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Violent Conflicts over Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region

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DECLARATION

I, Loise Alix hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

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This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor;

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this research work to my entire family for their endless support.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AoGs	Arm opposition Groups
IGAD	Authority on Development
CECORE	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EITI	Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
FGoS	Federal Government of Somalia
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
RINR	Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
RESCSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SINELAC	Société International d'Electricite des Pays des Grands Lacs
GLR	Great Lake Region
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army

ABSTRACT

Africa's Great Lakes Region has recently experienced political strife, violent conflicts and population displacements with severe humanitarian consequences. While these events have clearly revolved around political struggles for the control of the state, recent research point to the scarce natural resources in the region as structural causes of violent conflicts.The main aim of the study was to examine the extent to which scarce natural resources have contributed to violent conflicts in the Great Lake region. The criteria to be used to analyze the data collected included categorizing the themes derived from each category of questions, coding the themes, tabulating them where necessary, summarizing the major components and propositions of the study and cross checking the facts and discrepancies of the facts. Data was analyzed quantitatively by making interpretation of the findings based on the description.

The findings revealed that the shift in the strategies of regional governments from complicity in natural resource conflicts, to greater willingness to explore a new, legitimate, and peaceful conflict mitigation mechanisms in the Great Lakes is real. Independent auditing and harmonized standards for conflict-free natural resource utilization is essential in pressuring country governments to mitigate exploitation of natural resources by armed groups and in signifying to conflict-affected communities that human rights infractions matter to central and regional governments. These governments, and some powerful circles of interests within the great lakes region, are calculating how they can continue to profit from the natural resources without incurring costs associated with violation of proposed certification schemes. The study found that much of the shift in government positions on natural resource trade is being driven by the current and anticipated costs of trading in the scarce natural resources.

The study concluded that Regional bodies and institutions in East Africa are playing a more significant role as platforms for interstate collaboration on security issues and conflict management. Protracted conflicts, regional insurgencies, and crossborder criminality stress border and national-level response systems, and regional organizations are becoming more essential for monitoring, prevention, and crossborder response mechanisms. In recent years, intergovernmental relations have improved across much of the region, particularly between Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, providing new opportunities for conflict management. IGAD's aspirations to build more effective conflict early warning and mitigation capacity are institutionalized in CEWARN, operational since 2003.

The study recommended that for economic cooperation and peace building to become mutually reinforcing in the Great Lakes Region, the regional organizations needs to refine their mandate and areas of engagement in light of the instability and capacity of governments in the region through the following ways: In the economic cooperation pillar alone, large-scale infrastructure projects can represent highly contested natural resources worth fighting over. Further, initiatives such as a natural resource certification scheme risk duplicating efforts at the international level, which are already proving costly and often ineffective. The added value of the regional organizations' engagement in such activities must be better articulated. Regional organizations would be better off focusing on more security-related issues.

CHAPTER ONE

VIOLENT NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICTS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

1.1 Background to the study

The Great Lakes region comprises of Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and Democratic Republic of the Congo. The region has rapidly replaced Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa as the region that is highly prone to violence in the continent. In recent years, Africa's Great Lakes Region has experienced political strife, violent conflicts and population displacements with severe humanitarian consequences. While these events have clearly revolved around political struggles for the control of the state, recent research point to the scarce natural resources in the region as structural causes of violent conflicts. Scarce natural resources have contributed to a number of high-intensity violent conflicts in the region. In Rwanda for example, unequal access to in addition to privileges given to Tutsi above Hutu within the administration, and changes to land tenure were responsible for the genocide. The 1959 'Social Revolution' involved violence against Tutsi, many of whom fled and their lands but were later re-allocated. The post-colonial government claimed to have dismantled out-dated structures and created a more equitable system of land ownership, but the new state elite lost no time in misusing their power to access land and cheap agricultural labour retaining the same structural problem.

Limited access to natural resources in the Great Lakes Region, exacerbated by their inequitable distribution, and by land tenure insecurity brought about by frequent episodes of population displacement and subsequent re-distribution of land by the state. The Great Lakes region is an illustrative example of the need to abandon the artificial contrast between intra- and inter-state conflicts. It is, as well, an example of an armed conflict, in which a possible containment of violence has to take into account the interface between structural and direct violence. For the first time for many years, a fragile, but positive development is taking place in all Great Lake Region (GLR) countries. Rwanda formally left the transition process behind with the elections in 2003. The DRC reached a power-sharing agreement and a transitional government was installed in July 2003. In Burundi, a peace agreement was reached on November 15th 2003.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Natural resources have always been linked to conflicts both directly and indirectly. They both motivate and sustain violent conflicts. Control over valuable renewable and non-renewable natural resources has induced several acute conflicts. Primary products with high economic rent also provide means to finance violent activities. High dependence on natural resources, without proper management and appropriate policies also, tend to be associated with poor economic performance, weakening government institutions and thus increase risk of conflict. Natural capital seems to displace foreign capital, social capital, human capital, and physical capital. In addition to slower economic growth, increased dependence of natural resources seems to be associated with greater income distribution disparities. Natural resource dependence tends to eradicate government institutions, making them more vulnerable to conflicts.

Corruption, state weakness, and reduced accountability tend to be associated with large revenues from natural resources. .

It has been argued that natural resource driven conflict may be induced also by resource scarcity. The overuse and declining quantity and quality of the non-renewable resources or mismanagement of renewable sources, such as forests may cause tension over the shrinking resource base. Scarcity and mismanagement may also induce migration, forcing people to look for new resources to replace the local depleted resource base. This may lead conflicts between natives and immigrants, within national borders or internationally. Resource scarcity has been also linked to weakening government institutions, eroding confidence in government, civil unrest and conflict. Most governments in the Great Lakes Region do not have policies for managing crisis associated with scarce natural resources. Consequently, slight alterations in the scramble for the scarce resources by populations in the region have been known to ignite violent conflicts. This study therefore aims to analyze violent conflicts caused as a result of scarce natural resources in the Great lakes Region and recommend mechanisms that can be used by the regional organizations and states in mitigating such forms of violent conflicts.

The research was guided by the following research questions; To what extent have the scarce natural resources contributed to violent conflicts in the Great Lake region? What is the effectiveness of regional organizations in their response to violent conflicts over natural resources in the Great Lakes Region? What strategies are being used by governments in the Great Lakes Region to end violent conflicts over natural resources?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

1.3.1 Main objective

The main objective of the study is to examine the extent to which scarce natural resources have contributed to violent conflicts in the Great Lake region.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The study was guided by the following specific objectives;

i. To establish the role of regional organizations in responding to violent conflicts over natural resources in the Great Lakes Region.

ii. To identify the strategies used by governments in the Great Lakes Region to end violent conflicts over natural resources.

1.4 Literature Review

This section reviews literature on natural resources conflicts under the following sub-headings: Natural resource and violent conflicts, aspects of natural resource conflicts attributes of natural resource users, sharing of natural resources and onset of natural resource conflicts.

1.4.1 Natural resources and violent conflicts

Empirical studies have identified many relationships between natural resources and conflict. Interstate conflict is more likely between states that share river borders, especially where freshwater is scarce. Conflicts also erupt between states competing for scarce fishery resources, as illustrated by the Cod Wars between Iceland and Great

Britain.[1] The scarcity of environmental resources has been positively linked to interstate conflict, including fresh water, fisheries, soil degradation, and population density and growth.[2] In the civil war literature, oil resources have been shown to increase the chances for domestic conflict, while lootable resources, such as alluvial diamonds increase the onset and duration of civil wars. Environmental degradation, such as deforestation, land degradation, and scarcity of freshwater supply, may also increase the risk for civil war.[3]

Collier and Hoeffler[4] emphasize the opportunity costs for rebellion, focusing on productive economic activities individuals forego in order to join a rebel group. Their primary finding is that states with higher average income levels experience significantly reduced risk for civil wars. They also consider how natural resource dependency, measured by primary commodity exports/GDP, alters the opportunity costs for rebellion. They include this measure and a squared term in their models, finding an inverted U relationship between primary commodity exports and civil war onset. "At peak danger (primary commodity exports being 33% of GDP), the risk of civil war is about 22%, while a country with no such exports has a risk of only 1%".[5]They also disaggregate resources into specific types (food, nonfood agriculture, oil, etc.) and find that the only significant difference in civil war risk occurs between oil and non-oil producing states.

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[1] Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, Scott Gates, and Håvard Hegre. (1999) Evolution in Democracy-War Dynamics. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(4):771–792.

[2]Stalley, Philip. (2003) Environmental Scarcity and International Conflict. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 20(1):33–58.

[3] Theisen, Ole Magnus. (2008). Blood and Soil? Resource Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict Revisited. *Journal of Peace Research* 45(6):801–818.

[4] Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffler, (2004). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers,* 56: 563–595.

[5] Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. (2004) Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers* 56:563–595.

The emphasis on oil is further articulated in Fearon and Laitin's[6] study of civil war onset. They emphasize the importance of state strength, which influences the government's ability to handle insurgencies. Fearon and Laitin[7] also find that wealthier states have significantly lower risks for civil war. Theoretically, they argue that: The political and military technology of insurgency will be favored . . . when potential rebels . . . have . . . land that supports the production of high value, low-weight goods such as coca, opium, diamonds, and other contraband, which can be used to finance an insurgency and a state whose revenues derive primarily from oil exports. Oil producers tend to have weaker state apparatuses than one would expect given their level of income because the rulers have less need for a socially intrusive and elaborate bureaucratic system to raise revenues . . . At the same time, oil revenues raise the value of the "prize" of controlling state power.

1.4.2 Aspects of natural resource conflicts

Klare[8] outlines what he sees as a new landscape of global conflict in the post-Cold War era, shaped by the growing strategic value of certain mineral resources. The international community's attention to the resource-rich regions of Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa is seen as a sign of this shift. Klare[9] argues that the moves powerful countries make to ensure access to key resources can give rise to clashes in resource-rich areas. The assumption that powerful countries intervene elsewhere in pursuit of valuable resources is also the point of departure for another study, which finds

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[6] Fearon, James D., and David Laitin. (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97(1):75–90.
[7] Ibid
[8] Klare, Michael T., (2001). *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict.* New York: Metropolitan Books.
[9] Ibid Page 59.

that "wars over oil further destabilize faltering regimes". This contrasts with other research which argues that policy and context will determine whether and to what extent oil connects to conflict.[10] The assertion that global competition for resources gives rise to international wars is relatively weakly supported by evidence. Inter-state wars have been on the decline in recent years, and the extent to which the international wars that have taken place are resource-related remains contested.

Yet a country's resource bounty can relate to international conflict not only through global, but also through regional competition for resources. Some of the civil wars that broke out after the end of the Cold War saw involvement of armed groups from neighboring countries, some of which were active in extracting and selling resources from the country at war. Such groups can be state or non-state. As regards non-state armed groups, one study finds that rebel sanctuaries across borders do increase the probability of an international conflict.[11] It is less known to what extent resource extraction and trade by such foreign militias cause international conflict or internationalization of internal strife. The argument has also been made that resource bounty can prompt international conflicts by attracting agents representing neighboring states or business corporations, but one study finds little evidence of such a dynamic.[12] Yet given the relative dearth of research on resource wealth and international and internationalized wars, these conclusions remain tentative.

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[10] Humphreys, Macartan & Martin E. Sandbu, (2007). The Political Economy of Natural Resource Funds. In Macartan

[11] Salehyan, Idean, (2008). No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict. *Journal of Politics,* 70 (1): 54–66.

[12] Humphreys, Macartan, (2005). Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms. *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 49 (4): 508–537.

The focus of the resource-conflict literature to date has been on how resource wealth is associated with civil war. Most statistical studies analyze data on civil wars, which often is defined as a conflict over government or territory that involves a minimum of battle-related deaths per year –standard thresholds are 1,000 for civil war and 25 for lower-intensity internal armed conflict. Yet examining conflict only defined in this way reveals merely one part of the resource-conflict picture. As Le Billon[13] notes, "the narrow definition of violence used in much of the literature overlooks multiple forms and scales of violence enacted through resource exploitation and regulation. War is not the only (or even the primary) type of violence associated with resource-extractive industries". His review of the geographical literature suggests that violence in countries of extraction should be understood in relation not only to local dynamics, but also to the global chain of extraction, production and consumption, the peripheralization of the extraction site, and the "dispossession regimes" that these processes imply.

Resource-rich countries that do see civil war breaking out will see the war *last* longer than wars in resource-poorer countries. An early proponent of this argument was David Keen, who argued that "conflict can create war economies, often in the regions controlled by rebels or warlords and linked to international trading networks; members of armed gangs can benefit from looting; and regimes can use violence to deflect opposition, reward supporters and maintain their access to resources. Under these circumstances, ending civil wars becomes difficult".[14] Keen's perspective has been validated by statistical research on some mineral resources but not on others. A literary review and

[13] Le Billon, Philippe, 2008. Diamond Wars? Conflict Diamonds and Geographies of Resource Wars. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* 98 (2): 345–372.
[14] Keen, David, (1998). *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars.* London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

statistical study thus finds that the only resource variable robustly linked to conflict duration is a measure of contraband, which includes gemstones, timber, and narcotics.[15] Several studies of diamonds find that they tend to prolong civil wars,[16] but diamonds have also been found to shorten wars.

1.4.3 Sharing of natural resource revenues

The governance problems associated with resource bounty can be addressed through revenue sharing, which can be part of peace agreements, and institutionalized in so-called natural resource funds. Le Billon and Nicholls[17] examine 14 revenue-sharing deals part of peace accords from 1989–2006, and find revenue sharing to a deceptive quick fix: quickly followed by peace, but rarely by a lasting peace. When revenue sharing is combined with sanctions, however, peace implementation seems more likely to succeed – at least more likely than in cases where only military intervention was implemented. Here too, however, conclusions are tentative due to the small number of cases involved and the dearth of research on the effects of wealth-sharing agreements.

It is commonly held that a wise way of managing bountiful revenue streams from resources is to establish so-called natural resource funds, which serve to smooth expenditure patterns over time. Models for such funds vary as regards how they should be managed and by whom. One study argues that the fund's decision-making body should operate according to clear rules and with transparency; and involve

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[15] Ross, Michael L., (2006). A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War. *Annual Review of Political Science,* 9: 265–300.

[16] Lujala, Päivi, Nils Petter Gleditsch & Elisabeth Gilmore, (2005). A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource. *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 49 (4): 538–562.

[17] Le Billon, Philippe & Eric Nicholls, (2007). Ending 'Resource Wars': Revenue Sharing, Economic Sanction or Military Intervention? *International Peacekeeping,* 14 (5): 613–632.

representatives of diverse political constituencies.[18] This finding is supported by other research, which argues that funds dominated by national stakeholders risk being captured by politicians and be subject to corruption; while funds dominated by international and/or non-governmental actors risk becoming insulated and relieving governments of the need to undertake social spending, thus undermining the potential for a strengthened social contract.[19] In spite of the risks involved in bypassing the state however, even resource funds led by actors other than the national government may prove helpful in an early phase of a war to peace transition where reconstruction needs are urgent, state institutions initially are weak, and the local population eagerly expects a "peace dividend." Humphreys and Sandbu[20] thus suggest that where state institutions are weak, policy makers in resource-rich countries can consider a series of creative ways of drawing on the strength of external institutions to smooth spending patterns over time. A nationally run resource fund could then take over at a later stage, once state institutions are deemed strong enough to make it work efficient.

1.4.4 Natural Resource and Violent Conflicts

The literature also contains numerous studies that suggest that natural resource abundance is associated with the onset of civil war and influences the duration and intensity of civil war – that is the number of battle-related deaths. After examining the

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[18] Humphreys, Macartan & Martin E. Sandbu, (2007). The Political Economy of Natural Resource Funds. In Macartan

[19] Ballentine, Karen, (2005). Peace Before Profit: The Challenges of Governance. In Karen Ballentine & Heiko Nitzschke (eds.), *Profiting from Peace: Managing the Resource Dimensions of Civil War,* Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.

[20] Humphreys, Macartan & Martin E. Sandbu, (2007). The Political Economy of Natural Resource Funds. In Macartan

experiences of 98 countries and 27 civil wars, Collier and Hoeffler,[21] for instance, found that natural resource abundance, defined in terms of the ratio of primary exports to GDP, is a strong and significant determinant of the onset of civil war, although they also found that the relationship between these variables was curvilinear: initially, natural resource wealth increased the risk of civil war but after a certain level of exports, it reduced this risk. In a subsequent study, they confirmed this finding using a better data set. In a third study, they examined the effect of natural resource abundance on different types of civil wars. They found that natural resources increased the risk of both secessionist and non secessionist civil wars, but that the former were three times more likely to be associated with natural resources than the latter.[22]

Reynal-Querol[23] conducted a similar study, focused on examining the association between natural resources and the onset of ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars. Using data from a sample of 138 countries between 1960 and 1995, she found that natural resource abundance was an important variable in explaining the incidence of non ethnic civil wars and other forms of political violence but not the incidence of ethnic civil wars. In their most recent paper, Collier and Hoeffler[24] report on work showing that natural resource wealth continues to exhibit a curvilinear relationship with the onset of civil war even if a rent-based measure of natural resource abundance is substituted for their original export-based measure. However, they note that this result is less significant than their earlier

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[21] Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2005) '*Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict*', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49.4: 625–33

[22] Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Soderbom, M. (2004) '*On the Duration of Civil War*', Journal of Peace Research 41.3: 253–73

[23] Reynal-Querol, M. (2002) '*Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars*', Journal of Conflict Resolution 46: 29–54

[24] Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2005) '*Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict*', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49.4: 625–33

finding and that the rent-based measure of natural resource abundance becomes insignificant, when the original measure of natural resource wealth is included in the regression analysis as well. Some researchers have also suggested that natural resource abundance may lengthen the duration of civil wars. Collier and Hoeffler,[25] for instance, found that natural resource abundance and the duration of civil wars also had a curvilinear relationship.

Similarly, Doyle and Sambanis[26] found that natural resource wealth was significantly and negatively correlated with the success of peace-building initiatives. As Ross[27] has noted, in so far as there is a link between the failure of such initiatives and the duration of civil wars, this finding suggests that natural resource wealth is associated with longer wars. Fearon[28] found that countries that are rich in contraband resources such as opium, diamonds, or coca tend to experience longer civil wars and Ballantine[29] found that natural resources served to prolong civil wars in a selection of resource rich developing countries.

As Ross[30] has noted, several observers of Africa's civil wars, have suggested that natural resources worsen the intensity of civil wars 'by causing combatants to fight for

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[25] Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A (1998) '*On Economic Causes of Civil War*', Oxford Economic Papers No 50: 563–73

[26] Doyle, M. and Sambanis, N. (2000) '*International Peacebuilding*: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis', American Political Science Review 94.4: 779–801

[27] Ross, M. (2004) '*What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War*?', Journal of Peace Research 41.3: 337–56

[28] Fearon, J. and Laitin, D. (2003) '*Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War*', American Political Science Review 97.1: 75–90

[29] Ballantine, K. (2003) '*Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflict*', in K. Ballentine and J. Sherman (eds), *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*, London: Lynne Riener: 259–83

[30] Ross, M. (2004) '*What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War*?', Journal of Peace Research 41.3: 337–56

territory that would otherwise have little value'. Ross[31]himself found only very modest support for this idea: of the thirteen cases of civil war he examined, natural resources only clearly increased the intensity of conflict in two cases; in the eleven others, natural resources either had no effect or a mixed effect on civil war intensity.

1.4.5 The onset of violent Natural Resource Conflicts

The debate over the causal mechanisms linking natural resource abundance and the onset of civil war needs to be understood within the context of the wider debate over the causes of civil war. In broad terms, this wider debate has centred on two main arguments. The first of these, which reflects behaviouralist ideas, has emphasized the motives of rebel organizations. It has suggested that civil wars are caused by grievances stemming from inequalities of wealth, limited political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions. The second argument, which reflects ideas associated with the rational actor perspective, has emphasized the economic incentives and opportunities facing rebel organizations. In contrast to the grievance argument, it assumes that rebellions are caused by greed – that is, by a desire on the part of rebel leaders to enrich themselves and their followers. At the same time, however, it suggests that civil wars are most likely where opportunities exist for rebels to fund their activities. The former argument has appeared in some form in the work of various political scientists[32] while the latter argument has been advanced most prominently by the economists.

In the former argument, natural resource abundance is important in so far as it serves to exacerbate the grievances that lead to rebellion. Particularly important in this

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[31] Ibid

[32] Auty, R. (2004) '*Natural Resources and Civil Strife*: A Two-Stage Process', Geopolitics 9.1: 29–49

respect are grievances stemming from various typical consequences of natural resource exploitation: insufficiently compensated land expropriation, environmental degradation, inadequate job opportunities, and labour migration. In the latter argument, natural resource abundance is important because it constitutes a potential source of funding for rebel activities. More specifically, Collier and Hoeffler[33] suggest that it constitutes a potential source of funding for the start up costs of initiating a rebellion such as buying arms and hiring soldiers.

The existence of primary commodities, it is argued, enables rebel groups to raise money by extracting and selling resources directly or extorting money from those who do. This is often referred to as the 'looting' mechanism. A number of scholars have argued that neither the grievance nor looting arguments are particularly helpful in understanding the onset of civil war in specific cases, at least not if they are used on their own. After reviewing civil wars in several developing countries, including several resource rich countries, Ballantine[34] for instance, concluded that: 'Economic incentives and opportunities have not been the only or even the primary cause of these armed conflicts; rather, to varying degrees, they interacted with socioeconomic and political grievances, inter-ethnic disputes, and security dilemmas in triggering the outbreak of warfare'. In other words, she suggests that civil wars in resource abundant countries are caused, to varying degrees, by some combination of looting and grievance, rather than just one or the other. In a similar study of 13 civil wars that occurred in resource

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[33] Ibid

[34] Ballantine, K. (2003) '*Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflict*', in K. Ballentine and J. Sherman (eds), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, London: Lynne Riener: 259–83

abundant countries, Ross [35] found even less support for the looting and grievance hypotheses. In none of these cases of civil war, he argued, did nascent rebel groups ever fund the start up costs of conflict by extracting or selling natural resources or extorting money from those who did, a finding that contradicts the looting hypothesis. Nor, he argues, were complaints about land expropriation, environmental degradation, insufficient employment opportunities or labour migration associated with the onset of non-separatist civil wars in any of the cases, except possibly that of Sierra Leone. He did, however, find some support for the notion that natural resource-related grievances can cause separatist civil wars, an effect he labels the 'separatist' mechanism.

Ross[36] suggests that rather than being caused by the looting or grievance mechanisms, civil wars in resource abundant countries are typically caused by various alternative mechanisms. The other causal mechanisms for which he finds some support in his study are what he labels the 'foreign intervention' mechanism – a mechanism whereby 'resource wealth increases the probability of civil war by increasing the probability of foreign intervention to support a rebel movement' – and the 'booty futures' mechanism – a mechanism whereby resource wealth increases the probability of civil war by enabling rebel groups to sell future exploitation rights to minerals they hope to capture

1.4.6 Literature Summary

In summary, then, while there is strong evidence to support the notion of a resource curse, it is by no means conclusive. First, there are a variety factors related to

[35] Ross, M. (2004a) 'What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?', Journal of Peace Research 41.3: 337–56
[36] Ibid

the measurement of key variables – especially, natural resource abundance and civil war outcomes – that raise doubts about the findings of studies that are supportive of the resource curse hypothesis. Second, it is unclear whether the resource curse (and its various dimensions) applies to all natural resource economies or just certain ones. Different studies point in different directions on this issue. Also there is ongoing debate among those who argue that particular natural resources are the main problem about which natural resources are most pernicious, especially in relation to civil war. Third, some studies report findings contrary to the resource curse hypothesis, even when they use the same measure of natural resource abundance as those that support this hypothesis (as is the case, for instance, with some studies on the link between natural resource abundance and the duration of civil war). Finally, these studies do not illustrate conclusively that the direction of causation runs from natural resource wealth to poor development outcomes rather than the other way around and that the relationship between the two does not reflect the influence of an independent third variable.

1.5 Research Hypothesis

H_1 An increase in competition for natural resources leads to an increase in violent conflicts in the Great Lakes Region.

H_0 An increase in competition for natural resources does not lead to an increase in violent conflicts in the Great Lakes Region.

H_2 The governments in the Great Lakes Region have failed to put in place policies aimed at curbing the rising violent conflicts over natural resources.

1.6 Theoretical framework

This study adopts the Game theory, Game theory is the analysis of rational behavior in situations involving interdependence of outcomes (when payoffs depend on what you do). Game theory is based upon premises which are opposite to those in neoclassical economics such as equilibrium and perfect factor markets.[37] Game theory has been applied to many natural resource management problems because they involve interdependent outcomes, uncertainties and poorly defined property rights which are amenable to game theory approaches. The Prisoner's dilemma is perhaps the most widely used game theory applications being employed in diverse fields in economics, political science and biology. The prisoners' dilemma has been explored in modeling natural resource management, listing and delisting endangered species, safe minimum standard and the precautionary principle and ecotourism.[38]

Many applications of game theory to natural resource management have been reported in the literature. Becker and Easter[39] for example examine conflict and cooperation in the Great Lakes. They show that game theory can yield insights to the management of natural resources. They illustrate the kinds of coalitions that are more likely to work and which will fail. They adopt Runges'[40] analysis of joint costs or reciprocal externalities in their analysis. They show that non-cooperative solutions do not

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[37] Herath G and T. Prato (2006): *Using Multi-criteria Decision Analysis in Natural Resource Management,* Ashgate Publishing Limited, UK.

[38] Herath. G.(2002): *Research methodologies for planning ecotourism and nature conservation*, Tourism Economics, 8, 77-101.

[39] Backer, N and K.W.Easter. (1999): Conflict *and cooperation in managing international water resources such as the Great Lakes,* Land Economics, 75, 233-249

[40] Runge, C.F. (1981). *Common property externalities: isolation, insurance and resource depletion in a traditional grazing context*, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 63,595-606.

always have to be the outcome for open access natural resources. White and Runge[41] examined cooperative water shed management in Haiti and found that non separable costs is an important phenomenon, in explaining voluntary participation of individuals in treating non-participant land where 28 percent of the check dams were constructed.

Easter[42] has examined water management systems in several countries in Asia from the "assurance "perspective developed by Runge.[43] The free rider model does not provide a complete model to understand irrigation maintenance activities. Various incentives and institutional arrangements can be made to provide assurance. It is argued that if farmers can be provided with assurance about other users and that they manage the resource that will provide Institutional arrangements should provide the necessary assurance to elicit the desired behaviour from members. Game theory provides effective ways of addressing policy issues in the natural resource arena and affords means of achieving greater public involvement and consultation. As stakeholders exert conflicting demands management planning becomes more complex and this is particularly the case as globalization proceeds. The commitment to use game theory amongst decision makers is not high and most uses are case studies by researchers and not popular methods for policy formulations.[44]

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[41] Ibid

[42] Easter, K.W. (1993): *Economic failure plagues developing countries public irrigation: an assurance problem*, Water Resources Research, 29, 1913-1922.

[43] Ibid

[44] Herath. G.(2002): *Research methodologies for planning ecotourism and nature conservation*, Tourism Economics, 8, 77-101.

1.7 Justification of the study

1.7.1 Academic justification

There has been literature on violent conflicts by many scholars. Most of the scholars writing on the subject of violent conflicts, write from the political point of view without considering the contribution that scarce natural resources have to violent conflicts in post colonial Africa. This study will therefore contribute to the body of knowledge and theory on violent conflicts that are caused by scarce natural resources in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.

1.7.2 Policy justification

The impact of violent conflicts, marked by rising casualty rates has increasingly drawn the attention of international policy makers. As a result, some international and regional organizations have started to examine how they and their partners can work collectively to ensure that peace prevail in areas that are prone to violent conflicts as a result of scarce resources. Since natural resources are necessary for life and growth, it is not surprising that resource scarcity, environmental degradation, and unsustainable consumption sometimes contribute to or cause violent conflicts. It is therefore, hoped that this research will be helpful to policy makers, stakeholders and regional organizations in the Great Lakes Region as well other agencies with similar interventions around the world in mitigating violent conflicts over scarce natural resources.

1.7.3 Scope of the study

The study focused on violent conflicts in the Great Lakes Region organizations and it targeted the regional organizations, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and state agencies involved in conflict mitigation within the region.

1.8 Methodology and Design

Research as noted by [45] is defined as a scientific and systematic method consisting of enunciating the problem, formulating a hypothesis, collecting the facts or data, analyzing the facts and reaching certain conclusion either in the form of solutions towards the concerned problem or in certain generalization for some theoretical formulation. Research methodology on the other hand, is a way to systematically solve the research problem. It indicates the various steps that are generally adopted by a researcher in studying his research problem along with the logic behind them.[46]

Research design refers to the arrangement of conditions for collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy in the procedure.[47] The research design adopted for this study was a descriptive survey. A descriptive study determines the frequency with which something occurs and investigates the relationship between two or more variables[48]. The study framework was chosen because it allowed the researcher to obtain both quantitative and qualitative data. The researcher obtained data from both secondary and primary sources. Primary data was obtained through self administered questionnaires that will be sent to the personnel in

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[45] Kothari, C.R (2004) Research *methodology*: Methods &t echniques. New Dehi: New Age International (P) Limited Publishers. . (2004).
[46] Ibid
[47] Babbie Earl (1990). *Survey Research Methods* (2nd Edition). Belmont Wodsworth.
[48] Cooper,D& Schindler,P.S, (2003) *Research Methods,* 8th Edition .Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company., India.

various regional organizations that operate in the Great Lakes Region. The researcher used stratified random sampling to sample the respondents for the study, this gave equal chance of representation of facts for the study and analysis. This method was used because of the diversity of the population in terms of gender, age and nature of jobs undertaken by each respondent in the sampling group. The researcher ensured that the questionnaires were administered to the selected respondents using the "drop and pick later" method for most of the respondents within reach and adequate time shall be allowed for respondents to complete them. At the same time, the researcher sent the questionnaires by email to the respondents who are far away and allow them time to respond.

On the other hand secondary data was obtained from Text books, scholarly journals and newspaper articles. These were used to analyze the themes emerging from the research. The libraries of the University of Nairobi, United Nations and centre for African studies will be used. The criteria to be used to analyze the data collected included categorizing the themes derived from each category of questions, coding the themes, tabulating them where necessary, summarizing the major components and propositions of the study and cross checking the facts and discrepancies of the facts. Data was analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Qualitative analysis involved deriving explanations and making interpretation of the findings based on the description.

1.9 Chapter Summary

The study was organized in five chapters. Chapter one provides the introduction and contains the background of the study, the problem statement, objectives, justification of the study, hypothesis, the literature review, theoretical framework and the

methodology that will be used during the study. Chapter two presents the overview of the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region. In this chapter, an analysis of natural resources in the region is done as well as the patterns of violent conflicts resulting due to the scarcity of the resources.

Chapter three deals with the mitigation of violent conflict resulting from scarce natural resources in the Great Lakes Region by both regional organizations and governments. Conflict mitigation especially the aspects of organizational reforms is dealt in this chapter. International community efforts to end violent conflicts in the region and the outcomes will be captured in this chapter.

Chapter four critically analyzes the data obtained during the study. The analysis was done using secondary data as postulated in the themes found in the research. Finally, Chapter five presents summary of the findings, recommendations, conclusion and areas of future research.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUALIZING VIOLENT NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICTS AND GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the conceptual analysis of violent conflicts over natural resources. It discusses the following: Natural resource conflicts, the framework of natural resource conflicts, attributes of natural resource conflicts and governance arrangement in relation to natural resource conflicts.

2.2 Natural Resource Conflicts

As renewable resources, such as arable cropland, fish stocks, fuel wood, and potable water supplies, become ever more scarce, attention has focused on the potential relationship between these scarcities and the outbreak of civil strife. A number of articles in scholarly journals and the popular press have asserted provocatively that there are general links between environmental stress and violence.' Studies of civil strife in El Salvador, Haiti, Peru, the Philippines, and the West Bank' indicate a strong link among renewable resource scarcities, escalating grievances, and the outbreak of violence.

The environmental effects of human activity are a function of two factors: the vulnerability of the ecosystem and the product of the total population and that population's physical activity per capita in the region.[49] Homer-Dixon[50] uses the term and dquo; environmental scarcity & dquo; to refer to scarcity of renewable resources, and he

[49] Homer-Dixon, T. (1991). *On the threshold: Environmental changes as causes of acute conflict.* International Security, 16(2), 76-116.
[50] Ibid page 85

identifies scarcities of agricultural land, forests, water, and fish as the environmental problems that contribute most to violence. These scarcities, however, contribute to violence only under certain circumstances; there is no inevitable or deterministic connection between these variables. The nature of the ecosystem, the social relations within society, and the opportunities for organized violence all affect causal linkages.

Environmental scarcity arises in three ways: Demand-induced scarcity is a result of population growth in a region, supply-induced scarcity arises from the degradation of resources, and structural scarcity occurs because of the unequal social distribution of these resources. These three types of scarcity are not mutually exclusive: They often occur simultaneously and interact with one another.[51]

Environmental scarcity produces four principal social effects: decreased agricultural potential, regional economic decline, population displacement, and the disruption of legitimized and authoritative institutions and social relations.[52] These social effects, either singly or in combination, can produce and exacerbate conflict between groups. Most such conflict is sub-national, diffuse, and persistent.[53] For conflict to break out, the societal balance of power must provide the opportunity for grievances to be expressed as challenges to authority When grievances are articulated by groups organized around clear social cleavages, such as ethnicity or religion, the probability of civil violence is higher.[54] Under situations of environmental scarcity, in which group

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[51] Homer-Dixon, T. (1994). *Environmental scarcities and violent conflict*: Evidence from cases. International S(e1c)u,r it5y-,4 01.9

[52] Regan, A. (2003) '*The Bouganville Conflict: Political and Economic Agendas'*, in K. Ballentine and J. Sherman (eds), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, London: Lynne Riener: 133–66

[53] Homer-Dixon, T. (1994). *Environmental scarcities and violent conflict*: Evidence from cases. International S(e1c)u,r it5y-,4 01.9

[54] Ibid Page 27

affiliation aids survival, intergroup competition on the basis of relative gains is likely to increase. &dquo; As different ethnic and cultural groups are propelled together under circumstances of deprivation and stress, we should expect inter-group hostilities, in which a group would emphasize its own identity while denigrating, discriminating against, and attacking outsiders & dquo.[55]

In developing countries where access to and use of natural resources essential to livelihoods are highly contested, improving cooperation in their management is increasingly seen as an important element in strategies for peace building, conflict prevention, and longer-term social-ecological resilience. There are at least three reasons for this. First is a growing appreciation of the ways that competition over natural resources can link to other social divides as a contributing factor in violent conflict. While interstate warfare has declined in recent decades, intrastate conflict is on the rise, most now centered in poor countries, with civilians as the primary victims.[56] Loss of livelihood linked to natural resource degradation and competition over access to and ownership of natural resources is a common contributing factor. Indeed, natural resources were implicated in up to forty percent of all violent conflicts in the past six decades.[57]

Second is increased recognition of the role of violent conflict in undermining other assistance in conflict-prone environments, and how to ensure that development areas of potential progress in development. The international development community is now grappling with twin challenges – how to provide effective assistance reduces the

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[55] Shaxson, N. (2005) '*New Approaches to Volatility Dealing With the "Resource Curse" in Sub-Saharan Africa'*, International Affairs 81.2: 311–24

[56]Collier, P., and A. Hoeffler(2005). Resource rents, governance, and conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (4): 625-633.

[57] UNEP (2009). From conflict to peacebuilding: *The role of natural resources and the environment.* Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP.

risks of future conflict.[58] Because violent conflict frequently erases gains from prior development assistance, and because intrastate conflicts associated with natural resources are twice as likely to relapse into conflict within the first five years, these twin challenges are closely linked. Many of the burdens of violent conflict, moreover, extend far beyond the societies where they take place, frustrating progress towards global public goods including disease eradication, crime prevention, and international security.[59]

Third is an emerging awareness of the positive potential that cooperation around natural resource challenges can offer in reducing the risk of broader social conflict and violence. While this rationale is not altogether new among advocates of public policy support for and investment in natural resources management[60], it is gaining traction in international development circles. The international development community has explicitly identified goals of improving governance as an essential contribution to managing conflict and reducing poverty, and capitalizing on the potential for environmental cooperation as a contribution to peacebuilding.[61]

Research on natural resources and violent conflict has expanded rapidly in recent years, but important gaps remain in application to development policy and practice. Research on the causal links between competition over natural resources and violent conflict has focused largely on high-value extractive resources such as oil, gems, other minerals, and timber. Until recently, far less attention, in both research and public

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[58] Maxwell, S. (2009). Eliminating world poverty: Building our common future. *Development Policy Review* 27 (6): 767-770.

[59] Collier, P., and A. Hoeffler(2005)

[60]Tyler, S. R. (1999). Policy implications of natural resource conflict management. In '*Cultivating peace: Conflict and collaboration in natural resource management*, ed. D. Buckles.

[61] Feil, M., D. Klein, and M. Westerkamp (2009). *Regional cooperation on environment, economy and natural resource management: How can it contribute to peacebuilding*? Brussels: Initiative for Peacebuilding.

advocacy, has focused on violent conflict over the natural resources that underpin rural livelihoods in agricultural landscapes – the subsistence use of land, water, fisheries, and forests. The recent surge in international "land grabs" as countries and corporations aim to secure ownership or long-term use rights for agricultural land and primary resource extraction has increased attention to poor people's resource rights and livelihoods in policy debates over food security and poverty reduction.[62] Climate change, with its associated shifts in resource productivity and migration patterns, the emergence of new markets for carbon offsets for forest and land management, and investment in biofuel production have highlighted additional sources of competition and potential conflict in renewable resource management.[63]

Furthermore, little progress has been made to understand how cooperation over natural resources may provide a buffer against conflict risks[64], how governance factors can encourage pathways to constructive cooperation over natural resources, nor how cooperative use of natural resources may provide a focal point for improvements in governance and peacebuilding more generally.[65] In their review of the state of the art of research on environment, conflict, and cooperation, Matthew et. al[66] argue that to address such factors rigorously, analysts need to better engage research traditions on the roots of conflict and the dynamics and processes of cooperation.

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[62] Kugelman, M, and S. Levenstein (2009). *Land grab? The race for the world's farmland.* Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

[63] Barnett, J., and W. Adger (2007). Climate change, human security and violent conflict. *Political Geography* 26 (6): 639-655.

[64] Conca, K., and G. D. Dabelko (2002). *Environmental peacebuilding.* Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

[65] Carius, A. (2006). Environmental Peacebuilding: *Environmental cooperation as an instrument of crisis prevention and peacebuilding.* Berlin: Adelphi Consult.

[66] Matthew, R., M Brklacich, and B. McDonald (2004). Analyzing environment, conflict, and cooperation. In '*Understanding environment, conflict, and cooperation*', K. Toepfer, and S. Lonergan, eds. Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP.

While some degree of competition and violent conflict over natural resources can be considered inevitable, the focus of the study is finding ways to divert the progression from competition over natural resources essential to livelihoods to broader social conflict, including but not limited to violent conflict. Considering that natural resource competition can either spawn broader, destructive conflict or renewed cooperation, the study conceptualizes these opposing potentials as a "fork in the road". This simplification is not meant to imply that the choice is made just once or that it holds; rather, referring to a choice faced repeatedly by multiple stakeholder groups in different configurations over time.

2.3 The Framework of Natural Resource Conflict



Source: Ostrom, E., R. Gardner, and J. M. Walker (1994)

The framework elaborated above builds on the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework.[67] The framework has four main elements: the initial context influences an action arena, in which patterns of interaction are established, leading to certain outcomes. As such, it enables the analyst to incorporate key contextual factors without losing sight of the more immediate incentives that influence actors' choices. Outcomes can be evaluated on a number of criteria according to the particular focus of analysis. As a dynamic framework, outcomes, in turn, feedback and influence the context and action arena in future rounds.

In the "classic" IAD framework applied to study the management of common pool resources, context incorporates three broad sets of factors: attributes of the resources, which describe biophysical conditions and trends; attributes of the resource users, which encompasses both local communities and extra-local users; and "rules", which covers broad governance arrangements down to specific rules regulating use of given natural resources, for example.[68] In applying the IAD framework to the study of poverty, Di Gregorio et al.[69] break out the contextual factors somewhat differently, highlighting the importance of risk, assets, and governance arrangements. Because of our focus on natural resource management as a means of reducing conflict, the study uses the "classic" IAD set of contextual factors. However, risk and assets are also very relevant for shaping conflict or cooperative outcomes. The study therefore addresses these aspects under both

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[67] Oakerson, R. J. (1992.) Analyzing the commons: A framework. In '*Making the Commons Work*', D.W. Bromley, ed. San Francisco: ICS Press.

[68] Ostrom, E., R. Gardner, and J. M. Walker (1994). Rules, games, and common-pool resources. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

[69] di Gregorio, M., K. Hagedorn, M. Kirk, B. Korf, N. McCarthy, and R. Meinzen-Dick. (2008). *Property rights, collective action, and poverty: The role of institutions for poverty reduction.* CAPRi Working Paper No. 81. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute:

the attributes of the resources and the attributes of community. Because of particular interest in collective action, the study follows the approach of Di Gregorio et al.[70] in identifying collective action institutions as a separate box, which is both influenced by the other contextual factors, and influences the action arena. While collective action institutions could be considered as part of the governance arrangements (and collective action itself is one of the possible patterns of cooperation), a separate box have been created to indicate that the collective action institutions (such as kinship networks or natural resource user groups) are influenced by the attributes of the natural resource, the users, and the governance arrangements, and that these institutions, in turn, can play an important role in shaping the action arena.

Each of these factors of context can, in turn, be broken down into much more detailed elements, depending on the particular situation being examined. In this study, for each factor, the researcher assesses how particular characteristics shape the incentives for collective action to manage contested natural resources cooperatively – or, alternatively, how they increase the incentives for broader social conflict and violence. An action arena can be a village, a court, even a single meeting—any stage for social bargaining on which different actors may choose to cooperate or not. Ostrom[71] characterizes action arenas as being composed of an action situation and participants. Di Gregorio et al.[72] further break this down into: actors; action resources; and rules in use. This characterization is useful for considering the dynamics of interactions that lead to either

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[70] Ibid

[71] Ostrom, E. (2005). Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[72] di Gregorio, M., K. Hagedorn, M. Kirk, B. Korf, N. McCarthy, and R. Meinzen-Dick. (2008). *Property rights, collective action, and poverty: The role of institutions for poverty reduction.* CAPRi Working Paper No. 81. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute:

violent conflicts or cooperation. By considering the characteristics of the actors involved in a particular resource conflict, the action resources they each have to influence others and pursue their objectives, as well as the constraints and opportunities provided by the broader institutional context that limit the choices they have available. The action arena concept invites stakeholders to reflect on what can be done, and how to shift the action resources available so that disadvantaged groups can indeed influence decision making more effectively in pursuit of equitable outcomes.

Patterns of interaction refer to the bargaining processes among actors in which they exchange resources, devise new rules, and demand action from other stakeholders.[73] Given the focus of analysis for this framework, we have labeled these "patterns of conflict and cooperation," but these are not discrete categories; interactions can include competition and collaboration as well. The outcomes of such interactions over time influence the broader institutional context. Ostrom[74] points out that one of the strengths of the IAD framework is that it can be applied at many different levels, from small groups to national or even international levels, depending on the boundaries of the action arena under study. This is valuable for study of conflict, which can occur—or be prevented—at many different levels. Sanginga et. al.,[75] define three broad categories: community-level conflicts (opposing groups within local resource user communities); intercommunity conflicts (for example, neighboring villages); and supra community conflicts (local communities vs. higher level formal institutions or other non-local

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[73] Ibid

[74] Ostrom (2005)

[75] Sanginga, P., R. Kamugisha, and A. Martin (2007). The dynamics of social capital and conflict management in multiple resource regimes: A case of the southwestern highlands of Uganda. *Ecology and Society* 12 (1).

actors). While all of these levels are important, our focus is on supra community conflicts, where natural resource competition is central to local livelihoods, yet finding solutions requires bridging ecosystem scales and nested levels of institutions.

But unlike most violent conflict analysis tools that begin at the national scale, the perspective of the study builds up analysis from the local perspective, with its focus on livelihoods. In this, it also draws from the sustainable livelihoods framework, which focuses on the importance of factors creating vulnerability, the roles of different kinds of assets, and the effect of policies and institutions on people's diverse livelihood strategies.[76]

Most research and policy attention focus on the role of natural resources as a source of conflict; much less analysis and debate has focused on the dynamics of responding to resource conflict. A further advantage of our framework is that it recognizes the role of structural factors that can constrain or enable certain outcomes (the contextual factors), while the action arena highlights the importance of human agency. It therefore allows us to focus on capacity to respond to resource competition and conflict and seek out levers of change to allow disadvantaged rural people to increase their potential for positive action. As such, it reaches beyond the deterministic approach of many quantitative analyses of factors underlying civil conflict across a large number of cases.[77]

A related advantage of the framework is that it puts an emphasis on actors' knowledge, perceptions and values, such that institutions that define the rules of

[76] Ellis, F. (2000). *Rural livelihoods and diversity in developing countries*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[77] Franke, V, A. Hampel-Milagrosa, and J. Schure (2007). *In control of natural wealth? Governing the resource-conflict dynamic.* Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC).

interaction are considered socially-constructed and subject to change. Natural resources are often bound to social identities in complex ways. The historical, cultural, or symbolic importance of a particular resource may contribute to conflicts over its management, with competing groups invoking alternative narratives and ways of framing the problem.[78] Conversely, conflict over a resource may become an element of a group's social identity.[79] Research on common property institutions demonstrates that the level of trust that stakeholders have in institutions to mediate resource competition relates to the extent to which each has internalized shared norms and values; when shared norms and values are not internalized, greater levels of external enforcement are required.[80] When existing resource management institutions are unable to address resource competition in developing countries, typically one or more factors are at play that reduce or negate their credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of key stakeholders. These factors include broader social transformations that undermine shared values among local actors, new resource claims by external actors that disregard local institutions, ecosystem linkages (such as upstream-downstream relationships) or market integration that extends the range of stakeholders with an interest in resource management decisions, and generalized discrimination or other failures in the effectiveness of government institutions.

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[78] Long, N. (1992). Battlefields of knowledge: *The interlocking of theory and practice in social research and development.* London: Routledge.

[79] Green, A. (2010). *Social identity, natural resources, and peacebuilding. Paper prepared for the International Workshop on Collective Action, Property Rights, and Conflict in Natural Resources Management*, Siem Reap, Cambodia, June 28 to July 1, 2010.

[80] Baland, J.M., and J.P Platteau. (1996). *Halting degradation of natural resources: Is there a role for rural communities. Rome*: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

This emphasis on group values would be naïve, however, if it did not also consider the power relationships among different actors.[81] Access to livelihood opportunities is governed by social relations, organizations and institutions, in which power is an important explanatory variable. For example, Sietchiping's[82] discussion of land access in Sub-Saharan Africa emphasizes the importance of local power structures in explaining inequitable land access and resulting conflicts. The natural resources management literature is often weak on consideration of power, which is by contrast the central focus of political ecology writing. Our framework therefore also draws on the political ecology perspective to recognize the role of power and negotiation to gain influence, leading to an emergent nature of governance.[83] This means that analysis of any situation has to recognize risks of power imbalance and deprivation, and also seek out institutional responses that help frame incentives for cooperation.

While a number of other research approaches focus on explaining a single outcome (the determinants of violent conflict or cooperation), our focus on collective action is designed to capture the contingent nature of group interactions. Collective action comprises any form of concerted group effort to achieve a shared goal. Collective action is often considered to fall in a normative-voluntary "third sector," distinct from coordinated wage labor (part of the private sector) or coerced action such as public sector, where coercion falls under realm of the state. However, as Oakerson[84] notes, not

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[81] Edmunds, D., and E. Wollenberg (2001). A strategic approach to multi stakeholder negotiations. *Development and Change* 32 (2): 231-253.

[82] Sietchiping (2008)

[83] Wyckoff-Baird, B. (1998). The power of nature: Negotiating decentralization processes for biodiversity conservation. Washington, DC: Analysis and Adaptive Management Program, Biodiversity Support Program.

[84] Oakerson, R. J. (1992). Analyzing the commons: A framework. In '*Making the Commons Work*', D.W. Bromley, ed. San Francisco: ICS Press.

all collective action is voluntary—rules may be imposed that require people to participate. Collective action is not necessarily positive: collective action may be discriminatory or even violent. In some cases, collective action of one group can exclude others and undermine larger community cohesion. Indeed many conflicts are the outcome of two or more collective action groups operating against each other.

A comparative analysis of recent cases of forest conflict in developing countries highlights this potential of natural resource conflict to either strengthen or weaken collective action at the local level.[85] In a set of forest conflicts between communities and outsiders—usually companies or government agencies—the authors note that some communities respond by acting collectively to assert the legitimacy of their common claim to the forest while others respond to outside pressure by organizing in sub-groups that deepen divisions within the community.[86]

A major concern is what works to foster collective action that supports livelihood security and social-ecological resilience, recognizing at the same time the potential for broadening social conflict that increases people's vulnerabilities. These characteristics of the framework we have outlined above—multi-scale application, a focus on the interplay of contextual factors and group agency, emphasis on stakeholder values, and consideration of contingent outcomes—enable one to analyze long-term processes of institutional change. By definition a process, not a state, collective action is facilitated and constrained by institutions. Over time it can also shift the institutional context, i.e., it

[85] Yasmi, Y., T. Enters, L. Kelley, and J. Bampton (2010). *Forest conflict in Asia and the role of collective action in its management.* Paper prepared for the International Workshop on Collective Action, Property Rights, and Conflict in Natural Resources Management, Siem Reap, Cambodia, June 28 to July 1, 2010.

[86] Indriatmoko, Y., and E. Mwangi. (2010). *Conflict between local communities and oil palm plantations:* Two case studies of Janting and Suhaid, West Kalimatan, Indonesia. Paper prepared for the International Workshop on Collective Action, Property Rights, and Conflict in Natural Resources Management, Siem Reap, Cambodia, June 28 to July 1, 2010.

can help establish or build the legitimacy of new institutions, and it can help strengthen existing institutions to be more responsive, equitable, and effective for resource management, conflict resolution, and governance. The challenge is to build enduring institutional incentives so that multiple, complementary, legitimate channels exist to manage resource competition, making violent action less attractive.

The framework can be adapted for participatory problem assessments by drawing attention to the links between immediate sources of dispute and the broader contextual factors that increase or decrease conflict risk. An assessment of the contextual factors – characteristics of the resources and of the users, including the risks and assets, the governance arrangements, and collective action institutions – can help to anticipate the scope for conflict or cooperation. Examining the range of actors involved, the resources at their disposal, and the rules at play, provides a structured way to explore solutions. Equally, the framework should aid joint planning building on such assessments to scope collective priorities for policy and institutional reform efforts, or for development interventions at national, sub-national, or regional scales. As such, the process of collective analysis and problem-solving can itself become an instrument of social learning.

Just as the framework can be applied to collaborative analysis and planning, it can enhance efforts at monitoring and evaluation of ongoing initiatives, again by broadening the consideration of contextual factors and collective action strategies. The resilience approach encourages practitioners to augment stakeholders' evaluation of outcomes in terms of their immediate interests to encompass a more integrated perspective on prospects for the social-ecological system as a whole and the longer-term implications for

their own livelihood security. There is important scope as well for process evaluation, assessing the degree to which stakeholder interactions are contributing to social learning, building relationships and trust across social divides, and opening up opportunities for institutional innovation that facilitate positive expressions of collective action in the future.

In its application to multi-case comparative analysis, the framework yields lessons on the factors that influence collective action in natural resource conflict so as to refine the understanding of strategies that work in policy reform and development practice across a range of conflict sensitive environments. Although recent research on violent conflicts in developing countries has found that contemporary conflicts more frequently occur within rather than between states, the unit of analysis for many comparative studies remains the nation state. When the question at hand is not simply where risk conflict is high but also what to do in response, a more fine grained analysis of institutional dynamics is required. The framework shows how natural resource conflicts result from decisions made by resource users within a particular institutional and environmental context. By doing so, the framework provides a basis for comparison of cases that applies across multiple scales of analysis, rather than seeing conflict as a function of national-level characteristics. Likewise, it encourages analysts to explore both the constraints of the institutional and governance context and the scope for actors to influence and shape that context over time.

2.4 Attributes of the Natural Resources

One of the first key characteristics of natural resources that affect the risk of violent conflict is whether the resource is renewable or not. The extraction of

nonrenewable resources sets up a zero-sum game: what is taken today by one party depletes what is available for others or in the future. This is one reason why valuable non-renewable resources such as diamonds, minerals, or oil and gas are more strongly associated with violent conflict, compared to renewable resources. And even within a resource like diamonds, dispersed secondary diamonds from alluvial deposits are much harder to control, compared to primary diamonds found in underground diamond-bearing kimberlite pipes. This is one reason that the alluvial diamonds in Sierra Leone are more associated with looting and illicit trade that funded conflict, compared to diamonds from mines in Botswana, which are much easier to regulate.[87]

Scarcity of any natural resource that is renewable or non-renewable, creates pressure on natural resource. Whether these pressures lead to violent conflicts or to greater cooperation cannot be determined a priori. Among renewable natural resources, the spatial and temporal distribution of the natural resource also matters. Highly dispersed natural resources are more difficult to exclude others from using. It would be expected that the more predictable the natural resource, the easier it is to build institutional arrangements for its management.[88] At the same time, in many dryland areas with fluctuating rainfall, the erratic physical environment has created pressure for people to develop higher-level institutional arrangements such as reciprocal land and water access in pastoral areas[89], and water shortages prompted efforts to get the various

[87] Lujala, P. (2005). A diamond curse? Civil war and a lootable resource. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (4): 538-562.

[88] Agrawal, A. (2001). Common property institutions and sustainable governance of resources. *World Development* 29 (10): 1649-1672.

[89] Ngaido, T., and M. Kirk. (2001). Collective action, property rights and devolution of rangeland management: Selected examples from Africa and Asia. In '*Collective Action, Property Rights and*

community groups to federate and negotiate with each other for sharing resources such as water.[90] With climate change, hydrologic flows are likely to become even less reliable, creating additional pressures on the sharing arrangements. Thus, both long-term trends of ecosystem change and short-term shocks are relevant.

Observability of resource use is another factor that contributes to conflict mitigation by increasing transparency and reducing suspicion. Monitoring of others is one of Ostrom's[91] design principles for successful management of shared resources, and this is much easier to do when there is observability. Activities such as night patrols of irrigation systems or fishing grounds are done to improve monitoring, and build trust that rules governing the resource are being observed. Small size of resource units and well-defined boundaries of the resource—factors identified by Wade[92] as facilitating collective action—would similarly increase the observability and reduce the costs of monitoring resource use, so are likely to reduce conflicts.

2.5 The Attributes of Users of Natural Resource

Among attributes of natural resource users, socioeconomic characteristics such as ethnicity, education, and wealth are particularly relevant for studies of violent conflict. These are often central to the identity of particular groups, which distinguish "us" from "them", and therefore form the cleavage lines along which conflicts form. This is particularly the case where these different attributes are highly correlated, as, for

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Devolution of Natural Resource Management: Exchange of Knowledge and Implications for Policy', R. Meinzen-Dick, A. Knox, and M. Di Gregorio, eds. Feldafing, Germany: DSE/ZEL.

[90] Sutawan, N. (2000). *Negotiation of water allocation among irrigators'* associations in Bali, Indonesia. In 'Negotiating water rights', ed. B. R. Bruns and R. Meinzen-Dick. New Delhi: Vistaar.

[91] Ostrom, E. (2005). *Understanding institutional diversity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[92] Wade, R. (1988). Village republics: Economic conditions for collective action in South India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

example, when ethnicity is associated with different (and competing) uses of a resource, such as between pastoralists and farming communities. Areas with great heterogeneity along such types of identity factors are more likely to be prone to conflict. Stewart et al.[93] draw on a detailed cross-country comparative case analysis to support the conclusion that the risk of violent conflict is increased in situations where multiple horizontal inequalities align, such as where ethnicity aligns with type or resource use or historical claims for resources. The full range of sources of group identity is relevant. We therefore need to ask where are the salient social divides in terms of ethnicity, religion, gender, economic class, etc., and how these align or not with group interests in natural resource access and use. Where multiple types of property rights institutions or claims overlap, there are increased opportunities for disjunctures among various social groups, especially where each appeals to a different type of customary or religious law as the basis for their claims on resources. Nor should we view communities as static or undifferentiated; they consist of multiple identities and conflicting values and claims over the natural environment.[94] For example, farmers with a shared interest in collectively managed water may compete over private land rights. The general literature on factors affecting management of shared natural resources[95] posits that bounded groups with a shared identity and history of cooperation are more likely to engage in effective resource management.

Many of these factors are summed up in the notion of "social capital," which includes mechanisms for bonding (social cohesion within groups based on ethnicity,

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[93] Stewart, F., G. Brown, and A. Langer. (2008). Major Findings and conclusions on the relationship between horizontal inequalities and conflict. In '*Horizontal inequalities and conflict: Understanding group violence in multiethnic societies*', F. Stewart, ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

[94] Leach, M., R. Mearns, and I. Scoones. (1999). Environmental entitlements: Dynamics and institutions in community-based natural resource management. *World Development* 27 (2): 225-247.

[95] Baland, J.M., and J.P Platteau. (1996). Halting degradation of natural resources: Is there a role for rural communities. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

location, religion, shared values, reinforced by working together), bridging (structural relationships or networks that cross social groupings, involving coordination or collaboration, social support, or info sharing), and linking (ability to engage with external agencies, especially between poor groups and those in authority, to draw resources or influence policy).[96] Although social capital is often assumed to increase cooperation, it is not always straightforward. Bonding social capital may reduce conflicts at the most local level, but may contribute to conflict with other groups. Bridging social capital, that forges links between similar groups, can reduce conflict between communities. Linking social capital, that creates bonds with outsiders, may be important to mitigate broader social conflicts.

Another key aspect of natural resource users are their assets. The sustainable livelihoods approach stresses the importance of a range of tangible and intangible assets: natural, physical, human, financial, and social, which we categorize as attributes of the resource users.[97] Natural capital may, at first, seem to be part of the biophysical context, but we consider it as part of the characteristics of the users, because property rights are inherently social relationships. To be an asset there must be some form of property rights that connect that resource to a person or group. Property rights therefore "map" the natural resources into assets. Secure property rights are often held to be a crucial element in creating clear expectations and thereby reducing conflict. But the distribution of property rights also matters. Highly unequal property rights that deprive many people of

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[96] Pretty, J. (2003). Social capital and the collective management of resources. *Science* 302 (5652): 1912-4. New York, N.Y.

[97] Ellis, F. (2000). *Rural livelihoods and diversity in developing countries*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

even the basic means of subsistence can also lead to conflict, whether through large-scale revolutions (as in China or Nepal) or sabotage and localized use of "weapons of the weak" as in the Naxalite movement in India.[98]

2.6 Governance Arrangements and Violent resource conflicts

Rules that specify which actions are required, permitted or prohibited are generally nested. That is, it is typical for one set of rules to define how other sets of rules can be changed. Ostrom[99] distinguishes three types of rules: Operational rules govern day-to-day decisions; Collective choice rules affect how operational rules are to be changed, and who can change them, thereby indirectly affecting operational activities and results; Constitutional choice rules are the rules to be used in crafting collective rules that in turn regulate the operational rules.

All of these types can be a source of cooperation in forming or enforcing the rules, or they can be a source of conflict. Widespread and violent conflict (such as civil war) can rupture the institutional structures for constitutional choice, causing lower order rules to also become less effective. Rules are also expressed more specifically through the institutions of collective action governing resource access and use, such as water user groups, forest management committees, community fishery organizations, and farmer cooperatives, to name a few. In some instances where local sources of legitimacy for

[98] Peluso, N. (1992). *Rich forests, poor people: Resource control and resistance in Java.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

[99] Ostrom, E. (1990). *Governing the commons.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

these institutions remain strong, they can endure and remain functional even amidst a more generalized breakdown in governance.[100]

Governance arrangements include mechanisms of representation of diverse groups in decision-making, distribution of power and mechanisms of accountability.[101] These are mediated by formal (statutory) legal and political structures as well as customary and informal institutions. Whereas much attention in the natural resources management literature has focused on governance arrangements specific to the resource sector at hand, considering broad governance characteristics such as state capacity and legitimacy, rule of law, freedoms of expression and political organization, and protections on human rights is essential in conflict-sensitive environments.

Quantitative analysis across multiple country cases confirms the importance of resource governance for reducing the likelihood and intensity of conflict and as an investment in peace maintenance,[102] but says little in the way of practical implications for how to do this. The premise is that institutional innovations that enable diverse stakeholders to assess and manage resource competition equitably can help build resilience, including the capacity to adapt not only to current sources of conflict but also to future risks. The challenge is to identify how development interventions in the natural

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[100] Adhikari, J. R., and B. Adhikari. (2010). Third political conflicts and community forestry: *Understanding the impact of the decade-long armed conflicts on environment and livelihood securities in rural Nepal.* Paper prepared for the International Workshop on Collective Action, Property Rights, and Conflict in Natural Resources Management, Siem Reap, Cambodia, June 28 to July 1, 2010.

[101] Lemos, M. C., and A. Agrawal.(2006). Environmental governance. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 31 (1): 297-325.

[102] Franke, V, A. Hampel-Milagrosa, and J. Schure.(2007). *In control of natural wealth? Governing the resource-conflict dynamic.* Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC).

resource sectors can link with complementary efforts to strengthen the underlying role of equitable governance and secure rights as a foundation for resilient livelihoods.[103]

By probing the interactions between generalized governance arrangements, ecosystem integrity, and the livelihoods and rights of resource users, we expect that considerable progress can be made in deriving lessons for both conflict prevention and recovery. As Khagram et al.[104] note, integrating insights from the human security and human development fields in mainstream development practice moves the sustainable development field away from a primarily needs-based focus to a rights-based focus in the quest of improving opportunities and capabilities. The practical implication of this broadening is that civil and political rights along with economic, social and cultural rights become an integral component of the social pillar of sustainable development.

Bringing sustainability concerns to the human security debate also emphasizes cross-scale interactions and interdependencies, from intra-community to international. Many security studies focus on the national and international level, while many natural resource management studies focus on the farm, community, or local ecosystem. But when the sustainability and security fields are linked it focuses action on the meso-level, seeking out institutional linkages that can help foster collaboration across scales and sectors.

Today it is widely acknowledged that the complexity of social-ecological systems necessitates varying degrees of multi-level, cross-scalar coordination between civil-

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[103] Ratner, B. D. (2011). Building resilience in rural livelihood systems as an investment in conflict prevention. In *'Livelihoods, natural resources, and post-conflict peacebuilding'*, ed. H. Young and L. Goldman. London: Earthscan.

[104] Khagram, S., W. Clark, and D. F. Raad. (2003). From the environment and human security to sustainable security and development. *Journal of Human Development* 4 (2): 289-313.

society, private, and public actors in governance arrangements.[105] As Young[106] points out, it is dangerous to focus attention exclusively on one level, leading to inappropriate analysis, and by extension, inappropriate institutional interventions. In resilience research, governance systems that consciously address scale issues and dynamic linkages across levels of political administration are hypothesized to be more successful at assessing problems and finding solutions that are more socially equitable and ecologically sustainable.[107]

Important dimensions of resource conflict stem from institutional gaps. When authoritative hierarchies to enforce rules governing relations of state and remote agricultural communities are missing or inadequate, new institutions are required to bridge these gaps.[108] In some cases this entails a re-assertion of prior institutions. In post-conflict East Timor, for example, when the newly independent government lacked the capacity to enforce its own environmental laws, communities revived a customary system of land management known as Tara Bandu that had been superseded by the forestry code during the Indonesian occupation.[109] More often it requires institutional innovation – the creation of new institutions to address emergent challenges, or the adaptation of existing institutions to function in new ways.

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[105] Folke, C., T. Hahn, P. Olsson, and J. Norberg (2005). Adaptive governance of social-ecological systems. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 30: 441-473.

[106] Young, O. 2006. Vertical interplay among scale-dependent environmental and resource regimes. *Ecology and Society* 11 (1).

[107] Armitage, D. R., R. Plummer, F. Berkes, R. Arthur, A. Charles, I. Davidson-Hunt, A. Diduck, et al. (2009). Adaptive co-management for social–ecological complexity. *Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment* 7 (2): 95-102.

[108] Keohane, R, and E. Ostrom (1995). Local commons and global interdependence. London: Sage.

[109] Miyazawa, N. (2010). of Customary law and community-based natural resource management: Post-conflict recovery in Timor-Leste. In '*Land and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*', J. Unruh and R. Williams, eds. London: Earthscan.

Particular attention to boundary, or bridging, organizations such as watershed committees or other multistakeholder platforms is essential. These play an intermediary role between different social arenas, administrative levels, or geographic scales and provide a forum for knowledge co-production, trust building, sense making, learning, vertical and horizontal collaboration and conflict resolution through collaborative learning processes.[110] Bridging organizations encourage resource users to recognize the biophysical and social interdependencies related to natural resource management problems and negotiate methods of management.[111] Community based organizations that were formed to manage local water bodies and floodplains in Bangladesh, for example, have benefited from establishing networks across geographic areas and with other types of organizations. These networks facilitate the sharing of information and enable organizations to band together to resist pressures from powerful actors who threaten their livelihoods.[112] In other cases, NGOs or government agencies and "social entrepreneurs" may play this function. Research that probes the sources of effectiveness for bridging organizations in mediating across social divides to prevent conflict or promote reconciliation in the wake of conflict is an especially important priority in the search for practical guidance on governance interventions.

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[110] Cash, D.W., W.N. Adger, F. Berkes, P. Garden, L. Lebel, P. Olsson, L. Pritchard, and O. Young. (2006). Scale and cross-scale dynamics: Governance and information in a multilevel world. *Ecology and Society* 11 (2): 8.

[111] Ravnborg, H., and M. Funder (2010). *Third party involvement in collective water governance.* Paper prepared for the International Workshop on Collective Action, Property Rights, and Conflict in Natural Resources Management, Siem Reap, Cambodia, June 28 to July 1, 2010.

[112] Sultana, P., and P. Thompson (2010). *Natural resource conflicts and community organizations in Bangladesh.* Paper prepared for the International Workshop on Collective Action, Property Rights, and Conflict in Natural Resources Management, Siem Reap, Cambodia, June 28 to July 1, 2010.

2.7 Conclusions

It is important to evaluate how repeated responses to natural resource conflict affect the prevailing institutional and governance context. Here again, both positive and negative outcomes are possible: institutions and governance factors may promote social-ecological resilience and cooperative management of future conflicts or they may increase the risk of future conflict. The international research community has a great deal to learn about how to distinguish these tendencies. There is no consensus, and comparative empirical analysis remains preliminary. Much of the research on the institutional aspects of resilience has focused on the characteristics of local natural resource management institutions that enable self-organization, learning and adaptation. Less emphasis has been paid to the broader governance context that may encourage or discourage the emergence of such local institutions, and that influences how effectively competing claims on natural resources can be managed across classes of natural resource users, across sectors, and across geographic scales.

Beginning to address this gap, several recent contributions to the literature on social-ecological systems explore the governance context by proposing desirable characteristics of decision-making structures and processes that support or manage resilience. For example, Lebel et al.[113] propose three positive attributes of governance: participation and deliberation in building trust and common understanding about potential courses of collective action, polycentric and multilayered institutions as enablers of decision-making that adapts to social and ecological change, and accountability of public

[113] Lebel, L., J. M. Anderies, B. Campbell, C. Folke, S. Hatfield-Dodds, and T. P. Hughes. (2006). *Governance and the capacity to manage resilience in regional social-ecological systems. Ecology and Society* 11 (1): 19.

authorities as a determining factor in arriving at socially equitable outcomes. Critically, each of these describes attributes of governance in practice, which may vary greatly from the descriptions of decision-making or dispute resolution processes provided in policy or law.

The concern is with such de facto characteristics of the institutional and governance context, and how these are influenced by the interactions among social actors in response to natural resource conflict. Whereas vertical inequality is measured through differences in income across society, horizontal inequality concerns differences between groups, socially defined by region, ethnicity, religion, or class according to the most salient sources of group identity in a given society.[114] Stewart et al.[115] draw on comparative case study analysis to conclude that violence is more likely to be provoked when severe social-political and socio-economic horizontal inequalities coincide, providing elites within marginalized groups a strong incentive to mobilize their constituents and greater likelihood of gaining their support. They show as well, however, that proactive policies of social and political inclusion can reduce the likelihood of violent conflict. The implications for natural resource policy and management need further analysis.

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[114] Stewart, F. (2000). *Tackling horizontal inequalities in 'Evaluation and poverty reduction'*. Proceedings from a World Bank Conference, ed. O. Feinstein and R. Picciotto, 271-283.

[115] Stewart, F., G. Brown, and A. Langer. (2008). Major Findings and conclusions on the relationship between horizontal inequalities and conflict. In '*Horizontal inequalities and conflict: Understanding group violence in multiethnic societies*', F. Stewart, ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN RESPONDING TO VIOLENT CONFLICTS OVER NATURAL RESOURCES

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the role of regional organizations and bodies in responding to natural resource conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, the peace building potential of regional organizations in the region and the challenges faced by organizations in the implementation of peace initiatives.

3.2 The state of natural resource conflicts in the Great Lakes Region

The Great Lakes region is rich in fertile soils, watersheds, valuable minerals, fisheries, but densely populated. Governments in the region may or may not possess the capacity to project their authority into these border areas, but they unquestionably possess interests in the production and trade flowing from these valuable natural resources. By contrast, border areas in most of the Horn of Africa have until recently been viewed as remote, expansive, uneconomic, and thinly populated. The governments have thus made economically rational decisions not to expend scarce natural resources to control areas with little prospect of an economic return. As a result, populations in these borderlands have lived largely beyond the reach of the state. Geography and climate are critical drivers of communal conflict across the region, but shape conflict in complex ways. In some parts of the Great Lakes Region, worsening resource scarcity, combined with profound poverty and underdevelopment, are clearly exacerbating communal conflict. The more arid zones of the lowlands of the Horn of Africa suffer frequent and sometimes

devastating droughts, and hence are prone to communal clashes over pasture and access to water.[116]

Rapid population growth, possible long-term climate change, increased alienation of land for irrigated farms or ranches, and disruptions of pastoral movements are among the many factors intensifying pastoral and agro-pastoral clashes in semi-arid zones. Periodic catastrophic droughts, including the 2011 crisis which produced famine conditions in parts of Somalia and which affected over 12 million people in the eastern Horn, also triggered large-scale population displacement and migration which can badly strain relations between host communities and newcomers. Portions of East Africa that receive better rainfall have a different resource problem which include, growing pressures on available natural resources specifically land due to dense populations and rapid population growth. Competition for natural resources has intensified in recent decades across the Great Lakes region and have played an important role in both communal clashes and civil wars. Local communities possess well-established mechanisms for managing resource scarcity, but those mechanisms have in some instances been overwhelmed by the magnitude of new pressures and competition for land, water, and access to markets.[117]

At the same time, some of the most deadly and destructive instances of armed conflict and violent criminality have occurred in natural resource abundant portions of

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[116] ICGLR (2003). International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region: a Concept Paper. International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

[117] UN. (2006) Interim report of the group of experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 16-98.

East Africa, reflecting troubles associated with what some have termed the 'resource curse.' This has been most dramatically in evidence in eastern DRC and the Great Lakes, where competition to control the region's endowment of high-value minerals has been a major conflict driver at the local and interstate levels. Control over exploitation of and revenue from oil and natural gas deposits have also triggered or perpetuated insurgencies in Sudan and Ethiopia, and at times have raised tensions between neighboring states. Importantly, high-value mineral and energy resources introduce powerful external actors and money into the picture, complicating local efforts to manage resource disputes peacefully.[118]

In the Great Lakes region, evidence points clearly to the crucial role of effective governance. Resources need not be a curse, and resource scarcity need not provoke armed conflict, if effective and accountable governance structures are in place. Weak or indifferent governance capacity in Great Lakes has in the recent past made it much harder for border communities to cope with the pressures associated with both extreme scarcity and abundance. The DRC includes most of the Congo Basin region, an area of enormous wealth in terms of biodiversity, timber, and mineral resources. Despite this natural wealth, however, the DRC is one of the poorest countries in the world with significant infrastructure deficiencies and an economy that is highly dependent upon agriculture and forestry. Violent conflicts linked to the exploitation of its natural resources have historically prevented the DRC from fully utilizing its resources to generate revenue and improve quality of life for its citizens. Specifically, numerous policy reports have

[118] Dr. Joseph Yav, Associate Professor, School of Humanities, University of Lubumbashi:DRC, 2nd July 2013.

highlighted the role of minerals in financing the armed groups involved in the most recent DRC conflicts. Control over mining areas in the eastern provinces continues to shift between different independent armed groups and units of the Military of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ("FARDC").The struggle for control over these resources has exacerbated conflict and created greater difficulty in managing the resources to benefit the public.[119]

Despite a recent transition towards peace, conflict and insecurity remain in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, Orientale, Maniema, and Katanga. These conflicts are particularly acute in the northeastern provinces of Ituri in Orientale, and North and South Kivu, where local militia and foreign rebel forces continue to terrorize the regions. A prime example of conflict is the Virunga National Park ("Park") located in northeastern DRC, on the border with Uganda and Rwanda. The Park was the site of some of the large-scale armed conflicts that occurred in the Kivu Provinces. The 1994 Rwandan genocide and resulting refugee crisis led to the presence of about 700,000 refugees on the edges of the Park. These displaced groups increased the consumption of natural resources both inside and outside the Park, furthering the impact on the environment and leading to mass deforestation.[120]

Identity and nationality, which are linked to land and political power, have also played an important part in the different conflicts of the DRC. In the absence of alternative income earning opportunities in the formal economy or in commerce, access

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[119] Ibid

[120] Security Council 'Report of the Secretary General on the preparation of an international conference on the Great Lakes Region' United Nations, 17th November 2003. S/2003/1099.

to land is essential to livelihoods in DRC. There have been several historic conflicts over grazing land and land ownership between Hema and Lendu peoples in Ituri. These conflicts have killed 10,000 and displaced 50,000. Moreover, these types of conflicts are likely to continue until those natural resources with income-generating potential, such as timber, are better managed.

3.3 Causes of Natural resource conflicts in the Great Lakes Region and their causes

The existing and potential natural resource conflicts in the Great Lakes Region have a range of causes which must be fully understood before identifying possible solutions. However, in addressing such conflicts there is often a tendency to focus upon the immediate causal circumstances and look for technical or administrative solutions to these. In general, this is inadequate as it addresses only the symptoms and not the deep rooted causes. These include social, economic and political influences upon both the management of natural resource and the demands which are placed upon them.[121]

The factors influencing natural resource conflicts in the region exist at several scales ranging from the physical characteristics of specific natural resources, through the labour resources and wealth of a household, to the norms and knowledge in a community which affect natural resource management techniques. Beyond this, there are important policy influences from government, as well as political pressures within government, while the global economic situation will affect upon governments and farmers through a number of factors such as international prices and aid flows. In many cases these contributes to natural resource pressures and conflicts.

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[121] Annabell Waititu, Global warming and conflicts over water in eastern Africa, in Alliance Sud, Conference on Water and Conflicts, Berne, 6 March 2009

Natural resource conflicts in the region involve neighboring communities or states competing for the same resources or the present generation misusing a give n natural resource at the expense of future generations. These situations come about because people cannot meet their daily requirements from sustainable use of the said natural resource base to which they have access given what they see as appropriate effort. Hence they want to gain more natural resources or overexploit the natural resources that are available in order to survive, rather than change their natural resource management practices. Their focus is upon immediate production rather than long-term sustainability, and poverty means that they have neither the time nor resources to invest in better land management.

3.4 Trends in Regional Institutions

In the recent past, East Africa's regional organizations arevery weak, handicapped by interstate rivalries and tensions that sharply limited opportunities for collective action. The original EAC collapsed in 1977, and in the Horn of Africa the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was paralyzed by interstate and proxy wars waged by several member states against one another. In the Great Lakes region, interstate regional cooperation on security matters would have been unthinkable a decade ago, due to regional rivalries and direct military interventions into eastern DRC. The collective result has been a deficit of functional regional platforms to codify interstate cooperation on economic, political, development, and conflict management issues.[122]

[122] Interview with Kizito Sabala, Head and Political Officer, IGAD liaison office Nairobi , 15th June 2013

That context is changing. East African governments are manifesting a renewed interest in managing violent conflict and promoting regional economic development through greater support for and commitment to regional institutions. Though rivalry, mistrust, and even hostility endures between some East African governments, the broader trend across the region is much improved bilateral relations, driven primarily by a pragmatic realization that many of the region's most pressing problems can only be addressed through cooperative relations with neighboring states and through multilateral efforts.

Regional organizations in East Africa are the chief beneficiaries of this new environment. They are playing a more prominent role in conflict management, peace operations, norm-setting, economic trade cooperation, and regional integration issues. Intraregional trade volumes have leapt upward since 2004, adding new pressure to improve cross border infrastructure and maintain security in border areas where goods and laborers cross. IGAD is enjoying a revival in its roles, especially in regional diplomacy and conflict early warning and response, thanks somewhat to renewed commitment on the part of several key member-states to work closely together. Regional military cooperation has been enhanced by the collective action of several IGAD member-states contributing troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peace operation in southern Somalia. Finally, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), officially formed in late 2006 has enjoyed growing success as a platform for interstate cooperation and promotion of peace, security, and development.[123]

[123] Ibid

This trend of revival and strengthening of regional institutions is not unique to the region. It tracks closely with a trend across Africa, where multilateral approaches to conflict management, peacekeeping, and development are making real gains. Not surprisingly, a recent study by the US National Defense University calls for robust international support to regional organizations in Africa, concluding that the continent's regional economic communities —have emerged as the central norm-setting institutions in Africa.

3.5 The role of regional and sub-regional organizations

According to Christopher Ogwang Aria,[124] the sources of violent conflicts in the Great Lakes Region are many; the most common ones are scarce natural resources such as oil, gold, diamond, Land, Pastures for Grazing, etc. These conflicts have been escalated as a result of poor management of the natural resources by states, unequal distribution, ethnicity, political differences which are usually driven by political elites to gain their position in leadership or political power, unfair employment opportunities to citizens as well as religious differences and marginalization.

AMISOM responds to violent conflicts through the use of traditional methods which include involving community elders and Religious leaders to address the issues and giving the historical background, and preaching culture of peace, non violence and co-existence. AMISON is also encouraging states to support the needs for the missing gaps, but not to use arms or take sides. The main activities undertaken by AMISOM in terms of mitigating violent conflicts over natural resources in the region involve

[124]Christopher Lianyang Ogwang Aria, Civil Affairs Officer. African Union Commission African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM)

mediation, negotiation, dialogue by bringing all parties involved in conflicts to iron their differences in order to come up with the solution to resolve the conflict, not to give any future room for reoccurrence of the same conflict.[125]

Most conflicts in Africa often re-occur simply because at times people mixed disputes with conflict. Disputes are settled using legal mechanism, more coercive but not resolved. Conflict approaches of Mediation, Negotiation and reconciliation is reached so it is resolved such that all parties are satisfied with the decision agreed upon but not using coercive or legal method to avoid its reoccurrence. AMISOM has helped in that initially, Diplomatic means was addressed, when the extremist refused to come to the round table for Negotiation, then that's when the AUC has to mobilize Military intervention to save the lives of the innocent civilian being killed. AMISON's intervention has helped in bringing other Armed opposition Groups (AoGs) to Negotiation, Dialogue and finally reach reconciliation. The organization through Transitional Federal Government (TFG) organized constituency Assembly that allowed the Somali citizens to elect their members of Parliament and finally conducted National election, and a President was elected democratically through the ballots and as a result Somali now has the Federal Government of Somalia (FGoS).[126]

In coordinating peace AMISOM has mechanisms in responding to conflicts in the region, like Assembly of Parliament that comprises of Ministers, Ambassadors, and meeting of Heads of State, where advise is given to the State where there is conflict and views are shared to identify the best approach that minimize lost of lives, casualties,

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[125] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2007). 'Peace and security in Africa', 8th Meeting of the Partnership Forum. Berlin, Germany. 22-23 May 2007.
[126] Ibid

destruction of properties, to prevent conflict and stop conflict from escalating.. The most standard approach is the Diplomatic means where Mediation, Negotiation is used as a means to resolve conflict. Each States has also to apply traditional methods of resolving conflict using elders and community leaders. Above all, the Regions all have Institutions that give Early Warning System so as to respond promptly to conflict in the Region to avoid its spill over to the neighboring communities.

With regard to partnership with other regional organizations in trying to promote peace between communities and states in the region AMISOM takes into account its mandate very seriously and in working with IGAD and other partners and remain committed to supporting ongoing peace initiative efforts towards national reconciliation as well as the effort to rebuild the armed forces and integrate them in national forces as a means to promote peace and stability among the communities in the region to prevent conflict. The responsible body is the African Union Commission as the Chair (AUC), within the AUC, there is the Commissioner for Peace and Security, which coordinates initiative to other Regional Institution or organization like ECOWAS in West African States, IGAD in East African Community and the Great Lakes and SADC in South African States.

The challenges faced by AMISOM in the implementation of peace initiatives between states and communities involved in violent conflicts over natural resources are mostly financial as they do not have adequate funds to support the implementation of the required operation in responding to immediate conflict. Secondly, some neighboring states may have personal interests which escalate the conflict instead of supporting the

mechanism to resolve the conflict before it spill over to other communities within the Region.

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE), based in Kampala (Uganda), has joined five other non-governmental organizations and individuals to respond to violent conflicts over natural resources in the Great Lakes region. It has been involved in strengthening and developing a constituency of support for peaceful resolution of conflicts over natural resource in the Great Lakes Region; mobilizing public opinion locally, nationally, regionally and internationally to stop violent conflicts and end the culture of impunity in the region; and giving ordinary people and local NGOs a platform to coordinate their activities and influence and support the regional agenda for establishment of sustainable peace and prosperity.[127]

The evolving and shared understanding and commitment of the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE), has grown out of a series of meetings over a number of years, with recent meetings helping the organization to clarify its objectives. The meetings aimed to find a common understanding and shared platform among African NGOs, concerned African citizens and residents, as well as associations of non-African NGOs in the region, to support efforts to stop violent conflicts in the Great Lakes region. As a result of these consultations, CECORE consider it urgent to engage in a number of public activities to strengthen and further develop a constituency of support for peaceful resolution of the natural resource conflicts in the Great Lakes Region.[128]

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[127] Interview with Dr. E. Kamuhangire, Chairperson, The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE),Kampala (Uganda),29th june 2013.

[128] Ibid

The primary areas of CECORE's involvement and activity include a campaign to create a ground swell of public action and opinion to stop the culture of brutality and killings so that programmes of mediation and conflict resolution can succeed. The campaign asks all members of the community, at all levels, to work and create an atmosphere of "zero tolerance" to violence and impunity, which regrettably have become a widespread and common practice in the Great Lakes Region. In order to create an enabling environment for non-violent resolution of conflict, CECORE is enlisting a combined human and material resources, both as individuals and as organizations.

CECORE activities include training women trainers in Uganda in conflict resolution skills. "Because we have developed a pool of Ugandan trainers, we do not have to rely on outside trainers". CECORE trainers continuously update their skills through advanced courses, especially in South Africa. Since women are often the most affected in conflict situations, CECORE has helped women's groups in Gulu resolve conflicts, and works with African mediators and NGO's active in the northern part of Uganda on other conflict resolution initiatives. CECORE is also helping to train refugees, aid workers, and government and community officials in refugee camps for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and has designed a training manual and video for conflict resolution training in the camps for UNHCR staff.[129]

In July 1997 CECORE organized a training workshop on Conflict Handling Skills for Legal Aid Practitioners and Counsellors: Communication, Negotiation and Mediation Skills. It also holds periodic discussion on the situation in the Great Lakes Region with ministers and officials in the Uganda Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has conducted

[129] Interiew with Mr. Emmanuel M.O. Matua – staff Member, The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE),Kampala (Uganda),29th june 2013.

similar workshops for the media, police, former rebels and other crucial categories. As a member of a core group of human rights organizations spearheading a campaign against abductions and killings of children in conflict-torn areas, a CECORE-facilitated song composed by children became the theme song at the September 1997 launching of two reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The reports discussed atrocities committed against children in northern Uganda by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). And with World Vision, CECORE organized a national Churches Consultative Meeting aimed at identifying ways to deal with killings in northern and western Uganda. CECORE also joined other NGOs in Uganda in a campaign led by Oxfam to lobby the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Partly as a result of the campaign, which encouraged children to draw and write about the effects of poverty on their lives, Uganda was the first country to qualify for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.[130]

In collaboration with women's NGOs in Rwanda and Burundi, CECORE runs a radio station for the Great Lakes Region to augment peace efforts. The organization has contributed to workshops on the media and human rights and has participated in conferences on the situation in Burundi, a post-Fourth World Conference on Women forum in East Africa, Rwandan presidential diplomatic briefings, and briefings by delegations of ethnic groups. In addition CECORE's Youth Engagement Towards Social Integration in Rwanda plans to bring people together to release tensions and help reduce conflict. CECORE has also conducted a skills training workshop for women from different occupational backgrounds in Rwanda. The workshop, entitled "Hands across the

[130] Rose Othieno – Ex-Officio- Secretary to the Board, The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE),Kampala (Uganda), 28th june 2013.

Border: Women Empowerment and Capacity Building", aimed to empower women in capacity building and introduce skills for handling conflict and disputes. The 1997 Pan African Conference for Gender, Peace and Development held in Kigali and several other peace initiatives are a direct result of that workshop.[131]

More recently CECORE, together with other women in the region, visited Burundi to talk with the President and other key leaders in that country and mobilized more than 100 women to come to Kampala to discuss their participation in the peace process. This is part of the initiative of the OAU's Women Committee for Peace and Development. Internationally, CECORE has joined hands with organizations such as PANOS to work with the media in promoting peace-building, to promote co-existence and community building, and other organizations to discuss demilitarization.[132]

UNEP has been working at the global policy level to help the UN system understand natural resources, conflict and peace building linkages and to adopt new policies and programmes. This has involved the development of a joint policy report with the UN Peace building Support Office, providing technical inputs to the Secretary General's annual report on peace building, and chairing the development of a UN-wide guidance note on natural resource management in post-conflict transition settings as part of a dedicated task team within the UN Development Group. Based on its analysis, UNEP's report draws three key conclusions for future UN peacemaking and peace building operations. First, natural resources and the environment can be involved in all phases of the conflict cycle: from contributing to the outbreak and perpetuation of

[131] Helen K. Alyek -Vice Chairperson, The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE),Kampala (Uganda), 28th june 2013.
[132] Ibid

conflict and to spoiling the prospects for peace. The way that natural resources and the environment are governed has a determining influence on peace and security. Secondly, investing in environmental management and the governance of natural resources is an investment in conflict prevention. Finally, cooperation over the management of natural resources and the environment provides new opportunities for peace building that should be pursued.[133]

As the basis for evidence-based policy making and field programming, UNEP also established a global research programme on post-conflict peace building and natural resources together. In their diversity and number, the books represent the most significant collection to date of experiences, analyses, and lessons in managing natural resources to support post-conflict peace building. One of the main operational activities of this pillar is conducted through the EU-UN Partnership on Land and Natural Resource Conflicts, in which UNEP, five UN partners and the European Union are working to support countries to improve natural resource management for conflict prevention and peace building. Through this partnership, technical assistance will be provided to help national stakeholders, as well as UN and EU staff in conflict-affected countries, to better understand and prevent tensions over environmental issues and the management of natural resources.[134]

UNEP also engages the Great Lakes region with the EU-UN Partnership to help build civil society capacity to participate in natural resource decision making, dispute resolution, and concession monitoring. Past field operations on Conflict Prevention,

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[133] Nick Nuttall, Director of Communications and Public Information, and Spokesperson United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Nairobi, Kenya, 3rd July 2013.

[134] Ibid

Peace building and Natural Resources have taken place in Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic as agenda countries of the Peace building Commission. In both countries, UNEP provided technical analysis and support to peace building plans.[135]

The main activities by IGAD in initiating peace in the Great Lakes Region include mediation, establishing regional structures and policy frameworks such as mediation support Unit, fact findings missions and shuttle diplomacy, support to AU efforts such as AMISOM in Somalia, the Kofi Anani mediation in Kenya during the 2008 post election violence and election observation missions. This has contributed to mixed results, for example the CPA Sudan ended the war but there is still some unfinished issues that threaten the security of the region. For example the unresolved matter on Abyei, south Kordofan and the border demarcation. Somalia is a "hard nut to crack".[136]

IGAD's conflict prevention program, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), has been operational since 2003. Its mandate has been to collect information on possible or imminent conflict in border areas, disseminate those reports to member states, and facilitate rapid response to the crisis. Its focus is principally on pastoralist conflict. The Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs) - national reporting units based in country capitals are led by a government focal point. Field monitors in border areas are responsible for gathering and relaying early warning information to Local Peace Committees (LPCs) who in turn report to the CEWERUs.[137]

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[135] Corli Pretorius, Executive Assistant to the Executive Director, Executive Office United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),Nairobi, Kenya, 3rd July 2013.
[136] Kizito Sabala, Head and Political Officer, IGAD liaison office Nairobi , 15th June 2013
[137] Joseph Kiberi, Administration and Procurement officer, Regional Centre for Small Arms(RECSA), 17th June 2013.

The CEWARN program has considerable promise, but also faces predictable challenges. Many of these challenges are not unique to CEWARN but constitute universal difficulties of conflict early warning. Governments everywhere are often reluctant to share sensitive information even with close allies, and the Great Lakes is no exception. In addition, the capacity of the organization at both headquarters and field reporting levels has been variable. Poor and irregular output for some reporting channels such as the Rapid Response Fund (RRF) and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems has led to some growing donor frustration. But member states are another example of the new commitment to regional cooperation is the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, an intergovernmental organization based in Burundi which has been leading efforts to address the illegal exploitation of minerals through legally binding protocols since 2006. Through member state collaboration, bilateral donor support, and interregional cooperation with other African partners, this organization is working to provide tools for regional harmonization and technical capacity building for member states on due diligence and mineral trade accountability and tracking in the region.[138]

In December 2010, the ICGLR convened a Special Summit of the Heads of States in Lusaka, Zambia, specifically dedicated to the issue of the illegal exploitation of natural resources from the region. During this summit, all 11 members of the ICGLR signed the Protocol on the Fight against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources. The protocol outlines the specific actions that member states will take and also endorsed ICGLR's Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR). This

[138] Anne Mary Epechu –Staff Member, The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE),Kampala (Uganda), 28th June 2013.

summit was influenced in part by recently passed US legislation that ICGLR had campaigned for with international and regional organizations. The Dodd-Frank Act, which was passed in July 2010, requires publicly traded companies on the American Stock Exchange to disclose whether they are using, in production, any of the —conflict mineral (defined as tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold) from the DRC or neighboring countries that may have been used to finance armed groups or belligerents. This legislation and its pending impact has influenced ICGLR member states, as Dodd-Frank focuses on the due diligence that companies must take to transparently disclose the origin or their supply chain in the Great Lakes region, not only raw minerals that come directly from DRC.[139]

This new development in the ICGLR is significant, as the trade in conflict minerals is a regional problem requiring regional solutions. Although much of the raw material emanates from eastern DRC, refinement and transiting of the minerals is an important income for surrounding countries in the Great Lakes region such as Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Valuable shipments must transit borders and move through multiple national custom channels before reaching ports such as Mombasa in Kenya and Dar Salaam in Tanzania to be shipped to their final destinations. At any point in this chain, minerals from various mines can be mixed together, and records of mineral origins may not be kept or passed to new owners. Often certificates of origin and custom documents can be obscured and lack of harmonization of tagging and certification

[139] The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region of 15 December 2006.

makes smuggling and illegal trade not only lucrative but highly accessible across borders in the region. Any attempt to end the trade in conflict minerals necessarily impacts almost every country in Great Lakes region. The RINR initiative is one of the ICGLR's cornerstone programs and is an impressive example of a new regional commitment to codify, routinize, and institutionalize cooperation on an issue which in the recent past was a major source of regional conflict. It serves as a platform for member states' coordination and commitment to the protocol, which outlines six tools or proposed instruments for member states to implement to help curb the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The six tools supported by member states for development and implementation to combat illicit and illegal mineral trade are: a Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM), harmonization of national-level legal frameworks governing the mineral sector, a regional database documenting regional mineral trade patterns, increased capacity building for the formalization of artisanal mining to improve taxation and transparency across borders, peer learning mechanisms between member states in the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), and a whistle-blowing mechanism to allow citizens witnessing illicit and illegal activity to anonymously report abuses to the ICGLR through a web-based platform.[140]

IGAD promote peace between communities that have been engaged in violent conflicts over natural resources through Joint Election observation mission between EAC, IGAD and COMESA had taken place during the Ugandan elections and recent Kenya elections. In addition there are joint programmes on peace and security, EAC small arms, IGAD- Conflict resolution and COMESA War economy studies. The

[140] Ibid

coordination of the peace initiatives is undertaken by the Executive Secretary but day to day activities by the peace and security Division headed by a director with several officers under the humanitarian officer, political officer, heads of various security related programmes such as terrorism, organized crimes maritime and security institutions.[141]

The challenges faced by IGAD relate first to the problem of natural resources and the environment in complex conflict situations, and second, to the constructive role actors can play in natural resource, environmental and conflict management, they include: Integrating natural resources and environmental factors in conflict prevention, management and peace building: Conflict management approaches should increasingly take the environment and natural resources into account when attempting to prevent violent conflict from erupting; negotiating and implementing durable peace agreements; deploying peace support operations; and establishing preventative and post-conflict peace building mechanisms. Yet, integration has been a slow process, particularly since this requires an interdisciplinary and multi-sectoral approach.[142]

The Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) was set up to coordinate the implementation of theNairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. The main activity of RECSA is to reduce the circulation of small arms and weapons that fuel violent conflicts in the Great Lakes region. To date, RECSA has supported the destruction of over three hundred thousand small arms and light weapons in the region RECSA has a memorandum of understanding with regional bodies that

[141] Joseph Kiberi, Administration and Procurement officer, Regional Centre for Small Arms (RECSA), 17th June 2013.
[142] Interview with Kizito Sabala, Head and Political Officer, IGAD liaison office Nairobi , 15th June 2013

work toward the mitigation of violent conflicts, the organization coordinate peace initiatives between states and communities in the region through public awareness campaigns aimed at peace building and encouraging a culture of co-existence.[143]

Ten countries were joined by Seychelles in signing the legally binding Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States in April 2004. Somalia later joined the initiative. Currently RECSA has 15 Member States after the admission into membership of the Republic of Congo in 2009 and the Central African Republic and the Republic of South Sudan in 2011. RECSA is coordinating national efforts in its Member States to implement the Protocol. RECSA Member States are committed to fighting the proliferation and trafficking of illicit SALW in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa by implementing the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol. By so doing they contribute to increasing prospects for sustainable development in the region. It works along three main result areas/pillars (RECSA Strategy 2009 – 2014): Institutional Development, stockpile Management, and generation and Provision of Information. However, the organization face some challenges in their work which includes,high illiteracy levels among warring communities, limited organizational budget and political related factors. [144]

[143] Mr. Theoneste Mutsindashyaka, Executive Secretary, The Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), 29th July 2013.

[144] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2007). 'Peace and security in Africa', 8th Meeting of the Partnership Forum. Berlin

According to Emmanuel Ole-Sayiorry[145] political Contests on ethnic basis where the winner community is perceived as gaining access to benefits and resources at exclusion of other tribes has been a source of conflict. Thus politics is intricately tied to economics and livelihoods or satisfiers of people's basic needs. UNDP supports dialogue between feuding entities to negotiate a ceasefire and craft an immediate and long term plan of ending the violence. Secondly, the organization builds the capacities of the antagonistic to resolve conflicts amicably and nonviolently in future. If possible and needed it recommends a long term interventions that address the root causes of conflict including poverty eradication, cultural transformation, and structural reforms. As a result of UNDP's interventions, incidences and severity of violent conflicts have been significantly reduced. More peaceful means of addressing conflicts are being adopted including petitions, demonstrations, advocacy etc.

UNDP coordinates peace dialogues/initiatives between states and communities in the region by coordinating structures including District Peace Committees, Local Administration and Peace Monitors. In addition various CSO's and NGO's working for peace act provide a coordinating platform for dialogues and peace initiative. UNDP especially works with a broad range of actors at regional, national and communities levels. Examples include RECSA, IPTC, Oxfam. Challenges faced by UNDP include lack of adequate resources which is an all time concern, sabotage by conflict profiteers or other vested interests. Widespread poverty makes it hard to negotiate win-win deals

[145] Emmanuel Ole-Sayiorry , Programme Officer,Peace Building and conflict Prevention Programmee, UNDP –Kenya, 28th July 2013.

when what is on the table is simply not sufficient. In addition, there is bad legal or policy frameworks that do not encompass equity, fairness and dialogue.[146]

According to the Technical Advisor[147] on Conflict Management at Danish Refugee Council resource based conflicts occure mainly in that pastoral zones where livestock keeping is the mainstay and who depend mainly on scarce natural resources including pasture, water, natural vegetation. Recurrent droughts have over the years increased the pressure among the communities in regards to access and control of resources. These communities often violently clash when they converge in dry season grazing points. Disregard for Grazing Plans and Pacts/ Agreements is a key grievance where at any time, communities receiving other communities during dry periods feel that there is always a lack of consultation over the use of grazing resources and a complete disregard for peace pacts resulting in violent confrontations. Cultural Issues is also attributed to the fact that a great deal of conflicts also happen at the onset of rains as communities leave dry season grazing areas towards their traditional grazing areas. This may either be the cultural attachment to livestock and the need to replenish stock lost during dry periods and a proof of masculinity where the young men have to prove themselves and which happens mainly when they no longer have to be together.

The organization responds to violent conflicts over natural resources in the region by supporting dialogue between groups; supporting communities to come up with Peace agreements/ pacts, declarations e.t.c. The main activities the organization undertake in terms of mitigating violent conflicts over natural resources in the region include

[146] Daley, "Challenges to Peace: Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region of Africa", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2006

[147] Emmy Auma, Technical Advisor on Conflict Management at Danish Refugee, 28th July 2013

establishment and Capacity Building of grass root conflict management structures; facilitating the Linkage of Peace Committees and Grazing Committees to ensure they work closely; promoting peace, ensuring that grazing/ resource use plans are shared across borders / between communities who usually converge during months of scarcity; facilitating grass root structures to undertake dialogue especially where tensions arise; conflict Early warning and response; and promoting connector initiatives to enhance interaction between traditionally conflicting groups to increase mutual trust and respect

Quite a lot has been realized as a result of the intervention by Danish Refugee Council in terms of either the frequency or magnitude of the conflicts that occur. Communities are able to point out the fact that they know, they understand and even use the conflict resolution/ management structures e.g. the fact that community A can send word to community B about the fact that they are moving in their direction with their livestock and in the process the modalities of use are re established.

By working with local/ grass root structures that are trusted by different groups, the organization facilitates capacity enhancement for such structures to ensure that they can effectively support dialogue between groups. One such initiative is enlisting the services of Mediators Beyond Borders (MBB) who build the capacity of the community structures and supports them undertake such dialogue/ mediation initiatives. One successful area has been ensuring that grazing committees and peace committees work together closely and complement each other's efforts.[148]

[148] Annabell Waititu, Global warming and conflicts over water in eastern Africa, in Alliance Sud, Conference on Water and Conflicts, Berne, 6 March

Danish refugee Council does not have interventions across the Kenyan Border, the organization recognizes the fact that Peace Building requires everybody's efforts (more so because while projects are based within borders (County, sub county, District, Division e.t.c), Conflicts are majority of the time across borders. This has meant that the organization always made effort to get in touch with and work closely with other actors promoting peace across the borders to ensure that positive outcomes are realized simultaneously. There is also the dependency on regional organizations such as IGAD and especially CEWERN for conflict early warning information.

Since violent conflicts over natural resources are complex and involve actors from distant areas. This makes it difficult for the organization to reach all required especially in the establishment and sharing of resource use plans. It is also difficult to establish just who will be going to what direction during pasture and water scarcity (Some totally disregard guidelines they may have not been involved in developing). It is also sometimes difficult to justify to donors why the project funds are being used to target populations out of the target area. Political influences sometimes undermines credibility of structures that are in place to promote peaceful coexistence. Incidences in the past have indicated that the conflicts not only increase when there is scarcity but also when the rainy season begins and there is plenty and communities moving back to their traditional grazing areas. This is a big challenge because the organization and even the grass root Peace Building and Conflict Management structures are very limited on how they can respond to this scenario. The fact that sometimes you take a step forward and you are taken two steps back (Very small trigger completely destroys work done; need

for a lot of patience because of the effort needed to build trust and realize behavior change.

Peacebuilding/Conflict Management is mainly software which has been in the recent past been improved if an organization is lucky to have a peace dividend component included; Conflicting communities are also mostly poverty stricken and when there is no "*tangible benefit*" sometimes communities have little appreciation for the Peace Building interventions and tend to see other quantitative aspects/ initiatives as more useful and a priority. Timing which is a key factor in management of resource based conflicts is a difficult variable to manage i.e. movement patterns need to be established and repopularization for example resource use plans should be precisely timed. This is not always easy and the result is organizations being forced to step in after conflicts have occurred as opposed to the most desirable, mitigating before it happens.[149]

3.6 Peace building challenges in the Great Lakes Region

The ambiguous relationship between regional cooperation and peace building in the Great Lakes Region is evident in both Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) and ICGLR. Both claim to have peace building aspects to their work and both are supported and pushed by donor agencies. Despite the rhetoric however, the actual ability of such regional cooperation efforts to actively take into account conflict risks and act on peace building opportunities remains open to question. In order to ensure that the promotion of regional cooperation actually does contribute to better relations between countries as well as communities, improve economic opportunities for citizens

[149] Ibid

and communities, and support peace building, more needs to be done both by the member states of such institutions as well as by donor governments.[150]

The instability in the region as well as the remaining hostilities and mistrust between the governments in the Great Lakes Region, especially between the DRC and Rwanda, poses great challenges for regional cooperation and peace building. In the donors' drive to foster regional institution-building, this challenge must become the focus of all areas of planning and action, adapting different strategies depending on whether disengagement is due to a lack of willingness or capacity, or both. The Congolese government's continued disengagement with Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), for instance, cannot be treated as an aside by the member states as well as by the donor governments, but must be taken seriously and addressed.[151]

Burundi and the DRC are highly fragile states, requiring capacity support to enable them to fulfill their commitments. Rwanda struggles equally with capacity challenges as well as with internal, intergroup tensions. This does not mean that joint political initiatives accompanying the ongoing local trans-boundary activities are fruitless. Rather, effective joint activity should continue with the objective of benefitting local populations with opportunities and services. The asymmetries between economies in the region and the different abilities of governments to cope with and mitigate

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[150] P. Daley, "Challenges to Peace: Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region of Africa", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2006

[151] Ruben De Koning, *Controlling Conflict Resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Stockholm Int'l Peace Res. Poly. Brief (July 2010)

potentially negative effects on livelihoods in the short and long term are further challenges to institutions such as ICGLR and CEPGL.[152]

The ability of governments to harness human and financial resources to assess and act on such adversity remains extremely limited. The Burundian government, for example, is driving accession into the East African Community (EAC) while at the same time trying to address the consequences of traders and farmers facing vastly different markets. This is pertinent given the weakness of Burundi's economy relative to that of the Rwandan economy or the sheer size of the market represented by the DRC's economy. The changes brought about through cooperation facilitated by an institution like Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) should not be discounted in conflict-affected environments. Indeed, it will be difficult for the poorer, conflict-affected and more fragile countries to cope with and mitigate the rising inequality, underemployment and job loss that often accompany economic transitions, especially in the short term. Economic shocks, such as coffee price drops, have been shown to increase tensions and facilitate violence re-emerging in already fragile situations, and market integrations can similarly shock unprepared economies. Much support is required by these governments to adequately deal with the shifting economic and wider power relations that economic cooperation can bring.[153]

The ability of regional institutions to foster economic cooperation as well as support peace is also closely connected to their ability to address local needs, build on local resilience and operate in consultative, transparent ways. The ability of the ICGLR,

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[152] Mr. Theoneste Mutsindashyaka, Executive Secretary, The Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), 29th July 2013.

[153] Republic of Rwanda (2001).

for instance, to engage with civil society in the region in systematic ways that involve planning and monitoring of programmes and projects at local, national and regional levels is critical. Dedicated, long-term capacity building and accompaniment may be able to support such efforts as can generate consultative approaches that incorporate the perspectives of civil society, including the local private sector. European Union (EU) support in this area would not only avoid the pitfalls of feeding further into conflict dynamics but also reinforce 'local capacities for peace.'[154]

Institutions such as ICGLR need to articulate how they will ensure assumed peace building impacts, and how they will assess interventions and their impacts from this perspective. In this perspective, a critical review of existing structures of both institutions is necessary. A network of working groups with representatives from the different executive bodies may be a more appropriate forum to address different challenges than within a formal institution. Moreover, it is crucial to include further stakeholders, such as representatives of border provinces, and spread responsibilities. Donors such as the EU should help strengthen institutional capacity in this regard and ensure linkages and coordination across institutional pillars that work on economic development, security and peace building. This includes analysis and assessment at all levels of engagement, from high-level diplomatic activities to those that support the creation of local economic opportunities.[155]

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[154] Kazoora, Moses, 'Ombudsman Meets District Officials', *The New Times*, Kigali, 16–18 February, 2004.

Such peace building approaches must be actively incorporated into the fundraising and planning of economic, trade or energy projects to have a benchmark of its ability to incorporate conflict-sensitivity and capitalize on peace building opportunities. Donor agencies themselves have amassed a wealth of policies and experiences in this regard that should be shared with institutional partners. Regional approaches to peace building in the Great Lakes Region are critical and the economic dimensions of such cooperation represent a strategic entry point given their role in supporting peace as well as their potential for creating shared interest and improving the human security of the region's people. What emerging institutions such as IC/GLR and the supporting donor agencies need to do now, however, is to act on opportunities that exist and add value to peace building efforts through the economic aspects of cooperation they champion.[156]

3.7 Conclusions

Competition for natural resources exacerbated by the destabilizing effects of 'modernization' and enforced or spontaneous migration, is more commonly a source of conflict than generally supposed. Reallocations of land during conflict, or the profit from sale or use of land can provide a means of sustaining such conflict. Post-conflict, access to land for many people can be fundamentally altered, often, in the case study countries, through massive forced population displacement.

Conflict changes social relationships in profound ways, and perceptions of mutual rights and responsibilities in relation to land between individuals, social groups, and the

[156] Angelica Kashunju – Member, The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE),Kampala (Uganda), 28th june 2013.

state are altered due to changes in perceived legitimacy of institutions and obligations. Specific difficulties often encountered in post-conflict situations include: the inequities faced by women (particularly those widowed or separated from husbands) and orphaned children who are denied inheritance rights; the return of refugees and internally displaced people, often without titles or other proof of ownership; the status of environmentally sensitive areas, especially where there is land pressure due to sudden refugee returns; and the need for management of local inter-communal relations where civilian populations have often been the victims of violence, and where land claims have an inherently 'communal' nature. It is often desirable to implement rapidly some elements of post-conflict land reform in order to avoid problematic issues aggravating over time and triggering more conflict at a later date, and activities such as information-gathering, training and identification of relevant personnel can be done even in the emergency phase. However, the process of land reform is time-consuming, partly because countries frequently lack an effective legal framework in respect of tenure, and systems for participatory policy-development.

A range of important questions remain about the nature of policy reforms necessary to address land issues in order to prevent violence, during and following conflict. The transition between 'conflict' and 'post-conflict' is rarely clear: the causes of conflict may never be fully resolved; and violence itself may continue sporadically well past the official declaration of 'peace'. Transitional governments which seek to be inclusive or conciliatory by incorporating former belligerents, are, in reality, often characterized by wide differences in vision and development objectives, and these may translate into struggles between military and civilian leadership, or between different

ministries. Much more research is needed on the politics of policy-making in such difficult institutional environments.

Post-conflict governments, especially those with negative experiences of multi-party systems, are understandably slow to democratize after conflict. However, a more transparent dialogue within each country on governance and post conflict reconstruction is important, particularly in light of the tendency towards increasing economic and political dominance of urban-based elites. Effective implementation of a fundamental and sensitive issue such as land will not be possible without transparency.

CHAPTER FOUR

NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICTS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION AND THE INTERVENTIONS BY REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

4.1 Introduction

The chapter presents the analysis of data and interpretations on the research findings, the study used both secondary and primary data. The primary data was obtained from respondents who were drawn from various regional organizations across the Great lakes Region. The secondary data was obtained from published reports and articles.

4.2 Discussion of Natural resource conflicts in the Great Lakes Region

4.2.1 Geography and Natural Resource Conflicts

As presented in the literature review, Klare[157] outlines what he sees as a new landscape of global conflict in the post-Cold War era, shaped by the growing strategic value of certain mineral resources. The international community's attention to the resource-rich regions of Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa is seen as a sign of this shift. As noted in chapter two, the environmental effects of human activity are a function of two factors: the vulnerability of the ecosystem and the product of the total population and that population's physical activity per capita in the region.[158] Homer-Dixon[159] uses the term and dquo; environmental scarcity & dquo; to refer to scarcity of renewable

[157] Klare, Michael T., (2001). *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict.* New York: Metropolitan Books.
[158] Homer-Dixon, T. (1991). *On the threshold: Environmental changes as causes of acute conflict.* International Security, 16(2), 76-116.
[159] Ibid page 85

resources, and he identifies scarcities of agricultural land, forests, water, and fish as the environmental problems that contribute most to violence. These scarcities, however, contribute to violence only under certain circumstances; there is no inevitable or deterministic connection between these variables. The nature of the ecosystem, the social relations within society and the opportunities for organized violence all affect causal linkages. Environmental scarcity arises in three ways: Demand-induced scarcity is a result of population growth in a region, supply-induced scarcity arises from the degradation of resources, and structural scarcity occurs because of the unequal social distribution of these resources. These three types of scarcity are not mutually exclusive: They often occur simultaneously and interact with one another.[160]

The findings from the respondents revealed that geography and climate are critical drivers of communal conflict across The Great Lakes region, but shape conflict in complex ways. In some parts of the region, worsening resource scarcity, combined with profound poverty and underdevelopment, are clearly exacerbating natural resource conflicts. The more arid zones of the lowlands of the region suffer frequent and sometimes devastating droughts, and hence are prone to communal clashes over pasture and access to water. Rapid population growth, possible long-term climate change, increased alienation of land for farms, and disruptions of pastoral movements are among the many factors intensifying pastoral and agro-pastoral clashes in semi-arid zones in the Great Lake region. Periodic catastrophic droughts in the region also trigger large-scale population displacement and migration which can badly strain relations between host communities and newcomers.

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[160] Homer-Dixon, T. (1994). *Environmental scarcities and violent conflict*: Evidence from cases. International S(e1c)u,r it5y-,4 01.9

The primary data further revealed that areas that receive better rainfall have a different resource problem namely, growing pressures on available land due to dense populations and rapid population growth. Competition for land and water has intensified in recent decades across the region and can play an important role in both communal clashes and civil wars. Local communities possess well-established mechanisms for managing resource scarcity, but those mechanisms have in some instances been overwhelmed by the magnitude of new pressures and competition for land, water, and access to markets.

At the same time, some of the most deadly and destructive instances of armed conflict and violent criminality have occurred in resource abundant portions of the Great Lakes region, reflecting troubles associated with what some have termed as the "resource curse". This has been most dramatically in evidence in eastern DRC and Rwanda, where competition to control the region's endowment of high-value minerals has been a major conflict driver at the local and interstate levels. Control over exploitation of and revenue from oil and natural gas deposits have also triggered or perpetuated insurgencies in Sudan, and at times have raised tensions between neighboring states in parts of East Africa. Importantly, high-value mineral and energy resources introduce powerful external actors and money into the picture, complicating local efforts to manage resource disputes peacefully.

The findings of the study points clearly to the crucial role of effective governance in the Great Lakes region. Resources need not be a curse, and resource scarcity need not provoke armed conflict, if effective and accountable governance structures are in place. Weak or indifferent governance capacity in the Great Lakes Region has in the recent past

made it much harder for border communities to cope with the pressures associated with both extreme scarcity and abundance.

4.2.2 Patterns of natural resource conflicts

Literature on natural resource conflicts has included the examination of the causes of violent conflicts through a focus on greed, or economic motivations. Conceptually, greed is often associated with the economic motivations of competition for natural resources, thus leading to conflict, or where conflict is used as a strategic tool so the resources can be unlawfully extracted with impunity. Paul Collier's[161] assessment of these issues has shaped this greed discourse. Importantly, natural resources do not always play a primary role in starting armed violence. Conflict erupts for a variety of inter-related reasons, but they can be perpetuated by greed when a state is weak and unable to protect its porous borders from state and non-state armed combatants. Among other scholars, there is consensus that weak, weakened and/or unaccountable states with natural resources such as minerals, diamonds and oil are more prone to conflict.[162]

External actors such as neighbouring countries, syndicates, criminal cartels and global private and governmental actors have been found to contribute to the perpetuation of conflicts for economic purposes. This is of particular importance in attempting to understand the conflict in the eastern DRC, where illegally exploited minerals and

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[161] Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (1998) On economic causes of civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 50 (4), pp. 563–573.

[162] Berdal, M. and Malone, D.M. (2000) *Greed and grievance: economic agendas in civil wars*. London, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

diamonds have been smuggled over the border by local armed groups or foreign military forces, and sold on international markets by criminal cartels in Europe and Asia.[163] The type of resources and how "lootable" they are also shapes the very nature of conflicts. Easily lootable resources for example, minerals and diamonds – tend to encourage conflict for non-secessionist purposes, such as in the DRC, while in South Sudan, non-lootable resources such as mineral ores and, to some extent, oil tend to encourage secessionist conflicts.[164]

James[165] cited that that social-ethnic cleavages have featured in most of the Great Lakes region conflicts masking their very personalized and exploitative nature. The inability to respond to the challenges of managing multi-ethnic societies was compounded by the failure of political society to evolve adequate rules for governing itself and exacting accountability from its members. The conflict surrounding the Banyarwanda in the DRC today is a classic example of the denial of citizenship contributing to the violent conflict in the Great Lakes. The degree of dominance or suppression of the Rwandese diaspora in the Great Lakes links the conflict of this group to the domestic conflicts of the states in which they reside. Conflict in this region is linked to who has the right to full citizenship, in this case, ethnically defined. The consequences of this situation are the intensification of social divisions and tensions as

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[163] UN. (2001b) Addendum to the report of the panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. UN

[164] Ross, M.L. (2004), What do we know about natural resources and civil war? *Journal of Peace Research*, 41 (337–356), pp. 391–322.

[165] James Mbiiri, International Centre for Policy and Conflict (ICPC), Nairobi (Kenya), 28th july 2013.

well as a halt in the nation-building process, via the failure as a guarantor for social peace.

The primary data further revealed that the Great Lakes Region has in recent years experienced political strife, armed conflict and population displacements with severe humanitarian consequences. While these events have clearly revolved around political struggles for the control of the state, research findings has pointed to the significance of access to renewable natural resources as structural causes and sustaining factors in struggles for power in the region. Contested rights to land and natural resources are significant, particularly in light of land scarcity in many areas and the frequency of population movements.[166]

The diversity of the region makes it difficult to generalize about patterns of conflict and instability in the region's borderlands, but several factors are of importance across most of the region's conflicts. Across the Great Lakes Region, many armed conflicts especially insurgencies, civil wars, and violent extremism are fueled in part by frustration over limited economic opportunities; poverty; unemployment; and politics of exclusion along ethnic, religious, or class lines. The region's high population growth rates have produced a youth bulge which exacerbates problems of unemployment, and steady urban drift is feeding the growth of large slums where these grievances are concentrated. In rural areas, grievances are most pronounced over land access and alienation of land. Most of these grievances are rooted in a sense of ethnic or sectarian

[166] Daley, "Challenges to Peace: Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region of Africa", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2006

marginalization. These grievances have been easily tapped and sometimes manipulated by political elites.[167]

Insurgencies and armed groups in the region face few constraints in translating local grievances into material support. Recruits for armed gangs, tribal militia, insurgencies, and extremist movements are readily available as a result of high unemployment, the youth bulge, and large refugee camps. Young men in rural areas are often encouraged to join tribal militias by their community leaders. Financing of armed groups is rarely a major constraint, due to the practice of militia living off the land as their principal form of payment, support to tribal paramilitaries by regional governments, access to high-value such as gold and diamonds, diverted aid, diaspora contributions, and the availability of cheap small arms across all of East Africa.

Both oppressive government and inadequate government were cited by the respondents as contributors to armed conflict and instability as populations scramble for the scarce natural resources. Governments in the region vary widely in their attitudes and legislation toward non-state or civic actors in managing trans-border natural resource conflicts; some are highly restrictive while others are amenable to forging hybrid peace-building partnerships with civil society groups in border areas. The region's stronger states have been much more assertive about projecting their authority into border areas and across borders into neighboring states, resulting in a high level of regional armed interventionism and proxy wars. This has also helped to reinforce natural resource conflict in the region involving multiple states and non-state actors. Some instances of regional interventionism reflect state security interests, but regional militaries have also

[167] Kazoora, Moses, 'Ombudsman Meets District Officials', *The New Times*, Kigali, 16–18 February, 2004.

been deployed in pursuit of economic interests. The impact of regional armed interventionism has been variable as noted by the respondents during the study, in some cases it has worsened insecurity and armed violence, in other cases it has reduced it. One of the most important trends in government interests is a much greater commitment to border conflict management and promotion of solutions to regional natural resource conflicts.

4.2.3 Cooperation in the Great Lakes Region

As cited in the literature review, violent conflicts are essentially tied to regional drivers, and include arms flows and illicit finances such as war economies. The devastation of war is not limited to single communities or countries; population displacement, disrupted trade patterns and ruined infrastructure and markets are also regional in their scope and impact. The links between economies and conflict on a regional scale have come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, as violent conflicts have a devastating impact on a region's economy and populations' livelihoods. Yet the regional dimensions of conflict are often neglected in economic recovery and development efforts. Despite the political, economic, military and social interconnections that exist between communities and across borders during and following conflict, recovery and peace building efforts generally remain within national frameworks.

When such recovery policies are applied to a single state, unintended consequences for neighbouring states can result, such as the smuggling of illegal goods or people, including mercenary fighters. Hence, the region remains affected by conflict and instability. Most importantly though, policies and activities confined to individual states remain ineffective to combat such trans-boundary problems and even run the risk of

undermining their own aims. Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda have all experienced the impact of conflict and instability in neighbouring states at the national level. Armies, militias, refugees and civilians can all cross unsecured borders in the region. These countries have also experienced aggression emerging from within neighboring countries; some armed groups, such as the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) which operates in the Kivu provinces of the country, developed from foreign fighters entering the DRC following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The conflict in the DRC alone has created a lot of refugees in neighbouring countries, with the number continuing to rise. Establishing a basis of mutual trust and interdependence following such wars of regional scope creates enormous challenges, as is evident in the Great Lakes Region. Tensions and suspicions exist between governments and there is limited confidence in each other's ability and/or willingness to address the causes and drivers of conflict.

These apprehensions also exist between and within communities, especially where access to citizenship rights and resources, such as land, are contested, as evidenced by the Rwandaphone community in Eastern DRC. The ongoing conflicts and failed peace agreements exacerbate the lack of trust and confidence exhibited at all levels. This makes shared efforts to bring about effective peace building – let alone economic recovery on national or regional levels. The complexity and dynamism of the local, national and regional dimensions of conflict make it difficult for any kind of intervention to comprehensively address all issues. Donor agencies aiming to support economic recovery processes often recognize the regional dimensions to conflict, but rarely translate this knowledge into regional approaches to peace building and economic

recovery. When a regional approach to economic activities is promoted, peace building impacts are simply assumed and not integrated in programme objectives, designs and processes. Many donor agencies in the region continue to operate within the confines of a singularly positive relationship between economic growth and stability in conflict-affected countries, in which they assume the nexus of economic growth, leading to poverty reduction which will contribute to peace.

Their strategies often only address national authorities, excluding other significant stakeholders at sub-national and local levels, as well as non-governmental parties. Additionally, donor institutional structures, such as country strategies and desks instead of regional strategies, can hinder an integrated regional approach. Economic recovery efforts in conflict-affected countries are often criticized for focusing entirely on growth.

In some cases they promote regional economic cooperation with the stated objective of building peace. This approach is premised on the idea that closer cooperation between countries with respect to issues of mutual interest, namely the economy, will build trust between them, create mutual incentives in each other's stability and prosperity and facilitate more constructive relationships between adversaries. The European Union model is often invoked in such situations; however, in the fragile and unique context of the Great Lakes Region, such references appear misplaced. Context-specific circumstances are crucial when exploring ways to strengthen the peace building aspects of economic recovery and in ensuring that interventions have the potential to address the regional dimensions of economic interdependence, conflict and peace.[168]

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[168] Daley, "Challenges to Peace: Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region of Africa", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2006

4.2.4 Economic activity in a context of natural resource conflict

Early work in the literature on the economic performance of resource abundant countries suggested that the causal mechanisms linking natural resource abundance and economic performance were essentially economic in nature. Singer[169] for instance, argued that resource abundant countries had suffered from declining terms of trade over time, in turn constraining their prospects for economic growth and development. Other scholars such as Nurske[170] and Levin[171] argued that the problem for resource abundant countries was that international commodity markets were inherently unstable and that any instability within them could easily be transferred to domestic economies, in turn affecting the reliability of government revenues and foreign exchange supplies and dramatically increasing risks for private investors.

After decades of conflict and mismanagement, the economy of the Great Lakes Region is highly militarized and largely informal. The informal spheres reveal the contradictory situation that lies at the heart of the region's insecurity. The DRC's abundance in valuable natural resources and precious minerals has offered little benefit and created much insecurity for its population, but these resources could only be exploited to finance wars because of the vibrant and diverse local-level, cross-border trade in the region. These informal trade and economic interdependencies clearly fuelled violence in the past but also offer a crucial entry point for peaceful cooperation across

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[169] Singer, H. (1950), The Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries, *The American Economic Review* 40.2 (May), papers and proceedings of the sixty-second Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association: 473–85

[170] Nurske, R. (1958) _Trade Fluctuations and Buffer Policies of Low-Income Countries', *Kyklos* 11.2: 141–4

[171] Levin, J. (1960) *The Export Economies: Their Pattern of Development in Historical Perspective*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press

political divergences. In particular, regarding the aim of fostering peace through economic development, existing trade connections whether formal or informal, offer important potential.[172]

Whilst tensions and violence continue among populations living in close proximity to international borders, economic interactions between and among those populations represent critical sources of livelihoods. Beyond the illicit trade in natural resources, there is an entire range of economic undertakings occurring between traders and across borders. The most important element of cross-border trade from the local community's point of view is trade in agricultural goods. As the region suffers severely from energy shortages, petroleum is also very important for trade relationships.

This signals a genuine potential for peace. Before building on these cooperation networks and economic activities to promote peace, however, they must be better understood: for instance, how economic networks survive during conflict, how power dynamics can skew economics and promote predatory economic practices, and finally how war economies evolve and are sustained. This analysis needs to inform regional cooperation and support networks that can foster trade and energy cooperation with peace building impacts.

4.2.5 Regional approaches to peace building

As noted by Kizito,[173] regional approaches to peace building can be integrative or cooperative. Integrative and cooperative approaches mainly pursue different objectives,

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[172] Ruben De Koning, *Controlling Conflict Resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Stockholm Int'l Peace Res. Poly. Brief (July 2010)

[173] Kizito Sabala, Head and Political Officer, IGAD liaison office Nairobi , 15th June 2013

establish different institutional structures and vary in their effectiveness. Existing integration agreements in the Great Lakes Region, for example, mainly focus on trade and production. Cooperation agreements involve selected policy harmonization or joint production of public goods, such as security, while integration arrangements are characterized by much deeper mutual interaction or synergies.

Theoneste[174] cited that Regional cooperation initiatives in the Great Lakes Region tend to be more selective in their coverage and generally require less long-term commitment than integration. Countries from the region have benefited more from regional cooperation than from formal trade integration. However, regional cooperation may also hold some critical stumbling blocks hindering successful institutionalized regional cooperation. The biggest obstacles revealed in this analysis are: Lack of political commitment to and ownership of regional cooperation by member states; Lack of capacity of member states to engage in such initiatives; Insufficient attention to existing regional political and economic irregularities; Continued mistrust and mutual suspicion among members; and Top-down approaches that exclude many stakeholders. Not only is there a risk that institutions promoting regional cooperation remain ineffective, but there is also a risk that their failure could jeopardize regional prosperity and sustainable peace in the long term. Further, promoting such economic cooperation without first analyzing the political economy and ignoring the ways in which the economy itself may drive conflict dynamics can aggravate hostilities. In the Great Lakes Region, this disregard can include issues of underlying systems of control and access to economic resources based

[174] Theoneste Mutsindashyaka, Executive Secretary, The Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), 29th July 2013.

on coercion or even violence as well as horizontal and geographical inequalities feeding resentment and tensions. It can further include corruption and patronage closely linked to ruling elites or armed groups that continue to play a key role in perpetuating and benefiting from violent conflict and tensions.[175]

While regional cooperation may be important in developing constructive relations between states, it cannot be assumed that pooling resources to provide public goods for populations and creating platforms for dialogue regarding shared interests will automatically follow. Whether regional cooperation yields peace building benefits depends on the capacities and willingness of those involved as well as the design and processes of the cooperation.

4.3 Peace Building Challenges in the Great Lakes Region

As cited by Angelica,[176] ambiguous relationship between regional cooperation and peace building in the Great Lakes Region is evident in both Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries and ICGLR. Both claim to have peace building aspects to their work and both are supported and pushed by donor agencies. Despite the rhetoric however, the actual ability of such regional cooperation efforts to actively take into account conflict risks and act on peace building opportunities remains open to question. In order to ensure that the promotion of regional cooperation actually does contribute to better relations between countries as well as communities, improve economic

[175] UNEP (2004). Stakeholders' meeting on Environmental Issues in the Great Lakes Region Conference Themes. United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi

[176] Angelica Kashunju – Member, The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE),Kampala (Uganda), 28th june 2013.

opportunities for citizens and communities, and support peace building, more needs to be done both by the member states of such institutions as well as by donor governments.

The instability in the region as well as the remaining hostilities and mistrust between the governments in the Great Lakes Region, especially between the DRC and Rwanda, poses great challenges for regional cooperation and peace building. In the donors' drive to foster regional institution-building, this challenge must become the focus of all areas of planning and action, adapting different strategies depending on whether disengagement is due to a lack of willingness or capacity, or both. The Congolese government's continued disengagement with Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries, for instance, cannot be treated as an aside by the member states as well as by the donor governments, but must be taken seriously and addressed. Burundi and the DRC are highly fragile states, requiring capacity support to enable them to fulfil their commitments. Rwanda struggles equally with capacity challenges as well as with internal, intergroup tensions. This does not mean that joint political initiatives accompanying the ongoing local trans-boundary activities are fruitless. Rather, effective joint activity should continue with the objective of benefitting local populations with opportunities and services.[177]

The irregularities between economies in the region and the different abilities of governments to cope with and mitigate potentially negative effects on livelihoods in the short and long term are further challenges to institutions such as International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The ability of governments to harness human and

[177] Church, W. and Jowell, M. (2007). 'Conflict circuit breakers in the Great Lakes Region of Africa', Institute for Security Studies, *African Security Review*, 16.1.

financial resources to assess and act on such adversity remains extremely limited. The Burundian government, for example, is driving accession into the East African Community (EAC) while at the same time trying to address the consequences of traders and farmers facing vastly different markets. This is pertinent given the weakness of Burundi's economy relative to that of the Rwandan economy, or the sheer size of the market represented by the DRC's economy. The changes brought about through cooperation facilitated by an institution like (Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries) CEPGL should not be discounted in conflict-affected environments. Indeed, it will be difficult for the poorer, conflict-affected and more fragile countries to cope with and mitigate the rising inequality, underemployment and job loss that often accompany economic transitions, especially in the short term. Economic shocks, such as coffee price drops, have been shown to increase tensions and facilitate violence re-emerging in already fragile situations, and market integrations can similarly shock unprepared economies. Much support is required by these governments to adequately deal with the shifting economic and wider power relations that economic cooperation can bring.[178]

The ability of regional institutions to foster economic cooperation as well as support peace is also closely connected to their ability to address local needs, build on local resilience and operate in consultative, transparent ways. The ability of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), for instance, to engage with civil society in the region in systematic ways that involve planning and monitoring of programmes and projects at local, national and regional levels is critical.

[178] DFID and EPSDS (2008). 'Financial flows and banking related to the trade of natural resources and other commodities in the DRC', draft version.

Dedicated, long-term capacity building and accompaniment may be able to support such efforts as can generate consultative approaches that incorporate the perspectives of civil society, including the local private sector. EUs support in this area would not only avoid the pitfalls of feeding further into conflict dynamics but also reinforce 'local capacities for peace'. Institutions such as CEPGL and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) need to articulate how they will ensure assumed peace building impacts, and how they will assess interventions and their impacts from this perspective. In this perspective, a critical review of existing structures of both institutions is necessary. A network of working groups with representatives from the different executive bodies may be a more appropriate forum to address different challenges than within a formal institution. Moreover, it is crucial to include further stakeholders, such as representatives of border provinces, and spread responsibilities. Donors such as the EU have in the past helped strengthen institutional capacity in this regard and ensure linkages and coordination across institutional pillars that work on economic development, security and peace building. This includes analysis and assessment at all levels of engagement, from high-level diplomatic activities to those that support the creation of local economic opportunities.

Such peace building approaches have been actively incorporated into the fundraising and planning of economic, trade or energy projects to have a benchmark of its ability to incorporate conflict-sensitivity and capitalize on peace building opportunities. Donor agencies themselves have amassed a wealth of policies and experiences in this regard that has been shared with institutional partners in the efforts of mitigating violent natural resource conflicts in the region. Regional approaches to peace

building in the Great Lakes Region are critical and the economic dimensions of such cooperation represent a strategic entry point given their role in supporting peace as well as their potential for creating shared interest and improving the human security of the region's people. What emerging institutions such as IC/GLR and the supporting donor agencies need to do now, however, is to act on opportunities that exist and add value to peace building efforts through the economic aspects of cooperation they champion.[179]

In summary, the most significant findings as reported in chapter three include the following: Sustained efforts by local communities, regional governments, and external donors to address transborder clashes over livestock raiding and other localized criminal activities have helped to reduce and manage retaliatory violence and harmful spillover in recent years, though this varies greatly by location. Evidence from Kenya and Somalia point to the growth in the cartelization of politics, that is, the growing political clout of a collection of distinct networks operating largely out of the public view. These well-funded cartels have the potential to overwhelm community-level systems of governance and security.

Regional and international pressure is creating new opportunities to curb and combat at least some types of trans-border criminality. East Africa is seeing some progress in combating criminal impunity, because of a combination of genuine government commitment, the threat of sanctions on individuals violating arms embargoes posed by UN Monitoring Group reporting, US and other external legislation on conflict mineral trade, and the robust activities of the ICC in the region.

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[179] Security Council 'Report of the Secretary General on the preparation of an international conference on the Great Lakes Region' United Nations, 17th November 2003. S/2003/1099.

Violent extremism in the eastern Horn of Africa specifically Islamic extremism, in the form of Al-Shabaab is in decline. Al-Shabaab's legitimacy has dropped in most Somali and Islamic circles, after a series of self-defeating policies by the movement. Kenya and Ethiopia's recent military offensives into Somali territory have not, to date, produced blowback in the form of terrorist attacks in Kenya, but this remains a serious concern, as a weakened Al-Shabaab is in some ways a more dangerous movement. Leaders of sub national political administrative units in border areas play an under-appreciated but critical quasi-diplomatic role in managing borderland conflict.[180]

There is a greater commitment on the part of regional states to empower a regional body the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) to play a lead role in supporting host country governments to stem illegal mineral trade, partially due to international pressure to conform to industry and international standards. The cornerstone is ICGLR's "*Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources*" (RINR), which has been working since 2010 to promote harmonized regional approaches to curb the illegal exploitation of conflict minerals, by creating tools to increase member state accountability for responsible mineral trade.

The RINR is especially promising because of the breadth of the tools it and its member states are developing to combat illicit and illegal mineral trade. These tools include a Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM), harmonization of national-level legal frameworks governing the mineral sector, a regional database documenting regional

[180] Security Council 'Report of the Secretary General on the preparation of an international conference on the Great Lakes Region' United Nations, 17th November 2003. S/2003/1099.

mineral trade patterns, capacity building for the formalization of artisanal mining to improve taxation and transparency across borders, peer learning mechanisms between member states in the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), and a whistle-blowing mechanism to allow citizens witnessing illicit and illegal activity to anonymously report abuses to the ICGLR through a web-based platform.

One of the most promising regional responses to the problem of conflict minerals is ICGLR's Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM). This regional certification system will serve as a recognized guarantee that minerals were mined under acceptable conditions, in areas free of conflict, and have exited their country of origin in a legal fashion with all dues and taxes paid. Conflict-free mining conditions will be monitored at the national level by local systems, and will include third-party auditors to ensure standards are independently verified. The ICGLR certificate will serve as the sole acceptable document for intraregional mineral shipments and is critical in ensuring traceability of conflict-sensitive minerals exported from the region.[181]

Civil society groups are an important part of proposed independent monitoring mechanisms for certification standards. Their capacity to play this role varies by location. Strengthening the capacity of civic groups in monitoring, advocacy, and dissemination of information to local communities is a critical link in the certification chain.[182]

The shift in the interests of regional governments from complicity in conflict mineral trade and associated violence, to greater willingness to explore a new, legitimate,

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[181] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2007). 'Peace and security in Africa', 8th Meeting of the Partnership Forum. Berlin

[182] Joseph Kiberi, Administration and Procurement officer, Regional Centre for Small Arms(RECSA), 17th June 2013.

and peaceful mineral trade regime in the Great Lakes is real, but fragile. Independent auditing and harmonized standards for conflict-free mining is essential in pressuring country governments to mitigate exploitation of minerals by armed groups and in signifying to conflict-affected communities that human rights infractions matter to central and regional governments. These governments, and some powerful circles of interests within these governments, are calculating how they can continue to profit from the mineral trade without incurring costs associated with violation of proposed certification schemes. Those calculations can and will be shaped in large part by emerging international and regional norms regarding certification schemes, and associated penalties for illegal trade and transit of conflict minerals. CGLR officials acknowledge that smuggling of minerals will not be completely eliminated by the emerging certification regime, but are confident that 70% or more of total mineral exports will be certified and traceable. This will have a profound effect in reducing the extent to which minerals finance armed groups and drive insecurity and human rights abuses across eastern DRC.[183]

4.4 Conclusions

Armed conflicts and natural resources can be directly related in two main ways: armed conflicts motivated by the control of resources, and resources integrated into the financing of armed conflicts. Although few wars are initially motivated by conflict over the control of resources, many integrate resources into their political economy. While it would be an error to reduce armed conflicts to greed-driven resource wars, as political

[183] Ruben De Koning, *Controlling Conflict Resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Stockholm Int'l Peace Res. Poly. Brief (July 2010)

and identity factors remain key, the control of local resources influence the agendas and strategies of belligerents. This influence is played out through local resource exploitation schemes, involving the production of territories based on resource location, control and access to labour and capital, institutional structures and practices of resource management, as well as incorporations into global trading networks. To some extent, many contemporary wars are inscribed in the legacy of earlier mercantile wars privately financed to serve economic objectives and similarly focusing on resource rich areas and trading posts. The significance of resources also influences the course of conflict as the localization of authority and motives for violence can be deeply influenced by economic considerations to the point of impeding a transition to peace.

Beyond motivating or financing conflicts, the level of dependence, conflictuality, and lootability of a resource can also increase the vulnerability of societies to, and the risk of armed conflict. Yet, there is no environmentally deterministic relation at hand. Not all countries dependent upon conflictual and lootable resources face armed conflict. If this relation requires the existence of a resource in nature, it is the result of specific social processes. Desires, needs and practices weaving nature into the fabric of societies in the form of resources implies the potentially conflictual restructuring of economic networks and polities. The deployment of violence to arbitrate resource-linked conflicts is itself largely embedded in the historical pattern of social relations within and between countries; requiring both anthropological analyses and international relations ones. Yet, the specific geography and political economy of these resources lent themselves to the exacerbation of conflicts, often as a result of the level of resource dependence created in societies.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a summary of the findings of the study and the conclusions from previous chapters, recommendations and suggestions for further research.

5.2 Summary of the Findings

The main objective of the study was to examine the extent to which scarce natural resources have contributed to violent conflicts in the Great Lake region. The research findings in chapter three confirmed that significant challenges remain in the Great Lakes region as far as mitigating violent conflicts over natural resources is concerned. There is ample evidence that the political economy of natural resource conflict still remains a powerful force across the Great Lakes Region and will resist initiatives to regulate natural resource exploitation and improve governance that would contribute to conflict mitigation in the border areas. But it also confirmed that shifts in regional political will and international interests to address the violent conflict over natural resources constitute an opportunity to mitigate dimensions of violent conflicts that clearly require regional ownership and resiliencies to be supported.

The findings revealed that in the region, worsening resource scarcity, combined with profound poverty and underdevelopment, are clearly exacerbating communal conflict. The more arid zones of the region suffer frequent and sometimes devastating droughts, and hence are prone to communal clashes over pasture and access to water. Rapid population growth, possible long-term climate change, increased alienation of land

for irrigated farms or ranches, and disruptions of pastoral movements are among the many factors intensifying pastoral and agro-pastoral clashes in semi-arid zones. Competition for land and water has intensified in recent decades in the Great Lakes Region plays an important role in both communal clashes and civil wars. Local communities possess well-established mechanisms for managing resource scarcity, but those mechanisms have in some instances been overwhelmed by the magnitude of new pressures and competition for the natural resources.

The governments in the region are unable to devote adequate resources to natural resource conflict mitigation in borders areas, local communities are therefore forced to rely solely on their own conflict management tools, which are usually overwhelmed by powerful armed groups and well-financed external actors. Although the governments are actually trying to mitigate violent natural resource conflicts across borders, insecurity is virtually guaranteed. Even the strongest states in the region have difficulty extending their control over remote border areas and as a result, transborder natural resources conflicts can rarely be managed solely by neighboring states and often require collaboration and pressure from regional institutions

The findings revealed that regional organizations and institutions in the Great Lakes Region are playing a very prominent role in conflict management, peace operations, norm-setting, economic trade cooperation, and regional integration issues. The EAC for instance was revived in 2000, and in recent years has actively widened and deepened the scope of the organization, and in 2010, established a common market for goods, labor, and capital. It has expanded its membership to include Burundi and Rwanda (with South Sudan expected to join in the near future); supports numerous multilateral

institutions tasked with promising cooperation on specific regional issues, and is pursuing a common currency. Intraregional trade volumes have leapt upward since 2004, adding new pressure to improve crossborder infrastructure and maintain security in border areas where goods and laborers cross. IGAD is enjoying a revival in its roles, especially in regional diplomacy and conflict early warning and response, thanks somewhat to renewed commitment on the part of several key member-states to work closely together. Regional military cooperation has been enhanced by the collective action of several IGAD member-states contributing troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peace operation in southern Somalia.

5.3 Discussion of the Findings

5.3.1 Competition for natural resources

The first hypothesis stated that an increase in competition for natural resources leads to an increase in violent conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, this hypothesis was accepted. Based on the findings this hypothesis was accepted, the findings revealed that some of the most deadly and destructive instances of armed conflict and violent criminality have occurred in resource abundant areas of the Great Lakes Region, reflecting troubles associated with what has been termed the resource curse. This has been most dramatically in evidence in eastern DRC and the Great Lakes, where competition to control the region's endowment of high-value minerals has been a major conflict driver at the local and interstate levels. Control over exploitation of and revenue from oil and natural gas deposits have also triggered or perpetuated insurgencies in Sudan and Ethiopia, and at times have raised tensions between neighboring states in parts of East Africa. Importantly, high-value mineral and energy resources introduce powerful

external actors and money into the picture, complicating local efforts to manage resource disputes peacefully. The findings are consistent with that of Ballantine[184] which concluded that economic incentives and opportunities have not been the only or even the primary cause of these armed conflicts; rather, to varying degrees, they interacted with socioeconomic and political grievances, inter-ethnic disputes, and security dilemmas in triggering the outbreak of warfare.

The second hypothesis of the study stated that the governments in the Great Lakes Region have failed to put in place policies aimed at curbing the rising violent conflicts over natural resources. The findings revealed that the shift in the strategies of regional governments from complicity in natural resource conflicts, to greater willingness to explore a new, legitimate, and peaceful conflict mitigation mechanisms in the Great Lakes is real. Independent auditing and harmonized standards for conflict-free natural resource utilization is essential in pressuring country governments to mitigate exploitation of natural resources by armed groups and in signifying to conflict-affected communities that human rights infractions matter to central and regional governments. These governments, and some powerful circles of interests within the great lakes region, are calculating how they can continue to profit from the natural resources without incurring costs associated with violation of proposed certification schemes.

The findings further indicated that much of the shift in government positions on natural resource trade is being driven by the current and anticipated costs of trading in the

[184] Ballantine, K. (2003) 'Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflict', in K. Ballentine and J. Sherman (eds), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, London: Lynne Riener: 259–83

scarce natural resources. For example, in September 2010, the DRC government initiated a temporary 6 month ban on mineral exports emanating from the Kivus, creating unanticipated negative impacts across the region. In an interview held in December 2011, a DRC mining official said that this ban had dire impacts in the Kivus affecting both the formal and informal economy reliant on mineral trade and extraction. Significantly, though the mining embargo has now been lifted, companies are reluctant to commence mining, fearing the consequences of accusations they are dealing in conflict minerals. This unintended consequence has impacted regional traders and buyers in neighboring countries. The ban on the extraction of natural resources in Rwanda and Burundi impacted exploration concessions as well as industry expansion in their areas of operation. Along transit and supply routes as well, traders, transistors, and processing partners in the region were impacted. Although some Chinese traders are still operating in eastern DRC, their rates have driven down the value of minerals. Hypothesis two was therefore rejected because as the revealed in the findings, the governments in the Great Lakes Lakes Region are putting up policies aimed at curbing violent conflicts over natural resources. The findings are consistent with a study by Moore[185] which suggested that natural resource abundance leads to 'bad governance' in developing countries because states' financial autonomy means that they have little accountability to their citizens. Ross[186] also argues that when governments receive windfalls from a resource

[185] Moore M. (2004) 'Revenues, State Formation and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries', International Political Science Review 25.3: 297–319

[186] Ross, M. (2004) 'What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?', Journal of Peace Research 41.3: 337–56

boom, rational political elites will take the opportunity to either directly seize the rents created by resource booms or gain control over the right to allocate them

5.3.2 The Role of Regional Organizations and Institutions

Objective one of the study aimed to establish the effectiveness of regional organizations in their response to violent conflicts over natural resources in the Great Lakes Region. Based on the findings, there is a greater commitment on the part of the states in the Great Lakes Region to empower regional bodies and organizations such as the ICGLR, IGAD, AMISOM among others to play a lead role in supporting governments to mitigate violent conflicts over natural resources, partially due to international pressure to conform to industry and international standards. ICGLR's Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR) has been working to promote harmonized regional approaches to curb the violent conflicts over natural resources by creating tools to increase member state accountability for responsible natural resource extraction.[187] The study also showed that AMISOM responds to violent conflicts through the use of traditional methods which include involving community elders and Religious leaders to address the issues and giving the historical background, and preaching culture of peace, non violence and co-existence. AMISON is also encouraging states to support the needs for the missing gaps, but not to use arms or take sides. The main activities undertaken by AMISOM in terms of mitigating violent conflicts over natural resources in the region involve mediation, negotiation, dialogue by bringing all parties involved in conflicts to iron their differences in order to come up with the solution to resolve the conflict, not to give any future room

[187] Kizito Sabala, Head and Political Officer, IGAD liaison office Nairobi , 15th June 2013

for reoccurrence of the same conflict.[188] Regional bodies and institutions in the region are playing a more significant role as platforms for interstate collaboration on security issues and conflict management. Protracted conflicts, regional insurgencies, and crossborder criminality stress border and national-level response systems, and regional organizations are becoming more essential for monitoring, prevention, and crossborder response mechanisms. In recent years, intergovernmental relations have improved across much of the region, particularly between Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, providing new opportunities for conflict management. IGAD's aspirations to build more effective conflict early warning and mitigation capacity are institutionalized in CEWARN, operational since 2003.

Despite its growing pains, CEWARN remains an essential pillar in border conflict management. It routinizes intergovernmental response to conflicts; it remains the main generator of and source for early warning reporting; and enjoys the strong support of key regional states, most notably Ethiopia. Without CEWARN, countries like Somali, Uganda Sudan and Ethiopia would be unlikely to invest in any other form of regional conflict early warning. The most important aspect of regional conflict mitigation mechanisms in East Africa is the growing region-wide commitment to managing conflict and instability along borders. This, combined with some hopeful signs of improved levels of trust and cooperation between regional states, is reason to maintain support for existing regional institutions engaged in conflict early warning and mitigation.

The regional organizations in the Great Lakes Region are playing a very important role in conflict management, peace operations, norm-setting, economic trade

[188] Christopher Lianyang Ogwang Aria, Civil Affairs Officer. African Union Commission African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM)

cooperation, and regional integration issues. The EAC for example supports numerous multilateral institutions tasked with promising cooperation on specific regional issues, and is pursuing a common currency. Intraregional trade volumes have leapt upward since 2004, adding new pressure to improve cross-border infrastructure and maintain security in border areas where goods and laborers cross. IGAD on the other hand is enhancing regional diplomacy and conflict early warning and response facilitated by the renewed commitment on the part of several key member-states to work closely together. Regional military cooperation has been enhanced by the collective action of several IGAD member-states contributing troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peace operation in southern Somalia. Finally, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), officially formed in late 2006 has enjoyed growing success as a platform for interstate cooperation and promotion of peace, security, and development

Chapter three identified many variations in local community peace building in violent border areas of in the great lakes region, and a wide array of actors. Some are part of the formal CEWARN Local Peace Committees that have been formed in almost all IGAD countries. The LPCs comprise a combination of state and non-state actors. Others operate outside of a formal arrangement with the state, although they may liaise with government authorities. In the Karamoja cluster, for instance, church groups have been enlisted as cross border facilitators of dialogue and conflict management. In the disputed border area of Abyei in Sudan and on parts of the eastern DRC border, business and commercial actors have been tapped as part of a peace market strategy. Along the Somali-Kenya border, adjacent border towns purposely work to share cross border services such as schools and health posts to ensure that communities are stakeholders in

one another's stability and security, and to routinize cooperation on functional issues, in what is called a peace dividend strategy. The particular combination of local actors, and the particular combination of shared interests that bring them together in pursuit of border peace, is context specific. But the broader principle that conditions can and do exist for local communities to prevent or mitigate cross border conflict, despite the presence of powerful spoilers is relevant across the entire Great Lakes Region.

5.3.3 The role of Governments in the Great Lakes Region

The second objective of the study sought to identify the strategies being used by governments in the Great Lakes Region to end violent conflicts over natural resources. Based on the findings, local communities, state authorities, and interstate regional institutions play a vital role in managing a range of regional cross border conflict issues as seen in chapter three. They are chiefly responsible for variable and sometimes dramatic improvements in borderland security across parts of the Great Lakes Region in the past 15 years. Their capacity both as stand-alone actors and as part of an integrated, three-pillar approach to conflict-management has been a critical source of resilience in the face of mounting conflict pressures across the region's troubled border areas. Regional institutions and bodies serve as platforms for intergovernmental cooperation on trans-border natural resource conflict issues. As seen in chapter three, these institutions and their technical and strategic response capacities are often critical in preventing and responding to potential and protracted cross border and transnational issues such as crime, violent extremism, and displacement as a result of humanitarian emergencies or the impact of civil conflict. Sub-national governmental authorities in distinct conflict zones, whose area of jurisdiction are in border areas, are often the first responders to

regional conflict and are at the front lines for monitoring and management of crises that spillover from and into neighboring states. Weak capacity of local and national government is often magnified or mitigated by legitimate and committed civil society, often a hybrid coalition of civil society leadership, traditional leaders, religious leaders, women's groups, business interests, and professionals.

Over the past years, a number of initiatives, some grassroots, others governmental have sought to build and strengthen borderland conflict management systems in the Horn of Africa. Most of the focus has been on two of these three pillars. First, community-level peace building in border areas has been the object of considerable attention, and has yielded excellent, though predictably uneven, results across the Horn of Africa. Kenya's Peace and Development Committees embody this approach to enfranchising local non-state actors in peace building and building partnerships between local community authorities and local governments in border management; USAID's program exemplifies donor support to this pillar of borderland peace building. Second, regional states have, with substantial donor support, sought to routinize intergovernmental cooperation in the prevention and mitigation of border conflicts. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) Conflict and Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) is an example of this commitment.

The findings of this study revealed that there are significant underlying causes of the natural resources conflict in the Great Lakes Region, particular forms of colonialism interlocked with ethnic divisions to produce conflict potential. However this was far from determining. It was the addition of other factors, military dictatorships, an isolation from the wider economy, and, particularly as violence developed, a hollowing out of the adult

population and a destruction of civil society, that produced high conflict risk. While the primary data analyzed in chapter three gives support to Hypothesis 1, no single factor is decisive in producing violent conflict over natural resources. The findings in chapter three revealed that the states in the great lakes region had very different capacities to respond to violent conflict over natural resources. This is seen most clearly in two phenomena. The first is the process of democratization, which tends to produce new tensions and highlight older grievances. The second is the diffusion effect of conflict as flows of refugees, displaced and armed groups from one conflict region or state contribute to the destabilization in other states or regions. This has posed an almost insuperable problem, pushing even the groups that had temporary peace back to conflicts. In some states in contrast, the refugee flows were perceived as dangers but ones that could be successfully managed, for example by Kenya and Tanzania, who hosts very large numbers of refugees.

Border communities typically take on a broad portfolio of roles in maintaining peace. At their best, they serve as eyes and ears for early warning systems; create deterrence, by placing social pressure on would-be criminals and armed militia; mobilize the community for both conflict prevention and management; are a source of customary or religious law within their group; and serve as diplomats in managing tensions with neighboring groups. They also face serious constraints, and are especially limited in effectiveness when deprived of a strong partnership with local and national governments. Some of the factors constraining community peace building include ineffective or hostile local government in some locations, poor communication systems with cross border groups, increasingly complex new conflict drivers and fatality levels which can

overwhelm customary systems of justice and conflict management, powerful spoilers, and organizational challenges of keeping hybrid governance coalitions working together.

The conflicts arising over the use and ownership of resources in the Great Lakes Region are managed either in traditional methods or by modern conflict resolving institutions. However the traditional mechanisms are declining. Some of the factors for their decline are the results of the social changes the societies are undergoing. The trend shows that they are still weakening more. However, they are still more effective than the 'modern' methods to solve some kinds of resource conflicts. On the other hand, in spite of Government structure and its influences in all aspects of the rural people, modern conflict resolution mechanism does not get complete dominance over the traditional methods..

5.4 Conclusions

The Great Lakes' region is a comparatively confined geographical area, with high population density and a history of interdependence. There are several very strong regional dynamics, as well as direct and indirect interactions between the conflicts in the region. It is thus necessary to have a clear regional analysis as a basis for actions in the different countries in the region. This does not necessarily mean that implementation must be on a regional level. However, it is necessary to analyze how the situation or intervention in one country affects the neighbours.

This study has advanced four main arguments. First, while the literature on natural resource conflicts provides considerable evidence that natural resource abundance is associated with various negative development outcomes; this evidence is by no means conclusive. Second, existing explanations for the resource curse do not adequately

account for the role of social forces or external political and economic environments in shaping development outcomes neither in resource abundant countries, nor for the fact that, while most resource abundant countries have performed poorly in developmental terms, some have done quite well. Third, recommendations for overcoming the resource curse have not generally taken into account the issue of political easibility. And, finally, scholars have been too reductionist in their approaches to resource curse issues and need to focus more on understanding variation in development outcomes between resource rich countries and the associated policy lessons.

5.5 Recommendations

The existing research on natural resource conflicts does not adequately account for the role of social forces or external political and economic environments in shaping development outcomes in resource abundant countries, nor for the fact that, while most resource abundant countries have performed poorly in developmental terms, some have done quite well and therefore it is recommended that further research should be conducted in this area. Secondly, research has not focused on the role of political approaches in mitigating violent conflict over natural resources; this area therefore requires an in-depth further research.

For economic cooperation and peace building to become mutually reinforcing in the Great Lakes Region, the regional organizations needs to refine their mandate and areas of engagement in light of the instability and capacity of governments in the region through the following ways:

In the economic cooperation pillar alone, large-scale infrastructure projects can represent highly contested natural resources worth fighting over. Further, initiatives such as a natural resource certification scheme risk duplicating efforts at the international level, which are already proving costly and often ineffective. The added value of the regional organizations' engagement in such activities must be better articulated. Regional organizations would be better off focusing on more security-related issues.

The pillars of the regional organizations need to be more effectively integrated. The humanitarian pillar must take into account planned actions in the economic cooperation and development pillar, for instance. The overriding aim of peace building must be articulated across pillars, with impact assessments reflecting such priorities. A mission program develop a strategic partnership with the ICGLR technical unit, the Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR), to ensure effective implementation of regional tools and frameworks, designed to formalize and harmonize mineral trade in the Great Lakes region.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Questionnaire

Section A: Demographic information of the respondents

1. Designation: .....

2. Organization: .....

3. How long have you worked in your capacity? .....

4. Gender

Male [ ]

Female [ ]

5. Age

(*Tick where appropriate*)

18-24 years [ ] 25-34 years [ ] 35-44 years [ ] 45-54 years [ ] Over 55 years [ ]

6. Education

(*Tick where appropriate*)

Formal [ ] Informal [ ]

7. How many years have you worked at the organization?

(*Tick where appropriate*)

1-10 years [ ] 10-20 years [ ] Over 20 years [ ]

Section B: Information Violent conflicts over natural resources

8. What are the sources of conflict in your region? Explain

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.....

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.....

9. How do you respond to violent conflicts over natural resources in the region?

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10. What main activities does your organization in terms of mitigating violent conflicts over natural resources in the region and what tools are used?

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11. To what extent has your interventions helped?

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12. How does the organization coordinate peace dialogues/initiatives between states and communities in the region?

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13. To what extent does your organization partner with other regional organizations in trying to promote peace between communities and states in the region?

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14. Who is responsible for the coordination of the peace initiatives within the organization?

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15. What are the challenges faced by your organization in the implementation of peace initiatives between states and communities involved in violent conflicts over natural resources?

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.....

THANK YOU