzania and comprised dynamic groups of artisans, shopkeepers, clerks and accountants, was undermined, it retreated back to its closed communities and communal ties, engaged in its own economy of affection. Many migrated to Europe. The Tanzanian Leadership Code discouraged the development of entrepreneurship among the educated Africans. The lack of alternative employment in the private sector made politics and public service a permanent occupation and increased the dependence of the first-generation middle class on the state.

The party's commanding control over society demobilized the people and discouraged any independent organizations or associations that could act as pressure groups, or lobby for some specific politics or policies. In the rural areas, the massive policies and institutional changes ranging from mobilization, enforced communalization, physical destruction and relocation of peasants homes, enforced settlements, the disorganization of marketing, the

collapse of internal trade, and the scarcity of basic consumer goods. All this undermined the development of an emergent and middle-level peasant community and peasants sank back into the security of the economies of affection and subsistence.

In this environment of sweeping policies and social transformation punctuated by crisis and shortages of basic necessities and comforts, peace and stability prevailed only because of the absence of powerful classes (Mwansasu and Pratt 1979, Bienen 1967, Hopkins 1971). Thus at one level, it would be possible to argue that Nyerere's ideas were in tune with the spirit of the times. People were able to identify and accept his moral precepts because their class perspectives and experience were drawn mainly from the rural life that was still governed by a strong moral economy. In retrospect we can say that the political structures that Nyerere built, the state apparatus and the ideology of socialism which he espoused, fused in well with the level of development and of the social classes of that period but they also retarded the development of social classes and logically also of the civil society.

The Mwinyi Era

The Economic Recovery Programme
The policies which President Mwinyi adopted with the support of the party in the form of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) are important because they have created the conditions for the emergence of a more accelerated pace of social change. In the agricultural sector policies increased producer prices, incorporated the role of the market, encouraged private investments and commercial farming, and supported the smallholder farmer. It also permitted the leasing of land for commercial farming.

In the area of internal trade, the policy liberalized trade from state monopolistic control and allowed the parallel market to function side by side with state trading structures. An important reform was the Retention Scheme, which allowed export/import traders of specialized products to retain 50 per cent of the proceeds of their exports in foreign currency. The money was then used to buy designated goods. In the parastatal sector, steps were taken to liquidate nine parastatals. In addition, there has been monetary, fiscal and budgetary restraints to restore internal and external balances. Austerity measures were intensified to curtail public spending. As a result, social services have been most affected, leading to the deterioration of social conditions, especially in health and education.

The new Economic Recovery Programme has had some measure of success. After a decade of negative growth, GDP at 1976 prices grew by 3.6 per cent in 1986 and by 3 per cent in 1987. For these two years running, GDP growth has been slightly above the annual population growth. The value of exports in US$ increased by 122 per cent in 1986/87 to US$354.5 m., and by another 9 per cent in 1987/88 to US$388 m. Falls in export earnings were successfully complemented by private transfers, of which US$420 m. and US$490 m. were realized in terms of external loans and grants for 1986/87 and 1987/88 respectively. Attempts to contain the government budget have also shown positive results in these first two years. Government borrowing from the banking system dropped from T. Shs5.6 b. in 1985/86 to T. Shs1.7 b. in 1986/87 (TET 1988).

The policies of liberalization have allowed the build-up of imports which has helped to ease the 'goods famine' of the early 1980s and to provide the incentive goods and inputs necessary for the revival of agricultural production (TET 1988/89). Another indication of recovery is the confidence and improvements in expectations among the many actors in the economy. Thus, not only peasants and traders have benefited but also the informal sector of the poor.

On the other hand, there have been major shortcomings within the ERP. With respect to industrial production, although there have been some improvements and production has increased for some industries, especially between 1986 and 1987, nevertheless, there is a high tendency towards import-dependency, which is so great that the economy cannot sustain it at reasonably high rates of capacity utilization, unless agricultural exports were to be restored to their old level. According to World Bank estimates, an increase in the average rate of utilization of existing capacities from the present 25 per cent to about 55 per cent would require an additional US$360 m. of imported inputs above the present US$297 m. or a 2.2 times increase in imported inputs. Even under the most optimistic scenarios of growth in

agricultural exports and increase of import support, such amounts of foreign exchange for the industrial sector will not be forthcoming. The government has not been able to control and bring down inflation, which has continued to erode the purchasing powers of the people, and the deterioration in social services has particularly hit the poor.

Political development in Tanzania

Politics has been defined as a competition for access and control over resources; this competition becomes even more acute and almost irrational when the resources are dwindling and control becomes even more vital. For politicians in Tanzania who have made politics a life career and subsequently had been sheltered from the perils of the system which they themselves have created, remaining in office was almost a struggle for survival.

The year 1987 was crucial because of the party annual meeting which was to endorse the new party chairman candidate. The separation of powers between the party and the government was meant to be a temporary measure and in 1987, the two Heads were to be re-united. But many of the old vanguard politicians could not fail to see that, although they themselves had supported the new economic policies, the changes and the mood in the country were calling for a different political character and they feared that they would be marginalized and probably dropped from office at a time when economic conditions were not very favourable.

Nyerere was elected to continue with the party chairmanship and President Mwinyi to continue as head of the government. Nyerere's speech at the party annual conference reiterated the same message that he had made at Arusha in 1967 at the opening ceremony of the Arusha Declaration NEC meeting. He warned that the country's achievements of peace and unity would be endangered if injustice and inequalities were allowed to develop because social differentiation would begin 'to divide us into classes'. He said that although flexibility in implementation of socialist policies was essential, especially in times of economic difficulty, nevertheless, this should not lead to a whittling away of socialist goals.

The head of the Ideological Department of the party then presented the party's 15-year programme and argued strongly for the need to develop productive forces in different sectors of the economy, but the document failed to relate the attainment of these objectives to the material and social capacity existing in the country. In addition, the document saw the role of the private sector/capital in the ERP as a 'temporary measure', thus indicating that the party had not changed its perspectives over private capital. It would seem that the party has not reformulated a new thinking, a new perspective which could conceptualize the new developments in a manner with which the new Tanzania can identify. Many of the ideas, concepts and programmes of the party are a replay of the 1970s and early 1980s so that one has a sense of *déjà vu*, of being caught up in a sort of time-warp.

The government's liberal policies and the party's socialist rhetoric have created a disjuncture from the old political economy and the new emergent one. It seems as if there are almost two political systems, which are juxtaposed against each other, creating contradictory processes and ambivalence in the political economy of the country. The corporatist political structures co-exist with pluralistic tendencies that are emerging in the society, and the ruling ideology of socialism exists side by side with capitalist practices. The huge state sector coexists with the parallel market. The ideology of socialism is becoming more ideological and removed from the actual realities of life. This has in turn created an interesting phenomenon in Tanzania, where major policies are still being articulated in terms of paradigms which are no longer believed or can be implemented. Thought and action, beliefs and behaviour are alienated. The sociological and political consequences of this phenomenon on development and on culture are beyond the scope of the chapter.

A political impasse

The present conjuncture would indicate that there is a sort of political paralysis. The state, that is the party and the government, has failed to develop a new synthesis, derived from the old and the new developments. The absence of such a perspective has inhibited the political redefinition of issues, has retarded cultural development and is having a negative effect on the ERP. For instance, the logic of the economic reforms demands a new model of development which is more open and more competitive. Efficiency, accountability, cost-effectiveness, a more sophisticated cultural awareness and greater exposure to new ideas and trends are

some of the inputs that would be required to develop the new system. Such a system would clash with the patron-clientelism, with control and security of tenure which is not related to work ethos. Some industries are hardly producing at all, but they have not been closed down because the political decision has not been taken; yet meanwhile wages continued to be paid by the government. Many important decisions, concerning the redefinition of relations between managers and workers, and the role of private foreign capital, have not been taken, pending political clarifications. This situation would indicate that political institutions in Tanzania lack a consensus for change.

The administration remains one of the most important instruments in the government in monitoring changes, implementing and maintaining infrastructural development, producing and training manpower through its educational system, in collecting taxation and revenues, in maintaining law and order. The Nsekea Commission recommended changes and reforms in the state administration, some of which are being implemented. But many of these reforms in the state bureaucracy require changes in rules and laws, and require that regulations are brought more up to date with prevailing conditions.

A number of issues – economic, social and political – need to be re-interpreted and re-thought in a new light, but this process is not sufficiently articulated by the state nor is it reflected in the mass media, which is an important medium of educating and informing the people. As a result, the empirical processes that are taking place are not properly understood and cannot be dealt with adequately, this leaves room in turn for misinterpretation, rumours and mismanagement of social processes. In this way, the social change dimensions within the economic reforms became neutralized as agents for development and the system finds it difficult to reform itself. The political impasse has created a disjuncture, bringing about an aura of political ambiguity and stalemate.

It would seem to me that there is limited cooperation between the party and the government. For instance, the party has not taken on any major mobilization programmes which would support the Economic Recovery Programme, for instance in terms of self-reliance activities, mobilizing to provide school desks, clinics etc. To argue thus, is not to say that cooperation between the party and its government does not exist. For instance, on successive issues of devaluation the party chairman supported President Mwinyi, and even in relation to the Economic Recovery Programme, with its stress on the role of private capital and market forces, a most sensitive issue with the old vanguards, the party chairman has come to the support of the president. While such support ensures collective responsibility and ensures that major policies are passed, to enable Tanzania to obtain the necessary grants, more cooperation is required to get the economy moving more rapidly. The two leaders also recognize the importance and necessity of cooperating with each other in the maintenance of stability and have refrained from opposing each other to the point of destroying the state. This attitude and statesman-like behaviour on the part of the top leadership has helped to minimize conflicts and tensions.

But the successful implementation of the ERP depends greatly on the changes of rules, regulations, cultural attitudes, work and ethos, whose political parameters have not yet been spelt out. Many of these decisions are sensitive because they imply changes in the rights and duties, in the norms and behaviours that have become accepted and internalized as normal and natural. Changes in such intimate things, which are bound up with a person's livelihood, become a very sensitive political problem especially during a period of crisis. For these reasons, a closer party–government relationship is important and a more united front is necessary to educate people to the necessity of the changes, so that they can understand the rationality of these changes. Strategies need to be worked out for easing people from the administration into the private sector. A more active participation of the party could have eased many of the problems during this period of crisis and reform.

These conflicts and dissensions within the state, and the lukewarm political relationships, have prevented the development of a more cohesive normative structure from emerging, especially among the political and bureaucratic leaders. As Evans (1985) has argued, a cohesive normative structure is important because it forms a non-bureaucratic structure which gives coherence to the state apparatus. The lack of a cohesive normative structure creates the condition for the penetration of ethnicity, inter-ministerial competition, petty rivalries of the political economy of jealousy, and other forms of interests, all of which undermine the

organizational goals, and erode the political objectives and reforms. In addition, it would seem to many observers that the Mwinyi government has not come out with a strategy of handling the more sociological problems of social change and of projecting the image of the government in a more dynamic manner by explaining to the public the need for wider changes and the direction of these changes. Sometimes, the government has been hesitant to respond to the demands for change which have been voiced by parliamentarians.

President Mwinyi's style of governance

President Mwinyi's government has had to seek new ways of statecraft to handle and manage some of the dissensions, conflicts and the growing demands of the different social groups. First, his personality as a non-confrontational person, as a person who believes in creating consensus and winning support rather than in creating antagonistic relations, has managed to steer the country from conflictual situations and has paved the way for a more favourable climate for the reforms. Indeed, this factor accounts for the fact that he has been able to implement important changes without causing disruption to the society.

President Mwinyi's strategy of governance is based on inclusionary patterns. He has included in his cabinet and among senior government positions even those who may not share his views on policies. This inclusionary style of governance has the advantage of trying to reconcile dissensus and consensus, and of balancing stability with economic changes. Mwinyi's strategy appears to concentrate on winning support and cooperation in areas where this is possible, and yet refraining from resolving conflicts or contradictions, even those which impinge on his government and on his policies.

But this strategy has its drawbacks. It allows for almost contradictory approaches to development to co-exist within the state apparatus and this further weakens the coherence and the cohesiveness of the government. The strategy weakens its own support base, so that Mwinyi becomes his own worst enemy. Yet, at the same time, this strategy is geared to maintaining national unity and stability, though it may weaken important aspects of Mwinyi's own policies.

The civil society under Mwinyi

We could argue that in Tanzania we are now witnessing the emergence of a nascent civil society, but this process is not homogeneous. In fact, the development of the civil society in Tanzania is characterized by two contradictory tendencies: on the one hand, the development of civil organizations as an attempt to express themselves and advance their interests, and on the other hand, stronger ethnic alliances and a revival of ethnic consciousness. These two trends are running parallel and overlapping with each other in many cases.

While Nyerere's policies retarded the development of the civil society, his educational policies have created a reservoir of educated Tanzanians in all levels of the economy. The need for manpower in the 1960s had encouraged the government to invest heavily in high level manpower, while the party's policy of universal primary education has given the youth the full benefit of seven years of education. In 1961 only one person held a Masters Degree, in 1989 there are thousands of Tanzanians who are holders of this Degree. African participation in the modern economy in jobs requiring managerial or entrepreneurial skills, or in professions such as teaching, and medicine, have increased. The problem facing the Mwinyi government is to adequately employ the growing numbers of graduates, given the economic recession and the restraints that have been placed on development programmes and expenditures.

In addition, the recent liberalization policies have also widened the scope for various kind of business activities, both in the formal and informal sectors. Trading activities for instance have become an important employment for many young entrepreneurs, many of whom have benefited from Standard Seven education and Form Four education, while the informal economy is expanding rapidly in Tanzania. Most of these activities are not registered, but for those that have been, for the year 1987–8, small business licenses were granted to 6,082 out of 10,000 requests (Tripp 1989). Business activities in the area of export–import have increased significantly, as in small hotels and restaurants as well as in manufacturing. The younger generation may not be ready to accept poverty and low standards of living as the previous generation had done. A new social structure of the urban middle class and working

class is emerging and the peasants in the rural sector are shedding their subsistence mentality. These processes are creating a more complex, socially differentiated society as new values and identities are being formed.

Invariably, the policies of devaluation and liberalization of trade also benefited the peasants because they allowed for increases in producer prices and peasants were able to sell their crops in the open market. Private traders and private capital have also gained considerably. These policies have widened the opportunities for income-generating in the urban and rural areas and people are actively involved in the informal sector. Bureaucrats and the modernizing elites welcomed the policies because they signified attempts to reverse the trend towards economic decline, and to modernize and revamp the economy. Business men and professionals have become more active and more competitive. But this support may diminish especially if inflation continues and the purchasing powers of the people become further eroded. In addition, while those who can compete in the open market welcome the changes, many of the leaders and vanguards may not welcome these changes, which can marginalize the political leaders from the limelight and from controlling and influencing the economic processes.

A new phenomenon in the nascent civil society is the development of different groups and lobbies, associations, which are beginning to constitute themselves in an attempt to promote and develop their professional interest. Recently, for instance, professional engineers and businesswomen formed their own association. There are a greater number of magazines and a new newspaper. *The Business Times* and *The Family Mirror* have come into the market. These are all an indication that the state is loosening up, and second, that the emerging civil society is trying to organize itself and to articulate its interests, a further reflection of a society that is becoming socially differentiated but developing characteristics to constitute a civil society.

The peasantization of urban cultures

A more conspicuous trend to downgrade, underplay and even ridicule the Swahili culture can be seen in Tanzania which has increased with the politics of liberalization, the Zanzibar issue, the revival of Moslem identity and religious consciousness, and a Coastal President, and needs to be further investigated. With such politics an atmosphere of mistrust prevails so that often differences become magnified and this provides little guidance for policy. It seems difficult to comprehend why these problems have arisen in the 1980s rather than in the early 1960s, because one would have thought that integration would have gradually continued, but if this is so, even conflicts have become more open. Secondly, a wave of the peasantization of urban culture is taking place and can be seen especially in weddings and funerals. For instance, a typical wedding will consist of three types of ceremonies. There will be the formal reception and an inner party and a party that goes on all night called 'kesha'; this is a recent trend that has come from the peasant culture. In traditional societies, weddings were celebrated by the whole village, which would also participate in bringing food and drink. It would last the whole night. This practice has now been incorporated into weddings in the urban setting and has imposed immense financial strains on the new bride and bridegroom so that special contributions by friends have to be made. An interesting factor is the attempt to combine both traditional and modern aspects of the ceremonies, indicating the transitional state of the urban social structure and the weakness of the urban social actors in succumbing to both forms of pressures; a more urbanized culture has not yet evolved, especially for the new migrants. It would be interesting to see whether the Coastal culture can play a significant role in this transition period. The trend towards conspicuous consumption, especially in weddings and feasts in the midst of the economic crisis, is another new development of materialistic culture. It would do well for the Ministry of Finance to consider imposing a tax on lavish feasts, as India and Pakistan have done, as a means of discouraging such practices and of enlarging the revenue base.

Religious revival

Another important development is the revival of religious groupings and identities. Most of the traditional Christian religions, from the Protestant and Catholic churches, have been losing their members to the evangelic groups that have sprouted up. Different forms of sects have developed in Tanzania with prayer groups talking in strange tongues, casting out devils,

and miracles occurring. A revival of Moslem consciousness has also occurred and greater emphasis has been given to the development of Koranic schools for young boys and girls. It is surprising, however, that more concern tends to be expressed over the Moslem revival than the Christian evangelic sects. This can only be understood, if we view this concern in relation to the political struggles and conflicts. Witchcraft and witch-hunting have become more important mainly up-country, with older women being killed as witches, though the phenomenon of witchcraft is also widely practised in the urban towns, indicating the tensions and insecurities that people experience in the midst of social transformation characterized by extreme poverty and scarce resources.

Ethnicity

Ethnicity is concerned with politically organized interests which can affect different social forces and it functions primarily from particularistic interests rather than universalistic or national concerns. In other words, what ethnicity in Africa does is to utilize the political space to promote or protect its own interest against the common goods of the civil society. By political space we mean the range of issues over which general or universal decisions are made within a given political unit, particularly decisions which are seen by political actors as affecting overall social order. Thus, when we speak of ethnicity in the contemporary sense we do not mean the type of ethnicity that existed in the nineteenth or early twentieth century; this would deny the social change that has occurred. Indeed, ethnicity has changed its form – Nyerere's policies and the stress on national culture, language, the process of modernization, the developments of towns, changes in diet, inter-marriages, exposure to modernity, have all forced changes in the old form of ethnicity. Ethnicity now provides a structure to secure modern resources, be they educational, political, economic or social. Although language and certain customs such as 'kesha' become symbols of ethnic solidarity and group belonging, ethnicity does not mean that people want to go back to their tribal way of life and reject modernity. Rather ethnicity has changed its form while maintaining its structure to secure new functions and roles, especially in the context of declining economic resources and in situations where structural support is absent. Indeed, as Ekeh has noted, a tribesman cannot be a tribalist because the only space he knows is his own tribe, but a tribalist is not a tribesman. A tribalist is a person who has had access to a wider multi-ethnic society, yet chooses to plunder the goods of the nation in the name of his tribe, although he has abandoned the life style of his tribe (Ekeh 1989). Such a person destroys the nation and insults the privileged position which he/she has secured as a representative of the nation, but goes on to undermine the legitimacy and authority of the state. Ironically in Africa and in the Third World, it is the elites themselves who destroy the state because of short-term political gains and prestige, although it is the state that has nurtured them to that position.

   In the situation of scarce resources, ethnicity in Tanzania is becoming a stronger variable; it provides linkage between the state and society, so that in matters of elections, whether in the context of the party, parliament or the cooperatives, or in obtaining licences or favours from officials, ethnicity plays an important role. Empirically, it is possible for us, as theoreticians, to discern and analyse it because it is strong enough to form its own independent analytical category.

   The manner in which ethnicity will function cannot be generalized from one society to another because of the specificity of each historical situation. In Tanzania ethnicity plays a more dialectical role: while it weakens the state formation and the development of the civil society, it also helps to maintain the status quo in more than one way. First, conflicts and national problems are not confronted politically but are circumvented by seeking personal solutions to public problems. In this respect, ethnicity uses the state for its own ends, eroding its authority and legitimacy and reducing the state to an empty shell, but it does not seek to change policy, because it can co-exist with any form of status quo. However, in many regions, ethnic associations are active in many developmental projects, such as lobbying and organizing for schools, clinics, bridges, etc. Thus while ethnicity may weaken the state at the national level and also dampen national cultural integration, it also performs very good services to its community. Secondly, because of the multi-ethnic nature of the Tanzanian society where no one major ethnic group dominates, ethnic alliances and cooperation become an important political tool. Finally, no ethnic group could really benefit from the breakdown of law and order. These factors may partly explain the difficulties which the system has in

reforming itself, and also the stability and peace which the country has enjoyed, so that while things are not changing and not developing, they are not falling apart either.

More research is required to see how ethnicity functions in Tanzania at the political level. For instance, what kind of ethnic coalitions are there? How is the politics of liberalization related to the politics of ethnic coalitions? Which groups could form an ethnic core in politics so as to stabilize ethnic conflicts and to create a stable environment for economic, social and political development? Could the study of ethnic coalitions throw more light on the division of spoils from oil and other resources? A comparative analysis of aid would indicate that those regions which are well represented in the higher echelons of power have tended to benefit from these resources, while regions such as Tanga, which has traditionally been poorly represented, have suffered politically. In some cases religion overlaps with some ethnic groups but religion is also used to divide ethnic coalitions.

The acute economic conditions and difficulties which the people are experiencing have motivated them to look for support structures. Politics tends to be mediated through these structures, and sometimes these relationships overlap with each other. One person can belong to three forms of groupings, ethnic, religious and professional, widening his or her social space and support systems, augmenting them with witchcraft and appeals to supernatural forces. These systems also function as alternative structures for support, especially where the state is unable to meet even the basic subsistence requirements of its people. Under these circumstances the role of the state as protector, the issue of legitimacy of the state become threatened, as people erect and revive their own structures and belief systems to make their lives more meaningful and bearable. The state and all that it stands for becomes the victim of these processes, and development is, once again, sacrificed to the ancestral gods.

Present Developments and Future Trends

In August 1990 Julius Nyerere resigned from the party chairmanship and President Ali Hassan Mwinyi took over the chairmanship of the party. As head of both the party and the government Mwinyi is better placed to coordinate political and economic issues and to implement the 'Second Economic Recovery Programme'. Assisted by a dynamic prime minister, Malechela, on the one hand, and on the other by a new party general secretary, Kolimba, the Mwinyi government could provide a more forceful political leadership. But the traditions of the past hang heavily on the present. Though out of office Nyerere remains powerful. Like the late Indira Gandhi, Nyerere has been a master of coalition, patronage and alliance, as Mwinyi, like Rajiv, is not. Brought up more as a technocrat, a believer in the modern rational manner of working, Mwinyi is confronted with the tensions and crisis of Nyerere's patrimonial system as well as demands and expectations by the people for a new form of leadership.

In the realm of social reality contradictory levels of social practice often exist. At one level therefore the Mwinyi government may be able to implement further reforms and bring about the necessary policy changes, such as the re-organization of the National Milling Corporation, further liberalization, the trimming down of the civil service etc. But another level of social practice which works to stall these changes may also exist: the Nyerere shadow government. The retention of many of the principal secretaries and ministers who have been part of the patronage system under Nyerere cannot be dismissed as insignificant.

We have seen that under Mwinyi the civil society has begun to develop and that this development has also penetrated the state. The state has now become much more a part of society, it is no longer protected from society. But the state, according to the definition we have used, needs to seek predominance over the civil society in a positive way, to give leadership, to articulate new values and a vision which can provide an orientation to the emergent society. Analysis has shown that this is not taking place. For instance, the state needs to find ways to make a multi-ethnic society function, it needs to regulate tribalism and condemn tribalist behaviours, especially in educated people, whose education and position in society should provide them with a concept of public good.

Demands for democratization

Writing in 1967, Tordoff posed a far-sighted question when he said 'The threat to political stability will arise as society becomes more stratified and interest groups emerge which can

no longer find satisfaction within the single party structure' (*xvii*). First, the social forces that are developing – class, religion, ethnicity, political fractionalism – are demanding changes in the nature and direction of the state. Demands for greater democratization may well lead to modifications in the unitary political structure, though Mwinyi's government should also be cautious about too rapid changes. A more gradual transition may be recommended, for instance, by encouraging pressure groups and associations which would be in a position to lobby for policy changes. Greater encouragement to the non-governmental sector would be an additional asset in furthering the growth of the civil society. These processes of democratization are in line with the overall policies of President Mwinyi and would assist tremendously towards linking up state–society relations.

The Nyerere state is changing in many ways. Some of these changes were initiated by the state itself. First, the separation of the party from the government and their corresponding politics has introduced a pluralistic form of politics and structure. Thus the homogeneity and consensus which had characterized the Nyerere's state has been replaced by political fractionalism and competing ideologies of development. Secondly, as a result of liberalization policies, a greater social differentiation in terms of ethnicity, class and religion, etc. have emerged, and this must have repercussions at the social, economic and political levels. Politics and solutions to other problems become increasingly mediated through these structures. Thirdly, Nyerere's alliances based on patrimonial patterns still exist. Will they give the same support and loyalty to President Mwinyi as they had done to their patron? What kind of a system will take its place? This is a problem that needs to be worked out by the present leadership both in the party and in the government.

Conclusions

We can say that politically, socially and economically, Tanzania is moving towards a more pluralistic society and to a certain extent, the new political structures have created the political space for pluralistic politics. These processes cannot be reversed but they need to be 'domesticated', lest they weaken the state and create conditions for unconstitutional forms of intervention and for retarding the country's development. This state must rise above the society and domesticate the social forces, especially those of ethnicity to uphold and promote a national community of values through which it can appeal to the enlightened self interest of people in the state and in the civil society.

While the leaders and the state (the party and the government) have not come together to redefine their political agenda, society has done so. Informal linkages with the state that are taking place are redefining state–society relations, in a manner which may however weaken the state. The state needs to redefine its own political agenda, to redefine much of its position, to work out a new thinking which can synthesize the old and new developments which are taking place. It needs to work out a perspective that can justify the new values, attitudes and behaviour which it wants to propagate. Secondly, it needs to create a broad core multi-ethnic alliance, such an alliance would need to incorporate the Coastal and Moslem fraction as a means of stabilizing political relations. Just as Nyerere was welcomed to the Coast by the Coastal elders in the early days before TANU was even created, so too this spirit needs to become increasingly reflected in the making of a new Tanzania. Thirdly, the economic reforms can only succeed if they are accompanied by further social and political changes. The economic system will function better if it operates in concert with the social and political system that it inhabits. Indeed, to become effective, the economic reforms need to be placed in an appropriate socio-political context.

African leaders have to develop new skills and they need to find new ways of bringing about cultural integration in order to consolidate state-making and nation-building. They need to understand that tribalism or ethnicity, and the modern state, 'represent two opposite ends of an organizational spectrum and the transition from one to the other requires a development which is very complex' (Crone 1986: 7).

The failure on the part of African leaders to strengthen new supportive social structures, behaviour and values especially for those who have gone beyond and transcended the kinship and ethnic ideologies and affinities is evident. Such new groups are often forced back into traditional forms of support system or choose to leave their country. This negation of

modernity creates a situation whereby social change becomes constantly halted, or is pushed back because successive generations have to begin afresh.

The political consistency of the Tanzanian leadership is still with the first generation middle classes, who are just emerging from the peasant class because this is the class that is more easily co-optable. This practice however tends to alienate the more urbanized Africans as well as those Africans who come from the more developed regions and have been exposed to and have internalized more modernized social values and lifestyle.

The pluralistic tendencies operating indicate the need for the state to become more flexible and open, to democratize and liberalize the political institutions, so that these can capture the new social forces and domesticate them in order to make cooperation and consensus possible, which would in turn minimize and lessen the crisis in governability. This is the challenge facing both Nyerere and Mwinyi. Although Nyerere has relinquished formal powers, he still retains, in the nature of African politics and tradition, immense informal powers and influence through his patron–client relationships and alliances, which are still operating. Thus, though radically dissimilar men, combining and symbolizing two different cultural traditions in the country, they can, I believe, rise above the political struggle and contradictions of social change and come together in a symbiosis to offer Tanzania a new type of leadership that can lead the country into the twenty-first century.

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*To our great sorrow our colleague Jeanette Hartman died unexpectedly in early 1992. The Editors.

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17 The Public Realm & Public Finance in Africa*

PETER P. EKEH

Ultimately, the organization and status of the public finance of a nation have their roots in its political history. The well-rounded and smooth picture of the theory and practice of public finance that has been received into the corpus of Western macroeconomic theory, and that has frequently been employed as a model for fiscal analysis in Africa, has its origins in the evolution of Western economic thought and should be properly viewed as an aspect of the development of the public realm in the West. Seen thus, the traditions and features of public finance in other societies, outside the West, are liable to be determined by their historical experiences in the development of their public domains. Indeed, it is the aim of this chapter to demonstrate that the special circumstances of the social formation of the modern African state have led to its unusual patterns of public finance that are traceable to the difficult relations between state and society in Africa.

The emphasis of this chapter on the character of the relationship between state and society as a factor influencing the fortunes of public finance in Africa rests on the assumption that the involvement of the state, as the most public of all institutions in society, largely determines the make-up of any collective goods in society. Consequently, the nature of the relationship between state and society is central to any effective understanding of public finance.[1] The evolution of civil society in the West, including especially the relatively harmonious relationship between state and society, has yielded the outlines of public finance that has the attributes of being seen as public goods with which individuals identify. On the other hand, the weaknesses in the relationships between state and society in Africa – arising principally from the imperatives of the externally imposed eras of the slave trade and colonialism –has foisted on Africa traditions of public finance with properties from which the individual has been alienated.

There are good grounds for thus seeking to examine the traditions of public finance as a fragment of political sociology and in ways that are different from traditional economic concerns on this subject with aggregate levels of consumption, investment, production, employment, and taxation. As a leading figure in the area once put it, 'Public finance is one of those subjects which lie on the borderline between economics and politics' (Dalton 1929: 3). To focus on the problems of public finance from the point of view of political sociology will

enable us to understand the historical and sociological roots of the public realm in Africa. Such analysis is likely to be richer if it is carried out in a comparative context. As in many other fields of African studies, considerations of traditions of public finance in Africa will benefit in important ways from a comparison of its attributes with its Western model which in any case has been pressed on Africa as the master paradigm for organizing its fiscal affairs. Since the patterns of public finance in the West have been moulded from the evolution of its public realm, it seems proper to begin this analysis with a sketch of aspects of the development of the Western public domain as it has affected the individual's attitudes toward its public finance.

Individualism and the Development of the Public Realm and Public Finance in the West

Modern Western society – in Western Europe and its cultural implantations in North and South America and Australia – represents the most sophisticated organization known to human history. Its state system has dominated the world since about the seventeenth century. The relationship between society and the state in the West has been held up as the principal exemplar that other types of societies seek to emulate. Its models of public finance are widely applied in the running of the financial affairs of various governments in Asia and Africa and now in Eastern Europe. What attributes of Western society have enabled these achievements and what phases of its historical past have led to these features?

There are three elements of the modern West that have immediate relevance for our analysis in this chapter, because the interrelationships among them are important in our explorations of the subject of the public realm in Africa: they are the organization of society; the state; and the individual. The bonds among all three of them and the distinctions and autonomy of each of them have endowed the West with those characteristics whose implantation into the political culture of Africa many Africanist political scientists have desired. What makes the study of the West so engaging is that its state system and its strong individualism grew from within its history. Well up to the medieval period, state and society were largely fused together in Western Europe. The gradual differentiation of the state from the wider society occurred in response to the growing complexity of society whose needs required specialized agencies for their execution. The state in the West has largely functioned as an organization that carries out the mandate of its encompassing society. As such, and as Engels (1884: 155) so directly put it, the state [strictly, the Western state] 'is a product of [the] society' in which it functions. It is therefore implicated in society's value system, informed and governed by its norms and values. The development of single national states, which are coextensive with national societies in many instances, has provided in the West maximum political space for its members.

Beyond the emergence of the modern nation-state in the history of Western Europe, perhaps the other most remarkable aspect of Western political `sociology has been the progressive empowerment of the individual since the end of the medieval era. The rise of individualism has had two sides to its development. First, the individual has been freed, gradually but quite effectively, from enclosure in immediate kinship and other community frameworks of fixed hierarchies, enabling him to exercise ample choice of political action with reference to wider communities in the nation-state and beyond. Second, the individual has more or less replaced such corporate entities as kingroups and village communities as the significant political units of the medieval world and has emerged as the elemental unit of political action in the modern nation-state. Both of these strands in the historical empowerment of the individual constitute what is generally referred to as individualism. Although *individuals* always featured in the earlier history of the West, as indeed they have in other areas of the world, *individualism* – understood here as the generalization for the attributes of the individual beyond narrower aspects of society in its immediate kinship networks to a more inclusive national society and the individual's endowment with the powers to interact directly with the state[2] – is only a feature of the modern world. Indeed, a special distinction of modern Western society has been the increasing appreciation of the worth of the individual.[3]

The growth of individualism, with its explicit recognition of the individual as a political actor, led to the theory of citizenship which is concerned with defining and interpreting the terms of the exchange relationships between the individual and the nation-state. In effect, the individual exchanges his duties, which he performs in favour of the nation-state, for his rights, which he expects and claims from it as a member of a political community (see Marshall 1949; Bendix 1964; and also Ekeh 1974). What is so compelling in the theory of citizenship is its acknowledgement of the full worth of the individual as a central political actor with whom the state has to deal. It upgrades the individual from being a mere *subject* of a king in the medieval world to becoming a full-fledged *citizen* of the modern nation-state. The acceptance of the individual as a political actor allows the conception of political society as a public domain in which the individual has a major stake, both as a contributor and as a beneficiary from its resources. The public realm is thus seen as a repository of public goods to which the individual contributes and from which he expects to receive benefits.

Broadly speaking, public finance in the modern West has been conceived and run as an aspect of the theory of citizenship and of the public domain. Thus, individuals pay taxes as part of their duties to the state from which they will receive several benefits. Moreover, the individual, or at least his elected representative, participates in the determination of what goes into the common pool of fiscal public goods that enable the organization of public finance by the functionaries of the state. Again, this is a development of the modern world that differentiates it from the medieval world of sovereign kings and subjects. Taxation and public finance have become matters that are publicly determined, with the individual citizen playing an important part, since the American colonists' rebellious cry of 'No taxation without representation' some two centuries ago and since French peasants tied taxation to citizenship with the declaration during the French Revolution, 'He is not a citizen who does not pay taxes'. As Markoff (1990: 453) recently phrased it, 'Thus, the [French] Revolution turns taxes from "impositions" to "contributions".'

The Individual, Kinship and the Development of the Two Publics in Africa

Such a profile of the relationships between state and society and between the individual and the state in the West as has been sketched will properly serve as a foil for a full understanding of their counterparts in the political sociology of Africa. The history of Africa shows rather dramatically that since the wholesale intervention of Europe in its affairs, beginning by about the first decades of the sixteenth century, state and society have drifted apart from each other in Africa. More destructively, the individual has steadily been under attack by the forces of the state which has refused to recognize his unique existence and which has treated him as less than worthy of being a citizen. The increasing alienation of the individual from the state, beginning from the evil era of the slave trade and stretching to our modern times of dictatorships, is a feature of African political sociology that deserves fresh emphasis. In response to such alienation the individual has created a different public domain, which I label the primordial public, which functions independently of the superordinate civil state over which he has no control. In the process, and as a result of the coexistence of two public domains, there has emerged in Africa two parallel systems of public finance whose strands I shall attempt to pull together in later sections of this chapter.

In order to capture a clearer picture of the difficult relationships between state and society and between the individual and the state in Africa than has usually been presented, I shall retreat to the African past, to its pre-slave-trade period, for some background illustration against which we can usefully understand the problems created by the eras of the slave trade and colonialism that I should thereafter examine. Such extensive examination of the political sociology of Africa across several historical zones is intended to convey a portrait of the social formations that have developed from its history, including its patterns of public finance.

The individual, and state and society in pre-slave-trade Africa
Historians and political sociologists should treat the period before the onset of the Atlantic slave trade in Africa with caution because of limited evidence and lack of documentation.

But for our purposes the information available seems adequate. The general picture of the pre-slave-trade era is needed to serve as a background against which we can compare the conditions imposed by the slave trade and thus assess any changes that occurred in the relationships between state and society as a result of the trade. We are also interested in gauging the fortunes of the individual, particularly his relationship with the African state before and during the centuries of the slave trade as well as during and after colonialism. Toward this end, the pre-history of Africa appears to provide adequate information from which we can draw some conclusions concerning the political sociology of pre-slave-trade Africa.

It seems sufficiently clear that before the onset of the international slave trade the African state was largely dependent on the societies in which they existed for their development, functioning, and survival. It was largely due to ecological and political factors internal to Africa that most of these ancient states came into existence. This is as true of the states in the Nile Valley and its neighbouring Ethiopian Highlands (Kush, Nubia, Aksum and Ethiopia) as it was for those in the Western and Central Sudan (Ghana, Mali, Songhai, Bornu, and the Hausa states) and others in the Atlantic coastal forest zone (Benin, Oyo, and Dahomey). The single exception seems to be the strip of coastal city-states in East Africa that grew from international trade in the Indian Ocean (see Davidson 1966; Connah 1987). These states obviously depended on their societies for legitimation, even if the intervention of Christianity in ancient Nubia and Ethiopia, and of Islam in various pre-slave-trade African states was a possible source of wider bases of legitimacy beyond local value systems. Ancient African states similarly relied on their own societies for survival. The long span of the Ethiopian state, dating back to a period before the Christian era, owes to the remarkable fact of close ties between state and society in ancient Ethiopia. But already in the ancient world, some African states were being overwhelmed by alien powers, as the collapse of the Songhai Empire following its sacking by Moroccan forces in 1591 indicates. But even in this case of Songhai's disputes with Morocco, the functionaries of the Songhai Empire did not appear to wish to abandon the interests of their society by forming alliances with foreign forces. The overall evidence available suggests that the relationship between state and society was close in ancient Africa, before the onset of the slave trade.

Similarly, there is good indication that ancient African states were vitally involved in the process of providing security and justice for the individual within their territories. The triple state system of Ghana, Mali and Songhai – spanning the sixth century AD to the sixteenth – was well noted for its sensitivities about security and justice in the Western Sudan that would allow agricultural production, mining, and international commerce from which these states profited (see Levtzion 1973; Fage 1964). The consistent source of problems for many kings of Benin, leading to their downfall in several instances, as so capably documented and discussed by the Benin historian Egherevba (1934), was failure to provide justice and security in their kingdom. In the ancient state of Oyo, a common reason for asking the king to undergo the famous ritual royal suicide was on account of rampart injustice and insecurity which would create chaos in his kingdom if he continued to rule (see Morton-Williams 1960). To include another instance from a different part of Africa: one common rationale that is often cited for the gigantic undertaking of the huge enterprise of building the *Zimbabwes*, the multi-storey stone edifices constructed without the benefit of any bonding mother in ancient Zimbabwe, has been the need to provide security, for the nobility obviously, but no doubt for the common man as well (see Oliver 1968; Gayre 1972). There seem to be ample grounds for suggesting that in pre-slave-trade Africa the state was not insensitive to the Hobbesian problem of caring for the security of the individual. Whatever failing may have appeared in this regard of the relationship between the state and the individual in subsequent historical epochs cannot therefore be blamed on traditions inherent in the political culture of ancient Africa. They must be sought in the destabilizing events that accompanied the slave trade and colonialism.

The slave trade, the individual, and state and society in Africa

Ancient Africa was not innocent of internal slavery. The hierarchies of ancient state institutions, in Africa as elsewhere, were usually accompanied by some form of serfdom and slavery.[4] But no other portion of mankind has experienced the wholesale depopulation of its

lands as a result of the organized export of its own human kind to other lands as has happened in Africa. Developments in two regions of the world led to Africa's handicap in this matter. Africa is bordered by the Arab world and Asia Minor that were relatively well developed and that had practised slavery for long periods of their history. Arabs and Muslims had slave markets in various parts of the world, including Europe, from which they obtained supplies of captive persons, particularly young women who served as concubines for Muslim notables. But the strengthening of state organizations in Western Europe and the expansion of the Russian Empire in the East dried up European sources of slaves, leaving Africa as the sole region from which the Arabs could obtain persons for enslavement. The other major development in the modern world that affected Africa so dramatically followed from the Industrial Revolution that enabled Europe to take over the new lands it discovered in the Americas. Africa supplied a slave labour for the development for the new continents and islands of the Americas, largely because the initial use of European indentured labour proved ineffective and the enslavement of the native American population was not successful for the European immigrants' needs.

The Arab trans-Saharan and trans-Indian Ocean slave trade had its greatest impact in East and Central Africa reaching deep into modern Zaire, as well as the Western Sudan stretching to areas of northern Nigeria, with Borno and Kano serving as its main markets. Its long duration (usually denoted as 950 AD to 1850) left its trail of devastation behind it. The European Atlantic slave trade was more concentrated in time (1450–1850), and its consequences were probably more disastrous for Africa. Although its victims came heavily from the West African coast, other regions in the Southern and Eastern Africa were not spared. Between the Arab and European versions of the slave trade it has been estimated that some thirty million young men and women were taken from Africa in these nine centuries of the evil trade, with probably thrice that number dying from the wars, pestilence and famine induced by it (see Inikori 1982).

There is now available some literature on the consequences of the slave trade for Africa (see especially Rodney 1972, Inikori 1982, Ekeh 1990). In this chapter I shall limit myself to the effects of the slave trade with regard to state and society and their relations to the individual. The Arab slave trade in East and Central Africa involved in many instances the direct participation of Arabs in slave raids. Whether this was a consequence of lack of strong traditional state systems in these regions of Africa or whether it was the Arab slave trade that weakened the impulse to strong state formation in these areas is a question that deserves to be examined rather carefully elsewhere. But in Muslim states, especially those won on the battlefields of *jihad* revolutions, Islamic law and practice permitted slavery and probably encouraged the slave trade (see Levtzion 1985). Thus the Sokoto Caliphate, won on a puritan *jihad* mission of stopping the slave trade in which Muslims were victims, ironically witnessed some of the worst instances of the involvement of states in the slave trade in the nineteenth century, supplying both Arab and European interests the captives that state functionaries obtained from raids in 'enslavable' pagan territories.[5] The European slave trade in Africa had more direct relations with the African state through which the trade was organized from the African side. With rare exceptions – Ethiopia and Benin could be cited as such exceptions – most ancient states in Africa at the onset of the slave trade were corrupted into the trade, becoming partners to European mercantile interests and turning against their own societies. Where traditional African states were lacking or unwilling to become such European partners new states emerged to serve the needs of the slave trade (see especially Jones 1963).

Thus, whether seen from the Arab side or through the European angle, the net effect of the slave trade was to separate African states from their own societies. With the armaments that flowed with the slave trade, few of the states involved in it depended anymore on internal societal values for their survival and legitimation. Instead, they now relied on force of arms to retain power. Such fine-tuned programmes of checks and balances as existed traditionally between the king and chiefly councils, such as the *Oyo Mesi* in Oyo, suffered. Abuses of power were more rampant in states that grew from the slave trade. Thus, the so-called trading states of the Oil Rivers on the Atlantic coast in modern Nigeria – including Old Calabar (see Latham 1973, Nair 1972, Forde 1956), the Ijo states of the eastern Niger Delta (see

Dike 1956, Jones 1963, Horton 1969), and the Itsekiri trading state of the western Niger Delta (see Ikime 1969) – were in every respect terrorist states that grew to service the economic interests of European mercantile capitalism by harassing neighbouring societies with imported muskets.

In the process, the ordinary individual suffered enormously and his status was significantly diminished in the new economic and social order. In general, in the worst years of the slave trade the individual was virtually abandoned by the state. Security was at a minimum, with internal strife in civil wars and slave raids claiming a huge number of persons. The sense of responsibility for providing security and justice shown by such previous state organizations as the Songhai Empire virtually vanished from the African agenda of state system in the slave-trade era.[6] Although the African state system did not collapse during the slave trade, it was captured by the international mercantile capitalist system which needed the ordinary African for its purposes. The point needs to be stressed that the campaign against the individual in Africa was international and was ideologically waged in Europe as well as in Arabia. A new image of Africa was especially constructed to justify the slave trade which needed the individual in Africa as its wares: 'The more important the slave trade became the more the observations of its practitioners were distorted' (Barker 1978: 10, also compare Fredrickson 1971). But the image of Africa that thus emerged was designed to attack the ordinary African, not African state functionaries. As Curtin (1964: 36) noted,

> Reporting of this kind became increasingly common in the 1780's, as the African [British slave-trade] interest felt itself threatened by the rise of the anti-slave-trade movement. Several writers began to project a double image, relatively friendly to individual Africans but unfriendly to the collective African. Individuals in Norris' [1789] *Memoirs of the Reign of Bossa Abadee*, for example, are clearly living portraits of men not especially different from men elsewhere, while 'the African' in his collective image is an inhuman savage.

It is partly on account of the existence of such collective image of 'the African' in the West and Arabia[7] that it would be mistaken to assume that the impact of the slave trade was limited to areas where it was most intense and to exclude from its assessment regions that were not severely and directly hurt. The slave trade wreaked havoc on all of Africa, directly and indirectly. Among other considerations, it halted any normal cultural evolution on the continent, such as the Bantu migrations that have been credited with imposing common linguistic traditions on the whole region of Africa stretching from the Chad to South Africa (see Guthrie 1962, Oliver 1966). The rift between state and society was probably widespread through the continent and was not confined to areas where the slave trade was concentrated. In any case there were few regions that were spared from the scourge of the direct depredations of the evil trade.

In the face of the irresponsibility of the African state during the era of the slave trade, the individual relied on society for whatever limited protection could be afforded him. As I have emphasized elsewhere, the luxuriant growth of kinship structures and the African's close attachment to kinship organizations may be traced to that troubled period when this fragment of society offered the individual as much comfort as it could provide (see Ekeh 1990). Kinship served the role of protecting the individual in the same fashion that feudalism arose in key regions of Europe to provide security in place of state institutions which could not cope with the crisis of individual insecurity in Europe.[8] There was of course an important difference between the two events: while in Europe feudalism replaced the full state, of which it was a fragment at any rate, in Africa kinship was ultimately in competition against the state. There is another important difference: the individual emerged from medieval Europe strengthened; in Africa he was reduced to a mere trading commodity by the state and he emerged from that era badly bruised and diminished. In the years of the slave trade the individual was largely alienated from the state, whereas his ties to the elements of society were strengthened. Kinship emerged from the years of the slave trade as the boldest statement of society to which the individual was fully tied, because it was the structure that stood behind him and within which the ordinary man could find some protection and solace during the crisis of the slave trade.

Colonialism, the individual, and state and society in Africa

Eric Williams has effectively argued that the European slave trade and colonial rule in Africa represented two different phases of capitalism in England and Europe. The slave trade was a major aspect of mercantile capitalism whose profits ironically undermined its own authority, paving the way to the pre-eminence of the industrial capitalism that needed Africa's raw materials. The abolition of the slave trade and the substitution of colonialism marked this shift in capitalism, since colonial rule would help in the development of Africa's raw materials through the conservation of its labour resources. On such score colonialism was an extension of European economic interests in Africa (see Williams 1944). As with the slave trade, the African state was the point of European entry into Africa for its conquest and colonization. With the singular exception of Ethiopia's decisive defeat of an Italian invasion, the rest of Africa, considerably weakened from the slave trade, was conquered by European nations. They rapidly established Western-style states in their colonies, subjugating and making use of existing state structures in several instances.

African society was largely left intact by the invading and colonizing European nations. Its kinship structures were untouched and in several instances were protected by the circumstances of colonial rule. As a matter of fact, kinship expanded rapidly, with the rise of ethnic groups which in many cases were compositions of related pre-colonial kinship structures. But the relationship between the emergent colonial state and African society was distant. First, the colonial state did not crave nor need the values from indigenous African societies for its existence. On the contrary, it sought its legitimation from justifying its conquests on the grounds that African societies were primitive and needed reshaping – a point of view pressed home by its companion Christian missions (see Ekeh 1975). The colonial state was virtually a *deus ex machina*, looking down somewhat contemptuously on African societies from its Olympian heights. Second, from the other side, Africans regarded the colonial state along with its alien functionaries with ambivalence. While they were awed by Europe's technological achievements, they had grave misgivings about its morality, preferring the communal values engendered by Africa's kinship systems to what they regarded as self-centered European morality. There were, indeed, no moral linkages between the colonial state and African societies.

The relationship between the colonial state and the individual was also problematic. The colonial state, and the colonizers generally, brought forward from the slave-trade era most of the prejudices against the ordinary African. Although Europe was reeling from its medieval world of kings and subjects to a modern world of participant citizenship, so dramatically demonstrated in the American and French Revolutions, the colonial state retreated to Europe's feudal past to choose terms for its relationships with the colonized Africans. The French, whose peasant population had just been uplifted by the Revolution of 1789 to become full-fledged citizens, preferred the title of *sujets* for the colonized Africans. Only a handful of the colonized were to qualify for the title of citizens. In British colonies there was no room for the status of citizens. In the tiny enclaves of Lagos and a few other places dubbed 'colonies' Africans were for a while regarded as British subjects – but no more than that. For the rest of Africa, in the 'protectorates' every colonized person was a 'native' of a given 'tribe'. His status and his rights and obligations were not defined with respect to his membership of the colonial state but of his own ethnic group.

The individual, limited to his native ethnic group for his political and cultural spaces, nonetheless had plenty of room during colonialism for establishing his own identity within the parameters of his kinship group. Some of the most important social formations in Africa indeed occurred during colonial rule. It gave room for many ethnic groups to establish their boundaries and to use the technology of European literacy to document their languages. In other words, compared to the pre-colonial era, the individual had more scope for interacting with his own society in the colonial environment.

The emergence of the two public domains in Africa

It was under such conditions that an alternative public realm, located in kinship structures and different from the colonial public domain, was constructed. The individual had no room for political or cultural activities within the civil colonial apparatus of the colonial state. But

he could become a worthy citizen of the public realm within his kinship milieu. Here he was morally bound to his society defined in terms of broadened kin groups. His rights were fully protected and his duties to this public realm were morally sanctionable. I have called it the *primordial public* because of its kinship foundations (see Ekeh 1975). It is different from the *civic public*, made of the colonial state and its apparatuses and operated outside societal morality. These two public domains ran different stratification systems. A man could be insignificant in the reckoning of the colonial state and yet enjoy enormous prestige in the primordial public. On the other hand, there were those who had to operate in both publics, switching from moral actions in the primordial public to amoral postures in the civic public.

It is a demonstration of the strength of colonial social formations that the two public domains still dominate public affairs in post-colonial Africa, an indication of the lasting legacies of colonialism. But their continuing relevance probably also shows how much the post-colonial state resembles in character the colonial state, maintaining great distance from society. Such colonial legacy may be traced from another institution that was developed during the colonial era: taxation.

Colonialism and Taxation in Africa

The nature of the relationship between the individual and the colonial state may be gleaned from the curious history of taxation in colonialism. The folk meaning of 'taxes' was handed down to the colonized by the famous class of interpreters – a profession of semi-literate Africans who translated what colonial officers said in the metropolitan language (say, French or English) to the colonized in their indigenous languages. With remarkable consistency, the British colonial term *capitation tax* was translated into Nigerian languages by these interpreters as 'head-money', 'head-debt', and 'head-payment'. Now, in all these languages, these transliterations that embody the word 'head' do not connote the *per capita* meaning of reference to individuals. Far from it, what they metaphorically convey is 'freedom'. Taxation was thus understood to signify 'freedom-payment' or, for a more extended phrasing, 'payment-of-freedom-debt'. The many tax wars and rebellions of colonial history must therefore be seen, from the point of view of the resisting Africans, as resentment against a quest to yoke them into a new form of domination on the grounds of which they were now expected to pay tributes to alien overlords (see, e.g., Afigbo 1966, Ikime 1967, Ikime 1969: 221–30, Hargreaves 1956, Crowder 1968: 154–5). Given the background history of the slave trade in which a man's freedom was traded away as cheaply as a piece of cloth, the Nigerian colonial interpreters' rendering of taxation must be seen to be more substantial than an error of translation.[9]

Certainly, taxes and taxation had the connotation of an alien encroachment on the freedom of the individual. This was all the more apparent to the colonized because the alien rulers generally claimed, in what I have labelled 'colonial ideologies' of rulership, that their sources of income had little to do with the efforts of the colonized whom they had come to benefit (see Ekeh 1975). Nor was this mistranslation a mere displacement of meaning. It has substantive reference in the consciousness of colonialism: several men were jailed for failing to pay their taxes. There was clearly no citizenship component of rights and duties attached to colonial taxation. It was regarded by the colonized as punishment, not as the duty of a citizen that would qualify him to receive some social benefits from the state in the future.

As a matter of fact, such folk interpretation of taxation was not distant from its objective colonial practice. 'Direct taxation', wrote Frederick Lugard, 'may be said to be the corollary of the abolition . . . of forced labour and domestic slavery' in northern Nigeria:

> [Taxation] imposes on the freed slaves the obligation to render to the State, to which he owes his liberty, some portion, however small, of the labour or its equivalent which was formerly the sole property of his master, while the latter, deprived of the forced labour of his slaves, is compelled to lead a more useful life . . . by taking an active part in the labours of [native colonial] administration in return for a salary provided by means of taxation. (Lugard 1913–1918: 166)

A second reason cited by the man who designed the British colonial doctrine of Indirect Rule for imposing direct taxation was that it 'promote[d] an intimate touch between the British Staff and the Natives' (1913–1918: 168). Lugard's most important reason is Victorian in its aristocratic condescension: With regard to his beloved Northern Nigeria, Lugard paternally urged that 'direct taxation [was] a moral benefit to the people by stimulating industry and production . . . among the male population . . . [who had] become indolent and addicted to drinking and quarrelling' (1913–1918: 166).

Elsewhere the professed reasons for imposing taxation were less altruistic and paternalistic. In Kenya and Tanganyika, European plantation owners urged – quite successfully in Kenya – that severe taxes be imposed on the 'natives' as a means of prizing them from their own farms in order to seek employment in European plantations to raise money for paying such taxes (see Hailey 1957: 659–60). And in most colonies in Africa, the colonizers resorted to forced labour for public works for which there was little compensation (again see Hailey 1957: 1362–76). Remarkably, the French introduced the *corvee* into their colonies a century after the *corvee royale* (compulsory labour on public works) was thrown out of French political life because it was one of the most hated forms of taxation during the Revolution (see Markoff 1990: 438, also Crowder 1968: 182–7). Clearly, then, colonial taxation was an imposition with meanings far removed from any citizenship connotations it may possess in the modern West.

What makes the political sociology of colonialism in Africa so remarkable is that such methods of colonial taxation provoked a parallel form of taxation that has the full attributes of contributions by citizens rather than impositions by a superordinate colonial authority. While Frederick Lugard and his compeers in the history of European colonial administrations had clear ideas about what taxes were intended for, how much and in what form they should be paid, usually without consulting the opinions of their subjects, the colonized Africans were busy making their own arrangements with their kinfolk on how best to protect themselves from dangers arising from circumstances they did not fully understand, and how to improve their community and collective fortunes in the new world of colonialism. Taking advantage of the new colonial cash economy, many communities and whole ethnic groups taxed themselves to build schools, health facilities, and to award scholarships to their young members in efforts that in some instances, in southern Nigeria at least, rivalled or even surpassed the colonial taxes.

There are important differences between such community and ethnic taxes and the colonial taxes. First, the unit of the community and ethnic group taxes was the individual. He was important in the scheme of such community life and his opinions were taken into account regarding such matters as how each adult should pay, what sanctions should be imposed on those who do not pay, and what projects were to be embarked upon with the funds realized from their payment. In the sphere of the colonial state, the individual was of little consequence and taxes could be levied and collected on the basis of corporate kinship or some of its subdivision. On Lugard's authority, 'The village is the unit of collection, and the Village Head is responsible for collecting the tax and taking it to the District Head' (1913–1918: 195) – a method repeated in other circumstances and which placed so little emphasis on the paying individual. In some other places, it was reduced to the head of a household and called Compound or, more contemptuously, Hut Tax. Secondly, the payments of community and ethnic group taxes tended to be income-related, while the poll tax was the common style of colonial taxes. Certainly, the community would frown on a wealthy man who paid the same amount as poorer people with regard to their community payments whereas he would be supported in his resistance to any attempts to impose on him an income tax from the colonial state. Thirdly, women were generally excluded from colonial taxation, at least since the anti-tax explosions that developed into the so-called Women's War of 1929 among the Ibos in eastern Nigeria (see Perham 1937: 206–20). On the other hand, women were most active in the community and ethnic group taxes – sometimes paying rates different from men's. Fourthly, the individual's attitudes toward these taxes were wholly different. He or she understood the philosophy and purpose of the community and ethnic group taxes, whereas the colonial state taxes were regarded as an alien imposition, the purpose of which was often understood as punishment.

What is significant about such developments under colonialism is that they have survived in the traditions of public finance of modern African nations. This is particularly the case with the citizenship definitions of these two forms of taxation. The primordial public taxes are paid by its members who are resident in the primordial homeland as well as those who reside far away from it. On the other hand, government taxes are only paid by those who are resident in the territory under the control of the taxing civic public authority. But there is a dramatic difference in the uses made of the proceeds from these taxes. In the primordial public, it is argued that all its members, at home and temporarily away from it, would eventually benefit from it because it is assumed that all must return home, if only to be properly buried in their ancestral homeland. In the uses made of the civic public finances, 'non-indigènes' resident in the territory of the taxing authority are very often discriminated against, even if by their circumstances, say of employment, they are compelled to pay relatively heavy taxes in their current places of abode. Thus, in Nigeria, children of *non-indigènes* – including those born in the area of the awarding authority – are excluded from the award of civic public scholarships. On the other hand, all persons who are deemed to be native to an area, by some primordial criteria involving their parents, are qualified to receive such benefits from it, despite the fact they and their parents may never have paid civic public taxes in the area because they reside far away from it. Thus, persisting from the colonial past, the citizenship meaning of taxation in terms of reciprocity has remained extremely thin in the affairs of the civic public in modern Africa. Consequently, the common resentment expressed by individuals in the West against abuse of public office in the claim that the miscreant official has misused the 'tax-payers' money' is still absent in our circumstances in Africa because funds raised from state taxes are hardly ever regarded as collective goods.

The Two Public Realms and the Patterns of Public Finance in Africa

A distinguished feature of African political economy is that it is operated on two types of public finance which are constitutive aspects of its two public domains. The conventional public finance of the discipline of economics refers to public funds under the control of governments at the central, state and local levels. A significant aspect of the colonial situation, which has been continued into post-colonial African nations, is that such conventional public finance was paralleled by the existence of a separate public finance under the corporate control of primordial public groupings, although it makes use of formal civic public financial institutions, including their banking methods of operation. It would clearly represent a misuse of terms to label its funds as private, given their size and character. In many instances, these funds were generated from payments made by thousands or sometimes millions of citizens acting their kinship role. Nor should their public character be allowed to be hidden by the term often associated with them: 'voluntary contributions'. The truth of the matter is that there is considerable compulsion on those contributing to make their payments.

Because of the novelty of such primordial public finance in current economic thought, compact examples of its operations may help to demonstrate its significance for modern political development in one part of Africa. I will give two examples from Nigeria. First, Urhobo is one of the medium-sized ethnic groups in Nigeria, in the southwestern corner of the country, with a current population of not less than one million. Like the Ibos and Ibibios, with whom they suffered a common disadvantage of having been shut off from direct contact with the European Atlantic trade that was monopolized by smaller ethnic groups on the Atlantic coast (from about 1500 to 1890), the Urhobos were considered backward at the onset of British colonial rule of Nigeria at the turn of this century. They were virtually despised by early British administrators who preferred to rule the Urhobos through chiefly personnel from the smaller but distinguished neighbouring ethnic group, the Itsekiri (see Ikime 1969). By the 1930s, unlike their neighbours, the Binis and the Itsekiris, the Urhobos had not a single university graduate. Opportunities for secondary school education for their children were severely limited. It was clear to them that they could not rely on the colonial government for their progress and that if they were to reverse their lowly rating they would have to upgrade their fortunes by collective means. By the mid-1930s, they formed the

Urhobo Progress Union charged with the responsibility of managing their public affairs and of planning for their collective advancement.

Despite the adverse impact of the Second World War on the Nigerian economy, the Urhobo Progress Union embarked on an ambitious programme of awarding university scholarships to persons who would eventually run their own ethnic secondary school. Collecting little sums of money from every able-bodied adult, including those who were not paying government taxes at that time, the Urhobo Progress Union mobilized enough resources to send two Urhobos to Cambridge University and Durham University in the United Kingdom during the war years. The first of these returned in 1947 and the second in 1948 – and these two publicly trained men were the first Urhobo university graduates! They opened the gates of Urhobo College in 1948 to a flood of education-starved young men. It turned out to be the largest secondary school in the area in the 1950s, also rivalling the Government College nearby at Ughelli (which was owned and operated by the colonial state) in terms of the quality of its students. It is a testimony of the significance of the public finance that the Urhobo Progress Union could manage, that in Nigerian aggregate terms, in modern times, Urhobos are surpassed only by the much larger Yoruba and Ibo ethnic groups with respect to the number of their university professors, many of whom had their secondary school education cheaply at Urhobo College. Through their collective efforts managed by the Urhobo Progress Union, they have emerged as one of the most developed ethnic groups in Nigeria at the present time. The funds involved in these programmes were vast and the organization required for administering them were quite complex. There were some paid officials who serviced public meetings and standing committees that discussed the affairs and finances of the Urhobo Progress Union and Urhobo College.

Similar examples could be cited from colonial history, but our second example is recent. One of the economic miracles of modern Nigeria concerns the recovery of the Ibos from the misfortunes of the Biafran secession and their defeat in the Nigerian Civil War (1967–70). It is ironic that in just twenty years after the Civil War, the Ibo ethnic territory stands in danger of being over-built. And yet it is well known that following the Civil War state governments in Ibo areas have ill-served their people. On the contrary, the Ibos owe their phenomenal progress to themselves. Although their famous individual drive must have contributed enormously to their recovery, it is the steadfast Ibo kinship system and its primordial public organizations that have now transformed Iboland into well-developed territory. Individuals have built houses for themselves; but more significantly the communities have provided public facilities – including roads and bridges. One of the odd consequences of the Nigerian Civil War is that it has driven Ibos to be more dependent on their kinship system and less trusting of the state. Reverting to their colonial experiences with the organization of the Ibo State Union, communities have been shot across thresholds by taxing themselves to provide such public facilities as hospitals and town halls.

Other instances of public finance abound in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa. They represent a substantial presence of a parallel public finance, outside state control, that deserves the obvious label of *primordial public finance*. They have become quite significant in several nations where state institutions cannot be trusted to take care of the needs of the individual. Needless to say, the two systems are linked: primordial public finance benefits from, probably feeds on, civic public finance. In modern Nigeria, those who 'donate' the most to the primordial public purse are those who are deemed to have gained the most from the civic public.

Patterns of Public Finance and Political Corruption in Africa

A long line of distinguished scholars has attempted to characterize the crippling problem of political corruption in the Third World. Huntington's definition is typical: 'Corruption is behavior of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private interests.' He adds, 'Corruption requires some recognition of the difference between public role and private interest' (1968: 59, 60). This emphasis on the inappropriate relationship between public role and private interests emerges strongly in Myrdal's study of southeast Asia: 'In southeast Asia those vested with official authority and power very often exploit their position in order to make a gain for themselves, their family, or social group' (1968: 948).

Although Myrdal's list of beneficiaries is longer than is usual in case studies of corruption, his definition is limited to the distinction between the private and public realms within which Western political man operates. In fact, the traditional concept of corruption is rooted in the assumption that it is illegitimate to divert public resources for the private use of those who are their trustees, namely, public officials. It underlies the numerous studies of political corruption in developing countries (see, for example, McMullen 1961, Smith 1964, Wraith and Simpkins 1964).

Such manner of conceptualizing political corruption is liable to lead to an incomplete understanding of the scope and forms of political corruption in Africa. The truth of the matter is that it is possible to distinguish two forms of political corruption in Africa. The one that poses the smaller problem is the conventional problem of corruption involving the abuse of civic public office for personal and private gains, by means of such illegal activities as bribe-taking and embezzlement of civic public funds. It would be possible to control this form of political corruption if it operated independently. Unfortunately, in Africa, it feeds into the second and larger form of corruption in which the resources and funds of the inclusive civic public are diverted for the use of the more restricted primordial public by officials whose kinship origins are from such smaller enclaves. That very often these two forms of corruption are confused or, which is more likely, that the first type of corruption is justified on the grounds of the larger one, makes the problem of understanding and controlling political corruption in a nation like Nigeria a most difficult matter.

Political corruption gathers strength in Africa, and has expanded in scope, because it is widely accepted that the use of civic public office and funds for the benefit of one's primordial grouping is legitimate. A man who holds office in the civic public and upholds the norms of impartiality in the exercise of the powers and privileges of his position by being even-handed towards all groups is bound to be regarded as disloyal to his primordial group. On the other hand, an official who does special and favoured benefits for the interests of his primordial group is hailed as a hero by his people, even if he is proven guilty and condemned in the courts of the civic public. The cross-pressures to which public officials are exposed must be weighed in considering the problem of political corruption in Africa. Above all, public officials face the dilemma of maintaining two seemingly contradictory positions with regard to the two publics. Public officials are constantly under pressure to enrich their primordial public from the coffers of the civic public. A hero in the civic public may be robbed of any praise in his primordial public. Honour cannot mean the same thing in the two. The dilemma for those who must operate in both of them – as most in public service have to – is that officials who uphold the norms of conduct in the civic public are by their impartiality condemned in their primordial public. In the Nigerian situation at least, support and sympathy for those accused of political corruption are easily mobilized once there are indications that the accused officials' activities whilst in office benefited his primordial public. True, the activities of such persons may be resented elsewhere – but that is not because there is absolute moral condemnation of their misdeeds, but rather because their opportunities are envied by others, particularly by those from other ethnic groups.[10]

Conclusion

The political sociology of modern Africa has its origins in the patterns of relations established between state and society and between the individual and state and society in the two historical eras of the slave trade and colonialism. Starting from the ravages of the slave trade, African states were separated from societal representations, particularly their kinship structures, as most of them became dependent on European mercantile capitalism. Although the succeeding colonial state was not antagonistic toward kinship structures, the circumstances of colonialism led to further separation between state and society and to the continuing growth of kinship institutions. That pattern has continued into the post-colonial era of national dictatorships, in which societal structures flourish away from contact with the state. The relations of the individual with the state from the slave trade period up to modern times have been particularly bad. The individual in Africa was the object of persecution, either by the state or through its agency, in the centuries of the slave trade, with kinship serving as

the most trustworthy structure for his troubled existence. While colonialism did not debase him as much as the slave trade, the individual was viciously slighted and called such disparaging names as 'primitive' and 'uncivilized' 'tribesman' during colonial rule. But, importantly, colonialism provided the individual with a hospitable atmosphere for actively developing his own political agenda within the existing kinship networks, leading to the emergence of the primordial public realm which functions alongside the more formal state-defined civic public realm. Because the post-colonial state has remained unchanged in its character from its colonial predecessor, these two public realms have continued to coexist in modern Africa.

The analysis in this chapter has focussed on two types of public finance as subsets of the two public realms. In doing so, it becomes clear how they are related to the individual. The primordial public is fully democratic and is based on the individual's desires and abilities. The primordial public derives its character and strength from the politicization of kinship systems, largely because kinship structures have been beneficial to the individual from the era of the slave trade through colonialism to modern times. On the other hand, the civic public of state institutions have continued to be distant from the individual in the post-colonial era. The distrust of the African state by the individual stretches back to the evil years of the slave trade when it virtually abandoned him. The path of reform in Africa, therefore, lies with the state retracing its steps and embracing the individual. It is only then that the two publics may be dissolved into one common political fold.

Notes

[1] Texts on public finance generally recognize and frequently acknowledge its close ties to the state. Thus, 'The origins of public finance are to be found in the origins of the state . . . The existence of the state – whatever its form and whatever its precise relation to the individual – requires some method of provisioning . . . the subject of public finance [concerns] the states' employment of resources and the effect of such employment on the private [sic] euniomy' (Newman 1968: 1). Similarly, another text typically invokes Aristotle: 'As Aristotle pointed out centuries ago, man is a political animal. Certain of his needs can best be supplied through cooperative effort. Long before man grew out of his tribal estate, this united action made possible the stabilization of society through law and order. Out of such activities grew the modern state with its huge public expenditures and the diverse means used to get the money to meet these expenditures' (King 1936: 1).

[2] Although Lukes' conception of the abstract individual has wider parameters than it is intended here, my meaning of individualism is close to his definition: 'According to this conception, individuals are pictured abstractly as given interests, wants, needs, etc . . . [with] the relevant features of the individual determining the ends which social arrangements are held to fulfill . . . independently of social context' (Lukes 1973: 73).

[3] Such development is recognized and urged not only by such individualist thinkers as Spencer (e.g., 1884), but also by those traditionally labelled conservatives such as Durkheim (thus, 1901: 193): 'The place of the individual in society . . . becomes greater with civilization.' Also see Nisbet (1953: 107): 'In the medieval world there was relatively little concern with positive, discrete rights of *individuals*, largely because of the diffuseness of political power and the reality of innumerable group authorities. But when the consolidation of national political power brought with it a destruction of the social bodies within which individuals had immemorially lived and taken refuge, when, in sum, law became a more centralized and impersonal structure, with the individual as its units, the concern for positive, constitutionally guaranteed rights of individuals became urgent.'

[4] It should be noted that etymologically the term slavery is derived from 'Slavs', denoting the regions of Eastern Europe where slavery was common.

[5] Thus, the British administrator Frederick Lugard noted of the Sokoto Caliphate: 'The population of North [Nigeria] – described some 60 years ago [in the 1850s] by Barth as the densest in all of Africa – had by 1900 dwindled to some 9 million, owing to inter-tribal war, and, above all, to the slave raids by the Fulani . . . A rapid deterioration had . . . followed the decay of the religious zeal which had prompted the Fulani *jihad* . . . in 1900 the Fulani Emirates formed a series of separate despotisms, marked by the worst forms of wholesale slave-raiding, spoilation of the peasantry, inhuman cruelty and debased justice' (Lugard 1912-1919: 56). As a matter of fact, Dan Fodio, who led the revolution, compiled a list of enslavable ethnic groups on the grounds of their lack of profession of Islamic faith (see Willis 1985: 18).

[6] For glimpses of the personal insecurity that was clearly typical of Hausaland and northern Nigeria in the slave-trade era, see the folkloric story of the slave trade, *Shaibu Umar*, by Nigeria's first Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. For dramatic details of the civil strife occasioned by the slave trade in Yorubaland, see Mabogunje and Omer-Cooper (1971). And for a passionate discussion of the ravages of the slave trade and its horrifying effects on individuals in Iboland see Isichei (1976).

[7] See Muhammad (1985) for a version of the Arabian image of Africans. Starting from Ahmad Baba of Timbuktu (1556-1627), who had been captured during the Moroccan invasion of Songhai in 1591 and apparently maltreated in the Maghrib, the notion that Blacks were permanently enslavable had been attacked by some notable African Muslim scholars. While agreeing that certain pagan Blacks could be enslaved, Ahmad Baba rejected the doctrine that allowed the enslavement of known Muslim peoples as illegal: 'The Muslims among [the Blacks], like the people

of Kano, Katsina, Bornu, Gobir, and all of Songhai are Muslims, who are not to be owned. Yet some [Muslems] transgress on the others unjustly by invasion as do the Arabs, Bedouins, who transgress on free Muslims and sell them unjustly' (see Barbour and Jacobs 1985: 130–1). A more vigorous defence has come from a modern scholar Shaykh Musa Kamara who 'presents in his writings a constant antipathy to the slave condition' (see Hilliard 1985: 162). It is noteworthy that both scholars attacked the slanderous distortion of the myth of Noah's curse against his son Ham in the enslavement of Ham's children as justification for the enslavement of Blacks on the grounds that they hailed from Ham!

[8] As Marc Bloch has argued, the rise of feudalism in Western Europe (principally in England, France and Germany) was a reaction to the outside invasions – by the Hungarians from the East, Arabs from the South, and the Scandinavians from the North – which the traditional European state could not stem (1940: 3). But as he also contends there were important areas within Europe that were served by kinship principles, and where feudalism was not established: Scandinavia itself and the Celtic districts of the British Isles (1940: 142, 443).

[9] At the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation seminar at which this paper was first presented, Professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo remarked that in his native Burkina Faso taxation is translated from the French as 'nose-money', symbolically indicating its ability to cut off a man's life if not paid.

[10] See Myrdal's (1968: 941) perceptive statement: 'People's beliefs about the corruptibility of politicians and administrators would be in part a reflection of what they would like to do, given the means. If corruption is taken for granted, resentment amounts essentially to envy of those who have opportunities for private gain by dishonest dealings.'

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18 Africa in Search of a New Mode of Politics

ERNEST WAMBA-DIA-WAMBA

Introduction

We are living in a period of *political crisis*. Emancipatory (revolutionary or progressive) politics rooted in the fundamental masses of people – workers and poor peasants – is no longer incarnated by the existing dominant *historical modes of politics*. Theories of human and social emancipation and the practices they imply have suddenly become inoperative. This worldwide crisis has come to the fore with, among other things, the completion of the 'crisis of Marxism';[1] the breakdown of socialist states in Eastern Europe; the defeat of the Tien An Men insurrection[2] against Dengist modernist desocialization;[3] the defeat of the Sandinist as in Nicaragua; and the re-emergence in Africa, of uprisings of the masses (for democracy, or in bread riots etc.) against the IMF and World Bank supervised state paternalist or populist developmentalism.

We are in a period of crisis of the dominant historical modes of politics which have organized political processes since the nineteenth century. A *mode of politics*[4] is the specific way a particular politics functions as a process, as a system of decision-making, as practices and as an ideology internal to this process. Two dominant historical modes of politics have been specified: the parliamentarian mode of politics – which includes liberal democracy – and the Stalinian or Third International mode of politics. Neither the parliamentarian mode, nor the vanguard revolutionary party based Stalinian mode, support a process of human and social emancipation today. Mass enthusiasm for both modes has increasingly faded away.

Very briefly, the parliamentarian mode of politics subordinates parties under the state consensus. Ultimately, politics is reduced to a matter of numbers: the right of more votes is the foundation of its legality and legitimation. Politics is identified with the mere form of institutions (also called civil liberties) seen as mediations of freedom. Parties, in this mode, are not political organizations (i.e. operators of the internal conditions of political consciousness), but state organizations competing in the distribution of state positions.[5] They are internal to constitutions and operate on the basis of, and through, the constitutional and state system. Politics is, thus, reduced and geared to the occupation of state posts – and not their destruction. Multi-partyism defines, thus, a type of state. No guarantee is built in to force the state to be accountable to the large masses of people except through elections with long intervals.

The Stalinian mode of politics emerged after the end of the Bolshevik mode of politics[6] (defined as politics under conditions of revolutionary political consciousness) which existed from 1902–17. This mode ended with the armed insurrection of October 1917 which led to the seizure of state power and the transformation of the party into an organ of management of the socialist state. The Stalinian mode is not the same thing as the Soviet Union under Stalin (Stalinism); it refers to a politics, independent of the state, which existed through parties linked to the Third International – a formalist deviation from the Bolshevik mode, in which the revolutionary party is viewed as the condition of revolutionary political

consciousness. Politics, in this mode, is thus referred to the party; the party is finally, revolutionary politics and revolutionary politics is the party. Ultimately, politics is reduced to the organization or the building of the party. In the absence of socialism in a country, one must at least have a revolutionary organization, the party: 'If you want to make a revolution, you must have a revolutionary party'.

This mode – which subordinates politics under the idea of the One: *One Class, One Party, One State* – makes the party, as 'a detachment of the proletariat', into the political consciousness of proletarian politics.

Politics is confined to the party and the party as an organization is seen as the very content of that ideology. As the party is presented as the source of political truth, the Stalinian mode requires the credibility of the party. It is understandable that, in a workers' state there was a unitary equation: the state equals the party; making party adherence identical with submission to the state and consensus, if not unanimity. The notion of the state of the whole people is related to that position. People's thinking, all forms of consciousness not in line with the party, have to be suppressed. This was the basis of the purification of the party through purges, but space does not allow me to develop this further.

In the context of the bipolar world,[7] of super-power struggles for world hegemony, and of Cold War, the link between both modes of politics and people's emancipation was gradually broken. The modes tended to become bases of political alignment in their respective opposite camps. The politics of alliances in the so-called 'Free World' was organized on the basis of the parliamentarian mode and the socialist world (including those aspiring to be socialists) had its politics organized around the Stalinian mode of politics. Antagonism and crises connected with the bipolar world led ultimately to the abandonment of progressive and emancipatory politics. The basic needs and aspirations of the large masses of people ceased to be the objective basis of the modes of politics. The latter became *formal* political formulas being transferred and/or imposed on peripheral allies. Experiences of democracy-from-above and non-capitalist paths of development, or those of socialist-oriented states or movements could be understood in this perspective. With the de-construction of the welfare state in Western countries, the crisis of their mode of politics came to the fore. The rise of bureaucratic socialism, its crisis and collapse, revealed the crisis of the Stalinian mode of politics. It became possible in the West militarily to impose democracy on a country (e.g. Panama). The military protection of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, by the Soviet Union, pointed to the abandonment of emancipatory politics by those regimes. Communist Parties (in the West, etc.), already entertaining a form of bureaucratic socialism, gradually broke their links with the large mass of workers.

Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa

In Africa, even during the struggles for national independence, politics, with maybe a few exceptions, has been essentially referred to the state principle, i.e., that politics is the state and the state is politics. Not to a position of antagonism with the colonial state order – an organized form of consciousness – but referred to the replacement of colonialists inside the colonial state, i.e. to the occupation of the state posts. Political consciousness and state consciousness tended to be identical; the state tended, then, to be internalized even by those fighting or resisting it. This facilitated the emergence of 'territorial nationalism' as the foundation of post-colonial politics. Colonial history has something to do with the prevalence of this conception. The colonial state was a variant form of the state that Sheikh Anta Diop[8] called the 'state by conquest'. It is a state in which a conquering group refused to mix with the conquered ones and built its domination on that absolute separation. When the opposition was essentially ethnic, this eventually led to genocide. Most modern states fall into this category: states in North, Central and South America, Australia, New Zealand as well as South Africa. Here, the state does not correspond to a nation; a minority of the victorious conquerors imposes its law on the conquered, defeated majority through coercive state institutions conceived and built for that purpose.

Without going into details, the colonial state, in Africa, did not succeed in a complete genocide of the conquered, colonized people partly due to historical circumstances and

the fact that the resources needed to construct the state itself had to be generated by those very peoples. Colonies had to be self-reliant – this became the basis of their justification in the metropoles where the working-class movement was still strong. The first phase of the colonial state was based on brute force and its personnel was essentially composed of military forces, adventurers and psychopaths.[9] King Leopold II's Congo Free State, under the Red Rubber law of brute force, was a typical case. The second phase of the institutionalization of the colonial state was based on the systematic management of native labour as the basis of generation of state revenue. Various forms of forced labour – from coercive (correctional labour, compulsory labour, compulsory crop growing) to non-coercive ones (contracted labour, voluntary labour) – were organized. The Portuguese Labour Code for Natives was the most elaborate.[10] Specified forms of native collaboration ('indirect rule') were necessary to make this domination workable and bearable. Basically as an outcome of the consequences of the Second World War and the emerging social stratification, the decolonization phase of the colonial state introduced institutions – partially won through struggles by the colonized masses of people – allowing certain basic rights to colonized people. Although very important, this was a transformation within the colonial state and not the latter's destruction *per se*.

Parties or political platforms eventually organizing the movement for national independence were ultimately allowed. But, initially at least, these were based on colonial state organizations competing for the occupation of colonial state positions. In this preparation for neo-colonialism, only those political formations which treated the central matter of politics in the colonies – the colonial question – sapping thereby that preparation, were suppressed by the colonial state. Radicalization of the permitted parties or movements also took place, however, in the main, national independence was entrusted into hands favourable to neo-colonialism. This came, of course, after serious struggles through which the mass movement aimed at radicalizing some of the parties was ultimately defeated. From a political point of view, even to those who militated for emancipatory politics – complete abolition of colonial conditions of life – the occupation of the colonial state rather than the destruction of the colonial state itself was seen as the *condition* for the realization of such a politics. That is, the occupation of the machinery of the enemy rather, than its destruction and the deployment of a different machinery, was seen as the content of politics. The colonial state's limited adoption of the parliamentarian mode of politics in the decolonization phase, under the banner of modernization-cum-development (based on the problematic of transfer of models and technology, etc.), determined the political vision of the national independence movement. The analysis of African politics in terms of historical modes of politics remains to be done. This is necessary in order to make it possible to differentiate the African creative political *modernity*, among other things, from the mere adoption, by Africans, of a political model or formula – *modernization*. Ultimately, national independence was won on the basis of the abandonment of emancipatory politics rooted in the large masses of the people and their needs and aspirations. The constitutional frameworks taken from the colonialists, to be part of the machinery of government, were almost universally never submitted, through referendum, for approval by the large masses of people.

It is interesting to note that departing colonialists whose colonial state was the very opposite of a parliamentarian mode of politics, were the ones pushing for the variant of that mode through the constitutional frameworks they elaborated for the new independent countries. The coercive institutions created by the colonialists and the political identities and mentalities corresponding to them were not apparently taken into account. The civilization mission became the developing mission whose process was conceptualized as that of transforming, from above, a colonially carved territory into a nation-state. Did the colonialists know it would not work? In any case, former colonialists and former colonized people became 'partners in development'. And the former colonial state – now in modernizers' hands – became the agency *par excellence* of such development.

At independence a variant of a parliamentarian mode of politics existed. The resulting state-parties system was not far from the colonial state in its decolonization phase. Leaders of the newly independent countries, whose occupation of colonial state positions was viewed as the objective and the realization of conditions of an emancipatory politics of self-determination, adopted the colonial state treatment of matters of politics: treatment of differences among

the people – democracy, the national question or tribalism, the factory as site of politics, etc. Very quickly, their policies led to the same massacres as those of the colonial period: workers' strikes were being suppressed by firing, secessions and secessionist tendencies, cries of the national question were dealt with militarily, cultural unevenness was handled through imposed assimilationism, etc.

It would appear, for example, that the internal factor responsible for the so-called 'Congo crisis' was the absence of (due to the collapse or the end of) a progressive independent mode of politics, correctly treating the development of processes as matters of politics, shortly after the proclamation of independence. Existing parties were often confusing politics with ideology; in fact, in the absence of politics, ideology became politics and having a revolutionary sounding ideology was seen to be enough to make the state serve and be accountable to the people. Holders of a 'revolutionary ideology' were supposed, once in power, to move the state to the left to make it attentive to the needs and aspirations of the masses. In the main, parties condoned the state treatment, essentially colonialist, of post-colonial workers' strikes, secessions, army mutinies, tribalism, etc. and this fact deepened the crisis.

Even the 'national movements', whose ideology was radical, tended to refer their viewpoint on national independence to external factors (occupation of colonial state positions, external aid to resist against imperialism, adoption of already made models – making it difficult to grasp 'national historicity' and to identify and treat problems correctly as matters of politics). This tended to consolidate the colonial state logic, i.e. territorial nationalism. In my humble opinion, important elements of Lumumba's political programme – the necessity of the unity of the country along the lines and logic of the colonial state and the necessity for one national Party (viewed as the nation organized as one family) – have been implemented by Mobutu. Lumumbist attempts at overthrowing Mobutu's regime, though a variant of the same politics, thus seem illogical and ineffective.

Despite intense anti-imperialist struggle – centered around those against apartheid, Portuguese and settlerist colonialism – and under the pretext of the post-colonial project of developmentalist nation-building, very much rooted in the colonial legacy (the generation of surplus to ship abroad, by starving masses of people), progressive and emancipated politics was gradually abandoned. Add to this the impact of the Cold War which, starting with the Congo crisis, made of Africa another terrain of conflicts between East and West in struggles for world hegemony. Under the pretext of containing the spread of communism to Africa, the West supported militarily the most authoritarian dictatorships. Even the neocolonial variant of the state-parties (shorthand for the parliamentarian mode), left by departing colonialists, was with few exceptions, on and off, seen as an obstacle to 'rapid development' and 'national unity' and was ultimately abandoned. Mobutu's regime, for example, forged in the very process of dismantling the mass armed insurrection for the 'Second Independence',[11] and solidly supported by the US-led West, became increasingly authoritarian and repressive. France continued intervening militarily in internal conflicts leading to the consolidation of tyrannical regimes in some countries of Francophone Africa. Ultimately, the party-state absolutism became the dominant form of rule in Africa.

As far as theories and practices of state power and the organization of the economy are concerned, despite the fact that African countries were colonized and decolonized by Western powers, it is the Soviet (bureaucratic socialist) regimes which seem to have served these countries as *models*.[12] One party or one party-state, a bureaucratic and patrimonial management of the economy, the seizure and control of the state and its foreign policy by a gang of people speaking in the name of the common interest ('national unity', 'national development'), the scope of the repressive apparatuses (leading to cases of political assassinations, persecution of opponents, etc.), legal arbitrariness, censorship of mass media and cultural, intellectual and spiritual productions, etc. are elements which became common to almost all African post-colonial regimes. Society increasingly became *statized*: society is forced to service the state which is controlled by an authoritarian gang of people. This is true not only for the once self-styled Marxist-Leninist regimes of Ethiopia, Benin, Angola, Mozambique, Congo-Brazzaville or the so-called popular regimes of Burkina Faso and Ghana, but even for those which are closely linked to Western capitalist powers: the authoritarian bureaucracies of Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Togo, Gabon, Zaire, Kenya, etc. The distinction

between regimes of Marxist orientation and regimes of capitalist orientation or between civilian regimes and military ones has been unduly exaggerated. These regimes of African authoritarian bureaucratic centralism have increasingly led to the general feeling of the impossibility and absence of politics.

Various attempts at developing opposition politics to transform those state-party centred authoritarian regimes have often ended with failures. In some cases, armed struggles had to be attempted to overthrow developmentalist states without much success either. When successful, the newly established regimes were not so far away from the ones overthrown. With the deepening of the economic crisis, the situation has somewhat worsened. The party state (or the one dominant party-state) systems, subordinated to the International Monetary fund/World Bank control, have become increasingly corrupt and terrorist with regard to their own people.

Naturally, the very handling of the economic crisis itself has not been made a process of politics, but, instead, it has been completely referred to the logic of state imposition, in conformity with the IMF/WB restrictions, outside of mass participation, i.e. outside of, or in the absence of, a progressive, emancipatory politics. The 'freezing' of workers' economic rights and the abandonment of a 'State social welfare' policy have been retained as the conditions of the so-called 'economic recovery'. Recently, in Uganda – a variant of the state-parties system – party activities have been suspended to deal with the economic crisis.

Besides economic crisis, African countries are undergoing *social, ideological* and *political* crises. The absence of a democratic politics inside the people themselves – a consequence of the statization of society – has made people become unable to restrain the state in its exclusivist or symmetrized treatment of difference (whether of nationality, gender, intellectual/manual labour, levels of education, etc.). In the face of the maltreatment of refugees, women and national minorities, for example, people have been made to watch this passively. Political refugees seeking asylum have been forcibly returned to their own state's butchers. Societies have been plunged increasingly into a social crisis. Society has become divided into two: those with guaranteed interest – no matter how insignificant – and those without any interest or even rights. Any state treatment of differences (citizen/non-citizen, male/female, etc.) has been made socially acceptable and in quality has become accepted as a *natural* element: the right of the fittest. Even accountability has been redefined as a technical matter, as performance rather than a democratic issue. The idea of an Africa of peoples which arose in the late 1950s – leading to the *all African peoples' conferences* – has become impossible and absent in peoples' forms of consciousness. The state has no difficulty in opposing one group (refugees or university students for example) against society.

As a consequence of the state management of the working class, through the one state 'trade-union', and of state terrorism against 'non-authorized' workers' strikes, there is an absence of factory workers' resistance serving as the leading core of popular resistance in the political processes involving or concerning the entire population in their deviation, or autonomy, from the state. This has been aggravating the state division of the people, reinforcing the state forms of mediation within the population, and thus complicating the process of unification of the people. The struggle against imperialist domination, especially in its IMF/WB form, has become difficult to sustain. The statization of the youth through state-party organs has also blocked, in many African countries, student militance, and its social and ethical criticism of society. This has gone hand in hand with the often repeated closing of universities or schools. All these elements of the social crisis are important factors for politics but are not matters of politics *per se*. In themselves, they do not even generate a political capacity.

Confronted with situations of economic and social crisis, given their hostility to new and different ideas, the ruling forces have become unable to propose a *coherent system of values*, from so-called Authenticity to various African or other socialisms. Alienation from the masses, and disguised (or not) reliance on imperialism have been the rule. For example, Zaire's contract with the German OTRAG; Mozambique's Nkomati Accord; the acceptance of nuclear waste disposal on the continent, and the official smuggling out of national resources by state officials, have marked the ideological and cultural bankruptcy of the ruling forces. Cynicism, with the withering away of the credibility of 'official ideologies', has arisen. Religious

fundamentalism or syncretism have also been on the rise. Developmentalism, as an ideology arising from the imperialist propounded doctrines of development, given the state's incapacity to provide even for mere survival, has failed to be the answer to the ideological crisis. The same process leading to underdevelopment cannot at the same time generate general development or provide for it.

In Africa, the political crisis, made more obvious by the collapse of socialist states in Eastern Europe, is also specific. The credibility of the party on which the party-state authoritarian system arose has been exposed and put into question. Here too the party-state system has been functioning on the basis of what East Germans have called *state paternalism*[13] or what Algerians call *state populism*.[14] The practices of state security (kidnapping, harassment, violation of privacy, etc.) have contradicted that populism. Certain state-party decisions, such as the adoption of IMF/WB proposals and programmes, for example, have brought to the fore the fact that the political ideology governing the party-state has an *arbitrary character*, i.e. it is a *system of lies*. The open state repression unleashed against mass movements (of striking workers, students, lecturers, etc.) whose demands are *socially legitimate* (the state to guarantee regular payment of teachers' wages, the necessity of a living salary for producers to produce or just to live, academic freedom, etc.); the functioning of the so-called party mass mobilization, as the process of subordinating the people under state control and terrorism (intimidating the people, forcing them to service the state rather than the state servicing the people); the imposition of many types of taxes without the people having anything substantive to show as gains from those taxes; as well as the continuously rising foreign debt: all these aggravate the crisis of the credibility of the party-state system. People want and support efforts to improve the economy; it is, however, clear to them that the whole process is just geared towards the enrichment of the few on the back of the many – while the latter are required to remain silent and docile. The political ideology governing the party is increasingly manifested as *mere opportunism* with the most unproductive and idle so-called high cadres being the most highly paid! All the talk about austerity measures, in the face of this, is thus unconvincing; opportunism shows through.

On issues requiring people's solidarity with other peoples in the world (China, Romania, South Africa, Lithuania, etc.) the party vacillates. The party-state itself creates imaginary threats as occasions and pretexts to reinforce itself and to justify state terrorism. The party has been viewed as the site of politics and the source of political truth; the people, on the other hand, have been viewed as being *politically immature* in performance. It is not clear when and how they may become mature. Is not this fundamentally a trait of the colonial legacy as well? People are seen as incapable of correct and responsible thought; there is no positive need for the party to find out *what* the people are actually thinking, especially on what society should be like. The people, of course, are required to think as the party tells them! Refusing the people the right to think, the party relates to the people in the same way as state security. The autonomization of the processes of people relating to themselves (democracy), is perceived by the party-state system as a *security threat*. In Zaire even the Cardinal was expected, even theologically, to think what the Parti-Etat (MRP) thought and said (i.e. Mobutism). And when the party-state system admitted *publicly* to be *corrupt*, the process of redressing the situation, the so-called 'struggle or war against corruption' organized by the system itself was again referred to the same corrupting process outside of a politics which relies on the masses of people!

It was under these circumstances, as briefly described, that the events in Eastern Europe boosted the on-going people's struggles against state-party absolutism and authoritarianism and made them embrace the wind of democracy blowing through the world. Movements for democracy, demanding that gangs of those controlling the party-state system (in the name of common interest or fatherly paternalism) resign, came to the fore on the continent. Demands for multi-partyism have, in this regard, often been voiced. It is hoped that multi-partyism will make it possible to wipe out the party-state absolutism. While attempts at organizing internal reforms of the corrupt systems are going on (Gabon, Zaire, Benin, Madagascar, Ivory Coast, etc.) no party-state system has, so far, collapsed. Calls for the organization of democratic national conferences, bringing together all the existing political tendencies, freely to discuss the future of the countries, have also been made. However,

no comprehensive assessment has been made of the past failures of the experiences of the parliamentarian mode of politics. How and why did party-state absolutism emerge? Can multi-partyism bring about emancipatory politics in Africa? Why did it fail to do so before? In Africa, too emancipatory or progressive politics will only come about under certain conditions. The challenge is to specify these conditions and determine the process and operation of their realization, so that it can be clearly seen whether or not multi-partyism is one of the conditions, or the only condition.

The Collapse of 'Real Socialism' – What Next?

Socialist politics has been the main source of inspiration in the African struggles for social and people's emancipation. The crisis of 'bureaucratic socialism' in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and the collapse of people's democracies in Eastern Europe seem to have dried up that source. Solutions to that crisis may open up a new source of inspiration in the search for a solution in Africa. A brief examination of the crisis of 'bureaucratic socialism' is thus in order.

Bureaucratic socialism, a variant of socialism-from-above, emerged from dominance in post-revolutionary states (USSR, China, etc.) and post-1945 Eastern European countries on the basis of the abandonment of progressive and emancipatory politics[15] upholding the interest of the large masses of the working people – workers and poor peasants. It was incarnated by a rising group of 'bureaucratic intelligentsia' (described by Mao Ze-dong as a 'bourgeoisie of a new type') and refers to a system of 'socialist states' which became corrupt and terrorist in relation to their own people. These states are based on two fundamental functioning characteristics: the existence of a state-party where the party fused with the state and the statization of the means of production, especially the factories.

Two types of bureaucratic socialism can be distinguished (with socio-democracy, three types of socialism-from-above can be distinguished).[16] In countries such as the USSR, China and Vietnam it rose to dominance after a real internal revolutionary process. In Eastern Europe, however, with the exception of Albania and Yugoslavia, socialism was essentially imposed, at the end of the Second World War under the supervision of the Soviet military occupation. There existed, of course, internal forces supporting it. In a real sense, these so-called people's democracies, whose economies were forced to be dependent on that of the USSR,[17] were specific types of 'neo-colonies' in the context of the bipolar world.

According to Lenin, in *State and Revolution*, socialism could be defined as a dialectic opposing proletarian dictatorship exercised through a party-state system, to independent mass movements. The evolution of this system depended on how this contradiction was treated.[18] Continuing suppression of these mass movements led to the development of bureaucratic socialism. In Eastern European countries particularly, the 'neo-colonial' constraint of Soviet domination had a bearing on the way those movements had to be suppressed. That is why, for example, the Soviet regime's refusal to intervene, under *perestroika* and *glasnost*, had a catalytic impact on the collapse of the party-state system in the Soviet Union.

The rise of centralist bureaucratic socialism to prominence, despite reformist and cultural revolutionary mass movements against it, brought to the fore the completion of the 'crisis of Marxism'. Basic references to Marxism as a victorious revolutionary politics were eroded. Not only did socialist states become corrupt and terrorist *vis-à-vis* their own working people; the working class, misled by increasingly revisionist communist parties became unable to come up with a revolutionary political project and capacity; and radical national liberation movements gave rise to regimes which became unable to carry out, beyond national independence, any social emancipation – gradually they became authoritarian, corrupt and terrorist as well.

Struggles against tendencies towards bureaucratic socialism (often described as 'modern revisionism') in revolutionary movements, world-wide, go very far back. From struggles around workers' control culminating in the crushing of the Kronstadt Rebellion,[19] and anti-revolutionary cultural mass movements (the great Proletarian Revolution in China, the French May–June 1968, the Black Liberation Movement in the USA, the Black consciousness movement in South Africa, etc.) up to the 1989 mass uprisings in Eastern Europe and the

Tien An Men insurrection, the targets attacked have been similar centralist bureaucratic socialist tendencies, despotism, privileges and corruption in socialist States, revisionism, 'social-fascism', or racism in communist parties and trade-unions, for example.[20] The resignation of some African intellectuals (G. Padmore, A. Césaire, etc.) from communist parties or the exodus of southern Sudanese Marxists from the Communist Party of Sudan, etc. point to similar targets. Without going into details, what has been often aimed at in these struggles is a conception of politics which is *open, democratic, pluralist* in its processes and relying on the large masses of people.[21] Failure to achieve this objective led to the consolidation of bureaucratic socialism. At the same time, the failure of socialist states particularly to completely suppress the struggles of the masses of workers, peasants, and intellectuals, against it, has led to its economic, social, political and ideological crisis, and its collapse in Eastern Europe.[22]

What solutions have been proposed to handle this crisis? In the USSR and China, attempts have been made, and continue to be made, at reforming this crisis of bureaucratic socialism, from within the state-party system. Policies of 'struggle against corruption' – made from within the corrupt system and implemented by the same corrupt system, mechanisms aimed at easing the functioning of state regulations, and introducing partially free elections, the introduction of sectors of market economy, etc. have been put into practice. These reforms have given rise to considerable troubles within their respective social and national formations. In the USSR, especially, due to the past centralist way of treating the national question, nationalism has arisen. In the main, reforms have not so far resolved the general crisis.[23] The defeat of the Tien An Men insurrection, despite international pressures, has temporarily consolidated the very corrupt system in China without having completely resolved its general crisis. The Centralist tendencies seem to have been reinforced. In Eastern Europe, the state-party system has collapsed and people have been tempted to agitate for the state-parties system (multi-partyism) and/or for political organizations other than parties (eg. forums) viewed as operators of an open, democratic, pluralist and people based politics.

In the context of the bipolar world, the crisis and collapse of one side gives the impression of the victory and superiority of the other. The political death of bureaucratic socialism has propelled the politics of parliamentarianism to a hegemonic position. Celebrants of capitalism in the West, especially, have seized the occasion to intensify the propaganda for a free market economy and multi-party democracy. Self-styled Marxist-Leninist regimes and parties have very quickly dropped any reference to Marxism – not necessarily as required by any local mass movement *per se*, but to go with the world current.

To restrict or destroy the state-party monopoly of political truth, state paternalism or populism ('these factories belong to workers, strikes are unjustified'), three theses have arisen. The first thesis is that of internal reforms *à la Gorbachev* and *à la Chinoise*. It is essentially a centrist reformist line claiming to transform the existing state-party system (from 'bureaucratic socialism' to 'constitutional or liberal socialism')[24] while at the same time concentrating power around the presidency, rejecting the law of grand capital, while excluding any suggestions of making major factories the sites of political processes. Whereas some sectors are open to the laws of the market, strikes are forbidden in the so-called strategical state factories. This is a very unstable political line. Failing to be rooted on new progressive political orientations upholding workers' interests, it has unleashed, without being able to control them, troubles related to the national question in the former USSR itself (Azerbadjian, Armenia, Lithuania, etc.) as well as outside it, leading to the re-emergence of classical German nationalism in Central Europe, racist tensions in Bulgaria, nationality tensions in Romania, growing anti-Semitic expressions etc. Clearly, economic sanctions, to resolve some of those troubles, do not constitute a category of emancipatory politics. Decentralization from above may not solve democratically the national question.

China has not gone as far as the former USSR. Its handling of the Tien An Men insurrection, through armed aggression, seems to have definitely killed whatever remained of a 'people-based' character of the state-party system: the people's army seems to have been transformed into a simple repressive force. The troubles are not over yet. Nevertheless, the fact that part of the army refused to fire on the students was still remarkable.[25]

The second thesis has been to consolidate civil society politically while at the same time

make all the political organizations and reform parties (Stalinian ones having been discarded) participate in the competition for State posts. This has led more or less, to a state-parties (multi-party) system with a consolidated civil society (exercising a right of recall), a de-statized civil society trying to restrain the state (making sure that notoriously known corrupt people be ejected from state positions). This line is also unstable as it is effective only if accountability is a permanent process, i.e. if the civil society has a permanent right of recall at any moment. The government may be made unable to manage the country's affairs and 'market forces' may become paramount.

The third thesis, illustrated at one time by Poland, has been to consolidate politically through *autonomous* political organizations other than vanguard parties, gravitating around the workers and factories. Society is supposed to develop, under working-class leadership (through forms of consciousness) a clear distinction between society and the state. Political organizations here refrain from contesting for state positions or seizing state power. Instead of society serving the state, the empowered society should make the state serve it. Here multi-partyism is not viewed as a key element, even if it is present. Politics is defined through a multiplicity of sites of politics (the factory as a site of politics; religion or culture as matters of politics; communities; schools; the peasantry, etc.) relying on the societal leadership of the working-class masses, independently organized through factories and communities. The treatment of matters of politics through those sites – and led by militants – was supposed to consolidate the unity of society forcing the state to be accountable to the whole people. This conception is far away from the Leninist thesis of the poly-functionality of the state-party, of leading the state and also leading, against the state, independent working-class mass movements. The recent evolution of Poland seems to show that this thesis is also unstable – Poland seems to have relapsed into multi-party democracy and the market economy.

Very briefly, against the state-party absolutism in society and economy – Eastern European, Soviet, and Chinese – mass movements have put forth democracy without vanguard parties (separation of parties from the state), and the market economy with the view to catch up with the Western level of development (especially consumption). In Eastern Europe especially, the question of the relationship between politics and economy emerged as that between democracy and development. But an unregulated market economy and liberal democracy, judged by the rising mass disillusionment, has not resolved the issue.

Celebrants of the victory of democracy, in the West, are noticing that their own countries are still undergoing crisis and that even the so-called just cause of imposing democracy abroad is not bringing solutions to the economic, social, political and ideological crisis in those countries. The Gulf War has underlined the imperialist character of Western democracies. The politics of democracy and market economy required by the emerging 'new international order' may not uphold the basic interests of the large masses of the working people in the world. We are headed towards a prolonged world political crisis. Neither the state, the party, nor the market seem to be operators of a politics of social emancipation – this is the challenge.

An Emancipatory Mode of Politics

Progressive politics does not always exist; when it exists, it does so under conditions whose realization gives rise to a concrete mode of politics. What are the conditions in Africa, for emancipatory politics to exist? Specification of these conditions is necessary for a determination of a corresponding mode of politics. Instead of just comparing the merits and demerits of multi-partyism against those of the existing single party-state absolutism, the best approach is to specify those conditions.

In Africa, we must move away from the unpatriotic 'territorial nationalism'[26] of compradore modernizers, a process of 'nation-building-from-above', rooted in a colonial legacy and insisting on political unanimity ('national unity'). This process has blocked people's creativity and mass enthusiasm and complicated the treatment of differences among the people by the people themselves. We must move away from developmentalism which is based on a mere transfer of economic, cultural, political and social models arrived at through an outside controlled process of decision-making. We must de-construct the colonial legacy and the fixity of traditions (traditions invented or imagined by colonialists and claimed to be African

and adopted as such by Africans); these 'traditions' are used to justify, embellish and make bearable, the post-colonial state which we have to de-imperialize. Thus, we must move away from the process of 'de-indigenizations' of 'traditional society' and 'indigenization' of the colonial state. Our economies have continued to be 'denationalized'[27] i.e. privatized by international capital, keeping them away from the possible control by the African people through their 'democratic state' yet to be constructed. We must have control over our integration into the world economy. We must democratize the knowledge process now completely dominated by the outside. Without a new historical mode of politics, a new vision of politics, which would demarginalize the large masses of people (women, youth, workers, poor peasants, people-without-identity, the invisible majority), de-freezing their creativity and allowing them to move themselves to the centre stage of history-making in our countries, we cannot succeed.

Politics (political capacity, political consciousness), the active prescriptive relationship to reality, exists under the condition of people who believe that politics must exist. Marx and Engels assigned to proletarians the modern revolutionary capacity of realizing communism; this has not been fulfilled. Lenin thought that there was no revolutionary capacity other than political capacity. Proletarians may have this capacity under the conditions that they satisfy the requirements and conditions of that politics. They must take a position on politics i.e. take a position on the factory, on the question of the state and power, on the question of war and national liberation. That is, they must have political consciousness; a merely spontaneous class instinct (trade-unionist consciousness) would not do. Fanon assigned that capacity to the rebelling peasants; Cabral assigned it to intellectuals who have committed class suicide. Generally, in Africa, the tendency has been to assign it to the state (including the party and liberation movements functioning really as state structures) *per se*. Unfortunately, the state cannot transform or redress itself: it kills this prescriptive relationship to reality by imposing consensual unanimity. Internalization, by people, of the state, and state orientation in handling, for example, differences among the people, provokes self-censorship in people and arrests political consciousness.

Politics has *militants* and *sites*.[28] Sites are constituted by the development of the treatment of matters of politics. The factory is a site of politics, the assembly in the ancient Greek democracy, the Convention in the French Revolution, the Palaver[29] (where the collective open mutual self-questioning and self-criticism takes place as a way of treating differences among the people), the *Mbongi*[30] (lineage assembly), and perhaps now the national conference (when it is independent of the state) in Africa are sites of politics. Without those sites, politics ceases. Both the state-parties and the party-state systems refused to see the factory as being more than a simple place for production of commodities. Both systems think of the people, as a whole, as simply a guarantee for the state.

Politics is not in the party, because it does not always exist even when parties do. The party is often incorrectly viewed as a timeless instrument or organ of modern politics. In Africa, it is just adopted as a simple tool, formula or technology; its historicity is never problematized. In its present form, the party emerged after the failure of the Paris Commune (1871) and the rise of imperialist states.[31] It would take too long to discuss here the transformations, the crisis and the collapse of the party and the party form. The fact is today that every party incarnates a state project. Parties have increasingly ceased to be political organizations whether they be in power or in the opposition; they propose to us the state, the government as the exclusive reference for consciousness. Parties in opposition, instead of treating matters of politics, work to ultimately replace the one in power. The thrust of progressive politics is to be separated from the state. It is not possible to achieve a democratic state, i.e. a state that is transparent to, rather than destructive of, people's viewpoints, if people only 'think' state, internalize state and thus self-censor themselves.

Politics exists through historical modes, whether the revolutionary mode of Saint-Just and Robespierre, the Bolshevik mode of Lenin, the Stalinist mode of communist parties, or the parliamentarian mode of the consensus over the supremacy of the law of commodity. In Africa, we must work and militate for a new mode of politics.

In Africa too, emancipatory politics will be a politics without parties but through *political* organizations. The difficulty we are facing is that the categories we use (mass organization,

civil society, movements, etc.) are party related categories. Our starting point must be: in Africa too, *people think* and this is the sole material basis of politics. We must investigate the internal content of what they actually think. It is through an analysis of these forms of consciousness that we will grasp the forms of political consciousness characterizing the antagonism with the existing overall socio-political order. It is only a political organiza-tion – necessitated by political (as opposed to state) treatment of matters of politics – which can understand that there are at least two situations in contemporary societies: the factory (including the plantation and home) as a site of politics, and secondly the processes involving the whole people in the latter's deviations from the state. These are processes of political judgement, in which a deviation takes place from the consensual unanimity entertained by the state routine. This leads to the realization that progressive politics has *several sites* and a *multiplicity of processes*: localized processes like in the factory, and open (to all) processes involving all categories of people without privileging anyone of them. An open process is an extended *Mbongi*, a certain type of assembly in which a Palaver – animated by militants – takes place.

Emancipatory politics, in Africa, will not exist just because parties exist. It is because the party-state has collapsed and is politically and perhaps historically dead – even if it lingers on in some places – that the state-parties system is knocking at our door. Multi-partyism, replacing the single party-state, would not enhance the emergence of political consciousness; that is why even imperialism is agitating for the exportation of multi-partyism (making it an extra aid conditionality). This is reflected in the contradictory character of the African movement for democracy: the national conference is much more of a site of politics than the parties. Will these parties jeopardize the success of such conferences?

Multiplicity of sites of politics calls for a pluralist structure. We need a workers' committee (workers' cell, leading core) in the factory/plantation and not a trade union (specified by a link to a party in a Stalinian mode, or to a state under the state-parties system) leading the process to the abolition of the factory as a system of exploitation and despotism. But also the existence of such a committee highlights the fact that workers as a group are capable of making politics. We need popular committees (assemblies?), for everybody without anyone group being privileged, for other processes of politics: people's treatment of the differences within the people-democracy, people's treatment of many great differences (intellec-tual/manual labour, male/female, city/countryside, industry/agriculture, etc.), people's treat-ment of the question of national identity (historicity of the national question, multi-ethnic identity, cultural/linguistic decentralization, etc.), and people's treatment of the question of imperialist domination, etc. Together various militants of these political forms of political organization will serve as secretariats in charge of the political intellectuality of this mode of politics. Let me say, in passing, that a militant is not a representative of any group; that is why the basic method of work of the militant is to take a public statement for investigation and debate at various sites of politics.

It is through a scheme like the one briefly suggested above, that peoples' viewpoints on matters of politics, as opposed to that of the state and parties, will be kept alive, and that the state can be contained, made accountable and democratized. Regulations aimed at silencing people's political viewpoints must be made the first target for a politics of democracy and social emancipation to develop. If multi-partyism can achieve the eradication of those regulations then, as a transition to a new mode of politics, struggles for multi-partyism may be tactically supported

I have tried to show that dominant historical modes of politics, now in crisis, cannot resolve the world-wide political crisis we are facing. For a long time, since perhaps the Atlantic slave trade, African peoples have barely been responsible for their own self-emancipation; they, instead, have been the subject of 'Western Charity' (abolitionists, missionaries, colonialist civilizers, neo-colonialist partners in African 'development', etc.). Short of a new mode of politics, capable of making the large masses of people responsible independently of the state (repressive or paternalist/populist) problematic, we are headed as elsewhere, towards pro-longed crisis. This consciousness emerges and develops through the active participation in the development and treatment of processes of matters political. When this participation is stopped, the consciousness is replaced by the internationalization of the state perspective and

the ensuing self-censorship. The party, in its present form, cannot enhance this development; nor can a multi-partyism which reduces politics to a matter of numbers. In this process of regaining a sense of responsibility for themselves, the large masses of people can be reactivated and extended, through those traditions of the Palaver and the fire-place assembly (*Mbongi*, and *Baraza*) that were attacked, denigrated and destroyed by both colonialist and post-colonialist states.

These are just preliminary reflections to serve – hopefully as a basis of discussion and research – on questions of vital interest to our African countries.

Notes

[1] This question has been well treated in: Alain Badiou (1985), *Peut-on penser la politique?* Paris: Editions du Seuil. Also: Wamba-dia-Wamba (1990), 'The "Crisis of Marxism" and some of its Implications', in *Philosophy and Social Action*, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 7–22.

[2] Sylvain Lazarus, Valerio Romitelli, Claudia Pozzana & Sandro Russo (1990), 'Dialogue autour de Tien An Men: Les Entretiens de Bologne', in *Le Perroquet*, Nos 86–87, March.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Sylvain Lazarus (1985), *Peut-on penser la politique en intériorité?* Paris: Les Conférences du Perroquet, No. 4, November.
Sylvain Lazarus (1988), *La Catégorie de révolution dans la Révolution Française.* Paris: Les Conférences du Perroquet, No. 15, March.
Sylvain Lazarus (1989), *Lénine et le temps.* Paris: Les Conférences du Perroquet, No. 18, March.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Paul Kennedy (1989), *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.* London: Fontana Press.

[8] Sheikh Anta Diop (1981), *Civilisation ou barbarie?* Paris/Dakar: *Présence africaine.*

[9] See Crawford Young (1984), 'The Colonial State and its Connections to the Current Crisis in Africa'. Colloquium Paper, Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars. Washington DC, 29 May.

[10] Makidi-ku-Ntima (1983), 'Class Struggle and the Making of the Revolution in Angola', in Bernard Magubane and Nzongola–Ntalaja (eds), *Proletarianization and Class Struggle in Africa.* San Francisco: Synthesis Publications, pp. 119–41.

[11] The history of this insurrection is well discussed in: Ludo Martens (1985), *Pierre Mulele ou la second vie de Patrice Lumumba.* Anvers: Editions EPO. Also: E. Wamba-dia-Wamba (1987), 'Struggle for the "Second Independence" in Congo, Kinshasa', in *Utafiti*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 31–68.

[12] Achile Mbembe (1990), 'Régimes en crise, pauvreté et insubordination généralisée: L' Afrique noire va imploser', in *Le Monde diplomatique*, April, pp. 10–11.

[13] Bernard Dréano *et al.* (1989), *Aufbruch 89–L' Opposition démocratique Est-Allemande par elle-même.* Paris: Presse d'Aujourd'hui.

[14] Ali El-Kenz (ed.) (1989), *L'Algérie et la modernité.* Dakar: CODESRIA.

[15] A very interesting analysis of 'bureaucratic socialism' is given in an unsigned article in: *La Lettre des secrétaires de l'organisation politique.* (Paris), No. 6, April 1990, pp. 3–4.

[16] Manning Marable (1989), 'Beyond Stalinism and Social Democracy; Towards an American Socialism-from-below', unpublished MS.

[17] This dependency is analysed in: Michel Beaud (1989), *L'Economie mondiale dans les années 80*, chapter 6. Paris: Editions la découverte.

[18] It is asserted, for example in note 2, that China has been a socialist country because of the protracted existence of independent mass movements.

[19] Maurice Brinton (1970), *The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control, 1917 to 1921: The State and Counter Revolution*, London: Solidarity.

[20] J. Sakai (1983), *The Mythology of the White Proletariat: A Short Course in Understanding Babylon.* Chicago, I1.: New Publications List/CDL. Also, The Proletarian Unity League (1977), *Two, Three, Many Parties of a New Type? Against the Ultra-Left Line.* New York: United Labour Press.

[21] See *Journal de l'organisation politique* No. 2, February 1986; No. 4, July 1987; and *Rédaction du Perroquet: Les Invisibles.* Les Conférences du Perroquet, No. 10, March 1987.

[22] See Henri Simon (1985), *Poland: 1980–1982: Class Struggle and the Crisis of Capital.* Detroit: Black and Red; Cyril Smuga, (1987), 'A Year of Debates in Solidarnosc', in *International Viewpoint*, Issue 125, 14 September; Wamba-dia-Wamba (1990), 'Democracy in Eastern Europe: Preliminary Theses on Movements and Uprisings', in *Forward Motion*, pp. 28–30, May.

[23] See various issues of *Le Monde diplomatique* since 1989. Also: *Le Monde diplomatique, du communisme réel à l'ambition démocratique*, Manière de voir 7, February 1990 and *La Paix des grands, l'espoir des pauvres.* Manière de voir 4, February 1989.

[24] The concept, 'constitutional socialism' emerged in the USSR.

[25] It was reported (note 2) that most of the Chinese troops refused to use armed aggression against the students. The authorities had to bring in troops from Mongolia (which did not therefore speak Chinese) and the veterans of the war (of punishment) against Vietnam.

[26] E. Wamba-dia-Wamba (1990), 'The National Question in Africa: A Colonial Legacy,' in *Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly*, Vol. 3, No. 4, February, pp. 30–5.

[27] Jacques Depelchin has studied the 'denationalization' of the economy of Congo-Zaire – in: *Congo-Zaire: How Belgium Denationalized the Economy*. Dakar: CODESRIA, forthcoming.

[28] *La Lettre des secrétaires, op. cit.*; pp. 1–2.

[29] I have studied this question in: *Experiences of Democracy in Africa: Reflections on Practices of Communalist Palaver as a Social Method of Resolving Contradictions among the People*, unpublished MS, 1987, in French: E. Wamba-dia-Wamba (1985), '*La Palabre comme pratique de la critique et de l'autocritique sur le plan de toute la communauté*', in *Journal of African Marxists*, Issue 7, March, pp. 35–50.

[30] K. Kia Bunseki, Fu-Kiau (1985), *Mbongi: An African Traditional Political Institution*. Roxbury, MA: Omenana.

[31] Sylvain Lazarus, *Lénine et le temps, op. cit.*

VI SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS & SOCIAL ORGANIZATION Public Administration Education & Mass Communications

19 Development Theory & Public Administration in Africa

Controversies, Dilemmas & Openings   AFRIFA K. GITONGA

The General Context

In an unpublished paper outlining the so-called ISENPAD project,[1] Professor Ulf Him-melstrand observes that '. . . development theory is in a state of bankruptcy'.[2] In a revised version of the same paper, he makes much the same assertion, that '. . . development theory is in a state of . . . insolvency'.[3] Whatever the nuance, however, the point is clear: current theories purporting to describe, explain and predict the process of development, especially in Africa, are fatally flawed, defective and of little if any value for intellectual, practical and concrete purposes. In other words, they are, by and large, scientifically invalid.

Observations of this kind are notorious and seem to be becoming more and more the order of the day. Professor Archie Mafeje of the American University in Cairo, for example, notes that the 'indispensability of the African social scientists (with the exception of economists) . . . cannot be proved'.[4] As for the social sciences in general, Professor D. W. McKinney observes that after decades of efforts and the expenditure of immeasurable amounts of time, energy, money and other resources of all kinds, they have ended in a 'failure to produce demonstrable knowledge'.[5]

Many other scholars of note have come to broadly very similar kinds of conclusion. They include Professor Samir Amin who, commenting on the ISENPAD project, notes that 'There is a need for a severe criticism of all varieties of development theories . . . only the most conservative and doctrinaire proponents of [the] various approaches remain unaware of the crisis and the need for a re-assessment of existing doctrines.'[6] In a similar vein, Professor Anyang' Nyong'o also observes that 'Nowhere in the annals of African political thought do we really find any solid theory of African politics.'[7]

If such eminent stalwarts of social science scholarship, and many others like them have come to such conclusions, then it means that something is seriously wrong with the epistemology, methodology and technology used in the social sciences to generate knowledge. In other words, the paradigmatic framework or paradigms used in the social sciences to gather, analyse and interpret facts and figures is fundamentally flawed. It is this that makes them produce theoretically invalid, practically inapplicable and concretely unproductive 'knowledge'. It is for this reason also that most social science theories and productions are almost always the subjects of endless debates, disagreements, controversies and polemics.

Controversies, Dilemmas and Openings in Public Administration: The African Chapter

From the moment of attainment of independence to the present, the theory and practice of public administration in almost all African countries, like many other aspects of life in the continent, have gone through momentous transformations and an eventful history. At all levels, theoretical, practical and concrete, the last three decades or so have been

marked by an almost uninterrupted intellectual effervescence, practical experimentation and change.

In the field of public administration, this effervescence, activism and change have been characterized or indicated by the existence of sometimes very heated debates, controversies and polemics among scholars, administrators, political leaders and members of the general public regarding a wide range of issues. Among the most important or controversial of these have been the following:

(1) whether the public service should be politicized or not (i.e. whether public servants, especially civil servants, should be allowed to belong to and to actively participate in the activities of political parties or not);

(2) whether public servants (especially civil servants) should be allowed to engage in private business or not;

(3) whether the ombudsman system of control of public administrators should be introduced or not;

(4) whether there should be more or less centralization or decentralization, concentration or deconcentration of governmental authority and functions;

(5) whether the administration of development should be based on a strategy of 'development from below' or 'development from above';

(6) whether the public service should be 'africanized' rapidly or slowly;

(7) whether emphasis should be laid on adherence to the laid down policies, rules, procedures and regulations or on operational efficiency and achievement of results.

Politicization of the public service

One of the biggest controversies regarding the post-independence African public service has been on the issue of the political role of public servants, especially the civil servants. The question, basically, is that of knowing what kind of relationships public servants should maintain with political parties and politicians in general. In other words, it is that of knowing how 'partisan' public servants should be or should not be both as individuals and as public officials in their dealings with people or groups of different political affiliations.

The contending views in this regard are basically two: one, that public servants should be politically partisan and, the other, that they should be politically neutral. Political partisanism would mean allowing public servants to express and promote their political preferences or interests as freely as any other citizen. It entails allowing them to join political parties, participate fully in their activities and to promote their causes in all ways and with all the means that ordinary citizens are allowed to use. Political neutrality on the other hand would mean excluding them from or severely restricting their role in political activities including forbidding them from joining political parties, participating in the political activities of parties, expressing partisan political opinion, etc.

Contrary to a very widespread belief, the doctrine of political neutrality of public servants is relatively recent and, as a matter of fact, it is less widely practised or adhered to than the doctrine which advocates their politicization. It is basically a product of post-eighteenth-century British or Anglo-Saxon experience in government and it has never been very widespread among the countries which fall outside the sphere of Anglo-Saxon political influence.

Logically, in fact, the doctrine makes little sense given that public administrations are supposed to be headed by political authorities, that is, by the winners of political contests for state power. The very discipline of public administration is itself ordinarily taken as a sub-discipline of political science.

The tradition in most countries is and has always been that public servants are the subordinates or agents of the political authorities and, therefore, some kind of 'extension' of those authorities. They cannot therefore help but be the supporters, politically or otherwise, of their bosses. This, in fact, went without saying prior to the emergence of multi-party

political systems – a peculiarly British invention of the early eighteenth century with the emergence of the Whig (later Liberal) and the Conservative or Tory parties. The doctrine is therefore closely linked with multi-party political and governmental systems.

Otherwise, in all past and present single-party political systems, the doctrine seems to serve no purpose. This is the case for example in all communist countries, until recently, where the communist parties held a monopoly over all political matters. It is also the case in all those countries ruled by executive monarchs or any kind of autocrat, despot/or dictator. In line with this observation, it is no wonder that virtually all *de jure* or *de facto* one-party states in Africa have opted, in practice if not always in theory, for a more or less overt politicization of the public service.

The primary purpose of the doctrine of the neutrality of public servants is of course to prevent state power from being used to further the interests of one party or a few parties at the expense of another or other parties. The doctrine therefore represents a kind of compromise arrived at by members of different competing and possibly sometimes warring parties in order to minimize damage to each other in the course of their political struggles. Where no such warfare/competition exists, or where the calculations of the different political parties have not indicated that such a compromise is the most rational strategy, then the doctrine seems to serve no useful purpose. The existence of a multi-party system is therefore not a sufficient condition for the doctrine to be in vogue. It is also necessary that the parties involved, or at least the dominant ones, perceive the principle as the most rational method of conducting political business in the circumstances. In situations where this latter condition has not been fulfilled or satisfied, multi-partyism can coexist with a high degree of politicization of the public service.

A good example is the situation which prevailed in France during the time of the Third Republic (1870–1940). With each accession of a new party to power there followed what became popularly known as the 'massacres' (massive dismissals) of public servants appointed by the preceding government. This was because appointments to the public service, especially at the more senior positions, were made on the basis of one's political affiliations and or loyalties. Another very good example is that of the United States during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Under the so-called 'spoils system' each time a president from a different party came to power all the incumbent public servants lost their positions to the appointees of the new president.

Be that as it may, most African states at the time of independence inherited political systems in which the political neutrality of the public service was an established doctrine. Subsequently, however, as most countries veered towards single-party political systems, the issue of the politicization of the public service came to the fore. The debate and controversy which this raised in fact ran in parallel with the one raised by the evolution towards the one-party system itself.

Quite obviously, however, the issue of whether to politicize the public service or not goes beyond the issue of multi-partyism. For even where there exists no institutionalized political pluralism, it is nevertheless a fact that there are bound to be political dissidents of one kind or another. This is what makes it possible to argue that there exist objective or intrinsic advantages in the political neutrality of the public service.

> Proponents of a neutral or apolitical public service have advanced the argument, among others, that it enables recruitment into the service to be done on merit, that is, on the basis of professional or technical competence and effectiveness. It thus makes it possible for the service to be manned by people who can effectively perform the tasks they are charged with. In a politicized public service on the other hand, recruitment is done through political patronage. Appointments are made on the basis of one's political affiliation and/or loyalties. This opens the door wide for the appointment of all kinds of mediocrities and incompetents into the public service thus undermining to a more or less serious degree its objective capacity for effective and efficient performance of its tasks. As David Carney puts it, this process whereby 'the level of political posts increasingly [extends] from top jobs, to which it has traditionally been confined, and [reaches] down into the lower levels of the organization, [leads to] organizational arteriosclerosis'.[8]

Both the Ndegwa Commission[9] and the Waruhiu Committee[10] which carried out inquiries into and produced reports on the Kenyan public service early in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively, came out strongly in favour of an apolitical public service. Although it does not specify when, the Ndegwa Commission observes that,

> At one time civil servants were allowed to join political parties but this was later found to be contrary to the interests of the public in that it was capable of leading to the discriminatory treatment of the members of the public on party lines in matters where Civil Servants should use their discretion with complete impartiality [. . .] In our view, the rule that civil servants should not be members of any political parties should be maintained in any country which does not have a *de jure* one-party system.[11]

For its part, the Waruhiu Committee notes that '. . . undue [sic] political influence on the management of civil service affairs is a factor with serious adverse effects on the Services'.[12]

Thus, it would appear, in addition to the fact that it is perceived as compromising the professional competence and performance of the public service, politicization is also opposed on the grounds that it results in the lowering of the ethical standards of the administration. It leads to an increase of what has been called 'administrative immorality'. The use of public office for partisan purposes leads, in other words, to such administrative evils as unfairness, injustice, iniquity (unequal treatment), favouritism, victimization, intolerance, vindictiveness (excessive zeal in exacting penalties or punishment), etc. *vis-à-vis* the members of the public on the basis of their political affiliations, preferences or affinities.

Proponents of the politicization of the public service tend to be, as a rule, members or supporters of ruling parties. Although this appears to be clearly a case of naked self-interest, arguments justifying the position are not always devoid of a certain appeal or sense.

One of them, as was suggested earlier, is that it makes little sense, if any, for political actors (the elected political authorities who head the public service), with a clear political programme to implement, to act through non-political agents. Indeed, the Ndegwa Commission tries, without much success, to wriggle out of this contradiction. The political neutrality of the public service, it observes,

> . . . does not mean that Civil Servants may be indifferent to party policies in performing their duties. They have a duty, on the contrary, to promote actively and publicly the policies of the constitutionally elected President and his government, which is a party government. In matters where they have discretion and where legitimate party interests are involved, they must give precedence to those of the party in office [. . .] What counts as a 'legitimate' interest [however] is not always easily defined[!]'[13]

The argument in favour of politicization then is that only public officials who are loyal to and share the political philosophy of the elected political leadership can implement the policies and programmes of the latter faithfully and diligently. For this reason, it is felt, what the political appointees may lack in technical skill and expertise is amply made up for by their zeal, commitment and devotion.

Secondly, the argument goes, official neutrality does not always mean real or effective neutrality. Although it may be forbidden for public servants to express their political opinions or preferences or to join political parties, participate in their activities, or run for political office, etc. this does not mean that they do not have such opinions or preferences or that they do not, one way or another, openly or covertly, engage in politically partisan activities. Man has been described as a 'political animal' and, behind the mask of official neutrality, the public servant remains a very politically conscious and active person indeed. Thus politicizing the public service only means doing openly what in reality is done more or less covertly under the guise of a faceless and anonymous neutrality.

Quite clearly there is a lot to be said for and against the two positions. The solution adopted in most multi-party states is a compromise one: a balance between politicization and neutrality. The top echelons, the most critical or sensitive posts, are politicized and are often referred to as 'political appointments', while the middle and the lower echelons are expected to be politically neutral or apolitical. In all one-party states, however, virtually without

exception, the public service is politicized to a more or less pronounced degree, whether this is officially acknowledged or not.

Public servants and private business

The origin of the idea that public servants should not engage in private business on the same terms as other citizens is not very clear. David Carney suggests that it is probably linked to the doctrine of strict distinction and separation of the public from the private spheres, especially in economic matters, which was in vogue in the liberal states of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[14] This seems plausible enough. Whatever the case, a battery of arguments has been advanced both for and against the practice of public servants engaging in private business.

Among probably the most important reasons advanced against allowing public servants to engage in private business is that this creates divided loyalties or a conflict of interests in the minds and hearts of the public servants. Public servants, in other words, are placed in a position of serving two masters: their own private interests and the interests of their employer – the public. Naturally, as the saying goes, nobody can serve two masters equally well. One is bound to be neglected. Logical reasoning, common sense and even empirical evidence from experience leaves no doubt in fact, that, as a rule, public servants who are at the same time running their own businesses will tend to be more interested in those businesses and less interested in their public tasks, duties or responsibilities. This is likely to be even more so if the business is actually or potentially more remunerative than the job. A hypothesis which is more than likely to be true is that the more remunerative the business, the higher the interest the public servant is likely to show in it and the less the interest in his job.

Another very closely related argument along the same lines is that allowing public servants to engage in private business violates the principle of division of labour and specialization of tasks. This is a principle which, in the field of management and administration, is widely regarded as a factor of efficiency. Among other things, specialization allows concentration of attention and energies, accumulation of detailed knowledge of tasks, habituation and therefore dexterity and refinement in execution skills. All these advantages are lost when a person has to attend to a wide variety of tasks and interests. The consequence is dispersal of energies and attention, neglect of details, rough work and superficial and hasty treatment of matters. The ability of public servants to concentrate on their official tasks and duties, 'to give of their best' to their work, is thus compromised and with it their efficiency and effectiveness.

In addition to its adverse effects on the efficiency and effectiveness of the public services, allowing public servants to engage in private business has been attacked or opposed on ethical and moral grounds. One such argument is that since, as a rule, the world of private business is a world of competition, allowing public servants to engage in business gives them an unfair advantage over ordinary citizens with whom they are in competition. The reasons for this are many and they include the fact that it is the public servants who regulate private business activities (for example by giving permits and licenses of all kinds), that they are often privy to important information about future government policies, and that they are the ones who award government tenders and contracts. If they are tempted to use or misuse this privileged position to further their private interest at the expense of their competitors then quite clearly it would be unfair. And on the balance of probabilities, it is generally felt, this is more likely to happen than not if public servants are free to pursue private business interests.

Another, probably stronger moral argument against allowing public servants to engage in private business is that it would promote corruption in the public service. The public service would interact so closely and so intensely with the private sector that the boundaries between the two would tend to become fuzzy or to dissolve. Public servants would be exposed to the influences of unscrupulous businessmen and would tend to acquire a taste for money-making, expensive life-styles, etc. This creates an ideal climate for shady dealings and the general erosion of the ethical standards of the public services by multiplying the occasions for temptation to profit from one's position.

But, as it can be imagined, arguments for allowing public servants to engage in private business exist. They are many and again they do not lack in forcefulness. One of them as the Waruhiu Commission argues, is that

Like all other citizens, public servants [are] entitled to take advantage of the available opportunities for self-advancement.[15]

In other words, it would be unfair discrimination against public servants to exclude them completely from participating in gainful economic activities open to other citizens. According to the Committee, the minimum equitable policy would be to allow them to engage in at least 'limited and conditional' participation in business.

Again, as it is often pointed out, in most African countries, 'the best talents are limited and found only in the public service, hence other sectors would be deprived of their services unless the rules were changed to permit public servants to engage in business'.[16] As the Waruhiu Committee observes, for example, in the early post-independence years, 'most of the Kenyans who had the necessary skills and capital to take over foreign-owned business in the effort to Kenyanize the private sector were in the public service'.[17] It is argued therefore that it is both in the interests of rapid economic development as well as rapid Africanization that public servants should be allowed to invest their considerable intellectual and financial resources in the various sectors of the economy.

And finally, it has also been argued that allowing public servants to engage in private enterprise is the only viable way of stemming the brain drain from the public services to the private sector due to the comparatively low salaries in the public service. By allowing them to supplement their incomes through private business activities, public servants are less likely to be tempted to leave the public for the private sector. This makes it possible for the public sector to retain high-calibre personnel.

When all the pros and cons of the debate are taken into account, the Ndegwa Commission is categorical. It states that subject to the proviso that 'officers acquiring certain private interests bring [. . .] them to the notice of higher authority and where appropriate seek approval of their actions', then 'there ought in theory to be no objection to the ownership of property or engagement in business by members of the public services to a point where their wealth is augmented perhaps substantially by such activities'.[18] According to the Commission this is valid so long as the following principles are observed, namely, that 'all those who serve the Republic –

(a) should give it their undivided loyalty whenever and wherever it has a claim on their service;
(b) should not subordinate their duties to their private interest nor put themselves in a position where there is conflict between their duty to the state and their private interests;
(c) should not, outside their official duties, be associated with any financial or other activities in circumstances where there could be suspicion that their official position or official information available to them was being turned to their private gain or that of their associates;
(d) should not engage in any occupation or business which might prejudice their status as members of a public service or bring any such service into disrepute and, finally;
(e) should at all times maintain the professional and ethical standards which the nation expects of them in transacting Government business with efficiency, integrity and impartiality'.[19]

The above, as it has been pointed out, is like saying that provided public servants behave like angels, then there is no objection to their engaging in private business. In other words, it is little more than pious hopes and wishful thinking. Nevertheless it would be difficult to quarrel with the Commission. As the Commissioners very carefully put it, provided the above conditions are satisfied, there ought not to be any objection, *in theory*, to public servants engaging in private business. Thus, as the Waruhiu Committee notes, contrary to an 'erroneous but popular belief', the Ndegwa Commission did not recommend a 'free-for-all' participation in business by public servants. In practice and concretely, however, the cynics seem to have been proved right in the light of the

developments that followed the implementation of this idea. As the Waruhiu Committee points out,

> [Although] in our view the Ndegwa Commission Report was misinterpreted on the extent to which [it] recommended that a civil servant can attend to his private interests while at the same time serving the public [. . .] there has been gross neglect of public duty and misuse of official positions and official information in furtherance of civil servants' personal interests.[20]

According to the Committee, a majority of those who testified before it 'blamed the participation in business for the considerable erosion of discipline, integrity and devotion to duty'. In addition, there was 'overwhelming evidence that some public servants utilize government facilities in order to benefit themselves' (and that they engaged in) 'highly immoral acts of wanton corruption'.[21]

In spite of the above evidence, the Waruhiu Committee does not come to the conclusion that public servants should be banned from engaging in private business. Instead it proposes a number of new measures to tighten the control over their business activities along very similar lines to those proposed by the Ndegwa Commission. The latter were however not implemented according to the findings of the Committee and there is nothing to suggest that those of the Committee itself would meet with any better fate.

The Ombudsman debate

As the Waruhiu Committee points out, ombudsman is an old Swedish word which means a person who acts and speaks on behalf of someone else. The word has been adopted in international vocabulary to mean the special institution for the protection of the rights of the citizen against abuse of power, error and neglect by the authorities. The institution developed out of the practice, pioneered by Swedish kings in the eighteenth century, of appointing a special agent (currently known as the *Justitiekansler*) to investigate and report on the way public officials performed their duties and exercised their powers. In 1809, as parliamentary democracy continued to take root, the Swedish parliament (the *Riksdag*) started appointing its own counterpart to the *Justitiekansler*, the *Justitieombudsman*, 'to control the activities of and prevent abuses by public officials and, in particular, prevent the Crown from exercising undue influence over the judiciary'.[22] By 1915 a specialized parallel ombudsman had also been created with jurisdiction in the military field.

Generally, however, the term ombudsman is used to refer to the *Justitieombudsman* type of official – the parliamentary appointee who exercises general supervision over courts and civil servants to ensure observance of the law, the constitution and letters of instruction, investigates charges of illegality, negligence or gross disregard of the interests of the service in the performance of official duties, and institutes proceedings against officials in the courts on any of these grounds. The case for the establishment of an ombudsman system of control over the activities of public servants in Africa has been argued forcefully by many scholars and other people. In Kenya, both the Ndegwa Commission and the Waruhiu Committee came out strongly in favour of establishing the institution.

At issue here, basically is the question of the public *accountability* of the public service, in other words, the degree to which the public or the people as a whole, as the ultimate boss of the public service, is able to exercise effective supervision and control over the activities of government officials. According to the Ndegwa Commission, 'One of the most obvious legacies of the [colonial] past is a very low level of real accountability [. . .] Parliamentary questions provide at best a rather haphazard spot check on particular items of administrative performance. The Public Accounts Committee does provide more detailed supervision but in retrospect [post-mortem!] and concerned mainly with financial propriety and only marginally with the substance of administrative behaviour. Also the principle of secrecy has been reinforced since independence by the need to arouse in civil servants a concern for national security and to exclude the improper influence of foreign interests. The net results of all this is that to a very large extent the public services today operate almost entirely behind closed doors.'[23]

The advantages of 'immunity from criticism and inspection', as identified by the Commission, include:

(a) the need to protect state secrets in the interests of national security;

(b) enabling the public services to operate without fear or favour;

(c) enabling officials to work as they consider best without interruptions.[24]

The Commission, however, also spells out the disadvantages of secrecy and lack of accountability. It notes that:

(a) Although secrecy makes it possible for the public services to work without fear or favour, it does not guarantee this! It also makes it possible for fear and favour to influence its work behind the scenes.

(b) Immunity to outside evaluation and criticism, while making it possible for the public servant to pursue his duty without interruptions, also makes it possible for him to neglect his work or even to abuse his powers.

(c) . . . immunity to outside criticism means that the Civil Service is entirely dependent on self-criticism for the continuing reform and improvement of its development capability. [But] history gives us little grounds for optimism that any social institution will exhibit this quality of constant self-renewal if it is not subjected to effective pressure from outside.[25]

The Commission sees the ombudsman as the ideal institution for striking the best balance between the advantages and disadvantages of both openness and a high degree of accountability and the need for confidentiality or limited accountability. It states:

> To deal with the danger that fear and favour may operate behind the wall of official secrecy and with the danger that powers may be abused [we recommend] as a matter of urgency, the creation of a Kenyan equivalent of the 'Ombudsman' . . . a highly qualified and authoritative institution, with powers of access to all official files, and powers to question all public servants and any member of the public, which can receive and investigate any bona fide allegation that an abuse of power or improper use of office has occurred . . . to safeguard the public from abuse of power [and] the public services from false allegations.[26]

The arguments of the Ndegwa Commission were amplified ten years later by those of the Waruhiu Committee. Arguing in favour of the establishment of the ombudsman, the Committee noted that:

(a) There is no legal redress for many of the wrongs which the individual may suffer at the hands of those in authority e.g. when a public servant fails, neglects or refuses to do that which he is employed to do.

(b) It is impracticable to question the merits of every discretionary decision in a court of law.

(c) The majority of ordinary citizens cannot afford litigation, which is protracted and costly.

(d) In the minds of the ordinary Kenyan, courts are identified with the government and the ordinary man does not understand how the government can be sued in her own courts.

(e) Parliamentary questions do not provide an adequate method of checking on the acts of public servants. Replies, for example, are normally prepared by those against whom complaints have been lodged.[27]

Countering an argument which had earlier been advanced by the government against the introduction of the ombudsman system, the Committee further observed, 'The conditions under which the ombudsman [is] appointed [are] similar, if not identical to those under which judges or courts are appointed. Judges are not misused for witch-hunting and undue victimization and there is no reason why the ombudsman should be misused.'[28]

Kibutha Kibwana, also arguing the case for the introduction of an ombudsman system, observes that, 'The need for an ombudsman in Kenya can perhaps be readily appreciated when we take cognizance of the fact that many an aggrieved individual in the past, after exhausting

available remedial machinery have directly recoursed to the President to have their complaints redressed.'[29] Among other things, notes Kibwana,

> the knowledge that the acts or omissions of civil servants and party leaders could be [scrutinized by the] ombudsman [is] seen as conducive to curtailing the former's excesses. Hence an ombudsman would bequeath Public Administration efficiency.[30]

Quoting other authorities in the area, Kibwana points out that the office of the ombudsman may serve an explanatory and mediatory role. Thus, 'if a citizen complains, rather than simply recording the cases as justified or not, the ombudsman is expected to explain the logic of the decision as a contribution to civic education. Hence, citizens' pent-up feelings as regards complaints they harbour will be reduced.'[31] But, 'perhaps more importantly', notes Kibwana, 'especially to party leaders, the ombudsman has been seen as an asset by political parties especially in a one-party state, in that he provides the party with much needed feedback about the performance of the middle and low level party cadres in the field as they interact with the citizenry [. . .] Indeed this has been seen by some commentators as the most crucial function of Tanzania's Permanent Commission of Enquiry [the Tanzanian equivalent of the ombudsman].'[32] And lastly, he notes, with Bernard Frank (also quoted in the article), the ombudsman may be the best substitute for a second party in the one-party states of Africa, 'to protect the citizen and fill the gap in the machinery of government and party for the redress of grievances'.[33]

Despite the fact that an overwhelming body of opinion seems to be in favour of the establishment of the ombudsman system, most governments in Africa have been opposed to the idea. To justify its position, the Kenyan Government has argued as follows:

(a) The office of the ombudsman is unnecessary in a parliamentary democracy where the government and government servants can be sued and prosecuted in civil matters.

(b) A citizen injured by an abuse of office by public servants can have the matter raised in Parliament by means of a Parliamentary Question.

(c) The ombudsman may be misused by unscrupulous elements in society for witch-hunting and undue victimization.[34]

As indicated earlier, most scholars and other people have refuted these arguments and seem to find very little substance in them. The Kenya Government however has remained unshaken in its position. In a few African countries nevertheless, the ombudsman or very similar institutions have been established. They include countries such as Tanzania, Zambia and Nigeria.

Centralization, decentralization, concentration and deconcentration of public administration

The merits and demerits of centralization, decentralization, concentration and deconcentration have been debated and argued probably ever since the structural dimension of public administration became an established aspect of study in public administration. It is an old chapter in the development of the theory and practice of public administration. Most of the merits and demerits, advantages and disadvantages of these structural arrangements are therefore known and are not the subject of much controversy.

In Africa, however, the attainment of independence resulted in the emergence of a wide range of new tasks, challenges, problems and opportunities for the public administrations of the new states. As a result, in the search for the structural arrangement most suitable under the new circumstances, the structural debate was relaunched with renewed vigour.

Basically, the debate was sparked off by a widespread view among scholars and others that the colonial structures inherited at the time of independence were characterized by an excessive degree of centralization and concentration of authority and responsibilities. This, it was argued, was all very well for the colonial government, whose primary objectives were to ensure a tight control over the country and to minimize administrative expenditure. Such structures were however quite unsuited for the goals of the newly independent and young African nations which were radically different from those of the colonial powers and

emphasized above all the promotion of rapid socio-economic development. The overwhelming majority of scholars and other experts, therefore, were of the opinion that the public services of the newly independent African nations ought to undergo a major restructuring with a view to making them more decentralized and deconcentrated.

In Kenya, in addition to scholars, the Ndegwa Commission and the Waruhiu Committee came out in favour of greater decentralization and deconcentration. With regard to deconcentration, the Commission singles out the position of Permanent Secretary (who is the overall administrative head of each ministry, immediately below the Minister), as an example of excessive concentration of authority and responsibility. It observes that,

> [There is] an extraordinary concentration of functions in this omnibus office [. . .]. Instead of being the director and convener of a team of specialized officials, each of whom is ultimately responsible for his particular function or set of functions, the Permanent Secretary is formally responsible for all of them, and by regulation and convention is actually expected to be personally responsible for most of them. From his point of view, his working day is filled with matters of details to the exclusion of strategic planning and general management functions while from the point of view of his senior officers he stands between them and the full responsibility which they need in order to give of their best [. . .] the role of the Permanent Secretary is [a] solitary and encumbered [one . . .] Instead of being the key to development, the Permanent Secretary is often engaged in a constant struggle not to become a bottleneck.[35]

The Commission therefore recommends that 'there should be sensible and carefully regulated delegations of authority so that, for example, the Permanent Secretaries can divest themselves to a proper extent of day-to-day routine matters and leave themselves more free to deal with important policy and managerial tasks'.[36]

The Waruhiu Committee also argues along very similar lines. Noting that the institutional structure of the civil service has tended to aggravate its problems, the Committee observes:

> The higher echelons of the service are burdened with [. . .] responsibilities and a financial and administrative control system that does not facilitate delegation [. . .]. The more senior officers carry excessive workloads which makes it difficult for them to assess the operation of the staff under their control [. . .]. As Government functions have increased and the size of the Service has continued to grow, the duties of the Permanent Secretary (for example) have increased considerably and he is [. . .] encumbered with routine administrative duties.[37]

Like the Ndegwa Commission the Committee recommends that 'Permanent Secretaries be authorized to delegate responsibility and authority to their deputies in order to have more time to concentrate on policy matters.'[38]

Despite this quasi-unanimous recommendation for more decentralization and deconcentration by scholars and other experts, the position of most African governments has remained at best ambiguous and at worst hostile or opposed to the idea. This ambivalent situation is indicated by the existence of, on the one hand, official pronouncements and declarations accepting or endorsing the proposition that public services ought to be decentralized and deconcentrated, and on the other hand, the absence of any really serious or effective measures or efforts to decentralize or deconcentrate. In many cases most of the measures taken were in fact towards *more* centralization and concentration. In many other cases, the few measures that were actually taken towards effective decentralization and deconcentration were either half-heartedly implemented or were soon neutralized or reversed by others which had the opposite effect and which robbed them of any serious substance.

Development from above versus development from below

The general consensus among scholars, administrators, political leaders and other informed people is that to deal effectively with the problems, challenges and opportunities facing post-independence Africa, the kind of public administration that is called for is a 'development-oriented administration' or, as it is sometimes ambiguously called, a 'development administration'. According to the Ndegwa Commission a 'Development Administration' is distinct

'both from the old-fashioned concept of [public] administration as the passive executor of party policies, and also from the more modern concept of a managerial and problem-solving administration in an industrial state'.[39] It is the kind of administration which is geared towards fostering and inducing change, not just coping with or merely managing it, as is the case for the public administrations of developed countries.

A development-oriented administration therefore differs quite significantly from the classical or traditional type of administration, such as the colonial one, whose primary duty, task or responsibility was to maintain the status-quo and whose main functions were the provision of security, the maintenance of law and order and the collection of taxes. It is in this context that the issue arises as to which is the best or most effective, efficient and healthy strategy for administering development.

The least that can be said is that competing development theories proposing very different kinds of strategies have not been lacking. Among these theories, two of them stand out as far as the role of the public service in promoting development is concerned. The first is that which advocates a strategy based on what has been called the 'development from above' approach and the other one is that which advocates a strategy based on the so-called 'development from below' approach. The two strategies have also been called the top-to-bottom and the 'bottom-up' strategies respectively.

In more orthodox terms, the 'top-to-bottom', 'development from above' strategy is what is usually known as the state-centred strategy. As the name suggests, it is a strategy in which government officials or agents are the key actors in the promotion and management of development. The state assumes the role of the locomotive of change – planning, implementing and controlling development activities. Government agents and agencies dominate the development effort. This can be achieved in a variety of ways, such as, through government agents and agencies,

(a) initiating and implementing projects and programmes using their own (i.e. the government's) financial, material and manpower resources;

(b) initiating and implementing projects and programmes using their own resources *supplemented* by resources obtained from individuals, groups and local communities (the so-called 'cost-sharing' system);

(c) initiating projects and programmes and implementing them using resources mobilized from individuals, groups and local communities – the so-called provision of leadership and spear-heading of development activities;

(d) monitoring and controlling, more or less closely, the activities of private individuals, groups or local communities through a variety of instruments such as the issuance of various types of permits, licences, regulations or orders requiring registration of groups, filing of returns and reports as well as the use of coercive methods and persuasion.

In this kind of strategy, private initiative and free enterprise by individuals, groups or communities play a more or less secondary role in the promotion of development. As it is also quite evident, this is the kind of strategy which fits in very well with a socialistic ideological framework. As a consequence, it is not surprising to find that it is the strategy adopted by practically all the regimes which claim to adhere to one form of socialism or another viz. African, Arab, democratic, scientific, etc. as is the case with the majority of African governments.

Strictly speaking, however, the strategy cannot entirely be identified with socialist-leaning regimes. It was in fact the original and dominant creed of the first two or three decades after independence in virtually all newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. The strategy was advocated on the grounds that the state in these countries was by far the most powerful organized body and monopolized to a large extent the services and the talents of most of the educated and technically qualified citizens, those, in other words, who knew what development was all about.

Both the Ndegwa Commission and the Waruhiu Committee, for example, which reflect very much the dominant way of thinking of the 1960s and 1970s, come out clearly in favour

of the state-centred strategy of administering development. Among other things, the Commission states that '[there is] an obvious need for the Civil Service to take the lead in establishing national priorities and in ensuring the most productive use of national resources. It must also develop the capacity to control the private sector so as to protect the public interest.'[40] It goes on to add that the Civil Service should 'be and act as the major instrument of change and thus induce people to want to do new things'.[41] The Waruhiu Committee expresses very much the same sentiments. In the nation's overall development strategy, it says, that 'The Government [should] play a decisive and leading role in initiating and directing development'.[42]

For over two decades (or three if we count the 1950s), this approach remained virtually unchallenged among Third World scholars, administrators and statesmen. In addition to the apparent strength of the arguments adduced in its favour, the approach also fitted in very well with the Keynesian doctrine of economic management which was the dominant doctrine even among the Western liberal or capitalist countries.

In the 1980s, however, state-centred development has been denounced as a failure and those of its erstwhile proponents who have not recanted are everywhere on the defensive. Simultaneously, in closely related developments, the decade has also seen the overthrow of Keynesian economics by the so-called neo-classical or the monetarist economic doctrine as well as the emergence of liberal-oriented reform movements in socialist and communist countries.

To replace the discredited state-centred, top-to-bottom or 'development from above' strategy, the so-called 'people centred', 'bottom-up' or 'development from below' strategy is being actively promoted. As can be imagined, this strategy is diametrically opposed to the state-centred one. Unlike the latter, this strategy emphasizes and advocates the *participation and the dominant role* of private individuals, groups and communities at every stage of development, promotion activities, projects and programmes – from initiating and planning to implementation and day-to-day management. In this strategy, although the state and its agents continue to play an important part, it is nevertheless as second fiddle to the private initiative and enterprise of individuals, groups and local communities.

The, as yet, unproven operative hypothesis of this strategy is that the more the people participate in and play a major role in development activities, projects and programmes, the more successful the latter tend to be and the more the people are able to acquire the capacity for undertaking other development activities, projects and programmes. The greater, in other words, the process of development becomes self-sustaining and self-accelerating. By and large, these are the arguments and the circumstances that have led to the relatively recent but phenomenal expansion of the role and number of non-governmental organizations involved in the promotion of development in Third World countries.

Nevertheless, the debate as to which strategy is objectively the most suitable in the long run cannot be said to be over. Although they may be currently on the defensive, many if not most of the proponents of the 'state-centred' strategy have not yet disarmed. Many consider the current attraction for the 'bottom-up' approach to be more or less a passing fad. Many people also point out that it is in all probability little more than the time-honoured swings of the pendulum or, at most, a mere indicator of the need to make some corrective adjustments to the state-centred strategy.

Although both the 'bottom-up' and the 'top-to-bottom' strategies tend to be defended or attacked on the grounds of whether they enhance or reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of the public service in promoting development, there is also an ethical and moral dimension to the whole issue/debate. It raises, in effect, the question of legitimacy, freedom and democracy, that is, the degree to which the people are free to shape their own destinies or are controlled and led, directly or indirectly, willingly or unwillingly, by government officials or agents and other technical experts. The 'state-centred', 'top-to-bottom' approach is basically an elitist approach which emphasizes the role of technical experts in decision-making. Development from above, as the Ndegwa Commission observes, is not a very different strategy from the one used by the colonial public service (especially in the 1950s and 1960s), and in which civil servants saw their duty as consisting of doing 'what *they* saw as good for the people under their control'.[43] It is therefore essentially 'paternalistic in character [and has] a tendency to use strong-arm tactics'.[44]

Africanization versus professionalization

In the African context, although it may be given different names, such as localization, indigenization, Kenyanization, Zambianization, Nigerianization, etc., Africanization basically refers to the replacement of foreign or non-citizen personnel, either in the public service or in the private sector, by the citizens of the country concerned. This basic meaning however has sometimes been extended to refer to the much more general transformation of the public services inherited at independence so that they may reflect more closely the nature, personality, character, culture (i.e. values, beliefs, attitudes and norms) as well as the aspirations of the respective African peoples.

> It would be wrong, however, to look at Africanization purely in quantitative terms [. . .] Africanization is not the simple exchange of Africans for non-Africans. Africanization is the process of transforming a colonial type of public service. It implies the gradual elimination of expatriate predominance at all levels in the public service and a reassessment of the machinery and procedures to meet new functions and circumstances.[45]

It has been estimated that there were about 100,000 European civil servants in Africa at around 1958.[46] This gives an idea of the magnitude of the Africanization operation in the continent.

At the moment of independence, a broad consensus existed that the public services of the new African states should be 'Africanized' as soon as possible. The issue which the debate on Africanization raised, therefore, was not so much whether the public services should be Africanized or not, but whether the exercise should be carried out as fast as it was or at a slower pace, and whether it should be carried out at the implied cost in terms of administrative efficiency and effectiveness. Thus, although the Africanization process was immensely popular and was supported by virtually all sectors of opinion, the whole exercise raised some important issues and here and there voices were raised to question the wisdom of at least some of the aspects of the operation. While, for example, some people argued for a rapid and accelerated pace of Africanization, others argued for a slow and gradual pace.

The arguments in favour of Africanization were many and more or less obvious. They range from the political to the economic, the socio-cultural and the socio-psychological. They have been summarized as follows:

(a) The need to show the man-in-the street that the direction of the country's affairs is in their own hands.

(b) That as instruments of change it is necessary that key civil servants are in harmony with the needs, wishes and customs of the people.

(c) That mutual confidence between a minister and a civil servant is easier when both are from the same racial and cultural background.

(d) It is necessary to overcome the uncertainty created by dependence on expatriate staff.

(e) It costs less to employ an African and moreover the money spent as pay and allowances is kept in the country.[47]

Thus, among the most important political reasons for Africanization was the need by the governments of the day to win the support of the broad masses of the population. Quite clearly the general public was expecting at least some form or measure of Africanization as the concrete manifestation of independence. It was necessary to show the people that the government was indeed 'their' government – manned by themselves, their kin, kith and kind, 'brothers and sisters' or fellow citizens. This is perhaps a *sine qua non* for any government to enjoy the support of the population over which it exercises its authority.

In addition, it emerges from the reasons given above that another major justification of Africanization was the fact that the new regimes were not very sure about the reliability and professional commitment and devotion of the expatriate staff. This uncertainty was particularly unacceptable with regard to the most important and sensitive positions in the public service. Expatriates, it was felt, could always have double loyalties – one to their countries of origin and one to the country they were serving. In the circumstances it was

never possible to tell which loyalty would prove the stronger at any given moment. It was therefore necessary to replace such expatriates with the nationals of the country concerned who could be trusted and relied upon to serve both their new bosses and the country with commitment and devotion out of their patriotism.

As indicated earlier, opponents of Africanization were not against the principle *per se* but against the rapidity of the process and the implied costs in administrative efficiency and effectiveness.

Rapid Africanization was opposed on the grounds that it would be carried out at the expense of the merit principle and professional competence. It was pointed out that there existed no significant pool or reservoir of Africans with the kind of qualifications, experience and competence possessed by the European or Asian officers who were to be replaced. Replacing the latter before African cadres had attained or acquired the required levels of education, training, experience and competence would inevitably lower the efficiency and effectiveness of the public service with more or less disastrous consequences. It was pointed out that no amount of devotion, zeal or commitment could replace technical and professional knowledge and skills in task performance: 'The old idea that administrators are born, not made, no longer holds true. So also is the old-fashioned notion that administration is an art which is learnt on the job. It [is] a science [and] can be learnt in a classroom and administrators and managers [are] trained to use tools of their trade in much the same way as a craftsman is trained to use tools of his craft.'[48]

These objections to rapid Africanization seem to have been very much borne out by the facts. As the Ndegwa Commission itself pointed out, Africanization was carried out at the cost of 'serious dilution of experience and an over-burdening of comparatively young officials near the top'.[49] In Kenya, as in most African countries, it was only in the last days of empire that a handful of Africans began holding relatively senior positions. The great majority were to be found only in clerical and subordinate grades. Again the education levels of the vast majority of Africans working in both the public and the private sectors were extremely low. Only a tiny minority had reached high school level of education or above or possessed any specialized technical qualifications. Opponents of rapid Africanization therefore rightly saw it as nothing less than the opening of the door for mediocrity and incompetence to enter the public service.

Whatever the case, however, the Africanization process in almost all African countries was effected extremely rapidly. In Kenya, for example, the Waruhiu Committee observes that the process was 'extremely rapid and ill-prepared'.[50] By 1965, that is, barely two years after independence, 95 per cent of the Kenyan public service had been Africanized.[51]

In the process, the worst fears of the opponents of rapid Africanization were confirmed. · Appointments to the positions marked for Africanization were made on the basis of the barest minimum requirements from people with hardly any relevant training or experience. Rapid promotions followed after largely inadequate on-job training or 'crash programme' courses. At the end of it all, it was hardly surprising that many ministries had become what were later described as 'corridors of chaos and confusion'!

Over-hasty Africanization (a form of 'nationalistic tribalism'!) is clearly one of the factors that have led to the quagmire of administrative inefficiency and ineffectiveness that is plaguing public administrations in Africa. The deleterious effects of this and other factors on the public service are documented at length in the Ndegwa Commission and the Waruhiu Committee reports among others. It was quite clearly a mistake to think that administrative tasks, functions or duties are less complex than the so-called 'techno-professional' ones which in many African countries are still not yet fully Africanized almost three decades after independence.

Adherence to rules versus flexibility and results

Although this has not been a particularly controversial issue, it has nevertheless generated considerable debate and difference of view among scholars and practitioners, as well as laymen. The basic point at issue here is that of knowing how much emphasis should be placed on the observance of rules, regulations and procedures in the day-to-day operations or activities of the public service even at the expense, if necessary, of the achievement of results or

the accomplishment of the missions for which the public services are established. Conversely, of course, it is also that of knowing under what circumstances, if any, the rules, etc., may be broken or 'bent' for the sake of the 'expeditious achievement of results'. Put another way, the question is: to what extent should the letter and the spirit of the law be distinguished and separated and how much operational discretion should be given to public servants without inviting or running the risk of arbitrariness.

On the one hand, some people have expressed the view that one cause of the inefficiency of African public administrations is the fact that they are not bureaucratic enough. One of the arguments advanced is that given the strong communal and extended family ties that bind individuals to each other in African societies any relaxation of the rules or the widening of the discretionary margins of officials is an invitation to tribalism, nepotism and general favouritism in the management and operations of the public service. Moreover, the argument goes, given the fact that public servants in developing countries have relatively low salaries and generally live in what has been described as an 'environment of deprivation', any relaxation of the rules would be opening the door wide for corruption, embezzlement and shady deals.

On the other hand, rigid adherence to rules, regulations and procedures on the part of African public services has been widely and sometimes severely castigated. Excessive 'bureaucratism', 'red tape' and formality have been decried as the major weaknesses hampering the public administrations of Africa in the performance of their developmental tasks.

Writing about the characteristics which a true development administration ought to possess, the Ndegwa Commission emphasized the need for flexibility in operations. Among other things, a truly development-oriented administration, according to the Commission,

> [is] powerfully oriented towards change [. . .] rewards initiative and experimentation, is particularly concerned about considerations of cost-effectiveness, [. . . and] is ready to strike a compromise between central control and the need for flexibility, diversity and a certain autonomy for the units in the field.[52]

Excessive attachment to rules, regulations and procedures is also severely criticized by the Waruhiu Committee. The Committee notes, with regard to the Kenyan public service, that

> As the Service has grown and development aims have become more complex, central control has become stricter; lines of communication have become more intricate; procurement procedures have become more involved; recruitment and discipline more centralized; and achievement has tended to be overshadowed by the need to comply with regulations. While [. . .] conformity in the application of the laid down rules, regulations and procedures [is] an essential discipline, [. . .] considerable evidence [indicates] that the observance of the rules has become a matter of such concern that operational efficiency and achievement has been relegated to a position of secondary importance.[53]

Clearly the issue is not an easy one to resolve. Moreover it is an old one. In its more traditional form it has pitted the proponents of the bureaucratic mode of organization against those who recommend the so-called 'laissez-faire', free style, adaptive, project or organic modes of organization. As it is well known, both the bureaucratic and these others have their strong points or advantages as well as their weak points or disadvantages. It is therefore difficult to establish a hard and fast general rule or principle about how much strictness in rule observance and how much flexibility there should be in the operations of any organization. As certain scholars have pointed out it all depends on the type of organization, its goals or objectives, the nature of the environment it operates in, etc. Also, as a general rule, almost all rules can be regarded as always having 'exceptions'. But such exceptions should be real exceptions, that is, very few in number, and not the kind of exceptions which are said to make the rule! Thus, as a general rule, although there are circumstances under which almost all laws can be justifiably broken, violated or 'bent', this should happen only in exceptional circumstances, as in the case of what the French call a *cause majeur*, a vital necessity, or in order to achieve a superior goal or purpose.

Conclusion

Among other things, what emerges from the examination of the foregoing issues and the debates and controversies surrounding them is the fact that none has received an objective and definitive resolution. To a more or less large extent, they remain unsettled questions. None of them can be said to be the subject of a consensus view either among scholars, administrators or laymen. For this reason, where the assertions or findings of the various theorists contradict each other, they simply co-exist like two contradictory proverbs which are both true 'to some extent' which generally remains unknown or unstated. This is one of the most clear indicators of the 'theoretical bankruptcy' or 'insolvency' as well as 'failure to produce demonstrable knowledge' in the social sciences that was mentioned earlier.

Thus, when the time for decision-making came, the decision-makers, that is, the politico-administrative authorities at the head of the public services, made their decisions, as far as it can be discerned, almost totally without taking into account the arguments of scholars or indeed the view or opinions of the other social actors involved. The debates among scholars seem to have been utterly irrelevant and inconsequential as far as the decision-makers on these issues are concerned. They remained mere side shows or curiosities without any significant influence or effect on events and developments. In making their decisions, the authorities went ahead and trusted their own good old instincts, intuition, judgement and above all, interest! Once again this demonstrates in a most telling manner the relatively useless, unusable or inapplicable nature of the vast bulk of social science knowledge.

Against the weight of scholarly argumentation and the expressed views, opinions and preferences of others, the politico-administrative authorities of almost all African countries opted for:

• concentration and centralization instead of any real or substantive deconcentration or decentralization;
• little or no accountability (by opting against the establishment of the ombudsman);
• development from above;
• accelerated rate of Africanization;
• the politicization of the public service;
• allowing public servants to engage in private business;
• rigidity in rule-application.

These decisions were clearly *not* based on conclusively resolved theoretical debates, with a clear consensus or general agreement about the facts of the case. They were, on the contrary, made through politico-administrative fiat based on a mixture of commonsensical pragmatism or realism, an intuitive sense of priorities, and to a large extent, according to the *interests* of the decision-makers. For practical purposes, in the absence of unequivocal and scientifically objective clarifications about the merits and demerits of the various choices, little else was available to the decision-makers.

The point of the matter is that in line with established practice in the social sciences, scholars talked of the 'advantages and disadvantages', 'pros and cons', 'arguments for and against' (all of them characteristically vague and fluid concepts) instead of dealing with the *costs and benefits* for society as a whole which would immediately have brought in the need to measure and assign a value to each 'advantage' or 'disadvantage', etc. and therefore to come out with a balance sheet of the options in order to facilitate the selection of the optimal or most rational one, taking into account also the need for conflict-resolution between conflicting interests of the various options. All in all, the lesson is clear, as long as the social sciences continue talking in such vague and fluid terms and so long as they are unable to measure and quantify the parameters of their phenomena, not only will their debates continue to be interminable, but they will also continue to be singularly sterile and devoid of any utility to the man or woman of action as guides to decision-making.

The surprising, almost unbelievable fact in all this, however, is that the way out of this confusion, chaos and wastage of resources in the social sciences is quite simple; it lies in the adoption of the positive science (the so-called 'logico-positive') paradigm or approach in producing knowledge. It lies, in other words, in adopting the epistemology, methodology

and technology of the 'natural' or 'physical' sciences in generating knowledge about human societies. For, as it can hardly be emphasized strongly enough, from a serious scientific point of view, human beings and human societies are natural and physical first and foremost. There is nothing extra-physical or supernatural about them known to serious science.

As it is well known, the dominant paradigm in the social sciences is the so-called 'normative approach'. The very first of the many shortcomings of the normative approach is its vague, ambiguous and omnibus nature. It is, in fact, not a clearly defined or precisely formulated approach. As a result, it tends to accommodate all kinds of intellectual traditions and practices – from the most rigorously scientific to the most prosaically commonsensical, romantic and metaphysical. It is no wonder, therefore, that much of the knowledge produced using this mixture of processes tends to be a relatively unreliable and useless hodge podge of facts speculation and fiction.

Unlike the normative approach, the positive approach is a clearly formulated and highly systematized paradigm of producing knowledge. Essentially, it consists of a *materialistic conceptualization* of the universe and, therefore, its objects of study; the use of *quantitative* mathematical models of analysis and a systematic use of *inductive and deductive logic*. Today, the scientific disciplines which use this approach (physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, agriculture, engineering etc.) are the ones that are generally regarded as the seriously scientific ones. They are also the ones which are known to be the more usefully productive sciences heuristically (theory-production-wise), practically (technology-production-wise) and concretely (effects-production-wise).

There is almost no better argument for adopting the positive approach than the above fact. The contention that it cannot be used in the social sciences or that it is unsuitable for the study of human societies is at best defeatist and at worst mystificatory. In fact, it can be observed that, as a general rule, the more concepts, models and theories any particular social science discipline has adopted from the 'natural' or 'physical' sciences, the more advanced it is. In other words, the more any social science discipline relies on a positive approach to produce its knowledge, the more usefully productive it is for practical and concrete purposes. A good example in this regard is economics, which can be generally considered as the most 'scientific' of the social sciences. As a result, it is to a very much lesser degree characterized by the theoretical bankruptcy mentioned earlier.

In conclusion then, it can be posited that by refusing to use the paradigmatic framework of the 'hard' sciences, the social sciences are condemned to continue producing fluid, vague and unreliable knowledge. By refusing to adopt an epistemology, a methodology and a technology of producing knowledge based on a materialistic conception of the universe, quantitative mathematical analysis and systematic inductive and deductive reasoning, the social sciences are condemned to continue producing pseudo-scientific, romantic and commonsensical knowledge with the inevitable plethora of bankrupt theories, endless controversies, dilemmas and false openings!

Notes

[1] Acronym for 'In Search of New Paradigms in the Study of African Development', an international research project later renamed 'Controversies, Dilemmas and Openings in the Study of African Development' and carried out between 1988 and 1989.

[2] Himmelstrand, Ulf (1988), *In Search of New Paradigms for African Studies Theory and Applications*, unpublished research project paper, p. 3. Department of Sociology, University of Nairobi.

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[13] Kenya Government, Ndegwa Commission Report, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
[14] Carney, David, *op. cit.*, pp. 119 and 121.
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[16] Carney, David, *op. cit.*, p. 124.
[17] Waruhiu Committee Report, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
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20 African Education

Dilemmas, Challenges & Opportunities

KABIRU KINYANJUI

1.0 Introduction

Education in sub-Saharan Africa has become rather a complex and untidy undertaking. The prevailing complexity and untidiness stem from the magnitude and diversity of the problems to be tackled, and often contradictory and hazy policy guidelines being pursued by various actors. The system is also fettered by limited resources, stifling creativity through excessive state control and lack of vision for the 1990s. The problems to be encountered at policy and practice levels are complicated by lack of theoretical perspectives that can guide the analysis of the current situation and provide pointers for the future. The theoretical crisis facing education is not unique to this sector, but pervasive to all fields of development as a result of the global changes and theoretical discourses which have occurred in the eighties and nineties. African education is therefore facing the double crisis of theory and practice, in the midst of social, economic and political crises, conflicts, disruptions and discontinuities.

The development of education is therefore caught up in the midst of the many tensions and changes that confront African societies as they move towards the end of the twentieth century, and face prospects of continuing and emerging global competition. These internal and external forces make the operation of education very untidy, and pose enormous challenges, contradictions and indeed opportunities to researchers, policy analysts and practitioners. In many African countries, the challenges of poverty, rising unemployment, high rate of population growth, political instability, wars and conflicts, falling commodity prices, foreign indebtness and the rising tide of democratization are part of the reality which impinges on the growth and operation of education and learning processes. The recent UNESCO *World Education Report* (1991) has indicated the enormity and cost of this challenge, arguing that:

> The most dramatic [educational] challenge is in Sub-Saharan Africa: If all children aged 6–14 . . . are to be admitted to school, where for the sake of argument it is assumed that the pupil/teacher ratio is forty, then one out of every eighty work-age adults would have to be fulltime teachers. If the high rate of illiteracy of the adult population of sub-Saharan Africa is taken into account, then the requirement would be for one out of every forty literate work-age adults. The corresponding figure in developed countries is only one out of every 200 working-age adults. Thus the need for teachers in relation to the working-age population is greatest in those parts of the world which are least able to train and support them. (UNESCO 1991: 23)

The decline of state capability to provide meaningful and relevant education to those who need it has been one of the major disappointments of the eighties in Africa. The tension of rising demand at all levels in the midst of declining public resources allocated for education, and prospects of unemployment has left many disillusioned by the education system leading to loss of the legitimacy of the state and the ruling classes, and particularly those with responsibilities for management of the system. Education growth and quality has therefore become

unwieldy as compared to the clarity and sense of purpose that characterized the sixties and seventies. During these two decades the state was viewed as the prime mover in the economy and the most suitable mechanism for mobilization of resources, planning, building the necessary capacity and, above all, meeting the needs and aspirations of the ordinary people in the process of national development.

The conditions of the eighties and the onset of the nineties have brought into sharp focus the need to rethink and promote alternative forms, reforms and institutional arrangements and strategies for the transformation of methodologies of provision of education and improve-ment of quality. The prevailing challenges encompass economic situations, governance and accountability of public institutions, and the emergence of realistic social policies for human development. In essence practical, effective and feasible solutions are called for to extricate Africa from the current quagmire towards sustainable development. The task ahead is 'not just to change conditions and create new institutions, but to change consciousness in the process' (Van Rensburg 1981: 15). Is this a utopian ideal or something which is in the realm of possibilities? What is needed, however, is realism tempered with some inspiring vision for improving human development through a process of transformation and revitalization not only of existing institutions, but also the system of values, attitudes and behaviour that sustain the process of change.

The second aspect of this transformation involves discarding old baggage that comes in forms of institutions, approaches and ideologies which have been tried in the last thirty years and are central to the emergence of the current crisis. Out of the ashes of the old, we hope new institutional approaches can rise and inspire creativity and innovation desperately needed in African education today. We must however emphasize the centrality of emergence of a new vision, values, attitudes, discipline, and the mode of thinking to guide, shape and sustain the envisaged and possible educational changes at all levels. This perhaps is the most challeng-ing educational task facing sub-Saharan Africa today. It is only in dealing with these challenges and problems that the confusion and untidiness that is prevailing in African education can be dealt with systematically.

This chapter provides an analysis of the untidy situation in African education in terms of policies, practices and the theoretical underpinnings of its development. There is also a recognition of the challenges, openings and dilemmas which prevail in this sector, and which the main actors in the field have to contend with as they attempt to rehabilitate and transform the learning processes to enable Africans to be competitive in the global economy, and to build a much required capacity for development.

2.0 The Dilemmas and Challenges

African education has entered the decade of the nineties in the midst of a struggle to shake off the experiences of the last decade and to build on lessons learnt. Three broad areas of concern seem to pose dilemmas and challenges to policy-makers, communities, researchers and practitioners. First, there are a host of issues related to the social, cultural, economic and political context which have to be addressed appropriately, if educational development is to emerge from the doldrums of the eighties. Secondly, the consequences of this context for learning processes have to be analysed and understood. This will facilitate the emergence of policies and responses necessary to resolve the prevailing contradictions, and face up to challenges existing in the education sector. Thirdly, in dealing with the above concerns, there is an overriding question as to what assumptions and theoretical frameworks are to be utilized in search of openings out of current dilemmas, controversies and challenges.

2.1

In evaluating the context of educational development, one must contend with the magni-tude and structure of the population. With a population of over 550 million and an annual growth rate of about 3 per cent, sub-Saharan Africa has the most rapidly increasing school-age population in the world. The rapid growth in population is however not matched by a corresponding rate of economic growth, or availability of resources to channel into its

education and training. It is estimated that a third of the population is of school age. As Joseph Ki-Zerbo has dramatically put it: 'the fact is that Africa produces children at a rate unparalleled elsewhere, and pushes them into classrooms at a rate faster than elsewhere' (Ki-Zerbo 1990: 46).

The youthful population poses serious educational problems in terms of demand for schooling opportunities, the management and organization of the processes of learning, and the quantity and quality of school output. The challenges of providing the youth and illiterate adults with adequate, relevant and quality education remains the most pressing concern for parents, communities, policy-makers, researchers and international donor agencies. This population, it must be realized, requires not only to have skills and knowledge needed for employment, but also to participate fully in the management of the development of their societies. Learning of this kind is vital for environmental conservation, health, fertility control, agricultural production and empowerment in general. An equally important concern is the destination of those leaving the school system who face the prospects of unemployment and absence of opportunities to utilize skills and knowledge gained in schools in a productive and beneficial manner.

Demand for education should also be analysed and understood in the context of declining economies and per capita income. This has led to the shrinking of both public and private resources for education. The existing international economic environment has on the whole been unfavourable to the recovery of sub-Saharan Africa, and especially with the fluctuations of prices of traditional export commodities, coupled with foreign indebtness which reached close to US$230 billion in 1988, and debt-servicing that has continued to consume a rising proportion of export earnings (World Bank 1992). At the same time the inflow of investment capital has declined from about 25.2 per cent of GDP in the 1970s to about 15.0 per cent in the late 1980s. The consequences are that some African countries are unable to provide basic requirements such as education, health, food and shelter to the majority of the population as they at the same time attempt to meet their international financial obligations. The challenge will however remain as to how this process can be reversed and resources accruing thereof invested for economic recovery, job creation and improvements in provision of health, shelter and education.

The economic crisis, outlined above, has been felt dramatically in the education sector through structural adjustment programmes which have led to drastic cuts on education expenditures and other social services (Lungwangwa 1992, and Hansen and Twaddle 1991). The consequences and politics of structural adjustment are too complex and far-reaching to be dealt with here, but they remain central to African development debates and controversies and upheavals wherever applied.

But Africa has not only suffered from economic decline, but also from political instability characterized by wars, conflicts and disintegration of national states. Africa has the highest number of refugees and displaced persons in the world (Gorman 1987, and Doornbos, Cliffe, et al. 1992). Most of the aid being channelled into Africa today is being utilized to deal with problems of starvation, refugees and other victims of wars and conflicts (Duffield 1992). Natural disasters such as drought and famine have been made worse in situations of conflicts. Development in a number of African countries has therefore become almost an impossible undertaking, leave alone a possibility. Educational systems in conflict-laden countries have been destroyed, and the dilemmas and challenges these situations pose are unparalleled in the past. The destruction of educational systems (Nagar 1992), research institutions and universities; planning, management and policy capacities; indigenous knowledge systems; and the people themselves, can hardly be quantified. However, the energies required to replace lost capacities, leave alone resources to build anew the destroyed infrastructure and systems, are unimaginable. The tragedies of Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia and Sudan are too dramatic and far-reaching to escape analytical attention of individual scholars, institutions and non-governmental organizations in search for peace and lasting solutions. Education and learning in general will remain a central factor to the process of recovery from these situations. How to organize and manage such an educational undertaking will, however, remain complex.

Political and economic crisis indicated above notwithstanding, Africa is in the midst

of a major AIDS/HIV epidemic whose consequences to education are hardly realized or studied. There is no doubt that the AIDS/HIV epidemic will have a devastating impact on educational demand, the process of learning and output of the schooling system. The ability of communities to provide resources for education and sustain its productive capacity will be curtailed dramatically as able-bodied persons become ill and eventually die (Shaeffer 1992). The impact of AIDS is starting to be felt in countries such as Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Zimbabwe. How this will impact on education in sub-Saharan Africa remains to be studied and analysed, and the implications to future education drawn (Anderson and May 1992).

2.2

Repercussions of the above circumstances need to be given the analytical attention they deserve as they pose serious challenges and in some instances unique opportunities for educational change in Africa. We would like to focus on five areas of concern as a way of demonstrating the extent and depth of the existing problems. First, there is a noticeable decline of both public and household resources devoted to education (Ogbu and Gallagher 1991). Public expenditure on capital development has been virtually eliminated, and so has the provision of writing materials and textbooks (Kajubi 1991). This is observable in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and affects mostly primary and secondary education. Teachers' salaries tend to take most of the available resources for education, thereby leaving no room for discretionary actions in the budget. The consequences are that state interventions in the sector are becoming limited and community resources are required to augment the short-falls. In some countries, private schools have been established, as public schools deteriorate and loose their best-qualified teachers and administrators (Ogbu and Gallagher 1991, and Kajubi 1991). Resource constraints pose serious dilemma in terms of how the available limited resources are to be allocated between various levels. While research and prevailing wisdom favour investment in basic education (WCEFA 1990, and World Bank 1990), some countries have deliberately put relatively more resources into higher education. Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Kenya fall into this category. The dilemma is therefore the question at what level and type of education to invest the limited resources. There is also the question of whether to limit access to education, and concentrate on quality improvements with the consequences being felt mostly among urban poor, pastoral communities and generally less privileged groups in the society.

Secondly, there is a perceived decline in quality of education as measured in terms of inputs into the educational system. The proportion of untrained teachers has increased as writing materials and textbooks have become beyond the grasp of pupils who need them. Large classes have become the norm, leading to decline in the morale of teachers and pupils. In most countries teachers are spending less time in the classrooms as they take up supplementary activities for their survival. Learning and teaching seem to be affected not only by lack of adequate inputs, but also by the limited interaction occurring in the classrooms between teachers and pupils, a situation hardly studied hence the limited knowledge about this factor (Eisemon 1989). This is where classroom ethnographic studies can go a long way in improving our knowledge of learning and teaching in classroom situations (Foley 1991).

Decline in quality of education is also noticeable in the poor performance in mathematics and science subjects (Zymelman 1990), and in the overall learning outcomes of most African countries (World Bank 1988, and Alonge 1989). As a consequence, parents are losing confidence in the public-funded education system and increasingly turn to private education. Private schools, as indicated, are flourishing in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Kenya, Senegal and Tanzania among other countries on the continent. Private education is now no longer limited to supplementary contributions to government schools, but is clearly visible in the development of private schools at all levels from pre-school to the university.

Thirdly, in provision of schooling opportunities inequalities seem to persist and in some cases to widen. Regional inequalities have persisted in many countries with their ethnic ramifications, while class inequalities have become more pronounced in all countries. What is most disturbing is that the gains which girls and women made in the sixties and seventies

are threatened by economic conditions which have prevailed since the early eighties and are particularly noticeable through early school-leaving and poor performance especially in mathematics and sciences (Taole 1991, and Kinyanjui 1993). The opening-up of private schools and the participation of communities in providing required supplementary resources for education have not necessarily meant increased access to schooling, or improvement in the quality education by girls, especially those from poor households. The struggle to educate girls in the midst of economic, political and cultural obstacles remains a challenge which has to be faced squarely, while acknowledging fully the benefit of women's education for the development process. The search for appropriate ways to deal with existing inequalities, and especially those that discriminate against women, is both a challenge and an opportunity which must be faced even in a period of economic austerity, such as that indicated in the early nineties.

Fourthly, the economic, political and educational crisis of the eighties has enhanced the participation of grassroot communities in support for basic education. As state resources have diminished, parents and communities have taxed themselves to provide their children with some education. This participation is highly differentiated by regions, ethnic groups, economic abilities of the communities concerned and the value placed on education in various segments of the society. It should be noted that, while the resources being provided by parents and communities have recently increased relative to previous periods when the state predominated, this participation has not brought with it the sharing of power and demarcation of responsibilities relating to management, curriculum changes, the implementation, recruitment and disciplining of teachers, and the overall direction of educational policies at the local and national levels. Most of the power relating to the management and direction of educational policies still remains intact in the hands of local and national authorities, despite the changed circumstances. While the World Conference on Education for All (WCEFA) emphasized the need for meaningful partnerships and others have argued for collaboration in changing and improving education (Shaeffer 1991), the structures created in the sixties and seventies still remain in place. The dilemma here is that of the state wanting the communities to contribute more (cost-sharing) in terms of resources, but the same state is unwilling to surrender the power that this change entails.

Fifthly, a serious consequence of the conditions prevailing in sub-Saharan Africa is the impact on higher education as characterized by increased enrolments, erosion of university autonomy, deterioration of libraries and teaching facilities, and the overall decay of intellectual and professional life. The universities are therefore marginalized in terms of production of research knowledge and data that impact seriously on the development of their societies. The ascendancy and dominance of international institutions and donor agencies in the production of policy research, and their increasing influence on policy formulation, as will be indicated later on, is closely related to the marginalization of African universities in their societies. Excessive state control and surveillance over university life has not only suffocated them, but also destroyed intellectual creativity and initiative. The decline can therefore be seen in terms of poor undergraduate training, weak graduate programmes, and overall limited output of research, and impact on policy-making. The marginalization of African universities is particularly noticeable in the production and dissemination of scientific and technological knowledge. Africa is well behind other developing regions (Eisemon and Davis 1992). The continent is, and will continue, paying a high price for this neglect, as African societies are rapidly left behind in technological development.

African countries have all along recognized these problems and the challenges they pose, and indeed have attempted to deal with them although without much success. In the last three decades of political independence, a number of African countries have tried to implement far-reaching changes in education, but without noticeable major qualitative improvements. Among the countries that have been in the forefront of educational changes are Benin, Botswana, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The reforms, although tried from different ideological perspectives, nevertheless have achieved little. Joseph Ki-Zerbo provides a devastating critique of these experiments, and in general of educational development in the post-colonial period where he argues:

Now it is a fact that since the end of the colonial period, the school system in Africa has not really changed in any fundamental way. And that indicates that there have been no real social transformations so far. The colonial system as a whole retreated from the continent, but it left behind its school system to operate as a kind of time bomb. The bomb could have been adapted and retooled to serve as a missile propelling African society into a fresh new world; but that was not done. As a matter of fact, neither has there been any well-thought-out attempt to restructure the original African concept of the school to serve as part of an inner-directed development process. What we have had is on the one hand, a series of derivative and conservative systems frankly subservient to neo-colonial ends, and on the other, a set of pseudo-revolutionary adventures hitched to ill-digested leftist ideologies. Africa's endogenous system has been left fallow, ownerless and uncultivated. On the other hand, there is a blind stampede towards the illusion of a so-called modernization process that has always been unattainable for the majority anyway. Meanwhile, Africa has been dragging the school system it inherited from the colonial era behind it like a convict's ball and chain, unable to imagine and establish an alternative model. (Ki-Zerbo 1990: 43)

The crisis and challenges encountered in education today result partly from these failed experiments. There is, however, a need to evaluate them critically to learn whether they failed on account of the philosophical and theoretical basis on which they were articulated and implemented, or whether their failure resulted from cultural, economic and political disruptions and discontinuities that the continent has suffered since independence. In this retrospection, it is hoped, other issues of interest such as the place of indigenous knowledge and languages in the education system would be debated and their place in schools secured.

2.3

A major challenge to African development in the 1990s is the theoretical crisis which surrounds the study, analysis and formulation of solutions to the existing problems. The theoretical crisis confronting Africa today as it will be noted below did not start with the fall of socialist ideologies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but originated much earlier when structural functionalism was being challenged and dependency theories were fashionable.

The study of education in Africa since independence has been dominated by two broad paradigms. On one hand there has been the equilibrium paradigm, under which structural functionalism, system theory, modernization and human capital fall, and on the other hand, the conflict paradigm which is heavily indebted to the Marxist tradition and other conflict theories. The first paradigm has been the most influential in the analysis of African development, while the conflict paradigm has had limited application in the study of policies and practices of education on the continent. While rhetoric associated with the neo-Marxist tradition was evident in the seventies, the crisis of the eighties has led to the return to the theories of modernization and human capital, although modified to incorporate previous experiences.

As indicated, the dominant theoretical framework utilized in the analysis of education, formulation of policies and in guiding practice of education in sub-Saharan Africa has been the various theories of modernization and human capital. While the crude underlying assumption of all the existing variations was a developmental model which envisaged African development in the image of Western industrialized countries in terms of values, institutions and political orientation, the current formulation is more subtle and accommodating to the diversity of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. This formulation, however, retains the fundamental orientation of transforming the African situation to values, norms and standards related mostly to foreign images, which correspond more to Western societies, and the vision of development held by dominant international institutions.

This approach to the study of education and development in Africa has had a tremendous impact on the development of human resources in the years immediately after independence and to a large extent accounts for the rapid expansion of education achieved at all levels in the first two decades of independence. Attempts by African governments to rationalize

the planning and expansion of their educational systems and increase manpower output stemmed from this theoretical perspective and are clearly evident in most policy statements and development plans of the post-colonial period.

In the seventies it can however be observed that the initial concern and emphasis on manpower development through the expansion of the schooling system was modified to cope with the emergence of unemployment among school leavers. The preoccupation with manpower planning and education expansion *per se* therefore tended to be revised to include programmes for rural development diversification and technical education, to cater for the rising unemployment which the 'modern' sector could not gainfully absorb (Sifuna 1992). The aim of this policy and the innovations which were initiated to deal with these problems was to change values, attitudes and provide useful skills for the rural sector, but not for any fundamental change in education to fit the social structure. This approach did not deviate from the modernization and human capital framework. Modifications which were adopted were essentially meant to deal with the limitations and problems experienced within the African economy, but not to challenge in any fundamental way the conditions which created the problems.

This preoccupation led to an emphasis on rural development, second chance training institutions, and adult education. In essence this is the period when the need and search for new alternatives in African education started to emerge, as a consequence of unemployment among school leavers. Education for Self-Reliance and adult education in Tanzania, the Village Polytechnic Movement in Kenya, the Botswana Brigades, and Education with Production in Zimbabwe are some of the well-known experiments in this direction.

The emergence of the dependency theories in the seventies was a reaction, and indeed, a much deserved critique of theories of modernization, economic growth and human capital which dominated the development discourse in the sixties. Most of the criticisms and analyses carried from this perspective have been inspired by Marxist traditions, although utilized rather creatively to conditions of underdeveloped countries. The main accomplishment of this perspective was to provide a critique of the modernization theories originating mainly in the American social sciences. However, this theoretical project did not contribute much to the study and analysis of education in Africa. Influence of this perspective on policy-making and educational practice has also been limited.

In the eighties and early nineties the African reality has failed to fall into neat compartments of the dominant paradigms which African intellectuals and other scholars embraced and attempted to locate it in. Theorizing from the reality, rather than trying to fit the reality into existing paradigms, has and remains the most pressing scholarly project in Africa. This is not a call to ignore past scholarly traditions, but it should be viewed as an opening for creative and innovative thinking in the present circumstances. This is likely to usher debates and controversies which in essence can benefit the process of change in general, and understanding of education in particular. This task has hardly started, but the seeds for its growth have been sown in the prevailing untidiness.

3.0 Donor Driven Educational Development

The crisis of the eighties brought into sharp focus the role and influence of international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF and indeed the whole of the donor community in the field of education. With the decline of the African universities and the research institutions, and the distance they have tended to maintain from their governments, the donor and international organizations have become critical players in production of research knowledge and dissemination of policy-related research findings intended to impact on policy formation and implementation. The dominance of the World Bank initiated studies is widely felt in many academic discourses and research institutions (King 1990). Although this knowledge dominance is detested, no credible research alternatives have so far emerged to challenge what is increasingly being accepted as development orthodoxy (Emoungu 1992).

In addition to providing the policy analysis capacity needed for understanding and interpreting the prevailing crisis in African education, donors also provide the resources required

for implementation of the policy options they promote. The technical assistance provided by the donors and international organizations is not only utilized for generating the knowledge and data required by the Ministries of Education for decision-making, they also provide resources intended for planning and policy units in those ministries carrying out the implementation of donor initiated and funded reforms in education (King 1990).

With donor agencies becoming key actors in funding and consuming educational research, African universities have become even more marginalized in production of independent, nationally relevant research and in provision of policy analysis capability needed in the society. The universities themselves have become increasingly dependent on donor funds to maintain their research work, and indeed the functioning of existing institutions.

3.1

Consequently, in the last ten years donor and international organizations have taken a number of initiatives which have highlighted not only the critical issues in the development of education in Africa, but also indicated possible solutions and strategies for their implementation. Their dominance is therefore not only felt in the field of production of data and knowledge, but also in its utilization in policy formulation and in the development process as a whole. The publication of the World Bank Report on *Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policies for Adjustment, Revitalization and Expansion (1988)* followed by the establishment of the Task Force of Donors to African Education (DAE), initially with a secretariat at the World Bank and now located at the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), Paris, and bringing together about forty donor agencies operating in sub-Saharan Africa to co-operate and share information on educational support, is by itself an indication of the current and potential influence the donor agencies have on African education. The DAE activities are carried out through eight or so working groups each lead by a donor agency, and concentrating on perceived priority issues in educational development. Working groups have therefore been established to deal with examinations, women and girls participation in education, higher education, education statistics, the teaching profession, vocational and technical education, and educational research and policy analysis, among others. The World Bank leadership in this case has brought visibility and consensus among donors on these issues as priority concerns in African education at this juncture.

The Task Force of DAE since its inception in 1988 has provided for participation of African ministers in discussions related to critical education issues and policies in sub-Saharan Africa. While researchers have also participated in these deliberations, their effective representation and voice is provided for through the Working Group activities. On the whole the DAE initiative has emphasized the critical role which indigenous capacity in research and policy analysis can play in generating ideas and policy alternatives for the rehabilitation and revitalization of educational systems in Africa. Although the Working Groups are lead by donors, the concerns of African researchers, policy-makers and institutions have been given an opportunity to be expressed, and guide the activities of the Working Groups. In essence they have emphasized the critical role Africans themselves can play in undertaking educational research, policy analysis, participating in policy dialogue and sharing of information intended to shape the process of change and innovation. However, the dominance of funding agencies in articulation of priority issues, funding of the required research, and in formulation of policies consequent to this work, and on the whole of the critical underpinnings which guide an initiative like this, tend to marginalize African researchers and policy-makers (Collier 1991).

With the 1989 publication of the World Bank report entitled *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (1989)* there was added momentum to build and strengthen capacity in all fields, to facilitate recovery and long-term development. The report recommended capacity-building through 'institutional reforms at every level of government, and measures to foster private sector and non-governmental organisations' as a strategic agenda for the 1990s (World Bank 1989). The emphasis given to capacity-building seems to be the main concern of development. This found clear expression in the emergence of the *African Capacity Building Initiative* (ACBI) in 1990, and subsequently the establishment of the African Capacity-Building Foundation in Harare, 1991.

Implicit in these policy initiatives are assumptions about African reality, and theoretical frameworks for changing that reality and overall development processes (Collier 1991). Within this general approach, building and strengthening capacity for research and policy analysis is viewed as a critical input into the development process. The donor agencies, however, tend to dominate the direction, content and extent of the capacity-building being carried out in sub-Saharan Africa.

3.2

In the field of basic education, the World Conference on Education for All (WCEFA) held in Jomtien, Thailand, March 1990, highlighted the urgent need for building and strengthening national capacities for management, supervision, analysis and research geared towards provision of basic education to various groups in the society. Thus the WCEFA Framework for Action argued that:

> Ultimate responsibility rests within each nation to design and manage its own programmes to meet the learning needs of all its population. International support could include training and institutional development in data collection, analysis and research, technological innovation and educational methodologies. These capabilities will be even more in demand to support quality improvements in primary education, and to introduce innovative out-of-school programmes. (WCEFA 1990: 16)

The influence of donor agencies on the development agenda, as indicated, has thrived in the midst of the decline of African research institutions, and especially of the universities. The decline has been particularly observable in the faculties and institutes of education, where increased student population, coupled with budgetary constraints, has thrust heavy teaching responsibilities (narrowly focussed on production of teachers) and supervision of graduate students on to existing faculties, thereby seriously curtailing research output. A recent IDRC study (1991) on the *Status of Capacity-Building in Educational Research and Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa* has underlined the pervasive nature of this phenomenon in many countries in the region (Namuddu and Tapsoba 1993).

The dominant donor response to this situation has been to establish parallel and often competing institutions, and/or to utilize with increasing frequency foreign researchers to meet the existing research demand and gaps (Court 1991). The establishment of donor driven institutions like the African Capacity-Building Foundation, the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), and in the education field, the Task Force of Donors to African Education (DAE) must be seen in this light. At the country and indeed, ministries levels, the establishment of expatriate enclaves in the planning units manifest this phenomenon at work (Nagel and Snyder Jr 1989). Foreign advisers in these situations perform various functions and roles in policy formation, co-ordination and management of donor projects and provide the specialist and technical advice needed for implementation of policies.

While these alternative arrangements and institutions provide the required research and policy analysis for innovation and change in African development, they are not firmly linked to local institutions (universities, research institutes or even planning units of the ministries they are supposed to serve). Hence their operations are not fully rooted into the local reality, and their likelihood of being sustained when donor funding dries up is limited (Cohen 1991). In most cases, rather than strengthening indigenous research capacity, the initiatives have tended to undermine local contributions and alienate the existing capacity (Nagel and Snyder Jr 1989).

While the World Bank and IMF involvement in structural adjustment programmes in the education sector is important and needs research attention, we have concentrated our attention here on the World Bank reports of 1988 and 1989, and the multi-lateral donor initiative which culminated in the World Conference on Education for All. In choosing these initiatives we wish to illustrate the phenomenon of donor dominated educational development, and hopefully generate further research and debates.

4.0 Towards Pluralism and Diversity in Education

Recent events in Africa indicate the possibility of the emergence of an operational space which, with continued democratic struggles, can accommodate diversity, tolerance and pluralism in politics, ideological spheres, research and in the management of public institutions. This space however remains contested, and is hardly secure. The critical and urgent question is how to advance, strengthen and sustain the gains of the recent past and channel the emerging experiences into the management of educational institutions, selection of appropriate curriculum knowledge, and enhance learning environments. While civil society institutions remain weak, or controlled by the state, and while others still have to emerge and take shape, there are signs, nevertheless, that the nascent political changes (Hydén and Bratton 1992) will definitely impact on the educational processes in a fundamental way. We would like therefore to argue that Africa has entered an era where plurality and diversity of ideas,. actors and interests will contend for influence and involvement in the process of educational change.

4.1

As a result of socio-economic and political changes, we have observed that the provision and management of the education enterprise is no longer the monopoly of the state, but a contested terrain for private entrepreneurs, religious organizations, communities and international agencies. The contestation will revolve around sharing of available resources, formulation of policies and priorities, quality control and measurement of learning outcomes. This trend is now observable in many African countries, some of which we have indicated earlier. In Kenya, for instance, the development of private education is at an advanced stage, which has brought with it strong vested interests such as religious organizations which control most of the private university education. Here and elsewhere private entrepreneurs, non-governmental organizations and communities are contributing resources and managerial capacity to the development of education (Samoff 1990 and Mwiria 1992).

  In the countries which are emerging from long periods of conflicts and wars, the contribution of non-governmental organizations in rebuilding educational institutions and systems as a whole will be required. The governments of these countries will be glad to welcome these inputs and, hopefully, will facilitate participation and collaboration with local communities. Because of limited resources, the initiatives will tend to fall into the hands of international non-governmental organizations and other donors.

  However, legal and political arrangements have yet to reach the stage where these initiatives are accorded their rightful place, on account of their contribution to various aspects of educational growth. As public resources continue to be limited, and educational tasks escalate, this trend will continue, and diversity in the delivery of education becomes a permanent feature of most countries. Education provision will however remain a field where many interests and groups will be involved. These groups will not only be contesting for space to provide, manage and improve the quality of teaching and learning for their children, they will also be jockeying for research and policy information to strengthen their bargaining positions *vis-à-vis* the state, and on the whole to improve their competitive edge in the education market.

4.2

The second element in the expansion of the operational space is the emergence and strengthening of independent and representative associations to cater for interests of the various groups in the educational system and institutions. These associations represent teachers, parents, university academic staff and students. The guiding principle of these associations is to safeguard and advance interests of their members, while showing commitment to the overall ideals and goals of the educational system. In this way they will maintain diversity of views and approaches in the formulation, and implementation of policies, and the management of educational institutions and processes. In the present circumstances, it is clear that teachers' unions are attempting to free themselves from the control and surveillance they suffered under authoritarian regimes,

and are in the forefront of the struggles to safeguard and improve working conditions of their members, while making their professional contribution to the development of education.

Parent associations, on the other hand, will attempt to strengthen their participation in the management of schools, supervision of the implementation of school curriculum, and the overall improvement in the quality and relevance of schooling. Formation of parent associations with these broad objectives is now a common feature of many education systems in Africa.

Major struggles for strengthening operational space are, however, being witnessed in the universities where academic staff and students are waging determined battles for academic freedom, institutional autonomy, increased measures of internal governance and accountability. The University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, has been in the forefront of this struggle, this contest having preceded the emergence of multi-party politics in the country (UDASA 1990). In other countries, such as Kenya and Zimbabwe, students have waged a continuous battle for academic freedom and right to form free and independent unions. As students become more assertive of their rights, struggles for academic freedom are likely to intensify, thereby raising questions of the quality and nature of university education.

In this decade we are therefore going to see more organized interests in the educational system demanding to be heard, and articulating their views on many issues related to the orientation, organization and management of education. In this context of diversity of views and interests, creativity, we hope, will thrive and innovations emerge.

4.3

The content of school curricula will be another field of contest and intense discourses. This will stem from concern for what is relevant and legitimate knowledge in the rapidly changing local and international circumstances (Kraak 1991, Sifuna 1992, Fien 1991). Despite the failure of the experiments at educational reform in the last thirty years, educators are concerned as to how they can incorporate elements of health, environmental concerns, peace and population education in the curriculum, while they strengthen teaching of maths and science. Hence, selection of what is legitimate and relevant knowledge is going to remain a hotly contested issue with various actors arming themselves with the best research evidence available in the field, and citing comparative experiences from other regions.

Africa's rich cultural heritage is based on the diversity of its many ethnic groups who speak about a thousand languages. A critical issue of this diversity is how to accommodate it in the educational system, and especially the language of instruction. Central to the ongoing debates and critical discourses in Africa is the question of the language of instruction to be adopted in the classroom situations of each country. Language policies are perhaps the most debated issues in African education and yet remain a field with least agreement (Sanou 1990 and Fafunwa 1990). This is a terrain of intense exchanges and debates which will no doubt continue to pose dilemmas and challenges to educators and cultural experts (wa Thiong'o 1986, and Eisemon, Prouty and Schwille 1989). The upsurge of ethnic consciousness and the acceptance of pluralism has added new dimensions to the previous debates and discourses in this field (Westley 1992).

4.4

In the last thirty years, quantitative research methods and related functionalist rationality and planning models have dominated research and policy analysis in the field of education. In the last ten years this field has been broached, and qualitative research methods and related interpretative and phenomenological frameworks have become accepted and are becoming increasingly incorporated in research studies on all aspects of education. Researchers are being trained in this field and are applying skills so acquired in dealing with the prevailing educational problems. The African research community is starting to reflect on the concerns of various paradigms, and are taking 'epistemological stances' indicating interest in various research methods. This is an opening which, in my view, represents a serious attempt to analyse and come to terms with African reality with its diversity of meaning, and cultural nuances. This situation has also been recognized at the international level by an eminent comparative educational theorist, Rolland Paulston, where he has concluded that:

. . . research in comparative education will not return to the more optimistic and linear days of the 1960s. Our research problems and framing choices are opening up, not narrowing to the sole requirements of technical rationality. Related work in educational research and in the social sciences is also becoming increasingly diverse and tolerant of possibilities for multiple realities and ways of knowing. (Paulston 1990: 397)

In advancing theoretical work and various approaches to the study and analysis of African reality, attention should be given to maintenance of the diversity and pluralism which is painfully emerging. African universities have a unique opportunity to play a leadership role in this process. It must, however, be admitted that this is not going to be an easy task given the weakness they have shown in this field in the last decade or so. It is, however, imperative that the rapidly changing circumstances are recognized, and opportunities arising thereof taken advantage of. Universities have a golden opportunity at this juncture to build and strengthen research capacity especially in theoretical work and research methods. Research capacity as currently being articulated and implemented is giving scant attention to requirements of basic research and training in theory. This situation needs to be rectified, and funding and incentives provided to advance work in this field. In the past, basic research has been viewed as a luxury which African countries could ill afford in the midst of pressing problems. However, years of neglect are showing up in the quality of research being produced and even in the applied research currently fashionable. Universities can restore the required balance in this field, and in my view the time is opportune for this to occur. J. Kenneth Benson contributing to a colloquy on comparative theory has pointed to this possibility where he argues that:

if social science is to have an emancipatory role, it is necessary to develop reflexibility about theoretical stances. It is necessary to analyse theories, and theoretical assumptions built into seemingly atheoretical proposals. It is necessary to analyse the relations between theoretical approaches and the world of practice. (Benson (Colloquy on Comparative Theory) 1990: 393)

Pluralism, diversity and indeed contradictions are going to characterize educational provisions, the politics of curriculum content, delivery of learning, research methodologies, and the theoretical frameworks to be adopted and utilized in generating and disseminating knowledge and data for educational innovation and change. Creativity in all fields is therefore going to be the hallmark of educational enterprise as we move towards the twenty-first century.

5.0 Conclusion

Educational analysis and policies articulated in the eighties were carried out under certain assumptions regarding the nature of African reality, and the direction which development should take. The language utilized to define the problems and indicate solutions, underlines the continuity of theoretical assumptions which were dominant in the first two decades of African independence, and which predominated in donor and international agencies' approaches to development in the eighties. It is with this background that we should attempt to understand concepts of adjustment, revitalization and capacity-building that have tended to dominate educational discourses, articulation of policies and educational practice towards the end of the eighties and at the beginning of the current decade.

The crisis of education in the eighties is essentially a crisis of centralized state control, and the theoretical assumptions that guided the expansion and experiments of the post-colonial period. The weaknesses of the approaches adopted were, however, brought into the forefront by the economic decline which characterized most of Africa since the late seventies. While economic recovery is vital in dealing with the educational problems which exist on the continent, the solutions cannot be found without critical reappraisal of the role of the state and the contribution of other actors in the sector. New modalities of operation are therefore needed. Equally important are the theoretical assumptions to guide the search for alternatives that go beyond rehabilitation of the existing system to the creation of a vision for future developments.

Another critical concern today is how African universities are to be stimulated to rediscover and renew their research commitment, and take up the emerging challenges in teaching, research and policy analysis, and the search for a new vision of their societies. This is a top priority if

the current trend in output of scientific research and scholarly works in Africa is to be reversed from the decline that has characterized the last ten years or so.

Building a credible research capacity in any university is a costly business and, it must be accepted, requires a long-term perspective. African universities are therefore being called upon to rediscover and revitalize their research capacity and public service in a context of diminishing external and internal resources (financial, personnel and facilities), while pressure for quantitative expansion of higher education is continuing unabated. Hopefully, the current wind of democratization and change in the governance of universities will reverse previous trends, and usher in a new era of university autonomy, creativity, intellectual debates and productive relationships with their societies.

There is an urgent need to build and strengthen research capacity in Africa to undertake the existing tasks, and in the process hopefully formulate theoretical perspectives to guide the development of education in the nineties and beyond. This is an opportunity which should not be lost as we grapple with efforts that can lead us out of the current crisis. The donors' idea of capacity-building is closely linked to policy formation and implementation, but seldom linked to any theoretical work. African researchers should go beyond this to challenge the theoretical assumptions which guide the donor activities, and policy recommendations. The result of this critical questioning and discourse will definitely come up with theoretical and methodological approaches which can guide and sustain education enterprise in the tasks ahead. This is an opening which exists and which should be seized upon. This should be undertaken regardless of whether donor funding is forthcoming. It is however an essential element of capacity-building which tends to be ignored as pressing problems of the day are dealt with. This broad conception of capacity-building needs to be linked to the actors we have discussed in this paper, for it is through this collaboration that the existing capacity can be utilized for the debates and articulation of policy alternatives which are vital for the cultural revitalization and economic and political reawakening necessary for the development of education.

The pluralism and diversity which we have advocated in this paper can only thrive and attain sustainability in a context where different capacities are given space to exist and are utilized to undertake the many and diverse tasks that are urgently required for the new African project. The search for alternative paradigms, however, has to go beyond the confines of education and embrace other disciplines in the social sciences and humanities.

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21

The Nigerian Newspaper Press, the Reproduction of Consciousness & the Development Process

An Analysis of Perspectives   ADIGUN AGBAJE

Introduction

The non-concrete in the concrete

This chapter attempts to capture the image of the Nigerian newspaper press in the development process as reflected in the relevant scholarly literature. That image is more interesting for what it does not reflect than for what it displays, dilemmas hardly posed and largely unresolved, perspectives left undeveloped and approaches basically selective.

Controversies there have been, but these have taken place largely within the assumptions of the modernization/development paradigm infused with liberal-plural precepts and teleological fixation, given the tendency of the Marxist and neo-Marxist perspectives to consider the press unworthy of study by reducing press communication to an epiphenomenal process.

Not only has the field of media studies been subsequently dominated by non-Marxist perspectives; it has also been the case, thanks perhaps to the deterioration in library and research facilities in Africa, that such studies have continued to a large extent to reflect aspects of the modernization/development tradition fashionable up to the 1960s but now largely reformulated even in mainstream liberal social science. They have, thus, not reflected recent agenda on, for instance, the role of the media in the politics of consciousness and cultural and sub-cultural reproduction.[1]

Even the Marxist and neo-Marxist perspectives have displayed similar limitations. Current concerns have reflected a dominant pressure toward orthodoxy informed not by contemporary reality but by the imperative of doctrine fashionable in the 1950s and 1960s.

Thus, what has been witnessed is basically a 'follow the herd' mentality in which perspectives coexist without engaging in fundamental internal criticism or dialogue over theory, method and substance of inquiry. Such a mentality has encouraged a selective perception and interpretation of the Nigerian press in the development. The mentality has further been fuelled by what Sklar[2] describes as a peculiarly binary conception that sees the problem as one of a choice between capitalism or socialism. In reducing the problem to a choice of ideology, it basically ensures that intellectual effort would be in the form of insular monologues about the right path to development.

Against this background, therefore, this chapter examines how the literature has perceived the role of the Nigerian press in the reproduction of intangibles such as consciousness, which are crucial to the development process, at three levels: of media content, media evolution, and media context. In all this, the Western intellectual heritage has formed the necessary background and take-off point for the analyses of Nigerians and others. It is, therefore, important to examine first what can be called the received perspectives.

Received perspectives

In spite (or perhaps because?) of all the dust that has been raised in development theory between those who argue that capitalism, properly handled, can lead to development in Africa and those who insist on a reversed correlation between capitalism and development in Africa,[3] an area in which much less dust has been raised in the main arena of theoretical combat is the location of the media of communication in the development process.

Given their traditional concern more with the 'nuts' and 'bolts' of development, contributors to the debate on African development have thus tended to overlook, misperceive or underperceive the salience of the communication function in that elemental link between development and the agency of human intention. Debate about communication has hence not been high on the agenda of development in Africa, taking place principally in a tangential manner or outside the main body of development theory. The development debate has thus paid less attention to factors of production of consciousness in the development process – and the media's role in this regard.

That development theory – orthodox, Marxist and neo-Marxist – has tended to be more concerned with the 'concrete' in its consideration of the African predicament in this century is partly a function of the historical context of the initial contact between Western scholarship and Africa.

This occurred principally in the 1950s at a particular stage in the growth of non-Marxist and Marxist social science in the West. It was a period in which, in the neo-Marxist liberal-plural tradition, Parsonian political sociology, with its peculiar rendering[4] to a largely English-speaking audience in America and Britain of the works of Weber, held sway. That rendering was infused with functionalist assumptions and promoted a dualistic concept of modernization/development that posed Euro-American Society as the ultimate goal in the modernization process worldwide.

An offshoot of this tradition is the 'Communication for Development' school. Briefly, the school identifies a catalytic, often determining role for the media of communication in the development process. Its suggestions, at four levels, appear to indicate that there *is* a positive link between 'better' communication and 'enhanced' development; that where this is not the case, there *can be* such a relationship given the 'right "alchemy" '. Third, faced with empirical invalidation of its postulations even apparently following the application of the prescribed alchemy, the school goes on to insist that there *should*, or at any rate there *ought* to be such a positive relationship between communication and development.

The thesis of the Communication for Development paradigm appears well stated in the book *Mass Media and National Development*. According to Schramm, its author,[5]

> Countries in a hurry cannot afford the luxury of . . . an inert mass. They require the active and informed cooperation of their village people as well as their city people. Their human resources are indispensable. Therefore, they are going to have to speed the flow of information, offer education where it has never been offered before, teach literacy and technical skills very widely. This is the only way they can rouse and prepare their populace to climb the economic mountains and the only way they can do it and keep the timetable they have in mind is to make full use of modern communication.

Elements of this perspective charted the communication function at three levels;[6] that of the individuals, the society and the economy. By the late 1960s and 1970s, however, along with the general disenchantment with the assumptions and predictions of the modernization/development school, it has become clear that the dreams of the 'communication for development' paradigm had largely not been realized in Africa. In fact, one of the more reasoned earlier critiques of the paradigm was penned by one of its more respected founders, Everett Rogers,[7] in an article aptly entitled 'The Rise and Fall of the Dominant Paradigm' in which he called for an alternative approach to development, emphasizing 'a widely participatory process . . . intended to bring about both social and material advancement . . . for the majority of the people through their gaining greater control over their environment'.

The alternative position, outlined by the Marxist and neo-Marxist literature, however, also reflects the context of its initial contact with the problem of African development. That context was one in which the reductionism of Stalinism held sway in Marxist thought

in the era of the Third International, displaying elements of what Poulantzas[8] had called a deviation, economism, in its method and theory:

> . . . economism considers that other levels of social reality . . . are simple epiphenomena reducible to the economic base.

As Miliband[9] has also noted,

> . . . the Stalinist version of Marxism was a dreadfully impoverished affair . . . (with its imperative and binding definition of 'the line' to be followed).

This had two implications for African Studies: one, in its emphasis on orthodoxy and, two, in its tendency to reduce non-economistic (superstructural) factors and forces to mere epiphenomenal forms of economic factors and forces (the base). As Miliband says of this period:

> the accent was on authoritative interpretations and non-arguable propositions, . . . these were not expected to flourish, least of all in the highly sensitive area of political theory and political analysis, and it did not.[10]

The base-superstructure metaphor tended to be rendered in such a manner that emphasized principally basal factors and forces.[11] Essentially lost to these Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars were insights from the sensitive and rounded accounts of scholars like Gramsci and, later, Williams and Poulantzas who attempted some theoretical analysis of the superstructure and did not merely reduce this to an epiphenomenal entity whose key lay in an examination of the economic base in the social formation.

For instance, for Gramsci, elements such as the assembly of organizations like the press, political parties and the family which make up civil society, actually form a 'system of fortresses and earthworks' transposed between the economic structure and the state and, therefore, perform both economic and ideological functions.[12] Civil society is, thus, not merely a platform for the interplay of economic forces but also one for ideological and political contest in the form of systems of thought, common sense, philosophy and forms of consciousness.

Insights such as these did not inform in a major way the methods or theories of Marxist studies of Africa in the 1950s and 1960s. And, although much of the inheritance of the Stalinist early years have been overcome, Marxist and neo-Marxist studies still tend to reflect a tendency to be more interested in the more concrete economic dimensions of African development and to under-assess the role, potential and otherwise, of institutions like the newspaper press in this regard. The logic appears to have been that if the key to non-economic factors and forces were seen to lay in the economic structure of society, then all that was needed to be done was to concentrate effort on the explication of that economic structure and the illumination of everything else would follow.

Images of the Nigerian press in the development process

Against this epistemological background of the received hegemonic perspectives, I now turn to an analysis of the relevant literature on the newspaper press and development in Nigeria.

One of the earlier Marxist statements of the Nigerian situation was a 1975 volume of *Economic Development of Nigeria: The Socialist Alternative*.[13] That volume, published by the Marxist-oriented Nigerian Academy of Arts, Sciences and Technology and written by two well-known Nigerian Marxist intellectuals, has neither a chapter, a section nor even a subsection on 'superstructural' elements such as consciousness or on the role of the media of communication. Rather, reflecting the technicist economism of its writers and publishers, it focusses more on topics such as the class struggle, foreign domination and exploitation, dependency, neo-colonialism, corruption, development of basic socio-economic infrastructure, industrial, agrarian and commercial revolution and the development of natural resources.

Other works in this tradition also display this tendency either in their consideration of the development process in Nigeria itself or in analysing the implications of relations between Nigeria and specific developed industrial countries for Nigeria's development.[14]

In the few instances as in *Path to Nigerian Development, Social Science as Imperialism* and

A Political Economy of the African Crisis[15] when elements like ideology and consciousness enter a Marxist and neo-Marxist analytical framework, they do so as epiphenomenal forms of the economic struggle and tend to be conceptualized mainly at the level of the intellectual and methodological aspects of the study of the struggle for African and Nigerian development. Such a conceptualization does not allow for in-depth study of these phenomena or of the institutional frameworks for the reproduction of ideology, consciousness and culture and the maintenance of the hegemonic *status quo* via mass culture and mass politics.

All this has created a situation in which, as has been stated several times before, the study of press communication in Nigeria has been dominated by scholars operating largely within the assumptions of the modernization/development paradigm.

What follows below, therefore, is principally an attempt to analyse the image of the Nigerian press as a dependent and independent variable in the reproduction of consciousness germane to the development process as reflected in a literature dominated by liberal-plural precepts and a particular perspective that sees development as the creation of Western-type liberal-capitalist regimes all over the world. As stated earlier, the literature is examined under three headings, namely those that discuss the evolution of the press, those that examine the context of press operation, and those that analyse the content of press communication.

The Evolution of the Nigerian Press

The literature on the origins and development of the Nigerian press is replete with historical accounts which emphasize the 'nationalist fervour' of the press in the decolonization process and which tend to render the history of the press more as the history of the founders, owners and editors of the early press.[16] Such studies hardly focus exhaustively on the link between the newspaper press and the emerging local political elite within the context of an analysis of class formation processes. They also tend not to subject the economic background to the rise and fall of the various early newspapers to extended analysis.

For instance, the pioneering works of Coker and Omu,[17] which focus on the early years of the Nigerian press from 1859, tend to focus principally on the dominant actors in the evolving press structure. Thus, the literature highlights the various phases in this evolution, beginning from the missionary era, when the first set of newspapers were established by foreign enterprise made up mainly of missionaries, to the black émigré era from the 1880s to about 1900 when the newspaper scene was dominated by black ex-slaves of non-Nigerian extraction who had chosen to settle in Nigeria after being freed, to the era of the one-man editor-publisher and that of the newspaper chain begun in 1937 by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe but more noticeable by the late 1940s and the 1950s.

In outlining the transition from one era to the other, the literature has been more concerned with an explanation that focusses on the major *dramatis personae*, their interests and the use to which they put the media.

The transition from the missionary era to that of the black émigré is, for instance, traced to the black revolt against the tendency of such papers to espouse 'white' positions in increasing incidents of intra-church disputes between European and emergent black clergy, to endorse the decisions of the Berlin Conference, and the apparent inadequacies of media content, which tended to be more interested in fostering literacy and proselytization and was thus dull in language and heavy in substance. All these are identified as having turned the black ex-slaves and native Nigerians into a Black front united against the British colonial regime in its demands for recognition and active participation in both church and government.

So, the transition is posed in the context of the liberal-plural tradition of seeking to make the marketplace of ideas more alive to the yearnings of black Africans in Nigeria. Subsequent stages in the evolution of the press are also explained in this matter as a natural development within the context of the pluralities in the evolving Nigerian nation and the need to ensure that all major interests have access to the marketplace of ideas.

Such analyses as these no doubt suffer from an under-emphasis on other fundamental processes and forces underpinning these major changes in the structure and ownership pattern of the Nigerian press – namely, the development of literacy, changes in the cost and availability of technology, and changes at the level of political economy.

For instance, by the 1880s, blacks native to the area now known as Nigeria were generally not in the economic or social situation to establish or provide readership to sustain pro-black papers in competition with the European press. This opportunity was to be utilized only in the first two decades of the twentieth century following a relatively significant expansion of the black Nigerian middle classes in principal towns like Lagos, expansion of educational facilities in the colony and the return to Nigeria of natives sent by their well-to-do parents to pursue the 'golden fleece' in European, essentially British, institutions.

The initial challenge to white domination of the press, therefore, had to come from the relatively better-educated, more affluent African ex-slaves, mainly non-Nigerians, who had settled in Nigeria. After an initial period of providing a common black front to the British colonial regime, the hegemonic hold of non-Nigerian blacks was itself challenged by Nigerians who by the 1920s had come to dominate the newspaper scheme as one-man publishers and editors.

By the 1930s and 1940s, however, cracks began to appear among Nigerians themselves, now increasingly fractionalized along ethnic and political lines and by the late 1940s, the newspaper scheme was dominated by newspaper chains often tied to specific partisan political interest in the march toward independence in the colony.

The literature, in emphasizing the nationalist fervour of the press in the decolonization process and in focussing principally on press history as the history of the interactions and interest of notable newspapermen, politicians and the colonial regime, tends not adequately to capture more fundamental processes germane to these changes. For instance, the link between the newspaper press and the emerging local political elite is not subjected to sustained analysis in the context of class formation processes. While a congruence between political and economic imperatives [18] is often outlined for some of the stages of growth as in the transition from the missionary to the black émigré era or in the point that the first set of political parties tended to grow around newspapers,[19] the political economy of these various changes both at the macro level or at the more micro level of the economic foundations of individual newspaper operations is not subjected to serious analysis.

Another aspect of the evolution of the Nigerian press that is often taken for granted in the literature is the area of assumptions underlying the operation of the newspaper press. One relates to the liberal-plural definition of freedom of the press in the form of an absence of unnecessary constraints on press behaviour. The local journalist and publisher was so steeped in liberal-plural ethos as to react as far back as 1909 to perceived attempts to muzzle the press thus:

> the intention is simply to gag the people; to effectually gag the public press of the country; to suppress and extinguish all lawful assemblies; to discourage and suffocate all constitutional agitations against unpopular and oppressive measures of the government.[20]

Again, the underlying ethos is taken as self-evident and, in narrating the history of the evolution of the press, such ethos is then used to judge the extent to which the newspaper press matured from one stage of development to the other.

The Context of Press Communication

In the same vein, debate about the context of press operation has reflected the dominant liberal-plural assumptions in that it has focussed more on the primordial and horizontal cleavages of ethnicity, regionalism and loosely defined concepts like media ownership as variables independently shaping and constraining media communication. Attention has hardly been focussed on vertical considerations such as the exigencies of class, and fundamental, structural, technological and economic processes, or dominant ideas germane to the operation of the press.

Moreover, studies in this regard tend to focus more on the macro context of press operation, rather than on micro shop-floor studies utilizing specific newspaper houses as units of analysis.[21] Not enough attention has also, until very recently, been paid to the implications of the liberal-capitalist professional ethos, training and style of media operators on the operation of the press in the Nigerian context.

In this regard, in their definition of Nigerian pluralism and the plural logic, media studies have tended to focus almost exclusively on ethnicity and ethnic groups, to the relative neglect of religion, ideological and class cleavages and the impact of geo-political changes in the Nigerian federalism. To that extent, one could talk of a dominance of ethnic group theorizing in work on the context of press operation in Nigeria. Such a perspective then argues[22] that

> Ownership may not be as strong as geographical location in moulding newspaper opinion and reportage in the Nigerian circumstance . . . The newspaper's attitude is usually a function of geographical location more than ownership and certainly guided by the ethnic constituencies the papers serve.

Thus, in examining personnel and the context of media management, the ethnic factor is identified as the major, if not the sole, force shaping press communication, especially in competitions for political power. The perspective nevertheless identifies one positive element with this 'ethnicization' of the press: namely that of enhancing press freedom in the liberal-plural sense:

1. It ensures free flow of information and maintenance of a continued critical role, and relative freedom for the Nigerian mass media;

2. It helps ensure authenticity, credibility and verification of government information and statements;

3. It is important for generating socio-political awareness among listeners and eliciting feedback . . ., and

4. It sets a climate for individual free expression of opinion and an image of democracy even under a military regime.[23]

It is thus argued that

> The press is free in Nigeria in spite of the fact that they [sic] are owned by various governments and in spite of the ethnic factor which filters and beclouds its objectivity . . . the press owned by one ethnic group could expose wrong doings by others from a different ethnic group.[24]

This thesis suffers from certain empirical and conceptual problems. In the first place, the impact of media site need not be conceptualized in ethnic terms as has been done. There may indeed be some correlation between place of publication and attention paid to geographical areas as, for instance, in a tendency for the media to pay more attention to areas near where they are located. This is probably more a function of geography and an admission of an inability to do better.

In fact, the assumption of the ethnic group thesis that the more local a paper is, the more it has been ethnicized itself reflects the faulty historical logic in the evolution of the Nigerian press, in which papers tended to cover the whole country in content and circulation in order to be called national and in which, therefore, to be local was to be of little consequence. Given the structural inadequacies in the country, including inadequacies in telephone, telex, postal, land, air, rail and internal water communication and transport services, it cannot validly be assumed that amount of news carried by a paper is due solely to editorial preference informed by ethnic considerations. Such a position, in any event, assumes an ethnic congruence among media ownership, media management and place of publication – a congruence that need not be taken for granted.

Part of the problem, as indicated earlier, is that major aspects of the contextual issue have not received the kind of sustained attention that has been given to the ethnic problem partly because media studies have been basically of a macro·nature and have not seriously addressed the issue of day-to-day decision-making within the newspaper houses themselves in order to penetrate the veil of declared or apparent factors, to identify operative forces and factors.

No doubt, a few studies[25] have focussed on the imperative of ownership and partisan political considerations but these are loosely defined analytical constructs. Others have also outlined the impact of the governing regime – be it elected civilian or military – but even

here opinion varies. While some writers see the press as enjoying more freedom under elected civilian government than under military rule, others believe that this is not necessarily so, in the sense that the weakening of other pressure groups and the public opinion process further enhances the role of the press under military rule which also tends to be benevolent enough not seriously to threaten the liberal-type press freedom that Nigeria has 'traditionally' enjoyed.[26]

Again, positions such as these tend not to be based on sustained research but on some abstract and generally agreed positions on the 'traditional' rights of the Nigerian press. An attempt seriously to examine the notion of press freedom beyond these assumptions cannot but lead to their being questioned. Nigeria under the Gowon Military administration (1966–1975) is, for instance, most often cited as an example of a period in which Nigeria had 'the freest press in African and any country under military rule'. That administration has been identified by a notable newspaper baron of the era as having been 'exemplarily benevolent and more liberal to the press of Nigeria than any military government that I know of anywhere in the world'.[27]

Thus, it is argued that press freedom has been guaranteed even under military rule which has often been unwilling to tamper with it not only because of its benevolence but also because of the country's pluralist nature. If we take the Gowon example, for instance, this kind of argument is simplistic. As I have indicated elsewhere,[28] in the post-war era (after 1970), the Gowon regime had quickly become a degenerate military administration, faced by mounting public criticism over corruption and ineffective leadership and rent by internal acrimony. It thus suffered from a creeping process of internal decomposition thanks to which it was neither cohesive nor strong enough to take over action either against the press or even against members of the military inside or outside the government. This was despite the administration's constant threats to deal with dissent if it went too far. The process of decay had been so advanced that, by 'the end of his period of rule, Gowon seemed to reach almost total paralysis'.[29]

A lesson from this is that the largely unresearched assumptions about such issues need to be subjected to rigorous empirical enquiry for falsifiability. In this instance, the operative factors included also the nature of the regime itself.

Another contextual area in which there has been until recently very little debate was the tendency to see the professional codes and ethos guiding press operation and communication training and research in Africa as natural laws and not the derivative of Western liberal codes and ethos that they really are.[30] Whether the guiding concepts are development communication, public interest or press freedom, the tendency is to see these as natural and, therefore, universal imperatives for media action. For writers like Cruise O'Brien[31] and Peter Golding,[32] however, elements of such imperatives form part of 'an ideology imposed on countries in a situation of dependence, and concealing more than merely prescriptions for technical proficiency'.

The tendency not adequately to perceive the ideological bases of communication ethos in Africa is partly a consequence of the fact that communication educators and trainers have themselves been trained within the context of these Euro-American perspectives, depend on books and other materials, written and published from these perspectives and themselves use 'standard definitions of news found in all basic American journalism texts'[33] in writing books on the Nigerian and African experience. This is now coming under increasing criticism with calls being made for their view of curricula in communication education to emphasize the African cultural reality.[34] In pursuing this cultural thesis for relevance, however, the basic elements of the liberal communication ethos with regard to the means and ends of communication are left largely intact.

The Content of Press Communication

As indicated earlier, Nigerian discussion of the content of press communication is informed by the modernization/development paradigm which, even when it is critical of the press, assumes that press communication could or should enhance development. Much emphasis is then placed on the appropriate strategy or mechanism for ensuring communication for

development[35] rather than on an examination of the actual situation in order to answer the question: does press communication *as it is* enhance development, or underdevelopment? Having said this, it is important to note that Nigerian contributors have attempted to modify Western positions in the context of Nigerian and African experience.

In terms of the impact of structure and personnel of the media on development communication, for instance, writers[36] have accused earlier European proponents of focussing too much on *mass* media, neglecting non-mass media such as inter-personal communication, and also of encouraging a vertical, one-way media-structure seeking to direct change from 'above', rather than a horizontal structure that fosters a two-way information flow between change-agents and target audiences. In this regard, it is also suggested[37] that rather than seek how communication can enhance development in the Third World, efforts should in fact be geared first toward seeking long-term assistance 'to augment the mass communications capacities of developing states'[38] and, therefore, develop communication facilities to meet the needs of the waning years of the twentieth century. Moreover, by assuming that the goal of development was to make Third World nations look like Western industrial-type entities, earlier proponents were also accused of conceiving of change and change-agents as instruments of foreign ideas and practices. This, according to critics, created a problem of lack of empathy between change-agents and their messages on the one hand and the targets of such messages on the other. Contemporary critics then point to the need for training of change-agents and the utilization of the necessary cultural inputs to reduce this lack of empathy.[39]

With regard to media content, there are at least three criticisms levelled at the earlier proponents. It is argued, for instance, that they tended to overlook the point that there needs to be consensus in the information diffused by the media. In other words, they were said to have underplayed the role of conflict, inconsistencies and attendant confusion messages especially in plural societies.[40] Two ways of addressing such conflict, according to contemporary analysts, include fostering the so-called totalitarian model[41] of the media which, in their view, might be better suited to developmental needs. The second proposition calls for effective long-range planning of communication policies and practices backed by the effective communication research.[42]

The second category of criticisms relates to the perceived tendency of the earlier school to emphasize what can be described as 'psychologism' in its consideration of attitude change. Such an emphasis on psychological variables tended to limit the applicability of its techniques beyond the laboratory situation and to foster a 'marionette' image of the communication in development picture, with some omniscient manipulators above directing the situation as the perceived variables dictated – thereby giving policies and programmes an elitist, 'exploitatory' tinge.[43] What unites these totalitarian and psychologistic policy options is an anti-mass perspective that sees the policy elite as the repository of requisite knowledge about the desired goals of society.

Not least is the third point, that earlier proponents tended to assume that media fare would be 'developmental'. According to concerned scholars, recent experiences of the Third World have proved this assumption to be false in the sense that Third World societies have increasingly become the victim of a media and cultural imperialism from the West,[44] in the sense that the globalization of patterns of capitalist culture of consumption through mass communication have had more negative than positive impact on the Third World, creating a dissonance between indigenous culture and needs and what the media offer. It is now being suggested that policies be made that would utilize traditional and autochthonous media systems and messages to bring forth a positive meeting between traditional needs and modern imperatives.[45] In spite of these local criticisms and debates, however, the situation remains basically the same. It is the government-dominated urban-centred mass-media-dominated network that was inherited at independence which has been adopted by the post-colonial ruling class. Suggestions by contemporary analysts with regard to changes in this heritage have largely gone unheeded. Calls for replacing the largely one-way communication flow between government and governed, urban and rural, the elite and the non-elite, with two-step, two-way, and allied networks have gone largely unheeded.

In this regard, it is interesting that the concept of media imperialism is applied more frequently when the international flow of news into or about Nigeria is being discussed than

when issues of internal news flow or media ideology are discussed. To be sure, some perfunctory attention has been paid to the structure of news flow within Nigeria, especially with regard to rural/urban,[46] and elite/non-elite[47] imbalances. More attention, however, has been paid to international news flow into and about Nigeria and the rest of the Third World.

The tone of the literature in this regard was set by the debate on the desirability of a new world information and communication order (NWICO) between the industrial North and the developing South. The 'southern', Third World position is ably espoused by scholars from that part of the world and by the report of the McBride Commission.[48] As indicated earlier, however, less attention has been paid in the debate to the issue of news balance and directionality within races, continents and countries, especially with regard to media coverage of the non-elite, the weak and the marginalized. Not only that, equally less attention has been paid to the issue of the politics of the production of mass culture, consciousness, subcultures and images, not the least in the basic area of definitions and dominant perspectives in society. This touches not only on the question of what is reported, how it is reported and who decides when it is reported, but also the rules and assumptions that go into the decision. Such rules of the Third World, including Nigeria, have largely been exogenous, derived from Western capitalist society, even if largely unacknowledged as such.

In any case, the problem with suggestions on possible changes in the structure of communication in Nigeria relates to the unanswered questions: Communication of what? What would the suggested two-way flow now carry? Even if local opinion leaders were to be given more prominence in public communication, what would such local opinion leaders transmit if not the prejudices and values dominant in the national psyche, steeped as such leaders are in a culture stressing the superiority of Western, urban, material norms? The basic issue, then, is: If the structure of communication can be reformed via piece-meal social engineering, can media content also be so reformed even with an unchanging social formation with the attendant tastes of the audience and the limits posed by societal forces. These are issues that are hardly addressed by the dominant perspectives.

Conclusion: In Search of a Developed, Unified Perspective

In a nutshell, the crisis in the literature on the Nigerian press and the development process is a crisis of undeveloped perspectives encouraging a selective rendering of reality. What we face, therefore, is a series of dilemmas largely unidentified thanks to what can be described as a tyranny of ideology masquerading as theory. The field has been dominated by a tendency to pose questions that 'demonstrate or illustrate theoretical assumptions' rather than those that subject such assumptions to empirical tests.[49]

An important element in the search for solution, therefore, is an attempt to confront theory with data and transform these unidentified dilemmas into real dilemmas alive to the contradictions between preconceived theoretical notions and the empirical world. Such a development, in enriching the alternative liberal-capitalist and Marxist and neo-Marxist perspectives, could create a situation in which the tyranny of theory and selective description of reality would be seen for what it is. Surely, the study of the media in development will benefit from exchanges between these two dominant traditions; exchanges that could point out their relative methodological and theoretical strengths and weaknesses. No doubt, the teleological obsession of the liberal-capitalist tradition with communication for development could be tempered with the neo-Marxist obsession with the communication of underdevelopment. In the same manner, internal criticism within the liberal-plural assumptions in the Nigerian literature with regard to the salience of the ethnic factor cannot but lead to the realization of the material and situational dimensions of the manifestation of ethnicity which for quite some time have been widely acknowledged in general theorizing on ethnic groups and ethnicity.

Similarly, a more rigorous internal debate within the Marxist and neo-Marxist perspective in Nigeria cannot but point out its neglect of media studies for what it is – an aberration – given advances in Marxist studies that have opened up exciting areas of investigation in cultural and sub-cultural studies, hegemony and the politics and sociology of consciousness and ideology.

In the same manner, both perspectives still have a lot to learn from each other in the study of social cleavages in social formations as plastic as the Nigerian reality with cleavages that are situationally changeable and not yet fully formed. Thus, liberal-plural perspectives can learn from the analysis of class formation and class struggle in Marxism while the Marxist perspective could benefit from the analysis of horizontal cleavages such as ethnicity from the liberal perspective. In a context of flex, to assume discrete lines of cleavage analysis is to force cleavages into rigid analytical moulds and not to be able to capture social reality in its natural complexity. The need here, for instance, would be for the analyst to be able to plot where consideration of ethnicity, religion and regionalism end and the imperatives of class, owner-ship and partisan political considerations begin, how partisan political considerations fuel religious, ethnic and inter-class and intra-class factors and forces and so on.

In this regard, it is important to note that, beneath the veil of orthodoxy and neologism, and within a context that focusses more on the 'intangible', largely unreported dimensions of media communication – within the frame of the sociology and politics of consciousness, cultural and sub-cultural studies, the sociology of mass politics and hegemony – what comes out are certain common notions of the role or place of media communication in human society.

There is some agreement, albeit occasionally unacknowledged, with regard to communica-tion and control, and a common tendency to see media communication as affecting and reflec-ting social, economic and political forces and processes, even if emphasis is placed in disparate analyses on horizontal cleavages or vertical cleavages and developmental or non-developmental consequences in this regard.

There is no doubt[50] that an attempt to tackle the tyranny of ideology masquerading as theory in the study of African development cannot but benefit from the realization that epistemological purity is not an end in itself – especially in the study of social formations in a state of flux. Such an epistemological purity can only be seen as a means to an end of a unified, powerful theory that adequately captures social reality. When it fails in this, as it has done in the analysis of the Nigerian process and development, there is no other more compelling evidence to justify its being discarded than its own failure.

Notes

[1] Cf. Ulf Himmelstrand (1960), *Social Pressures, Attitudes and Democratic Processes*, Stockholm, and R. W. Connel (1987), 'Why the "Political Socialization" Paradigm Failed and What Should Replace it', in *International Political Sciences Review*, Vol. 8, No. 3, July.

[2] R. L. Sklar (1988), 'Beyond Capitalism and Socialism in Africa', in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 4.

[3] On a review, see A. Phillips (1977), 'The Concept of "Development"', in *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 8.

[4] For a critique, see A. Andreski (1984), *Max Weber's Insights and Errors*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 58–82 and J. Cohen, L. Hazelrigg and W. Pope (1975), 'De-Parsonizing Weber: A Critique of Parsons' Interpretation of Weber's Sociology', in *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 40, April pp. 229–41.

[5] W. Schramm (1964), *Mass Media and National Development*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 19.

[6] Cf. D. McClelland (1961), *The Achieving Society*, New York: Van Nostrand; E. M. Rogers and F. Shoemaker (1971), *Communication of Innovations: A Cross-Cultural Approach*, New York: Free Press; K. Deutsch (1961), 'Social Mobilization and Political Development', in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 55, No. 3; H. C. Kelman (1961), 'Processes of Opinion Change', in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 25; I. Pool (1963), 'The Mass Media and Politics', in L. Pye (ed.), *Communication and Political Development*, Princeton: Princeton University Press; M. F. Millikan (1967), 'The Most Fundamental Technological Change', in D. Lerner and W. Schramm (eds), *Communication and Change in the Developing Countries*, Honolulu: East-West Centre Press; E. Rogers (1969), *Modernization Among Peasants*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston; D. Lerner (1958), *The Passing of the Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, New York: Free Press; S. P. Huntington (1968), *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press; W. W. Rostow (1953), *Process of Economic Growth*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 6; W. W. Rostow (1960), *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 6 and 19; D. J. McCrone and C. F. Cnuddle (1967), 'Towards a Communication Theory of Political Development: A Causal Model', in *American Political Science Review*, pp. 72–9; E. Carpenter (1971), *Oh, What a Blow that Phantom Gave Me!* New York: Oxford University Press; J. Marceau (1972), 'Communication and Development: A Recon-sideration', in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 235–45.

[7] E. Rogers (1978), 'The Rise and Fall of the Dominant Paradigm', in *Journal of Communication*, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 64–9.

[8] N. Poulantzas (1969), 'The Problem of the Capitalist State', in *New Left Review*, Vol. 58, p. 239.

[9] R. Miliband (1977), *Marxism and Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 3.

[10] Ibid., pp. 3–4.

[11] On this, cf. K. N. Cameron (1980), 'The Fallacy of "the Superstructure"', in *Monthly Review*, Vol. 31, No. 8, January, and R. Williams (1973), 'Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory', in *New Left Review*, Vol. 82, November/December.

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VII CONCLUSION

22 Changing Ideological
& Theoretical Perspectives on Development

GÖRAN HYDÉN

Development is the product of human efforts. As a result, it has both its architects and auditors. The former are typically persons with a vision, wedded more or less explicitly to a given ideology. Most of them occupy positions of power, a prerequisite for the successful dissemination of their ideas. Depending on both context and timing, ideas may or may not go far in shaping the development of a given society. Some political architects are capable of making quite a mark on their society. Others, however hard they try, find themselves forgotten by people.

The principal auditors of development are academics. Their task is to assess, within a given theoretical perspective, how successful the architects are in shaping the process of social change according to their own models. Academics as auditors typically take a back seat, but when the occasion demands, many rush to the front expressing their concern over what is happening. They tend to become activists especially when unanticipated consequences of architectural ambitions become imminent. In other words, when the ideal and practice of development grows increasingly apart.

The auditors are at least in principle independent, but much of their work takes its lead from the perspectives provided by the political architects. That is the way it should be as any attempt at evaluating their interventions must be built on premises similar to those on which these interventions were planned. It is unfortunately a common sin of many academics to ignore this basic premise and instead direct their critique of the architects from lofty positions where they often appear 'holier than thou'.

This is not to deny the fact that the architectural perspectives on development are always only partial – however persuasive they may appear. They may conceal or overlook vital elements that often must be considered for development to take place. Thus, the academic as auditor has a responsibility to highlight precisely those elements that the architects obliterate or conveniently leave out of their equations.

This being said, the challenge for the academic is to strike the necessary balance between the need for a broader or deeper understanding of a given social phenomenon, on the one hand, and the societal expectations that certain practical conclusions can be drawn from such an understanding, on the other.

Such a balance has been particularly difficult to find in the African context for reasons that are important to understand as we are searching for new perspectives or 'paradigms' in the study of development on the continent. The first is the nature of the tools that the academics use as auditors, their theories. These are by definition universal and hence bound to provide a perspective on any given phenomenon that is external and, as a result, only more or less relevant to the particular object of study. The other factor is the almost inevitable ambition of Africa's post-independence political architects to localize the perspective on development; to build a society that takes its inspiration from African as opposed to global cues. The effect has been that Africa's political architects in the past three decades have either consciously ignored or considered irrelevant the universal ideals that have guided development elsewhere

in earlier periods. This 'populist' orientation has made these architects feel particularly uncomfortable with the universalist academic auditors, who typically have been accused of aping 'foreign ideologies'.

This confrontational relation between architects and auditors in the African context has been exacerbated by the weakness of the local 'development construction industry'. There have been a shortage of good private and public entrepreneurs and managers to put the architectural dreams into reality. This is partly the consequence of colonialism but partly also the outcome of the tendency among the political architects to insist too much on the execution of their own blueprints without modification. As a result of this dogmatism or adherence to personal glory, the political leadership has become its own worst enemy, leaving itself exposed to accusations of incompetence.

International agencies have not been late in filling the vacuum left on the African continent. It is typically their perspectives that have been allowed to shape the actual construction of development. In spite of some heroic effort at populist development, notably by Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, little has proved feasible or sustainable. To add insult to injury on Africa, the same can be said about the globally inspired development programmes of the international agencies. They have found themselves caught between a cadre of political architects with little appreciation or understanding of their universalist ideals and a cadre of development construction workers with little inspiration or commitment to the objectives of the international agencies (other than possibly for personal career considerations).

The upshot of all these circumstances is that the conditions for the African academic as auditor of the development process have been very difficult. He has found himself ignored or despised by the local political architects and in relation to the global academic community increasingly peripheralized. His voice has, if anything, rung fainter.

Secondly, the discourse between architects and auditors in Africa has lacked the empirical base on which reasonable arguments can be built and sustained. The lack of such a base has not only allowed the international agencies as well as non-African academics to have an unproportionately strong influence on the thinking about development in Africa. It has also encouraged a rapid shift in perspectives both in ideology and theory. Because of the shortage of empirical data and the absence of public discourse among Africans themselves about what is viable or sustainable, the development debate has been allowed to 'slide' from one position to another without much consideration of what in the original architectural design does work and does not work.

The rest of this chapter will illustrate these phenomena with regard to shifts in both development ideology and development theory. The concluding section will discuss the implications for development discourse of the recent tendency in Africa, as elsewhere in the world, to consider the possibility of greater political openness.

Shifts in Development Ideology

One of the striking things about the development debate in Africa is how little it has been shaped by African architects. I have suggested that this does to a large extent reflect the relations of power in the world. It must also be recognized, however, that the strategy which Africa's own political leaders have adopted so far has only exacerbated this situation. Thus, it is the international community that has helped set the African development agenda. It is to the ideological perspective of the donor community that Africa has had to respond.

This international development debate over the last three or so decades may be viewed as a spiral-journey around two axes: (1) *growth–equity*, referring to the objectives of development, and (2) *management–participation*, the means or methods of development. The journey is sketched in the figure below.

Following this framework, it is possible to identify four distinct phases through which the development debate has passed. Each phase is distinguished by a lead concept (inside the spiral), capturing the ideological essence of each phase, and a key institutional actor (outside the spiral), indicating the predominant management mode.

By suggesting a linear progression, the map disregards the complexities of reality. It does not acknowledge the multiple zig-zag movements in and out of blind alleys that have also

Figure 22.1: Shifts in ideological perspectives on development 1955–90

characterized the debate in each phase. Nor does it take into consideration the conflicts associated with the shifts from one phase to another. It does recognize, however, that, as the journey progresses, there is accumulated learning, hence the notion of a spiral might be more adequate than the circular move indicated in the figure. Lessons learnt in one phase are carried over into the next. There is no return to the same spot as before, although the same broad territory may be revisited. The basic features of each phase are outlined below.

(a) 'Trickle down'

The 'trickle down' phase was heavily influenced by the thoughts of political architects trying to draw the full lessons from post-World War Two experiences in reconstructing Europe. Influenced especially by John Maynard Keynes, policy-makers were preoccupied with trying to find out what could, and should, be done to allow countries to emerge out of poverty (Meier and Seers 1984). By contradicting orthodox classical economics, Keynes had prepared the way for an alternative approach to economic problems that gave governments a particularly important role in the development process. By assigning the key role to the public sector as generator of consumer demands, he had also opened the way for discretionary national economic management. In this perspective, public policy and public management were to be much more active forces in national economies. Full employment, social security, the political and social responsibility of government – all these attributes of the welfare state – were carried into the perspective on how to design development in the future. The relative success that Europe had experienced in post-war reconstruction, making use of the Marshall Plan as a Keynesian tool, had convinced even conservative and liberal politicians about the potential benefits of discretionary national economic management. As a result, the ideological guard of capitalism had been lowered. In the 1950s and early 1960s, there was a growing acceptance of such instruments as macroeconomic planning. It is important to acknowledge this orientation because in other respects this was a period when the West was fiercely set against anything that smacked of communism.

This ideological orientation fitted the political conditions in Africa as it began to liberate itself from the colonial yoke. It shared the optimism of the emerging generation of African political leaders, especially their hope that the state could be used as means to eradicate poverty and redress imbalances caused by colonial policy. In a situation like that of Africa, where the indigenous private sector was also weak and underdeveloped, it appeared

to make good sense to embrace the notion that the state ought to serve as the engine of growth.

Development in the ideological perspective of this first phase was tantamount to modernization. The political ambition of Africa's political leaders was to industrialize their countries, educate their populations, and provide social amenities associated with modern life. To promote manufacturing the state had to engage public capital and to administer complex – and expensive – import-substituting policies. To promote the development of human resources, the state had to vastly expand available opportunities for both primary and secondary education. To upgrade medical and other health facilities for the local population, large investments were necessary. This largely 'demand-driven' strategy of development was to be financed through foreign aid. The convergence of ideas and priorities between donors and recipients gave the former legitimacy in designing the necessary strategies.

It is important to remember that the policies of the day were cast not in the language of equity but that of growth. The latter was to be achieved through the big push of public investments but it would also be targeted on special categories of people, notably the well-endowed and entrepreneurial types with capacity to make a difference. In agriculture, for example, these were identified as 'progressive farmers'. They were expected to take the lead in modernizing agriculture and thereby encourage others to follow suit. To ensure this trickle-down effect, rural cooperatives were viewed as key instruments. Kept under close supervision by government, these institutions would provide credit and other inputs to interested and willing members. By making farmers cooperate on a voluntary basis, there was a local organizational base for diffusing innovations. Back-up services were provided by government extension staff. For example, agricultural instructors, equipped with advice from findings obtained at agricultural research stations, were expected to provide support for this drive toward agricultural modernization.

The extensive role assigned to the state, or more specifically to the central government, created a special challenge, especially since executive capacities were generally low in African countries. The existence of only a small cadre of trained and experienced public servants ruled out the possibility of decentralization. Instead, a new style of administration, which met the development needs of the new nations, rather than conventional public administration, was being advocated. This 'development administration', according to one observer, refers to the administration of development programmes, to the methods used by governments to implement development programmes (Riggs 1970: 6–7). It was contrasted with regular 'bureaucratic' administration, which was seen as only control-oriented. Development administration was demanding both flexibility and innovativeness (Schaffer 1969; Gant 1979).

(b) *Basic needs*

This phase began with the radicalization of the development debate that took place in the second part of the 1960s. It represented a reaction to the excessive optimism of the first phase and the disillusion that it generated in many circles. Political independence proved to be much less than everybody had expected. State-administered growth was not enough to guarantee progress.

'Development' was no longer coterminous with growth. Political architects began to argue that growth without equity was growth without development. With this redefinition of the concept, the progressive farmer was abandoned in favour of the poor peasant. Trickle down was no longer adequate. Dissemination of information and diffusion of innovations (Rogers and Svenning 1969) – the key features of the earlier phase – were too slow-moving to suit the mood of the time. The development debate now stresses the importance of a determined political will and a strong benevolent government to carry out re-distributive policies. Governments willing to give priority to redistribution in favour of the poorer population received special attention by the international community.

Growing equity concerns also meant greater support of social development. While it had featured also in the first phase, it was only now that governments and donors shifted their investment to education and health on a massive scale. This phase saw the introduction of universal primary education in many African countries and the rapid expansion of primary health care facilities. This new orientation took its lead from the assumption that without

satisfaction of their basic needs, poor people could not participate fully in development. The logic was that by appealing to basic needs, governments and donors could entice people to participate more fully in the national development process.

This redefinition of development had important repercussions for its management. The centralized nature of public policy-making that characterized the new states in the first phase had led to much red-tape and thus, inability to perform the expected role of innovator. The presumed and prescribed behaviour of the new public servant had never materialized. Development administration, as originally conceived, proved much more difficult to put in place than expected. The second phase, therefore, opened the door to administrative reform. Of particular relevance here were the efforts to decentralize authority and to integrate management structures for development. There were now sufficient numbers of trained African civil servants so that shortage of manpower was no longer viewed as a constraint to such efforts.

Although the idea of popular participation featured in the political rhetoric justifying these reforms, they were largely administrative. Political authority was not delegated to autonomous local authorities. Instead, in some countries, e.g. Tanzania, these authorities were abolished. Instead, authority came to rest in the hands of government-appointed officials in regions, provinces or districts. This form of decentralization – deconcentration – gave more clout to field administrators but left governments spread thin over the widening range of development matters.

Integrated development programmes were another type of administrative innovation in this phase. The first years of post-independence experience had suggested that not only were departmental headquarters far removed from implementational realities, but they were also insensitive to the needs for coordination of governmental activities in the field. Integrated programmes, carried out within existing government structures or independent thereof, as the case was in a few countries, helped bolster the executive capacity in the field but also increased the management load in significant ways. For example, the growing emphasis on integration of government activities reinforced the need for development planning. Proper design of projects as well as adequate identification of linkages and relations at the macro level were viewed as preconditions of successful implementation (Nellis and Rondinelli 1986). The importance of architectural blueprints reached its peak at this point.

(c) Small is beautiful

The second phase had been the logical continuation of the first. Both were characterized by a strong belief in government as the key institutional actor, responsible initially for growth but subsequently for an even broader range of development activities. Furthermore, both phases had been marked by government control over the provision of inputs for development, thus, reinforcing the notion that it was to come from above and to be centrally directed.

The break between the second and third phases is more pronounced. It reflects the new conditions that were brought about in the world economy by the first 'oil crisis' in 1973 and the growing disillusion with reliance on government institutions not only to modernize Africa but also to reduce poverty on the continent. In other words, criticism was being directed against not only the original modernization ideology but also its socialist successor of the second phase. The positivist spirit that had been underlying both these ideologies was now being called into question. Neither political mobilization nor public management was seen as the answer to Africa's development challenges. Ordinary people displayed increasing doubt that their governments were willing to or could serve as the sole dispenser of resources and benefits. By heavily taxing producers without at the same time showing its ability to successfully implement development programmes, many a government in Africa had alienated its people.

This was becoming evident in the latter part of the 1970s, but the issue only exploded in the open with the publication of the World Bank's report (1981) on *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*. This report, which in fact was commissioned on an initiative by Africa's own representatives on the Bank's board, made a strong case for 'rolling back' the state in the interest of private and voluntary initiatives. It also pointed to the poor quality of public services, leading people to disengage from rather than to engage with the state.

It was not as if ordinary Africans needed the World Bank to tell them about the deteriorating state of the countries. They knew it only too well but had been discouraged to organize with a view to voicing their critique. Faced with worsening – and in the 1980s contracting – services, people were induced, or compelled by circumstances, to explore alternatives. People began to recognize the significance of their own contribution and challenge the legacy that development comes about through central initiatives, to which the original Keynesian perspective had given rise. Even political architects began to heed Fritz Schumacher's point that 'small is beautiful', i.e. that small-scale and private efforts can achieve what large-scale government bureaucracies had failed to do.

Thus, it was no longer possible to view development management exclusively as a government domain. It was acknowledged that it also involved other institutions in society, notably those in which people participated freely and voluntarily. Society itself had an active contribution to make, whether in the form of self-help, or the private and cooperative pursuit of progress. In the 1980s, this manifested itself in a growing reallocation of responsibilities to 'grassroots' organizations. For instance, such utilities as water supply which previously had been the exclusive onus of government departments was now being handed over to community-based associations. The latter not only raised funds for building such schemes but also engaged in maintaining and repairing them. Similar things happened in soil conservation and tree-planting. Ordinary people, often women, were in the forefront of this 'green' movement (Harrison 1986). In primary health care, alternatives included the encouragement of 'traditional' healing and care, e.g. the training and use of traditional birth attendants.

The search for alternatives was also most prominent in the economic sector, where at the macro level considerable structural adjustments in the direction of greater market orientation took place, typically with World Bank and International Monetary Fund insistence. Above all, this structural adjustment implied greater incentives for the producer to engage in market transaction, the assumption being that if provided with such incentives he (or she) would respond with higher levels of production. The same ideology also stressed the importance of the growing informal sector. As a result of the severe restrictions on entering the formal sector and its own incompetence, many individuals and groups had started their own ventures without the authority of official institutions. This sector was playing an increasingly important role and governments were encouraged to recognize its development potential.

(d) *Enabling environment*

Such recognition was vital, because even enthusiastic advocates of people's institutions accepted that small is not only beautiful. By being small and dispersed, such institutions cannot make much of a difference to development unless they are incorporated into broader institutional networks. But in countries where the political legacy is of a state bureaucracy used to acting at its own pace and in its own interest, spontaneous local efforts cannot necessarily expect much support and encouragement from that direction. Thus, the international community has in the last phase begun to stress the need for new support structures outside government.

What is gradually, and still slowly, happening is the growing recognition that local seeds, i.e. local initiatives, can flourish and become viable alternatives to the many hybrid solutions that have been implanted with foreign assistance in earlier phases, provided that governments are ready to create an environment in which these are allowed to grow. An enabling environment is being defined as open and pluralist, providing the conditions in which economic and political restructuring can take place in a constructive fashion. The concept provides the counterpart to the well-known Russian words of *perestroika* and *glasnost*.

In spite of all the post-independence rhetoric in support of self-reliance, Africa still lags behind Asia and Latin America in promoting greater self-reliance on domestic resources at different levels of society. The determination to do something about this, however, has heightened in recent years. Key institutional actors in this effort are intermediary, usually non-governmental organizations, with the ambition to assist groups of people who do not qualify for support from formal sector agencies or, even if they do, fail for other reasons to obtain such support. These intermediaries provide incentives for local initiatives through the provision of e.g. credit and technical or managerial advice.

Unlike governments, these NGOs tend to have a deliberate strategy for allowing beneficiaries gradually to disengage from their inputs and services. In a climate where people have got accustomed to patronage politics, however, reducing such dependency is not always easy, as several NGOs have already experienced.

Another challenge in Africa stems from the relative weakness, in both political and managerial terms, of African NGOs. International NGOs still dominate the African scene, but even they realized that it is in their own interest to strengthen local counterparts. For this reason, special attention has been paid to strengthening indigenous NGOs. The mainstream churches with international connections – Catholic, Anglican and Lutheran – have become especially active in the development field. As part of their mandate, these church-based organizations have also included monitoring of human rights violations on the assumption that an enabling environment is impossible without respect by their governments for the rights of citizens. Secular NGOs have also begun to emerge in recent years. The environmental issues have been one catalyst for the formation of such organizations but so has the popular demand for education. For instance, in the second part of the 1980s, privatization of education has increasingly been channelled through trusts or associations, bringing together people of a given area or ethnic group for such purposes. Although such efforts were by no means new – the *harambee* movement in Kenya started in the 1960s – they became particularly prominent throughout the continent as a result of the pressure for privatization of certain social services.

The institutional landscape in Africa, therefore, is today much denser and more varied than it was before. Development management is increasingly being shared by a broadening range of public, private and voluntary organizations. This growing institutional pluralism poses a special challenge to African governments which have grown used to a monopoly of power. Most of them have been reluctant to give NGOs and other society-based institutions the autonomy they demand in order to do their work effectively.

Their reluctance, however, has met with growing challenges from these organizations, especially as a result of the sweeping changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe, where power monopolies have given way to greater pluralism. Even the promise of majority rule in South Africa has boosted the advocates of greater democracy in the rest of Africa. Thus, the notion of an enabling environment is likely to remain an ideological guide-line for at least the next few years.

Shifts in Development Theory

In the same way as development ideology is determined by different ends–means combinations, development theory evolves within a clearly demarcated conceptual territory. Ever since the classics of the social sciences began to develop the field in the last part of the nineteenth century, this conceptual territory has been defined along two principal parameters. The first refers to the basic premise underlying the nature of society or the social system: Is it essentially characterized by integration or conflict? Major theories have come to differ according to their answer to that question. The second concerns the perceived nature of social action: Is it voluntaristic, i.e. the result of independent social actors, or is it determined by structures within which individuals are effectively confined? Social science theories have also evolved differential responses to this question.

Development theory, as it has evolved in the last thirty years, has borrowed its main ingredients from the conceptual map to which attempts to answer the above two questions give rise. Thus, we can see that the major theories or paradigms fall neatly into place on the map. What is more, the way it has evolved describes a similar move to that of development ideology – around two principal axes, as suggested in the figure below, but perhaps, at the end, spiralling toward the centre, a synthesis of several approaches.

Also striking about this figure is the parallel timing of the shifts in development ideology and development theory, confirming that auditors do take their lead from the architects, but also that their intellectual audit may have something to do with the shift from one perspective to another.

Figure 22.2: Shifts in Development Theory 1955–90

(a) *Structural functionalism*

While the economists came to serve as principal advisors to the political architects of the first phase – and development economics was born out of this association – it was sociologists and political scientists who played the major role in constructing the first generation of development theory. It grew out of the ambition to evolve a 'grand theory' that would enable social scientists to evaluate social and political action cross-culturally. Although the tools had been available, they had never before been applied to understanding 'development'. Pulling together various threads in non-Marxist social science, Talcott Parsons in sociology and later Gabriel Almond in political science became the flag-bearers of structural functionalism.

This theory implied that societies regardless of their peculiarities inherently perform the same basic functions, but they are differentiated in terms of which structures perform these functions. Thus, for instance, a country's development is measured in terms of how differentiated its structures are, the assumption being that the more pluralistic a country, the more developed it is also (Almond and Coleman 1960).

There is no doubt that the new theory was generally regarded as a major breakthrough in the social sciences. It provides what was seen by its advocates as a 'value-free' approach to the comparative study of societal development. It enabled the social scientists to transcend the parochial cultural and institutional boundaries that had characterized social science research in the past, especially as it applied to the study of colonial territories. There was a genuine sense of intellectual emancipation.

Structural functionalism stressed the integrative role of structures in society, enabling it to keep a social equilibrium. Furthermore, it emphasized structures over individual actors. As bearers of social or political functions, structures were typically reified, i.e. seen as having a life of their own. Structures, however, were not seen as constraints, only as facilitators of development.

As suggested above, structural functionalism was built on the assumption that development is a linear evolution, involving structural differentiation and cultural secularization, using Western (and more specifically US) democracy as the ultimate stage. While it is still an open question how far these assumptions in the long run may be borne out by empirical data, when the theory was first constructed, it was done so in the intense Cold War climate that prevailed in the 1950s. Structural functionalism was meant to be a counter point to the universalist ambitions of Marxist theory.

It borrowed from the prevailing development ideology of the day the notion that development was equivalent to modernization; that anything 'traditional' was backward and had to be abandoned. This positivist assumption suited quite well the optimism that permeated the world in the late 1950s and early 1960s, especially as countries in Africa and Asia became politically independent. Thus, academics shared with political leaders a very optimistic, perhaps naïve, assumption about how development could and should be brought about.

This 'honeymoon' period, however, came to an end, as by the mid-1960s it became increasingly evident that development was not coming about quite as easily, or in the fashion that structural functionalism had assumed. There was a critique from within, exemplified in political science by 'realists' like Zolberg (1966) and Huntington (1968) who argued that the principal challenge of development was the absence, certainly weakness, of the very institutions or structures that were meant to perform the developmental functions. Thus, Huntington developed his well-known argument that rising expectations without institutions to channel and realize these expectations lead only to rising frustrations; consequently, political regimes find themselves increasingly engaged in containing and controlling these frustrations rather than promoting development. The power of the ruling establishments had to be safeguarded. Possibly the rise of widespread corruption was one of the by-products of these attempts. The accumulation of ill-gotten wealth within the ruling establishments seems to have been one way of securing the benefits of being in power in response to the tide of unfulfilled public expectations. This could be described as a privatization of the African state. Public service would seem to have been largely replaced by an urge for private gain within the ruling establishments. This again was in sharp contrast to what was assumed in the idealized conceptual frameworks of structural functionalism.

By the second part of the 1960s, the critique of structural functionalism had grown to such an extent that its leading role was in question. A careful scrutiny of its basic premises suggested that they were untenable. Future development theory had to seek its inspiration from other sources.

(b) Neo-Marxist political economy

With the general radicalization of development ideology in the late 1960s, it is not surprising that theoretical inspirations were sought primarily from Marxism. The Marxist renaissance that took place in the social sciences in these years effectively put an end to structural functionalists' claim to have evolved a universal theory for analysing development.

Neo-Marxists argued that structural functionalism was naïve in assuming that development is best pursued in conditions of social harmony or equilibrium. Development grows out of conflict, notably those stemming from changes in the material conditions of life. Furthermore, structures are not only facilitating. They are instead constraining, holding back human potential. By virtue of their origin in what the Marxists see as the determining factor – the system of production – structures cannot be changed at will. The whole system has to be properly understood as a precursor to effective social action. Such action has to be revolutionary, i.e. aimed at overturning structural constraints.

Responding to the growing calls for greater attention to equity as opposed to growth in the global development debate, neo-Marxists stressed, in particular, the international character of these structural constraints, and hence the need for the poorer countries of the world to emancipate themselves from their dependence on the richer nations. Cast in the context of the global capitalist system, Marxist analysis suggested that countries in the periphery of this system are bound to remain underdeveloped because of the economic strength of the countries controlling the core of that same system. In its extreme form, the argument suggested that the development of the core meant the underdevelopment of the periphery. Among the most influential advocates of this argument were Andre Gunder Frank (1969) and, in relation to Africa, Walter Rodney (1972).

The dependency perspective remained strong until the mid-1970s but it was also being accompanied by a differentiation of arguments within the Marxist paradigm. Class analysis, in its orthodox form, was also brought back into development theory. Drawing much of its inspiration from Frantz Fanon's scathing critique of the new leaders in Third World countries (1963), this analysis focussed primarily on the weakness of ruling class in these countries.

An example of this genre that was particularly influential in anglophone Africa is Issa Shivji's account of the class struggles in Tanzania (1975), where he ridicules the 'petty-bourgeoisie' and makes heros of the country's suppressed workers and peasants.

In the wake of this expansion into proper class analysis followed a greater interest in the role of the state, an institution that had been obliterated in the systems-theoretic perspective of structural functionalism. Much of this literature tended to emphasize the negative role of the state in development as a tool of oppression and exploitation. Freed from some of its Marxist jargon, the literature on the state experienced a renaissance of its own in later years also among non-Marxists (Skocpol 1979; Callaghy 1984). By this time, however, the Marxist renaissance had already run its course and other competing theories had evolved.

(c) *Neo-liberal political economy*

Foremost of these was the neo-liberal 'rational choice' theory which began to make its impact on social science thinking about development in the latter part of the 1970s. Contrary to both structural functionalism and neo-Marxist political economy, this new theory stressed the importance of individual actors. Instead of holding on to a structural macro perspective, neo-liberals stressed the scope for action that exists in the micro context. Development is the aggregate outcome of a multitude of individual decisions.

The emergence of this theory must be viewed in the light of the frustrations experienced with Marxists as intellectual auditors. While they had, on the one hand, made a major contribution to our understanding of development issues by broadening the agenda in the 1960s, their 'answers' to the hard development questions proved less helpful, especially after the revolutionary fervour that had characterized the late 1960s had begun to die down. In the mid-1970s, the idea that only through social revolution would there be development in the Third World had lost most of its power to attract scholars concerned with development. Instead, they wanted answers which showed that it was possible to achieve it without having to wait for such rare events as genuine social upheavals.

Based on the classical Benthamite notion of individual utilitarianism, 'rational choice' theory is a simple and effective analytical tool. By assuming away the question of what motivates human beings to act in a given a way, and instead taking for granted that it is always self-interest (broadly conceived) that does so, this approach 'solves' in its own way many of the methodological problems experienced by other schools.

Its contribution to the development literature came first and foremost through a rehabilitation of the peasant as an actor in his own right. The 'rational peasant' analysed by Samuel Popkin (1979) and Robert Bates (1981) is contrasted with the 'moral' or 'oppressed' peasant that had dominated the literature in earlier periods. Operating in a market context, peasants make their own decisions in a voluntarist fashion under conditions that can be described as 'contained conflict' or competition. Thus, the neo-liberals share with the neo-Marxists a conflict perspective but incorporate the latter into what is essentially a theory of the market.

This 'methodological individualism', as it sometimes also is referred to, has in the 1980s continued to exercise influence in the social sciences in the form of 'public' or 'collective' choice theory. The notion of the 'tragedy of the commons', originally coined by Garrett Hardin (1968), has preoccupied the minds of many development theorists, especially as it has a bearing on such issues as environmental degradation. Generally, adherents of this 'collective choice' perspective have been devoting much attention to the question of how individuals can arrive at collective decisions that are also rational in a macro context. As such, neo-liberals have been preoccupied with testing the premises on which their own theory rests.

The same is true for the 'public choice' theorists who have spent most of their time finding an answer to how public policy can be improved. It has led to a political economy which stresses the 'technocratic' or 'managerial' aspects of politics, reducing it to what is economically rational. In this perspective, the concept of power is ignored.

This is probably one reason why 'public choice' theory has had less impact in Africa, where politics is intensely believed to be a struggle over power. Another reason may be that the individualist perspective of this school is culturally so Western that people in other cultures intuitively reject it. A third reason why it has had little impact in Africa is that it has been associated with institutions like the World Bank and hence with the 'other side' in the battle

over how to analyse and understand development in the 1980s. The result is, as this volume bears some testimony, that the intellectual audit by African academics in the 1980s has remained within what is largely a neo-Marxist orbit.

(d) 'The new institutionalism'
In the past five years or so, however, the theorizing about development has begun to move away from the neo-liberal field, a major reason being dissatisfaction with its overly simplistic methodological assumptions. Even if efforts have been made by many rational choice theorists (e.g. Kiser and Ostrom 1982) to incorporate an institutional perspective into the analysis of decisions, this has been done without questioning the basic premise of utilitarian rationality. In recent years, a number of scholars have argued with increasing persuasion that value preferences are not given but shaped in the context of social interaction. In sociology, Amitai Etzioni (1988) has made a strong case for a re-examination of the concept of 'rationality' that was gaining ground during the years of neo-liberal hegemony, suggesting that it must be understood as the outcome of intentional social processes. In political science, Aaron Wildawsky (1987) has also argued that cultural preferences are developed from cues acquired through social and political interaction. As society develops its own institutions, these preferences take on a life of their own. They become buried in the institutions and perpetuated by those who work or live in them. This is also the point made by James March and Johan P. Olsen (1989), in their analysis of institutions in political life. Their perspective – the 'new institutionalism' – is being used here to describe what appears to be in the 1990s the new emphasis in development theory. Although it is still to be effectively translated into the development field, scholars are increasingly concerned with 'institutions', the layer between individual actors and societal structures. Thus, it moves the analysis to a level where it has hitherto not been. The 'new institutionalism' retains what is largely a voluntarist perspective, but argues that social action is primarily integrative, aimed at going beyond self-interest.

It is too early to say exactly where this new theoretical perspective on development will end up; it is still in the making. Still, it is clear that it corresponds to the ideological concern with an 'enabling environment'. Much scholarly analysis, therefore, is likely to focus on institutional issues, both the question of how to strengthen them ('institution-building') and the constraints and opportunities for using them as 'tools' of development. For African scholars, it provides an opportunity for moving beyond the neo-Marxist perspective without necessarily having to adopt the methodological assumptions of either functionalism or utilitarianism.

Conclusions

This chapter has attempted to identify the dynamics of the development debate by distinguishing between development architects and auditors. Performing the latter role, academics are inevitably influenced by the ideologies of the architects. As I have tried to show here, there is a striking parallel in the way shifts have taken place both in ideology and theory. The two develop side by side and there is clearly much spillover from one to the other.

However, perspectives on development theory also change because of an internal dynamic. As the premises of one theory prove too confining for understanding and analysing continuously changing social and economic conditions, the academics themselves break new ground. Each 'school' appears to last approximately ten years before it runs its course. Scholars seem to have an appetite for fresh ideas at such intervals and become increasingly open to new perspectives with a persuasive message. Thus, development theory changes as a result of the internal rivalry among academics. The debate itself is a source of change in perspective.

The latter point is important, particularly as far as Africa is concerned. One of the problems that African academics have experienced is a lack of appreciation; a denial of the opportunity to make a genuine contribution to either their country's development or that of the international community. With growing appreciation of the need for an enabling environment and pressures for *glasnost*, there is today an opportunity to change this state of affairs.

For too long African academics have been reduced to echoing, often in an opportunistic fashion, the voices of theorists elsewhere in the world. The new institutionalist perspective

with its emphasis on social and cultural variables offers the intellectual foundation on which a genuine African perspective may develop. Such a perspective would include what is peculiar to the African condition, yet relate to broader theory in such a way as to allow meaningful comparisons.

This is the challenge for all who study the African continent, but it is particularly relevant to African scholars with the ambition to make a contribution to both their continent's development and to the progress of the social sciences.

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23 The Issue of Democracy in the Contemporary Third World

SAMIR AMIN

Introduction

The recent past has shown a global trend toward democratization of political regimes on a scale that may well become irreversible. In the socialist countries at least the trend has been forced upon the powers that be; they must take account of it and adapt to its demands or perish. In Third World capitalist countries the call for democracy has not reached the same popular dimension, until recently (1991), but is now picking up momentum. It is frequently limited to the middle classes and segments of the organized urban society – the unions for example. Even on such a narrow scale the trend signals a qualitative leap in the permeation of democratic consciousness through the political system of a great many Third World countries. In the West a broad consensus embracing governments, public opinion and the media has emerged in support of the call, particularly when it appears in the countries of Eastern Europe and sometimes in the Third World – in the latter instance according to the reasons of state of interested parties.

The 'Market' and Democracy

This democratic trend has appeared concomitantly with another global evolution emerging in the 1970s and more so in the 1980s: a kind of generalized offensive in favour of liberation of 'market forces', aimed at ideological rehabilitation of the absolute superiority of private property, legitimation of social inequalities and anti-statism of all kinds. Neo-liberalism – the name given to the offensive – knows no frontiers and is deemed to have worldwide validity. 'Openness' (to capital and to 'information', i.e. the dominant media) is considered synonymous with essential progress. Established powers everywhere seem to be falling in with the trend: in the West, social democracy has always accepted the rationality of the market, but to be fair only in a limited sense, and still adamantly resists the privatization and marketization of medical, educational and other non-commodified public services; but Western liberals – even so-called social-liberals – have fallen in completely with the neo-liberal trend, and succumbed to the supposed demands of the 'rationality' of open markets in most respects. This trend is also obvious in the Third World where the radical nationalist regimes all now seem pre-historic; and even in the socialist countries where entire sections of the

ruling class have passed – or are in the throes of passing – from tactical retreat from their 'Marxism' to revision – or abandonment of it.

The coincidence of these two trends makes ours an era of intense confusion. The preponderant tolling of the bell, systematically drowning out all discordant voices and orchestrated by an unprecedented media campaign, sounds as a simple, unsubtle, unilateral affirmation, taken to be self-evident. The 'market' – a euphemism for capitalism – is regarded as the central axis to any 'development' and such development can come only as part of an 'ineluctable worldwide expansion'. Total openness to the forces governing worldwide evolution and simultaneous adoption of an internal system based on the 'market' are taken to be self-evident. Democratization is considered the necessary and natural product of submission to the rationality of the worldwide market. A simple dual equation is deduced from this logic: capitalism = democracy; democracy = capitalism. By the same token, socialism is pronounced dead (and Marx of course along with it); its failure is said to be complete, it has proven itself to be synonymous with inefficiency and autocracy. Similarly, 'national liberation' is proclaimed obsolete; 'nationalism' is accused of necessarily engendering a fatal backwardness in inter-nation competition.

The most serious of these unilateral propositions, simple to the point of being simplistic and without scientific or historical foundations, seems to confuse even the ranks of those who fight for democratization and social progress in still remaining socialist countries, and in the Third World.

Three issues are worth examination in formulating a response to the questions raised by the democratic movement operating in the context of the capitalist offensive: (i) the character of the new stage of capitalist transnationalization – the issue here being whether openness to the exterior has in fact become 'ineluctable'; (ii) the crisis of really existing capitalism – the issue here being whether the crisis calls into question Marxism and socialism; (iii) finally, the range of aspects of the relationship between democracy and social progress under contemporary Third World conditions.

The internal logic of the argument suggests tackling the three issues in that order, as the response to the first has implications for the others. This paper deals with the issue of democracy in the contemporary Third World and I shall make only brief mention of preliminary matters expanded elsewhere. I shall signal only those of my conclusions which must be spelled out to situate my argument on the matter directly at hand.

If we acknowledge that so-called Third World countries almost never have seen their political systems in a genuinely democratic form (on the lines of the developed capitalist countries of the West – since 1945 at least) this is neither accident nor a hangover from their 'traditional culture'. Democracy here is incompatible with the demands of capitalist expansion.

Is Delinking the Periphery Possible?

What I call 'really existing capitalism', that is capitalism as a world system and not as a mode of production taken at its highest level of abstraction, has to date always generated polarization on a world scale (the 'centres/peripheries' contradiction). This dimension has been underestimated by Marx and Marxism. It has brought to the forefront of this historical stage not 'socialist' revolutions led by the working classes of the developed capitalist countries, but 'anti-capitalist' revolutions provoked by the polarization inherent in worldwide capitalist expansion with socially intolerable consequences for the peoples of the peripheries and semi-peripheries of the system.

The strategic aims of these revolutions entail delinking from the logic of worldwide capitalist expansion. Implementation of these aims supposes power based on 'national and popular' social hegemony (and not the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' envisaged in the Marxist tradition) acknowledging a conflictual mix of aspirations of a socialist kind and a capitalist line. The process of achieving these aims entails in turn a gradual and continual progress of democratization of society through practical management of power and of the economy.

Regimes that emerged from so-called socialist revolutions (USSR, China etc.) had begun to create the necessary conditions to eradicate the legacy of peripheralization produced by

capitalism, by abandoning criteria of capitalist rationality and proceeding to internal social revolutions of tremendous impact. The national liberation struggles, arising from a similar rejection of capitalist peripheralization, have not led to such significant advances, in delinking or internal social transformation. The societies emerging from these struggles in the Third World have so far remained subject to the law of capitalist polarization. National and popular revolution and delinking are still the strategic aims of the fight for progress for the periphery of the world capitalist system. Progress in this regard in the so-called socialist countries of Eastern Europe as in those of the South (the capitalist Third World) was believed to determine not only the future of socialism on a world scale, but even social progress pure and simple for the majority of mankind (Amin 1987).[*]

The central proposition I have sketched here would fail in the event that either (i) the new forms of transnationalization had rendered the national and popular strategies, and concomitant delinking, obsolete, and made feasible a single path of development: the capitalist path within worldwide openness; and/or (ii) if the fundamental propositions of socialism (and of Marxism in particular) concerning the historical limits of capitalism, and if the forms of democracy developed on this basis were without scientific foundation, their utopian character being established by the failure of their implementation in the socialist experience.

We should not underestimate the fact that worldwide capitalist expansion has entered a deeper phase, marked by qualitatively new characteristics, of which I would mention at least the following six: (i) replacement of national systems of production (founded on the logic of social agreements produced by national history) by a worldwide system of production that challenges these national social agreements; (ii) the worldwide spread of finance capital; (iii) the new technological revolution; (iv) a worldwide culture produced by intensified communications; (v) the availability of weapons with a destructive power that forces a change in traditional diplomacy; and (vi) ecological dependence, on an increasingly global scale.

Does this mean that these new factors impose a unilateral submission to unification of the world by the 'market'? Does this mean that the polarizing impact of capitalist expansion could be neutralized within the framework of national strategies willing to operate within such a submission to the 'market'?

I have found it necessary to condition a response to these questions on an analysis of the effects of these evolutions on the structure of the labour force on a world scale. From this angle the first three items in the list combine to speed up the formation of a passive reserve army of labour exploited by worldwide capital, especially in the peripheries on the path to industrialization. Far from attenuating the polarizing character inherent in really existing capitalism, the new phase of worldwide expansion can only heighten the contrasts through which it is expressed. Moreover the military, diplomatic and cultural evolutions in the list help to shift the mechanisms through which the polarization operates from the field of economic relations *strictu sensu* to the broader one of politics.

I have further concluded that strategies of surrender to these identifiable 'worldwide constraints' could lead to an intolerable catastrophe. The alternative of a 'national and popular' response not only has no rival but is even more essential than in the past. The forms it will take still must be defined, although the broad outlines can already be perceived. In this perspective, the reconstruction of a polycentric world system seems to me a realistic option (insofar as it is feasible in the fairly short term), and the only one capable of restoring the necessary scope for autonomy to permit the social progress of all the partners.

Socialism, Democracy and 'Patrimonialism'

The crisis of the societies of Eastern Europe is frequently invoked to draw the conclusion that socialism is utopian, that capitalism corresponds to an ageless reality, and that the Marxist critique of capitalism is an aberration. This confusion when subtly deployed makes it much easier to sell the West's strategy, based on the equation: market = democracy.

Bourgeois democracy is the product of the revolution that has dethroned 'tributary

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[*] See likewise on issues concerning the birth of socialism, my articles in Arabic in *Al-Mustaq bal al' - Arabi*, No. 114, 1988, and No. 126, 1989.

metaphysics' (Amin 1989). It established 'equal rights' and personal liberties, but not 'equality' (except under the law). As late as the latter half of the nineteenth century, the labour movement could impose unqualified political democracy and seize social rights, but in the framework of a compromise based on the acceptance of capitalist management of the economy, a compromise made possible by world polarization to the benefit of the industrial centres. Western democracy is thereby restricted to the political and public domain, while economic management continues to be based on non-democratic principles of private ownership and competition. In other words, the capitalist mode of production does not of itself require democracy; but rather its characteristic oppression is hidden in economistic alienation affecting the entire society. By contrast, the socialist project of a classless society freed of economistic alienation ideally implies a democratic structure – but obviously this was not the case under the so-called 'real-socialism' of former Eastern Europe. Once capitalist reliance on competition is broken, social relations based on cooperation among workers, and no longer on their subjection, are inconceivable without a full flowering of democracy.

The crisis of the societies of Eastern Europe does not invalidate these fundamental propositions, for the good reason that it is not a crisis of genuinely socialist societies. Genuinely socialist societies can be nothing more than committed to a national and popular construct on the basis of a revolutionary refusal to surrender to the dictates of capitalist peripheralization.

These societies currently face a triple option that I briefly summarize under the following three questions:

(1) Evolution towards a bourgeois democracy, or progress beyond it, by the strengthening of the social power of workers in the management of the economy?

(2) Restoration of an out-and-out 'market economy', or effective progress in a carefully controlled resort to market forces through democratic planning?

(3) An unguarded door wide open to the exterior, or perhaps a guarded relation with the surrounding capitalist world, albeit on the basis of increased trade?

The confused theoretical debate and political disputes reverberating through the Eastern bloc countries come in part because ideological labelling as 'socialist' has obscured the genuinely 'national and popular' character of the historical revolutions which once established each of these regimes. But more pertinent is the fact that the conflictual forces of capitalism and socialism are meeting within genuine struggles. The forces anxious to 'restore capitalism' propose unilateral acceptance of the 'market' (as a springboard for the restoration of private ownership) and of 'an open door to the exterior', with or without democracy (in the Western sense of the word) according to the tactical requirements of their project. If the socialist forces dither in their resistance to the project, and if they find it difficult to articulate a coherent alternative (on the lines sketched above), it is because of the lack of democratic debate; and the ideological fallacies indicated above are major impediments to action. I would add that the Western ideological offensive, orchestrated by powerful media, is flocking entirely to the pro-capitalist, albeit anti-democratic forces.

The conventional social theory offered as an explanation of the absence of democracy in the Third World is desperately hollow and repetitious. In their successive vestments demanded by the fashions governing intellectual production in our time, these theories formulate and reformulate the paradigm of 'modernization': the Third World societies are 'half traditional/half modern' (on the path of development and modernization), and therefore preserve the tradition of the autocratic concept of power, being constrained by forces of circumstance to democratize gradually in step with their 'catching up' on their economic backwardness. In this domain as in others, the capitalist road is the only one envisaged, and is assumed by necessity to produce democratization.

This thesis, hidden for a while by the success of the 'Third-Worldism' of the 1960s among Westerners, has made its latest reappearance in a Weberian formulation (Sandbrook with Barker 1985). Weber, as we know, distinguished supposedly traditional power, described as 'patrimonial', personalized and contrary to the concept of law of modern times, from the 'bureaucratic' and depersonalized, based on the concept of law.

In truth Weber's thesis is very Germanic in the sense that it stretches particular charac-
teristics of German history to that of the whole of humankind. Power in pre-capitalist societies
was not as a general rule either personalized, or disrespectful of law. The exemplar of the
advanced tributary society provided by imperial China went to the limit of an impersonal
mandarin bureaucracy. In Pharaonic Egypt the Pharaoh Thutmose III of the eighteenth
dynasty wrote to his vizier Rekheret: 'What he [the vizier] must do is to take the law into
account . . .' (Erman and Ranke 1983, pp. 201 f.) Undoubtedly European feudalism of the
early centuries (from the barbarian invasions to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries) comes
close to the Weberian model in one aspect: personalization of feudal power. But in fact the
fragmentation of power, a precondition for its personalization, merely illustrates the fact that
feudalism is a peripheral variety of the tributary system and not the general rule of the
pre-capitalist 'tradition' (Amin 1980). It can also be seen that the system of power loses this
personalized character in the mercantilist Europe of absolute monarchies. And the regal
bureaucracies were similar to those of other advanced tributary societies, as contemporary
observers were not slow to note (Etiemble 1988–9), with the distinct exception of Germany
clinging to the seigneurial stage.

However, the principal element of tributary ideology is not 'patrimonialism', but
'metaphysical domination' (Amin 1989). This is true of all cases, the advanced tributary forms,
evidenced by Confucianism in China or Islam in the Khalifate, as well as in its peripheral
feudal forms, except that the metaphysical domination operates here through the autonomous
power of the church, compensating for the failings of the state. Once again with the evolution
from feudal Europe to absolute monarchies the church–state fusion was close to the general
tributary model, as is evidenced by the establishment of national reformed churches or even,
in Catholic countries, tendencies such as Gallicanism represented in France.

Furthermore the so-called 'patrimonial' systems in no way disregarded the law. In the
advanced tributary systems there was state law governing the whole of social life, as is
evidenced for example by the *sharia* in Islamic countries. In the feudal peripheral systems,
seigneurial power, even when personalized, was obliged to respect customary peasant rights.

Is the modern concept of power, devised by Weber and his imitators in contrast with the
supposed 'patrimonial' concept, 'bureaucratic' in its main impact? Certainly not, as the
bureaucratic character is only a form in which it works. Its essential content is bourgeois,
produced by the operation of bourgeois democracy. With the distinct exception once again
of Germany where the weakness of the bourgeoisie had its sequel in the power of the
'enlightened despot' until very recent times. Here again Marx seems to me to outshine Weber
in his analysis of this German specificity. Here also Weber generalizes a particular
characteristic – certainly typical of Wilhelm's Germany but not of Parliamentary England or
France of the Third Republic – to the West as a whole.

Weber's imitators (Richard Sandbrook, for instance) have tried to apply this dubious
historical thesis to explain specific characteristics of power in contemporary black Africa where
in fact personalization and disregard for law do seem to have marked a great many post-
colonial systems. They merely attribute these characteristics to African patrimonial 'tradition'.
But is this thesis of 'patrimonial power' valid for pre-colonial Africa? Undoubtedly the latter
has certain similarities with feudal Europe. Since pre-colonial black Africa was pre-tributary,
still largely at the stage I call communal (Amin 1980), feudal Europe preserved communal
forms from an origin in barbarism that explains the primitive and peripheral character of its
tributary system. This analogy illustrates the significance of customary rights in the two cases,
and in the absence of a bureaucratic state law, with the proviso that the role of the church
is confirmation of the metaphysical domination governing this stage. By contrast in Africa,
the ideology of kinship – appropriate to the communal stage – still dominates the systems of
legitimation of power. The ideology looks very much like personalized power. But this is
much less the case than might be believed, as the power had to operate, 'traditionally', within
the framework of a customary law acting as a brake on possible caprices on the part of the
'chiefs'.

As will be shown later, the contemporary authorities in Africa have little to do with this
supposed legacy which long since was discredited, particularly in the slave trade. As will also
be shown, the question of possible charisma of leaders here, as elsewhere, has no 'traditional'
roots. It is a modern phenomenon to which we shall return.

The neo-Weberian thesis is not the only form of expression of the broader paradigm of modernization. Everyone will remember the Latin American *desarollismo* of the 1950s and 1960s arguing that industrialization and bourgeois style modernization would of themselves bring democratic change. 'Dictatorship' was regarded as a hangover from the supposedly pre-capitalist past. The fallacy in this ingenuous line of argument has been shown in the facts. Industrialization and modernization in the framework of this bourgeois plan have merely produced 'modernized dictatorship' and replaced the old oligarchical and patriarchal systems with an 'efficient and modern' fascistic violence. Peripheral development could take no other course; it aggravated rather than reduced social inequalities.

The absence of democracy from the periphery of the world capitalist system is a constant that is not a hangover of earlier 'traditionalist' eras but the inevitable consequence of the international expansion of really existing capitalism. International polarization inherent in this expansion brings in turn a manifold internal social polarization: growing inequalities in income distribution, widespread unemployment, marginalization etc. Making the world system the key unit of analysis responds to a social factor of crucial importance for an understanding of what is at stake in the struggles, namely that the essential reserve army of capital is to be found geographically in peripheries of the system. This reserve army is certainly composed of a staggering mass of urban unemployed and under-employed (many times the number of unemployed in the West, even at times of crisis), but also of large segments of non-wage labourers, destined, in accordance with progress in these activity sectors, to be expelled in turn from their land, or the so-called 'informal' urban activities that keep them busy. Integration – always very limited – of fractions of this reserve army into the active army occurs either through 'semi-industrialization' characteristic of the genuine peripheries of today and tomorrow, or by international migration towards the centres. But this migration is always limited, among other things by the employment strategies of the centres, and is of concern to only an infinitesimal fraction of the worldwide reserve army. 'Liberalism', which has never envisaged completing its programme of liberalization of exchange and capital flows by unlimited openness to labour migration, remains therefore a truncated swindle.

Despotism, Populism and 'Petty Democracy'

Instability is the rule in the political life of the peripheries. The background of a vicious dictatorship (military or not, as the case may be), broadly amenable to the demands of the world expansion of capital, is occasionally shaken by explosions that challenge the dictatorships. Such explosions rarely lead to any semblance of political democracy. The commonest model is a 'populist' response. This is found in regimes that genuinely address some aspects at least of the social problems, and contemplate a development strategy capable of reducing the tragic consequences of peripheralization. These regimes can be given credit for industrialization (mainly by the state), nationalization of sectors dominated by foreign capital, agrarian reforms, efforts in the field of education and health (that are sometimes remarkable), and some social rights offering a degree of job protection. Nasser's Egypt was such a case.

But they too have their historical limits: on the one hand they clash with dominant imperialism (quite simply because any policy of social progress at the periphery is incompatible with the demands of the worldwide expansion of capital), but they remain incapable of taking this conflict to its logical conclusion – delinking; on the other hand these regimes are not democratic. They have often been popular, and as we say supported by the 'masses'. But these 'masses' are maintained in an amorphous passive condition, 'mobilized' to 'support' but not permitted to organize as an autonomous force in respect to the authorities. These regimes, produced by a familiar situation marked by a weak class formation, embark on a national and popular transformation without being able to carry it through. Therefore, the charismatic leader is a common feature of these populist regimes. This inherent weakness of the populist system, combined with external aggression, bring about its fall, most frequently for the benefit of a return to dictatorship.

There is a middle ground between dictatorships of the right, and/or populist popular movements, on to which 'petty democracy' can sometimes sneak. We mean regimes that recognize the principles of multi-party elections, and grant a measure of free speech, but fall

short of addressing fundamental social problems and/or challenging relations of dependence and subjection to the world system. The range of these situations is broad enough to include seeming 'democracies', with the authorities retaining the means – most frequently by electoral fraud – of remaining in place, and other regimes that will bow to the eventual outcome at the polls.

These 'democracies' are little more than an expression of the crisis of the usual despotic system of international capitalism. Latin America, Korea, the Philippines provide examples of contradictions unresolved by such regimes. The development plans of the dictatorships which these regimes succeeded has not given the intended results: the crisis has shown the vulnerability of the construct, and the impossibility of 'independence', which for some would legitimate the dictatorship.

Democratic systems imposed in such circumstances face a striking either-or dilemma. Either the democratic political system accepts surrender to the demands of world 'adjustment': it could not then consider any substantial social reforms, and the democracy would not be slow in reaching a crisis (as is already the case in Argentina). Or the popular forces take hold of the democracy and impose the reforms: the system would then come into conflict with dominant world capitalism, and must shift from the national bourgeois project to a national and popular project. The dilemma of Brazil and the Philippines falls entirely within this contradiction. In Argentina it has already been seen how the electorate, wearied by the impotence of President Alfonsin's democracy, returned of their own accord to the populist sirens, this time under the guise of fascists openly submissive to foreign dictates!

Delinking by Rejection – the Mafia Takes Over

The areas of the periphery most affected by capitalist expansion are in a more desperate plight. The parlous condition of the 'Fourth World' is not the outcome of a refusal to integrate within the international division of labour, and a 'failed' attempt to delink. In fact the 'Fourth World' that is talked of as something new is a constant feature of capitalist expansion. A clear but lamentable example of this former Fourth World is provided by the areas of slave labour in the Americas in the period of mercantilism: North-east Brazil, the West Indies (including Haiti). These areas were regarded as 'prosperous' in their day; and they were the heart of the periphery corresponding to the system of the time.

Later the new structures of capitalist development marginalized these areas, and they are today among the most grievously wretched parts of the Third World. The history of capitalist expansion should cover not only the 'development' it has engendered. Capitalism has a destructive side too, often omitted from flattering portrayals of the system.

Is Africa not now on the road to exclusion from the world division of labour by a system that has consigned the continent to specialization in agriculture and mining through extensive exploitation of the soils until they are exhausted, and now when the technological revolution provides substitutes for some raw materials? Fourth World societies subject to a passive delinking through rejection can not by definition solve their problems through open-door policies. Recolonization sweetened by donor charity is surely trying to conceal the explicit failure in Africa of the neo-liberal solutions. Here the 'usual' pattern of power is that of the Tontons Macoutes in Haiti, Somoza in Nicaragua and a disturbing number of dictatorships of the same stamp in contemporary Africa.

The thesis of 'patrimonial' power which we criticized above was formulated in regard to such African regimes. At a superficial level it would seem to match a common description of this kind of regime: extremely personalized (from head of state to petty administrator – the village tyrant), with utter contempt for any notion of legality and rights (including sacrosanct bourgeois property rights), to say nothing of basic human rights and widespread corruption. There has been a strong temptation to blame this supposed 'legacy' on African tradition. A hint of racism may underlie the insinuation. In fact it is no such legacy that produces the 'Fourth World' phenomenon; on the contrary it is the latter entailing this kind of personalized power. For the power in question is no more 'authentic' than the swindle of the same tag invoked as an ideological legitimation of its behaviour.

It is rather a cleptocracy, as Nzongola Ntalaja (1987) described it, closer to racketeers

of that classical civilization paradoxically turned the tide of history. The relative absence of such costs among the rising barbarians of non-Roman Europe, together with their opportunities of borrowing what had earlier been achieved in science and technology from the now stagnating ancient civilizations, accounts for the emerging strength of what is today called Western civilization. The rising cultures of the formerly barbarian peoples of central and northern Europe was to become a dominant culture of the world.[9]

What Africa might be able to learn from these historical examples are, first, that a previous lack of development is not a permanent feature of any society, secondly that Africa has the advantage of being able to borrow, and further develop the technologies of the West, and thirdly that stagnation is a result of the cultural, human and economic costs involved in maintaining the expensive life styles, and the costly secret police defending the privileges of ruling elites, thereby withholding resources needed for a genuine social, technological and economic development. The ruling elites in many African countries do not have an ancient civilization to defend; only a costly and corrupt lifestyle which contributes to stifling the productive, and distributive investments needed for economic and social development.

If these costs of maintaining the expensive habits of ruling elites could be minimized, then we could go on to ask if there are any other factors which hinder a wise and development-prone use of the rich natural and human resources which exist on the African continent today? This is the kind of question to be pursued further by African social scientists concerned about the future of their continent. If there are no other significant obstacles to African development than the costs of maintaining corrupt ruling elites interested mainly in their own safety and consumption rather than in productive and distributive gains, then Africa could have a bright future once these ruling elites have been removed by democratization. African social scientists could then start to pursue the challenging and exciting problems of progressive development rather than the predicaments of underdevelopment.

In answering the question of whether African social science must be different from contemporary Western social science, the answer is yes. This does not imply that Western social science must be discarded, or is 'incompatible' with the kind of social science which must emerge among African social scientists. It simply means that Western social science with all its insights and knowledge is insufficient for an analysis, understanding and explanation of African conditions, present and future. African social scientists can certainly learn a great deal from the manner in which Western social science is conducted, but a broader and more complex set of objects of knowledge – structural elements as well as processes of change – must be studied by African social scientists to supplement whatever Western social science can offer. If African social scientists pursue this matter with theoretical imagination and sound empirical practice, then African social science may gain a knowledge which in the long run may turn out to be relevant even for Western social scientists studying their own societies, with their emerging 'dual economies' and cultural dualisms.

Notes

[1] Thomas Kuhn (1970), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

[2] See Peter B. Evans & John D. Stephens (1988), 'Development and the World Economy', chapter 22, particularly pp. 740f, in Neil S. Smelser, (ed.) (1988), *Handbook of Sociology*. London: Sage Publications.

[3] For an explicit attempt to use the notion of predicament as a sociological concept, see U. Himmelstrand *et al.* (1981), *Beyond Welfare Capitalism*. London: Heinemann, pp. 145–9.

[4] The local understanding from below which is involved here differs in several respects from Weberian *Verstehen* in that the former type of understanding focusses a great deal more on material conditions and constraints 'from which it is difficult to disentangle oneself' while the *Verstehen* advocated by Weber is focussed mainly on the meaning and interpretation of cultural values, and related action.

[5] This is a view which has been eloquently expressed in a paper by Samir Amin (1988), 'Plurality of Schools of Social Thought and Critical Thought', *in Southern Africa. Political and Economic Monthly*, No. 12.

[6] An economist voicing such opinions is P. T. Bauer (1982), in *Equality, The Third World and Economic Delusion*. London: Methuen & Co.

[7] Having made a simplified and narrow version of Marxism into an official doctrine and political ideology, the leaders of the past Soviet Empire were unable to recognize and acknowledge many sensitive and critical points in the writings of Marx. To pursue such critical questions in the Marxist theoretical tradition, particularly with regard to the internal problems and contradictions of the USSR itself, was a dangerous affair in that country. Therefore

and the Mafia than to any traditional chiefdom, as the latter was mindful of customary rights. In any event it is a modern state perfectly operational in its own way. How could the authorities operate any differently under Fourth World conditions? The latter deprive the state of the possibility of basing its legitimacy on any discernible development, and of finding a social base to carry the appropriate strategy through to a successful conclusion. Not only do the peasantry, the working class and the urban fringe have nothing to look forward to – and they know it – but even the bourgeoisie is deprived of any prospect of meaningful development. All that remains is direct .exploitation of power as a means to personal enrichment, or its indirect exploitation through the channel of pseudo-private economic activities whose profitability depends entirely on relations with the administration. Terror, corruption and extreme personalization are therefore essential to the very operation of the system. Charisma – so often spoken of – has no place here: it is not a matter of charisma of leaders who have won genuine popularity at a moment of history as in the populist regimes, but of a pseudo-charisma concocted by the media and incapable of fooling the public. Superficially the petty bourgeoisie might be regarded as the social base of these systems, insofar as these strata share power and benefit from the budget. When this is not an optical illusion, the correlation reveals a measure of fascist incorporation of this social stratum. Their hopes have been dashed, and in their powerlessness – in the absence of a revolutionary intelligentsia offering an alternative – they take refuge in the worship of power. The state itself becomes privatized.

Democracy Ignored, and Rediscovered

The main task of progressive forces at the periphery of the system nowadays is to assert the missing democratic component, not as a substitute for the national and social aspects of national and popular liberation but as a reinforcement of them. In fact the old paradigm of national liberation largely ignored the democratic component essential for pursuit of national and popular advance. Democratic consciousness may well be a new phenomenon. In the past, democratic demands were limited in Africa to particular segments of the urban bourgeoisie, and were not vigorously expressed except at particular moments of the radicalization of anti-imperialist struggles (the Egyptian Wafd being one of the best examples); moreover this democratic consciousness was within the narrow limits of bourgeois liberalism. The dominant tendencies in the popular and radical movements of national liberation were more marked by a progressive social content than by the democratic beliefs of their militants, despite the, sometimes ritualistic, use of the term 'democracy', and even despite the more advanced consciousness of some segments of the avant garde. I do not believe I am caricaturing reality by saying that the peasant-soldier of the liberation army entering Peking in 1949 was thinking of land reform, but as yet unaware of the meaning of democracy. Today his worker or student son or daughter has new aspirations in that regard. The same was true of the Egyptian peasant, even the Wafd voter, and many others no doubt.

But what democracy are we talking about? This is not the place to disparage the heritage of Western bourgeois democracy: respect for rights and the rule of law, freedom of speech, institutionalizing of electoral procedure and separation of powers, checks and balances, etc. But we should not stop there. Western democracy in itself, as a political method, has no social dimension – even though it has allowed powerful labour movements such as the Scandinavian ones to introduce a social dimension into politics, using the methods of parliamentary democracy. The people's democracy at moments of revolutionary social change (the USSR in the 1920s, Maoist China, etc.) have also taught us much about what 'people's power' could be, if we allow this much abused expression its real meaning. To stop at Western democratic forms without taking into consideration the social transformations demanded by the anti-capitalist revolt of the periphery is to remain with a caricature of bourgeois democracy, and thereby condemned to alienation from the people, and to extreme vulnerability. For our democracy to take root it must at once take a position that goes beyond capitalism. In this as in so many other domains the law of unequal development operates.

This is the prospect that imperialism can not accept. That is why the campaign on 'democracy' orchestrated by many Western establishments stresses some sides of the issues,

and ignores others. For example it equates multi-party politics and democracy. In contrast with the language of Western media about democracy, our thinking concerns democracy in the service of national liberation and social progress (and not in opposition to them, or overlooking them).

I would argue that 'Jacobin democracy', to borrow an expression from the French revolution, is astonishingly modern. In each of the three great revolutions of the modern world (the French, the Russian and the Chinese), the play of ideas and social forces at moments of radicalization has succeeded in moving far beyond the requirements of 'historically objectively necessary' social transformation. Hence, Jacobin democracy did more than merely establish 'bourgeois power'. Although this democracy operated in a framework of private ownership, its anxiety to establish power genuinely at the service of the 'people' clashed with the merely bourgeois needs. At this stage of social development the bourgeoisie looked for little more than qualified democracy such as Britain, the United States and France practised in the nineteenth century. The bourgeoisie were furthermore willing to compromise with the monarchy and the aristocracy, as British history shows. The aspirations of the 'people' – namely the crowd of peasants and artisans – went further. The people wanted something more than 'free trade'. They wanted this to such an extent that during the Convention, at the time of the French revolution, they launched the astonishingly modern slogan that 'Liberalism (i.e. economic) is the enemy of democracy'! This looking forward was a forestate of a socialist consciousness yet to come (Babeufism is an indication). In the same way, the USSR in the 1920s and Maoist China expressed a communist vision well beyond the requirements of the 'national and popular' reforms on the agenda. Certainly these moments of radicalization are fragile; in the end narrower concepts more consonant with 'objective' needs win the day. But it would be quite wrong to underestimate their significance as an indication of the way the trend is going.

'Jacobin democracy' rejuvenated by radicalization of the socialist revolutions of our times is the democracy to which the popular classes of the contemporary Third World aspire – albeit in a confused manner. It is distinguishable from liberal bourgeois democracy, which ignores the dimension of necessary social reforms, just as it is distinguishable from 'populist mobilizations' to which we referred above, whose contempt for democracy has exhausted the potential for renewal.

My proposition certainly pays no heed to 'fashion'! The latter nowadays seeks to devalue moments of revolutionary radicalization in the name of 'realism'. Or to compare them with another tradition: that of the 'local democracy' familiar in English-speaking countries. 'Decentralization' and autonomy of a dismembered and segmented civil society are often in this spirit proposed as realizable advances, potentially more fertile than the supposed illusion of 'statist' popular democracy. The trends in this direction, often tinged with religiosity, seem to me to suggest a strategy too strongly biased by 'anti-statism' to be genuinely on a par with the real historical challenge.

But there is something to be learned from them; and a genuine dialogue is necessary here. That said, it is difficult nowadays to know if the social movements of all kinds manifest at the periphery (and at the centre) are capable or not of making headway in answering the objective challenges.

Some of the movements seem to us dead-ends. This is so of the religious fundamentalist renewals, or 'ethnic' communal withdrawals. As symptoms of the crisis and not solutions to it, and entirely the effects of disillusionment, they will collapse as soon as they have revealed their impotence in the face of the real challenge. This is obviously the expression of an optimism that reason shall triumph.

Other movements may on the contrary find a role in the reconstruction of a plan for society 'beyond capitalism' that resolves the contradictions which really existing capitalism is incapable of overcoming, by drawing on the lessons of the first steps in this direction. It seems to me that this occurs whenever the 'new movements' (or the old ones!) do not stand exclusively on the platform of 'state conquest', but on that of another concept of social power to be won. The choice is not 'struggle for power or struggle for something else' (what?), but what concept is held of the power for which the struggle is waged. The forms of organization constructed on the prevailing 'traditional' concept of power (power = state) are inevitably going to lose much of their legitimacy once the people take the measure of the

character of this conservative state. By contrast, forms of organization stressing the complex social content of the power to be developed will be increasingly successful. In this category the thesis of 'non-party politics' may prove fruitful. The same may be said of 'anti-authoritarianism' in Latin America, in which Pablo Casanova detects the principal requirement of the 'new' movements: rejection of state authoritarianism in the party, and in the leadership repudiation of doctrinaire ideological terms. This is a reaction against the burdensome legacy of the historical formation of the continent, and undoubtedly a reaction that will encourage progress. But likewise, and for the same basic reason, feminism in the West, with its aim of attacking at least some of the roots of male autocracy, stems from the same logic, and another concept of social power. To some extent the West is in the vanguard of new advances in the liberation of society. Whether these advances imply breakthroughs 'beyond capitalism', or remain 'absorbable' ('recoverable') by the social system, raises new questions. In the medium term at least it would seem that the advantages of a central capitalist position are such that the movements in question are unlikely to shake the foundations of the capitalist management of society.

The future of the 'new movements' remains uncertain. It is not impossible that they will wither away in the current crisis. Can objective criteria be defined to encourage the movements to take the essential national and popular direction? I believe they can and I make the following preliminary comments.

Conditions for Restoration of Democracy

First: the principal task is that of democratic re-politicization of the masses. The latter had a view of independence to be regained. But once the aim was achieved, the language on which national liberation was based ran out of steam. Can the new re-politicization be 'extra-party' or even 'contra-parties' as the latter are devalued by their post-independence behaviour? The question is open, although I am personally somewhat shocked at what seems to me a degree of 'paternalism' underlying the activity of many of the trendy 'non-governmental organizations'.

Second: democratic re-politicization of the people must be based on a reinforcement of their capacity for self-organization, self-development, through various forms of cooperation, co-management and popular management, and this will provoke conflict with the state. Overt conflict if the state is neo-colonial, latent if the state has embarked on a national and popular programme, as the national and popular society remains the focus of objective class conflict. Through such actions, could it be possible that we may ask, for example, to transform activities inaccurately described as 'informal' into a 'people's economy'?

Under current conditions, these activities are fully integrated into the global capitalist system and fulfil precise functions, of ensuring the reproduction of the labour force at minimum cost, or supplying sub-processing of inputs at low cost. They are a necessary adjunct to ensuring the profitability of capitalist exploitation. Transforming these activities into a 'people's economy' would be fraudulent if this conflict of interest were not faced openly.

Third: the kind of action envisaged here raises anew the question of relations between the 'movement' and the parties of the historical left and populism, established in the fight for independence, or in the fight waged against the neo-colonial system. It seems to be neither proper nor cogent to lump these parties – whatever their 'mistakes' and historical limits – with those who have been responsible for neo-colonial management. Similarly the question arises anew of relations between the 'movement' and the new forces that have coalesced at one time or another on a national and progressive platform. I am obviously thinking of organizations of anti-imperialist and progressive soldiers at the root of changes responsive to popular aspirations, even if the changes were inaugurated by *coups d'état* (Egypt, Libya, Rawlings' Ghana, Sankara's Burkina Faso, etc.).

Fourth: analysis of the strategy of democratic re-politicization implies the re-opening of at least three broad debates of theoretical significance:

(1) The debate on the role of the revolutionary intelligentsia as a social catalyst capable of drafting a concrete alternative plan and promoting the struggles for its implementation;

(2) The debate on the cultural content of this alternative plan – its potentially universalist scope is essential in my opinion, its relations with the national cultural heritage etc.;

(3) The debate on the long-term outlook: socialism or capitalism? Although it is fashionable nowadays to deny validity to such debates, I believe they are indispensable. Here I merely point them out, as I have discussed the details in my other writings.

Fifth: current history has some tentative examples of this direction. I am thinking here of the experience of Thomas Sankara's Burkina Faso, but of others even more abused by the dominant media of the West (Gadaffi-ism for example!) Obviously their first steps fell short of solving the fundamental issues of the relationship between the authorities and parties of the radical left, the relationship to populism, to the soldiers etc. However, the debate on these propositions should be opened.

Sixth: I shall not suggest a magic formulae of which I hold the secret to replace the necessary democratic dialogue between all the components of the movement. I shall merely suggest that if polarization imposes an 'alternative development', the options are: accepting 'wealth' as the backbone of the aspirations to be encouraged, or its replacement by 'welfare'. How? First, by returning to old papa Marx whose critique of the market ('commodity alienation'), far from being 'played out', is rejuvenated by the re-discoveries of the contemporary movement.

In the final analysis the issue of democracy can not be debated without reference to the philosophical concepts underlying the various interpretations of democracy. Contemporary trends of opinion, broadly typified by Anglo-American evolutionism and pragmatism, impoverish the debate by treating democracy as a gamut of narrowly defined rights and practices, independent of the desired social outlook. This democracy can then stabilize the society, by leaving 'evolution' to 'objective forces' operating regardless of human will. Furthermore, in the analysis of these objective forces the focus is on technical and scientific progress whereas the social realities that hide behind 'market forces' are systematically concealed. Finally, democratic transformation of the society is regarded as being largely the product of evolution; hence the functional role of the revolutionary process in history can be played down.

I am poles apart from this line of argument. The analysis of economistic alienation provided by Marx is in my view central to any scientific and realist understanding of the mechanism of capitalist reproduction. It is the only analysis that places democracy in its true context, and grasps its stabilizing role. Along with Marx, the Frankfurt School and Karl Polanyi, I find it impossible to interpret our world outside this analytical reference. The method leads of necessity to a rehabilitation of the crucial function of qualitative transformation and crystallization of potentialities inconceivable without revolution.

According to this view, the contemporary world, and the perception of the future of its supersession, are the products of the three great (and sole) revolutions of the modern world: the French, the Russian and the Chinese. With Immanuel Wallerstein I attach qualitative significance to the break inaugurated by the French revolution. For the break substitutes a system of secular legitimation of political and social action for the ancient religious legitimation appropriate to what I have called tributary ideologies. In that sense the break inaugurated the later evolutions, whether of bourgeois democracy or socialism. The Paris Commune slogan in 1871 ('Neither God, nor Caesar, nor Tribune') was no accident; it flowed from – and was an extension of – the slogan of 1789 ('Liberty, Equality, Fraternity'). The stress on this ideological aspect of the French revolution challenges the very concept of bourgeois revolution.

The three revolutions mentioned above were the great moments still shaping our vision of the modern world, and its possible and desirable future. Unfortunately it would take too much space in a chapter on democracy in Africa to dwell in historical depth on these moments – unfortunately because there is a lot to learn of relevance even today from such a historical study (the CODESRIA paper mentioned in the very first lines of this chapter contains a more complete historical account). In order to find other such decisive previous moments in history would mean going back 1,500 to 2,500 years. Back to the times of the great ideological revolutions through which the crystallization of tributary society is expressed, in our part of the world under the successive forms of Hellenism, Christianity

and Islam, elsewhere under the forms of Confucianism and Buddhism. At the level of ideology – a dominant instance in the pre-capitalist societies – they represented as gigantic a qualitative transformation as that wrought in our era by the three modern revolutions. It is also worth noting that these ancient revolutions went further than simple adjustment to the demands of social evolution: by proclaiming, for example, a universalism which the necessary regional tributary societies did not require (Amin 1989). The changes in between have been of local and minor significance, provoked merely by continual adjustments of various spheres of social activity to the constraints of 'evolution'.

'In Favour of Democracy' – What Democracy?

The perception of the issue of democracy that can be expounded in the analytical framework we offer here is very different from what follows Anglo-American evolutionist philosophy. Democracy in our mind is a creative destabilizer, the means by which concepts 'ahead of their time' continue to progress and encourage social action to progress.

The current offensive of some government circles and reactionary establishments of the West, ostensibly 'in favour of democracy', has the merit of concealing this destabilizing tendency of democracy. I deduce then that this really is not an offensive in favour of democracy, but an offensive against socialism. The cause of democracy – in its impoverished form as a means of stabilizing an alienated society – is then mobilized as a tactical weapon. And like all tactical weapons it is deployed with a grain of cynicism. What other explanation is there for the way the Western media, so touchy in defence of freedom of expression in the countries of 'real socialism', have stood up for the 'freedom' of the Afghan Muslims to propagate the closing of schools (beginning with those for girls of course) which the infamous secularists in the pay of Moscow did dare to open? What other explanation is there for the way these media ignore the interventions of Western paratroopers coming to the rescue of African dictators at the end of their tether? What other explanation is there for the way the assiduous defenders of trade union freedom in Poland overlook that the so-called Structural Adjustment Policies imposed on the Third World envisage the dismantling of the unions?

Shortcuts to Progress*

Let me conclude this chapter by referring to some thoughts of my colleague Göran Hydén: that there are 'no shortcuts to progress', and that there is a need first of all to establish a national bourgeoisie in Africa in order to develop productive forces, and to set the stage for economic growth, class differentiation, class struggle and further democratic development, as in the West. For the sake of discussion I would agree 50 per cent and disagree 50 per cent perhaps.

The problem with social thought – I will not call it social science; social thought is fair enough – is that in using normal, common language, there is always a big danger of words being used with different meanings, and being understood from different backgrounds. Therefore social thought will continue to be full of misunderstandings. In the field of natural sciences, where the language is much more precise and where agreement on definitions is much more strict, such misunderstandings are less likely. So, 'shortcut' is a very nice word, and to say that there is no shortcut might be correct, and in the context in which Hydén used this term, it is – in my personal opinion – correct. That there is no shortcut today implies an objective need to develop productive forces, because you cannot do anything – not least build a genuine democracy – until you have developed productive forces. There are a number of constraints resulting from this fact including the need to import, for instance. In that sense there is indeed 'no shortcut'.

For 70 years, and still at this historical juncture, we have had on the agenda of African history quite a long journey with revolutions based on a rejection of the effects of global polarization which are unbearable for the peoples in the periphery of the system. From our

*The concluding part of this chapter is based on a verbatim tape recording from discussions at the ISENPAD workshop in Nairobi in July 1989.

experiences of this journey I derive that the building of true socialism, which we imagined was on the agenda, can not be realized at present. Instead we still have on the agenda what I have called a national popular revolution. In that sense also there is no 'shortcut'. But the danger in the use of this expression is that some people on the right – those belonging to the modernization school – would derive from the notion of 'no shortcut' something very different. They do say that really existing capitalism, that is contemporary transnational capitalism, is objectively the only way to develop productive forces, and that we have to operate within those constraints. This is not really correct, I think. Because history after all is full of shortcuts. In that sense the building of national popular movements is a shortcut. Maybe, history is made only, or basically, of shortcuts.

When Almighty God created this species he may have decided in His wisdom that mankind should be given the privilege of finding shortcuts, if it was clever enough. Mind you, if there were no shortcuts in history, since civilization started in Egypt possibly 3,000 years before Christ and which spent 3,000 years building pyramids, then the Swedes of today who started developing perhaps only 1,000 years ago would still have 2,000 years of building pyramids before they could move beyond that stage. Fortunately Europeans found shortcuts. Perhaps God did not want history to be so boring, to be repetitive to that extent.

Moreover Sweden, Göran Hydén's homeland, is full of good shortcuts in my view, repeated at least twice in its history, and brilliantly mastered. Even if not consciously, when the Swedes moved from quite a primitive society to a developed absolute monarchy without going through every stage of European feudalism, that was indeed a shortcut. Consider furthermore the Swedish working class at the end of the nineteenth century, and in the early twentieth century. While being late-comers in industrialization in a backward country, this class still succeeded to organize as a powerful autonomous force. Let us imagine that they had been told that there was no shortcut – and that they should look at the English people who were the earliest industrializers, and that the Swedes therefore would have to wait for several decades before being able to operate an autonomous labour movement . . . Sweden would not be as developed as it is today if they had followed that 'no shortcut' prescription.

There are shortcuts. But there are also blind alleys. Therefore the question which should be debated is whether the apparent shortcuts taken here in Africa or elsewhere are genuine shortcuts, or are blind alleys.

Is a National Bourgeoisie Possible in Africa?

At this point I would like to introduce the subject of the national bourgeoisie which has been touched upon only in passing above. Because this concept might also be full of ambiguities and lead to misunderstandings, and therefore produce sterile controversies, we ought to make clear what we mean by it. I shall try to make clear what I mean by national bourgeoisie, and why I think it is not a necessary or even possible first stage. It is not a possible stage in many African countries, and therefore we do have to find a shortcut.

By national bourgeoisie I mean something which must be understood on the basis of the historical experience of the West. I think that we can speak of a *national* bourgeoisie as a historical product, when a bourgeoisie, and its state (which are inseparable except in liberal ideology) are mastering the processes of internal accumulation, not in autarchy, not in isolation from the rest of the world, but still in a way which allows the mastering of relationships implied by the processes of *national* accumulation in the global system. That implies, first, mastering the conditions of the reproduction of the labour force (which is not exclusively a question of law and order, but also the capacity to develop agriculture and industry, in some harmony, so that basic foods and basic tools are produced to ensure the level of wages acceptable at a particular time, and so on). Second, mastering the process of centralization of the surplus by national integrated financial and taxation systems, and re-channelling this surplus while, of course, respecting private property and all the rules of the game played by the national bourgeoisie. Third, mastering productive technology within this framework, and being able to absorb technology to reproduce it locally, and eventually to develop it. Fourth, mastering the market which means to have the tools of a national policy of

relative isolation, and of aggressive exportation if needed. This is the mastering of national accumulation, not in autarchy of course, but – in many cases – in an aggressive relationship with the rest of the world (including colonialism). *These are the four conditions needed for the emergence of a national bourgeoisie.*

Since the world-system today is deepening the processes of transnationalization, it is leading to a new qualitative phase of history. It is obvious from this chapter that I agree with this point of view, except that one has to understand clearly that this new phase comes historically after the national bourgeoisie in the West already had built, within their own countries, a capacity to be real partners in the global system. Now, the question is whether it is possible for African states to become such real bourgeois partners in the global system, having developed first of all within their own countries, and their own domestic or regional markets? I would say frankly no. It is not possible, except perhaps in a few cases, because of all those internal and external factors I have mentioned, combining internal history, colonization, imperialism, the working of the global system, etc. All those conditions make it very unlikely that any national bourgeoisie with the four characteristics mentioned above could emerge and crystallize in most African countries under present conditions.

Some countries have attempted it, and the attempts will continue. If we go back again to Egypt, the attempts of the national bourgeoisie have filled 150 years of its history, from Muhammed Ali, at the beginning of the nineteenth century down to Nasser. During this long history there has been a historical series of such attempts – of the khediv Ismail, and then of the Wafdist liberal bourgeoisie, as mentioned above. Each time, after some success and achievements, or let us call it development, the conjunction of internal and external factors have led back to what I am calling the 'recompradorization' of the bourgeoisie. Of course the process of compradorization is not a repetition, because it is operating within the framework of a global system which itself has evolved from period to period. So the compradorization of today is not the compradorization of yesterday due to the fact that, today, the global system is so much more developed. I submit that we are now having this recompradorization on a global level and on a large scale for the whole Third World – even for countries such as Brazil and Mexico. Even these large countries, with a relatively high capacity for developing a national bourgeoisie, are undergoing this process.

The understanding of why it is impossible for a national bourgeoisie to crystallize in most African countries is a key to understanding the failure of development policies based on this bourgeoisie assumption. You can certainly find capitalist relations of production in the Third World, and therefore there is a *local* bourgeoisie in some African countries, but this class is not able to master the process of national accumulation, and to interconnect it with the global trend in a way allowing it to be a real and equal partner. It is just continuously adjusting to, and not participating in the fabrication of the global system.

The Bandung period was precisely based on the idea that newly independent countries of Asia and Africa could participate in the global system on the basis of the so-called comparative advantages, accepting international specialization and division of labour, flows of capitals, private and public, and simultaneously master those relations with the rest of the world. The countries which attempted to realize the Bandung idea, and to reconcile these somewhat conflicting targets are the ones which labelled themselves 'socialist'. This is no pure accident. To achieve these targets these countries had to rely on other forces than bourgeois forces in their own society. They had to rely on popular forces which were to a large extent the product of the national liberation movement, of the degree of its radicalization, of the need for the potential bourgeoisie to ally with other sectors of the people, with peasants, with the working class in some semi-industrialized countries, with large sectors of the petty bourgeoisie, and so on. But these alliances are currently being destroyed, as a simultaneous result of their own internal contradictions and limitations, and of the new trends and forces operating at the global level. I include here the cultural dimension, the massive influence of Western patterns of consumption conveyed through the media. I include also the fact that the on-going technological revolution is capital saving and therefore creates conditions for worse terms of trade for backward countries still being specialized (as most African countries are) basically in agricultural and mineral exports. The combination of all these factors explains precisely why the process of recompradorization is going on.

Delinking Again – 'the National Popular Alternative'

If this analysis is correct, then we have to look for another shortcut that I call the national popular alternative toward economic development and democracy. We must ask ourselves how to find those who are the social, potential agents for it, and what are the political forces which can unite them? What could be the targets for what we may call this transition period, which will be a long transition, a historical phase, in which one would have to combine internal social changes with the capacity to master external relations, and yet in doing so maintaining some distance from the global trends.

This is what I call delinking, using, like Hydén, a very dangerous word. He is using a dangerous word when he speaks of 'no shortcuts'. I am using a similarly dangerous word – 'delinking' – which is as poorly understood as his 'no shortcuts'. I am *not* using the term 'delinking' as a synonym for autarchy – even though many of my critics have confused it from the very beginning with autarchy. I am only saying that the needed national alternative goes against the very logic of global expansion of capitalism. It is not contradictory to capitalism *in abstracto*, because it is to a large extent based on relations of production which still remain capitalist relations of production, therefore operating within a class society with many of its characteristics, including exploitation, even if African governments in their rhetoric usually say that there are no classes and no exploitation.

African governments have generally not been in favour of my concept of 'delinking'. In enriching themselves the ruling classes in Africa have had obvious advantages from engaging in agreements with transnational firms, and by the control of donor money. If 'delinking by design' therefore has turned out to be impossible to realize, we may well now encounter a delinking by rejection, or a 'delinking by default' – a term suggested by Hydén in our discussions – as a result of the fact that the Western business and donor communities increasingly are losing interest in Africa, and rather turning their attention to Eastern Europe. It is an open question whether a delinking by default will bring about a passive, further deterioration of Africa's underdevelopment, or whether it offers new opportunities for Africa to actively develop on its own accord, with a larger margin of relative autonomy to achieve internal changes, at some distance from the global system.

Actively using the opportunities implied by a 'delinking by default' could in fact again place what I have called a national popular revolution on the agenda of African countries. Active political initiatives are needed to strengthen internal markets for mass-consumed agricultural products and food primarily, and secondarily for the production of simple and successively more complex capital goods (machinery for production, transportation etc.) for use within a country – rather than for international export markets. Only once this kind of domestic politico-economic development of production and markets has been secured in African countries, if not yet completely established, should production for export – first within Africa's own regional Preferential Trade Area (PTA), and then further afield – be politically encouraged. This could be the beginning of a genuine African development.

But a focus not primarily on international, export markets but on the building of internal, domestic markets for domestic production of what is needed for mass-consumption within African countries, and on the African continent as a whole, is not something generated by the 'market' itself, but requires political decisions impossible without a democratic order open to national popular movements. And vice versa: a stable and representative democracy may not be possible without this kind of internal economic development. There is a process of circular causation here with economic and democratic developments linked to each other in ways which are not always harmonious but dialectical.

Therefore in the interest of democracy as well as economic development our target should be to enlarge this margin of economic autonomy for African countries, and to struggle for a new global system in which there would be more margin of autonomy for the different partners. I believe that the Left in the North has a responsibility in understanding and promoting this option, and should take on a greater responsibility in this struggle. This goes much beyond the conventional view which is paternalistic, and sometimes boils down to pure charity for the peoples of Africa.

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