

**DUAL DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT:
THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE INITIATIVES IN SOMALIA, 1991-1999**

SAFARI ANTHROPOLOGY COLLECTION

BY

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DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree to any other University.




.....
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25/10/2000

.....
Date

This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as a University Supervisor.



.....
Dr. Makumi Mwangi

25 October 2000

.....
Date

DEDICATION

To my Mum Hooyo Caddey, Dad Aabbe Bursaliid, Brothers Abboowe Sacdi, Yusuf, Abdisalam, Jibril, Abdukadir, Ahmed Atto, Sisters Abbaayo Aamino, Khadija Labo, Wife Delta and Children Aisha, Bahja and Mohammed-Amin.

BAKU APUSANA COLLEGE

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Ibrahim Qassim Farah
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
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
List of Abbreviations

List of Abbreviations

| | |
|--------|--|
| CBOs | Community Based Organizations |
| EC | European Commission |
| ECHO | European Commission Humanitarian Organization |
| ELF | Eritrean Liberation Front |
| EPRDF | Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front |
| EU | European Union |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| LAS | League of Arab States |
| LPI | Life and Peace Institute |
| LSE | London School of Economics |
| MP | Member of Parliament |
| NFD | Northern Frontier District |
| NGOs | Non-Governmental Organizations |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |
| OIC | Organization of Islamic Conference |
| OLF | Oromo Liberation Front |
| PC | Provincial Commissioner |
| PSWs | Problem Solving Workshops |
| RRA | Rahanwein Resistance Army |
| SACB | Somali Aid Coordination Body |
| SDM | Somali Democratic Movement |
| SNA | Somali National Alliance |
| SNF | Somali National Front |
| SNM | Somali National Movement |
| SPM | Somali Patriotic Movement |
| SSDF | Somali Salvation Democratic Front |
| TEU | Treaty of the European Union |
| TNA | Transitional National Assembly |
| TNC | Transitional National Council |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| UNDOS | United Nations Development Office for Somalia |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNITAF | Unified Task Force |
| UNOSOM | United Nations Operation in Somalia (I and II) |
| UNPOS | United Nations Political Office for Somalia |
| US | United States |
| USC | United Somali Congress |
| WFP | United Nations World Food Programme |
| WSP | War-torn Societies Project |



MAP I: PRE-CIVIL WAR SOMALIA



MAP 2: Regional and District boundaries of Somalia.

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND TO THE SOMALI CONFLICT AND THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE INITIATIVES

Introduction

Dual diplomatic approach (track one and track-two diplomacy) in conflict management is said to be the most effective approach to the management of internal conflicts. In this approach, the methodologies and concerns of track one and track two conflict management would cooperate in the management of the same conflict. It is very clear that none of them can stand or function alone as they address the different aspects involved in the conflict management processes and as track one ideally focuses on the negotiable aspects and track two addresses the psychological and percept ional aspects.

In conflicts all over the world there are certain values and interests held by the conflicting parties. These values or interests have something to do with the availability of justice; the need for political participation; ensurance of security; and identity and recognition since underlying all conflicts there are certain values that are neither negotiable nor repressible.

On the basis of the dual approach, this research project will discuss and analyse the roles and contributions of track one and track two diplomacy in the management of the Somali conflict by examining the international peace initiatives in Somalia from 1991-1999.

Depending on their relevance to the two tracks, the study will focus on the United Nations, the European Commission and some of the states that have been involved in the Somali conflict management. The study argues that both track one and track two diplomacy complement each other and that neither can operate effectively without the other especially in

the management of internal conflicts. The eventual argument of the study is that in the management of the Somali conflict there is a need to apply a two-track diplomacy.

The Problem

In 1991, the Somali State collapsed as civil war engulfed the capital Mogadishu and the military regime of Mohammed Siad Barre was forced out of power. After more than a century in the making and 30 years of independence, Somalia has ceased to function as a unitary state.¹ It is generally agreed that the root causes of the present Somalia civil war can be traced back to various decades— the main reasons being the scarcity and mismanagement of resources, political and administrative inefficiencies, corruption and nepotism practiced by the former governments and the colonialists before.

In 1992, a US diplomat described the situation in Somalia as 'the worst humanitarian crisis faced by any people in the world'.² At the end of 1992, it was estimated that more than 500,000 people had died due to war and famine in Somalia.³ The nature of the Somali conflict is rooted deeply in a clan-based political system, as Somalia's political history is itself determined by its clan structures. This was coupled with the militarization of Somalia and the internationalisation of the Somali conflict.⁴

After Barre's fall, the international community came to assist Somalia to get out of the mess of the civil war. This was done through the provision of emergency relief and the organization of peace and reconciliation efforts and conferences. Many international

¹ M. Bradbury, Somaliland: Country Report (Totton: Hobbs the Printer Ltd., 1997) p.1.

² J. Prendergast, Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia (London: Plato Press with Center of Concern, 1997) p.115.

³ Ibid.

⁴ See M. Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace Oxfam Paper No. 9, (Oxford: Oxfam Print Unit, 1994) Part II and III.

organizations including the United Nations and the European Commission tried to do something. Some states were also involved in the management of the Somali conflict.

Both states and non-state actors which have been involved in the peace and reconciliation efforts have been using different approaches relevant to their status and there was no single time when both track one and track two diplomacy were used simultaneously.

There is also very little literature regarding the management of the Somali conflict. There is therefore a need to discuss and analyse the roles and contributions of both track one and track two diplomacy, by examining the international peace initiatives in the Somalia conflict management efforts from 1991-1999. This will contribute to the current available literature on the subject.

Objectives of the Study

Broad Objective

The study aims to analyze the roles and contributions of track one and track two diplomacy in the management of the Somali conflict.

Specific Objectives

- (i) Examine the international peace initiatives of the United Nations and the European Union and other stakeholders in the Somali conflict management efforts between 1991 to 1999 and their contribution to the Somalia peace process.
- (ii) Examine the strategies the UN, the EC and other stakeholders have employed and how effective these strategies are in the management of the conflict.
- (iii) Identify the major obstacles and problems hindering their contributions to the management of the conflict.

- (iv) Sensitize policy makers, both local and international, on the need for devising a solution from within Somalia and/or the Horn of Africa region as the Somali conflict is one of the epicentres of the conflict in the Horn of Africa conflict system, and its resolution would enhance and broaden the peace making in the region.

Justification of the Study

Just like any other conflict in the Horn of Africa region, the Somali conflict is a protracted one. It has had, and continues to have, negative consequences not only for Somalia but also for the stability and development of the Horn of Africa sub-region. It has a lot to do with the country's political structures, since the civil war was part of a structural conflict process, which turned violent.

The civil war that preceded and followed the fall of the Siad Barre government uprooted an estimated 1.7 million people.⁵ While most of the people fled the country to become refugees outside Somalia, internal displacement continued. Even before the civil war Somalia was one of the poorest countries in Africa.⁶

With regard to the peace processes in the Somali conflict, track one diplomacy was the main focus of the international organizations and states, which were involved. The importance and use of track two has only been appreciated lately thus totally ignoring or forgetting for a long period of time the importance of and complementarity between track one and track two approaches in the management of the Somalia conflict.

⁵ The United Nations and Somalia: 1992-1996 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1996) Volume VIII, p.14.

⁶ In Somalia, a Human Development Index has not been estimated for UNDP's global report for several years because neither the government nor an economic institution exists that could provide reliable and comprehensive data. Based on available data, from UN and aid agencies, Somalia's HDI ranges between 0.184 and 0.159. Ranked globally, this estimate places Somalia 175th out of 175 States in its level of human development. See UNDP's Human Development Report Somalia (Nairobi, Colourprint Ltd., 1998) p.21.

In view of this, the need for a detailed study of the international peace initiatives in Somalia cannot be over-emphasized. This is because the study aims to analyze the roles and contributions of track one and track two diplomacy in the management of the Somali conflict by examining the international peace initiatives in Somalia from 1991-1999.

Apart from studying the strategies that have been used and their efficacy, and the major obstacles encountered, the study will also sensitize the policy makers, both local and international, to the need of coming up with an internal Somali one from within the Horn of Africa sub-region.

Literature Review

The relevant literature to this study is classified into two categories: those which deal with conflict management, and that which deal with the Somalia conflict and attempts to manage it. Conflict is part and parcel of everyday life. It is part of human society and it exists where people have incompatible goals.⁷ This means that each conflicting party believes that their point of view is the only correct one and therefore they cannot accept other points of views thus leading to a disagreement, be it a violent or non-violent.

Conflict management is a relatively new academic discipline with a growing number of followers. It has developed most in Europe and North America, where academics and practitioners devote time and resources to analyzing conflicts in Africa and other regions of the World. Those researchers see conflicts in Africa through the prism of Europe and North America.⁸ They often come up with untested theories and recommendations irrelevant and

⁷ M. Mwagiru. "Understanding Conflict" in Mwagiru. M. et al Understanding Conflict and its Management (Nairobi Watermark Printers Limited. 1998) pp. 4-5.

⁸ See M. Munene. "Preface to CCR Series" in Mwagiru. M. et al Understanding Conflict and its Management (Nairobi: Watermark Printers Limited. 1998).

inapplicable to the African situation, forcing them to go back to the drawing table to find explanations for their failure.

In the study of conflict and its management, theory and practice co-exist, sometimes easily and sometimes uneasily.⁹ This means that theory drives practice as it is often influenced by it, and that without a sound theoretical basis the practice of conflict management would be considerably impaired.

Stanley Hoffman,¹⁰ a scholar of the traditionalist school, has defined contemporary theory of international relations as “a systematic study of observance phenomena that tries to discover the principal variables, to explain behaviour, and to reveal the characteristic type of relations among national units”.¹¹

J. David Singer,¹² a scientifically oriented scholar, offers a shorter and much more restrictive definition: theory is “a body of internally consistent empirical generalizations of descriptive, predictive, and explanatory power.” Both definitions agree that generalizations must be empirically derived, logically sound, and be able to describe, explain, and predict.¹³

⁹ M. Mwangi. “Understanding Conflict and its Management” in Mwangi, M., et al., Understanding Conflict and its Management (Nairobi: Watermark Printers Limited, 1998) p.1.

¹⁰ See S. Hoffmann. “Theory and International Relations”. in J. N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy. (New York: Free Press, 1969), p.30; quoted in Coulombis, T. A., Wolfe, J. H., Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- Hall, Inc., 1978) p.25.

¹¹ T. A. Coulombis, and J. H. Wolfe. Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- Hall, Inc., 1978) pp.25-26.

¹² See J. David Singer. “Inter-Nation Influence: A formal Model”. in International Politics and Foreign Policy. 2nd ed. Rev., ed., Rosenau, p.380.

¹³ It appears that another leading student of the international relations field, Charles A. McClelland (who would invariably accept the Singer definition), is not convinced that the field of International Relations has managed to develop any theory at all. At best, it has developed a series of “Conceptualization” or generalizations, but little or no theory. McClelland argues, for instance, that “the step of conceptualization is the only one that we have taken, and there is very little in the way of existing theory to discipline and guide organized inquiry or research” (A design for International Relations Research: Scope, Theory, Methods and Relevance, Monograph 10, American Academy of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia, 1970) p. 72). James Rosenau frequently argues that “pre-theories”, another term for conceptualizations, are what we have achieved at best to date, quoted in Coulombis, T. A., Wolfe, J. H., Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- Hall, Inc., 1978) pp.25-26.

From this, theory is fundamental to conflict management as paradigms provide theoretical frameworks to enable conflict analysts/managers to analyze conflict and its management. In conflict studies, themes include a cross-action which cuts across International Relations, Diplomacy, and International Law. In this aspect of conflict management, theory serves several functions.

Apart from the theoretical framework of conflict management, there are also theories about diplomacy or the diplomacy of conflict management. The important aspects of these theories is that they are concerned with the diplomatic management of conflict and its structures. One of them is that it exists in two different methods. Official diplomacy (track-one) and unofficial diplomacy (track two). The importance is not how these two interact with one another but how they relate or should be related.

Track one diplomacy is concerned with the role of states and statesmen in conflict management processes for example bilateral approaches, summits, and multilateral conferences while track-two diplomacy is concerned with the role of non-states and non-statesmen with different processes and even different methodologies of conflict management. One major contribution of track two diplomacy has been the use of problem-solving workshops, which are a creation of the world society paradigm.¹⁴

Both track one and track two diplomacy in conflict management are about mediation. According to Bercovitch, mediation is a process of conflict management in which disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their basic differences without resorting to

¹⁴ J. W. Burton, and T. Vayrynen. "The End of International Relations?" in Groom, A. J. R. and Light M. (eds), Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994) pp.69-80:75.

physical force or involving the authority of the law.¹⁵ Bercovitch argued that mediation is likely to take place when the disputes are long drawn out and complex, when the disputants themselves are not able to come up with a solution to their disputes, when they are not ready to incur further costs or further escalate of the dispute, and when they are prepared to break the stalemate by co-operating and engaging in some contact and communication.¹⁶

Bercovitch came up with five conditions for a successful mediation: mediation must take place at a place at the ripe moment. The situation must be ripe enough and disputants should show a willingness to moderate their intransigence and revise their expectations; adversaries need to be recognized as the legitimate spokesmen for their parties. Without unity or cohesion within each conflicting party it is difficult for both the parties and the mediator to engage in any meaningful form of conflict settlement, since there is a lack of unified decision-making power or authority within parties due to their disunity or lack of cohesion; Mediation is more likely to be accepted and be successful in low intensity disputes, for example when the number of fatalities experienced by each conflicting party is low.

Usually, protracted and intense international disputes are not particularly conducive to either a mediator or any other form of third party intervention. Mediators need to be perceived as reasonable, acceptable, knowledgeable, and must be able to gain the trust, confidence and co-operation of the disputants. Both sides should see them as impartial and as part of the process. Mediators have to be seen as participants in a conceptual decision-making system. They should, in other words, use strategies that provide the disputants with new ideas and issues in the mediation process. They should suggest ways of seeing and resolving the dispute,

¹⁵ J. Bercovitch, Special Feature on. 'Conflict Resolution Parameters and Possibilities' in Negotiations Journal Vol.7 (Plenum Publishing Corporation, 1991) p.2.

¹⁶ Ibid.

ask for concessions and/or alter the motivational structure of the parties. The possession of resources and employing an effective strategy can and will lead to successful mediation.

These conditions outlined by Bercovitch for a successful mediation have been challenged, moderated and modified by other authors. Zartman has argued that the key to understanding the resolution of intense conflicts is the notion of "ripeness". He came up with the concept of the "ripe moment", a moment in which crises are highly conducive to resolution by an outside actor. He argued that a crisis is ripe when there exists a situation of deadlock and deadline; unilateral solutions are blocked and joint solutions become conceivable; and the party, which previously had the upper-hand in the conflict has slipped and the underdog has gained in strength. In this moment, each conflicting side perceives that it is unable to win the conflict by itself.

Such a state of affairs will last into the indefinite future, with each side possessing the ability to hurt the other and at the same time, each party perceiving a moment when things will significantly get worse if they have not become better in ways that negotiation seeks to define.¹⁷ He describes such conditions as a 'mutually hurting stalemate'. Zartman argues that the challenge for an outside actor lies in presenting an alternative to the conflicting parties, which attains some of the goals of their unilateral preferences while eliminating or reconciling the more conflictual elements.¹⁸

Zartman dismissed the argument that trust is the defining element for the moment of ripeness. According to him if trust were required mediation would not be necessary. Indeed, it

¹⁷ I. W. Zartman, 'The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts' in A. George (ed.), Managing US- Soviet Rivalry (Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1993), pp.341-364.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 354.

s the initial absence of trust between the parties that makes the conciliator's role necessary.¹⁹ However, trust in the conciliator is indispensable as the conciliator builds trust between the conflicting parties by acting as a channel between them.

Stedman²⁰ questioned the concept of deadlock and deadline, arguing that the perception of deadlock and deadline can lead to different assumptions. He argues that ripeness in terms of military situation can be a function of internal changes, for example: the emergence of new leaders; the consolidation of a divided leadership or the division in government that was previously unified in its war aims.

The decision of a mediator to assist factions within conflicting parties to strengthen their hands in a negotiation is a risky one. Mediators may attempt to identify those leaders who favor settlement and those who oppose settlement and try to strengthen those who favor while isolating those who oppose settlement. But this will automatically mean locking important leaders out of the negotiating process, who could be able to block the settlement of the conflict. While this will be based on empowerment and disempowerment outside attempts to aid one party, mainly the soft-liners, may at the end backfire and weaken their position in the negotiating process.

Mediators themselves are seldom unitary actors and can be beset with the same factional problems that are observed in the antagonists. The mediators should speak with one voice as this is very crucial in bringing the conflicting parties to agreement and in preventing

¹⁹ I. W. Zartman. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) pp. 255-288: 254.

²⁰ S. J. Stedman, Peacekeeping in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe (1974-1980). (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987) pp.25-28.

parties from attempting to play off factions against each other in order to increase the likelihood of a settlement that favors them.

Lastly, Stedman calls into question the implicit conception of the main antagonists as unitary actors who perceive or calculate the gains and losses of combat, negotiation and surrender in terms of the government or insurgency as a whole. He suggests that the notion of ripeness and conflict resolution should be strengthened as follows. Firstly it is not necessary for all actors in a conflict to perceive a mutually hurting stalemate, although it is necessary for some actors to perceive. Secondly, the perception of a mutually hurting stalemate can be manifested at the patron level and the efficacies in bringing about settlement for example if that patron holds a monopoly on assistance to its clients and can persuade the client on the credibility of the threats.

Thirdly, ripeness paradoxically can come from a situation where both sides believe that a settlement will produce victory for them; and lastly, for a conflict to be ripe for resolution, it is necessary for the military wings of both sides to perceive a mutually hurting stalemate, but such perception alone is not sufficient to create a ripe situation for resolution.²¹

Regarding the principle of impartiality, Touval²² argued that the traditional requirement that impartiality is a necessary condition for an intermediary to be accepted and also be a successful mediator to the conflict fails to recognize mediation as a structural extension of bilateral bargaining and negotiation. Mediation should not be regarded as an exogenous input as this is not realistic. Mediators engage in behaviour that is designed to elicit

²¹ Ibid., pp.235-242.

²² S. Touval, "Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations" The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1. No.1. 1975, pp. 51-69.

information and exercise influence, thus bringing in the need for leverage or resources so as to exercise any degree of influence.

Zartman and Touval²³ argue that the mediator's task is primarily one of reframing and persuasion and these are best achieved when the mediator possesses resources that either one or both parties value. This generally follows the concept that the more powerful international actors are, the more effective they will be as intermediaries. In this case according to the power theory, the great powers have better chances of becoming better and more effective intermediaries than small states or international organizations.²⁴

Contrary to this view, Burton²⁵ stresses that there is a need to recognize adversaries as the legitimate spokesmen for their parties. He underscores the importance of seeing every conflict as having many parties involved at different levels. Since each conflicting party has different interests in that conflict, the analysis and conclusion of the conflict should start from within each of the parties involved in the conflict. There can be no form of mediation if each party cannot be identified and its representatives' views and aims cannot be determined. Therefore, there is a need to identify persons or legitimized authorities representing their parties.

Burton argued further that "questions of recognition" which arise in inter-state conflicts and "status" in communal conflicts need not arise. This is because when two parties are in conflict they view themselves as a legitimate opposition and what matters is that they

²³ I. W. Zartman, and S. Touval, "Introduction: Mediation in Theory" in S. Touval and I. W. Zartman (eds.) International Mediation in Theory and Practice. (Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1985) pp. 1-17.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ J. W. Burton, "Resolution of Conflict" in International Studies Quarterly, 1972, pp.5-29.

should recognize they have a problem to solve, and in this case they should come together to resolve this problem.

Regarding the skills required of mediators, Zartman and Touval²⁶ argued that mediation acts as a catalyst to negotiation. It facilitates the settlement of disputes that parties ought to be able to accomplish on their own if they were not so absorbed in their conflict. From this, there arises the need for the general perception that the mediators should be perceived as reasonable, acceptable, knowledgeable and able to secure the trust and co-operation of the conflicting parties.

Susskind and Cruikshank²⁷ describe mediation as a group-oriented problem-solving intervention. They argue that, as a process, it educates the participants about each other's needs and potentially provides a model for settling the current and future disputes. Susskind and Bubbitt²⁸ also argue that successful mediation can result in the cessation of violence; agreements that allow each party to save face both internationally and domestically; good precedents in the eyes of the whole community; arrangements that will ensure implementation of whatever agreements have been reached; and a better relationship among the disputing parties. Not all of the objectives are met every time a mediator intervenes, but the importance here is that the conflicting parties should realize that they could not get what they want through unilateral action.

²⁶ I. W. Zartman and S. Touval. "Third Party Diplomacy and Informal Peace Keeping" in S. J. Brown and K. M. Schraub, (eds.) Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 1992), p.259.

²⁷ See L. Susskind and J. Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

²⁸ L. Susskind and R. Bubbitt "Overcoming the Obstacles to Effective Mediation of International Disputes" in J. Bercovitch and J. R. Rubin (eds.), Mediation in International Relations (New York: Martinus Press, 1992) pp.31-51.

Regarding negotiations, especially diplomatic negotiations, there should be a dispute or a conflict. Conflicting parties get together to negotiate these disputes or conflicts. There can also be negotiations when there are common interests to be discussed and furthered. In conflict management, and diplomatic negotiations in particular, both track one and track two, there should be conflicting parties involved and certain rules that deal with the process of negotiations, which also govern them.

Susskind and Bubbitt²⁹ draw attention to the fact that all negotiations that yield settlement, whether assisted or unassisted, pass through three distinct phases: pre-negotiation phase, negotiation phase and implementation phase. During the pre-negotiation phase, the major task is to get the disputing parties to agree to negotiate. The next task is to determine who will represent each party at the round table. It is also very important to consider other actors that may have some influence or may be able to block the implementation of the negotiation outcome. This pre-negotiations phase should focus on drafting protocols for example how and what they would talk about. In other words, it is an agenda setting phase.

In the negotiations phase, parties discuss what is on the agenda and any other relevant business that arises. Attention should be paid to the preparation of final accords. This is a very crucial stage where parties dedicate their time and abilities to get their interests, concerns and issues considered.

During the implementation phase, the focus is on the implementation of the agreement and how it would be linked to the decision-making component of the conflicting parties. Parties should agree on a monitoring strategy for compliance with what has been agreed.

²⁹ Ibid.

Mechanisms for reconvening the parties and amending or modifying the agreement should also be put in place to avoid any breakdowns and, cater for any eventuality.

In the same vein,³⁰ Zartman and Touval argue that since mediators are motivated by self interest, they will not intervene automatically but only when they believe a conflict threatens their interests or when they perceive an opportunity to advance their interests. Such threats and opportunities are unlikely to be noticed when there is a mild disagreement between parties; it is usually after the conflict escalates that its implications are perceived. By then, the parties are likely to have become committed to their positions and to a confrontational policy, further reducing the common grounds on which that mediation must proceed.

To Zartman and Touval, for mediation to succeed, the parties must be disposed to re-evaluate their policies, but to Susskind and Bubbitt it is important to address these issues with a view to altering the way the parties assess the costs and benefits of continuing the conflict.

Wall³¹ points out that mediation is a complex social process, which facilitates interpersonal, inter-group and international negotiation. He argues that the mediated negotiation system is not only composed of the mediator, the two conflictants and their relationship, but it also includes the negotiators' constituents, the mediator's constituents and third parties who affect or are affected by the process and outcomes of the mediation.

There are other factors, in process of mediation, which decide, or indirectly affect the negotiation and these include societal norms, economic pressures, and international constraints.

³⁰ I. W. Zartman, S. Touval, "The Role of Third Party Diplomacy and Informal Peace Keeping" in Brown, S. J., and Schraub, K. M. (eds.), Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 1992) pp.250-251.

³¹ J. A. Wall "Mediation: Analysis, Review and Proposed Research," Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 25 No.1., 1981, pp.157-180.

It is the mediator's role and task to devise and come up with strategies that provide additional tools to enable him to cultivate productive bargaining. While Wall believes that the most effective way is to bring third party ultimatata to the negotiation for example deadlines in terms of agreement, as they can be directed at one or both conflictants and can contain a tacit or overt threat, promises, or rewards, Susskind and Bubbitt³² argue that some of these strategies can include: the third party threatening to impose additional economic or political costs; or helping to coalesce national support for a leader willing to try mediation, and lend external support so as to mute internal criticism. Third parties can elicit formal statements of support from the relevant regional or multilateral organizations, when a request from one side alone might be rebuffed for fear that such organizations would be seen as taking sides. Susskind and Bubbitt conclude by arguing that a mediator should understand the interests of 'second-tier' parties and consult them during negotiations.³³

Track two diplomacy is suggested as most effective during the pre-negotiation phase of a conflict, or as supplementary players during formal talks since problem-solving workshops help in highlighting conflictual differences and they aim to reframe the dialogue.

Generally, as Mwangi argues, track two diplomacy has a special meaning, particularly in the context of conflict management. It represents a different view of international relations, which is not state-centric but emphasizes the fact that in the final analysis individuals are at the center of all international interactions.³⁴ Problem-solving workshops try to contribute to the

³² L. Susskind and E. Bubbitt "Overcoming the Obstacles to Effective Mediation of International Disputes" in J. Bercovitch and J. E. Rubin (eds.) Mediation in International Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992) pp.30-51.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ See M. Mwangi. The International Management of International Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation 1985 Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1994 p.10.

creation of a political environment conducive to conflict resolution and transformation of the relationship between the conflicting parties both in the short-term and in the long-term. They create conditions that would enable the parties to move towards negotiations.

In essence, problem-solving workshops help and act as a complement to negotiations. They help parties to the conflict to overcome all barriers, for example political, emotional, and technical that hinder their wish to negotiate. They also help parties reach agreement in the course of negotiations and change their relationship right after political agreements have been reached.

Mwagiru³⁵ notes the problem-solving workshop have been suggested as a form of conflict management that addresses deep seated and protracted conflicts. It aims at the resolution of a conflict, and it is participatory because it must primarily involve the people in conflict, as they must participate mutually in working out a resolution to their conflict. He further argues that a problem-solving workshop is an approach to conflict resolution as it tries to bring out the deep-seated feelings of the parties.

Mwagiru sets four important issues a problem-solving workshop encourages parties to do: it encourages parties to talk about the history of their conflict; it encourages them to accept responsibility for any harm they have caused each other; it encourages them to mourn about the losses they have suffered from the conflict; and it encourages them to agree on what their future relationship will be. These things are necessary before the process of resolution can begin as they prepare the ground for healing process to start, and provide the atmosphere in which parties can meet without accusing each other.

³⁵ M. Mwagiru, "Participatory Conflict Management: Problem Solving Workshops (PSW)" in Mwagiru M. et al Understanding Conflict and its Management (Nairobi: Watermark Printers Limited . 1998), pp. 52-54.

Problem solving-workshops are not only useful in the pre-negotiation phase. They could also be helpful in breaking a stalemate during the negotiation phase. Even during the implementation phase they help in addressing agreement issues and in exploring new relationships based on patterns of co-existence or co-operation.

Varynen³⁶ argues that the problem-solving workshop is seen as an attempt to find a shared reality between the parties in conflict for the purposes at hand without causing a further breakdown of social order. In this case, unlike official negotiations, problem-solving workshops provide for the parties a means to engage in dialogue. Problem-solving workshops usually need the assistance of a facilitator. The work of the facilitator includes encouraging the parties to continue the dialogue; to provide the parties with examples of past similar conflicts, which were resolved; and to avoid to suggest or impose solutions.³⁷ The facilitator can participate in the political process by asking questions, and making summaries of what has been discussed and agreed on.

The Somali Conflict

As far as the Somali conflict is concerned, several authors have written about the origins, processes, types and different conflict management approaches to manage it, both official and non official. These include Mark Bradbury³⁸ who argues that there is no single factor, which can explain the causes of the Somali civil war. He pointed out that the legacies of European colonialism, the Somali kinship system, contradictions between a centralised state and a pastoral culture, Cold War politics, militarisation, marginalisation and uneven

³⁶ T. Varynen "Going Beyond Similarity: The Role of the Facilitator in Problem-Solving Workshop Conflict Resolution" Paradigms The Kent Journal of International Relations Vol. 9 No.2., 1995, pp.71-85.

³⁷ M. Mwangi, "Participatory Conflict Management: Problem-Solving Workshop (PSW)" in Mwangi, M. et al Understanding Conflict and Its Management (Nairobi: Watermark, 1998), p.54.

³⁸ M. Bradbury, Somaliland Century Report (Totton: Hobbs the Printer Ltd., 1997), P.1.

development, ecological decline, lack of power-sharing, corruption, oppression and the cumulative impact of decades of armed conflict have all contributed. He argues that the common use of 'anarchy' and 'madness' to describe the war and state of disintegration in Somalia, demonstrate an ignorance of Somali society and the nature of the civil war, by the outsiders. He points out that this ignorance was evident in the massively expensive and controversial UN military intervention in Somalia.³⁹

Samatar⁴⁰ argued that the Somali society was torn apart because their blood ties, without the *Xeer*,⁴¹ was manipulated by the elite so as to gain or retain access to resources. He traces the conflict to two major historical benchmarks in the evolution of Somalia: the commercialisation of the subsistence economy; the imposition of a colonial structure, and the creation of post-pastoral democratic nodes of power.

While he agrees with other analysts that it was the unseating of President Barre that finally pulled the trigger that sparked off the Somali conflict, Samatar comes up with two components which should be part of the task to restructure Somalia if it is to come back to normal: the creation of an economy in which productive resources are widely distributed, and which channels resources towards productive investments; and crafting political order which is accountable, representative and entrepreneurial, and which does not allow for the personal appropriation of public resources.⁴²

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ A. S. Samatar. Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil. Minority Rights Group. London. 1991.

⁴¹ *Xeer* is the Somali traditional or customary law, which is more of social conventions/contracts. It serves very important roles in managing not only social life but also present day Somali politics in this new era of statelessness and anarchy.

⁴² Ibid.

Clark⁴³ takes a different stand and links the problem of the Somali people partly to the nature of their social and political organization, which is based on a decentralized genealogy culture. The authority of the community elders and clan leaders was however undermined due to Cold War politics and because of the prevalence of modern weapons resulting from the super-powers involvement in Somalia during this time.

Bryden and Steiner,⁴⁴ meanwhile, argue that war has been a constant in the experience of the Somali state virtually since independence (and arguably even earlier). Whichever the cause of the Somali conflict, there have been both official and non-official attempts to manage the conflict. The United Nations' involvement in Somalia has been criticized because as Clark⁴⁵ argues, the UN was absent from Somalia when Siad Barre was fleeing Mogadishu and there was no UN presence during the Aideed/Mahdi conflict. Again when the UN returned back later in 1991, it came up with a weaker strategy, a "peace-keeping"⁴⁶ force under UNOSOM I that never achieved its objectives of cease-fire supervision between faction leaders in the capital.

In this case, the UN seemed to lack direction as its policies were interwoven with those of the United States, which led the first UN operation in Somalia. Mwagiru⁴⁷ argues that the United Nations has partly failed to manage the Somali conflict due to the way in which the UN and US policies were interwoven in a confused manner. He further points that the organization was constrained by the conceptual limitations of its Charter, while the US

⁴³ J. Clark "Debacle in Somalia" Foreign Affairs. Vol.72 No.. 1993. pp.109-123.

⁴⁴ M. Bryden and M. I. Steiner Somalia between Peace and War: Somali Women on the Eve of the 21st Century (Nairobi: United Nations Office, 1998). p.2.

⁴⁵ J. Clark, "Debacle in Somalia" Foreign Affairs Vol.72 No.1. pp.109-123.

⁴⁶ See Definitions of the Principal Terms

⁴⁷ M. Mwagiru "Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa" A Paper presented at the IRG Conference. Mombasa, Kenya. 5-9 Nov., 1996.

was developing a new policy a shift from Cold War politics to a post-Cold War era where democracy under American leadership was the main focus.

Bradbury⁴⁸ argues that the UNOSOM I and II operations in Somalia and their efforts to reconcile have only enhanced the prestige of the warlords, strengthened their political role and left little room for other potential leaders to emerge. The argument is that the UN did not explore ways to broaden the representation in the reconciliation process.

According to Thakur,⁴⁹ the UN needs to sharpen its skills in identifying potential conflicts before they break into war, and in bringing parties together early enough. It also needs to become involved in post-conflict peace building by identifying, supporting and deepening the structure, which will consolidate peace and enhance people's sense of confidence and well being.

Following the departure of UNOSOM II, von Hippel and Yannis⁵⁰ argue, the EU adopted three guiding principles for the Somali conflict: first, strict neutrality with respect to the fighting factions, secondly non-recognition of any government that is not broadly representative, and thirdly no direct mediation role but rather encourage and support for initiatives by the UN and the OAU. It is because of this that many European countries supported the UN operations in Somalia. The EU's Special Envoy to Somalia took the lead of the international organisations work in Somalia.

The EU's Special Envoy linked rehabilitation instruments to conflict management initiatives as the Commission's policy attempted to translate the centrifugal realities of Somali

⁴⁸ M. Bradbury Somaliand: Country Report (Totton: Hobbs the Printer Ltd., 1997), p. 15.

⁴⁹ See R. Thakur "From Peace keeping to Peace Enforcement in Somalia" The Journal of Modern African Studies . 1994, pp.384-410.

⁵⁰ K. von Hippel and A. Yannis " The European Response to State Collapse in Somalia" in Jorgensen K. E. (ed.), European Approaches to Crisis Management (Copenhagen: Kluwer Law International, 1997). pp.65-81.

society into a viable government regionally by supporting local initiatives for social and economic reconstruction as prerequisites for a country-wide political recovery; and nationally, by attempting to shift the political debate from the question, "which group should own the state?" to the development of democratic and decentralized constitutional arrangements prior to the formation of a central government.

On the OAU's contribution, Mwangiru⁵¹ notes that the OAU is unable to exercise leadership in the management of internal conflicts because of its structures, which militate against such a role. He points out that its conflict management is based on the principle of sovereign equality of states, non-interference in internal affairs, the territorial integrity of member states, and African solutions to African problems.⁵²

Although the OAU has in fact adopted a mechanism to respond to the post-Cold War era challenges, and spearheaded the regional responses to conflicts in the Horn of Africa, the mechanism has however been criticized on various grounds. It does include absolute interpretation of Article 3(2) of the OAU Charter on non-interference and this principle is not and will not be appropriate especially in this era of conflict internationalisation. The mechanism does not also design a proper pattern of co-operation with African regional organisations despite the fact that it recognizes the need and does indeed contemplate doing so. Mwangiru argues that the OAU mechanism should aim at strengthening sub-regional organisations rather than sub-ordinating them.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² M. Mwangiru, "Beyond the OAU: Prospects for Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa" Paradigms, Vol. 9 No. 2 Winter 1995, p.107.

Theoretical Framework

Three contending frameworks of analysis will be examined in this study. These are the power politics, the problem-solving approach and the integration of conflict systems approach. The power approach argues that conflict management is greatly, if not entirely, facilitated by the preponderance of power in favour of one of the parties to the conflict, which can include a third party. It transforms a dyadic into a triadic relationship and it can alter the outcome of resolution by the use of its power.⁵³ It has been noted that such a third party in exercising a mediator role must exert some form of leverage, if the mediation (as bargaining) is to succeed.⁵⁴

In the Somali case, a mediator with leverage has been lacking. The intermediaries have been actors from within and outside Somalia. Such a role of being a third party without leverage, as is the case of those actors from within Somalia, and such a role of being a third party even with leverage but with interwoven policies in a confused manner, as is the case of some of these actors from outside Somalia, have shown the weakness of power approach associated with the resolution of the Somali conflict. Therefore, the power approach has not been fully utilized in this particular conflict management process.

The problem-solving approach to conflict analysis rejects the introduction of power in conflict management, and denies its emphasis in the analysis of international relations. It postulates that the proper path to conflict management, indeed resolution, lies in the parties to

⁵³ See J. Bercovitch, Social Conflict and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution (Boulder Co.: Westview and Press, 1989).

⁵⁴ See M. Mwangi, The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation 1985 "Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1994", p. 14.

the conflict re-perceiving their conflictual relationship, and in so doing mutually building bridges that lead to a self-sustaining post-conflict relationship.⁵⁵

Montville⁵⁶ argues that parties to the conflict need to take a walk through the history of their conflict leading to the acknowledgement of mutual responsibility. Therefore, the role of a third party is to facilitate that process whereby the parties' own actions and in discovering ways in which each can exert influences on the other without assigning blame but rather proceed on the basis of a no fault principle.⁵⁷ This is based on the ability to inject an analytical perspective into the dialogue between the parties and avoid the exercise of leverage and power.

Kelman⁵⁸ sees that the problem-solving approach is the most effective strategy to be used during the pre-negotiation phase of the conflict as it prepares parties in conflict for formal track one mediation. The problem-solving approach could ideally be applicable to the Somali conflict since most actors have resorted to track one methodologies instead of using the strengths of the problem-solving approach. This is due to the nature of the actors themselves. Most outside actors are track one agents employing track two diplomatic approaches; therefore, the problem-solving approach needs to be tested and more time given.

The integration of mediation systems approach⁵⁹ argues that each conflict has a life and an anatomy of its own, and that the search for its solution must lie in understanding its

⁵⁵ Ibid. pp.14-15.

⁵⁶ J. V. Montville "The Healing Function of Political Conflict Resolution" in D. J. D. Sandole and H. van der Merwe (eds.) Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application. (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. 1993), pp.112-127.

⁵⁷ H: C. Kelman. "Informal Mediation by the Scholar / Practitioner" in Bercovitch J. and Rubin. J. Z. (eds.) Mediation in International Relations (New York: Saint Martins' Press. 1992) pp. 64-96.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ The writers referred to include R. Vayrynen. "To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflict" in R. Vayrynen (ed.) New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Transformation (London: Sage Publications) pp. 1-25. and C. R. Mitchell The Structure of International Conflict (London: Macmillan, 1981).

internal dynamics. This can be done by designing an approach by which mediation is perceived from a comparative perspective,⁶⁰ since it allows a comparative study of mediations, which also permits a general theory of mediation to emerge. Anyang Nyong'o's plea for a regional conflict management in Africa generally, and in the Upper Nile valley in particular is a good example to show the effectiveness of the application of this approach. Having contextualised the peculiarities of the conflicts in the countries of the Upper Nile Valley, he draws out generalities between them in pleading for the necessity of a regional approach to their management.⁶¹

According to the integrated mediation systems approach, as advanced by Deng and Zartman, "not all conflicts in the continent can be solved all at once, but note should be taken of solutions adopted in similar conflicts."⁶² In practical terms, according to Mwangiru,⁶³ this means that the conflict manager/analyst should not be restricted to one conceptual level of analysis. It also implies that the conflict manager should not seek to impose subjective perceptions of the conflict on the parties. S/he should draw on the generalities of other conflicts as an aid to effective management and analysis. Accordingly conflict management and analysis should be treated as a multi-level, multi-approach and hence, complex undertaking.

⁶⁰ See M. Mwangiru, The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Ugandan Mediation 1985 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1994), p. 19.

⁶¹ P. Anyang Nyong'o "The Implication of Crisis in the Upper Nile Valley" in F. M. Deng and I. W. Zartman. (eds.) Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 95-114.

⁶² F. M. Deng and I. W. Zartman "Introduction" in Deng and Zartman (eds.) Conflict Resolution in Africa op. cit. pp. 1-15.

⁶³ See M. Mwangiru, The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Ugandan Mediation 1985 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1994), p. 19.

Definitions

Third Party Intervention and Third Party Involvement

According to Mwagiru the term “third party intervention” is currently used in conflict management literature to refer to any of the situations where a third party becomes engaged in the conflict, either in the capacity of a court, an arbitrator (or arbitration tribunal) a mediator, a conciliator, a facilitator or a provider of good offices.⁶⁴ From the power politics approach intervention leads to manipulation and leverage, which causes parties to agree on settlement, which they would not otherwise have agreed to. This goes against the notion of method of peaceful settlement such as mediation. The study, therefore, prefers the term “third party involvement” rather than intervention.

Internal, International and Internationalised Conflicts

Mwagiru⁶⁵ argues that the classical view was that conflicts were perceived as either internal or international. This dichotomous approach was a creature of realist international relations doctrine, which maintained a dichotomy between domestic and international politics.

However, many developments in the modern world such as transport, communications, information technology, human rights and the general interdependence of the world have all demonstrated the faults of this strict dichotomy. These developments have made the international society interdependent. Therefore the internationalisation of conflict means those internal issues spill over into the international sphere and are no longer purely internal.

⁶⁴ Ibid. pp.31-32.

⁶⁵ M. Mwagiru. “Conflict and Peacemaking Efforts in the Horn of Africa: A Survey and Analysis” A Paper presented to the IRG Preparatory Meeting for the Conference on Peace and Regional Security in the Horn of Africa. (London UK 14 April 1996) p.30.

A good example is the question of human rights violations, which occur, in internal conflicts such as those in Somalia and Rwanda and give rise to international and even universal concern.⁶⁶ Their abuse and derogation/violation can no longer be justified on “internal affairs” grounds alone. They attract the attention and quick action of all the actors of the international system, as human rights have become a universal concern.

The same applies where international boundaries separate ethnic communities, a conflict in one side of the border will automatically spill over across the border and will necessarily affect the people across, and this in itself goes a long way to internationalise the conflict.⁶⁷ Therefore, the Somali conflict will be understood as an internationalised conflict.

Track One and Track Two Diplomacy

As mediation is becoming increasingly the frequent management approach for many parties in conflict,⁶⁸ many analysts approach it from the basis that the conflicting parties communicate with each other through either of two channels: track one, which is official, formal and governmental, and track two, which is non-official, non-formal and non-governmental.

Track One Diplomacy is usually “conducted by properly appointed and empowered diplomats who meet openly at the properly appointed venues (e.g. in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or at Conferences) and interact with each other according to established practices and properly adopted rules of procedure.”⁶⁹

⁶⁶ J. Donnelly, International Human Rights (Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1993).

⁶⁷ See R. Steinhagen “Ethnic Conflicts and their Impact on International Society” International Social Science Journal vol. 43, 1991, pp. 117-131.

⁶⁸ M. Mwangi, The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation 1985, op.cit., p. 1.

⁶⁹ See D. Kappler, M. Mwangi, and J. Odera, Diplomacy: Concepts, Actors, Organs and Rules (Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi, 1991), pp. 10-11.

Burton and Duke⁷⁰ argue that track two diplomacy deals with matters that are normally dealt with at a diplomatic level, but by people who are not constrained by official ties. It is directly opposed to track one since it is not just about unofficial methods within this allegedly political realistic world of power politics. This does not mean that track two diplomacy has no official application indeed it has its official application. In other words "track two diplomacy is not about improved negotiating skills where leverage and power can be employed more effectively but about an altered set of hypotheses about world politics and human behaviour."⁷¹

Dual Diplomacy

Dual diplomacy does not necessarily mean two or more track one approaches operating in the same conflict. Also, it does not apply to cases where two tracks operate in sequence but independently. It means operation of both tracks simultaneously as part of the same conflict management process.

Mwagiru argues that in internationalised conflicts, "dual diplomacy or dual track diplomacy would address simultaneously both inter-state and internal levels. Track one conflict management would address these bargainable matters such as constitutional and institutional frameworks in the post-conflict period, while track two diplomacy would address the psychological and perceptual matters which are not bargainable aspects."⁷² According to Mwagiru, the use of dual diplomacy would lead to an enduring and self-sustaining outcome to the conflict with the two tracks acting as valuable components of the same conflict

⁷⁰ J. W. Burton and F. Dukes. Conflict: Practices in Management, Settlement and Resolution (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 139.

⁷¹ J. W. Burton. "Track Two: An Alternative to Power Politics" in J. W. McDonald and D. B. Bendahmanne. (eds.) Conflict Resolution Track Two Diplomacy, op.cit., pp. 65-72.

⁷² M. Mwagiru. The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation 1985, op.cit., p. 41.

management process.⁷³ The whole essence of this dual approach in other words is the realization that mediation is a complex issue.

Settlement, Resolution and Management of Conflicts

Although in common language the terms “conflict resolution” and “conflict settlement” are used interchangeably, they are technically different. According to Mwagiru⁷⁴ settlement of conflict relies a lot on the power relationships between the parties in a conflict. It does not address the causes of the conflict. Instead the parties bargain with each other. The structure of a settlement is a win-lose one. This means that what one party gains, the other loses. This solution is not satisfactory and it is not long-lasting. This means that as soon as the power relations between the parties change, conflict will erupt again and the party, which was not satisfied with the original settlement, will now feel stronger to demand a new settlement. On the other hand, resolution of conflict does not rely on the power relationship between the parties. It is based on negotiation and analysis rather than bargaining as it tries to address the causes of the conflict and to remove them.

The structure of a resolution is a win-win one, which means that each of the parties can both win. This is a more satisfactory solution as it is long lasting because both parties reach a solution they both agree with and feel mutually comfortable with.

Conflict management means efforts to contain and reduce the amount of violence used by parties in violent conflict and engage them in a process to settle the dispute and terminate

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ M. Mwagiru, “Methods of Conflict Management” in Mwagiru M. et al Understanding Conflict and Its Management, op.cit., p.34.

the violence.⁷⁵ Whatever the case, in this study “international conflict management” will be used to refer to diverse efforts to bring conflicting parties together.

Horn of Africa Conflict System

Vayrynen⁷⁶ and Mitchell⁷⁷ argue that each conflict has a life and anatomy of its own and the search for its resolution must lie in understanding its internal dynamics. Mwangiru⁷⁸ points out that this argument can be extended to that each conflict, and indeed each mediation, exists as a system, which is sufficient in itself. He further argues and points out that there is a need for a comparative approach, which he calls “the conflict system approach”.

This approach suggests that, within a particular conflict system, all the other conflicts within the system should be held in contemplation during the management of one, because settling or even resolving only one conflict in the system may be short lived because of the systems interconnection between the settled conflict and the other within the system.⁷⁹

Within the Horn of Africa, there is an important and core conflict system. This system includes Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda.⁸⁰ This conflict system has an epicentre in the Somali conflict and therefore the management of the conflicts within the Horn of Africa conflict system should be centered on the Somali conflict. It is generally agreed that it is only once the Somali conflict is settled or resolved that other conflicts in the Horn of Africa can be resolved.

⁷⁵ See Veen H. Van de Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflict: An Abridged Practitioner's Guide (Amsterdam: Creative Associates International, 1997).

⁷⁶ R. Vayrynen, “To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts”, in R. Vayrynen, (ed.) New Directions in Conflict Theory, op.cit., pp.1-25.

⁷⁷ C. R. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict (London: Macmillan, 1981).

⁷⁸ M. Mwangiru The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa, The Ugandan Mediation 1985, op.cit., p.18.

⁷⁹ M. Mwangiru, “Conflict and Peacemaking efforts in the Horn of Africa: A Survey and Analysis” op.cit., pp.5-7.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peace Keeping

The terms preventive diplomacy, peace making and peace keeping are integrally related. The United Nations⁸¹ definitions would best suit for understanding. Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. Peace making is action to bring hostile parties to agreement especially through such peaceful means as those provided for in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

Peace making is the deployment of a United Nations, or any other force, presence in the field, with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.

Peace keeping is a technique that expands possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. "Peace-building" or post-conflict peace building is also a related concept, which means action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Hypotheses

- i – A dual diplomatic approach can enhance the process of conflict management as neither track one nor track two diplomacy individually will provide a suitable diplomatic context within which to manage the Somali conflict.
- ii – The Somali conflict has continued because of lack of serious commitment to the mediation process. This is due to the lack of political will by the conflicting parties and lack of maintaining a coordinated and coherent approach by wide range of intermediaries.

⁸¹ B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace. (New York: United Nations, 1992) pp. 11-12.

- iii – Co-operation and co-ordination among all stakeholders increases prospects for achieving their final objectives.

Methodology

Sources

Publications of the United Nations and the European Commission provided most of the information required. These include reports, books, journals and updates. Interviews, both formal and informal, were also conducted with staff members of these two organizations, non-staff members, Somali intellectuals, community elders and clan leaders at all levels. Newspapers during the project duration 1991-1999 were also consulted. In addition to this, the relevant literature, mostly by other researchers, was reviewed and some fieldwork was done to support the findings of the study.

Chapter Outline

Chapter One of the study constitutes the introduction, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, significance of the literature review, theoretical framework, hypotheses and research methodology.

Chapter Two will discuss briefly the paradigms about conflict and its management, institutions of conflict management, track one and track two conflict management, characteristics of track two conflict management and the relationship between track one and track two conflict management.

Chapter Three will provide an overview of the Somali conflict. It will discuss the Somali conflict system, the epicentre of the conflict, historical background of the Somalia conflict, the origins of the conflict, the international intervention and the local peace initiatives.

Chapter Four will examine the United Nations' peace initiatives in the Somalia conflict and their contribution to the peace process. It will examine the strategies the United Nations has employed and how effective they have been in the management of the conflict. It will finally identify the major obstacles and problems the UN faced in its attempt to manage the Somali conflict.

Chapter Five will examine the European Commission's peace initiatives in the Somali conflict and their contribution to the peace process. It will examine the strategies the EC employed and how effective they were in the management of the conflict. It will finally identify the major obstacles and constraints that hindered the initiative.

Chapter Six will constitute a critical analysis of the issues that have emerged in the previous chapters and focuses on the peace initiatives tried by the United Nations and the European Commission. It will finally discuss the need for dual diplomacy, with a view to suggesting ways and means of improving the future peace initiatives to resolve the Somali conflict.

Chapter Seven will constitute the conclusions. This chapter will be an assessment of the long journey the study took in the history of the Somali conflict, the UN and the EC peace approaches, the lessons that have been learnt and suggestions on the way forward.

CHAPTER TWO

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRACK ONE AND TRACK TWO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Introduction

Chapter One offered a background to the Somali conflict and the international peace initiatives. It discussed the problem, the study justification, the hypotheses, the literature on both conflict management and that on the Somali conflict. This Chapter is mainly concerned to provide the theoretical background of the relationship between track one and track two conflict management as two conflict management approaches used by conflict managers and analysts to enable them to study and manage conflicts. They are very important tools which fall under two different schools of thought in international conflict management.

The Chapter will briefly discuss the conflict management paradigms: strategists, peace research and conflict research to show where the two tracks belong in conflict studies as a discipline. The Chapter will then examine the relationship between track one and track two conflict management. It will finally show the need for their collaboration in conflict management.

Paradigms about Conflict and Its Management

Conflict analysts can all be engaged in conflict studies in different schools of thought and can still contribute to the understanding of conflict and its management. This is so because each of the paradigms represents different views. They represent different views about the nature of the international society, what motivates it and how it is structured; also the nature of man and society. These paradigms are concerned with

leadership and its nature. They are also concerned with its relationship with society; also they are concerned with the use of force.

Within broad considerations and the need for conflict management studies and analysis, some schools on conflict studies have emerged. They are allied to international relations. The three paradigms that now dominate the study of international relations are the realist, world society and structuralist paradigms.¹

Strategists

Strategy in its most general sense is “the art and science of shaping means so as to promote ends in any field of conflict.”² Also, since “the time of Napoleon to that of Hitler, strategy was conceived as an aspect of war”³, this school was inspired by the Realist paradigm of international relations. It argues that international relations are primarily inter-state relationships. The Realist school believes that states in the international system are organized in a certain way. The strategist and the realist schools are based on “power” ideals and its role within the international society. They are also based on the acceptance that it is the states that control the instrument of power internationally – meaning that only states possess power.

The strategist school sees a system of states, which are equal theoretically. It hardly recognises differentiations based on power. The whole message is that in the international system, there is hierarchy based on power. There are powerful states, middle

¹ See more on this. A. J. R. Groom “Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, The Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher” in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds.), Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution. (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp.71-98:72.

² H. Bull, “Strategic Studies and Its Critics” in K. Knorr, A World Politics Reader: Power, Strategy, and Security. (New Delhi: Asian Books, 1987), pp.68-80:68.

³ Ibid.

power states and lesser power states. Power defines the world order and also guards it and this is the essence of hegemony. International relations is all about the struggle for power and domination.

From a conflict theory perspective, states have a drive to dominate and that drive is an instinctive drive. It looks that the strategist and the realist are coming to Darwin on their explanation of how society is organized. They believe that it is inherent and that it cannot be eliminated but it can be managed due to its instinct nature by threats, sanctions or by use of force.

In the recent times, the strategists had to modify their thinking especially the role of non- state actors. This was so because the role of revolutionary warfare in the international system increased of lately. The strategists had to accept that these are also to affect the international system and its ability.

Peace Research

Peace research is the second of the conflict management paradigms. It is allied very closely to the structuralist school of international relations. This school is interested in structures that give rise to conflict. Structural violence connotes a situation in which overt violence is absent but in which structural factors have virtually the same compelling control over behaviour as the overt threat or use of force.⁴

It believes that there is need to promote values in society for example humanity, justice, and the like. Peace research is oriented towards not just a critique of existing

⁴ Ibid. p.93.

societal conflicts in them but towards creating architecture of peace for future. Peace research- as a school of thought is said to be artistic in nature.

The main pillar of peace research is "structural violence". This notion of structural violence is that violence or conflict is not just of the overt or physical type. It is based on the belief that it embodies the idea that the underlying structure and relationship can itself be the basis for a structural conflict which is to become a violent one anytime in the future. The whole idea is that where there is structural violence, the structure itself constraints human beings from doing certain things for example developing diverse interest, developing their own intellect and talent. Such people, in that kind of structure, do not even realize that they can develop their diverse interest, intellect, and talent.

Conflict Research

The conceptual of this school is the World Society paradigm- pluralism. This school is non-partisan as it tries to involve all conflictants, in the process of resolving the conflict, in its attempt to build legitimised relationships, which are also self-supporting. Conflict research rejects the idea that conflict arises from instinct. The world society model acknowledges that the political function may be perceived in power terms, but it does not allow that this need necessarily be. The reasons for this lie in a different conception of the nature of man.

Conflict research argues that conflict arises from actors' conflictual behaviour based on their perception of the environment. It believes that the environment triggers conflict of behaviour. Therefore it logically follows the idea that managing a conflict is to manipulate the environment, which generates conflict. It is possible to manipulate the conflict behaviour, which is violent since not all conflicts are bad.

Conflict research believes that there should be conflict management mechanisms that do not rely on power. The main tenants of conflict research is that conflicts are subjective. Conflict is objective only because the parties choose to see it as such and their perceptions are subject to change.⁵ This is so because the parties can change their goals if they realize that they are in a conflict situation. Also, the values can be reassessed and therefore perception is central to the conflict research view of conflict, while perceptions are also open to change.

Conflict, its causes, modalities, outcome and effects, is a matter central to each of the three approaches which characterize for the most part of the study and practice of international relations today. "What we think causes conflict determines what we think we can do about it. And both are a reflection of our conceptual framework for studying world society. It matters too, if we are to survive."⁶ Based on the above discussion, a brief summary can be made to show the characteristics of the three paradigms (See the table).

⁵ Ibid. p.87.

⁶ A. J. R. Groom "Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, The Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher" in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds.). Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution, op. cit., p.96.

Table: 1**Three Approaches to the Study of Conflict and its Management
International Relations/Conflict Studies Paradigms**

| | | | |
|---------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|--|
| Conceptual frameworks | Realist/Strategist | World Society/Conflict Research | Structuralist/Peace Research |
| The world vision | State-centric | Non state-centric | Class or world system oriented. |
| Conflict | Inherent and therefore objective | Endemic and therefore subjective | Incompatible interests built into structures and therefore objective |
| Conflict management approach | Manipulation and use of threat systems | Supportive techniques | Revolution |
| The role of the Analyst/Manager | Partisan | Non-partisan | Partisan |
| The focus | Capability and tactics | Relationships | Structural violence |
| The goal | Order and instability based on balance of forces and power | Legitimised resolution of conflict | Post-revolutionary peace |
| Track | Track one | Track two | Track two |

Source: Modified from A. J. R. Groom "Paradigms in Conflict: The strategist, the conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher" in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds), Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 71-98: 96.

Institutions of Conflict Management**Track One Conflict Management**

From an international relations perspective, Mitchell argues that the language and concepts of the discipline, if not their exact original meaning, are thus becoming increasingly familiar. In short, "the field has 'arrived' at the centre of academic and political attention and at least some of its central ideas, hopefully not too distorted, will

affect the way in which people think about the world and its problems, at least for a time.”⁷ This clearly shows the need for approaches to conflict management.

In the study of conflict, there are two different approaches to conflict management, official and non-official. The official is track one conflict management. The basis is that for a long time the dominant view was that only states were actors in international relations and in diplomacy. This meant that there was no role for non-state actors. This idea was based on the state-centric realist perspective, which argued that war, diplomacy and conflict belong to high politics, which only states and their officials were and could be involved in. The view is basic to both international law and international relations depending on which perspective one is looking from. It is also a pillar of international law and of diplomacy.

Even individuals, while recognised as subjects to international law, have not been considered. Their personality depends on states to recognize non-state actors. It was therefore believed that only states could concern themselves in conflict management and diplomacy. This was based on traditional diplomacy. It was before the idea of track two conflict management emerged.

The twentieth century has witnessed a technological revolution of unprecedented proportions. On the other hand “rapid changes in transportation and communication have had, among other things, a deep impact on the scope and the process of diplomacy.”⁸ With

⁷ C. Mitchell. “Conflict Research” in A. J. R. Groom and M. Light, Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory. (London: Pinter Publishers. 1994), pp. 128-141:128.

⁸ T. A. Coulombis and J. H. Wolfe. Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978), p.123.

the development of different schools of thought, it was discovered the emergence of quite influential non-state actors. For example the Multinational corporations.

The distinction between track one and track two is a central issue in conflict management. It not only helps one to understand conflict and its nature but also to design acceptable and proper methodologies for managing conflicts. Track one focuses on states and international organizations as actors since there is a close relationship between states and international organizations because international organizations derive their personality from member states such as the OAU, the UN and the like. Track one is therefore that diplomacy practiced by states and the international organizations or other actors representing them. The major characteristic is that of its formality as it is guided by both legal rules and practice. It involves formal operating procedures and it therefore leads to formalized relationships because of this.

Time limits is also another major hindrance since track one conflict management takes place within the public gaze and this means the public is aware of the conflict management being done by the government. The public becomes a critic of those processes. Also, track one conflict management often operates under the pressure of time. This is done because usually politicians search for a quick agreement and action. This therefore leads to concentration of track one diminishing considerably since such politicians do not want to involve in such long time processes.

Pressure of constituents is another major problem which track one conflict management faces. Parties in a conflict management process, and mediators also, all have constituents they must take into account as the conflict management process proceeds. This is so because, if demands and/or expectations made by the constituents are not met it

can then lead to serious problems of re-entry.⁹ This brings another major problem which leads official actors in track one to aim a result which, at least on the surface, a positive and a successful result.

Contrary to track two conflict management, track one is closely allied to power and its manipulation. This problem of power, and its manipulation leads to settlement rather than resolution to the conflict. This is so because even if the conflict is there by manipulation the process is the same as the outcome because as soon as power balances change conflict will escalate once again.

In terms of methodology, power relations are tested against each other in track one conflict management. This methodology of bargaining is a zero-sum gain. It is a gain for a party, which is a corresponding loss for the other, a win-lose sort of outcome. It also leads to short duration of management outcomes, based on bargaining structures.

Track one conflict management does not address the values of the parties but their interests. It does not even recognize that there exist values. Instead it recognizes the existence of interests which cause conflicts. Due to these unsatisfied values, conflict remains. The conceptual problem posed by this is that when track one engages in bargaining both interests and values are bargained. Bargaining is not the most suitable to values underlying conflicts. Every conflict has interests that are negotiable and values that are neither negotiable nor bargainable. Track one targets interests and because of this it makes it even more difficult for a resolution ever to be reached.

⁹ A Case in point is the complexity of the D. R. Congo conflict, which has attracted over six other African countries. More on this see, M. Mwangi, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management, (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000), pp. 82-83.

Peace agreements are very closely associated with track one diplomacy. They also reflect track one conflict management's preoccupation and interests instead of values. All peace agreements contain some things in common. They are concerned with constitutional structure of post-conflict governance, the composition of post-conflict armies, sharing cabinet posts, holding elections and the like. All of these issues are bargained and they are not the issues that lie at the heart of the problem. It is values that always lie at the heart of any problem when it comes to conflicts since they are not disputes that have to do with interests. Values are not addressed and because of this, these peace agreements collapse. Parties see peace agreements as temporary agreements, documents and solutions, which are only binding as long as they are weak.

Track two Conflict Management

Track two, as a conflict management approach, is less visible in conflict management. It is also not driven by power. Unlike track one, track two agents are not tied to official bureaucracy and it is totally done informally. A very important contribution to people's understanding and appreciation in international relations is that unofficial actors are also involved in the practice of diplomacy. Also, non-governmental organizations have become significant actors in situations of conflict, and they possess "certain enabling characteristics that enhance their ability to contribute to a more enduring peace, including strengths in informal diplomacy, mediation, humanitarian assistance, and peace building."¹⁰

¹⁰ See "Rebuilding Peace in War-torn and War-threatened Societies" The Ploughshare Monitor, Vol. XVI, No. 4., December 1985, p.4.

This type of diplomacy and conflict management is known as track two diplomacy and conflict management. The main characteristic of track two is that it rejects power and its formal relationships. Also, it does not emphasize the institutionalisation of conflict management processes. Track two is informal conflict management because its operations are influenced by informal structures since actors are not officials and their operations are not based on official policies and ideologies. It is not preoccupied with formal agreements and structures.

Problem-solving workshops is an effective tool of track two conflict management. It is argued that the problem-solving workshop can, in itself lead to the resolution of conflict. It is also seen as “a pre-mediation approach that prepares the parties in conflict for formal, track one mediation.”¹¹ This gives track two diplomacy the ability to be more flexible than track one diplomacy. All this means much more flexibility. It also means that track two diplomacy can respond to the demands and requests of the parties informally. While track one focuses on the political demands of conflicting parties and how to settle them, track two aims at the resolution of conflict.

Characteristics of Track two Conflict Management

Structure and Operations

Track two conflict management has different structures and operations from track one conflict management. One of the major characteristics of track two diplomacy, and conflict management, is found in its rejection of power politics. There is also the question and problem of leverage and the perceptual aspects of conflicts, which it addresses.

¹¹ See M. Mwagiru, The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation 1985. (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Kent at Canterbury 1994), p.24.

Track two Diplomacy and Conflict Management

Track two diplomacy and conflict management are based on the notion that power alone does not explain social relationships and indeed any relationship. In track two, the causes of conflict are considered to be the lack of satisfaction of needs such as participation, dignity, recognition and the like. If needs are not satisfied, there can be no legitimised relationships and therefore conflicts cannot be resolved. This means that conflicts will be resolved as long as those needs and values are fulfilled, since they are not bargainable. Since those needs are central to all conflicts, the proper management response should therefore be to address these needs and the reasons why they have not been fulfilled.

Perceptual Elements of Conflict

Track two is mainly concerned with the perceptual elements of conflict. This is because those elements address the psychological relationship of the conflictants. These are the attributes of parties of each other, their relationships and about their conflict. This is what is often ignored in track one conflict management. It is not possible to resolve conflicts if those elements are ignored during conflict management processes. This is because perception by the parties of themselves and of their conflict matters.

This is important from a third party point of view. What really matters is the perception of parties towards one another and towards the conflict environment in particular. Zartman¹² addressed the perception of the parties towards one another and the conflict environment. If third party perception diverges from parties', then there is no

¹² See for example I. W. Zartman. "Conflict and Resolution: Contest, Cost and Change" in I. W. Zartman (ed.), Resolving Regional Conflict: International Perspectives. (Newbury Park: Sage Publications. 1991). pp.11-12.

problem. Diverging was evident in Kenya's mediation of the Uganda conflict in 1985.¹³ The perception of parties about each other and about their conflict had some repercussions in the outcome of their mediation. This was the case of Tito Okello, the Ugandan government side, which saw mediation as a cost-benefit exercise about how there could be power-sharing in Uganda whereas Museveni's NRA saw it as a process of regime change and as away that it could be enhanced to their advantage. On the other hand, the mediator, President Moi of Kenya, himself saw the mediation, as a contest of wills in which there should be an acceptable outcome,¹⁴ although it was a partial success. This means that the perception of the parties was not put into account.

The Question of Leverage

Leverage is the ability of a third party to persuade parties that there is a better alternative than fighting. It is the means which a third party can use to persuade and make parties accept the mediator, be they military, economic or any other resources. This identifying of leverage with resources is a track two kind of approach. In track two conflict management, however, since actors may not possess all or some form of leverage, they locate them elsewhere. This means that they have it informally. This is so because the main kind of leverage which track two managers possess is knowledge. Parties then accept track two actors. This is in line with the French Historian Bainville¹⁵ who once wrote: '*il faut vouloir les consequences de ce que l'on veut*'. (One must want the consequences of

¹³ For more on this see. M. Mwangi, The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation 1985. (Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Kent at Canterbury 1994). pp. 361-433:366.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Sir I. Kirkpatrick "As a Diplomat Sees the Art of Diplomacy" in A. L. George and W. C. McWilliams (eds.), Crisis and Continuity in World Politics: Readings in International Relations. (New York: Random House. 1966), pp.420-437:422.

what one wants). Failure to obey this precept has been the cause of many an embarrassing diplomatic fiasco. Or in other words, in diplomacy, as in every other enterprise, "it is difficult to be successful unless one knows exactly what one wants."¹⁶

In track two conflict management, parties do not engage in power contests nor in bargaining. The parties go through the process of analysis of conflict and perception. The main aim of track two is to get a legitimised outcome, meaning a legitimised post-conflict relationship. Also, in track two conflict management, the role of the third party is quite different. It is more of a facilitative role than direct mediation. It is therefore never distinctive as the case in track one conflict management. Track two conflict managers go through an analytical and exploration exercise about the conflict and its causes with the belief that it is only the parties who know what the problem is with their relationship.

The Relationship between Track One and Track Two

The distinction between official and unofficial actors is very important for conflict management. It is not only useful as a basis from which to understand the nature of the conflict, but also in designing the proper methodologies and approaches to conflict management.¹⁷ This supports the idea that different conflicts call for different diplomatic tracks of management, or a duality of tracks.¹⁸ Based on this discussion on both tracks, an important question is here whether and how the two tracks can be brought together. As it is, it often looks as if they are mutually exclusive. Each track has its own strengths and weaknesses. In practice, they do not take each other's strengths into account and this does

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ See M. Mwagiru. Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management. (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000), p.122.

¹⁸ See M. Mwagiru. The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa, op. cit.

not advance conflict management process or peace at all. Therefore for effective conflict management, these two tracks should cooperate in the conflict management process.

In broad terms, while both track one and track two are concerned with issues of methodology, track one conflict management addresses itself directly to the level of the technicalities of negotiation and mediation. Track two focuses on other relations between the parties, such as the perception and attitudes to the conflict, trust and confidence building measures. Neither track individually takes into account the whole complexity of conflict and its management process.¹⁹ Every conflict contains aspects which require different approaches. Some are bargainable, as they have to do with constitutional and institutional aspects, and some are non-bargainable, as they have to do with values and psychological aspects. Each aspect needs to be handled appropriately and in line with its management procedures. There is therefore a need for both tracks to refer to each other's area where each track performs better. This sort of approach where track one and track two diplomacy cooperate in the management of the same conflict is characterized as dual diplomacy. It suggests a cooperative diplomatic framework for conflict management that has not been witnessed in practice, but which is crucial if conflict management is to achieve enduring outcomes. This interaction between the two tracks will give a chance and facilitate the emergence of acceptable conflict management process.

¹⁹ Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SOMALI CONFLICT: AN OVERVIEW

Introduction

The Somali conflict started long ago before the civil war broke out in early 1991. A number of issues have contributed to the conflict. They include political and administrative inefficiencies, corruption and nepotism practiced by the former Somali governments and the colonialists before. The competition between the East and the West during the Cold War has also greatly contributed to the conflict. As will be shown later, the Somali conflict is part of the Horn of Africa conflict system. The conflict involves not only the warring factions but also other actors and this makes it internationalized.

There have been a number of peace and reconciliation efforts tried so far by both local and international actors at different levels. The United Nations also intervened in the conflict between 1992 and 1993 due to alarming famine coupled with war. In 1991, Bardera district of Gedo region and Baidoa district of Bay region, Somalia became what was termed as “the cities of death” by the aid agencies and the media. The war plus the 1992 drought and famine caused the death of thousands of vulnerable people in both towns, mainly women and children from the Rahanwein clan. It is now the 10th (tenth) year Somalia is still at war. Also, the conflict has already split into a regional conflict since different factions have support from different states, each having its own interests and goals.

This Chapter will discuss the Somali conflict, which is part of the Horn of Africa conflict system. It will provide an overview of Somalia’s historical background, the origins of the conflict, the international intervention, both peaceful and forceful, the role of women and the local peace initiatives so far tried.

The Somali Conflict System -

Somalia is part of a larger conflict system, the Horn of Africa conflict system which includes all those states in the Horn, and in this case Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia. There are also other countries involved, which have interests in Somalia in one way or another. These include Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Italy, and USA. They all play important roles to ensure the different groups they support serve their interests.

From a systems theory perspective "systems theory" or "general systems Theory" is defined as a series of statements about relationships among independent and dependent variables in which changes in one or more variables are accompanied, or followed, by changes in other variables or combinations of other variables.¹ Anatol Rapoport explains explicitly saying "A whole which functions as a whole by virtue of the interdependence of its parts is called a system, and the method which aims at discovering how this is brought about in the widest variety of systems has been called a general systems theory".² Burton³ argued that the concept of systems connotes relationships between units. The units of a system are of the same 'set' – meaning that they have features in common that enable a particular relationship. He further argued that systems have different features at different levels.

Based on this explanation, theoretically one can identify that a conflict system should have certain components – mainly states although they are not the only actors involved. Conflict systems is used to analyze conflicts for purposes of managing them. It helps one to identify and understand its complexities and leads to its management. In this case, the Somali conflict has to

¹ J. E. Dougherty and R. L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. (New York: Longman, 1996), p.136.

² A. Rapoport "Forward", in W. Buckley (ed.), Modern Systems Research for the Behavioural Scientists. (Chicago: Aldine, 1968). p.xvii. See also, J. E. Dougherty, "The Study of the Global System" in J. N. Rosenau et al (eds.), World Politics: An Introduction. (New York: The Free Press, 1976). pp.597-623.

³ Burton J. W., Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968). p.6.

do with more than the Horn of Africa conflict system as there are other states from other parts of the world that are involved both directly and indirectly. While some states are involved in the conflict through other states in the Horn, some are directly dealing with factions. Therefore, one can argue that it is a Horn of Africa conflict system, which Somalia is part of.

The Epicentre of the Conflict

During the course of the conflict, the epicentre has continued to shift as determined by the focus at any particular time just like any other conflict. The current epicentre has shifted from the regular warring of factions in Somalia to between Aideed's USC/SNA and supporters and RRA and its alliance and their opposing supporters, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The initial epicentre can be determined as the total collapse of the Somali state which led to injustice, instability and insecurity for all, inefficient utilization of both human and natural resources and political, economic and social instability.

Historical Background to the Somali Conflict

Geographically, Somalia is located in the eastern part of the Horn of Africa and covers a total land area of about 637,540 square kilometer. Somalia has a relative semi-arid environment, which favors pastoral nomadism. Water is scarce and it easily provokes communal conflicts over wells in most parts of the country as nomads rely primarily on wells rather than on surface water for example water catchments. Rains also fall on an average of once every five years, leading to recurrent droughts and periods of hardship.⁴

As much of the contemporary conflict in Somalia can only be understood in the context of its history, historical claims and grievances by most Somali clans play an important and powerful role in the current political debates in Somalia. Although the interpretation of the Somali history is

⁴ See Human Development Report. UNDP Somalia. 1998, p.23.

itself a contentious political issue due to its clan-based nature, it is important to trace some of the most important historical themes and events that shape contemporary Somalia.

Pre-Colonial Somalia

Somalia has a long history of migration, conquest and assimilation, a pattern that was accelerated by the 1991-1992 civil war.⁵ Some people claim that before pastoralists started migrating in the 10th century, the Somalia interior was inhabited by Oromos, pastoral tribes and other hunter-gather groups. Along the coast Barawas and Benadiris, originally of a mix of Arab, Persian and other ancestors, inhabited several trading cities. There are also Bajunis and Swahili (mainly fishing people) who lived along the Southern coast.

It is argued that Somali clans were pushed into the Eastern Horn and into the inter-riverine regions of Southern Somalia from Southern Ethiopia in the 10th century. Those who settled in the inter-riverine regions adopted an agro-pastoral, sedentary lifestyle and have managed to get absorbed into the lineage and settled. In the 19th century, clans from central and northeastern regions crossed the Juba River and migrated all over Southwestern Somalia and all the way to the Tana River in Kenya. At the same time, Somali populations along the Benadir coast imported slaves from East Africa to provide labour for a rising slave-based grain export economy along the lower Shabelle river⁶ and this is where the Bantus known as *Jareer* in Somali originally come from.

This movement by Somali clans is a major source of the production and dominance of the Somali culture, lineage identity and adherence to Islam throughout the Eastern Horn of Africa. Also, this history of pre-colonial migration shows the scattered nature of clan settlement

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid. p.24.

throughout Somalia. A good example is the Ogadens who are also found in Ogaden in Ethiopia; Southern Somalia and the North Eastern Province of Kenya.

Another important issue in pre-colonial Somalia is that Somalia was a stateless society except for very few exceptions. As Marchal argues like most broad generalizations, this one merits qualification. Some parts of Somalia did at different points in history sustain Sultanates or quasi-state polities.⁷ Customary law or *Xeer*⁸ evolved to manage relations within and among Somali communities and it is still one of the few conflict management elements that survived to the present day.

There was a decentralized political authority vested in community elders and clan leaders who had to negotiate disputes and conflicts with other community elders and clan leaders by relying on customary law. There was also the *diya* system or blood compensation, which was part of the *Xeer* but mainly derived from the Islamic *Shari'a* law.⁹ Generally, the Somali customary law, *Xeer*, and the *diya* system helped prevent not only communal conflicts and criminality but also served and contained lawlessness in pre-colonial Somalia.

⁷ See Marchal P. "A Few Provocative Remarks on Governance in Somalia". Nairobi. UNDOS discussion paper. November 1997; and Cassanelli L.. The Shaping of Somali Society. (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press. 1982).

⁸ *Xeer* is the Somali traditional or customary law, which relates mainly to social conventions/contracts. It serves very important roles in managing not only social life but also Somali politics in this new era of statelessness and anarchy.

⁹ *Diya* system or blood compensation was negotiated and members of the group that committed the crime had to pay what was agreed with the other group. In Islamic *Shari'a* law the *diya* is 100 camels for men and 50 for women. This is paid to the aggrieved clan as compensation. Presently, due to the Somali customary law *Xeer*, clans pay what they agree which also becomes another *Xeer* which is binding to them when the same is done to any of their members. For more information on this see. I. M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

Somalia's Colonial Period

Colonialism had its effect on Somalia as it divided the Somali people into five separate colonies and later on into four different countries including Somalia.¹⁰ The scramble for Africa in the late 19th century caused Somalia and Somalis to be split into five different polities: Southern Somalia (Italy), Somaliland Protectorate (Britain), Northern Frontier District (Britain), Ogaden (Ethiopia), and Djibouti (France). They were later on divided into four different countries including Djibouti, Ogaden for Ethiopia, Northern Frontier District for Kenya and Northwest and South for Somalia. This was done as part of a European deal struck during the First World War, and several efforts were made following World War II to consider uniting the Somalia inhabited portions, but to no avail.¹¹ This legacy of colonial division and Ethiopian and Kenyan claims that Ogaden and NFD are part of their territories had profound effects on Somali's foreign policy not only at independence but even after independence. These led to two wars Somalia had with its neighbors whose causes were rooted in this.

The other important factor that colonialism brought was a state system, which favored the European and their Ethiopian counterpart to enable them to tax, conscript the labour force and exploit other peoples resources. This was not a lesson in civic democracy as many people believe and since the Somalis were more of a pastoral society, they were in no position to adopt this alien political structure with a central state. This authoritarian structure also spilled over into post-independence Somalia politics. Both the civilian systems and the Barre administration that followed used the same tactics to maintain power.

¹⁰ See I. M. Lewis. A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. (Boulder: Westview. 1988).

¹¹ Human Development Report. UNDP Somalia, op. cit., p.25.

Somali nationalism, in line with the European notions of nationalism for example unity and the like, was also another major factor colonialism brought to Somalia. Before colonialism, Somali national identity was hidden, nobody cared which clan one came from, and politics was localized. Right from the first day the Europeans came to Somalia, they put more emphasis on clannism and sub-clannism rather than on general Somali identity. They used to divide and rule the natives. This made clannism remain a very powerful tool to wrangle over jobs and resources.

Colonialism also quickened and facilitated the rapid growth of urban centers and life especially in Mogadishu and Hargeisa, which were the main capitals of North and South. Also, Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Kismayu, and Baidoa served as centers of political life for politicians and business people who had an interest in politics to safeguard their businesses and wealth. This, on the other hand, contributed to the marginalisation of the urban centers. All these developed enmity and oppressive feelings and have contributed to the Somali conflict.

Independence

Somalia¹² experienced three distinct political periods in four decades of independence including the civil war. The first was the period of multiparty democracy and civilian rule from 1960-1969. During this time, beginning July 1st, 1960 by agreement with the UN Trusteeship Council, Somalia was granted independence and was merged with the former British Protectorate of Somaliland. The election and seating of the first Somali President Aden Abdulle Osman followed, who was defeated by Abdirashid Ali Sharma'arke, in 1967. President Abdirashid was, two years later, assassinated by one of his bodyguards. This period is one which some Somalis recall as a golden period while others disparage it as a time of corrosive and paralyzing clannism.

¹² For comprehensive accounts of politics and development in independent Somalia include D. Laitin and S. Samatar. Somalia: Nation in Search of a State. (Washington: Library of Congress, 1992): See also, A. Samatar, Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality. (London: Zed, 1988).

The second period between 1969-1990 was one of militarization, dictatorship and scientific socialism. It was presided over by President Mohamed Siad Barre, who attained power through a bloodless *coup d'etat* on October 21st, 1969. Barre came up with what he termed "scientific socialism", which Lewis¹³ argued was less socialism than Siyadism. Lewis argued that although Lenin, Mao Tse-Tung and the peripatetic Kim Il Sung (to say nothing of Mussolini) all had some influence on the homespun philosophy of development and power constructed by the Siyad regime.¹⁴ Local political realities suggest that "scientific socialism" might be an appropriate description of the Somali experience at that time. Certainly socialism here was a means rather than an end.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Siyadism was advanced and it brought more nationalism. It helped to revive the irredentism of the Somali leaders, which led to the decision to support the Ogaden freedom fighters to invade Ogaden with Barre's support – both men and military equipment. This was in line with the policies of former Somalia governments, which saw the union of the former British protectorate with South Somalia not as an act of colonialism, expansionism or annexation but as a positive contribution to peace and unity in Africa. The further extension of this unification to embrace former French Somaliland (Djibouti), former Ethiopian Haud and Ogaden, and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya was boldly enshrined in the Republic's Constitution¹⁵ and Barre had no other option although he opted to use force against Ethiopia.

¹³ See I. M. Lewis. A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. op. cit., Chapter 9.

¹⁴ For fuller discussions of these issues see I. M. Lewis. "Kim Il Sung in Somalia: The End of Tribalism?" in P. Cohen and W. Shack (eds.). The Politics of Office. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). pp.19-38.

¹⁵ Article VI, Section 4, of the Somali Constitution reads: "The Somali Republic shall promote, by legal and peaceful means, the Union of Somali territories and encourage solidarity among the peoples of the world, and in particular among African and Islamic peoples." i.e.: "Greater Somalia" idea.

This witnessed the beginning of a major rivalry between Barre and Mengistu of Ethiopia, as each started supporting the other's opposition groups by giving them military base-camps in their countries and training them. The Ethiopian troops even fought alongside the Somali guerrilla groups. A good example is the support of Mengistu for Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali National Movement (SNM), United Somali Congress (USC) and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) to topple Barre and conversely Barre's support for the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).

State Collapse

The third period was one of state collapse and civil war. It was a period of anarchy and lawlessness. Somalia's political, economic and social situation was transformed by events since the fall of the Somali government in early 1991. This period can be broken down into three distinct periods – the emergency period, pre-UN Intervention (1991-1992); the UN Intervention period (1992-1994); and the post-Intervention period (1994-2000).

The Emergency Period

The fall of Barre worsened the situation and did not bring the expected coalition government. Also, Barre did not give up politics after he was toppled. He went to his home area, Garbaharey of Gedo region and mobilized both his ex-military men still loyal to him and militias from his own clan to go back to re-take power. This was also coupled by the disputed claims by both Aideed and Mahdi between November 1991 and March 1992, which led to a four month bitter war between the two over the Somali presidency.

Despite the fact that anarchy characterised Somalia's politics, giving local militias the green light to rove and plunder villages and towns, late in the 1991, the nature of the civil war

changed significantly and most armed conflicts have been taking place within factions and clans rather than between major factions and clans. In 1992, a US diplomat described the situation in Somalia as 'the worst humanitarian crisis faced by any people in the world.'¹⁶ At the end of 1992, it was estimated that more than 500,000 people had died in the war and famine in Somalia.

International Intervention

Forceful Intervention

Apart from the different stakeholders in the Somali conflict that have all contributed to the internationalization of the Somali conflict in one way or another, the media also played an important role as the situation received intensive media coverage. This led to a surprise decision by the United States to take the lead for what they termed as "an international humanitarian intervention" into Somalia in late 1992. They came under the name UNITAF (later the codename was changed to UNOSOM when the nominal command was transferred from the US to UN). They temporarily stopped the factional fighting and put a quick end to the famine. From there, the US-led UN mission developed a policy of arms cantonment, which unfortunately dragged the UN into an armed conflict with General Aideed, who was one of the most powerful warlords. This was caused by an incident in which twenty four Pakistani forces were killed in June 1993, followed by the death of thousands of Somalis.

The UN and in particular the US forces engaged in a full-scale war with Aideed's SNA militias in the streets of Mogadishu thus leading to a four-month urban based guerrilla warfare and Aideed was never captured. The US announced a final withdrawal after eighteen of its Special Forces (the US Rangers) were killed in the fight. Also, most of the Western forces in the UN

¹⁶ See M. Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace. Oxfam Paper No. 9. (Oxford Print Unit, 1994). p. II and III.

mission followed suit and UNOSOM was completely withdrawn from Somalia in March 1995 with neither a national peace nor a revived structure.

Peaceful Intervention

The United Nations helped organize two peace and reconciliation conferences in Addis Ababa, one in January and one in March, 1993. The first conference endorsed a cease-fire and procedures for disarmament by the UN while the second conference was mainly on national reconciliation. The most important agreement reached at Addis Ababa was the formation of a Transitional National Council (TNC) and other transitional political and administrative structures that would guide the country to elections within two years.

The UNOSOM I and II operations in Somalia, and their efforts towards peace and reconciliation enhanced the prestige of the warlords by giving them more recognition with pay, strengthened their political role and left little room for other potential leaders to emerge. This can be seen in both the two conferences facilitated by the UN, as the UN did not explore ways to broaden the participation of the conferences in the reconciliation process.¹⁷

Apart from the UN's efforts in Somalia's peace and reconciliation efforts, the European Commission was also involved aiming at the same but with a different approach. In 1995, the EC commissioned "A Study of Decentralized Political Structures for Somalia: A Menu of Options" which was carried out by experts at the London School of Economics and Political Science.¹⁸ The report which produced a Menu of Options focused on three Models: Confederation, Federation, a Decentralized unitary state and a community based type of power sharing known as "Consociation". In June and November 1996, the EC sponsored two seminars in Kenya (Naivasha

¹⁷ See Chapter Four.

¹⁸ See S. Illing, Helping Rebuild Somalia: The EC in Somalia 1993-1996, (Nairobi: Majestic Printing Works, 1997), pp.16-17.

and Nakuru), which were attended by Somali traditional and religious leaders, intellectuals, professionals, women and other representatives of the Somali civil society. The seminars provided the participants with a forum to discuss the study in greater detail and to contribute their experiences to the debate.

The participants supported the concept of establishing "a decentralized state with constitutional guarantees for full autonomy of the constituent units."¹⁹ They also encouraged the international community, in particular the EC, to continue to facilitate efforts towards the promotion of this concept. The participants established a Steering Committee and a Liaison Committee so as to ensure the projects continuation.

There have been three other seminars held inside Somalia: in Mogadishu, Bosasso and Hargeisa. In Hargeisa, it was very difficult to hold the workshop. The problem was that the residents in Somaliland did not see themselves as part of Somalia. In Bosasso, which was the most interesting part of the workshop, the workshop led to the formation of Puntland government.

In another initiative, parallel to this, the EC sponsored activities of Somalis from the Diaspora and inside the country. Two conferences were held, one in Paris in October 1995 and another one in Addis Ababa in June 1996. These conferences resulted in the formation of Somali Peace Line, which is a large grouping of Somali intellectuals, with the objective of promoting a peace culture in Somalia.

The OAU was silent about the Somali conflict, as it lacks the resources and power to involve itself in the Somali situation. Also African leaders have no intention of empowering it and therefore the OAU can only condemn atrocities and form *ad hoc* committees as it does have tools

¹⁹ Ibid.

to enforce peace or to solve disputes.²⁰ It developed in early 1996 a sub-regional policy towards the Somali conflict. It has also assigned Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Ethiopia to deal with the management of the Somali conflict.

Post-Intervention

Renewed sporadic factional fighting in Mogadishu, Kismayu and Baidoa started right after the UN withdrawal from Somalia. Both the international port and airport in Mogadishu remained closed due to the same intra-Hawiye clan conflicts over the resources the facilities generate. Factions split into sub-factions and units, and although General Aideed was the most powerful warlord at that time, he was killed in a battle with Osman Atto's sub-faction.

Many other attempts were made to work on peace and reconciliation but to no avail due to the political authority in the country which was increasingly localized, into village, town, district and region. Islam played an important role as it tried to fill this political vacuum and offered some security services by setting quasi-police and Islamic courts throughout many parts of the country including Mogadishu, the capital.

The radical localization of political authority in this period has become a new trend, which might contribute to national peace in Somalia. Specific regions started to establish autonomous regional administrations. The idea of radical localization of political authority was primarily foreign and regional actors, such as IGAD, and the international donors stressed that they would work with and assist areas with authorities and functional governance in place at the regional level. Because of this importance, Puntland was declared an autonomous region after more than four hundred delegates from northeastern regions met in 1998. Having Garowe its capital and

²⁰ Andrew Ngwiri, "Give the OAU real teeth or do away with it" The Daily Nation, (Nairobi), 11th July 1999, p.7.

Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf²¹ as president, Puntland announced ministerial appointments, including five women Members of Parliament, which are yet to become operational. Other regional authorities at various stages of discussion include the Benadir Authority in Mogadishu, the Hirland of Belet Wein and the Jubaland of Kismayu but none of them works. The proponents of this regional idea see these as building blocks for a national authority in future.

The Causes of the Somali Conflict

As shown from this historical background, there is no single cause that can be isolated as a source of the Somali conflict. Several causes have jointly contributed to the creation and development of the war. The legacy of European colonialism and the Somali kinship system and their impacts on one another can be said to be the major causes. There were also contradictions between the new centralized system and the Somali pastoral culture, which could never co-exist.

Cold War politics also had its contribution especially in the 1970s and 1980s when Barre sided with the West, the East and then the West again due to economic interest while the former USSR sided with Ethiopia to defeat Barre in the Ogaden war. Militarization by Barre himself after the Ogaden war and the marginalization and uneven development between the urban and the rural Somalia were also major factors that contributed to the conflict.

Another major factor is also the cumulative impact of armed conflicts in Somalia. From 1900-1920, Italy and Britain fought against Sayyid Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, the Dervish. During this war, one third of the population of northwest Somalia died. Between the 1920s and the 1930s there was Italian fascist rule, which the Somalis fought. During the Second World War, Italy and Britain themselves fought over Somalia. While during the 1960s and 1970s Somalia had

²¹ Former leader of SSDF, the first opposition group in Somalia. Ethiopia, which supported SSDF itself after relations with Barre improved in 1988 arrested him, and he was released from prison by the EPRDF government in 1991.

border disputes, which led conflicts with Kenya and Ethiopia while from 1988 there has been a civil war.

Regional and International Influences in the Somali Conflict

Presently, the regional and international influences in the Somali conflict are a major cause and a contribution to the continuation of the conflict.²² On the other hand, Ethiopia and Egypt are competing to have a greater role in the formation of the future Somalia government. This was shown in their conflict management efforts for Somalia. While Ethiopia sponsored the Sodere Conference in 1996, which focused on Somali unity and agreed on a transitional and rotating presidency, which was to be discussed later, Egypt, on the other hand, involved itself in another conference, the Cairo Conference which was held in December 1997. This focused a federal structure. The Cairo Conference produced the Cairo Declaration, which included Egal and Hussein Aideed who both rejected the Sodere conference because the Egyptian government had convinced them to join the process since they also had a stake in Somalia.

Both Ethiopia and Egypt²³ have got some support from different international organizations. For example Ethiopia was supported and backed up by IGAD and the United States, which is happy with the Ethiopian government led by one of the new men of contemporary Africa. Similarly, Egypt has the support and the blessings of the Arab League and the Islamic Conference. This is because the Arab states seem to support a strong centralized state system in Somalia, which is what Egypt is trying to work on. Several European countries including Italy also support Egypt. This is due to their mere economic interest in the South and the prospect of re-negotiating the Lome Agreement.

²² See more on these in P. Johnson. Somalia/Land: Political, Economic and Social Analysis. A Report for Oxfam GB. Nairobi. April 1999. pp.12-13.

²³ Ibid.

Libya and Sudan²⁴ are also interested in supporting the Mogadishu-based factions, Aided in particular, because of their anti-US policy. They have been very keen to see a joint police force supported by them in Mogadishu, which is yet to become operational.

The Ethiopia-Eritrea²⁵ war has also complicated the competition between Egypt and Ethiopia over Somalia as it has also brought Eritrea into the picture. Ethiopia and Eritrea have attempted to outflank each other by fighting through rival, armed political factions in Somalia. They have both provided massive military support and training to different factions in Somalia including an Ethiopian opposition group. Because of all there is no single cause that can be identified being the main cause of the conflict. All of them have contributed.

Local Peace Initiatives

There have been many peace and reconciliation efforts organized by different community elders and clan leaders, which have been successful to some extent. These include the Borama Conference, which was mainly on reconciliation, security and state formation. It opened on 24th January 1993 and lasted nearly four months.²⁶ The conference established a national committee of one hundred and fifty Somaliland elders and produced a Peace Charter and a National Charter. Both led to the election of Egal as president.

Another significant conference was the Sanag Peace Conference, which brought together elders from four main clans Habar Yonis, Habar Jecllo, Dolbahante, and Warsangeli.²⁷ It embarked on a lengthy process of reconciliation and adopted a regional Peace Charter and facilitated the return of those displaced during the war.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ M. Bradbury. Somaliland: Country Report. (Totton: Hobbs the Printer Ltd., 1997), pp.21-22.

²⁷ See A. Y. Farah. The Roots of Reconciliation: Peace-making Endeavors of Contemporary Lineage Leaders in Northwest Somalia/Somaliland. (London: Action Aid, 1993).

In the Southern part of the country, the community elders and clan leaders of Habar Gidir and Abgal held the first local peace initiative in Mogadishu, in May 1992. This was partially facilitated by the UN, and it was successful because it stopped the Abgal-Habar Gidir conflict in Mogadishu. In early 1993, there was another conference in Kismayu in which the elders and politicians from the Juba region agreed on a cease-fire and disarmament, re-opening of the roads and a return of the properties looted.²⁸ This led to the signing of Jubaland Peace Agreement on 6th August 1993.

In early 1994, there was another important conference locally organized and held in Bardera. It brought together representatives of Somali National Front (SNF) and Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and a large number of community elders, clan leaders, and intellectuals from Gedo and Bay regions. The purpose of the conference was to reconcile the warring SNF and SDM factions and to unite the peoples of the two communities. The conference endorsed the Bardera Agreement, which included the SPM of General Morgan. It allowed the peaceful interaction of the communities of Gedo, Bay, Bakol, Middle Juba and Lower Juba. Life came back to normal in the four regions under the three factions. Also, businesses started to run smoothly and without any problems.

The Galkacyo Conference is also one which initiated a process of reconciliation in Galkacyo, attended by elders from Mudug region mainly from Habar Gidir, Majerten and Marehan. Also, in the process were the Lelkase and Awrtable clans. This conference endorsed the return of properties looted, the withdrawal of militia from Galkacyo and the re-opening of the roads.

²⁸ See M. Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace, op. cit., pp.56-58.

The Garowe Conference, which was also seen as a product of the EC's involvement in Somalia, is a significant one. It culminated in July 1998 in agreement on a constitution and the inauguration of the regional government of Puntland, with Abdullahi Yusuf as president. Almost all the conferences are a good example of the local peace and reconciliation initiatives. The only thing they lacked was the financial support and an enforcement mechanism. With the necessary support and back up the same community elders and clan leaders would be able to develop and manage conflicts without external forces.

The Republic of Somaliland

Despite the fact that the civil war affected most parts of the country, parts of Central and all of Northern Somalia were spared this tragedy. The two regions are separate from the southern part of Somalia. The two factions that occupy in those areas, SSDF and SNM, were also experienced enough in civil wars and they never wanted to get involved in the Somali civil war. In the northwest better and dramatic developments occurred. Hargeisa declared independence from the rest of Somalia in May 1991 and the then chairman of SNM, Abdirahman Tuur, was elected as the first president. An intra-Isaq fighting broke out in 1991. It was only May 1993 when the Assembly of Elders (*Guurti*) established peace and elected Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, a former premier, as the second president. From there, they began building their capacity in terms of administration and striving for an international recognition, which they are yet to get.

Intra-Isaq conflicts renewed again and there was less Egal's administration could do. Since 1996 Somaliland has made advances in extending its authority and control in the northwest except some clashes they had over land disputes with Puntland, which they have sorted out.²⁹

²⁹ See Contested regions in the Map.

The Role of Women .

Little has been said and written about the role of women in pre-war and present day Somalia. Women have played a significant role in a number of ways. They ran food kitchens during the first days of the war and the famine that followed. They also helped and worked as nurses in the early days of the war.³⁰ After the war, many women have adopted orphaned children of close relatives and friends. Some have also opened children's homes and are still running them.

From another perspective, the Somali women seem to be getting aggressive and playing more active roles since the war broke out. They have formed local NGOs/CBOs and are involved in relief and rehabilitation work in Somalia. As part of this, some women groups are working on women empowerment projects whereby they provide training programmes and project funding for small-scale credit facilities.

Women have also played a pro-active role in the war. Women have organized demonstrations in support of, or in protest against, any decision made by the faction leaders. They also organize local fundraising campaigns and help factions and sub-factions to reconcile, and in this sense they are also involved in conflict management. Some women group leaders have powers similar to those of warlords and they are involved directly or indirectly in the day to day decision-making of some factions.

³⁰ Ibid., p.71.

CHAPTER 4

TRACK ONE DIPLOMACY IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE UNITED NATIONS IN SOMALIA

Introduction

The previous chapter offered an overview of the Somali conflict. It discussed the historical background, the causes of the Somali conflict, and a brief introduction of different peace initiatives tried by the United Nations, the European Commission and local peace initiatives in Somalia. In its history, the United Nations “has launched more peacekeeping operations in Africa than in any other single region,”¹ and moreover it was deeply involved in Somalia, particularly in the field of humanitarian assistance, long before it first sent military observers and peacekeepers in 1992. From the late 1970s, “the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), along with the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and other United Nations agencies and programmes provided assistance to several hundred thousand refugees from Ethiopia’s Ogaden region in camps in Somalia.”²

As part of its mandate to maintain international peace and security the United Nations went into Somalia eighteen months after the Somalia civil war broke out in early 1991. It had two main objectives: the provision of emergency relief and the facilitation of the re-establishment of the collapsed institutions of the Somali state. The efforts of the United Nations to end the human suffering in Somalia, foster reconciliation among the

¹ N. Theo “Towards Joint Ventures: Use of UN Observer Missions in Africa” in Jackie Cilliers & Greg Mills (eds.), From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa (Johannesburg & Pretoria: The South African Institute of International Studies and the Institute for Security Studies. 1999) pp.27-44:27.

² The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996 (New York: Department of Public Information. United Nations. 1996), p.15.

conflicting factions and promote national reconciliation led to one of the most challenging, and arduous undertakings in the organization's fifty-year history.³

This Chapter will examine the United Nations' peace initiatives in the Somali conflict and their contribution to the peace process. It will examine the strategies the United Nations has employed and how effective they have been in the management of the conflict. It will finally identify the major obstacles and problems the UN faced in its attempt to manage the Somali conflict.

The United Nations Involvement in Somali before the War

As noted earlier in this Chapter, the UN was earlier in Somalia in response to the refugee influx from Ethiopia, caused by the Ethio-Somali war of 1977-78. This response was in the form of relief assistance to the several hundred thousand refugees from Ethiopia's Ogaden region in camps in Somalia. Since then, the UN returned to rescue about half a million displaced Somalis who fled from north-west Somalia due to the 1988 civil war between government forces and Somali National Movement (SNM) loyalists from the north-west. This problem of widespread displacement made the United Nations to assist the displaced Somalis until January 1991, when the Somali civil war took its toll and it swept into Mogadishu. The United Nations closed its offices due to security reasons and inaccessibility to some people in need. During this time, "the deteriorating security conditions helped create a deadly famine that consumed about 300,000 lives and threatened the lives of 1,500,000 more. By 1992, the clan war itself caused about 30,000 deaths."⁴

³ Ibid. p.3.

⁴ A. J. Mubarak From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia (London: Praeger. 1996), p.17.

The offices of the United Nations were closed until August 1991 and there was no work going on except some assessment visits to determine whether or not it was safe for the United Nations to return to Somalia. United Nations offices were re-opened in August 1991 in Mogadishu, Berbera and Borama, mainly for the provision of emergency relief and only with a small number of staff. The office in Mogadishu was again closed in November 1991 when Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Aideed, both from the United Somali Congress (USC) started fighting in the city, "resulting in widespread loss of life and destruction of physical infrastructure in the capital."⁵

The Initial Stages: UNOSOM I

In April, 1992, having secured a cease-fire agreement from Aideed and Ali Mahdi, the UN Security Council, under Resolution 751 (24 April 1992) authorized the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).⁶

The appointment of Mohamed Sahnoun as the UN Secretary-General's special envoy to Somalia followed. As an observer mission, UNOSOM initially comprised fifty unarmed military observers. This number was later increased to five hundred. The international community, especially the west, delayed the deployment of the observer mission, and the promised peacekeepers had not arrived by September 1992. The UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali accused the west of being more concerned with the 'rich man's war' in former Yugoslavia than with Somalia.⁷

This delay frustrated Sahnoun and prompted him to resign and leave office after he

⁵ J. Ameen "Peacebuilding Efforts in Somalia: Legacies of the International Intervention" an IPA Policy Forum (New York: April 1996), p.2.

⁶ For more on this see M. Bradbury Somaliland: Country Report (Totton: Hobbs Printer Ltd. 1997), p.15. Ibid.

differed with the Secretary-General and publicly criticized the United Nations and its work in Somalia in October 1992. Sahnoun was very bitter with the United Nations even before he took up this position. He believed that the UN should engage in preventive diplomacy and that there were three missed opportunities before this intervention that the UN could have exploited for the benefit of Somalia.⁸

UNITAF

Another resolution (794) was endorsed by the UN Security Council, in 1992, which authorized an offer made by US President George Bush to deploy 30,000 US troops in Somalia. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) troops aimed at the creation of a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief throughout Somalia. The US marines then landed in Mogadishu on 9th December 1992.

The UNITAF operation, (Operation Restore Hope) “did in fact quickly end the humanitarian crisis and froze factional fighting, but it did not wish to risk possible casualties in a disarmament mission against the factions.”⁹ The UNITAF operation was concerned with the security of its own forces, and sought the co-operation of the warlords as no attempt was made to disarm the factions and the delivery of food was improved. This gave the warlords a measure of legitimacy thus leaving a legacy of unresolved problems behind. This approach also reduced the possibility of a confrontation with the faction leaders, which might have resulted in some casualties to UNITAF forces.

One major contribution UNITAF troops made was the smooth implementation of a 100-Day plan developed to reduce hunger in Somalia, worth \$82.7 million in aid, which

⁸ See M. Sahnoun *The Missed Opportunities* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1994).

⁹ See *Human Development Report*, Somalia, 1998 p.30.

was devised by the US-led UN operation in Somalia in October 1992. Otherwise not much progress was made by the US troops since they did not want to involve themselves in Somali politics.

Towards National Reconciliation

From the beginning of United Nations involvement in Somalia, one of the principal objectives was "to help the Somali parties arrive at a durable political settlement of the conflict."¹⁰ This was so because without national reconciliation including the establishment of viable political structures any other progress towards ending hunger and famine in Somalia would remain precarious. In the same way, economic recovery would remain largely impossible because such viable institutions lay the basic foundation in ending hunger and famine.

Based on these ideals, several co-ordination meetings on humanitarian assistance were held by the United Nations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from late 1992 to early 1993. The first conference focused on humanitarian issues only and "it was at the second humanitarian aid co-ordination meeting held in Addis Ababa from 3 to 5 December 1993, which had undertaken the first informal discussions towards national reconciliation."¹¹ The other meetings discussed humanitarian work in Somalia and the need for coordination among the UN agencies and others involved in the Somali relief operations. This involved both political leaders and clan elders who had requested the United Nations to call a reconciliation meeting for 4 January 1993 in Addis Ababa.

The Addis Ababa Conference on National Reconciliation: January 1993

¹⁰ The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996. op. cit., p.37.

¹¹ Ibid.

Since faction leaders controlled Somalia in general, the factional reconciliation process was a pragmatic response to the prevailing situation of insecurity in Somalia. The United Nations and other agencies operating in Somalia realized that "the factions and their militias were the principal arbiters of this situation and had to be contended with in order for the international community to operate in the country."¹² The United Nations at the request of all factions arranged the Addis Ababa Conference on National Reconciliation. The Secretary-General of the United Nations took the initiative to write to all fifteen Somali factions and other regional organizations inviting them to participate. The essence of the conference was to help the faction leaders resolve the Somali conflict.

The talks opened on 4 January 1993 under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with the participation of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Standing Committee of the countries of the Horn of Africa. All the fifteen political factions in Somalia attended the meeting except the Somali National Movement (SNM), which claimed the establishment of an "independent" state in the northwest of Somalia. Also present at the meeting were Somali elders, clan leaders, scholars, and representatives of community organizations, women groups and non-governmental organizations, both local and international.

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali emphasized the importance of the meeting. He told the participants that the meeting was a precious opportunity that must be taken advantage of and not lost. He told them that the Somali people, Africa and the

¹² J. Ameen "Peacebuilding Efforts in Somalia: Legacies of the International Intervention". op. Cit.. p.2.s

world were all watching both the meeting and its outcome.¹³

The discussions of the meetings focused on several important issues including cease-fire, the question of the ownership of heavy weaponry, the disarmament and rehabilitation of the different militias, prisoners of war and the free movement of the Somalis throughout the country. More critical discussions focused on the importance of preparation and arrangement of a national reconciliation conference to be held later in Addis Ababa.

The fifteen factional leaders participating in the peace talks signed three agreements between 8 and 15 January. Besides declaring an immediate cease-fire in all parts of the country under their control, the agreements provided for the establishment of a cease-fire monitoring group composed of UNITAF and United Nations troops, the hand-over of all heavy weaponry to the cease-fire monitoring group, the encampment and disarmament of the militias, the release of prisoners of war and the free movement of Somalis throughout the country.¹⁴ Also, the parties established an *ad hoc* committee to prepare for a national reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993.

Despite the fact that this was first that time the warlords had promised to stop the fighting, and they pledged to disarm and demobilize their militias and to request the United Nations to take custody of their heavy weapons, there was not much progress that was made. Apart from some progress towards voluntary disarmament by some militias, a gulf of mistrust among clans and sub-clans and among faction leaders continued. Also, "as long as the United Nations was willing to continue to sponsor trips to conferences, there was

¹³ The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996. op. cit.

¹⁴ For more on this see The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996. op. cit.. pp.37-39.

little incentives for the factions to reconcile.”¹⁵ This conference was meant to lay the basic foundation for the other conference, which would discuss peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

The Addis Ababa Conference on National Reconciliation: March 1993

The conference requested for in the earlier Addis Ababa agreement of January 1993 had opened on 15 March 1993. The United Nations provided logistical assistance. The same fifteen factions who were present at the previous meeting attended, while the Somali National Movement (SNM) sent observers. They thought the meeting would bring peace to Somalia and that this would give them a chance to have an administration they could talk to. The conference was also attended by clan elders, leaders of community, women's' organizations and other prominent representatives of Somali civil society including local NGOs and Community Based Organizations (CBOs), thus bringing in more observers into the conference. The National Reconciliation conference held in Addis Ababa from 15 to 27 March 1993 was considered by many Somalis as the best encounter among the factions. This is because it represented a cross-section of the Somali people. Also, the masses in Somalia prayed for a lasting solution to the crisis that has reduced the country to rubble.

Lansana Kouyate, a Guinean represented the United Nations Secretary-General, as the Deputy Special Representative for Somalia. Also, President Meles Zenawi of the Federal Government of Ethiopia played a very critical role in the facilitation of the negotiations. Zenawi was the man who had the original idea of calling the faction leaders to talk. The March 1993 Addis Ababa conference was critical to the international

¹⁵ M. Bradbury Somaliland: Country Report, op. cit.

intervention in Somalia. The conference was to provide a framework for tackling Somalia's political problems and for the UN-led administration that would take over from UNITAF, UNOSOM II.

The meeting discussed four important broad issues: disarmament and security, rehabilitation and reconstruction, restoration of property, settlement of disputes and transitional mechanisms of conflict management. On 27 March 1993, the conference participants, including leaders of the fifteen armed factions in attendance, unanimously adopted the "Addis Ababa Agreement of the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia", committing themselves to "put an end to armed conflict and to reconcile their differences through peaceful means" and to continue "the peace process under the auspices of the United Nations and in cooperation with the regional organizations and Standing Committee of the Horn as well as with Somalia's neighbors in the Horn of Africa."¹⁶

The Addis Ababa Agreement set out a plan for a two-year transition to a new central government to be accomplished by March 1995. It was based on the notion that the political and administrative structure in Somalia needed to be rebuilt and restructured in a way that provided each Somali an opportunity to participate in shaping or re-shaping the future of their country.

The transitional system of governance would put more emphasis on the provision of essential services, the creation of a strong basis for long-term planning and the resumption of greater political and administrative responsibility by Somalis. This was to be done through the establishment of District Councils, Regional Councils and a

¹⁶ The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996, op. cit., p.46.

Transitional National Council, which would be the highest political organ of the country.

Under such arrangements, local communities would elect or select local councils at the district level. The members of these district councils would then send representatives to the regional councils, to be established in each of the eighteen regions, which existed before the civil war. The creation of a Transitional National Council (TNC) would be the next stage. The TNC would be composed of three representatives from each of the eighteen regions, including one woman from each region, five additional representatives from Mogadishu, the capital, and one representative nominated by and from each of the fifteen political factions during the two-year transitional period. The TNC would serve as the interim central government of Somalia with legislative functions during the two-year transitional period. The TNC would also appoint a special committee for drafting the charter for the transitional period. That committee which was called the Transitional Charter Drafting Committee was set up by the fifteen faction leaders at another follow-up meeting held in 30 March 1993.

'Other important issues endorsed by the conference participants included the complete and simultaneous disarmament throughout the whole country in line with the disarmament concept drawn in the Addis Ababa Agreement of January 1993. UNITAF and UNOSOM were asked to assist in this exercise by providing logistical support, safe custody of the arms collected, and project funding for projects towards rehabilitating disarmed militias. The meeting also endorsed the need for the establishment of an impartial national and regional police force.

The SNM, which proclaimed an "independent state" in the northwest, was the only major faction which did not officially participate although it sent observers. But even

without the endorsement of the SNM, the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993 marked a milestone in the combined efforts of Somalis and the international community to restore security and rebuild political institutions on democratic foundations. The Agreement concluded with an invitation of Secretary-General of the United Nations and his Special Representative in Somalia, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the UN Security Council to extend all necessary assistance to the people of Somalia for the implementation of this Agreement.

The adoption of Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993 on the expansion of UN presence in Somalia came just one day before the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed. The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, decided to expand the size of UNOSOM and widen its mandate. UNOSOM II thus began the process of assisting local Somali communities to establish district and regional councils, police forces, judicial and penal systems, in many parts of the country.¹⁷ While the Addis Ababa conference provided a framework for national reconciliation, insufficient time was allotted to determine clear mechanisms for implementing the agreements. There were signs that some of the warlords, including General Aideed, in Addis Ababa were not quite happy with the approach of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the situation deteriorated when fighting broke out in Mogadishu between General Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA) militia and the United Nations, which led to a bitter war in June 1993. This also moved Mogadishu into a new period of violent confrontation, which eventually resulted the withdrawal of the UN troops from Somalia in March 1995.

When UNOSOM ended its mission in 1995 without succeeding in re-establishing a

¹⁷ Ibid. pp.47-48.

national authority in Somalia, observers expected that Somalia would quickly slip into renewed chaos and civil war. This is because "that slide back into anarchy did not materialize, however. Renewed armed conflict has plagued parts of southern Somalia, but, like political authority in the country, has remained highly localized."¹⁸

Major Obstacles to the UN Peace Initiative

Several arguments have been advanced with regard to the major obstacles to the UN operation in Somalia. The UN¹⁹ itself put forward some of these arguments arguing that the failure of the Somali factions to commit themselves to peace or to cooperate adequately with the United Nations and its agencies made it impossible for the operation to carry out its mandate fully. This contributed to the Security Council's decision to withdraw United Nations forces from Somali in March 1995. Another major problem was the broad mandate given to UNOSOM II to assist in rebuilding the state from the ground up, thus making this mission one of the most graphic examples of multi dimensional peace keeping.

The involvement of the United Nations in Somalia occurred at a turning point in the organization's history and there was no model for the United Nations to follow in its efforts to bring humanitarian assistance and peace to the people of Somalia.²⁰ In addition, there was a structural problem faced by the UN. For example the UN Charter was not clear on what the UN itself could do about internal conflicts like the Somali one.

Contrary to the United Nations justification for its failure in Somalia, which it calls 'shortcomings' and not failure, Bradbury argues that at the end of the Cold War, and in

¹⁸ K. Menkhaus "Stateless Somalia" UNDOS/LAS Unit. Nairobi 1997.

¹⁹ The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996. op. cit., pp.3-5.

²⁰ Ibid.

the wake of the Gulf War, Somalia became a testing ground for the international community's response to conflict and humanitarian crisis in the 'new world order' and because of this, UNOSOM II's policies were thus driven more by international political concerns than by the situation in Somalia.²¹ Also, The international peacekeeping intervention in Somalia, from December 1992 to March 1995, was a period of high expectations and deep disappointment.²²

Following the Addis Ababa conferences, it was felt in some quarters, for example the civil society and some international agencies, that the conference had further legitimized the warlords by agreeing that the proposed transitional committees should consist of members of the fifteen armed factions.²³ It is evident that in Somalia there was no clear vision of how reconciliation should proceed. The United States initially saw its mission as short and limited to opening supply lines so that it would not have to become involved in Somali politics. Nor did the United Nations have a clear road map for reconciliation as Clarke and Herbst argue.²⁴ They further argue that the US and UN officials were guilty of not persuading their leaders that the mission had been so sharply curtailed at the outset that any later action to alter the balance of power in Somalia would meet violent resistance. A policy that allowed unarmed Somalis to emerge as political players and change the Somalia power balance should have been in effect from the start.²⁵

The United Nations failed in its attempt to bring a lasting resolution to the Somali

²¹ M. Bradbury Somaliland: Country Report, op. cit., p.16.

²² Human Development Report, op. cit.

²³ M. Seifuiaziz Causes and Consequences of the Somalia Conflict (Nairobi: Unicef Somalia, 1997), p.42.

²⁴ W. Clarke and J. Herbst "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention: Learning the Right Lessons" Foreign Affairs, Mar./April 96, Vol.75 Issue 2., p.1-7:4.

²⁵ Ibid. p.5.

conflict. Faction leaders, on the other hand, were either unable or unwilling (or both) to implement peace accords,²⁶ and the reasons for the failure of the United Nations approach are clear. Among other things, the peace conferences were externally driven and sponsored. There was little incentive for military leaders and their militias, profiting from an economy of plunder and extortion, to implement any peace accord. Furthermore, with the peace conferences held outside Somalia there was little pressure on the factional leaders to adhere to the agreements. From another perspective, "initially conceived as a humanitarian response, the UN military intervention in Somalia (UNOSOM- United Nations Operation in Somalia) turned from a 'peacekeeping' to a 'peace-enforcement' operation. Its ignominious failure has had far reaching implications for countries such as Bosnia and Rwanda."²⁷ This is so because "the problems are not only related to the complex and protracted nature of armed conflicts and wars but to the lack of adequate concepts and knowledge for dealing with them."²⁸ Some UN officials argue, though defensive, that there was insufficient knowledge about Somalia. In addition, less experienced and knowledgeable people were sent to work with the United Nations. Also, the U.S. versus Italy policies led to a total lack of coordination and a breakdown of command and control on the ground. Further, the perception of the Somali people was very wrong in that they believed the United Nations was after gold, copper, oil and other natural resources.²⁹

²⁶ See K. Menkhaus "International Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia" *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.3: no.1 (Spring 1996),pp.42-67.

²⁷ M. Bradbury *Building Partnerships for Peace and Development: A Report of A Workshop Held in Borama, Somaliland, 9th-12th December 1996.* p.8.

²⁸ P. Thania *Mediating Wars: A Comprehensive Assessment of Mediation Approaches with Reference to findings from the Mozambique Peace Process*. Frankfurt, Germany, 1995. p.1.

²⁹ Interview with Mr. Fadi Badejo. UNPOS Political Advisor to Somalia. June 19 2000. Nairobi.

Finally, Menkhaus and Prendergast argue that diplomats in the international community (particularly the UN) partly contributed to the persistence of state collapse by pursuing inappropriate diplomatic strategies in premature efforts to revive the central state system."³⁰

In conclusion, "the most common charge about the Somalia intervention is that the mission changed."³¹ The general argument is that the extremely limited US-led intervention initiated by President Bush to feed Somalis in December 1992, UNITAF, was a success, but the operation began to founder when the second UN Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II, took over in May 1993 and expanded the mission to include the re-building of basic institutions.

Post-UN Somalia

In reality, Somalia today is stateless but not anarchic. While repeated efforts to revive a central government have failed, local communities have responded with a wide range of strategies to provide themselves with minimal essential elements of governance.³² On the other hand, "while the rest of the country plunged deeper into chaos in 1991, the northern elders initiated a cycle of local, regional and eventually national conferences that led to the secession of their area and the formation of modern government and the writing of constitution."³³

The United Nations announced months later, that it was going to open a political

³⁰ See K. Menkhaus and J. Prendergast "Governance and Economic Survival in Post-Intervention Somalia" Trocaire Development Review, Dublin, 1995, pp 47-61.

³¹ W. Clarke and J. Herbst "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention: Learning the Right Lessons" op. cit., p. 1.

³² K. Menkhaus "Stateless Somalia" UNDOS/LAS Unit, Nairobi 1997, p. 12.

³³ B. Helander "Some Reflections in African Conflict Resolution: Reflections on Alternative Reconciliation Work and Research." The Danish Journal Den ny verden, Vol. 28 No. 2, pp. 41-54.

office in Nairobi to monitor developments in Somalia as a whole and keep the Secretary-General informed on the situation in the country, taking into account relevant decisions of the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations. This office named the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), which was opened in Nairobi in mid-1994, was also given several other mandates including: assisting the people of Somalia, where appropriate, in their efforts to achieve national reconciliation; liaising with the neighboring countries and concerned organizations such as the OAU, the LAS, and the OIC on political developments relating to Somalia; liaising with the office of the Humanitarian Resident Co-ordinator for Somalia, if and when necessary, while preserving the independent nature of the office; and performing other activities commensurate with the mission of the political office in Somalia. UNPOS has since been based in Nairobi. It had no other mandate in any other capacity beyond the above terms of reference.

The European Commission's Somalia unit was also involved as a Post-UN actor in Somalia's peace process. The EC, though a track one agent, employed track two diplomacy of conflict management in its approach and this is what the following chapter will discuss.

CHAPTER 5

TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN SOMALIA

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed track one diplomacy in conflict management. It studied the case of the United Nations in Somalia, in its attempt to bring a lasting resolution to the Somalia conflict. While the United Nations focused on official diplomacy to resolve the conflict, the European Commission (EC) tried a different approach—unofficial diplomacy to find a lasting resolution to the Somali conflict. The overall goal of the EC was “to help rebuild peace and restore the social and economic well-being of the people of Somalia.”¹

As part of the EC’s contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security, the EC’s Somalia unit tried unofficial diplomacy in conflict management after the United Nations withdrew its forces from Somalia in early 1995. This chapter will examine the European Commission’s peace initiatives in the Somali conflict and their contribution to the peace process. It will examine the strategies the EC employed and how effective they were in the management of the conflict. It will finally identify the major obstacles and constraints that hindered the initiative.

The European Commission’s Involvement in Somalia before the War

Apart from having an office representing the European Union in Mogadishu, before the Somali civil war broke out, Somalia was generally a European colony. The northwest was a British colony and the south an Italian colony before independence.

¹ See T. Paffenholz The European Union and the Practice of Peace Building in Africa The European Commission in Somalia: Challenges, Problems and the Way Forward (Hamburg: The Institute for African Studies, August 1998), p.122.

European interest in the Horn of Africa region dates back to the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Somalia, under agreements signed by the government of Siad Barre, also had several multilateral development programmes and projects funded by the European Union. There were also other bilateral programmes and projects from both Britain and Italy as former colonial masters and good friends of Barre's government. These programmes and projects covered all sectors of life.

After Barre's fall, the European Commission Delegation in Mogadishu was closed in January 1991 but the EC continued to provide humanitarian aid to Somalia through the EC Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and through other international, mainly European, NGOs operating in Somalia. The presence of the EC in Somalia was quite significant in that it represented western values and the importation of democracy and human rights. Cold War politics also had something to do with the EC's presence in Somalia, Britain and Italy in particular since they were former colonial masters. A good example is that "in 1980, the EC members developed a 'European Initiative' on the Middle East to demonstrate to the Arab world the difference between European and American approaches to the Arab-Israel conflict."²

The Initial Stages: Relief and Rehabilitation

Just like any other regional organisation, "the EC's involvement in Somalia was indeed inspired by the principal objectives of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), including the promotion of international and development co-operation."³ This was done in the form of provision of relief and rehabilitation assistance in both emergency and non-

² K. J. Holsti International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India, 1992), p.395.

³ See Art. J.1 of the Treaty of European Union and Title XVII of the EC Treaty.

emergency situations, although there were some conditions that went with such assistance in non-emergency situations. A good example is the EC's conditions of assistance for peaceful areas in Somalia.

On the other hand, "the departure of UNOSOM II in March 1995 and the retreat from Somalia of other main international actors, in particular donors, left the EC to play the leading role in international involvement in the country."⁴ This made the EC's Somalia unit in Nairobi to become the main point of reference not only for the European Union member states but also for other interested groups, including donors, with regard to Somali issues. This also led to the formation of a Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB), which was, and is still led by the European Commission, which is in charge of aid coordination in all over Somalia. SACB is a network based in Nairobi with representatives of all of those interested groups, donors, states and other non-state actors for example international organisations and non-governmental organisations operating in Somalia.

It was apparent that "the leading role entrusted to the EC by the international aid community in the framework of the Somali Aid Coordinating Body since February 1994, which was confirmed during the restructuring process of SACB (February 1996) has provided a rather unique opportunity for the EC to shape and implement together with EU member states a common and coherent EU strategy for Somalia."⁵

One particular aspect that the EC has promoted since its work in the early years of the civil war in Somalia was the active participation of civil society in the rehabilitation process and in grassroots reconciliation and other peace building initiatives. The term

⁴ See S. Illing Helping Rebuild Somalia: The EC in Somalia 1993-1996 (Nairobi: Majestic Printing Works, 1997), p.1.

⁵ Ibid.

'civil society' literally means "the limitation of state power through a public sphere"⁶ and while it is used in a variety of different ways by different scholars " it usually refers to the emergence of new patterns of political participation outside of formal state structures and one party systems."⁷ This is not far from the EC's definition of civil society. To the EC, civil society "comprises all individuals or groups who do not possess legislative or executive powers and are unarmed, and who actively pursue the well-being of the society at large through peaceful means."⁸ The EC put more of its focus on the civil society because of the belief that the integration of civil society in the reconstruction of Somalia serves as a prerequisite for both the peaceful settlement of the conflict and the sustainable development in Somalia.

Because of this notion, the EC, under the SACB banner, came up with a Code of Conduct⁹ which laid down rules, and regulations set to facilitate the smooth running of the relief, rehabilitation and development work in Somalia. The Code of Conduct is a two-way document meant to facilitate relief, rehabilitation and development work in Somalia. It urges the local communities to ensure that secure conditions prevail for aid agencies and their staff, pursue and bring to justice the perpetrators of criminal acts, provide office and residential premises to agencies where available, allow agencies to decide how to meet their own transport and local staffing needs, and to employ staff on technical merit in accordance with project requirements, exempt all aid personnel and aid-related cargo from

⁶ For more on this see M. Bratton "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa" *World Politics* 41/3. 1989. pp. 407-430: 407.

Ibid.

⁸ *European Union Bulletin*, Somalia Unit Issue No. 6. Nairobi June 2000. p.4.

⁹ See Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia. 8 February 1995. SACB Nairobi.

duties and any other form of levy and publish a scale of reasonable tariffs for the payment of services rendered at the demand of an agency for the clearance of aid cargo at ports and airports. The aid agencies working in Somalia, for their part, should pay due attention to local social customs, cultural and religious values, maintain impartiality in the conduct of their activities and develop a coordinated approach to programme implementation.

One major issue in this Code of Conduct, which is a main pillar, is that project funding is only available for peaceful areas and the more peaceful an area is the more project funding will be made available to rehabilitate, reconstruct and develop that area as an incentive and reward and a contribution to peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

Towards National Reconciliation: An Alternative Approach

Right after the United Nations withdrew its forces from Somalia, "the EU adopted a three guiding principles for the Somalia conflict: strict neutrality with respect to the fighting factions; non-recognition of any government that is not broadly representative; and no direct mediation role but rather encouragement and support for initiatives by the UN and the OAU."¹⁰ This was a new approach, different from the UN's attempt at conflict management initiatives since the Commission's policy was to attempt to translate the centrifugal realities of the Somali society into a viable government at two levels: at the regional level, by supporting local initiatives for both social and economic reconstruction as prerequisites for a country-wide recovery, and at the national level by attempting to shift the political debate from questions surrounding state ownership to the development of decentralized constitutional arrangements also as prerequisites for the formation of a

¹⁰ v. Hippel K. And A. Yannis "The European Response to State Collapse in Somalia" in K. E. Jorgensen (ed.). European Approaches to Crisis Management (Copenhagen: Kluwer Law International. 1997). pp.65-81.

central government. It was also clear that this policy would take sometime to both develop and bear fruits. This was due to instability in Somalia and the approach, which was also new.

The Menu of Options

In June 1993, the European Commission sent a Special Envoy to Somalia, Mr. Singurd Illing, a German diplomat, armed with a mandate to prepare for the re-establishment of the Commission delegation in Mogadishu. Mr. Illing arrived in Nairobi where he worked as the EC Special Envoy to Somalia because the Somali situation could not allow the re-opening of the Mogadishu office until 1995 when a liaison office was opened. Illing started different projects throughout Somalia with special focus on how best peace and reconciliation could be achieved. He entered into discussions with both locals and foreigners on the Somalia situation and in particular with representatives of the European Union and other members of the Somali Aid Co-ordinating Body (SACB). He also held discussions with various warlords, community elders and clan leaders.

Recently "civil society has become a major target group of diplomats, donors and development workers, searching for solutions to Africa's crisis."¹¹ Somalia was no exception, and Illing was forced to come up with relevant projects. He focused on the empowerment of civil society in Somalia through project funding and mobilization. This was so because it was the EC's policy "that sustainable development can be achieved only through democratization, decentralization, the integration of civil society and respect for human rights."¹² Based on these ideals the EC, under the directions of Illing, supported

¹¹ European Union Bulletin, Somalia Unit Issue No. 6, Nairobi June 2000. p.2.

¹² S. Illing Helping Rebuild Somalia: The EC in Somalia 1993-1996, op.cit., p.16.

peace building initiatives and capacity building projects particularly in support of local and regional administrations. For example, the EC helped various local administrations with funding rehabilitation projects and technical support and back up in local governance and in other related areas to build the local capacity.

As part of this long-term goal, these discussions led to a request made to experts at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), "for information about the implications of different ways of decentralizing political authority to prevent one person or a group from usurping and/or monopolizing power at the centre."¹³

A team of consultants led by Professors James Mayall and Ian Lewis conducted an extensive research. They came up with a report titled *A Study of Decentralized Political Structures for Somalia: A Menu of Options*. As the name implies, this study represents a menu of options for setting up decentralized political structures and forms of government which side with no special group or affiliation in Somalia. It is a study based on an opportunity of experimentation. This means that it endorses no special system to be established but instead it comes up with four different models of political structures Somalis can choose from, hence the title, *A Menu of Options*. It is clear that "the EU, also a significant donor, has moved towards a decentralized policy for Somalia."¹⁴ The study was generally accepted. It also formed the constitutional basis of some parts of Somalia, the northeastern regions in particular.

¹³ See I. M. Lewis, J. Mayall et al *A Study of Decentralised Political Structures for Somalia: A Menu of Options* (London: LSE and UNDOS, August 1995), p.iii.

¹⁴ P. Johnson *Somalia/Land: Political, Economic and Social Analysis A Report for Oxfam GB*, Nairobi, 1999, p.12.

The study is divided into seven parts. Part One discusses decentralization options for democratic reconstruction. Four decentralized models of governance are outlined in this part and in the report in general. The models are: a confederation system; a federal system; a decentralized unitary state system with guarantees of regional or local autonomy and a consociation system, which is a non-territorial option. These models are drawn from the experience of other peoples whose history has something in common with that of Somalis. The models were also analysed with reference to emerging institutions in the former Somalia: for example the self-declared "Republic of Somaliland"; the northeastern regions as a self-governing unit; and the Digil Mirifle autonomous area of Bay and Bakol regions of southern Somalia.

Part Two of the study discusses the political economy of decentralization including inter-regional transfers, money, trade and credit, property rights and agriculture, health and water, education, roads and security. Part Three discusses remaking administrative structures and puts more emphasis on the organization of a stable administration for even the most decentralized government including staffing for the public sector. Part Four discusses the judicial branch of government. It discusses the supreme court, multiple judicial systems, multiple laws and Islamic law, administrative justice and human rights implications.

Part Five of the study deals with alternatives for defense and foreign relations including treaty making, foreign representation, defense, citizenship, foreign trade, foreign aid and the currency system of the country. Part Six deals with principles of constitutional and electoral design including parliamentary democracy, and electoral options. Part Seven

of the study covers the conclusion, which is the menu of options. It lists down the advantages and disadvantages of the four models considered in the report.

The Naivasha and Nakuru Seminars: A Constitutional Debate

After studying the LSE report on decentralized political structures for Somalia, the EC decided to sponsor a number of seminars to further disseminate the ideas elaborated in the menu of options. The first seminar took place in Naivasha Kenya between June 20 to 22. Thirty intellectuals were invited to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the four models discussed in the report. The participants endorsed the principles of decentralisation and institutionalized power sharing as preconditions for the establishment of a peaceful and viable Somali state in the future.

The participants, after lengthy discussions on the four models, concluded that the decentralized unitary state system and the federal model were quite relevant to the Somali situation. They further requested the EC to provide additional technical support and back up to further these ideas and because of this the EC arranged the second seminar. This first seminar was a preparatory one for the Nakuru seminar, which really carried out most of the work and the discussions.

The Nakuru Seminar

The second seminar took place at Nakuru Kenya. It was organized a bit differently, this time putting more of the focus on community leaders than purely intellectuals. The EC invited some of the most respected Somalis in both Somalia and in the diaspora including community elders, clan leaders, intellectuals, religious leaders and women representatives and other statesmen, for example former ambassadors, government ministers and a prime minister. The selection of the seminar participants was based on personality rather than

factional affiliations and the focus was more on the participants' abilities to take the message home and make their community members understand whatever was discussed and agreed with others.

The participants at the Nakuru workshop discussed the report and its findings with more emphasis and detailed analysis and information-sharing exercises on which option to pick from the menu offered by the European Commission. These deep-rooted discussions were part of a follow up demanded by different Somali groups and individuals after the EC published and disseminated the executive summary of the report, translated into Somali, which was also discussed in both the local and international media. This led to a considerable public debate. People raised questions related to constitutional debates and what to pick from the menu. Some were a bit suspicious of what would be next while others were very positive about the menu.

Three important points were discussed in Nakuru: decentralized political structures: an overview; economic development in a decentralized state; and security in a decentralized state. The LSE experts gave out detailed explanations on these three topics and discussions followed right after the opening session in day one.

Day two was dedicated to group work discussions on the same topics. The participants split themselves into different task force and focus groups to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the four different models of governance proposed in the report. After briefings by the LSE experts and lengthy discussions among the participants on the report, the participants of both workshops supported the concept of establishing a decentralized state system with constitutional guarantees for the full autonomy of the constituent units. The participants saw this model as quite relevant to the Somali situation

since it would serve as an alternative to the previous centralized unitary systems, which the former Somali governments were based on. During day three, which was also the final day, the participants shared the results of their discussions in the plenary session.

Present at the workshops, as representatives of the international community, were Mr. Felix Masha who was the then Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General who was also the head of the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS); Mr. Singurd Illing, the EC's Special Envoy to Somalia and Mr. Arend Pieper, the Charge d'Affaires *ad interim* at the Royal Netherlands Embassy, representing the EU presidency. All of the representatives saw the report and the workshops as being quite significant, something relevant and worth funding.

Mr. Masha of the United Nations stated that: "for those of us who recognize the special role elders occupy in our societies, we consider your influence and authority to be greater than many armed battalions even those who finance armed groups can also be expected to submit to your authority."¹⁵ He further stressed that the task of restructuring Somalia belongs to the Somalis and that the international community whole-heartedly supports all efforts that encourage dialogue among Somalis.

The EC's Special Envoy to Somalia, Mr. Illing stated that "these deliberations on decentralized governance and institutionalized power sharing in Somalia have been inspired by Somalis themselves."¹⁶ In his view, the idea of developing a common understanding between the Somali leadership about the future constitutional arrangements of the state remains a fundamental issue of the peace process in Somalia. But Mr. Arend

¹⁵ European Union Bulletin, Somalia Unit Issue. op.cit., pp.6-7.

¹⁶ Ibid.

Pieper stated that both seminars were initiatives from the European Commission's Special Envoy to Somalia and that they demonstrated the commitment from the European Union towards Somalia. Before the second workshop was closed, the participants established two committees whose work was mainly to follow up the findings and recommendations of the study and the workshops and to ensure the project's continuation.

The Provincial Commissioner of Rift Valley Province, Mr. Mohamed Yusuf Haji, represented the Government of Kenya in his capacity as the official representative of President Moi. The Rift Valley PC received the seminar participants and other international observers to the seminar. He also conveyed President Moi's serious concern about the Somali situation by urging the participants to find a political solution to the Somali conflict since they had the authority to persuade their people to stop the fighting and rebuild Somalia peacefully.

After the close of the second seminar at Lake Nakuru, the participants returned to Nairobi where they spent three additional days discussing the over-riding issue of peace and reconciliation in Somalia. The participants also drew up an appeal they called the "Nakuru Peace Appeal", calling on all Somalis, wherever they may live, to cease the fighting and rebuild their state. The participants also appealed to the international community to continue facilitating Somali efforts at establishing peace and reconciliation and to provide the needed humanitarian, rehabilitation and development assistance to further these efforts.

Lastly, on Thursday 21 November 1996, President Moi invited the participants to meet with him, where they officially launched the Nakuru Peace Appeal. The general

opinion, both before and after the workshops, was that decentralisation would be an essential tenet of a reconstructed Somali state in the future.¹⁷

Other Follow up Workshops

The participants of both workshops requested more follow up workshops to be conducted in Somalia. These were meant to explore possibilities and further develop a common understanding between and among both the Somali leadership and the community at large. Based on this request, three other workshops were held inside Somalia, one in Mogadishu, one in Bosasso and another one in Hargeisa. They all led to interesting debates and opted for federal structures and a weak central government.

The workshops in Mogadishu and Bosasso were quite significant. They served the purpose of developing a common understanding among the Somali people on which political structures to suggest. In Bosasso, in particular, there was a lively discussion and some people argued¹⁸ that the formation of the regional government in Puntland was a product of the report and the workshops and discussions that followed. Only in the northwest, in Somaliland, were the discussions difficult because the residents of Somaliland did not see themselves as part of Somalia and there was no compromise.

Other EC Peace Initiatives

The EC also sponsored activities of Somalis both from the diaspora and inside the country in terms of peace building and reconciliation. Two international conferences were held outside Somalia, one in Paris, France in October 1995 and another one in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in June 1996. Most of the participants were drawn from academic

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Both EC officials and residents of Puntland contest this.

institutions and from the Somali business communities in the diaspora. Those who came from Somalia were representatives of local NGOs, human rights, youth and other active peace and reconciliation networks throughout the country. The conferences resulted in the formation of another peace and reconciliation network called "Somali Peace Line", which is a large grouping of Somali intellectuals, with the objective of promoting a culture of peace in Somalia.

Other projects towards Somalia's peace and reconciliation include the EC's peace building project, which focuses on the empowerment of the civil society in Somalia. Peace building literally means "an action to identify and support structures which will strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse to conflict."¹⁹

Although this project was meant to serve as a follow up effort and support the Menu of Options report, its findings and the recommendations of the participants it also turned to cover a wider programme which was a bit different from its initial focus. The project turned its focus from the follow up of the Menu of Options and instead focused on other long-term peace building projects at the local level. This project funds different specialized UN agencies and other international NGOs including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization (UNESCO), the War-torn Societies Project (WSP), ACTIONAID and the Life and Peace Institute (LPI).

The project covers funding for a wide range of training programmes, advocacy and research and documentation work all aimed at contributing to peace and developing reconciliation mechanisms in Somalia. These peace building practices under these agencies

¹⁹ For more on this see B. Boutros-Ghali An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992), p.11.

in Somalia include peace education programmes, civic education programmes, culture of peace programmes, research and documentation programmes, advocacy programmes, participatory governance training programmes, initiated peace process and reconciliation programmes and a survey of grassroots peace conferences in Somalia.

Major Obstacles to the EC's Peace Initiatives

Several arguments have been advanced with regard to the major obstacles and constraints to the EC initiative in Somalia. The EC itself put forward some of these arguing that "support to the peace process was blocked by different mediators. For example, Egypt has concluded its own Somalia peace talks, leading to tensions with IGAD's peace initiative."²⁰ Egypt invited the Somali political leaders, the warlords, to Cairo for talks alongside the IGAD-approved Ethiopian Sodere conference and this made IGAD members annoyed since the OAU has assigned Somali issues to IGAD.

Other mediators who blocked the EC's peace initiative were IGAD and the UN Political Office for Somalia, which have been in Somalia since the UN pulled out. IGAD was involved in Ethiopia's attempts to manage the Somali conflict and the UN Political Office for Somalia was involved in information gathering exercises and political advisory services to Somali leaders countrywide. This reduced the focus of the Somalis on the EC's attempt. Because of this, the EC was given no chance to test the outcome of the constitutional debate, which was quite functional and had a lot of potential. Other obstacles included lack of project funding and lack of follow up mechanisms put in place by the EC's Somalia unit. This was because the EC designed the project to be a Somali

²⁰ T. Paffenholz "The European Commission in Somalia: Challenges, Problems and the Way Forward" Safer World Focus, July 1999, p.4.

driven initiative, and because it was Somali-driven, Somalis had to take the full responsibility of the project implementation and follow it up from there.

Another major obstacle to the initiative was that the civil society the project targeted was not strong enough and most groups were biased and lacked objectivity. Paffenholz argues that "it is difficult to find local partners who are without political and clan affiliations to warlords. Civil society needs to be empowered. Experienced international partners are not prevalent and this is also a constraint to capacity building,"²¹ and this was a major obstacle to the EC's peace initiative.

There were also difficulties in co-ordinating peace building instruments in Somalia. This was due to the lack of action guidelines, limited project planning tools, obstacles to integrating long term peace building with short term projects, and the inflexibility of some technical development staff who insisted on their ideals, but who never listened to the local people's ideas and suggestions. Usually aid agencies, through their non-Somali staff members, go into the field and assess and analyse the situation from an outsider's perspective and this usually leaves a negative impact on the project output.

Another major obstacle was the shorter time-frame given to both the development of the study, the workshops and the testing period in the field. This was an abrupt exercise, which was meant to bear fruits in less than how informal peace talks should be. This, on the other hand, has the methodological problem that the end result would be a Peace Agreement that can never be implemented because the time spent which is not enough to discuss deep-rooted problems and to prepare for a smooth post-conflict relationship.

²¹ Ibid.

The biggest obstacle is that “generally the international community does not yet have an appropriate, politically acceptable and affordable response to the challenge of failed states”²² and the EC was no exception, although it tried unofficial diplomacy while the EC is itself an agent of official diplomacy. From the UN Charter to the working documents of specific agencies, there is a general lack of appropriate tools to deal with internal conflicts like the Somali one.

Post-EC Somalia

The Djibouti Initiative²³

In September 1999, the new Djiboutian President Ismael Omar Gelle read out a long speech before the Security Council, proposing a new peace initiative for Somalia.²⁴ It was a new peace initiative, which sidelined the warlords and gave more powers and participation to the civil society in all decision-making processes towards Somalia’s peace and reconciliation. The president came up with an action plan, which would set up the government system in six months.

Delegates, mainly the Somali civil society; community elders, clan leaders, religious and women representatives, and intellectuals were invited and the peace conference held in Arta, Djibouti from 2nd of May to the 25th of August when a Transitional National Assembly and an interim President was elected. The new interim Somali President Dr. Abdiqassim Salad Hassan was inaugurated on August 27th 2000 in

²² J. Cilliers “Regional African Peacekeeping Capacity- Mythical Construct or Essential Tool?” in J. Cilliers & G. Mills From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa (Johannesburg & Pretoria: The South African Institute of International Studies and the Institute for Security Studies, 1999), pp.133-152: 138.

²³ The Djibouti Initiative is outside the scope of this study and it is therefore being discussed only to show what took place in Post-EC Somalia.

²⁴ See “Somalia National Peace Conference: An Action Plan for the Peace Process” by President Gelle of Djibouti, September 2000.

Arta, Djibouti. The two government institutions have so far received popular support from the Somali public both inside and outside the country. Also, grievances have been experienced by the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, the regional government of Puntland and warlords from the south, who all claim the initiative was not an all-inclusive broad based one.

Presently, some countries and several international organizations including the Arab League and the European Union have recognised the new interim government. IGAD has also endorsed and supported the Djibouti initiative in its 7th IGAD Summit of Heads of States and Governments on 26 November 1999. Although it looks like a government in exile, it is very busy on general security and stability in Somalia and international legitimacy. It is not yet clear whether it will work but it is widely believed that this initiative, which is the thirteenth in the history of Somali peace initiatives, is different from all the past peace initiatives in Somalia and many people believe that it will work.

CHAPTER 6

THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE INITIATIVES IN SOMALIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Introduction

The Somali conflict is, as discussed in the preceding chapters, part of the Horn of Africa conflict system which includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya. The main problem was not why the conflict began but how it was approached and what track of diplomacy the international actors that have been involved in the various peace and reconciliation initiatives employed. Chapter One discussed the relevant literature on the Somali conflict in general and attempts to manage it, while laying the basic foundation, the theoretical framework of analysis for the study. Chapter Two discussed the relationship between track one and track two conflict management, while Chapter Three gave an overview of the Somali conflict.

Chapter Four specifically discussed track one diplomacy in conflict management. It examined the case of the United Nations in Somalia, in its attempt to bring a lasting resolution to the Somali conflict. Chapter Five discussed track two diplomacy in conflict management. It examined the case of the European Commission in Somalia, in its attempt to bring a lasting resolution to the Somali conflict.

This Chapter critically analyses the issues that have emerged in the previous five chapters, and focuses on the international peace initiatives tried by the United Nations and the European Commission. The Somali conflict has split into a regional conflict and has brought neighbouring countries and others into the system and this has had its implications. The approaches taken by the two international organizations in their conflict management attempts have also had problems, which need to be taken into account if

peace is to prevail in Somalia, since they tried different diplomatic tracks in conflict management. This Chapter will finally discuss the need for dual diplomacy, with a view to suggesting ways and means of improving the future peace initiatives to resolve the Somali conflict.

The Ripe Moment

Chapter One dealt with the notion of ripe moments, in detail, as moments where crises are highly conducive to resolution by an outside actor, as Zartman¹ put it. Based on Zartman's explanation regarding the ripe moment, the United Nations did not intervene the Somali conflict at the ripe moment when the situation was highly conducive to resolution. The United Nations was more for a settlement than resolution for the Somali conflict. On the other hand, the factions were in serious battles and none was willing to come to the round table for any kind of discussion.

To Stedman,² the concept of deadlock and deadline can lead to different assumption. He argues that ripeness in terms of the military situation can be a function of internal changes for example the emergence of new leaders, the consolidation of a divided leadership and the like. Based on Stedman's argument, it is evident that in the Somali conflict the situation was not ripe enough for a third party intervention. This is because each faction leader was capable of defending its territory and those leaders who lost their territories to other faction leaders were prepared to use force as nobody was going to give up an inch of its controlled area and factional reputation for any other leader.

¹ See I. W. Zartman, "The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts" in A. George (ed.), Managing US-Soviet Rivalry, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp.341-364: 341.

² See S. J. Stedman, Peacekeeping in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe 1974-1980, (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), pp.25-28.

In addition to this, as every historical occurrence is, of course, unique³ the Somali conflict situation was itself very new and some warlords had the trust and confidence of their followers. Furthermore, no factional splits existed nor new emerging leaders within factions. Instead, there were factional alliances to enable a group of factions, in a main group, to bargain hard for a bigger and more significant role in future Somali politics as was the case with General Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA), which brought together several other factions including his faction United Somali Congress (USC).

With regard to the European Commission's Somalia unit peace initiative, it came at a time when the Somali conflict was highly conducive to resolution by an outside actor. It was the ripe moment and it can be argued that the EC was more for a resolution of the Somali conflict than a mere settlement. The factions were all tired and nobody wanted to fight anymore. People lacked ideas on how to go about resolving the conflict. Similarly, some factions were weakened while some were strong enough to maintain the status quo thus forcing all of them to come to the round table for discussions.

On the other hand, the general public was fed up of the continuation of the Somali conflict. The civil society, in particular, was also building up its capacity bit by bit, was becoming more powerful and gaining momentum from the support of international elements involved in humanitarian work in Somalia.⁴ The emergency phase, and the relief efforts in response, was over. There was no serious hunger, the people reduced poverty to manageable levels, and it was time to think of reconstruction and development.

³ K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis. (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India. 1992). p.2.

⁴ Interview with Mr. Paul Simkin, EC Somalia Technical Assistant, Peacebuilding project, April 4, 2000.

More businesses started and the civilian community, mainly from business, had a say in politics this time. The time also came where some businessmen could own their own militias and battle-wagons (known as "technical" in Somalia) manned by them. This gave them a role to play in both local politics in their areas of operation and in other circles of life as long as it had something to do with their business interest and issues.

Track One and Track Two Mediation

Apart from the humanitarian intervention of the US-led heavily funded United Nations operation in Somalia,⁵ the United Nations employed a track one approach to conflict management. This was because the UN itself is a track one actor and the target group, the warlords, represented the government structures and leadership since factions controlled the whole Somali country.

The United Nation's approach was rather complex. In the first Addis Ababa conference, delegates included community elders, clan leaders, NGOs representatives, intellectuals and religious and women's groups. All these belong to track two and not track one. Therefore, the United Nations was confused in the approach it took.

Another issue which contributed to the UN's failure in the management of the Somali conflict, was the Somali conflict situation, which required an appropriate and different track of diplomacy in conflict management. This was because the warlords were not properly appointed and empowered diplomats who could meet and interact with each other according to established practices and rules of diplomatic procedure. On the other

⁵ This operation cost the UN a lot of money. For example between April 1992-March 1993 the UN expenditure was US\$ 42.9 million (net) while between March 1993-March 1995 it was US\$ 1.6 billion (net). See more on this in 50 Years UN Peacekeeping 1948-1998. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1998), pp.28-29.

hand, some warlords could not agree on any point since they had no power. A majority of the local militias in Somalia were under no man's rule. Therefore there was a need for an alternative in which the conflict would have been resolved by bringing everybody into the process. The United Nations, on the other hand, did not have any sort of leverage to pressurize the warlords in the implementation of the peace agreements. This therefore left the United Nations to act as a facilitator and do nothing beyond that.

With regard to the EC, apart from the humanitarian work the European Commission's Humanitarian Office (ECHO) ran, the European Commission's Somalia unit, while a track one agent, employed a track two approach to conflict management. This was because the UN's approach failed and the EC wanted to try its hand on some 'think pieces' with a different approach⁶ despite its status as a track one actor. Another major reason for the EC's initiative was the existence of an acceptable civil society that the EC could depend on for the implementation of the outcome of the peace talks. From this perspective its approach was good.

A major problem was that the EC's approach, just like the UN's, was also somehow complex. Instead of inviting the actual community elders, clan leaders and the local militias involved in the conflict, it invited some prominent community elders, clan leaders, intellectuals, religious and women representatives and other prominent leaders including former statesmen, who were not or little involved in the actual fighting. These actors were also less powerful in decision-making at the local level since decisions were unanimous and tied to not only the community elders and the clan leaders but also to the warlords.

⁶ See more about track two in Chapter One.

The European Commission, on the other hand, did not have strong leverage, which could enable it to pressurize the workshop participants to make sure that the recommendations of the workshops were fully implemented in Somalia. The type of leverage the European Commission had was knowledge and reputation. These two could not work in an environment where people wanted money, and this left the European Commission to act as a facilitator and nothing beyond that since it was not capable of doing anything else.

The Question of Leverage

Leverage⁷ in terms of political and economic power was one of the basic elements the United Nations lacked in its Somalia operations. The United Nations could neither force nor threaten militarily factions to accept and implement any peace deal. Instead it took a back seat and played the role of a facilitator in the peace and reconciliation talks and it begged warlords to respect and implement the Addis Ababa agreements. This strengthened the warlords' positions.

In terms of economic power, the United Nations had mismanaged the resources at its disposal. There were no viable projects towards peace and reconciliation, which would otherwise help as leverage. This was a major problem since political acts often have far-reaching social and economic effects and conversely social and economic factors greatly influence politics⁸ thus making the whole process very complicated. Also, there was no

⁷ More on this see M. Mwagiru. Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management. (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000), pp. 132-133.

⁸ E. Nwabazor and M. Mueller. An Introduction to Political Science for African Students. (London & Basingstoke: Macmillan Education Ltd, 1985), p.20.

special fund for the follow up and implementation of peace agreements apart from some logistical support during conferences.

The European Commission had both the financial resources and the political will to work on the peace initiative but there were certain procedures which hindered the full use of these resources. These included competition between former Somali colonialists, Britain and Italy, which lobbied for a federal and a central state system respectively. The Italian government lobbied for a central state system because of its economic interests in the south, and the possibility of trade relationship with the future Somalia government including a possible re-negotiation of the Lome convention. The British government, on the other hand, lobbied for either secession for the northwest or for a federal system where 'Somaliland' would have regional autonomy because Hargeisa was once a British colony.

' The EC's financial management system is also time consuming. It is very bureaucratic. Instead, the EC used its knowledge to get the peace initiative going but this was not enough. The only place where the initiative worked was in Bosasso, in northeast Somalia where the EC claims the formation of 'the zonal government of Puntland' as one of the successes of the EC's peace initiative in Somalia. This is true although Ethiopia, under the IGAD banner, has also contributed to the idea, of zonal governments or regional administrations, as 'building blocks' towards the formation of a federal state system for Somalia.

The Time Frame of the Peace Initiatives

The time-frame of the Addis Ababa conferences was another major obstacle to reaching a peaceful resolution to the Somali conflict. The faction leaders were not given enough time to discuss the conflict. They could not discuss all the problems before them,

the causes of the conflict, the prospect for peace and other important businesses regarding the Somali conflict. The faction leaders were forced to sign peace agreements they could not implement. Also these agreements were not studied and analysed in detail.

The peace agreements were drafted abruptly and gave little room for the possibility of implementation in Somalia. They were very ambitious and contained impossible terms that could never be implemented in Somalia at least in the short term. Due to the UN pressures on the speed of the conference, less time was allocated for the parties to discuss the real issue of, the framework for national reconciliation. Also, less time was allotted to designing clear mechanisms for implementing the agreements.

Apart from the short time-frame given to the development of the study of decentralized political structures for Somalia, the workshops were also given less time to cover discussions on the study recommendations, analyse and come up with locally acceptable recommendations including which options they would pick for Somalia. The participants were not given enough time to digest the study and deeply analyse it. They, instead, went through an abrupt exercise where they had to select the best option from the four political models proposed by the European Commission. The workshops produced the "Nakuru Peace Appeal,"⁹ which is more or less a Peace Agreement, which the participants themselves, as members from the civil society, were not in a position to implement. Even the other three follow up workshops held inside Somalia were not allocated sufficient time.

Usually informal peace talks take longer than formal talks because they involve a deeper analysis of the causes of the conflict and the establishment of confidence building

⁹ See European Union Bulletin, Somalia Unit Issue No. 6. Nairobi April 1997, p.14.

measures for post-conflict relationships. Due to pressures from the EC officials who were organizing the workshops, the participants were not given enough time to study the options. It can be argued that the discussions were not complete and that the participants would have come up with a better idea if they were given more time.

Changes in Power Realities

While, quite often, people think of politics as involving competing or conflicting leaders, factions or parties which seek to occupy positions of power in the public arena, with the aim of shaping public policies,¹⁰ this is not the case in Somalia. It is there for self-interest and this greatly contributes to refueling the conflict. Another major problem, which contributed to the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreements, was the change of power realities right after the conference. It is widely believed that the Addis Ababa conferences strengthened the position of the warlords by giving them some legitimacy and recognition¹¹ within and outside Somalia. They became the political leaders the international community dealt with in terms of humanitarian co-ordination and political settlement for Somalia. Also the parties which signed the agreements were not on the same level in terms of military capability, organization and political power. Some factions did not represent the people they claimed to represent and this greatly contributed to the collapse of the talks.

Somaliland, on the other hand, maintained its stand that it was independent and had nothing to do with the south although the Somali National Movement (SNM) sent

¹⁰ N. G. Wanjohi, "The Substance of Politics" in C. Okigbo (ed.), Reporting Politics and Public Affairs. (Nairobi: English Press, 1994), pp.17-30:17.

¹¹ See M. Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace Oxfam Research Paper no. 9. (Oxford: Oxfam Print Unit, 1994), p.23.

observers to monitor what was going on. This was also another reality which was not taken into account. Somaliland, a former British colony, was independent for five days between June 26 to July 1st, 1960 when it decided to join southern Somalia to form the Republic of Somalia. Barre's oppressive government violated the human rights of the people in northwest after SNM started armed opposition against Barre. They were massacred and this led to anger and to the decision to secede.

The Role and Power of Civil Society

The target group "the civil society" was not strong enough to relay the message or have a strong influence in local politics. This was a major hindrance to the initiative and partly contributed to its collapse. Most of the participants were not directly involved in the Somali conflict in any way. Only very few of them, especially the clan leaders, had a strong say in the decision-making processes in their home areas in Somalia and indeed a majority of the participants had no say at all.

Another major problem was the bias and the lack of objectivity often related to the term "civil society" in war-torn Somalia, which also contributed to the collapse of the initiative. Civil society in Somalia, and most groups NGOs and CBOs in particular are biased and lack objectivity. This is because there is no single group which includes all the clans or sub-clans of the wider Somali tribe. In other words each clan or sub-clan forms a group made up of its membership, thus making the role of civil society in war-torn Somalia unacceptable by international standards. This is also a notion shared by most representatives of the international community in Somalia.¹²

¹² Interview with Mr. Fadi Badejo. UNPOS Political Advisor to Somalia. June 19 2000. Nairobi.

Other Interests and Issues

As has already been noted, the Somali conflict is part of the Horn of Africa conflict system. Because of the conflict system it belong to, there have been different issues and interests held by various actors, which all contributed to the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreements. These included the host country, Ethiopia, which was not for a future central Somali state. This was due to its fear of Somali irredentism, which could cause another Ethio-Somali war. Ethiopia and Somalia were bitter enemies for quite sometime. It was due to the change of power and regimes, which the two countries brought together. The two countries fought over Ogaden in 1977-1978, which led to the defeat of Somalia and the start of the current Somali civil war. It is on this basis that Lewis¹³ argues that if the Somali government had spent a minute fraction of its military budget on a professional public relations campaign, it might have been easier to convince outsiders of the justice of the Somali case for self-government in the Ogaden. Egypt, on the other hand, is for a central Somali state, which can become a threat to Ethiopia so that it would have some relief over the Nile waters.

From the UN side, wrangles existed between and among its members inside Somalia. For example there was a problem between Italy and the United States on military command and control since the UN troops were headed by an American national who also reported to Washington while the Italian Commander in Chief decided to report to Rome. This gave the United Nations less time to focus on peace and reconciliation for Somalia. The United Nations was forced to spend more time and resources on its internal

¹³ I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. (Boulder: Westview, 1988). p.243.

organizational conflicts and problems, and this diverted most of its attention from Somalia to other less important issues which were not part of its mandate, for example internal conflict management.

The EC peacebuilding project officials claim that other parallel regional peace initiatives were developed and run alongside the EC's, and this discouraged it from continuing since it did not belong to the region. These initiatives included Ethiopia's Sodere Conference, Egypt's Cairo Conference, the general territorial nature of IGAD's work in the region where it wants to manipulate all efforts as the main sub-regional organization, and Italy's involvement in Somalia. All these peace initiatives would have worked well if there had been a well coordinated information sharing network between and among all the stakeholders.

The "Republic of Somaliland"¹⁴ was also an obstacle to the EC's peace initiative because the people of northwest Somalia, the "Somalilanders", did not see themselves as part of Somalia and they therefore demanded a separate study for them.

The Expected Outcome of the Peace Initiatives

The expected outcome of the peace talks in Addis Ababa was the drafting of Peace Agreements. The peace talks focused on future constitutional and institutional aspects of the conflict and never looked at the psychological and perceptual aspects of the Somali conflict. There was a lot to be done before these two major issues were discussed since the conflict itself needed to be analysed. The faction leaders forgot to discuss the causes of

¹⁴ Formerly known as northwest Somalia, under the administration of Somali National Movement (SNM) the "Republic of Somaliland" proclaimed independence from Somalia in May 1991.

the conflict, mechanism for a long-term reconciliation, and confidence building measures which would have laid down a solid foundation for a sound post-conflict relationship.

Regarding the EC's initiative, the expected output of the study concerned the selection and the use of the best political structure suitable for Somalia. The study was mainly a constitutional debate, which further discussed what institutions should be in place under each political structure. It had nothing to do with psychological and perceptual aspects of the Somali conflict. The EC could not avoid from its nature as a track one actor and although the study targeted track two actors, it fell back to the methodologies of track one conflict management to resolve the Somali conflict.

Finances and Resources

The United Nations was handicapped in terms of financial resources both for its operations and for the peace and reconciliation initiatives. Most of the funds for the UN operation in Somalia were covered by the United States. This restricted the independence of the UN's decision-making and contributed to the collapse of its peace initiative. On the other hand, the UN operation had a positive economic impact on the lives of many Somalis especially those living in areas covered by the operation, mainly south Somalia. As a contribution to the national economy, there was an unintended structural impact derived from UNOSOM's size, location, and manner of conduct and from its programmatic impact, resulting from its programmes and activities.¹⁵ This, therefore, encouraged some reluctance by the faction leaders, who in one way or another benefited a lot from the UNOSOM presence.

¹⁵ See J. Ameen "Peacebuilding Efforts in Somalia: Legacies of the International Intervention" an International Peace Academy Policy Forum (New York: United Nations, April 1996), pp.9-10.

A major problem the EC faced was the lack of project funding for the implementation and follow up of the study recommendations. The steering and technical committees set up required some technical support and back up which would have worked without the EC's financial support. This was contrary to the EC's claims that the project was meant to be a Somali driven. The participants, and the committees in particular, could not continue the project due to lack of project funding and the project was terminated. It was poor planning on the EC's part since it did not allocate enough funding to continue with a good number of workshops, seminars and forums for discussion on the study. Also the EC did not establish any follow up mechanisms at all, whether voluntary or not.

The Missing Role

™ The Somali community elders, clan leaders, religious, youth, and women groups, intellectuals, the professional associations and the civil society in general were denied roles to play in the peace talks. UNOSOM invited some of these actors only to the first part of the conference and kept the warlords in the final critical discussions. This was also contrary to the Somali culture and custom, which acknowledges the role of community elders and clan leaders as peacemakers. The main concern of the UN was that signatories at the conference were the fifteen political leaders, the 'warlords', who in the eyes of many Somalis were criminals responsible for much of the suffering in Somalia.¹⁶ This has, on the contrary, contributed to the collapse of the agreements signed by the warlords only since the agreements did not have their blessings.

¹⁶ M. Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace Oxfam Research Paper no. 9. (Oxford: Oxfam Print Unit, 1994). p.23.

Usually Somali community elders and clan leaders take some time to discuss conflict, analyse their causes and finally resolve them. There is no single conflict in which the community elders and clan leaders were not involved. These actors are also known to be honest about the implementation on the agreements they sign.

Similarly, the EC's initiative lacked the role of track one actors in the discussions of the menu of options which would have accommodated their ideas and pave the way for a self-sustaining dual diplomatic conflict management process.

Holistic Approach of Managing the Somali Conflict: Dual Diplomacy

As noted in Chapter One, dual diplomacy does not necessarily mean two or more track one approaches operating in the same conflict or track one and track two operating in parallel in the same conflict. As Mwangiru argues, dual diplomacy or dual track diplomacy would address simultaneously both the inter-state and internal levels.¹⁷ It means that track one conflict management addresses bargainable matters such as constitutional and institutional frameworks in the post-conflict period, while track two addresses the psychological and perceptual matters, which are not bargainable.

According to Mwangiru,¹⁸ the use of dual diplomacy in any case would lead to an enduring and self-sustaining outcome to the conflict with the two tracks acting as valuable components of the same conflict management process. Based on this concept and its understanding and the whole essence of this dual approach is the realization that conflict management is a complex issue. Both the United Nations and the European Commission

¹⁷ See M. Mwangiru, The International Management of Internal Conflicts in Africa: The Uganda Mediation 1985, (Ph. D. Dissertation. University of Kent at Canterbury. 1994), p.41.

¹⁸ Ibid.

should have opted for dual diplomacy since it would have addressed both sides of the conflict and it would have included all the actors involved, both official and non-official.

Dual track diplomacy enhances the process of conflict management since neither track one nor track two diplomacy individually can provide a suitable diplomatic context within which to manage the Somali conflict. It is clear that the two tracks complement one another since none can stand and function effectively without the support and back up of the other. Because of this the United Nations and the European Commission failed their peace initiatives in Somalia.

Dual diplomacy¹⁹ also serves three main purposes: an analytical role where it helps the conflict manager/analyst to study the conflict system the conflict in question belongs to, and base the conflict studies, its findings and recommendations on that conflict system. Secondly it plays a supportive role where it helps different conflicts to be resolved together, and it finally plays a monitoring role where the conflict manager/analyst is able to monitor and know what is going on in each diplomatic track and keep a record of any development within the conflict management process.

Commitment to Conflict Management

As was shown in Chapters Four and Five, there was no serious commitment to the conflict management processes by both the United Nations and the European Commission in their peace initiatives in Somalia. This was due to the major obstacles the UN and the EC faced during the peace processes and the lack of political will by the warlords and the Somali people in general. Without serious commitment to any peace process and the lack

¹⁹ More on the roles of Dual Diplomacy, See M. Mwangi. The International Management of Internal Conflicts in Africa: The Uganda Mediation 1985. (Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1994). p.41.

of political will there can be no effective and successful process that can take place and this was what the study has revealed.

Another major problem the study noted was the lack of coordination among the stakeholders in the peace initiatives in Somalia. The aid agencies ran their relief, rehabilitation, and development work in different parts of the country. The United Nations employed official diplomacy and failed. The European Commission employed a different approach and also failed. Other actors were also involved in the process in one way or another but they all failed. All these third parties, both official and non-official did their conflict management work without any coordinated and coherent approach.

This contributed to the failure of all their efforts towards peace and reconciliation in Somalia. In future peace initiatives, there is a serious need for coordination and cooperation among all stakeholders because this increases the prospects for achieving their final goal. Such coordination and cooperation also facilitates the establishment of a serious commitment to the peace process, the creation of political will by the conflicting parties and the maintenance of a coordinated and coherent approach by all the intermediaries involved in the management of the conflict.

In the European Commission's efforts, the problem solving approach was not really put into use. As Montville²⁰ argues the parties to the conflict need to take a walk through the history of their conflict leading to the acknowledgement of mutual responsibility. Instead of employing a problem-solving workshop approach, the EC fell

²⁰ J. V. Montville. "The Healing Function of Political Conflict Resolution" in D. J. D. Sandole and H. Van der Merwe (eds.). Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application. (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 1993). pp.112-127.

back to track one methodology and tabled a constitutional debate in an informal diplomatic discussion.

In conclusion, the roles and contributions of track one and track two diplomacy in the management of the Somali conflict were not very effective. This does not mean that they have not been effective at all. The two tracks have been employed but they should have been employed in a more effective way. No single track can function effectively without the other and this really has been ignored. Therefore there are effective roles and great contributions they can make together in the management of the Somali conflict.

CHAPTER SEVEN CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

The study has made a long journey from the history of the Somali conflict.¹ It has tried to point out where the problems lie and which obstacles hindered the international peace initiatives tried by the United Nations and the European Commission, by using both official and un-official diplomacy in conflict management. It started from pre-colonial Somalia all the way to present day Somali politics, conflict and conflict management.

Despite the fact that Somalia was considered to be a unique state in Africa, having a single ethnic group, the Somali tribe, whose ethnicity was defined by the Somali common language, their pastoral economy and adherence to Islamic Sunni and the clan-based political system, it still raises the question of why the Somalis should fight, and why such a homogeneous society should be wrecked by such an internal strife. It is true that apart from the causes of the Somali conflict, discussed earlier, there exist some very fundamental issues that relate to power and wealth, the distribution of administration and opposition, the urban and rural areas and those that relate to the rich and the poor and the widening gap between the two.

Currently, Somalia, neglected by the world and without a government for nearly ten years, it is doing better than expected.² A good example is that the average Somali, self-reliant and tough, is probably no worse off than the average Tanzanian or Zambian. Wages for unskilled workers in Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, in the north, which

¹ See Chapter Three.

² See The Economist (London) August 28th 1999, p.31.

now considers itself independent of Somalia, are twice the rate in Nairobi, Kenya's capital city.³

The United Nations intervention⁴ was not a total failure, but one, which taught a very expensive lesson, to the United Nations and the international community to watch out carefully before such an attempt is made, and to the Somalis themselves. The United Nations believed when it was withdrawing its troops from Somalia that the situation in Somalia would continue to deteriorate until the political will was created among the parties to reach a peaceful solution to their conflict, or until the international community gives itself new instruments to address the phenomenon of a failed state.⁵ The UN has a right to say so because the UN Charter provides for the admission to the international community of a country, which gains the attributes of a sovereign state, for instance, through independence or decolonisation.

The UN Charter does not, however, provide for any mechanism through which the international community can respond when a sovereign state loses one of its attributes of statehood for example its government. This leads to the conclusion that further reflection by the international community is required and, this study agrees with this perception.

The European Commission's attempt⁶ lacked a follow-up mechanism and the continuation of the project and its funding. On the other hand, the Menu of Options was also against Islamic *Sharia* law, thus creating another structural conflict between the religious groups on one side and the factions and the workshops participants on the other.

³ Ibid.

⁴ See Chapter Four.

⁵ The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996 (New York: Department of Public Information. United Nations. 1996), p.87.

⁶ See Chapter Five.

Also, just like any other policy formulated, implementation is and will always be the biggest problem. In addition to this, it is an initiative many Somalis⁷ see as “foreign” to Somalia’s political history which cannot work.

The ripe moment to manage the Somali conflict has now been reached since the current Somali situation is conducive to intervention by a third party.⁸ It is the work of the international community to step in and facilitate peace talks since the current situation is highly conducive to third party intervention and will also therefore serve as a preventive diplomacy.⁹ This will prevent further turmoil, which can lead to genocide, a situation in which everybody, both the international community and the Somalis, will accuse the other of not helping out.

The study concludes a dual track conflict management would work in the management of the Somali conflict as they both complement one another. This is in line with Thomas Bailey’s¹⁰ idea that the generals and the diplomats should cooperate in both peace and war since diplomatic and military affairs are siamese twins. In this approach, the methodologies and concerns of track one and track two conflict management would cooperate in the management of the same conflict.¹¹ This would give groups, the warlords and the civil society and especially in this case the community elders, clan leaders, and intellectuals, religious and women groups, more and active roles in the management of the

Interview with Mohamoud Saleh Noor. Foreign Minister, “Somaliland Republic”, September 15, 2000. Nairobi.

⁸ For more on ripe moments see I. W. Zartman, “The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts” in A. George (ed.), Managing US-Soviet Rivalry, (Boulder: Westview, 1983), pp.341-364:341.

⁹ For more on preventive diplomacy see B. B. Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, (New York: United Nations, 1992), pp.13-19.

¹⁰ B. Thomas, The Art of Diplomacy: The American Experience, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p.244.

¹¹ M. Mwagiru, “Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa” A Paper presented at the IRG Conference, Mombasa, Kenya 6-9 Nov., 1996.

conflict. There is therefore a need to disempower the warlords and empower the civil society, in order to create an effective role for other actors in the management of the Somali conflict.

In conclusion, while Somalis need to ask themselves too whether the fight, started with the struggle for independence, and theoretically consolidated with freedom, is still the good fight forty years on,¹² it is only true to state that Somalis and their leaders would be the ones to tackle their domestic political problems and to bring about peace in the Somali society. In fact nobody outside Somalia would or could do it. Of course, facilitation may work but nothing beyond that.

Furthermore, Somalia is in the process of creating a totally new and different state system. It also appears that it is going back to its origins. All it needs is the support of the international community to facilitate this process since the Somali problem is for Somalis and it is for them to sort it out.

¹² To paraphrase M. Mwagiru, Reclaiming the Future: Pan-Africanism, the OAU and Foreign Policy in Africa. USIU-A Occasional Paper on International Relations, No. 1., 1999, p.1.

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