

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: IGAD'S  
MEDIATION OF THE SOMALI CONFLICT, 2002 – 2006**

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# DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has not been submitted for another Degree in any other University

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This project has been submitted for examination with my permission as University supervisor

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## DEDICATION

**To those whose lives are committed to ending suffering in Africa through engaging in peaceful resolution of disputes and strive to realise the Pan-African dream of a United States of Africa.**

## ABSTRACT

Violent conflicts and resultant humanitarian tragedies in large parts of the world combined with the United Nations' still insufficient capabilities to address effectively these cases merited a closer look at the idea of regionalizing peace operations. Since the end of the Cold War it has become increasingly fashionable to suggest that sub-regional organizations should play a prominent role in conflict management often argued as the principle of subsidiarity. Furthermore, the critical combination of the OAU shortcomings, on one side, and the appalling African situation on the other side seem to have necessitated that sub-regional organizations play a vital role in their respective sub-regions

African regional and sub-regional organizations have been called upon to lead in providing security and conflict management either in the form of conflict prevention and mediation or civilian or military intervention or post-conflict peace building. These regional groupings were initially meant to provide opportunities for establishing sustainable economic growth. However, contemporary regionalism in Africa has seen these organizations change their mandates to cover security issues that include conflict and peace management.

The conflicts in Africa require proactive response strategies. The reality is that unless the conflicts that have pervaded different sub-regions of the continent are resolved there would be no hope for the lofty goals of economic integration, development and prosperity. IGAD's role in this regard cannot be understated as will be observed within this study. It should receive continued support from the governments of the region as they all strive to increase regional capacity to handle matters of conflict management.

# CHAPTER ONE

## SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: IGAD'S MEDIATION OF THE SOMALI CONFLICT, 2002 – 2006

### Introduction to the Study

Global politics have changed since the end of Cold War. There has been an increase in the number of intra-state conflicts that have left devastating consequences for a world that was expecting peace dividends after the end of the Cold War. Most of these conflicts are rooted in disputes over resource sharing arising from gross disparities in wealth among different groups within the same countries, and the consequent struggles for reform of economic systems to ensure an equitable distribution of economic power. Other causes of conflict in Africa include the absence of democratic structures, culture and practice, and the consequent struggle for democratization, good governance and reform of political systems; systemic failure in the administration of justice and the inability of states to guarantee the security of the population; and issues relating to religious cleavages and religious fundamentalism.<sup>1</sup>

The end of the Cold War has seen an increase in the number of intra-state conflicts in Africa with most of these conflicts spilling over borders. This often poses a risk to regional stability and undermines the continent's development. The persistent absence of peace, security, and stability has serious consequences for Africa's development and integration. Violent conflicts and wars have slowed integration in some regional economic communities (these include during the initial years of the EU, ECOWAS and SADC)—and brought it to a standstill in others (ECCAS). Conflicts have also diverted resources from development efforts and prevented countries from participating fully in regional economic community activities (for example, Burundi and Rwanda). Moreover, unrest in one country can reduce foreign investment in neighbouring countries and throughout a sub-region. This

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<sup>1</sup> Akinrinade, S., and Siseyi, A., 1997, *Africa in the Post-Cold War International System*, London: Cassell.

is particularly damaging since such investment is linked to much of the development of infrastructure and productive capacity in regional economic communities.<sup>2</sup>

Violent conflicts and resultant humanitarian tragedies in large parts of the world combined with the United Nations' still insufficient capabilities to address effectively these cases merited a closer look at the idea of regionalizing peace operations. Since the end of the Cold War it has become increasingly fashionable to suggest that sub-regional organizations should play a prominent role in conflict management often argued as the principle of subsidiarity.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, the critical combination of the OAU shortcomings, on one side, and the appalling African situation on the other side seem to have necessitated that sub-regional organizations play a vital role in their respective sub-regions

African regional and sub-regional organizations have been called upon to lead in providing security and conflict management either in the form of conflict prevention and mediation or civilian or military intervention or post-conflict peacebuilding.<sup>4</sup> These regional groupings were initially meant to provide opportunities for establishing sustainable economic growth. However, contemporary regionalism in Africa has seen these organizations change their mandates to cover security issues that include conflict and peace management.

The conflicts in Africa require proactive response strategies. The reality is that unless the conflicts that have pervaded different sub-regions of the continent are resolved there would be no hope for the lofty goals of economic integration, development and prosperity. It is impossible to achieve such goals in an atmosphere of instability. In each sub-region, countries that are not experiencing civil war are dealing with the consequences of wars in neighboring states in different ways. Manifestations of these include the influx of refugees and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. In extreme cases the neighboring state would be destabilized through border incursions.

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<sup>2</sup> Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union, 2006, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities*, Addis Ababa: ECA and AU 2006.

<sup>3</sup> Møller, B., 2005, "The Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity: The Role Of African Regional and Sub-regional Organizations in Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa," DIIS Working Paper No 4.

<sup>4</sup> Schnabel, A., 2002, "Operationalizing Conflict Prevention: Opportunities and Challenges for Regional and Sub-regional Organizations," in Sara Lodge, *Sharing Best Practices on Conflict Prevention: The UN, Regional and Sub-regional Organizations, National and Local Actors*, Report of a Workshop held by the International Peace Academy and the Swedish Institute in Alexandria, Egypt, New York: International Peace Academy.



## Statement of the Research Problem

Recent conflict and conflict management trends in Africa portrays the message that regional and sub-regional organizations are an integral part of the design and implementation of conflict management norms and strategies. Furthermore, conflict management practices in Africa have shown that mediation is the most dominant mode of conflict management. During the post-Cold War era, the former French President Francois Mitterrand repeatedly called for Africans “to resolve their conflicts themselves and organize their own security”.<sup>5</sup> The proliferation of sub-regional security mechanisms in the post-Cold War era has mostly thus been interpreted from such a perspective.

Since January 1991 Somalia was without a functional recognized central government. This conflict produced not only catastrophic insecurity for its own citizens but also a range of dangerous potentially destabilizing security threats to neighbouring states. Consequently, many reconciliation conferences were organized in the fourteen years of Somalia’s statelessness. Ken Menkhaus was perhaps right in stating that “collectively this cacophony of peace building yielded, from 1991 to early 1995, no fewer than 17 national level and 20 local level reconciliation initiatives.”<sup>6</sup> The Somali National Reconciliation Conference under the auspice of IGAD was the fourteenth attempt to restore law and order in Somalia with thirteen other efforts having failed.<sup>7</sup>

The establishment of a Transitional National Government (TNG) as a culmination of the IGAD-led mediation process ignited some optimism on the effectiveness of sub-regional organizations in handling regional conflicts. This study seeks to examine the conflict management approaches that IGAD adopted culminating to the establishment of the TNG in Somalia as well as identifying the forces—regional and international—that undergirded the process. This examination will be made against the background of 13 previous attempts that failed to resolve the Somali conflict and ascertain if there were lessons learnt.

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<sup>5</sup> French President Francois Mitterrand as quoted in *The Washington Post*, Nov. 10, 1994

<sup>6</sup> Menkhaus, K., 1997, “International Peace Building and the Dynamics of Local and national Reconciliation in Somalia,” in Clarke Walter and Herbst Jeffery, (eds.), *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, Boulder Co.: Westview Press.

<sup>7</sup> See Farah, M., 2000, *Dual Diplomatic Approaches in Conflict Management: The International Peace Initiative in Somalia, 1991-1999*, University of Nairobi: MA Dissertation.

## Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of this study is to analyze the role and contribution of IGAD in the management of the Somali conflict. The specific objectives of this study are:

- 1) To examine the conflict management approaches adopted by IGAD in mediating the Somalia conflict;
- 2) To identify the major obstacles and problems that hindered the contribution of IGAD to the management;
- 3) To identify the actors, their interests, and how this impacted on the IGAD-led Somali peace process.

## Justification

The study has both academic and policy justifications. Academically, this research shall contribute towards the literature in the field of conflict management by sub-regional organizations. There has been an increase in the number of internal conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Although the Cold War ended, neither history, as we were led to believe, nor conflicts, ended in 1990.<sup>8</sup> The complexities of post-Cold War politics have resulted in innovative initiatives in conflict management at regional and sub-regional levels. This has thus made it necessary for studies on the activities of regional and sub-regional organizations with a view to suggesting ways through which their efforts in conflict prevention and resolution can be enhanced to meet future challenges.

Contemporary studies attempt to analyze the causes of conflict with a view to understanding strategies for conflict resolution. This study seeks to address how conflict can be avoided, and how cooperation and stability can be maintained. Effective conflict resolution presupposes the adoption of appropriate conflict management mechanism, the *raison de'être* of this study—an attempt to examine the mediation approaches adopted by IGAD in the Somali peace process.

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<sup>8</sup> Fukuyama, F., 1992, *The End of History and the Last Man*, London: Zed Books.

Policy-wise the study will make recommendations to conflict managers, diplomats and government agencies on how best to formulate strategies for intervening in intra-state conflicts. This will go a long way in contributing to African conflict management and resolution mechanisms due to its empirical analysis.

## Literature Review

An extensive examination of the subject is necessary in order to make a general conclusion in respect to the applicability of a regional approach to conflict management. Such an endeavor would not only need to trace the origin of the debate, but also to question the motives and the purposes served thereby. Further, comprehending the overall debate and its practicability as an alternative strategy for addressing African conflicts would be impossible without considering the political context in which the African mechanisms of conflict management have to act. In doing so, it will be important to examine the strength and weakness of regional and sub-regional efforts of conflict management. Analyzing whether the oft-asserted geographical and cultural proximity are indeed assets on which regional and sub-regional efforts of conflict management can rely on is the focus. By illustrating several cases, in particular the case of Somalia, we will attempt to substantiate the thesis that geographical and cultural proximities are not necessarily positively contributing assets, rather they often contribute to the complication of the situation. This is because they inhabit long-standing incompatibility of interests that are the main driving motives of regional actors in involving themselves in or undertaking regional initiatives of conflict management.<sup>9</sup> Generally, there are four reasons or factors that necessitate a regional and sub-regional organizations approach to securing peace and stability at the regional level.

First, the rationale for a regional approach to conflict management is said to be the actors' familiarity with the problems at hand as well as their cultural, social and historical affinity with each other and the parties to the conflict. Regional and sub-regional organizations' geographical proximity can facilitate more rapid and less expensive responses to violent conflict than is possible through a global body such as the UN and their cultural

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<sup>9</sup> Ghebremeskel, A., 2002, "Regional Approach to Conflict Management Revisited: The Somalia Experience," *Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 4, No. 2.

proximity “provides them with a better understanding of a conflict’s dynamics, key players and context-specific management and resolution options.”<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, conflicts in the post-Cold War have become increasingly regionalized and thus need to be tackled at their roots of origin: “the interlocking nature of African conflicts has led to the view that political communities are locked in a regional security complex, hence response and interventions in domestic wars require a regional approach to the containment, management and resolution of these conflicts.”<sup>11</sup>

Second, there is often the possibility that warring parties are more willing to or feel more comfortable at managing disputes at a regional level as opposed to the international level through the UN. This is because both states and private actors in a conflict may favor the participation of less intrusive third-parties.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, some countries might resist assistance from outside states and international organizations out of concern for protecting state sovereignty and to shield themselves against outside actors seeking to gain political influence over internal affairs. The President of Sudan’s refusal to allow UN troops to replace the African Union (AU) force in that war-torn country is one illustration of this issue.<sup>13</sup>

Third, regional organizations, again compared to the UN, have the possibility of being more flexible in their treatment of evolving or ongoing wars as they have a limited agenda and are not subject to the use of veto powers from the part of regional hegemonies as is the case in the UN Security Council. There is also reason to believe that peer pressure

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<sup>10</sup> Franke, B., 2006, “In Defense of Regional Peace Operations in Africa,” *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, Article 185; Langinvainio, M., and Reyes, J.D., 2006, *Building Peace and Security Capabilities in Africa: The Role of the African Union and its Partnership with African Regional Economic Communities and the European Union*, CMI Background paper 4/2006.

<sup>11</sup> Langinvainio, M., and Reyes, J.D., 2006, *Building Peace and Security Capabilities in Africa: The Role of the African Union and its Partnership with African Regional Economic Communities and the European Union*, CMI Background paper 4/2006.

<sup>12</sup> Carment, D., and Schnabel, A., 2003, *Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?* Tokyo: United Nations University Press; Langinvainio and Reyes 2006

<sup>13</sup> Bergen, J., 2007, “The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations in Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Preliminary Assessment of the African Continent,” for the UNIDIR-MIIS Comprehensive Project on Regional Organizations and UN 1540 Committee. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) is a non-proliferation resolution aiming to prevent non-state actors from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring or using weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery.

applied from other states within regional and sub-regional organizations will be more effective than efforts from outside.<sup>14</sup>

Fourth, a combination of proximity and flexibility should, in principle, imply the ability to act faster and, if needed, rapidly deploy peacekeeping forces.<sup>15</sup> Regional and sub-regional organization would spur national governments to action and set a positive example for nations in other regions.<sup>16</sup>

Critical to the success of any regional or sub-regional endeavour to enhance human security are the political interests and commitment by the leadership of each member state. This would essentially entail giving up a certain degree of national sovereignty by each member state for a common good, a matter which is not easy to achieve as most states are highly guarded about their sovereign identity and interests. Moreover, the regional approach to resolving complex problems should also have inter-sectoral linkages, because the totality of human existence consists of interrelated facets of social, cultural, political and economic experience which do not appear in isolated compartments. Considering the dynamic nature of threats to human security in the global arena and the fact that the development problems afflicting the Horn of Africa are neither sector-or-country-specific, it is well acknowledged that they could be more effectively addressed when tackled at the regional level than at an individual country level. The combined resources of regional states are also likely to be cost-effective and much more productive to regional development than individual efforts of states which are often replete with duplication of efforts and wastage of scarce resources.

Counter-arguments for the role of regional organizations for securing peace and stability at the regional level have been based on three recurring ideas. First, it is stated that regional arrangements usually lack the operational expertise to handle complex conflict

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<sup>14</sup> Bergenas, J., 2007, "The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations in Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Preliminary Assessment of the African Continent," for the UNIDIR-MIIS Comprehensive Project on Regional Organizations and UN 1540 Committee.

<sup>15</sup> Francis, D., 2006, *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited; Berman, E. and Sams, K. 2000, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, pp. 113-117.

<sup>16</sup> Bergenas, J., 2007, "The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations in Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Preliminary Assessment of the African Continent," for the UNIDIR-MIIS Comprehensive Project on Regional Organizations and UN 1540 Committee.

situations. As their experience in this field is usually restricted they do not have the capability to prevent violence from breaking out and have not been able to develop a comprehensive peacekeeping capacity.<sup>17</sup> Second, the previously mentioned proximity factor could play a negative role as it might generate tensions and undermine impartiality as member states could be involved in the conflict.<sup>18</sup> They also doubt the motives of regional actors, who, they argue, tend to see conflicts in their region through “the coloured glasses of narrow national self-interest” and are thus likely to be confronted with an incompatibility of interests leading them to put their own political and military gain before a lasting resolution of the conflict.<sup>19</sup> Third, and usually the greatest obstacle in regional peace efforts, is the fact that these organizations lack the resources and the political consensus to carry on effective operations. “The inherent problem is that not only do quick terminations of escalating violence require military backing and political support, they also require long-term post-conflict commitments. It is no longer sufficient to stop the violence.”<sup>20</sup> These regiosceptics maintain that the continent’s regional and sub-regional organizations suffer from enormous resource and capacity constraints in the areas of training, interoperability, sustained readiness, transportation and logistics as well as funding which will continue to thwart effective action for the foreseeable future. Given that these resource and capacity constraints are directly related to the meager military capabilities of the organizations’ member states and their dire economic situations, the regiosceptics also doubt the potential for substantial improvements in the short-term.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Francis, D., 2006, *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited; Berman, E. and Sams, K. 2000, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, pp. 113-117.

<sup>18</sup> Clement, A., 2003, “Do Regional Organizations Matter? Comparing the Conflict Management Mechanisms in West Africa and the Great Lakes Region,” in Boulden, J., *Dealing with Conflict in Africa*, New York: Palgrave MacMillian.

<sup>19</sup> Ghebremeskel, A., 2002, “Regional Approach to Conflict Management Revisited: The Somali Experience,” *The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 9-29; Franke 2005.

<sup>20</sup> Jackson, R., 2000, The Dangers of Regionalizing International Conflict Management: The African Experience, *Political Science*, Vol. 52, No. 1; Carment and Schnabel 2003; Langinvainio and Reyes 2006; Franke 2005.

<sup>21</sup> Cleaver, G., and Massey, S., 2001, “DRC: Africa’s Scramble for Africa.” in Furley Oliver and May Roy (eds.), *African Interventionist States*, Ashgate, Aldershot; Maclean, S., 2003, “New Regionalism and Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Networks of Plunder and Networks for Peace,” in Grant, J. Andrew and Söderbaum, F. (eds.), *New Regionalism in Africa*, Ashgate, Aldershot; Dorn, W., 1998, “Regional Peacekeeping is not the Way,” *Peacekeeping and International Relations*, Vol. 27, No. 2; Juma, M. and A Mengistu, A., 2002, *The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity of African Institutions*, International Peace Academy, New York.

Apart from the literature on the debates on the viability of sub-regional organizations to undergird conflict management regionally, there are other on their involvement in such processes. Such studies have primarily dwelt on mediation processes. Noredin Netabay argues that the peace efforts in the Somalia civil war failed because they do not solve the problems that caused the civil wars. He posits that the main causes of the Somalia civil war were unequal power distribution, poor sharing of resources amongst different Somalia clans, negative clanism, marginalization of intellectuals, misrepresentation in the government and negative external influences. Netabay argues that the adoption of a top-down approach to reconcile the Somalia society could not properly address the causes of the civil war, contributing therefore, to the failure of the previous peace processes—a bottom-up approach to solve the conflict in Somalia.<sup>22</sup>

Mohamoud Abdullah looks at the previous peace efforts towards the Somalia conflict and concludes that twelve national reconciliation conferences were convened with the goal of restoring a central authority in Somalia yet no success was achieved. He attributes this to the fact that faction leaders and warlords who signed the peace deals, and agreed to form a central government, often failed to honor their pledges and/or promises. This is because they have never trusted each other and fear losing their economic and political power in a national government framework.<sup>23</sup>

The role of the National Council of Churches of Kenya in attempting to unite the Southern Sudanese factions has also been studied. One of the factions was led by John Garang and the other by Riek Machar. The aim was to make them one formidable force to enable them negotiate in a better position with the Khartoum government.<sup>24</sup>

Assefa looks at the role of the World Council of Churches-All Africa Conferences of Churches of the mediation in the Sudan conflict in 1972. Their entry point into the mediation process was that no official state actors were willing to be involved in the conflict

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<sup>22</sup> Netabay, N., 2007, "Bottom-up Approach: A Viable Strategy in Solving the Somalia Conflict."

<sup>23</sup> Mohamoud, A., 2006, *State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa: The Case of Study of Somalia*, USA: Purdue University Press.

<sup>24</sup> Mwangi, M., 1994, "Beyond the OAU: Prospects for Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa," *Paradigms*, Vol. 9, No. 2.

as that would be seen to constitute interference in the internal affairs of a country. OAU, too, could not mediate in the conflict for that would go against its Charter.<sup>25</sup>

In an analysis of Kenya's intervention in the Uganda conflict, Mwangi argues that President Moi was an interested party in the conflict, a heterogenic actor and thus could not distance himself from the conflict issue thereby affecting the outcome of the mediation process.<sup>26</sup> Mwangi also analytically looks at the problems bedeviling conflict management practices in the Greater Horn of Africa and particularly the mediation processes. He points out three major problems that include: inability to see the mediation process in the contexts of wider conflict systems—so as to be in a position to accommodate wider parties and interests; intra-and-inter mediator conflicts; and weak institutional mechanisms for conflict management and mediation.<sup>27</sup>

Olonisakin analyzed the experiences of African regional and sub-regional in the management of conflict on the continent. It examines the challenges they face in the contemporary international political arena and factors that mitigate in their effectiveness towards resolving conflicts in Africa. Olonisakin finishes her study by enumerating the problems encountered by these African organizations in conflict management. Nolutshungu argues that the development of the security community for the SADC region was a reaction to the severe security problems for which there was a requirement for a better solution<sup>28</sup>

From the forgoing literature review, it is apparently clear that most of the studies have dwelt on generalizations on the role of sub-regional organizations in conflict management with little emphasis on specific roles by specific organizations in a particular conflict. That marks the departure point for this study in that it seeks to critically analyze the role that IGAD has played in the Somali mediation process.

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<sup>25</sup> Assefa, H., 1997, *Mediation in Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies—The Sudan Conflict*, Boulder CO: Westview Press.

<sup>26</sup> Mwangi, M., 1997, "Mediation in Internal Conflict: The Uganda Peace Process, 1985," *East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights*, Vol. 3, No. 2.

<sup>27</sup> Mwangi, M., 1997, "The Greater Horn of Africa Conflict System: Conflict Patterns, Strategies and Management Practices," Paper Presented at the USAID Conference on Conflict and Conflict Management in the Greater Horn of Africa, Nairobi.

<sup>28</sup> Nolutshungu, S.C., 1994, *Southern Africa in a Global Context: Towards a Southern African Security Community*, Harare: SAPES Trust.



## Theoretical Framework

There is no unanimity among international relations scholars on the role of international organizations. Classical and neo-realists downplay the importance of organizations seeing them as instruments for states, especially great powers, and thus reflect the distribution of power within the international system. This school posits that not only do the great powers decide on what the organization can do but they also reserve to themselves the option of doing what they think needs to be done unilaterally.<sup>29</sup> To the realists, the very presence of organizations may actually produce negative synergies thereby making the combined strength of an organization less than the sum of its parts simply because all members will be tempted to free-ride on each other. According to this school of thought therefore, it would be preferable to count on initiatives by individual states acting unilaterally than to unrealistically pin one's hope on multi-lateral and institutional actions.

Classical liberalism and neo-liberal institutionalism place greater emphasis on institutions crediting them with an identity of their own and a considerable potential autonomy. Liberal institutionalism thus foresees the transcending of the anarchical self-help system of international relations,<sup>30</sup> i.e., presupposing genuine integration. Such integration has the potential of a stronger peace-furthering and holds out the prospects of transforming a region into a security community within which war has become inconsumable.<sup>31</sup>

This study shall adopt the liberal institutional theory of international relations that is premised on the intrinsic good nature of human beings in that peace is the normal state of affairs among men; therefore, war is seen as both unnatural and irrational, an artificial contrivance and not a product of some peculiarity of human nature.<sup>32</sup> Such a conceptualization presupposes that human beings have the capacity to cure the cancer of the war through antidotes such as democracy and free trade. Democratic processes and

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<sup>29</sup> Mearsheimer, J., 1995, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 35-49; Kegley, C., (ed.), 1995, *Controversies in International Relations: Realism and the Neo-Liberal Challenge*, New York: St. Martins Press.

<sup>30</sup> Keohane, R., 1999, "Neo-Liberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics," in *International Institutions and State Powers: Essays in International Relations Theories*. Boulder CO: Westview Press.

<sup>31</sup> Deutsch, K., 1975, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historic Experience*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

<sup>32</sup> Burchill, S., 1996, "Liberalism," in Burchill, et al., *Theories of International Relations*, New York: Pulgrave.

institutions would break the power of the ruling elites and curb their propensity for violence whereas free trade would aid the transcending of artificial barriers between individuals thereby uniting them into one community.

In cases of war, liberal institutionalism, a variant of the theory of liberalism, calls for collective security as the solution. Such a collective security presupposes states' membership to international organizations or institutions in which they can broaden conception of self-interest and widen the scope of cooperation. By complying to the rules of the organization there would be the discouragement of the narrow pursuit of national interests and the weakening of the meaning and appeal of state sovereignty.

The core of liberal theory is anchored on the concept of interdependence between all societies. Collective security is thus one of the means by which liberals try to maintain international peace and ensuring that man can realize his or her potentiality. The relevance of this theory to this study is in so far as it explains the emergence and utility of regional and sub-regional organizations such as IGAD as well as their role in conflict management. At the same time the study is cognizant of its key weakness in that it does not explain the narrow and selfish interests that some states pursue under the cover of international organizations and international laws

## **Hypothesis**

- 1) The adoption of wrong mediation approaches by IGAD contributed to the lack of effective conflict resolution in the Somali conflict;
- 2) Vested interests by mediators in the Somali peace process stultified the Somali peace process;

## **Methodology**

The kind of data one is interested in determines the methodology one adopts. This study will primarily focus on the process and qualitative change parameters that are not

quantitatively measured. The study will depend on two main sources of information: secondary and primary data.

Primary data will be based on interviews with officials from IGAD, UN Agencies, IGAD member states mediators and from academics in the field of regional integration and more specifically on regional peace and security. Personal interviews will be affordable because of the relatively lower cost with the self administered structured questionnaire acting as a question guide to control discussion so as to elicit the required information.

The collection of secondary data will consist of literature review. Secondary data will be accessed through reading relevant published and unpublished literature, internet sources, IGAD files, newspapers articles and commentaries, magazines and journals. Official reports of organizations like the UN and the International Crisis Group will be used. Content analysis, of this secondary information, will thus be an important method in collecting data.

## **Chapter Outline**

This study will consist of five chapters.

*Chapter 1:* gives a background to the problem statement, shows the conceptual lens that the study will utilize and illuminates on the knowledge gap that this study seeks to fill traceable through the literature review. This chapter also shows the methodology to be adopted by this study and especially the objectives of the study and the hypothesis it seeks to validate or invalidate.

*Chapter 2:* looks at other sub-regional organizations that have participated in the management of conflicts within Africa. This would perhaps give us a comparative edge in our analysis of the role of IGAD in mediation of the Somali conflict.

*Chapter 3:* in this chapter the study shows that prior to the involvement of IGAD in the mediation of the Somali conflict there had also been other external actors such as the

United Nations, the African Union, and the United States who had also attempted to mediate in the same conflict with varied results.

*Chapter 4:* this is the gist of this study and involves a critical analysis of the role of IGAD in the management of the Somali peace process. Hereby, we not only look at the peace process itself but also other variables such as the mediation approach adopted, the actors and their interests and the challenges they pose to the peace process and the role of the external actors.

*Chapter 5:* This chapter contains the conclusions of the study

# CHAPTER TWO

## CONFLICT MANAGEMENT BY SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

### Introduction

Within Africa there are several sub-regional organizations whose main purpose at formation did not center around conflict resolution and management. Among these sub-regional organizations are the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and *L'accord de non-aggression et d'assistance de defence* (L'ANAD). Apart from L'ANAD which was created specifically for purposes of security management, the others have evolved into security and conflict management institutions. In the Case of ECOWAS it was founded primarily for purposes of economic integration, while SADC evolved from a political alliance against apartheid to an organization alter aspiring to economic cooperation. AMU was founded to promote Arab unity while IGAD's focus was on development in North-East Africa where it gradually took on the role of promoting peace and security particularly in Sudan and Somalia.

Africa's regional institutions have made substantial strides over the past decade by assuming the primary responsibility for promoting peace and security.<sup>1</sup> Acting on the rationale that the increasingly sub-regional nature of conflict in Africa necessitates an increasingly sub-regional response, many of the continent's sub-regional institutions have added security and conflict management initiatives to their original (mostly economic) purpose.<sup>2</sup>

African Union's architecture for peace and security is premised on the intensive cooperation between the AU and sub-regional institutions which are considered as the

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<sup>1</sup> Eric, B., and Katie, S., 2000, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

<sup>2</sup> Franke, B., 2007, "Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continent's Emerging Security Architecture," *African Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 9, Issue 3.

essential building blocks and implementation agencies for its many programs.<sup>3</sup> By basing its security architecture on sub-regional pillars and incorporating existing initiatives into its continental policy, the AU not only profits from the sub-regions' comparative advantage in military and security matters, their experience with peace operations and – in the case of Western, Eastern and Southern Africa – their established frameworks and mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, also grants them a significant stake and a central role in all processes.<sup>4</sup> Under this approach, the primary responsibility for peace and security remains squarely with the sub-regional economic communities (RECs), while the AU serves as an authoritative clearinghouse and framework for all initiatives.

African regional and sub-regional economic institutions initially did not deal with political and security concerns at their inception. However, starting particularly in the 1980s, African governments began framing security issues in terms of their impacts on trade, economic growth and development upon the realization that a secure environment is a prerequisite for the fulfilment of the mandates of sub-regional institutions. The negative impact of security on economic development could not be ignored anymore.<sup>5</sup> The high intensity of conflict in many cases and the protracted nature of conflicts in others resulted in massive loss of human life, displacement of people, high numbers of refugees, child soldiers, high incidence of vulnerability and social exclusion, destruction of socio-economic infrastructure, and erosion of institutional capacity. The conflict situation in Africa has exacerbated poverty across the continent, made it difficult to accelerate sustainable economic growth and development and destroyed physical infrastructure and human capital. This state of affairs forced sub-regional organization to begin engaging in conflict management measures as priority for developing the necessary atmosphere within which socio-economic development could be pursued and actualized.

There are several African sub-regional organizations that play important roles in conflict management and resolution in Africa. These organizations include the

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<sup>3</sup> Franke, B., 2007, "Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continent's Emerging Security Architecture," *African Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 9, Issue 3.

<sup>4</sup> Franke, B., 2006, "In Defense of Regional Peace Operations in Africa," *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, Article 185.

<sup>5</sup> Powers, K., and Goertz, G., 2006, "The Evolution of Regional Economic Institutions into Security Institutions or the Demise of Realist Military Alliances?" *GeoJournal* (forthcoming).

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) the South African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Central Africa (COMESA).

## EAC's Approach to Conflict Management

EAC is an attempt to institutionalize a forum through which cooperation between the East African can obviate conflicts whose sources are economic. The philosophy of the cooperation is premise on functionalism in which it is believed that more the member states act in cooperation in various areas the less conflict between them is likely to break out. One of the interesting aspects of EAC is that it does not provide specifically for conflict management activities. The thinking is that since the members should be engaged in diverse areas of cooperation touching on all aspects such as security, trade, economics, and immigration this would lead to integration and with it avenues of conflict will be removed.<sup>6</sup>

While conflict management is not one of the EAC's explicit goals, the organization has recognized the critical importance of security in fulfilling its mandate of economic development and integration. At the core of the revised EAC treaty is the notion that economic and regional integration can help prevent conflicts and enhance security.<sup>7</sup> Notably, in 1998, the EAC drafted a *Memorandum of Understanding on Common Defence and Security*, a prelude to the 2000 *Memorandum of Understanding on Interstate Security*. Given the Kenya-Uganda border clashes among the Pokot, Sebei, Turkana and Karamajong communities, the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding provides specifically for the establishment of border committees to stabilize these areas.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Mwangi, M., 1996, "Towards an Architecture of Peace and Conflict in the Horn of Africa Conflict System," University of Nairobi: IDIS Working Paper No. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Anyang'-Nyong'o, P., 2002, "Governance and Democratization in Eastern Africa: Overcoming Conflicts and Initiating Political Integration," Paper Presented at the International Peace Academy/Makerere University/Africa Peace Forum seminar in Entebbe, Uganda, 16-18 December 2002.

<sup>8</sup> Bekoe, D., and Omach, P., 2002, Building Peace in Eastern Africa, Conference Report, International Peace Academy/Makerere University/Africa Peace Forum seminar in Entebbe, Uganda, 16-18 December 2002.

## COMESA's Approach to Conflict Management

COMESA was founded in 1993 as a successor to a Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) and formerly came into being the following year. The main objective of the organization is to create a customs union as a first step towards regional economic integration, but COMESA also has ambitions to play a role in conflict and security matters, inter alia to “cooperate in the promotion of peace, security and stability among member states in order to enhance economic development of the region.

After a meeting of COMESA's Intergovernmental Committee in November 1999 in Lusaka, the Secretariat commissioned a study on how to involve COMESA more directly in efforts to secure peace and rebuild war-torn economies in the sub-region. In March 2000, a decision was taken to develop a legal framework on peace and security and on a three-tiered structure composed of heads of states and government, minister of foreign affairs, and a Committee on Peace and Security.<sup>9</sup>

At a meeting of the COMESA Foreign Ministers in Lusaka in April 2001 it was agreed to prioritize the control of the proliferation of small and light weapons, the campaign against landmines, and the control of arms sales, and at a subsequent meeting in May 2002, agreement was reached on tasking national parliaments to promote “a culture of peace and security, for example, by strengthening the accountability of governments in these matters. However significant this may all sound, very little has actually been implemented.<sup>10</sup>

## ECOWAS's Approach to Conflict Management

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) founded in 1975, includes 15 member states. ECOWAS was established as a vehicle for economic collaboration,<sup>11</sup> but it has increasingly become involved in conflict management.<sup>12</sup> As early as

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<sup>9</sup> COMESA Treaty

<sup>10</sup> Møller, B., 2005, “The Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity: The Role Of African Regional and Sub-regional Organizations in Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa,” DIIS Working Paper No 5

<sup>11</sup> Kaciwicz, A., 1998, *Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.



1976 a treaty on 'Non-Recourse to Aggression' was signed, followed in 1978 by a 'Non-Aggression Protocol' and in 1981 by a 'Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence.'<sup>13</sup> Only in the 1990s, however, did ECOWAS embark on actual crisis management and resolution, and then without the privilege of being able to put the requisite institutions in place at a leisurely pace before going into action. Rather, the organization was forced to improvise and 'muddle through' as best it could, driven by events on the ground.

ECOWAS has been the most active institution in conflict in the African continent. Its first experiment was in Liberia which was later on followed by Sierra Leone—two cases which have often been used as evidence that African states are capable of joining their efforts to solve common problems without resorting to external partners.<sup>14</sup> However, its shortcomings are often evoked to inform the design and implementation of future peacekeeping initiatives. The decision to deploy the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops was strongly supported by Nigeria against the views of, mainly, Francophone countries. This has shed doubts on the legitimacy and neutrality of the intervention. In addition, the high record of abuses against civilian populations committed by ECOMOG troops and ECOMOG's failure to protect some of the most vulnerable people in certain conflict settings have nuanced the generally positive assessment of its performance in the two countries. In spite of this, ECOMOG has gained both local and international recognition. In 1998, ECOWAS' Foreign Ministers recommended that ECOMOG formally become responsible for peacekeeping operations in the region. ECOWAS subsequently enhanced its capacities and slowly transformed ECOMOG from a series of *ad hoc* initiatives to a more permanent structure for sustained military co-operation.

ECOWAS was the first sub-regional institution in the continent to establish a regional military peacekeeping intervention (Liberia, in 1990).<sup>15</sup> In the absence of a response from the international community to massive violations of human rights in Liberia at the end

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<sup>12</sup> Kwesi-Aning, E., 1999, *Security in the West African Subregion: An Analysis of ECOWAS's Policies in Liberia*, Copenhagen: Institute of Political Studies, University of Copenhagen

<sup>13</sup> Adedeji, A., 1999, *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance*, London: Zed Books.

<sup>14</sup> Dowyaro, E.T., 2000, "ECOMOG Operations in West Africa," in Mark Malan, (ed.), *Boundaries of Peace Support Missions: The African Dimension*, ISS Monograph Series, No. 44, Pretoria: ISS.

<sup>15</sup> Hussein, K., Gnisci, D., and Wanjiru, J., 2004, *Security and Human Security: An Overview of Concepts and Initiatives: What Implications for West Africa?* Paris: OECD.

of 1989, ECOMOG<sup>16</sup> intervened in the country and successfully supervised the presidential elections in July 1997. In August 1997, the ECOMOG mandate was extended to Sierra Leone to reinstate the democratically elected government into power, following the May military coup, and to restore peace and security. Both deployments were arguably reasonably successful, and the performance of the ECOMOG forces largely satisfactory, even though their achievements have not been tantamount to conflict resolution.<sup>17</sup>

ECOWAS subsequently deployed a small peacekeeping operation in Guinea-Bissau in 1998-99, which ended in failure. According to Adekeye Adebajo, this failure was partly due to the absence of Nigeria: "Lacking the regional Gulliver, the Lilliputian peacekeepers had to withdraw from Bissau by June 1999".<sup>18</sup> In late 2002, ECOMOG troops were deployed to Cote d'Ivoire to monitor a ceasefire in the civil war that had been ravaging this country, and they were subsequently integrated with a UN mission in 2004. Something similar happened in Liberia when a peace agreement had been reached between then president Charles Taylor and the rebels, which ECOMOG assumed responsibility for monitoring until its forces were converted into a UN mission less than a month later.<sup>19</sup>

The deployments have been accompanied by a strengthening of the structural framework, for example, in the form of an Allied Armed Force of the Community (AAFC) with a joint commander and the establishment of a Defence Council. ECOWAS has also taken steps (at the Summit meeting in Lomé in 1997) to create an early warning and conflict resolution mechanism, including plans for an early warning centre, to which should be added the establishment of a Mediation and Security Council. Most of these plans, however, remain to be implemented and their practical consequences have been minor. For instance,

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<sup>16</sup> Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W., 1994, "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia," *International Peacekeeping*, 1, (3); Hussein, K., Gnisci, D., and Wanjiru, J., 2004, *Security and Human Security: An Overview of Concepts and Initiatives: What Implications for West Africa?* Paris: OECD.

<sup>17</sup> Dowyaro, E.T., 2000, "ECOMOG Operations in West Africa," in Mark Malan (ed.), *Boundaries of Peace Support Operations: The African Dimension*, ISS Monograph Series, No. 44; Howe, Herbert M., 2001, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

<sup>18</sup> Berman, E.G. and Sams, K., 2000, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, Geneva: UNIDIR/Pretoria: ISS.

<sup>19</sup> Møller, B., 2005, "The Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity: The Role Of African Regional and Sub-regional Organizations in Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa," DIIS Working Paper No. 4.

ECOWAS proved unable to prevent the crises in Guinea Bissau in 1998-99 or in Côte d'Ivoire in 1999/2000.<sup>20</sup>

The Mechanism goes beyond the earlier protocols to the extent that it foresees that ECOMOG should intervene in internal conflicts threatening to trigger a humanitarian disaster or posing a security threat to the region and situations that result from the overthrow or threat to a democratically elected government. The Authority of Heads of State and Government is the highest decision-making body of the Mechanism. ECOWAS' Executive Secretary can initiate fact-finding, mediation, facilitation, negotiations and reconciliation actions to effectively prevent and manage conflict in the region. In addition, the Mechanism comprises five distinct bodies: the Mediation and Security Council which accounts for 10 members elected for a period of 2 years. It can authorize all forms of intervention such as the decision to deploy political and military missions (a two-thirds majority is required in this cases), inform the UN and AU of its decisions, provide and review mandates and terms of reference for forces, and appoint force commanders.

The Defence and Security Commission is composed of military technocrats, and advises the Mediation and Security Council. It examines all technical, administrative and logistical issues related to peacekeeping operations. The Council of Elders comprises 32 members appointed by the Executive Secretariat on an ad hoc basis to engage in preventive diplomacy and "use their good offices and experience to play the role of mediators, conciliators and facilitators". A subregional peace and security observation system encompassing the Observation and Monitoring Centre with headquarters in Abuja and offices in Cotonou, Banjul, Monrovia and Ouagadougou covering four Observation and Monitoring Zones is also in place. It aims to collect and transmit data to the ECOWAS Secretariat on conflict risks and potential disputes in all of West Africa.

ECOMOG constitutes the Community's intervention force, composed of standby multi-purpose modules from member states, ready for immediate deployment. According to Article 22 of the Mechanism's protocol, ECOMOG can be responsible for the following

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<sup>20</sup> Møller, B., 2005, "The Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity: The Role Of African Regional and Sub-regional Organizations in Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa," DIIS Working Paper No 4.

missions: observation and monitoring; peacekeeping and restoration of peace; humanitarian intervention; enforcement of sanctions, including embargoes; preventive deployment; peacebuilding, disarmament and demobilization; and policing activities, including the control of fraud and organized crime. To help ECOMOG troops fulfil their missions, three training schools have been established in the region: the Peacekeeping School (Côte d'Ivoire); the International Training Centre (Ghana); and the National War College (Nigeria). These are to provide tactical, operational and strategic training to standby units. It is foreseen that it would become compulsory for each member state to have standby units to be regularly inspected by the Defence and Security Commission.

The ECOWAS Peace and Security Observation System was established by the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, adopted in 1999. The ECOWAS Mechanism has three key organs: the Mediation and Security Council, the Defence and Security Commission, and the Council of Elders. The Mediation and Security Council is responsible for implementing the provisions of the Mechanism through the Defence and Security Commission, the Council of Elders, and ECOMOG. Peacekeeping missions by ECOMOG are planned by the Defence and Security Commission, while the Council of Elders is used primarily for conflict mediation and electoral monitoring. The system consists of an Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC), which is based at the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, as well as of four Zonal Offices, which, gathering information from their focal areas on a daily basis, report to the OMC. The OMC collects and processes data and analysis, and compiles reports, which are submitted to the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS. Currently, ECOWAS is in the process of operationalizing its early warning system both in terms of technical issues and human resources. The political will to implement the EWS has been affirmed by the Heads of State. ECOWAS has established key partnership with the West African Network for Peace Building (WANEP) in the operationalisation of the ECOWAS Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN). It has identified 15 Member States monitors and 15 civil society monitors for each country.

The main brigade (ECOBRIIG) of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) will be comprised of 5 000 soldiers within pre-determined units, which will be ready to deploy

within 90 days. Also in existence is the ESF task force, a high readiness component of the ESF consisting of 2 773 soldiers at 30 days' readiness. The latter is based on Nigeria as lead nation. West Africa has appointed a task force chief of staff, established a task force headquarters (in Abuja) and has an operational PLANELM. It has also completed its concept of operations, doctrine and SOPs. The region has also undertaken a training needs analysis and designated Hastings as its regional logistic base. All countries have pledged their support and the commission has undertaken a verification mission to confirm the levels of readiness among member states and has also conducted a number of command post exercises. The intention is that all contributions on standby in member states be ready and available for deployment by the end of 2008.

In conclusion, ECOWAS has considerably improved its responsiveness to conflict and has become the key player enhancing peace and security in West Africa, as proven by the mission in Côte d'Ivoire. The Secretariat has progressively taken more important initiatives to tackle security challenges faced by West African populations (especially on small arms and light weapons) and obtained consistent international support to build its capacities in this area.<sup>21</sup> The focus of ECOWAS initiatives on security has progressively begun to address dimensions of human security beyond physical violence, as demonstrated, for instance, by the creation of Child Protection Unit (CPU) within the Secretariat.<sup>22</sup> The role of ECOWAS as a guarantor of peace and security in West Africa, beyond peacekeeping and conflict management and resolution, could be developed further if ECOWAS were involved in providing a regional framework for Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration programmes implemented at the national level.

### **SADC's Approach to Conflict Management**

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been in existence since 1980, when it was formed as a loose alliance of nine majority-ruled states in Southern Africa known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), with the

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<sup>21</sup> Alao 2000.

<sup>22</sup> Hussein, K., Gnisci, D., and Wanjiru, J., 2004, *Security and Human Security: An Overview of Concepts and Initiatives: What Implications for West Africa?* Paris: OECD.

main aim of coordinating development projects in order to lessen economic dependence on the then apartheid South Africa.

In 1992 SADC was launched and among the stated objectives of SADC were some which may appear well intended, but entirely unrealistic such as to 'promote the interdependence and integration of our national economies for the harmonious, balanced and equitable development of the region.' The basic principles included 'the sovereign equality of all member states; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual benefit; and the peaceful settlement of disputes,' as formulated in the SADC Treaty. The field of 'politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security' was mentioned as one among several areas of cooperation.

The structure described in the treaty was quite elaborate, featuring the following main bodies: a Summit of Heads of States or Government, a Council of Ministers, various commissions, a Standing Committee of Officials, a Secretariat headed by an Executive Secretary and a Tribunal. In 2001 the treaty was amended, *inter alia* with a view to referring properly to the new AU and to accommodating new offices. SADC has crafted mechanisms and a security architecture that provide for both collaborative security (peaceful cooperation to enhance the mutual security of states and peoples); collective security (peaceful cooperation and the use of force with the explicit authorization of the UN Security Council); and collective self-defence (mutual defence against external aggression). Since SADC's founding, a comprehensive and ambitious security project has unfolded.

The SADC protocol also established a mechanism to support its peace and security objectives in the form of a one-year revolving chair of its security Organ. SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was established in 1996, and a protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation was signed in 2001. The protocol seeks to harmonize the foreign policy of southern African states and calls for security initiatives ranging from conflict prevention to peace enforcement. The accord also calls for SADC member states to coordinate their security policy through a troika of members under a one-year rotating chair, supported administratively by the SADC secretariat.

The Organ operates a troika chairing system (just as the overall SADC) which comprises three member states supported by the SADC secretariat: an outgoing Chair; a serving Chair; and an incoming Chair. The current troika is composed of Namibia (2005-2006), Tanzania (2006-2007), and Angola (2007-2008). The Organ decided to operate within this troika chairing system to simplify communication and the solving of problems within and between SADC member states. There is a Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO) comprising of the ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security from each of the state parties. Its main function is to co-ordinate the work of the Organ and its structures and it reports to the Chairperson. Ministers of Foreign Affairs of each Member State perform the functions of the Organ relating to politics and diplomacy within the Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee. Ministers for Defence, Public Security and State Security work through the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee.<sup>23</sup>

In 2004, SADC consolidated its peace and security plan through the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), which it describes as an “enabling instrument for the implementation of the SADC developmental agenda”.<sup>24</sup> SIPO envisages co-operation among member states in the areas of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It also establishes a platform for co-operation to address a number of other defence and security issues, including: combating terrorist activities; countering trafficking in small arms; protecting strategic infrastructure; combating stock theft; protecting wildlife; streamlining immigration legislation between member states; addressing refugee issues; enhancing law enforcement at sea; and providing joint border controls.<sup>25</sup> The structure of the Organ will thus rest on two pillars, one for the objectives relating to politics and diplomacy, the other for those relating to defence and security.

SADC has also taken some steps to address the serious problem of small arms proliferation in the region—partly as a legacy of the end of the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique—e.g. with a “Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other

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<sup>23</sup> Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), 2007, *Southern Africa: Building an Effective Security and Governance Architecture for the 21st Century*, Cape Town: CCR.

<sup>24</sup> Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), 2007, *Southern Africa: Building an Effective Security and Governance Architecture for the 21st Century*, Cape Town: CCR.

<sup>25</sup> Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), 2007, *Southern Africa: Building an Effective Security and Governance Architecture for the 21st Century*, Cape Town: CCR.

Related Materials”.<sup>26</sup> The military activities have, likewise, been expanded, mainly in the form of training for peacekeeping activities, (e.g. at the now defunct Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, RPTC, in Harare),<sup>27</sup> towards which end a couple of military exercises have also been conducted, including the “Blue Hungwe” and the “Blue Crane”.<sup>28</sup>

More controversially, two military deployments have taken place, ostensibly under the auspices of SADC. First of all, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia became militarily involved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), that is, in what was formally speaking a text-book collective defence operation intended to protect a member state against aggression from Rwanda and Uganda. However, the deployment only received a SADC mandate *ex post facto*, and the intervention has been highly controversial, both with regard to the accomplishments, costs and the underlying motivations, as it seems that Angola was mainly driven by national security concerns related to UNITA operations out of the DRC, and Zimbabwe by the desire to exploit Congolese natural resources.<sup>29</sup> Secondly, South Africa and Botswana launched a singularly ill-fated intervention in Lesotho in 1998, which likewise received a SADC mandate, but only after the fact.<sup>30</sup>

SADC has made progress in positioning itself to assume this new role. Arrangements for establishing the SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) are proceeding steadily. The structures and framework for the establishment of an early-warning centre based at the SADC secretariat are also progressing. The SADC chiefs of defence staff and police chiefs approved the modalities regarding the formation of SADCBRIG, which includes police, in July 2004 in Maseru, Lesotho and received the blessing of ministers of defence and security

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<sup>26</sup> Oosthuysen, G., 1998 “Shooting the Golden Goose: Small-Arms Proliferation in Southern Africa,” in Robert I. Rotberg and Greg Mills (eds.), *War and Peace in Southern Africa. Crime, Drugs, Armies, and Trade*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

<sup>27</sup> Berman, E.G. and Sams, K., 2000, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, Geneva: UNIDIR/Pretoria: ISS.

<sup>28</sup> Møller, B., 2005, “The Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity: The Role Of African Regional and Sub-regional Organizations in Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa,” DIIS Working Paper No 4.

<sup>29</sup> Turner, T., 2002, “Angola’s Role in the Congo War,” in John F. Clark (ed.), *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>30</sup> Makoa, F.K., 1999, “Foreign Military Intervention in Lesotho’s Elections Dispute: Whose Project?” *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol. 21, No. 1; Matlosa, K., and Neville W. Pule, 2001, “The Military in Lesotho,” *African Security Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2.



and the SADC heads of state shortly thereafter. SADCBRIG was officially launched in August 2007 and the region has made steady progress with its operationalization.<sup>31</sup>

The sub-regional security architecture in SADC remains nascent and challenges for conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict transformation are daunting. SADC has been the least effective African sub-regional actor in the areas of preventive diplomacy and deployment. Its botched intervention in Lesotho and its failed peace-making efforts in the DRC represent the only authentic SADC attempts to forestall conflict. The challenge that faces SADC is whether it can actually implement the numerous and ambitious activities outlined in SIPO, given the reality of limited financial and human resources at its disposal. Despite the existence of SIPO and its associated institutions, southern African states are still grappling with identifying and defining common threats facing the sub-region. SADC member states should explicitly identify and define common threats to southern Africa. The authority and mandate of actors to address common threats have strategic implications. Such processes determine, for example, how SADC governments allocate funds for defence in their national budgets; how the organization positions itself in relation to global powers; and how governments interact with external actors in bilateral and multilateral fora. This suggests that SADC should spearhead participatory processes to articulate security priorities for the sub-region and how these are to be addressed. There is still a need for a more integrated plan of action and a streamlined list of priorities.

Generally, SADC is hampered by the apparent rivalry between South Africa and the rest based on the fact that South Africa possesses all the wherewithal of hegemony (both in military, political, economic, demographic and geographical terms) or even regional unipolarity. It thus seems unlikely that the other states in SADC will be able to field any major military operations without the participation of South Africa.

### **IGAD'S Approach to Conflict Management**

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), established in 1986, comprised Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and

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<sup>31</sup> Cilliers, J., 2008, "The African Standby Force: An Update on Progress," ISS Occasional Paper No. 160.

Uganda, and was mandated to deal with ecological and humanitarian problems in the Horn of Africa. Its mandate has since changed and expanded in response to the reality of conflicts and insecurity in the region which were an obstacle to development in the sub-region. The perceived need for regional approaches to conflict management, led to a formal restructuring of the organization. In March 1996, the organization was renamed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The objectives of the new organization were broadened to include the promotion of peace and stability and the creation of mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts within the sub-region.<sup>32</sup>

Consequently, IGAD embarked on the implementation of a five point programme on Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management, launched in 1998. At the Khartoum summit in 2000, the establishment of the “mechanisms in the IGAD sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter-state and intra-state conflicts” was endorsed.<sup>33</sup> IGAD’s mandate now includes conflict prevention, management and resolution, humanitarian affairs, infrastructure development, food security and environmental protection and gender. IGAD has been involved in the management and resolution of various conflicts in the Horn of Africa, those in Sudan and Somalia. At the subsequent Summit meeting in January 2002, an elaborate protocol was adopted on the “Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States” (CEWARN).<sup>34</sup>

IGAD has over the last 10 years evolved into a regional security institution boasting of a conflict early warning and response mechanism (CEWARN). IGAD has also been instrumental in the establishment of the 3,000-strong Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) for peace-keeping action under a unified command whenever required for the restoration of peace and security. The EASBRIG management has since been taken over by the EASBRIG Coordinating Mechanism (EASBRICOM) and the full handover from IGAD

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<sup>32</sup> Bekoe, D., and Omach, P., 2002, *Building Peace in Eastern Africa*, International Peace Academy, Makerere University, Uganda and Africa Peace Forum, Kenya.

<sup>33</sup> Møller, B., 2004, “Regional Security in the Horn of Africa,” Paper for the 9th International Congress of the Somali Studies International Association on Diaspora and State Formation in the Horn of Africa, Aalborg University, 3-5 September 2004.

<sup>34</sup> Mwaura, C., and Schmeid, S., (eds.), 2002, *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*, Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press.

scheduled to be completed by the end of 2007. These two institutions have been formed to be used for preventive deployment, peace-enforcement and peace-keeping missions and are part of the African Standby Force (ASF).

IGAD's central organs are the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Council of Ministers, Committee of Ambassadors, the Secretariat which is located in Djibouti and headed by an Executive Secretary, a Gender Desk, the department for fund raising, and a documentation centre. As all other subregional organizations in Africa, IGAD is based on the principles of the sovereign equality of all member states and non-interference in their internal affairs, yet with the option (which may be mainly theoretically) of taking decisions through qualified (two-thirds) majority in the Council of Ministers (art. 10.5).

The ratification of the CEWARN Protocol in January 2002 laid the foundation for the establishment of the "Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism" for the IGAD region. It intends the timely gathering, processing and distribution of conflict information in the complex institutional network of member states, CEWARN and IGAD. The CEWARN-Unit comprises Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERUs) of the member states, and the Foreign Ministries Committee of Permanent Secretaries acting as supreme organ and link to the political IGAD committees.

The EASBRIG now has three components; the brigade HQs located in Addis Ababa, the Planning Element based in Nairobi and the Logistic base to be co-located with the Brigade HQs in Addis Ababa. Its structure includes the Committee of Eastern African Chief of Defence Staff which reports to the Eastern African Council of Ministers of Defence and Security which in turn report to the Assembly of the Heads of State of Eastern Africa for EASBRIG.<sup>35</sup>

A significant initiative by IGAD has been CEWARN which became operational in 2002 when IGAD Heads of State and Government signed the Protocol on the Establishment of CEWARN. The process of developing the mechanism's conceptual and operational framework took place over a period of two years (2000-2002) and became

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<sup>35</sup> Alusal, N., 2004, "African Standby Force: East Africa Moves on," *African Security Review* Vol. 13, No. 2.

operational on June 2003.<sup>36</sup> Following a consultative process, the subsequent central hub of the CEWARN Unit was set up in June 2003. The Unit now has seven professional staff and a resource centre. It is intended to act as the hub and clearing house for early warning within the Horn. The CEWARN Unit is responsible for the actual exchange of information, encoding of information and support of the national units, known as CEWERUs (Conflict Early Warning and Response Units). Currently, there are three operational CEWERUs (Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda). CEWARN obtains, analyzes, and distributes information on potentially violent conflicts; develop scenarios to respond to potential conflicts; and conduct research on ongoing crises. Once fully mature, each IGAD member state will have a CEWERU and an optional operational steering committee that could include a wide range of stakeholders.

IGAD is an established institution in tackling political security albeit in a diplomatic manner. For instance, it has contributed to the establishment of the interim government of Somalia, and as well as in the signed peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), marking the end of Africa's longest civil war. This was achieved through the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)—the final agreement tying together and setting in motion all the protocols, implementation modalities and ceasefire—on 9 January 2005. IGAD has also been supportive in ensuring that the peace deal holds and mediating between the two groups when any of the two parties feel that the peace deal has been breached hence ensuring the some semblance of normality is maintained. Other examples such as IGAD's handling of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war and the involvement of Ethiopia in the excursion of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) from Somalia as opposed to IGAD does not augur well for the legitimacy of the organization.

As for Somalia, various mediation efforts have been undertaken by IGAD, mostly intended to somehow create unity among the rivalling clans and factions around the Transitional National Government (TNG) which was "elected" by the Arta conference in Djibouti in 2000, attended by two thousand delegates. The Somali Peace Process was initially hosted in Eldoret and began with a gathering of Somali political leaders in October 2002,

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<sup>36</sup> CEWARN, 2005, *CEWARN in the IGAD Region: The CEWARN Handbook*, Addis Ababa: CEWARN.

under the auspices of IGAD before being moved alter to Mbagathi, Nairobi for logistic reasons. On the 7th of October the Eldoret Declaration on “Cessation of Hostilities and the Structure and Principles of the Somali National Reconciliation Process” was adopted. Besides a cease-fire it entailed agreement on the basics of a new federal constitution entailing considerable devolution of power to inclusive and representative local and regional political structures; and an invitation to the international community to monitor the process. Subsequently, the signatories reconstituted themselves as a “Leaders’ Committee.”<sup>37</sup>

In 2003, the process was continued, now under the leadership of the new IGAD envoy, Kenyan Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, and relocated to Mbagathi in Nairobi. By then, however, what had begun as a promising process had, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG), evolved toward “an unimaginative ‘cake-cutting’ exercise in power-sharing by an un-elected and only partially representative political elite that threatens to repeat the history of earlier failed initiatives”. Regional rivalry between, on the one side, Ethiopia, sponsoring the Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC) and, on the other side, Djibouti and various Arab countries, supporting the TNG, did not help at all. By the summer of 2004, however, a parliament had been appointed (rather than elected) which had selected the former warlord and leader of the semi-autonomous Puntland region, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, president of Somalia. In the major conflicts in Sudan and Somalia, external pressure is decisive for potential success of IGAD mediation efforts. IGAD itself can only use the weak means of mediation; especially potential “spoilers“ and war profiteers not interested in peace cannot be addressed with these means, which becomes most obvious in the considerable deficits in the Somalia mediation.<sup>38</sup>

All in all IGAD has been able to set up requisite structures within which, political will allowing, conflict management can be effectively implemented and conflicts addressed in due time.

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<sup>37</sup> Møller, B., 2005, “The Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity: The Role Of African Regional and Sub-regional Organizations in Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa,” DIIS Working Paper No 4.

<sup>38</sup> Terlindu, U., 2004, “IGAD: Paper Tiger Facing Gigantic Tasks,” FES Conference in Berlin.

As the above analysis portrays, conflict management by sub-regional actors in the African continent is a recent phenomenon which African sub-regional organizations have been experimenting with in the last two or so decades. Therefore, this is a practice which is yet to take root and is still at the evolution stage. Considerable progress has been achieved in building African sub-regional capacity for managing violent conflict and addressing security threats on the continent.

# CHAPTER THREE

## MANAGEMENT OF THE SOMALI CONFLICT BY EXTERNAL ACTORS

### Conflict Management Missions Involved in the Somalia Conflict

A myriad of institutions have been involved in attempts to find a lasting solution to the over decade conflict that has struck the Somalia since 1988. The most prominent of these institutions are the UN, US, AU, and IGAD. This focus of this chapter will be the efforts undertaken by the former three institutions while chapter four will tackle the experience of IGAD I its endeavours.

### United Nations Intervention

UNOSOM I (United Nations Operation in Somalia) was the first part of a United Nations (UN) sponsored effort to provide, facilitate, and secure humanitarian relief in Somalia, as well as to monitor the first UN-brokered ceasefire of the Somali Civil War conflict in the early 1990s. The operation was established in April of 1992 and ran until its duties were assumed by the UNITAF mission in December 1992. UNITAF discussed below had to take over as a transitional body to prepare the secure environment within which UNOSOM II would effectively complete the task for the restoration of peace and security in Somalia. The new mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to assist the Somali people in rebuilding their economic, political and social life, through achieving national reconciliation so as to recreate a democratic Somali State. Following the dissolution of UNITAF in May 1993, the subsequent UN mission in Somalia was known as UNOSOM II.<sup>1</sup>

The UN was engaged in Somalia from early in 1991 when the civil strife began. UN personnel were withdrawn on several occasions during sporadic flare-ups of violence. A series of Security Council resolutions (733, 746) and diplomatic visits eventually helped

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<sup>1</sup> Rothchild, D., 1995, "The United States and Conflict Management in Africa," in Harbeson, J., and Rothchild, D., (eds.), *Africa in the World Politics*, Boulder Co.: Westview Press.

impose a ceasefire between the two key factions, signed at the end of March 1992. These efforts were aided by other international bodies, such as the Organization for African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. These efforts were initiated in order to provide a secure environment within which humanitarian assistance could be challenged to over 3 million people who were in severe danger of starvation and malnutrition-related disease, mostly in the drought-stricken rural areas.<sup>2</sup>

The UN, with the active support of all rebel faction leaders, felt that some sort of peacekeeping force would be required to uphold the ceasefire and assist the humanitarian relief effort, in conjunction with other relief agencies and NGOs. By the end of April 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 751. This provided for the establishment of a security force of 50 UN troops in Somalia to monitor the ceasefire. This detachment would be known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and it existed at the consent of those parties who had been represented in the ceasefire. The resolution also allowed for an expansion of the security force, with a number of around 500 troops initially discussed. The first group of ceasefire observers arrived in Mogadishu in early July 1992.

Despite the UN's efforts, all over Somalia the ceasefire was ignored, fighting continued, and continued to increase, putting the relief operations at great risk. The main parties to the ceasefire, General Mohamed Farrah Aidid and "President" Ali Mahdi Muhammad, once again showing the difficult and troubled relations between the warlords, proved to be difficult negotiating partners and continually frustrated attempts to move the peacekeepers and supplies. In August of 1992 the Security Council endorsed the sending of another 3,000 troops to the region to protect relief efforts. However, most of these troops were never sent.

Over the final quarter of 1992, the situation in Somalia continued to get worse. Factions in Somalia were splintering into smaller factions and splintering again. Agreements for food distribution with one party were worthless when the stores had to be shipped

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<sup>2</sup> United Nations, 2003, *United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM 1)*, New York: UN; Laitin, D., 1999, *Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention*, in Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder (eds.), *Civil War Insecurity and Intervention*, New York: Columbia University Press.



through the territory of another. Some elements were actively opposing the UNOSOM intervention. Troops were shot at, aid ships attacked and prevented from docking, cargo aircraft were fired upon and aid agencies, public and private, were subject to threats, robbery and extortion. Meanwhile, hundreds, if not thousands of poverty stricken refugees were starving to death every day.

By November 1992, General Mohamed Farrah Aidid had grown confident enough to formally defy the Security Council and demand the withdrawal of peace keepers, as well as declaring hostile intent against any further UN deployments. The inability of UNISOM I to achieve its mandate forced the US to intervene.

### **United Task Force**

Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was a United States (US) led, United Nations (UN) sanctioned multinational force which operated in the Republic of Somalia from 9 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. A US-initiated effort (code-named "Operation Restore Hope"), UNITAF was charged with carrying out UN Security Council Resolution 794: to create a protected environment for conducting humanitarian operations in the southern half of the Republic of Somalia. Accordingly, the Security Council suspended any further significant strengthening of UNOSOM as UN affairs in Somalia were subsumed by UNITAF.

UNITAF's original mandate was to use "all necessary means" to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid in accordance to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and is regarded as a success.<sup>3</sup> UNITAF comprised of forces from 24 different countries, with the vast bulk contributed by the US. UNITAF soon secured the relief operations which were being coordinated and carried out by UNOSOM, which was also attempting to negotiating a political end to the conflict. Indeed, although UNOSOM had been replaced by UNITAF, it was technically still in operation and would remain ready to resume its function when UNITAF had met its goals of creating a secure environment for humanitarian relief.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Daniel, D., 1996, "The United States," in Trevor Findlay, (ed.), *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>4</sup> Zartman, W., (ed.), 1995, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers

The Secretary-General convened a meeting in early 1993 in which 14 important Somalia political and rebel factions agreed to hand over all of their weapons to UNITAF and UNOSOM, and over \$130 million was pledged by donors at an aid conference that year to assist in reconstruction. However, Somalia continued the stumble, and in March the UN decided to transform the UNITAF mission into what came to be known as UNOSOM II. The mandate of UNOSOM II stipulated that the operation was to secure continued relief efforts and, more significantly, to restore peace and rebuild the Somali state and economy

UNITAF was only intended as a transitional body. Once a secure environment had been restored, the suspended UNOSOM mission would be revived, albeit in a much more robust form. On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He noted that despite the size of the UNITAF mission, a secure environment was not yet established and there was still no effective functioning government or local security/police force.<sup>5</sup>

The Secretary-General concluded therefore, that, should the Security Council determine that the time had come for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the latter should be endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia.<sup>6</sup> UNOSOM II would therefore seek to complete the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia. The new mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to assist the Somali people in rebuilding their economic, political and social life, through achieving national reconciliation so as to recreate a democratic Somali State.

UNOSOM II was established by the Security Council in Resolution 837 on 26 March 1993 and formally took over operations in Somalia when UNITAF was dissolved on 4 May 1993.

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<sup>5</sup> United Nations, 2003, *Operation in Somalia I*, UN: Dept of Peacekeeping.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, 1992, Letter dated 92/11/24 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council.

## UNISOM II

UNOSOM II (United Nations Operation in Somalia) was the second phase of the United Nations intervention in Somalia. It ran from March 1993 until March 1995. UNOSOM II carried on from the U.S.-controlled (but UN sanctioned) UNITAF, which had in turn taken over from the ineffectual UNOSOM I mission. All three of these interventions were aimed at creating a secure enough environment for humanitarian operations to be carried out in the increasingly lawless and famine-struck country.<sup>7</sup>

A federalist government based on 18 autonomous regions was agreed upon by the leaders of Somalia's various armed factions. It was the objective of UNOSOM II to support this new system and initiate 'nation building' in Somalia. This included disarming the various factions, restoring law and order, helping the people to set up a representative government, and restoration of infrastructure. UNOSOM II had a strength of 28,000 personnel, drawn from 38 countries.<sup>8</sup>

UNOSOM II faced the same challenges that made it impossible for UNISOM I to deliver on its mandate. Further to this was the resentment of the foreign forces by the locals as they became entangled in the conflict in Somalia and were unable to disarm the warlords and restore peace and security in the country. The Americans became more insular, the warlords began to reassert control of many Mogadishu districts. With each failure to apprehend Aidid, the militias grew bolder. Serious rifts between nations contributing to UNOSOM II also began to develop, with Italy in particular being a major critic of the American methods.<sup>9</sup> The resultant assassination of foreign troops especially US troops forced President Bill Clinton withdraw the US forces, setting a deadline of 31 March 1994 for their complete withdrawal. Other nations, such as Belgium, France and Sweden, also decided to withdraw at this time.

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<sup>7</sup> United Nations, 2004, *Operations in Somalia II*, New York: UN.

<sup>8</sup> Zartman, W., (ed.), 1995, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

<sup>9</sup> Cowell, Alan, 1993, "Italy, In UN Rift, Threatens Recall of Somalia Troops," *The New York Times*, 16/7/9

In early 1994 the Security Council set a deadline for the mission of March 1995. Various reconciliation talks were carried out over the next few months providing for a ceasefire, the disarmament of militias and a conference to appoint a new Government. However, preparations for the conference were repeatedly postponed and many faction leaders simply ignored the agreements at will. With no real progress occurring and a dwindling of support from member states UNOSOM was disbanded in March 1995.<sup>10</sup>

The post-UNOSOM period is marked by several key developments. First, it began a failed pattern of externally funded national reconciliation conferences. More than a dozen such conferences have been convened, of which only one—the 2000 Arta Peace Conference—came close to bearing fruit. The conferences have tended to provoke conflict inside the country, divert energies of the political elite from governing areas they claim to control to jockeying for positions in a proposed state, and elevate the status of factional and militia leaders, whom some argue are part of the problem, not the solution. Second, UNOSOM's civil and political work helped to empower a small but growing civil society in Somalia, which has since been an important force for peace-building in the country. Third, UNOSOM's enormous presence transformed the Somali economy in ways that helped to undermine the war economy and reshape interests in greater levels of security and rule of law. Merchants who in 1991–92 had profited from diverted food aid and looting now made small fortunes in quasi-legitimate business ventures, from procurement and construction to remittances and import-export commerce. Their shifting interests helped to contain armed conflict and lawlessness in the post intervention period.<sup>11</sup>

### **African Union Mission to Somalia**

African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the AU with the approval of the UN. AMISOM is mandated to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali

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<sup>10</sup> United Nations, 2004, *Operations in Somalia II*, New York: UN.

<sup>11</sup> World Bank, 2005, *Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics*, Washington: World Bank.

security forces, and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid.<sup>12</sup>

It was created by the AU's PSC on 19 January 2007 with an initial six month mandate. On 21 February 2007 the UN Security Council approved the mission's mandate. Subsequent six-monthly renewals of AMISOM's mandate by the AU PSC have also been authorized by the UN Security Council. AMISOM's current mandate expires in August 2008, and in March 2008 the UN Secretary General is expected to report on options to replace AMISOM with a formal UN peacekeeping mission.<sup>13</sup>

AMISOM replaced and subsumed the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM), which was a proposed IGAD protection and training mission to Somalia approved by the AU and UN Security Council on September 14, 2006 and December 6, 2006 respectively. IGASOM was originally proposed for immediate implementation in March 2005 to provide peacekeeping forces for the latest phase of the Somali Civil War. At that time, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had not yet taken control of Mogadishu, and most hopes for national unity lay with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which had organized in Nairobi, Kenya in 2004 and were planning to establish a provisional capital in Baidoa, Bay region, Somalia.<sup>14</sup>

By May 2006, the situation was radically different, as the ICU had recently engaged the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) and was fighting for control of Mogadishu in the Second Battle of Mogadishu. By June, they had established control of the capital. Fighting began to spread to other parts of the nation as the UIC gained ground. Plans for IGASOM continued, though by July there were indications of opposition from the ICU, who saw the initiative as a US-backed, Western means to curb the growth of their Islamic movement.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1772 S-RES-1772(2007).

<sup>13</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1801 S-RES-1801(2008).

<sup>14</sup> World Bank, 2005, *Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics*, Washington: World Bank

<sup>15</sup> Security Council Report: July 2006: Somalia Security Council Report.

Until December 2006, the UN Security Council had imposed an arms embargo on the group, but the embargo was partially lifted and a mandate for IGASOM issued on 6 December 2006 for six months.

On 21 February 2007, the UN Security Council authorized the AU to deploy a peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months. In March 2007, Ugandan military officials arrived on the ground in Somalia. On 20 August 2007, the UN Security Council extended the AU's authorization to continue deploying AMISOM for a further six months and requested the Secretary-General to explore the option of replacing AMISOM with a UN Peacekeeping Operation to Somalia.<sup>16</sup>

## **The IGAD-Led Peace Process**

### **Background to the Process**

With twelve efforts at providing a lasting peaceful process in Somalia having failed, in 1999, during its IGAD-term of office, Djibouti initiated an international concerted action. In the framework of IGAD a high high-level meeting was held in Arta (Djibouti), supported by Egypt, Libya, Eritrea, and the Gulf States, among others. Participants were hundreds of traditional elders, and some political leaders, like former government politicians of the Barre Era, yet only a few warlords attended. The Transitional National Government (TNG), formed there and headed by President Abdiqassim Salad, was supported by the Islamic clergy and particularly by parts of the business world. The latter run their import and export business through middlemen in Djibouti, which explains the considerably tight relationship between the TNG and Djibouti.<sup>17</sup>

TNG ended up producing a weak and ineffective government since it was not inclusive. Some of the key actors in the conflict at the time, including some militia leaders, the semi-autonomous region of Puntland, and the self-declared Somaliland, were not part of the talks. As a result the TNG was out rightly rejected in most parts of the country. It came

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<sup>16</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1772 S-RES-1772(2007).

<sup>17</sup> Terlindu, U., 2004, "IGAD: Paper Tiger Facing Gigantic Tasks," FES Conference in Berlin.

to be seen by many in Somalia as representing Hawiye interests, and it did not manage to extend its control and legitimacy beyond the capital of Mogadishu. The results of the Arta Conference could not be implemented because the actors who were excluded, the armed factions, effectively blocked and confined the activities of the new government in a section of Mogadishu. TNG's mandate expired on 12th August 2003 having failed to achieve any of its presumed mandate. In March 2001, with the help of Ethiopia, the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), a coalition of factional leaders, was formed in Awassa, Ethiopia, intensifying opposition to the TNG. Prominent members of the SRRC included Abdullahi Yusuf (now TFG president), Hussein Aideed (now TFG deputy Prime Minister) and Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail (former TFG Foreign Minister), forcing the conflict in Somali to enter a new phase as both Djibouti and Ethiopia armed various militias in Somali which saw the conflicts worsen over time.<sup>18</sup> This rivalry between the Djibouti-fronted TNG and the Ethiopia-fronted SRRC helped to ensure that by the end of its three-year mandate in August 2003 the TNG had failed to establish its authority and effectively became just another Mogadishu faction.

This state of affair led to the 9th Summit of IGAD in Khartoum, Sudan, in January 2002, to mandate the three frontline states of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti to organize an all-inclusive national reconciliation conference for Somali. The Summit commissioned by the then Kenyan president Moi, to start a joint initiative with Ethiopia and Djibouti in order to bring the warlords of SRRC, and thus Ethiopia's political allies back on the board

### **The Eldoret Process**

The Somalia National Reconciliation Conference was initiated on 15th October 2002 under the auspice of IGAD in Eldoret. It had a structured four levels of decision-making. The first level was that of heads of IGAD states and governments. This level incorporated the various heads of states and governments of the IGAD region. Below this was the IGAD ministerial council. This involved all the foreign ministers of the IGAD region and acted as

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<sup>18</sup> Morolong 2007; ICG, 2007, *Somalia: The Tough Part is Ahead*, Mogadishu/Brussels: ICG; Awad, A., 2008, "Reflections on the National Somali Reconciliation Conference." [www.ossrea.net](http://www.ossrea.net); Kamudhayi, O., 2004, "The Somali Peace Process," in Mwangi, M., (ed.), *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation.

an advisory organ to the summit. The facilitation committee comprised of the special envoys of Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea and Uganda did the day-to-day running of the conference on behalf of the IGAD governments. To assist the facilitation committee was a secretariat. The facilitation committee worked closely with the IGAD Partners Forum who were the key donors of the conference.<sup>19</sup>

The conference had three levels of decision-making. The first was the leader's committee composed of Somali leaders. There was no consensus on who the Somali leaders were, and this often led to a lot of debate. There were those who believed that genuine Somali leaders were those who signed the Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities in 27th October 2002. That position restricted the leadership to a group of 24 factional leaders. Others would have liked a broader definition of leaders that included a larger number than the 24 faction leaders.<sup>20</sup>

The second level was that of the officially invited delegates who belonged to different factions. The number of official delegates remained a contentious issue right from the beginning of the conference. While the officially invited delegates were 361 there was an additional five from civil society. However, there was between 800-1000 delegates at the conference at all times. The question of which of them was genuine remained elusive. The last level of decision making in the conference was the plenary. This comprised of the delegates, the leaders committee, the IGAD facilitation committee and observers who include the IGAD Partners Forum among others. The plenary was the highest decision-making organ of the conference; it ratified all decisions taken by the other organs of the conference. The rationale behind this was to allow the widest participation in decision-making for purposes of ownership and consensus building.<sup>21</sup>

The framers of this round of talks came up with several innovations, including an initial phase, which pledged parties to a cessation of hostilities, and a second phase devoted to reconciliation, which required the participants to address key conflict issues. The second

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<sup>19</sup> Kamudhayi, O., 2004, "The Somali Peace Process," in Mwangi, M., (ed.), *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation.

<sup>20</sup> Kamudhayi, O., 2004, *ibid*

<sup>21</sup> Kamudhayi, O., 2004, *ibid*



phase was to provide a blueprint for whatever government emerged from the talks. The third phase of the talks centered on power-sharing negotiations. All the phases came to a conclusion as each was able to deliver on its presumed mandate. The signing of the Eldoret Declaration concluded the first phase, the completion of the draft papers on various aspects of reconciliation and state building and which as a result of division and mistrust ended up in the production of two charters neither of which provided clear answers to the demands for decentralization or federalism signaled the end of phase two [these two charters were later merged into the Transitional Federal Charter agreed among a large number of factional leaders], while the election of parliamentarians and the president supposedly saw the end of the third phase.<sup>22</sup>

This IGAD-led peace process was initially conceived as a reconciliation conference between Abdiqasim's TNG and its Ethiopian-backed opponents, headed by Abdulahi Yusuf. By the end of the long-drawn-out conference there was no trace of TNG: Somalia was to make a fresh start under the TFG.

All the political actors, with the exception of the Somaliland administrators, showed up for the opening round. Initial planning, drawing on lessons learned from previous peace initiatives, laid out a flexible agenda and timeframe well suited to the rhythm of Somali negotiations. The conference framework borrowed from the broad participation and open-ended timeframe of the Arta conference, the detailed technical discussions of the 1993 Addis Ababa talks, and the pragmatic recognition of regional and local administrations embodies in what has come to be known as the "building blocks" approach.<sup>23</sup>

The first major breakthrough came in the Eldoret Agreement for the Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities and Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process on 27th October 2002.

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<sup>22</sup> ICG Africa Report, 2004, *Biting the Somali Bullet*, Mogadishu Brussels: ICG; ICG African Briefing, 2002, *Salvaging Somalia's Charter for Peace*, Mogadishu Brussels: ICG.

<sup>23</sup> ICG, 2003, *Negotiating a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia*, ICG Africa Report No. 59: Mogadishu/Brussels: ICG.

After this initial breakthrough, the Eldoret process was dogged by numerous challenges which included: First, repeated fierce fighting in Somalia ridiculed the warlords' pretended will to negotiate peace. Furthermore, leadership to the conference was awarded to the same faction leaders who had failed to implement previous peace agreements. As a result the 27 October 2002 ceasefire was violated so often that it was practically meaningless. Second, in the course of negotiations, the warlords as the "Political Leaders' Committee" unduly claimed more and more competences at the expense of civil groups and traditional elders. Third, it took the negotiating team too much time to establish unambiguous criteria for the selection of delegates and the negotiating procedure. Fourth, the three-country committee initially responsible for managing the talks on behalf of IGAD was practically paralyzed by chronic disagreements between Ethiopia and Djibouti. In September 2003, following the "landmark" signing of a transitional national charter, Djibouti suspended its participation, accusing Kenya of mismanagement—Djibouti was to only return after the steering committee was expanded to include all of the six neighboring countries. By the end of 2002, the process almost ran aground on many procedural questions. The process was also dogged with mismanagement and alleged corruption. Several factions, including TNG withdrew from or suspended their participation in the conference.<sup>24</sup> By the end of 2002, the process almost ran aground on many procedural questions.

### **The Mbagathi Process**

After the change of government in Kenya, the negotiations were revitalized on 18th January 2003, when Ambassador Bethwell Kiplagat became the chief mediator replacing Elijah Mwangali. This change of leadership revived hopes that the peace process could be salvaged and that the challenges that had faced the Eldoret process could be surmounted.

The meeting place was transferred from Eldoret to Mbagathi, near Nairobi. Protracted negotiations finally resulted in a procedure to admit the delegates along the lines of an already agreed clan formula. On July 5, 2003, it seemed that a final agreement on the

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<sup>24</sup> Terlindu, U., 2004, "IGAD: Paper Tiger Facing Gigantic Tasks," FES Conference in Berlin; Award 2008; International Crisis Group (ICG), 2003, *Negotiating a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia*, ICG Africa Report No. 59: Mogadishu/Brussels: ICG.

charter for the formation of a new government had been found (and on 29th January 2004 some endorsed a revised transitional charter, the Safari Park Declaration). Over 20 leaders of military factions, who had signed the ceasefire agreement in October 2002, were to nominate 351 members of parliament. Those, in turn, would elect the new president who would then appoint the prime minister. The key role of the warlords in the planned nomination of delegates expressly underlines that the original Arta idea of a bottom-up process had been abandoned almost completely.<sup>25</sup>

Even before the ink that wrote this agreement had dried, the TNG President Abdiqassim—whose term in any case had expired—declared the agreement null and void forcing a deadlock in the conference in Mbagathi. Consequently, the TNG as well as several warlords (Muse Sudi Yalahow [USC/SSA], Barre Aden Shire [JVA], Osman Ato [USC/SNA], Mohammed Ibrahim Habsade [RRA]) stayed away from the talks since summer 2003, with one brief interruption, even repeatedly threatening to organize their own peace conference in Somalia, and on 19 March 2004 nearly half the leaders at the talks announced their intention to withdraw.<sup>26</sup>

For months, attempts were made to influence the TNG. The delegates remaining in Mbagathi revised the already adopted charter, considering some of Abdiqassim's points of criticism. However, he still rejected the Charter. In January 2004, a repeatedly postponed in-camera meeting finally took place in Kenya, intended to reintegrate all the Somali "leaders" in the negotiation process. The retreat concluded with the signing of an amendment to the Charter. The new document reduces the number of future parliamentarians to 275 and requires approval by both the Transitional National Assembly (born out of the Arta process) and the Mbagathi conference.<sup>27</sup>

Eventually, this process culminated on the 10th October 2004, in the election of Yusuf Abdullahi as the President of the TFG of the Somalia Republic to serve a five-year term. This was preceded by the inauguration on 29th August 2004 of a Transitional Federal

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<sup>25</sup> Terlindu, U., 2004, "IGAD: Paper Tiger Facing Gigantic Tasks," FES Conference in Berlin.

<sup>26</sup> ICG Africa Report, 2004, *Biting the Somali Bullet*, Mogadishu Brussels: ICG; ICG African Briefing, 2002, *Sabotaging Somalia's Charter for Peace*, Mogadishu Brussels: ICG.

<sup>27</sup> Terlindu, U., 2004, "IGAD: Paper Tiger Facing Gigantic Tasks," FES Conference in Berlin.

Parliament, which comprises 275 members, and the election of Sharif Hasan Sheikh Aden as the Speaker on 15th September 2004. The dominant belief among observer of the process is that Yusuf's was installed by Ethiopia and this has become part of the orthodoxy by which the legitimacy of the TFG and Yusuf himself is dismissed.<sup>28</sup>

President Yusuf selected Professor Ali Muhammed Gedi to serve as Prime Minister. The cabinet composed by the Prime Minister in December 2004 was subsequently rejected by the Parliament but a new cabinet based on different clan quotas was approved in January 2005. The establishment of transitional institutions represented a significant step towards reconciliation and stability. However, the consolidation of stability and a functional central government in Somalia will take time. In the coming three to five years, the general security environment throughout Somalia is likely to remain fragile and prone to armed conflict and criminality whether or not a government of national unity is maintained.<sup>29</sup>

### Actors, Interests and Issues

No state gets involved in any conflict without having any vested interest. And it is the interests of these external actors that shape the framework that the peace process ultimately takes and the possibility whether the process will be successful or not. Put differently, it is these external actors that make or break a mediation process.

In the Somalia case actors' interests have time and again been blamed for the inability to find a solution in the country, more specifically the neighbouring countries of Ethiopia and Djibouti who have been influential in all the peace processes in the country as each has tried to install a regime that is seen to be partisan to their interests. For instance, Ethiopia engineered the creation of the SRRC after the formation of TNG which was allied with Djibouti in order to ensure that under no circumstances would the TNG succeed as well as to protect and the champion the interests of Ethiopia in Somalia which were now under threat from the TNG.

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<sup>28</sup> Healy, S., 2008, "Somalia: The Demise of the Mbagathi Peace Process," Horn of Africa Groups Report by Chatham House.

<sup>29</sup> Interview with Mohamud Hassan, Director of International Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Somalia, 3rd October, 2008

In the IGAD-led Somali peace process, Ethiopia dominated the Technical Committee and was closely involved in conference mechanics such as the organization of the daily agenda and screening delegates—an initiative that produced and increasingly noticeable bias in favor of SRRC and that ensured the eventual outcome of the process was seen as pro-Ethiopia as the internal actors allied to them took all the influential positions in the TFG.<sup>30</sup>

The inability to reach a consensus during the conference, the numerous delays in selecting delegates as well the lack of concerted approach in the process has been squarely put on the differences between Djibouti and Ethiopia. While Djibouti has always been interested in ensuring that the results of the Arta conference hold and are reflected in any subsequent peace process, Ethiopia has always sought the circumvent these results and gain the necessary numbers to install its allied internal actors.

In the interests of Djibouti, it was important to influence the results of the peace process in order to keep Abdiqassim in office. A friendly Somali government is useful for economic purposes of Djibouti, which lacks resources and whose population of 300,000, cannot sustain a viable market to its business oriented economy.

Ethiopia's interest in Somalia lies in the strategic concerns for security. Since conflicts in Africa have been known to have the spill over effect, Ethiopia sought to ensure that any regime that comes to power in Somalia will be of no significant threat to its security. It is for this reason that Ethiopia partnered with the TFG to route the ICU out of key areas once they started to consolidate their hold on the country. Further, Ethiopia fought the last war with Somalia over the Ogaden and is careful to create a friendly government that cannot revive the hostilities over Ogaden.

Throughout the peace process it was deemed impossible to arrive at a solution unless that solution entailed satisfactory answers to the concerns of Ethiopia and Djibouti. Kenya,

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<sup>30</sup> Interview with Maikara, J.K., Head of Horn of Africa Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya, 18<sup>th</sup> July 2008.

Uganda and Eritrea also had security concerns just like Ethiopia and sought to ensure that peaceful solution was found since the conflicts in Somalia had repercussions for their economies as well as investor confidence in the region.<sup>31</sup> There was also the border incursion by Somalia militias into Kenya and the influx of small arms and light weapons which has resulted into a security nightmare in the country as well as the involvement of these militias in conflicts in Uganda and Eritrea. Kenyan and Ugandan leaders—presidents Moi and Museveni were also interested in becoming the regional leaders in peace efforts in the Horn of Africa and sought to be influential in these processes which were all geared to regional supremacy wars. Eritrea also sought to settle its scores with Ethiopia and always sought an alliance to counter Ethiopia's interests and ambitions in the region.<sup>32</sup>

Egypt, Libya and the Arab League followed the proceedings at Mbagathi keenly on the ground that they are Muslim states like Somalia. However, Egyptian interests go beyond Islam. Egypt was keen to safeguard its Nile designs through the conflict in Somalia. Egypt would like this protracted conflict to continue to ensure Ethiopia's distraction from developments at home. In this case there would be no danger that Ethiopia would divert the waters of the Nile for irrigation purposes.<sup>33</sup>

Peacemaking in Somalia has long been hostage not only to irascible warlords, but also to the interests of regional powers.<sup>34</sup> IGAD's member states have found it impossible to forge a common approach, sometimes for reasons that have nothing to do with Somalia. All of Somalia's immediate neighbours—Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti—have provided military assistance to various factions at one time or another since the advent of the civil war. Other regional actors, including Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, have intervened at various times in support of factional clients. Somalia's Islamist militants have also benefited considerably from the military and financial support of foreign

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<sup>31</sup> Maikara, *ibid*

<sup>32</sup> United Nations, 2007, *Security Council Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia*, New York: UN.

<sup>33</sup> Morolong, H., 2007, *Somalia: Have all the Options run out?* ISS Situation Report

<sup>34</sup> Interview with Mohamed Affey, Kenya's Former Ambassador to Somalia and Lead Diplomat in IGAD Somali Peace Process, Nairobi 25<sup>th</sup> July

governments and private sponsors. More often, geopolitical rivalry has been pursued through political, diplomatic and financial means<sup>35</sup>

The interests of international actors were varied. Italy, Britain and France wanted to protect its investments in the former colony especially large banana plantations and farms. Italy also wanted to be seen to be at the forefront in trying to restore law and order in its former colony as well as set an environment within which to return the bulk of the refugees that reside in its country. Britain was more interested in lobbying for the recognition of Somaliland as an independent state as it was able to restore law and order in its territory.<sup>36</sup>

Financial support notwithstanding, donors have also failed to supply the level of political commitment and technical assistance required for success. Whereas IGAD's member states have fuelled the Somalia crisis through interference, the wider international community is guilty of studied indifference. Elsewhere in Africa, regional differences have been overcome largely through patient negotiation and diplomatic arm-twisting by outside powers. Pressure from the US and European governments have been central to progress in the Sudanese peace process, also conducted under IGAD auspices and equally riddled with historical difference and conflicting policies between participating IGAD countries. Unfortunately for Somalia, international interest has dwindled to the point that competing regional influences in the peace process have gone unchecked.<sup>37</sup>

The US was much concerned with ensuring that a radical terrorist group did not take root in Somalia. As terrorists cells were slowly shaping up in Somalia, US sought to find ways to demobilize them and regain lost initiative in ensuring that an environment requisite for the development of terrorist was denied. The US showed little interest in the TFG project and was establishing links with individual warlords with whom it hoped to make headway against an ill-defined "terrorist-threat" believed to exist in Mogadishu. It was the kind of muddle of competing interests that has consigned Abdiqasim's government into oblivion, and it looked as though the TFG was heading the same way until the ICU which

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<sup>35</sup> Biyokulele, 2006, *The Arabs and the Great Game in Somalia*, [www.biyokulele.com](http://www.biyokulele.com).

<sup>36</sup> Morolong, H., 2007, *Somalia: Have all the Options run out?* ISS Situation Report

<sup>37</sup> United Nations, 2007, *Security Council Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia*, New York: UN

the US viewed as harboring terrorist elements came into the picture. The appearance in mid-2006 of ICU as the sole authority in Mogadishu looked like a carefully planned Islamic revolution to the international actors. Ethiopia was also extremely wary of the new developments which promised to take Somalia's politics in a new direction, one in which Ethiopia's influence was sure to be greatly diminished. Therefore, US supported Ethiopia's initiative to kick out ICU as part of its policy to prevent Somalia becoming a haven for international terrorists.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> ICG, 2007, Somalia: The Tough Part is Ahead, Africa Briefing No. 45, January 2007.



# CHAPTER FOUR

## CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IGAD AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE SOMALIA PEACE PROCESS, 2002-2006

### Introduction

Any critical analysis of the IGAD-led Somalia peace process has to grapple with the twin-question of whether the outcome of the mediation process can be considered a success or a failure. To the outside world, the installation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia is seen somewhat as a successful product of the peace process. However, to the majority of the citizens of Somalia, the reality on the ground is that the TFG—despite military support from Ethiopia and AMISON—remains a failure as conflict propagated by clan-based militias remains the order of the day.

In light of the fact that the seminal idea behind the original framework for the peace process was that a comprehensive blueprint for peace and governance should be developed before power shared out, one is tempted to agree with the majority of the Somalia citizens that indeed the TFG is a façade that can crumble anytime. Juxtaposed against the successful insurgency by the ICU before the entry of Ethiopia into the matrix and the consequent conflicts after the ouster of ICU fought by clan-based militias as well as remnants of the ICU one can easily arrive at the conclusion that the IGAD-led process has ended up producing the opposite of what its various backers had intended—conflict-generating rather than a conflict-solving initiative. It is this Somalia's clan-based political dynamics that has consistently worked against the re-establishment of a central government. This is further reinforced by the fact that TFG's security institutions remain chronically weak, corrupt and factionalized, practically indistinguishable from clan militias.

This has given rise to foreign military intervention and a related insurgency in Mogadishu, the violence of which has surpassed anything that has been happening among Somalia factions for the previous decade. The TFG has had no impact on the self-

governing region of Somaliland; it has made little evident difference to Puntland, President Yusuf Abdulahi's home region, except to weaken security control somewhat as militia from his own Majerten clan were drawn into Mogadishu to defend his position.

In lieu of the above, this Chapter sketch out what went wrong with the peace process such that despite the presence of a transitional government things have more or less the same to the extent of necessitating external military assistance instead of the process leading to a situation whereby the person elected by the parliamentarians representative of all the clans would have sufficient support inside the country to negotiate his way into a position of power. To tackle the issues at hand the Chapter critically looks at the following questions: it is shown that the Eldoret and Mbagathi peace talks produced were characterized by fundamental flaws in terms of the mediation approach adopted by IGAD in terms of the identification and accreditation of real Somali leaders, weak institutional mechanisms, divergent interests between the mediators and organizational constraints (finance and resource).

### **Critical Analysis**

The IGAD-led Somali peace process did not contextualize the conflict within its real conflict system within the Greater Horn of Africa. It has been shown that not all actors, real and perceived, were involved in the mediation process. For instance, the issue of Somaliland was always a thorn in the flesh of mediators and was actually bound to create problems regardless of the outcome. Exogenous and endogenous actors to the conflict were not properly identified. To make matters worse even the heterogeneous mediators, in this case the multilateral IGAD initiative could not "keep distance" from the conflict because its membership was an integral part to the conflict.

Another fundamental issue that emerged during the IGAD-led mediation process in the Somali conflict was the apparently visible intra-and-inter mediator conflict which actually reduced the prospects for a successful mediation process. It was clear from the word go that IGAD member states were always attempting to chart the path of the mediation process to their advantage. The tension between Ethiopia and Djibouti to a larger extent stultified the

mediation process as each struggled to ensure that the delegates sympathetic to their causes were the ones in accredited by the IGAD Secretariat. As a matter of fact September 2003 saw Djibouti withdrawing from the conflict accusing Kenyan of micromanaging the mediation process. There have also been arguments to the effect that the TFG that was formed out of this mediation process is Ethiopia's puppet government hence the resistance from the Hawiye-led opposition. It has therefore been shown that the IGAD-led process was undermined by the inability of the member states to work in concert as mediators stemming from their different interests in the Somali conflict.

It has also been illustrated that the Somali peace process suffered from IGAD's inadequate institutional mechanisms for conflict management. The IGAD Secretariat lack qualified personnel as most of the employees are always on secondment from their respective government mostly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has been shown that there is actually need to have conflict specialists and practitioners who could be in a position to tame the political interests vis-à-vis the security issues that are necessary for the Greater Horn of Africa region.

The IGAD-led peace process, it is arguable, culminated to the establishment of a TFG as a result of the role of external actors who had also interest in the conflict. For example, the US-led war on terrorism played a significant part in explaining the trajectory of the peace process. There was the fear that an unstable Somalia would be home for terrorist cells thereby undermining the war on terror. This saw US flex its muscle, political and financial, to ensure that there is a semblance of order in Somalia.

It is these realities that the IGAD-led peace process failed to live up to and which might be key to unravelling the precarious scenario that obtains in Somalia to date that any future process that attempts to ensure peace and stability in Somalia should bear in mind. Unless these issues are addressed peace and stability in Somalia will remain a mirage.

## [Un]Settling Down of the Transitional Federal Government

Even before the TFG settled foot in Somalia, it already faced questions of legitimacy as to who it was accountable to since those who participated in its election could not legitimately claim to represent Somalis. This has resulted in a situation whereby the TFG lacks sufficient authority and legitimacy to implement the agreement and deliver peace. In light of this state of affairs, immediately the TFG jettied into Somalia the appeal the President made was to call for the AU to provide 20,000 peacekeepers to help him establish his authority, an idea which was unpopular with the majority of Somalis, a fairly large section of the Somalia parliament that elected Yusuf and approved his government and the ICU.

Trying to assert his authority Yusuf did not receive any support from either IGAD, AU or the US and consequently failed to expand its support base beyond Baidoa (after failing to secure agreement from the populace to its installation in the capital) or establishing real authority inside the country. Only Ethiopia was at hand to provide back-up to Yusuf and was to later play a key role in the dismantling of the ICU and resultant entrenchment of the TFG in Mogadishu which they captured from the ICU on 28th December 2006.

The rise of the ICU was considered a blessing to the TFG as the US viewed it as an international terrorist group and was forced to intervene. The Courts had begun to operate in the 1990s, providing law and order within the confines of clan zones, mainly in South Mogadishu. Links grew among them, signaling a slow evolution towards a coherent Islamic vision of political order. At the end of 2004, just as Yusuf was being elected TFG President in Nairobi, Sheikh Sharif was elected chairman of all Islamic Courts operating across Hawiye-clan-dominated Mogadishu.<sup>1</sup> The Ethiopian assault together with the TFG militias coupled with divisions between the ICU “radical” and “moderate” wings ensured its defeat. However, this is not to say that the ICU has completely retreated. Its remnants and other clan-based militia continue to taunt the TFG with coordinate attacks every other day.

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<sup>1</sup> Healy, S., 2008, “Somalia: The Demise of the Mbagathi Peace Process,” Horn of Africa Groups Report by Chatham House.

To date a manifestation of TFG inability to set up control within Somalia is the efforts that has been initiated by the AU to provide “peace support mission” currently undertaken by Ugandan and Burundian forces to back the TFG as they await the full AMISON peacekeeping mission. In the meantime Ethiopia continues to act as guarantor and protector of the TFG.

TFG notwithstanding, the situation in Somalia has not improved for the better. Far from bringing peace and government to Somalia, the installation of the TFG provoked a major insurgency and a severe deterioration in security. The population of Mogadishu endured conditions akin to civil wars for much of 2007. Major Ethiopian-led security operations in March/April and October/November caused widespread destruction and triggered massive displacement. UN sources estimate that up to 60 per cent of Mogadishu’s 2 million population have fled. Evidently, Yusuf’s transitional government has been unable to establish meaningful authority in Mogadishu or elsewhere in the southern regions where the Courts formerly held sway.<sup>2</sup>

Furthermore, by the end of 2007 the TFG bore little resemblance to the entity that had first emerged from the Kenyan talks back in 2004. A group of about 30 parliamentarians hostile to Yusuf had been replaced in 2006. Similarly Prime Minister Gedi has been replaced by Nur Adde and the cabinet also reconstituted.

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<sup>2</sup> Healy, S., 2008, “Somalia: The Demise of the Mbagathi Peace Process,” Horn of Africa Groups Report by Chatham House; Morolong, H., 2007, *Somalia: Have all Options run out?* ISS Situational Report .

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSIONS

Contemporarily, there has been an acknowledgement of the importance of regional and sub-regional organizations in conflict management inevitably putting more responsibilities on them. What is thus required would be a strategy to enhance the capacities of these organizations to meet the impending challenges. And it is on this basis that these organizations have to adopt some of the recommendations made herein.

There are a number of steps that sub-regional and regional institutions in the Horn of Africa involved in enhancing peace and security must undertake if they are to remain relevant in the ever-dynamic changing nature of the challenges afflicting security. IGAD needs to re-invent itself in light of the pace that developments have taken, and especially the challenges that globalization is posing for African states. There is need to provide strategic leadership in the area of foreign and security policy and harmonize the policies of IGAD member countries into a single policy for the region. A joint foreign and security policy is a very critical feature of any success of the sub-regional institution. Furthermore, there must also be greater interaction between the security establishments of the IGAD member states. Institutions interacting and cooperating in that field should be established, as well as regular joint military exercises between countries are also one area which could help build confidence between the countries.

IGAD should develop institutional and operational capabilities for conflict management. It is noteworthy that presently it plays a relatively minor role in managing the conflicts within the region. Its entire membership should support and participate more actively in its CEWARN.

The organization should forge partnerships with civil society actors in the region, other sub-regional and regional organizations and external actors. This would go a long way in transcending the recurrent problem within IGAD in which the state actors are

compromised in their ability to intervene effectively in conflicts for they are agents of both war and peace in regional conflicts. More so, there should be a stronger partnership/relationship with the UN.

IGAD should emphasize on improved governance within the member states as this could promote the management of civil conflicts and instability within the region. Good governance would help to increase the legitimacy of regional states in undertaking neighborhood interventions. The sub-regional organization should therefore call for the adoption of common regional principles on the rule of law, human rights, strong democratic institutions, free and fair elections and the creation of programmes that would in the long run reduce or eliminate economic disparities between ethnic groups.

There should be greater inclusion of the civil society organizations—and women in particular—in efforts by IGAD to manage and resolve conflicts. Civil society organizations should no longer be viewed as anti-government bodies pushing for the agenda of external funders but as agencies that have potentialities to be harnessed in conflict management and resolution. Consequently, proper institutional mechanism for the participation of civil society actors in conflict management process should be prioritized.

The problems of inadequate resources for mediation and intervention can be mitigated through increased financial and military assistance from the UN and other funders such as the European Union, the Scandinavian countries, USA and Japan.

Finally, IGAD should formulate a monitoring mechanism to promote coherence between deliberations arrived at and the implementation of the same.

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