Declaration

This study is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

Signed.....

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This study has been submitted for examination with our approval as University supervisors.

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to my Mother Monica Waitheira, my wife Betty and my children Lewis, Beverly and Andrew for their support, prayers and patience.

Acknowledgement

Working and refining an academic dissertation is obviously a demanding and even frustrating exercise especially if one is employed as a career Military Officer. The ambition of writing a dissertation begins with the author alone but the choice of the area of research, the style of writing and the final production of a dissertation remains a joint enterprise. Accordingly, I must from the onset state that three individuals played a special role in the writing of this dissertation: Prof. V.G. Simiyu, lecturer at the Department of History, who taught and supervised my work and Dr. G. M. Gona, my second supervisor, Prof. Makumi Mwagiru, Director Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, for his guidance and selection of research problem. That way, I was able to nurture and abstract winding ideas into a focused area of study. This dissertation is clearly a product of their thoughts and candid guidance.

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On a more personal note, I thank my wife Betty, my children Lewis, Beverly and Andrew for their relentless encouragement and understanding at a time that I would have spent to attend to their individual and collective needs. Finally, writing this dissertation meant being away from my rural home most of the weekends. Accordingly, I thank my late mother, Monica Waithera for her prayers and understanding. May God rest her soul in peace.

Historical Analysis of Peace Agreements: A Comparative Case Study

of Sudan (1972), and Mozambique (1992)

Abstract

Analysts of conflict resolution and civil wars have paid scant attention to the short-term implementation of peace agreements. Negotiated settlement of civil wars was a relatively rare phenomenon during the Cold War era. Conflicts studies in the early 1980's focused primarily on the conditions and tools for getting parties in civil wars to sign peace agreements. Conflict resolution was perceived as a linear process where successful negotiation signaled an irreversible reduction in conflict. Accordingly, peace agreements between a state and insurgent leaders remained binding in the post-agreement phase.

As the Cold War came to an end, new trends of intra-state conflicts emerged. The emerging conflicts defied the linear view of conflict resolution and brought to question the difficulties of getting parties to live up to their commitments to peace. Peace agreements never lived long and post conflict peace agreements were fraught with uncertainty, suspicion and security dilemma.

The 1972 Sudan Peace Agreement was signed on 27th February 1972 after seventeen years of civil war. The agreement made Southern Sudan region an autonomous political entity with its own legislative authority. The agreement recognized cultural diversity and accommodated religious tolerance. More importantly, the Agreement provided for equal opportunity for education, employment and development. However, ten years of stable peace was brought to an abrupt end in 1983 when the peace agreement was abrogated through the

introduction of Shari'a Law and re-division of the South into three political regions. This turn of event led to the second civil war year from July 1983.

In Mozambique, sixteen years of conflict between RENAMO and FRELIMO centred on illegitimacy and the radical Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO ideology. After a military stalemate, a Church-led mediation effort culminated into the signing of a General Peace Agreement in Rome on 4th October 1992. The Peace Agreement was successfully implemented and sustained by the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). ONUMOZ's mandate included monitoring of ceasefire, providing and coordinating humanitarian assistance and electoral monitoring.

The Mozambique case represented a situation where belligerent parties opted for cooperation and accepted an external transitional authority which resulted into conflict resolution after a protracted civil war. On the contrary, the Sudan case represented a situation where a peace agreement had failed in spite of sound guarantees it had provided.

The collapse of these agreements brought to question the issue of management and sustainability of negotiated peace accords as permanent commitments in post-conflict periods. It affirmed an erroneous dictum that the signing of negotiated peace agreements did not necessarily conform to an irreversible linear process as had previously been argued by scholars and practitioners of peace agreements.

This study sought to establish why the 1992 Mozambique Peace Agreement succeeded while the 1972 Sudan Peace Agreement failed. The study used structural, systemic and human needs theories as tools of analyzing failure or

success of peace agreements. Accordingly, this study examined a matrix of external and internal variables that were thought to have influenced the outcome of peace agreements.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAA	Addis Ababa Agreement
AAAID	Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development
AACC	All African Council of Churches
AAHCC	*Anya nya* High Command Council
AAs	Assembly Areas
ANC	African National Congress
BC	Beja Congress
BHNs	Basic Human Needs
CAC	Cessation of Armed Conflict
CCFADM	Joint Commission for the formation of Mozambican Defence Forces
CCM	Christian Council of Mozambique
CFC	Cease-fire Commission
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CISAC	Centre for International Security and Cooperation
COMPOL	National Police Affairs Commission
CORE	Commission for Reintegration
COW	Correlates of War Project
CSC	Supervisory and Monitoring Commission
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FADM	Mozambican Defence Force
FAM	Mozambique Armed Forces
FRELIMO	Frente da Libertacao de Mozambique
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICP	Italian Communist Party
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority on Development
IPA	International Peace Academy
JPR	Journal of Peace Research
KANU	Kenya African National Union
LONRHO	London-Rhodesia Company
LP	Liberal Party

MANU	Makonde African Union
MCC	Mozambique Christian Council
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NMF	Nuba Mountains Federation
NPG	Nile Provincial Government
NSS	National Security Service
NUP	Al- Azhari's Northern Union Party
PRAHEC	Peoples Regional Assembly and High Executive Council
RENAMO	Resistancia Nacional Mozambicana
RTC	Round Table Conference
RUDI	Rhodesian Universal Declaration of Independence
SADC	Southern African Development Cooperation
SANU	Sudan African National Union
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SF	Southern Front
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SPLA	Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SSLM	Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
SSPG	Southern Sudan Provincial Government
SSU	Sudan Socialist Union
TANU	Tanzania African Union
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Project
UDENAMO	Uniao Democratica National de Mocambique
UNAMI	Uniao Nacionol Africana de Mocambique Independence
UNAR	African National Union of Rhombezia
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees
UNITA	Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola
UNOHAC	United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
UNUMUOZ	United Nations Operations in Mozambique
WCC	World Council of Churches
ZANLA	Zimbabwe National Liberation Army
ZCIO	Zimbabwean Central Intelligence Organization

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Chapter One

Historical Analysis of Peace Agreements: A Comparative Study of Sudan (1972) and Mozambique (1992).

1.1 Introduction

Civil wars in Africa have been fairly complex because at the most abstract level, four broad patterns have been evident: First, the levels of violence in these wars and the viciousness with which they have been prosecuted have been particularly high. In the Sudan, fighting between the Government and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) has claimed an estimated 1.2 million lives with another 4.5 million refugees fleeing the conflict area since the early 1980's nearly a decade after signing the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement.

Second, large-scale violence within states have tended to be protracted much more than wars between states. When belligerents turn to violence as a way of settling their differences, the chances of a quick end to conflict have normally been remote. Third, despite the International Community's interests in promoting the settlement of sub-state conflicts at the bargaining table, negotiated peace has been a rare outcome. Fourth, when belligerents have been able to sign a peace accord, either on their own or with the assistance of outside mediators, negotiations have historically produced more unstable settlements than those resulting from the outright victory of one side.

Roy Licklider and Barbara Walter for example, have established that negotiated settlements have led to renewed warfare within five years in about 50% of the cases.[1] Peace treaties are not a guarantee for perpetual peace but rather, a first step in a usually complex peace process. Some peace agreements have, however, been relatively successful than others. The Mozambican Peace Agreement in 1992 was a successful and sustained peace agreement model. However, with regard to the Sudan Peace Agreement, it can be asserted that not all peace-agreements are self-executing and therefore, most of them cannot be viewed as rigid documents engraved in stone. Agreements require continuous and creative adaptation in light of changing conditions on the ground and the evolving relationship between former adversaries. When a settlement aims at transforming relationships and fundamentally altering the way people pursue their political goals, it is desirable that it has the sustained duration and backing of an external actor as a mediator.[2] It is therefore necessary to continuously refer the role of a mediator in conflict resolution.

Historically, negotiated settlement of civil wars was a relatively rare phenomenon during the Cold War era. Conflict studies in the 1980's focused primarily on the conditions and tools for getting parties to civil wars sign peace agreements and in so doing, expected a dramatic cease-fire. Conflict resolution was viewed as a linear and irreversible process and particularly based on the legal principle of mutual trust. Subsequently, tranquillity was expected to prevail after the signing of peace treaties.[3]

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[1] Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars (1945-1993)," *American Political Science Review,* 89 no. 3 (fall 1995): 681-690; and Walter F. Barbara, *Negotiating Civil Wars: Why Bargains Fail,* (New York: Columbia University, 1996), pp. 42-57.

[2] Chester Crocker, "What kind of US Role in African Conflict Resolution?," in David Smock and Chester Crocker, *African Conflict Resolution: The US Role in Peacekeeping,* United States Institute of Peace, (Washington DC:, 1995), pp. 128-130.

[3] For details of the principles of mutual trust in treaties, See, Ian Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law,* 5th ed., 1999, in *The Law of Treaties,* pp. 607-640 and Dixon, McCorquodale, *Cases and Materials on International Law* 3rd ed., (London: Black Stone Press Ltd., 2000), pp. 59-107.

The reality in the post-cold war era is that peace agreements are volatile and fraught with suspicion, security dilemma and vulnerable to renewed and violent conflict almost immediately after signing of treaty. This study proceeded by arguing for the current explanations for success and failures of peace agreements.

Conflict is widespread and often causes tremendous amount of human suffering, posing serious threats to national, regional and international security. The debate over international responses to the problems posed by internal conflict is usually through negotiation, mediation and subsequently through peace agreements.

The current conflict in the Sudan is historically traced in the historical relations between Northern and Southern Sudan. In 1972, the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement was signed between the Sudanese Government and the *Anya nya I* (Snake poison) movement. The church-brokered peace agreement lasted for ten years but was subsequently interrupted when war broke out in 1982 culminating into a protracted war between the Sudanese Government and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) which to date has no immediate end in sight. The current peace process brokered by Kenya Government under the auspices of IGAD is one of such effort.

The Mozambican war lasted for seventeen years (1975-1992) and was an exceptionally bloody war culminating in nine hundred thousand dead, three million displaced and eight million facing starvation. On 4th October 1992, a Peace Agreement between Resistancia Nacional Mozambicana (RENAMO) and Frente da Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO) was signed in Rome.

The agreement was successfully implemented culminating into the pullout of the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (UNUMOZ) in 1995. The Mozambique conflict represented an extraordinary case for successful settlement; particularly because of South Africa's destabilization strategy aimed at assisting RENAMO. It also showed how cooperation between belligerents could yield a positive sum peace outcome. Specific military guarantees led to FRELIMO and RENAMO sign the Peace Agreement. The agreement was reached when there was a hurting stalemate, reduced external funding, drought and mediator's intervention.

Successful peace agreements are coveted peace models; but they are rare. On the contrary, failed peace agreements are accompanied by serious violent conflicts involving massive material and human loses. This study sought to critically investigate variables associated with failure or success of peace agreements in the area under study.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Analysts of conflict resolution and Civil Wars have paid scant attention to the short-term implementation of peace agreements. Negotiated settlement of Civil Wars was a rare phenomenon during the Cold War era. Conflict studies in the early 1980's focused primarily on the conditions and tools for getting parties in civil wars to sign peace agreements. Conflict resolution was perceived as a linear process where successful negotiation signalled an irreversible reduction in conflict. Peace contract between a state and insurgent leaders remained binding in the post-agreement phase.

As the Cold War came to an end, new trends of intra-state conflicts emerged. The emerging conflicts defied the linear view of conflict resolution and brought attention to the difficulties of getting parties to live up to their commitments to peace. Peace agreements never lived long and post conflict peace agreements were fraught with uncertainty, suspicion, security dilemma, increasing vulnerability for the warring parties and civilians.

The collapse of the peace agreement in Sudan brought to question the issue of the management and sustainability of peace agreements in post-conflict period. The failure of this agreement affirmed an erroneous dictum that the signing of peace agreements did not necessarily conform to an irreversible linear process. On the contrary, the success of the Mozambique Peace Agreement meant that not all peace agreements are doomed to fail. A look at both failure and success of peace agreements imply that certain variables contribute to the failure or success of peace agreements at least in relative terms. Consequently, success of peace agreements has been measured in relation to the ending of specific violence and return to peace.[4] Successful peace agreements are associated with successful mandate achievement, the degree of conflict resolution, the extent to which operation reduced both military and civilian casualties below the rates that existed before the operation began, democratic elections taking place in succession of five years terms and economic stabilization. Failure has been measured by the continuity of the conflict itself, presence of peace spoilers, increase in the number of warring parties, collapsed state structures, increase in Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and the emerging post agreement conflict between

[4] George Downs and Stephen John Stedman, "Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, Centre for International Security and Cooperation, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2002), pp. 43-66.

incumbent Government and rebels as in case of Sudan.[5] Issues of post-peace agreements, monitoring, management and implementation has been overlooked. This study sought to examine why some peace agreements tend to be relatively more successful than others. It critically evaluated the Sudan and Mozambique Peace Agreements on a comparative basis.

Other than in isolated cases in conflict resolution in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Nicaragua, it appeared in general terms, that for each conflict resolved through a negotiated peace agreement, a new conflict emerged, totally disregarding terms and provisions of the previous agreement and thereby constituting a zero-sum outcome.[6] Lack of studies in peace agreements and the repeated experience of their success and failures, fuelled an interest in their analysis. As a result, there existed an intellectual lacuna in the knowledge about peace agreements, which this study sought to fill.

1.3 Goal and objectives of study

Various causes are responsible for the success or failure of peace agreements. Some of these range from systemic conditions where political, socio-economic and geo-political issues determine the outcome of peace pacts within a region to intra-state conditions under which communal needs within state boundaries are either denied or guaranteed. Subsequently, studies on the analysis and management of peace agreements can be explained through Needs, Systemic and Structural theories.

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[5] Ibid., p. 55.
[6] Ibid., pp. 1-3.

The goal of this study was to identify variables, which accounted for the success or failure of peace agreements. Two objectives emerged out of this goal: To analyze the 1972 Sudan Peace Agreement with a view to isolating systemic and intra-state factors responsible for its abrogation and subsequent failure. To analyze the 1992 Mozambique peace process with a view to finding out the reasons for its success.

1.4 Research Hypotheses

The study is based on the following hypotheses:

a. Certain fundamental human needs guarantees are necessary ingredients for enduring peace agreements.

b. Systemic factors in a conflict system influence the outcome of peace agreements.

c. The structure of power sharing in a post-conflict Government determines the success of peace agreements.

1.5 Justification of the study

The global political spectrum spans between peace and conflict. The international commitment to peace implies the seriousness of the world community to manage peace. Managing peace agreements was therefore a national, regional and international priority as the effects of badlly managed peace agreements could easily be internationalized.[7] Subsequently, a comparative case study of peace agreements became necessary to mitigate the costly outcome associated with failed peace agreements. Workable peace

[7] Makumi Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management.* (Nairobi: Watermark Printers Kenya Ltd., 2000), pp. 58-70.

models are the subjects of study through systemic analysis of conflict. This study weaved well into the current efforts towards peace management such as the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCRP) based at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University in Sweden, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for major world conflicts, the Journal of Peace Research (JPR) and the Correlates of War Project (COW) at Michigan University are live cases of the universal concern for peace.[8]

At a personal level, the impetus to undertake this study derived from the reality that the traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement role of the military had shifted towards a multi-dimensional approach to the management of peace and conflict. Today, the professional military officer is expected to plan, monitor, interpret and observe the implementation of peace agreements and cease-fires. The military officer is required to oversee the demobilization, disarmament and integration of belligerents as distinct phases of the implementation of peace agreements. Consequently, I felt motivated to carry out a study and analysis of peace agreements.

The choice of Sudan as a case study was firstly due to availability of research materials in form of an existing peace agreement. Secondly, Sudan's conflict is the oldest in Africa and has cost many lives and displaced millions. Continued conflict in the Sudan implies a continuous influx of refugees and a threat to regional security in the Horn, and Great Lakes region in general and Kenya in particular.

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[8] Ho-Won Jeong, *Conflict Resolution: Dynamics Process and Structure*, (London: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999), p. 9.

Mozambique was chosen as a case study because it was felt that the comparative aspect of the study could only make sense if a geographically separate region was considered for analysis. The study of Mozambique took into consideration its historical, economic and political relationships with other countries in South African region. Moreover, the United Nations and scholars have documented it as a successful and sustainable peace agreement model and therefore affirming the assertion that not all peace agreements are doomed to fail.[9]

1.6 Scope and limitations

This study carried out a historical analysis of the conflict prior to the signing of the agreements. It examined the underlying social, economic and political structures that led to the conflict. The study looked at the 1972 Sudan and the 1992 Mozambique Peace Agreements and established systemic and intra-state factors that led to their failure or success respectively. Subsequently, the study looked at the qualitative and contextual aspects of the specific peace agreements by considering region-specific historical, political and diplomatic variables.

1.7 Operational definitions

Conceptual understanding of the terms used in this study is necessary, as they will make the understanding of the study much easier. The relevant concepts are operationally defined as follows:

[9] Ibid., p.12.

1.7.1 Conflict

Coser Lewis defines conflict as a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources.[10] The struggle seeks to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals. The definition sees conflict as a struggle over values and is goal-directed. Himes defines conflict as a purposeful struggle between collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and gain status, power, resources and other scarce values.[11]

The most important aspect about conflict is that it is endemic in society and will remain an important part of human life.[12] Conflict can be functional or dysfunctional. Functional conflict leads to social change and it can be a unifying factor among the weak and deprived. Dysfunctional conflict leads to the breakdown of social order. Conflicts are also known to have a memory. Those who experienced the conflict and took part in it carry the memory of the conflict. Consequently, the resiliency of conflict renders conflict resolution very difficult.

1.7.2 Conflict History

The basic assumption is that each conflict has a previous history and some sort of a future. The outcome of peace agreements is largely dependent on the interpretation of pervious conflict history and how that interpretation will determine future relations. Conflict history is

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[10] Lewis Coser, "Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change," *British Journal of Sociology* Vol. 8, (1957), pp. 190-297.

[11] Himes J. S., *Conflict and Conflict Management*, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980).

[12] Makumi Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, (Nairobi: Watermark Printers Kenya Ltd, 2000), pp. 1-6.

transmitted through generations and is attributed to the resiliency of most conflicts in Africa.

1.7.3 Peace

In the past, peace was thought of as merely an absence of war. The concept of peace today is broad and positive. Michael Banks[13] considers peace as harmony, justice and a process of conflict management. These views of conflict concede that conflict is endemic and is based on the needs and values of people. These values determine their physical survival, spiritual aspirations, possessions, belongingness and identity. Threat to these values is interpreted as threat to the community as an entity. Peace is therefore a volatile state of affairs and its management is part of conflict management strategy.

1.7.4 Peace Agreements

Peace agreements are commitments agreed upon by more than two parties to carry out specific tasks and obligations with the ultimate goal of realizing a peaceful relationship. Peace agreements are drafted on the principle of mutual trust. It is on this basis that peace agreements are assumed to be binding in International Law.

1.7.5 Negotiation

Negotiation is the fundamental form of dispute resolution. It involves the voluntary coming together of disputants for the purpose of

[13] Michael Banks, "Four *Conceptions of Peace,*" in Michael Banks, ed., *Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations,* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books), pp. 259-269.

reaching a compromise resolution. It is a non-coersive and voluntary process that disputants seek to map out the future of their relationship. Negotiation can be a simple dyadic relationship involving two parties or a more complex multi-lateral process involving many actors.

1.7.6 Mediation

Mediation precedes peace agreements and is one of the primary methods of alternative dispute resolution. It involves the intervention of a third party mediator in the negotiation process. The mediator's role is to assist the disputing parties to communicate effectively, analyse the dispute and develop a mutually acceptable solution. A mediator has no decision-making authority but help the disputants arrive at their own decisions. Mediation is likely to lead to a successful peace agreement if the conflict has gone on for some time and the efforts of disputants have reached an impasse and neither of them is prepared to bear further costs or escalation of the dispute.

1.7.7 Ripe moments

The concept of ripe moments refers to a time-oriented approach to conflict resolution. Ripe moment is realized when disputants reach a culminating point where the costs of continuing with the conflict are higher then the cost of negotiating. Conflicting parties reach a certain stage where there is nothing in the horizon apart from the reality of continued fighting.

1.7.8 Conflict settlement

Conflict settlement forms part of the wider conflict management processes. It refers to the elimination of differences of interests either by negotiation, compromise or by an authoritative decision made by a court. Conflict settlements provide solutions to a particular problem involving differences in interests or a dispute over rights. Accordingly, a settlement does not address the causes of the conflict but it merely adjusts and regulates conflict relationships. Conflict settlement is a realist approach towards conflict management, which seeks a win-lose outcome. Peace agreement founded on power basis and bargaining is volatile and short-lived.

1.7.9 Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution refers to a relatively stable resolution of a deep-rooted conflict, which is obtained by identifying the underlying sources of a conflict. In most cases, the underlying sources of deep-rooted conflicts are the denial or frustration of fundamental human needs and values. Conflict resolution entails holistic institutional, socio-economic and political changes that allow the values and needs of all sides to be met simultaneously. Unlike conflict settlements, conflict resolution is a positive-sum outcome, which mutually satisfies the conflicting parties. Peace agreements derived from conflict resolutions take into consideration that at the bottom of every conflict, there are certain non-negotiable needs. When non-negotiable issues are identified and addressed, a win-win outcome between parties is realized.

1.7.9.1 Spoilers

Stedman[14] defines spoilers as leaders or parties who believe that peace agreements threaten their power, worldview and interests and consequently use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it. The presence of spoilers in peace agreements poses daunting challenges to their implementation. By signing a peace agreement, leaders put themselves at risk from adversaries who may take advantage of a settlement from disgruntled followers who see peace as a betrayal of key values. When spoilers succeed, the results can be catastrophic and the quest for peace in civil wars would be dangerously counterproductive

1.7.9.2 Collapsed State

State collapse means that the basic functions of the state are no longer performed. As the authoritative political institution, a collapsed state loses its legitimacy. State collapse is the breakdown of good governance, law and order.[15] Lack of state institutions and governing capacity places great demands on peace implementers. Peace implementation requires a stable and secure state with effective institutions

1.7.9.3 Wars of Secession

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[14] Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," in Michael Brown, *Nationalisation and Ethnic Conflict ed.*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 366-414.

[15] William Zartman *Collapsed States: Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority,* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), pp. 5-10.

Where Civil Wars are fought for autonomous national sovereignty, it means that negotiated settlements are more difficult to realise than in cases where warring parties share a common identity and at least a unitary future for their country. Secession-based conflicts often revert to zero-sum struggles and thus complicating implementation of peace agreements.

1.7.9.4 Cease-fire

Cease-fire is a cessation of military operations and all armed actions between belligerents. It is a brief, dynamic and irreversible process of predetermined duration, which must be observed and implemented, in strict terms and conditions of the Peace agreement. A comprehensive Cease-fire bans attack by land, sea and air, occupation of new positions, laying of mines, interference with military communications, acts of sabotage, acquisition of lethal equipment, recruitment, reinforcement and propaganda. The Cease-fire operation is comprised of four phases: as Cease-fire itself, separation of forces, concentration of forces and demobilization. The duration from Cease-fire to demobilization phase four may range from a few days to several years.

The Joint Cease-fire Commissions are usually responsible for the implementation of matters relating to the observation of Cease-fire, violations,[16] disengagement, separation, encampment

[16] Actions of violations include actions against Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, obstruction to movements, summary executions, torture, harassment, detention, execution of civilians based on their ethnic

in Assembly Areas, reintegration and issues relating to external peace support missions.

1.7.9.5 Demobilization

In Military terms, Demobilization is a process of deactivating troops while in a state of mobility in a theatre of operation. This may be achieved through the reduction of the alert state from war to peace status. Demobilization is a call back or a stand down operation. Mats Berdal[17] defines Demobilization as the formal disbanding of military formations or a process of releasing combatants from a mobilized state. This process may involve the complete disbanding of military units or their reduction in size. Long-term demobilization should include efforts to assist former combatants to reintegrate into society. Demobilization helps create an environment for confidence and security building prior to disarmament.

1.7.9.6 Disarmament

Disarmament involves the removal of the means of Civil War prosecution by keeping away weapons from combatants. It is critical that there is adequate verification of the demobilization and disarmament process to guarantee security.[18]

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origin, arming of civilians, recruitment and use of Child Soldiers, sexual violence, training and use of terrorist massacres and any other specified collateral damage.

[17] Mats R. Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilization After Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper no. 303 (London: International Institute of Security Studies, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.39.

[18] Ibid., p. 39.

1.8 Literature Review

Negotiated settlements of civil wars were a relatively rare occurrence especially during the Cold War era. As the Cold War came to an end, new trends of intra-state conflicts emerged. Prior to that period, conflict resolution was perceived as a linear process where successful negotiations analysing an irreversible reduction in conflict. Today, peace agreements are fraught with uncertainty; suspicion and issues of security dilemma dominate the conflict arena.

This study conceded that prior to the emergence of protracted civil wars, which was significantly a Cold War phenomenon, most treaties were interstate. This unfortunately did not seek to address the issues that were affecting the emerging conflict trends. Much of the conflicts today are intrastate and fortunately, this has attracted international attention either through facilitation or direct mediation. Parallel with that attention, there have been a growing number of funded projects to investigate the phenomenon of peace agreements.[19] There is ample literature in the field of peace agreements. Fen Osler Hampson[20] explains, the success and failures of peace agreements and lists the extent of international nurturance of the peace process, the ripeness of the conflict as represented by the intrinsic desire of the parties to make peace, systemic or regional power balances that favour peace and the quality of the peace agreement itself and in particular, whether

[19] For example, between 1997 and 2001, Stanford University's Centre for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and the International Peace Academy (IPA) conducted research to understand the determinants of successful peace agreement implementation in Civil Wars. Funding for the research was funded by Ford Foundation (FF) and United States Institute of Peace (USIP). For details, see, Stedman John Stedman " Introduction," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild; and et al, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements,* Centre for International Security and Cooperation (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2002), pp. 4-5.

[20] Fen Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail,* United States Institute of Peace, (Washington D.C., 1996).

the agreement includes power sharing agreements. Hampson continues to argue that the outcome of a peace agreement is linked to the quality and level of support given by third parties to the peace process especially during the implementation phase. He further argues that there must be a supportive regional and international environment.[21] Key regional actors or outside great powers must intervene directly or indirectly in the conflict either in pursuance of external actors' national interests or for the objective purpose of seeking peace and stability. The argument advanced here is that there exists a multiplicity of actors in African conflicts, which have a direct or indirect influence in the outcome of peace agreements.

Barbara Walter[22] holds another view for the success of peace agreements: He argues that, the key variable to explain successful implementation of peace agreement is a third party security guarantee. The security guarantee is an undertaking by an external actor that adversaries would be protected during the peace agreement implementation period. Walter argues that these guarantees can either be weak, moderate and strong and thus implying the seriousness of commitment for demobilization, monitoring and verification, troop deployment, demilitarisation disarmament and re-integration, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace building programmes as desired elements in peace agreement implementation.

John Stedman[23] in his article argues that peace treaties fail due to vague and expedient peace agreements, lack of co-ordination between mediators and implementers of agreements, lack of co-ordination among implementing

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[21] Ibid., p. 120.

[22] Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (summer 1997): 340.

[23] John Stedman "Barriers to Implementation of Peace Agreements," in Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothschild *Ending Civil wars: the Implementation of Peace Agreements,* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2002), pp. 8-14.

agencies, the incomplete fulfilment of mandated tasks, the short time horizon and limited commitment of implementers and the presence of spoilers who use violence to undermine implementation. Similar views are also shared by Rothchild greatly reinforcing the fragile nature of peace agreements.

The notion of conflict history as a determining factor in the outcome of peace agreement is based on the assertion that conflicts have a life and history. Accordingly, conflicts have a past and presumably some sort of future. Indeed, previous history is considered as one of the variables affecting the course and outcome of peace agreement. Deutch establishes that where past history has been of friendly relationship, the probability of a successful mediation was 80% and where the parties have had one or more previous dispute, the probability of successful mediations was 40%.[24]

The historical context of a dispute exerts a strong influence on the manner of its management and likely outcome. David Lake and Donald Rothschild argues that intense ethnic conflict is more often caused by collective fears of the past. [25] As groups begin to fear for their safety, strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them, the potential for tremendous violence. In the Sudan for example, the Southerners with strong memories of slavery and perceptions of ethnic and religious hatred were partly responsible for the conflict between the Islamic north and non-Islamic southerners. Thus, the resultant durability of peace agreements is largely dependent on the conflict history.

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[24] Deutch, M. *The Resolution of Conflict, (New* Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 23.
[25] David Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," in Michael Brown et al, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* eds., (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2001), pp. 126-159.

According to Michaels Banks, the concept of peace is important in the study of peace agreements since in its very nature, it is a volatile state of affairs and should therefore not imply its permanence.[26] The theory of peace is based upon recognition that the needs and values of people are fundamental in conflict.[27] Peace agreements must address basic needs and values of a people in order to guarantee stable peace. Accordingly, Johan Galtung supports Michael Bank's conception of peace as justice by asserting that justice or peace is denied when people are unable to attain their full potential due to limitations in the social structure imposed because of people's membership in a particular society.[28] Consequently, the instability of peace agreements is a clear manifestation of a denial of justice and tends to remain so long as the needs and values of people are not met.

The theory of peace is therefore based upon recognition that the point of departure must be the needs and values of ordinary people: What they require for physical survival and spiritual analysing, what possessions they aspire to own, what groups they belong to and what relationships they cherish.[29] These aspects give people their identity and are central to issues of peace agreements.

Peace agreements are commitments agreed upon by more than two parties to carry out specific tasks with a desired end-state of achieving peace and its implementation focuses on the narrow, relatively short-term efforts to

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[26] Michael Banks, "Four *Conceptions of Peace,*" in Michael Banks, ed., *Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations,* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books), pp. 259-269..

[27] Ibid., p. 260.

[28] Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 3. no. 5 (September 1969), pp. 167-191, Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence," in *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 27. (1991), pp. 291–305 and Makumi Mwagiru "Structural and Violent Conflict," in Makumi Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000), p. 24.

[29] Banks, "Four Conceptions of Peace," p. 267.

get warring parties to comply with their written commitments to peace.[30] Success is measured in relation to the halting of violence on self-enforcing basis as in the Mozambican case, while protracted fighting as in the Sudan conflict manifests failure. Consequently, peace agreements and the mandates of implementers contains as a minimum, a myriad of commitments ranging from protection of human rights to repatriation of refugees, holding of elections, demobilization, disarming, re-integration, post conflict peace-building and economic recovery programmes.

Negotiation precedes peace agreements and is therefore a critical forum of exchange between individuals and groups. Just like peace and conflict, negotiation and conflict are inseparable on the assumption that warring parties will reach a culmination point and see the need for negotiation. Pruitt[31] defines negotiation as a form of decision-making in which two or more parties talk with one another in an effort to resolve their opposing interests; it is a process by which a joint decision is made by two or more parties. Fischer defines negotiation as a basic means of getting what you want from others. It is back and forth communication process designed to reach an agreement. Kennedy[32] et al hold a similar definition as they define negotiation as a process for resolving conflict between two or more parties where all parties modify their demands to achieve a mutually acceptable compromise. [33]

[30] For details on the principle of mutual expectation in peace treaties, see for example, the 1966 Vienna Convention on treaties, Art. 26. In this study, treaties and peace agreements are taken to be synonymous. In International Law, treaties have been a matter between states. There has been a shift in this view as non-State actors including insurgent groups are now subjects of International Law and can therefore enter into treaties. The SPLA, FRELIMO and RENAMO are examples of entities that legally entered into peace agreements with incumbent governments.

[31] Pruitt D.G., *Negotiation Behaviour,* (New York: Academic Press, 1981), pp. 14-39.

[32] Kennedy G. and Benson J. et al., *Managing Negotiation,* (London: Hutchinson Press, 1987), pp. 45-67.

[33] Fischer R. and Ury W., *Getting To Yes,* (London: Hutchinson Press, 1981), pp. 23-39.

Drawing from the works of Kressel, Fisher and Ury, several criteria are necessary for assessing the successful outcome of peace agreements: First, the agreement should meet the legitimate interests of all sides to the extent that the parties are fully satisfied. This appears idealist but most dyadic negotiations over simple issues of interest can be agreed upon. Second, the agreement must be durable. Again, there would be no need to agree on an issue, which may not hold. The parties involved must be able to live by it. Third, the agreement must be owned by the parties and not imposed or manipulated by an external actor. Finally, the agreement must be unambiguous, complete and must be achieved within an acceptable time frame.[34]

As a form of international conflict management, mediation precedes most peace agreements. It is a form of a third party intervention into disputes, directed at assisting disputants to find a mutually acceptable settlement. It is the continuation by other means. Bercovitch defines mediation as an intermediary activity undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of issues at stake between parties.[35] He views mediation as the process by which the participants with the assistance of a neutral person systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives and reach a sensual settlement that will accommodate their needs.[36] Although mediators may operate from high or low power base, they are not accorded authoritative decision-making power but are empowered to facilitate settlement through the use of mediation process.

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[34] Ibid., p. 25.
[35] Bercovitch J., *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practise of Mediation,* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp. 11-31.
[36] Ibid., p. 13.

Mediation is a dynamic and complex social process comprising of parties into dispute and an intermediary, thus altering the dyadic structure of the conflict into a triadic one. The triadic structure means that the mediator becomes one of the parties to a conflict.[37] Since mediation is a voluntary process, it is logical to assume that a conflict will be most constructively and effectively dealt with through mediation when both parties are willing to commit themselves to the process. Hiltrop suggests that mediation is most successful when the conflicting parties request it and that a successful mediation results in cessation of violence and hence leading to peace agreements that allow each party to save face and ensure smooth implementation.[38]

Mediation is likely to occur when there has been some degree of time lapse in a conflict. William Zartman refers to a more time-oriented view of conflict resolution as ripe moments.[39] Thus, the course of the conflict itself can be an effective influence on its management and an evaluation of when and how to use carrots and sticks in conflict resolution. In the ripe moments approach, the lifecycle of the conflict including its intensification, escalation, timing points and crises is as important in determining the chances of settlement as are the various outcomes.[40]

The basic component of a ripe moment is a deadlock that keeps both parties from achieving their goals. But deadlock is not enough; it must be a particular stalemate that hurts both parties. Equally important is a previous

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[37] Folberg J. and Taylor, *Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide of Resolving Conflict without Litigation,* (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1984).

[38] Hiltrop J.M., "Mediator Behaviour and Settlement of Collective Bargaining Disputes in Britain," *Journal of Social Issues* no. 5 (London, December 1989): 83-99.

[39] Zartman, I. W. "Conflict and Resolutions: Contest, Cost and Change," in The *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (CA:* Sage Publications Inc., 1991), pp. 16-17.

[40] Ibid., pp. 23-43.

or looming catastrophe that acts as a deadline or is remembered as a warning that threatens to impose additional and unacceptable costs. A formula for resolution is merely not enough but rather the willingness for the parties. It is not easy for a third party to know precisely when the ripe moment for mediation is.[41] The practical problem with this is that the mediator may enter into a conflict that is not ripe. Mediation in such a case is not likely to succeed.[42] Peace agreements that are hastily concluded without considering the ripe moments are fragile, as the belligerents are unlikely to have realized a hurting stalemate.

The diversity of views from scholars on the success and failure of peace agreements suggest that there exists no blue print model for successful peace agreements. Each conflict has its own region-specific characteristics that may not replicate elsewhere. However, the hypothetical assumption in this study is that as long as resources and human needs are not equitably distributed, peace agreements will be inclined to fail because denial of resources and fundamental human values is an emotional enterprise of conflict resolution. Burton[43] argues that Basic Human Needs (BHNs) are held to be fundamentally non-negotiable so that a resolution and subsequent peace agreement must by definition, fulfil these needs to the satisfaction of the parties involved. Failure to fulfil these needs may result in a win-lose outcome and any peace agreement reached on such an outcome is temporary.

On a spectrum of conflict, the satisfaction of BHNs represents total satisfaction of relevant and fundamental needs and often leads to conflict resolution while partial fulfilment of needs leads to temporary compromise

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[41] Makumi Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theories, Process and Institutions of Management,* (Nairobi: Watermark Printers Kenya Ltd., 2000), pp. 50-57.
[42] Ibid., p. 53.
[43] John Burton, *Conflict: Human Needs Theory,* (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 84-109.

or settlement. Peace agreements are based on the philosophical belief that at the bottom of every conflict, there are certain needs that are not negotiable.[44] The non-fulfilment of certain needs has been linked with the collapse of peace agreements.

In an attempt to reveal how the Cold War conception of peace settlement was deficient, this study will argue that resolving the underlying issues over which a Civil War has been fought is clearly not enough to convince the combatants to accept and implement a peace agreement. The combatants must clear a much higher hurdle: Designing credible guarantees on the terms of agreement.

Peace agreements today have become more complex to resolve where issues at stake involve fundamental human values such as identity and security. These issues were hitherto not addressed and to date, no study has comprehensively addressed the question of why civil war belligerents might stay away from negotiations and return to war soon after a peace agreement has been signed. Practitioners and scholars of conflict resolution and civil wars have previously paid scant attention to the intermittent nature of peace agreements and by not looking at the contextual and qualitative aspects of peace agreements were not critically looked into. Discerning from the existing literature on peace agreements, it appears that post Cold War peace agreements have been characterized by conflicts between states where territorial disputes prevailed. During these inter-state conflicts, peace agreements did not seek to address internal (intra-state) issues but focussed on inter-state conflict. However, there has been a significant shift in the character of conflicts within state boundaries in the post cold war to more

[44] Ibid., p. 93.

complex, ethnic-oriented conflicts based on non-negotiable and fundamental human values.

The literature on the implementation of peace agreements has hitherto been written by Western scholars with a focus to case studies outside Africa. Scholars in peace agreements thus escaped the analysis of peace agreements in Africa; a continent fraught with protracting civil wars. Additionally, the available literature on peace agreements does not focus on the basic human needs aspects which are considered critical in resolving deep-rooted conflicts particularly in Africa. This study seeks to fill these gaps by analysing peace agreements in Sudan and Mozambique taking into consideration the historical and social-economic and political contexts in these two countries.

This study argues that conflicts are not confined within the territorial limits of a state but they also have an international dimension. It has therefore focused on the analysis on specific peace-agreements with reference to the conflict systems where they belong.

1.9 Theoretical Framework

In classical discourses in History, Political Science and International relations, there exists a clear distinction between war and peace. The two represent opposing ends of a spectrum around which societies exist. In between the two extremes, there exist conceptual tools for managing peace or conflict. Peace agreements are such conceptual and practical tools that are designed to manage peace and conflict. From this viewpoint, it can be argued that peace agreements are products of the interplay of peace and conflict.

In order to understand the dynamics of peace, conflict and its management, this study developed a theoretical framework from which the management of peace agreements became discernible. In the realm of armed conflict and peace studies, theories are considered as roadmaps that guide researchers in understanding complex concepts associated with conflict and peace managements. Accordingly, this study used systemic, human needs and structural theories to understand and analyse peace agreements as end products of peace and conflict management. Accordingly, these theories formed the basis of analysis in this study. The use of multiple theories should not therefore be perceived as conflictual but rather complementary and representing broad paradigms on how to study and analyse conflict and peace agreements. The causes, outcomes and effects of conflict was analysed within the framework of the following approaches:

1.9.1 The Structural Approach

Structural approach assumes the existence of social economic, political and legal structures that are potentially capable of inducing conflict. Structural approach examines relations between parties in terms of politics, economics and social status. Galtung[45] defines structural violence as existing in those conditions in which human beings are unable to realize their full potential. In conditions of structural violence there is no actor who commits direct or personal violence, but the influences against people's realization of their full potential are the basis of structural or indirect violence. For Galtung, the analysis of structural violence is that there is no actor who actually

[45] Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 3, (1969): 167-191; and Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence" *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 27 (1991) pp. 191-205.

creates the violence, and neither does it hit directly and physically at the individual.[46]

The structural approach assumes that conflict will continue to exist as long as repressive socio-economic and political structures exist. Structural violence is therefore embedded on a structure of relationships.[47] Structural approach is an interdisciplinary field of inquiry that investigates the causes and consequences of war and seeks ways through which conflict can be avoided or terminated once it begins.

Structural approach is fundamentally concerned with several issues: First, it is concerned with structural violence where overt violence is absent but in which structural factors have virtually the same compelling control over behaviour as the overt threat or use of force.[48] Second, structural violence or dominance is a potential cause of conflict and occurs when persons or a group of people are prevented by structural constraints from realizing their full capacity.[49] These may be manifested by denial of education, health, employment and racial discrimination, apartheid, cultural relativism, and religious discriminations. Although the victims of structural conflict may not realize the conflict, structural researchers assert that indeed, structural conflict exists and hurts and that a just society is one without structural violence.[50] Conflicts in the area under study were considered embedded on unjust and non-equitable legal, political, social and economic

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[46] Ibid., p. 201.
[47] Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theories, Process and Institutions of Management*, pp. 28-35.
[48] Ibid., pp. 28-35.
[49] Ibid., pp. 28-35.
[50] Ibid., pp. 28-35.

structures prior to the eruption of conflict. Success or failure of peace agreements in the area under study will be measured in relation to how these structures sought to address basic human needs.

Structural approach seeks to remove structures that breed structural violence and is thus revolutionary in nature. Finally, structural approach assumes that conflict is class oriented and is based on incompatible interests that are built in social structures, which must be dismantled. The structural approach concedes that conflict is inevitable where social, economic and political structures are designed to deny the well being of some communities. Conflicts that are based on unjust social, economic and political structures are unlikely to be resolved.[51]

Accordingly, social, economic and political structures that existed in Sudan and Mozambique were responsible for the generation of structural violence and conflict. Social structures involved disparities in access to education, security sector, economic development and denial of participatory politics, justice and constitutional making. Where structural conflict prevails, it is unlikely that peace will sustain. Consequently, peace agreements that are not tailored to specifically address certain structural deficiencies are temporary settlements rather than resolutions.

[51] Ibid., pp. 28-35.

1.9.2 The Basic Human Needs Theory

This study used the basic human needs theory as a tool to examine the relationship between fulfilment of basic human needs and the outcome of peace agreements. The existence of needs cannot be empirically measured. A need can only be inferred from observable human behaviour. John Burton makes basic human needs theory the centrepiece of a theory of conflict resolution.[52] He argues that it is important to conceptualise basic human needs and know its essential elements, how they manifest themselves and how they are identified. Through basic human needs approach we are be able to identify those needs that if denied can lead to deep rooted conflict. This theory reinforces the idea that peace agreements that do not address basic human needs are likely to collapse.[53]

While the structural approach helps in the broad analysis of conflict by looking at the social, political and economic aspects, BHN theory is fairly specific, focused and helps make sense of many interrelated phenomena and is able to predict behaviour or attitudes that are likely to occur when certain conditions are met.[54]

The existence of a need can be concluded indirectly either from the respective satisfiers that the person uses or strives for or from symptoms of frustration caused by any kind of non-satisfaction.[55] Azar demonstrates that conflicts often occur when basic human needs such

[52] John Burton, *Conflict: Human Needs Theory,* (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1990), pp. 152-173.
[53] Ibid., p. 162.
[54] Ibid., p. 162.
[55] Ibid., p. 164.

as the need for physical security and well being, community or cultural recognition, participation and control; and distributive justice are repeatedly denied, threatened, or frustrated especially over long periods of time.[56]

Mitchell[57] links the idea of causes of conflict to the existence of basic human needs in individuals, groups and communities. Only arrangements that fully satisfy BHNs can bring about any final resolution of the conflict. Burton's view on deep-rooted conflict is that protracted conflict is necessitated by the denial of basic unachievable values or frustration of BHNs. [58] Unlike interests, which can be negotiated, BHNs are high order values that are not for trading.[59] Conflict is likely to be caused by the need for identity, recognition, security of the identity group and other human values. Facilitated conflict resolution must aim at determining BHNs and assisting parties to consider what alterations in structures, institutions and policies are required to enable the fulfilment of needs.[60]

James Davies[61] concedes that violence becomes increasingly likely when any kind of basic needs, which had become routinely gratified suddenly, becomes deprived. Davies hierarchically lists seven categories

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[56] Azar E. E., *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases,* (Hampshire, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., 1990), pp. 72-89. Similar views are also variously held by Burton, Galtung, Maslow, Mitchell, Sandole, Pruitt, Rubin, Lake, Rothschild, Fisher and Sites in John Burton, *Conflict: Human Needs Theory,* (1990).

[57] Christopher Mitchell, "Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution: More Basic Questions about Basic Human Needs Theory," in John Burton, *Conflict: Human Needs Theory,* (UK: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1990), pp. 152-173.

[58] John Burton, *Resolving Deep Rooted Conflict: A handbook,* (Lantham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), pp. 73-134.

[59] Ibid., p. 84.

[60] Ibid., p. 85.

[61] James Davies "Aggression Violence," in Margaret G. Hermann ed., *Political Psychology: Contemporary Problems and Issues,* (London: Jossey Bass, 1986), pp. 35-57.

of needs as self-actualisation, esteem, aesthetic, cognitive, belongingness and love; safety and physiological needs. Davies's hierarchy suggests a distinction between more basic and less basic needs with respect to the urgency of satisfaction. [62]

Handley Cantril [63] on the other hand considers the interplay between the individual and society in terms of meeting basic needs. It is clear that a viable society must provide for survival needs, security and the achievements of satisfactions. An effective society enables individuals to develop loyalties and aspirations compatible with social values while at the same time taking account of individual differences.[64] In this sense, every social and political system is basically an experiment, which will eventually have to accommodate the fundamentals of human design.[65] We can derive general characteristics of human needs to be universal and common to all human kind across time and space.

The variety of human needs postulated by different scholars seems complex particularly when one ventures beyond the basic list of purely material needs that human beings require for their physical survival. Michael Banks[66] for example mentions three BHNs that are relevant for conflict resolution: The need for basic resources, the need for self-determination and the need for association. DeReuck[67] talks of legitimate conflict resolution and lists six basic needs that any peace

[62] Ibid., p. 43.
[63] Cantril H. "A Fresh Look at the Human Design," in Bugental J. F. T., Challenges *of Humanistic Psychology* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), pp. 14-17.
[64] Ibid., p. 9.
[65] Ibid., p. 7.
[66] Michael Banks, *Conflict in World Society,* (New York: St. Martin Press Inc., 1984) pp. 45-65.
[67] De Reuck "A Theory of Conflict Resolution by Problem Solving," in John Burton, Conflict*: Readings in Management and Resolution, (*London: Macmillan Press, 1990), pp. 183-197.

agreement must fulfil if it is to be counted as a resolution. These include the need for identity, recognition, nationality, respect, autonomy and control. Galtung on the other hand writes of security, welfare, identity and freedom needs.[68] This diverse classification of BHNs implies non availability of certain minima or maxima of needs. In other words, there is no universal list of BHNs and therefore the fulfilment of BHNs is a difficult task.[69]

However, we are confronted with the problem of hierarchy on the assumption that it is not possible to satisfy all needs at once. The issue of priority or hierarchy is thus important because conflict resolution will consider high priority needs first. If all needs are equally important, then a peace agreement must deal equally thoroughly with all relevant needs in order to achieve a long-term resolution.[70]

There is some agreement among scholars that some order of needs importance exists. John Burton[71] for example argues that individuals will pursue BHNs such as security and identity to the bitter end. Others like Oscar Nudler[72] suggest a hierarchical conception of human needs. Accordingly, Nudler lists the need for identity as the first and most fundamental need. This is followed by the need to grow and the need to transcend, from each of which arises a set of derived needs such as: shelter, affection, security, self-esteem and meaningfulness, the exact nature of which depends upon each

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[68] Johan Galtung, *Human Needs:* A *Contribution to the Current Debate* (Massachusetts: Oelgeshlager Press, 1980), pp. 130-133.
[69] Ibid., p. 130.
[70] Ibid., p. 130.
[71] Burton, *Resolving Deep Rooted Conflicts*, p. 90.
[72] Oscar Nudler, "On Conflicts and Metaphors: Toward an Extended rationality," in John Burton *Conflict Human Needs Theory*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), pp. 186-188.

individual's environment. In Nudler's hierarchy, fundamental needs are invariable but derived needs differ according to the social system to which an individual belongs.[73]

It is argued that there exists essential and peripheral needs and that conflict resolution should seek to deal with essential and core needs. Clearly, the concept of conflict resolution and settlement depends on the degree in which essential and peripheral BHNs are dealt with. It can be argued that for all BHNs, there are thresholds of analysing, below which the level of need satisfaction is insufficient to make peace agreements acceptable to conflicting parties. Burton's view is that BHNs are fundamentally non-negotiable and that the sustainability of peace agreements are largely dependent on how far basic human needs have been met.[74]

1.9.3 The Systemic Theory

Systemic theory is an approach that analyses conflict and the management of peace agreements from the premise that the durability of peace agreements is dependent on the systemic linkage with other actors at national, regional and international levels. The systemic approach is therefore a product of the process of analysing internalisation of conflict.[75] The internalisation of conflict acknowledges that conflicts previously thought of as purely internal are now international through diffusion and multiplicity of external

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[73] Ibid., p. 188.

[74] Burton, *Resolving Deep Rooted Conflict: A handbook*, p. 81.

[75] On systemic perspective in conflict, see, Mwagiru "The Idea of Conflict Systems," in Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theories, Process and Institutions of Management.* pp. 71-85.

actors.[76] The starting point in systemic theory is that emphasis is given to the whole since this has an impact greater than the sum of its parts and must therefore be taken into consideration in any empirical theory of systemic behaviour.[77]

The Systemic approach theory assumes the existence of regional, sub-regional patterns of interactions.[78] Certain things become evident when conflicts in a region are surveyed through the conceptual glasses of a conflict systems approach: First, regional interdependence accelerates conflict in time and space. It becomes a reality that a conflict erupting in country A ends up affecting country B. This is because nations exist as a system of interlocking and overlapping interactions. A conflict system therefore consists of a regional tessellation of relationships between actors and issues within the system.[79] There is an increasing external dimension in regional conflicts than ever before due to geopolitical/strategic reasons. In most cases, the external dimension of a conflict is resource driven and this aspect tends to make conflict protracted. In one sense, conflict systems are theoretical constructs imposed on geographical political and historical reality. But within the systemic theory, they have ontological status: They reflect an observable pattern of relationship that cannot be constructed merely at random. Within a conflict system, a distinctive territorial pattern of security interdependence must exist that marks off the members of a security complex from other neighbouring states. This pattern has to

[76] Ibid., p. 74.
[77] Ibid., p. 76.
[78] Ibid., p. 83.
[79] Ibid., p. 84.

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be strong enough to make the criteria for inclusion and exclusion reasonably clear.[80]

Second the systemic approach treats the role of the state as an empirical question rather than being axiomatic.[81] This means that states are not considered as the exclusive actors in the regional systems; implying that regional conflicts require a multilateral approach due to their complexity and interconnectedness. It becomes imperative that we look into conflicts as regional rather than purely intra-state phenomena.

Third, an issue like ethnic spatial distribution across borders is a complex issue today. Asiwaju[82] and others have shown that virtually every border in Africa and in particular in the areas under study, divides an ethnic community between at least two states. This is so because the carving up of African borders was essentially an imperialistic exercise rather than an ethnic mapping within borders.

A systemic approach means eventually that at some level of abstraction, generalisations can be made about regional conflict systems. Systems in these respects may occur at various levels e.g. (IGAD, ECOWAS and SADC). The argument here is that regional political economic groupings share common history, ideology and values. The study analysed conflict in the context of the greater Horn of Africa Conflict System centred on Sudan, and the Southern Africa Conflict System centred on Mozambique.

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[80] The idea of security interdependence, geographical and historical patterns is discussed in detail by Barry Buzan et al in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1998), pp. 9-15.

[81] Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theories, Process and Institutions of Management*, p. 83.

[82] For a detailed discourse on this see, for example, Asiwaju A. I., *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africans International Boundaries*, 1884-1984, (Lagos: Lagos University Press, 1984), pp. 23-27.

Systems theory serves several useful functions in conflict analysis: It takes into account the diversity of actors within a region, it blurs conventional borders and instead takes cognition of inter-state frontiers, it brings actors who share a common historical perception, concerns and a common cause for struggle.[83] It is a holistic tool of analysing regional conflicts and acknowledges that conflicts are indivisible from the whole.[84] Finally, systemic approach shifts the level of analysis from particularistic perception to a systemic perception thus according some degree of generalization.

Peter Wallensteen and Margaretta Sollenberg[85] observe that many civil wars today intersect with regional conflicts and inter-state competition. From this it would follow that the surrounding states attitude towards a peace agreement in neighbour's civil war place a key role in supporting or undermining the process of peace. Spoilers to a peace agreement for example are likely to be much stronger and more vocal if they are confident that they count on neighbouring states for sanctuary, fuel, weapons and capital.[86] Likewise, in regions where weak states have little control over borders, organised private or semi-official networks can allow neighbouring states to take advantage of such state decrepitude to support spoilers in a war- torn country.

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[83] On internal self determination, see, Michalska A., "Rights of People to Self Determination in International Law," in Twining W. Ed., *Issues of Self Determination, (*Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1991), pp. 71-90.

[84] Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theories, Process and Institutions of Management,* p. 84.

[85] Peter Wallenstein and Margaret Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements," in *Journal of Peace Research no.* 3 ((Washington D.C., fall 1997): 333-358.

[86] John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," in *International Security,* 22 no.4 (Fall 19970), pp. 32-36.

In practical terms, perceiving conflicts within a systemic perspective has important implications for conflict management. This study concedes that conflict management, which does not take into account systemic realities, is unlikely to be effective. It also means conflict management efforts, which do not engage other stakeholders within the conflict system, are unlikely to succeed or endure. This was one of the main problems that stalled the settlement of the Sudan conflict in the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement because it failed to take into account the systemic setting.[87] Similarly, the Mozambique Rome Peace Accord involved many non-state actors like the Church.

1.10 Methodology

Secondary data sources have a rich intellectual tradition in the social sciences. Accordingly, this study used primary data which included archival peace agreements. Secondary data sources included scholarly journals, unpublished thesis, and books. It used the existing peace agreements as primary sources to isolate qualitative aspects with a view to investigate the social, economic, and political structures that influenced the outcome of peace agreements in Sudan and Mozambique. No sampling or questionnaire was administered.

1.11 Chapter outline

Chapter 1: Introduction.

This chapter sets the aim and forms the introductory and theoretical basis of this study. It is the conceptual approach to the study of peace

[87] For a detailed analysis of the Sudan Conflict Mediation, see, Assefa, H., *Mediation in Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies-The Sudan Conflict*, (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1987) pp. 65- 130.

agreements. The chapter spans through the problem statement, goal and objectives of the study, justification, operational definitions, literature review, theoretical framework, methodology and research hypotheses.

Chapter 2: The Sudan Conflict and 1972 Peace Process.

Chapter two examines the historical origins of the Sudan conflict and in particular, it examines the Sudan peace process by reviewing the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement. It examines the implementation phase of the agreement in subsequent years by evaluating its success or failure.

Chapter 3: The Mozambique Conflict and 1992 Peace Process.

This chapter looks at the historical sources of the pre and post-independent conflict in Mozambique and the subsequent emergence of FRELIMO and RENAMO. It will evaluate the Mozambique Peace Agreement and ultimately seek to isolate those elements that led to its success.

Chapter 4: Critical Analysis of Sudan and Mozambique Peace Agreements.

This chapter critically analyses the existing Sudan (1972) and Mozambique (1992) Peace Agreements with a view to consolidating factors that led to success or failure of each agreement. It brings new insights in the management of peace agreements by specifically isolating structural variables that contributed to the success or failure of peace agreements in the area under study.

Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendation. This chapter presents a concluding reflection of the study and management of peace agreements. It isolates as a minimum, those elements of peace agreements that must be addressed to guarantee a sustainable and predictable peace. This chapter offers suggestions for areas of further research in the areas of Peace Agreements.

South has been manifested by the denial of quality education, health, economic development, employment, and racial discrimination in form of apartheid, cultural chauvinism and religious discrimination. With the coming of the British in 1898, the concept of two Sudans was anchored.[3] The British perceived the Southerners as inferior to the Northerners and hence warranting humanitarian intervention in form of conversion to Christianity and initiated some modern development. From the Arab and British perspectives, the Southerners were awkward, barbaric and having a Hobbesian propensity to violence and therefore they deserved to be treated as a separate entity.[4]

The other factor for consideration in the Sudan conflict is the policy of Condominium. In January 1899, an Anglo-Egyptian Agreement restored Egyptian rule in Sudan as part of a joint authority (Condominium) exercised by Britain and Egypt.[5] This was however, a political ruse[6] as Sudan became the first and only colony in Africa with divided sovereignty. The British had clearly stamped their authority in the South, which were the emergence of Southern policy and the concept of two Sudans.[7] The period of condominium forms an extremely important event in the political and economic history of Sudan. It was during the condominium years that most pressing social and economic problems were to be found. Chief among these were the problem of unequal distribution of wealth, the irregular spread of

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[3] Mansour Khalid, "Fractious Dualities and Colonial Muddle 1898-1945," in Mansour Khalid, *War and Peace in Sudan: A tale of Two Countries*, (London: Keagan Paul Limited, 2003), pp. 16-24.

[4] Ibid., p. 24.

[5] Mansour Khalid, "The Condominium: We Divide and They Rule," in Mansour Khalid, *The Government They Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan's Political Evolution*, (London: Keagan Paul International, 1990), pp. 39-64.

[6] Ruse is used here in the context of high Politics. The British Government could not have allowed Egyptian control of Southern Sudan, as the region was potentially viable for agricultural commodities like Cotton. Cotton was vital for the survival of textile industry in Britain. The South was therefore strategically important to Britain in the Economic sense. Joint administrative partnership with Egypt was necessary but ultimately to the advantage of the British.

[7] Khalid, "Fractious Dualities and Colonial Muddle 1898-1945," p. 16.

modern development throughout the country, the rise of educated elite and the problem of regional integrity.[8]

The Closed District Ordinance, which was a product of a Condominium policy introduced in the 1920s, was designed to facilitate the final abolition of the internal slave trade and more importantly to halt the spread of Islam and commerce.[9] The Closed District Ordinances also barred Northern Sudanese from entering or working in the South thus reinforcing separate development between North and South. Moreover, the British gradually replaced Arab administrators and expelled Arab merchants, thereby severing the South's last economic contacts with the North.[10]

Structural conflict between North and South had reached a threshold in 1947 when Juba Conference was the first unification and peace initiative attempt. This Conference did not achieve much but it demonstrated that the North and South were dialectical entities that needed to be united.[11]

The policy of the native administration adopted in the 1920s tended to discourage education in Southern Sudan. The Government policy needed only a few educated blacks to fill minor clerical posts in the South. Owing to the policy of absolute exclusion, the South had no access to education facilities except from the Christian missionaries, who were as a matter of policy, assigned the complete monopoly of running the school system in addition to their Christian proselitization.[12] The absolute marginalization of the South from the political administrative and economic life of the country

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[8] Ibid., p. 21.
[9] Douglas H. Johnson " British Overrule 1899-1947," in Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, The International African Institute, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2003), pp. 9-19.
[10] Ibid., p. 17.
[11] Ibid., p. 84.
[12] Ibid., p. 18.

led to early signs of political disunity. When General Ibrahim Abboud took power in 1958 he declared a state of emergency and suspended the 1956 constitution, which had granted Federal status to the South and imposed a ban on political Parties. Abboud was determined to fight the South. The military believed the South could only be tackled through Military and radical Islamization and Arabicization. In so doing, Abboud's regime adopted four radical steps in the South: Quranic Schools and Islamic Institutions were established in the South, a decree issued in the 1960 abolished Sunday as a day of worship in the South replacing it with Friday. The Missionary Societies Act compelled Missionaries to obtain licenses and banned preaching.[13] Consequently all missionaries were expelled from the South between 1960 and 1964. The granting of independence to Sudan was based on condition that the South would adopt a Federal System for the entire country, de-linking itself from Egypt.[14] The South reserved its right for self-determination, which included the option of complete independence and cessation from the North.[15]

Sudan's violent conflict began in earnest in the 1960s, though as already mentioned, its non-violent antecedents had begun with the occupation of the Sudan by the Arabs and British.[16] The issue of identity and religion clearly became the centrepiece of the current conflict in Sudan. Subsequent Governments never addressed the underlying causes of the conflict between North and South and this led to the formation of the *Anya nya I* movement.

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[13] Mansour Khalid "Betrayal of the Nation's Expectations 1956-1965," in Mansour Khalid, *War and Peace in Sudan: A Tale of Two Countries*, (London: Keagan Paul Limited, 2003), pp.84-89.
[14] Ibid., p. 85.
[15] Ibid., p. 83.
[16] Douglas H. Johnson "Nationalism, Independence and the First Civil War," in Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, The International African Institute, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2003), pp. 21-37.

On 25 May 1969, Gaafar Nimeiri came to power and immediately sought dialogue with the South.[17] The search for permanent peace was reached on 27th February 1972 through the signing of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement. This was a major milestone in the history of Sudan. Unfortunately, this peace was short-lived as in 1983, the ten-year-old peace agreement was shattered and the Civil War that is just ending erupted. For the map of Sudan, see Annex B.

This chapter seeks to give an overview historical analysis of the Sudan conflict from Turco-Egyptian period through the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Administration up to the Nimeiri's regime when the historical Addis Ababa Agreement was signed in 1972. The peace process between the Government of Sudan and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) is examined in detail. Chapter two has nine sections.

2.2 Emergence of *Anya nya I*/SSLM

The origin of Civil War in Sudan dates back to 1950s.[18] On August 1955, the Equatoria Corps, a Military Unit composed of the Southerners, mutinied at Torit.[19] Soldiers of the Equatorial Corps whose British trainers had been replaced by Northern officers feared that they would be disarmed and moved to the North.[20] There was distrust among Southern soldiers that their transfer to the North would end tragically leading to military court martial and eventually execution. Rather than surrender to Government authorities, many mutineers disappeared into hiding with their weapons,

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[17] Mansour Khalid "Nimeiri Era: From Euphoria to Dementia," in Mansour Khalid, *War and Peace in Sudan: A tale of Two Countries*, (London: Keagan Paul Limited, 2003), pp. 134-148.

[18] Assefa H., *Mediation of Civil Wars-Approaches and Strategies: The Sudan*, (London: Boulder Westview Press 1987), p. 59.

[19] Ibid., p. 60.

[20] Ibid., p. 60.

marking the beginning of the first Civil War in the Southern Sudan.[21] On the non-military front, there was widespread discontent in the South as a result of the outcome of the 1954 elections which were flawed and whose elected members underrepresented the South. The newly formed Liberal Party (LP) to which most Southern Politicians belonged contested the elections.[22] Al-Azhari's Northern Union Party (NUP) which still advocated union with Egypt also fielded some of its own candidates in the South. NUP promised Southerners full representation at all levels of civil service. Unfortunately, the Sudanization process, which favoured the Arabs, was a source of discontent in the South. The rapid increase of Northerners in the South as administrators, senior officers in the Police, Teachers in Government schools and as merchants increased Southerner's fears of Northerner's domination and colonization.[23]

The hostility of Southerners towards the Northern Arab majority violently emerged in 1955 when Southern army units mutinied in August 1955 to protest their transfer to Northern garrisons under Northern officers.[24] The rebellion's troops killed several hundred Northerners, including Government officials, army officers and merchants. The Government quickly suppressed the revolt and eventually executed seventy Southerners for sedition. This reaction failed to pacify the South as some of the mutineers escaped to Uganda, Kenya, Central African Republic and Congo (Later Zaire and DRC) and organized themselves into an armed resistance.[25] The 1955 mutiny demonstrated a widespread discontent as a result of the outcome of the 1954 elections and the Sudanization process,

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[21] Ibid., p. 60.
[22] Douglas H. Johnson "Nationalism, Independence and the First Civil War," in Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, The International African Institute, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2003), pp. 27-33.
[23] Ibid., p. 27.
[24] Ibid., p. 28.
[25] Ibid., p. 28.

which involved the domination of Government posts by Northerners.[26] Indeed, the federal status of Southern Sudan was revoked by a constitutional clause in the constitutional amendment which said 'the request by Southern members of parliament for a federal status for the South will be given due consideration by the constituent assembly'.[27] By 1958, Sudan was an Islamic theocratic state and the Southern call for a federal system of Government was subsequently outlawed. Sudan was literally plunged into a state of its first Civil War that lasted for seventeen years up to 1972 when the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed.[28] The Addis Agreement was a product of Northern Sudan appeasement strategy. The Agreement guaranteed relative peace for Southern Sudan for a decade until its abrogation[29] in 1983 leading to the current conflict.[30]

The seventeen years war between the South and North was resolved in February 1972 after the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed. The Peace Agreement guaranteed the South a regional autonomy within one united Sudan, Southern Regional Government with a High Executive Council, an independent Public Service Commission and a Southern People's Regional Assembly established at Juba in 1973.[31]

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[26] Externally, Egyptians claimed that the Northerners had frustrated a union arrangement prior to Independence and therefore instigated general dissatisfaction in the South. Internally, the Southerners became suspicious of the intent of the Northerners who opposed a federal arrangement since this was perceived as a first step towards separation. The rejection of the idea of federation by the Government galvanised and radicalised political and liberation struggles in the South. For details of the 1955 mutiny, see for example, Johnson Douglas, *The Root Causes of Sudan Civil Wars*, (Indiana University Press, 2003) pp. 27-33.

[27] The trickery of the Southern Sudan federation attempt is well covered by Abel Alier, *Too many Agreements Dishonoured*, (Lebanon: Oxford University Computing Service, 2003), pp.34-38. See also, Nyaba, P.A., *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider's View*, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers Ltd, 1977), pp. 14-23.

[28] Alier, *Too many Agreements Dishonoured*, p. 35.

[29] In Treaty Law, *abrogation* means the official ending of a law or agreement.

[30] Alier, *Too many Agreements Dishonoured*, p. 36.

[31] Assefa H., *Mediation of Civil Wars-Approaches and Strategies: The Sudan*, (London: West view Press, 1987), p. 123.

In as far as the emergence of the *Anya nya I* uprising was concerned, the repressive policies of the Government of the Sudan, particularly in 1955 and from 1962 to 1972, contributed to the uneasiness between the North and South Sudan.[32] This led to thousands of refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries. The exiles included many prominent political leaders and Southerners who ended up organizing themselves into three groups; one of which came to be known as the Sudan African National Union (SANU).[33] SANU's aim was to publicize Southern problems and to organize guerrilla attacks in order to gain independence for the South. In 1955, the Equatoria Corps, the All-Southern section of the Sudan Army stationed at Torit mutinied when they were transferred to the North.[34] The mutiny soon developed into a widespread uprising in the three Southern provinces of Equatorial, Bahr el-Ghazi and Upper Nile where 260 Northern administrators, merchants and their families were murdered.[35] The Government reacted by rushing Army units from the North and with the help of the British Royal Air Force, managed to crush the revolt. The result was the trying of the mutiny leaders; and their summary execution; many villagers were destroyed and many Southerners fled to Uganda, Kenya, Central Africa Republic and Zaire.[36]

By September 1963 several of the leaders of the scattered groups decided to merge their forces under the command of Emilio Taffeng, a former Lieutenant in the Sudan Defence Force. The new group called itself the *Anya nya I* meaning "Snake Poison." [37] It established training camps and focused on recruitment and training. Its members started to blow up bridges, block

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[32] Ibid., p. 122.
[33] Ibid .,p. 124.
[34] Ibid., p. 125.
[35] Ibid., p. 126.
[36] Mazrui A. and Tidy M., *Nationalism and New States in Africa*, (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1984) p. 195.
[37] Assefa H., *Mediation of Civil Wars –Approaches and Strategies: The Sudan op. cit.* p. 126.

roads, ambushing government troops and punishing Southerners who collaborated with the Northern administration in the South. As result, the number of refugees from the South into the neighbouring countries increased. By the end of 1964 the *Anya nya I* were 60,000 strong and had a semblance of a guerrilla force.[38]

The discontentment in the North, mainly as a result of the *Anya nya I* activities resulted in widespread demonstrations, strikes and general public unrest, and forced the toppling of the government of General Abboud in October 1964. [39] This brought into a power a new civilian Government led by Sayyed Sir Al-Khatim El-Khalifa as Prime Minister. As an appeasement strategy, he appointed Southerners Clement Mboro and Ezboni Mundari to his cabinet and immediately called for a Round Table Conference in Khartoum in March 1965 to work out a viable Peace Agreement.[40] There were four possible outcomes before the conference. These were: federation, confederation, and unconditional unity with the North or separation.[41] The South wanted those choices to be made through a referendum. The Southerners under a proposed confederal arrangement, demanded to be allowed to assume control of finance and economic planning, foreign affairs, Armed Forces and Internal Security of the region.[42] However, SANU leaders were divided over the agenda with the north. The extremists led by Uganda-based Joseph Oduho advocated for a secessionist approach and outside-the country negotiation. The moderates led by Sudan-based William Deng denounced the call for self-determination and called for a federation with the North and subsequently preferred an inside-Sudan negotiation. The problem

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[38] Assefa H., Mediation *of Civil Wars-Approaches and Strategies: The Sudan,* (*London*: West view Press, 1987), pp. 70-89.
[39] Mazrui and Tidy, *Nationalism and New States in Africa*, p. 192.
[40] Woodward P., *Sudan 1898-1989: The Unstable State*, (London: Lynne Rienner publishers Boulder, 1990), p.110.
[41] Ibid., p. 98.
[42] Ibid., p. 100.

of disunity among the Southerners was demonstrated through the formation of factional political parties such as the Beja Congress (BC) and Nuba Mountains Federation (NMF) and The Southern Front (SF) led by Clement Boro. The disunity among nationalistic parties suggested that the future of the South would finally be decided by a plebiscite and a subsequent peace agreement in the South. [43]Despite this apparent loss of unity of purpose, the Round Table Conference between the Government and the Southerners took place from 16 to 29 March 1965. Although the participants were unable to reach an agreement, the conference provided an opportunity for early negotiations while appreciating the Southern problem.[44]

The participants at the 1965 conference were divided on the issues of the South and subsequently appointed a Twelve-Man Committee to work out a constitutional and administrative format for the application of regionalism in Sudan.[45] Sentiments at the Round Table Conference (RTC) were evident about the true nature of the Arab. In the conference, the superiority of the Arab-Islamic race was echoed emphasizing that the Arabs had brought "civilization" to Sudan and that African culture was subordinate to that of the Arab.[46] These relativist remarks were misplaced since the Round Table Conference agenda was about the resolution of conflict that had pitted the North against the South since the 1950s.[47]

Within Khartoum, the rivalries and quarrels among the various parties were not abated even by the formation of Khalifa's Government. Riots and violence in the North continued and forced out Khalifas's Government on 2 June 1965. Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub's Government adopted a policy of

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[43] Ibid., p.100.
[44] Ibid., p. 104.
[45] Ibid., p. 107.
[46] Detailed accounts on these comments are found in the minutes of the Round Table Conference in 1965.
[47] Woodward, *Sudan 1898-1989: The Unstable State*, p. 112.

strict law and order. This encouraged Government troops to carry out massacres against the Southerners under the pretext of maintaining law and order. In Juba, 25 Southerners were killed while 76 were killed in Bahr-el-Ghazal at a wedding reception.[48] This was soon followed by an incident at Rumbek where soldiers allegedly shot and killed hundreds of people. It was during this period that many Southerners realized that the Government was pursuing a policy of extermination and hence stepping up the *Anya nya I* Civil War.[49]

By 1967, the different *Anya nya* groups agreed to set up a full-scale administration, the Southern Sudan Provincial Government (SSPG) with its headquarters in Yei district. Although the rallying point was unity, nonetheless, the new SSPG was characterized with tribal rivalries and was further divided and splintered.[50]

In March 1969 a splinter faction took over SSPG leadership and renamed it the Nile Provincial Government (NPG) with the purpose of fighting for complete independence and unity of the South. The *Anya nya I* was now on the verge of collapse. However, Colonel Joseph Lagu, Commander of *Anya nya I*n the Eastern Equatoria region managed to harmonize the splintered factions and established the *Anya nya I* High Command Council (AAHCC). Colonel Lagu persuaded all the splinter groups and in 1971 called a meeting of political and military leaders at which he announced the formation of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement

[48] Mazrui A. and Tidy M., *Nationalism and New States in Africa*, op. *cit.* p. 196.
[49] Ibid., 200.
[50] Ibid., p. 203.

(SSLM) and became its leader. The SSLM thus became the political arm of the *Anya nya I*.[51]

2.3 The 1965 Round Table Conference

The 1965 conference was regarded by political historians as a follow-up political activity to the stalled 1947 Juba conference that had sought unity and certain guarantees from the North. The Juba conference had demanded accelerated socio-economic development especially in education, preservation of Southern culture, the ending of exploitation and recognition of a special status for the South as an African region. These promises were not realized and as Alier puts it, "18 years following the Juba Conference, both the British and Northern Sudanese leaders' dishonoured many agreements." [52] General Abboud's policy of forced Islamization and Arabizaton of the South and its assimilation had introduced a new dimension to the South-North relations. In spite of the division in Southern leadership on matters of federation and separation, the Northern leaders expressed a desire to reach a settlement that would allow social and economic development of the South, equality of citizenships and establishment of a system of local Government.[53] However, a rider was made in the recommendations: That none of the proposals could be executed when violence in the south was going on. This was interpreted as another was of denouncing *Anya nya I* and giving the Army an uncontrolled use of military against the South.

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[51] Assefa H., *Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches And Strategies: The Sudan*, (London: E.W. Press, 1987), p. 75.

[52] For a detailed analysis on how many agreements were dishonoured since the 1947 Juba Conference, see Alier Abel, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured: Southern Sudan*, (Lebanon: Ithaca Press, Granet Publishing Ltd., 2003), pp. 34-55.

[53] Ibid., p. 42.

Although the conference failed to find a formula of ending the War, which was its aim, the following points were considered and discussed: The formation of an Economic Development Council with a subsidiary agency for the South. This was to be implemented through the reopening of irrigation schemes in the South, the appointment of Southerners to administrative posts in the Prisons, Police, Administration and Information Services.

However, there were barriers and distrust about the very idea of holding a conference between the *Anya nya I* leadership and Islamic North. During the conference, the Southern radical philosophy of Self-Determination was interpreted to mean independent Southern political entity.[54] None of Northern Political parties were ready to discuss or concede to issues of separation and federation. Subsequently, the Conference came to a deadlock in March 1965.[55] For details of the resolutions of the Round Table Conference, see Annex C.

A Twelve-man committee comprising of northerners and southerners was set up in Khartoum to study and recommend Constitutional, Administrative and Financial relations between the South and the Central Government and recommend the future date of another conference.[56] Specifically, it agreed to a number of proposals: First, it agreed on the transfer of some powers, previously exercised by the Central Government to the Southern region.[57] These included Local Government, public information, promotion of tourism, protection of forests, crops, pasture, animal husbandry, internal commerce, industry and land utilization. Second,

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[54] Ibid., p. 94.
[55] Ibid., p. 96.
[56] Alier Abel, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured: Southern Sudan*, (Lebanon: Ithaca Press, Granet Publishing Ltd., 2003), p. 47.
[57] Ibid., p.50.

the South was to preserve and develop regional languages and cultures. The issue of culture and language implied that the South was unique in terms of ethnicity, culture, religion and traditional practices.[58] Third, a regional legislative body was to be established in each of the regions, to be elected by direct secret ballot.[59] The Regional Legislative would enact regional laws, elect members of a Government and supervise the executive machinery. The head of the region would be a native from the region concerned to ensure co-coordination of work between the regional and central organs of Government.[60]

Although the twelve-man committee had exerted considerable effort to identify problems and recommend solutions for the South, many fundamental issues remained unresolved.[61] Some of these issues included the manner of selection of the regional chief executive, the number of administrative regions in the South, security arrangement, the power of the National Parliament over Regional Assembly/Legislature, culture and religion and the future constitution largely in response to an inclination from a secular to a theocratic constitution.[62] With such fundamental disagreements in the Round Table Conference, unfulfilled Twelve Man Committee proposals and the stalled National Constitutional Committee, the agenda for peace in Southern Sudan had officially collapsed. By then, *Anya nya I* was well organized as a guerrilla force and was already engaging the Sudanese government troops. For details on recommendations of the Twelve Man Committee, see Annex C.

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[58] Ibid., p.50.
[59] Ibid., p. 51.
[60] Ibid., p. 55.
[61] Ibid., p. 66.
[62] Ibid., p. 67.

2.4 Nimeiri and the South

When Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiri came to power on 25th May 1969, through a military take over, he immediately declared his intention to look for a peaceful resolution to the Southern question. Nimeiri's commitment to peace in Sudan was evident in 1969 when he publicly declared that he recognized the historical and cultural differences between the North and South and unity should be based on the recognition of those differences and promised to grant the South regional autonomy. Several factors were responsible for Nimeiri's soft stand on Southern Sudan. First, two unsuccessful coups d'etat attempts were responsible for seeking a negotiated solution to the Southern Sudan conflict. These events contributed to the willingness of Nimeiri's regime to resolve the Southern Sudan conflict. Second, the *Anya nya I* was growing stronger in the South with the external arms aid from Israel. The Israel support of the *Anya nya I* was further compounded by the fact that Nimeiri was already sympathetic to the Egyptians in their conflict with Israel.

On 9th June 1969, Nimeiri made a political declaration that would eventually reconfigure the North and South relationship. In this declaration, Nimeiri recognized the historical and cultural differences between the North and South. He asserted that future unity would be based on the recognition of those differences and promised to grant the South regional autonomy. By the end of 1971, the All African Council of Churches (AACC) and the World Council of Churches (WCC) initiated a peace process in Addis Ababa. The pre-negotiation phase of the peace process agreed to the principles of one Sudan and the possibility of a negotiated settlement. Accordingly, there existed a mutual desire for peace and restoration of mutual confidence. By

early 1972, it became apparent that the legitimate interests of the South were of a political nature and were to be achieved through a peace agreement.

2.5 The Addis Ababa negotiations

Following the preliminary negotiations, both parties to the Southern Sudan conflict agreed to nominate a team of negotiators for formal negotiations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 15th February 1972. Emperor Haile Selassie was approached and agreed to chair the official negotiations and both parties to the conflict agreed and endorsed that proposal.[63] However, on arrival in Addis Ababa, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement representatives learnt that the Emperor was not going to chair the negotiations. Apparently, the Emperor had undertaken to mediate but changed his mind and instead offered good offices for the conduct of negotiations. The dramatic refusal to mediate was based on the fear that should the Southern Sudan eventually win a substantial autonomous state, then the Eritrea secessionist insurgents in Ethiopia would also demand a similar status. That was not acceptable to the Emperor.

According to Assefa, a two-way approach was preferred during the initial stages of the negotiations.[64] Smaller working committees would formulate draft agreements jointly, while referring points of disagreement to the main committee for further discussion and negotiation until an agreement was reached. Using this methodology, the committees were able to produce a draft document isolating issues of contention and classifying them into categories of political, human rights, economic, military and security issues. This approach was considered the best way to solve a possible stalemate.

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[63] Assefa H., *Mediation of Civil Wars-Approaches and Strategies: The Sudan*, (London: West view Press, 1987), pp. 70-95.
[64] Ibid., p. 51.

One of the issues of contention was that of the military security. The question of what would happen to the Armed Forces of the *Anya nya I* after the war was a serious issue to the SSLM. The SSLM wanted its entire armed forces to be absorbed into the Sudanese Army and to remain in the South as the Southern Armed Forces in charge of the Southern Security. For obvious reasons, the Government refused to make any blanket commitment to the idea of absorbing all the *Anya nya I* fighters without knowing their exact number. This was tricky for the SSLM since they could not reveal their numerical strength to the Government prior to concluding the agreement for fear of military reprisals that could jeopardize the chances of reaching a negotiated settlement. This was a serious security dilemma and an obstacle in the negotiations. Some of the major proposals were that 150,000 peacekeepers were to be stationed in the South after the War. However, the need for UN peacekeepers was shelved, as the terms of the agreement appeared to work. Out of these, 7,500 would be from the North while the remaining 7,500 would be from *Anya nya I.* 4,500 troops from each would be absorbed into the Sudanese Armed Forces while 3,500 would be absorbed into the police and prison warders.[65]

After two months of extensive discussions, a peace agreement was eventually ready for signing. The historical breakthrough was realized on 27th February 1972; when the Government delegation led by Abel Alier (then Vice President) and representatives of the SSLM led by Joseph Lagu met and signed the Peace Agreement. The Addis Agreement was clearly a political victory of the first order for Nimeiri's Government. It restored peace to the region after seventeen years of internecine; it also gave the regime a sudden and enormous boost of popular support from many quarters as well as contributing to the stability and economic development of the South.

[65] Ibid., p. 41.

2.6 Provisions of the Addis Ababa Agreement

The 1972 agreement was soon translated into law and this became part of the Law of the land. The Southern Province Regional Self-Government Act created the Peoples Regional Assembly and High Executive Council (PRAHEC). The Act made the South a distinct and autonomous entity. The HEC was to be composed of members appointed and relieved off office by the President on recommendations of the President of the HEC. Other constitutional reforms centred on the question of religion. Not only were references to Islam as the religion of the state removed, but also the constitution recognized other religions like Christianity and other spiritual beliefs and guaranteed their followers equal treatment. The Addis Ababa Agreement also guaranteed autonomy to the Southern region comprising of Equatorial, Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile provinces.

The Regional Government had an independent budget, whose revenue was to come from local taxes, fees, natural resources such as lumbering, quarrying, and special allocations from the Central Government. As a result of an independent budget, several projects were initiated in the South. Some of these included the rehabilitation of roads, agriculture, forests, crop production and eradication of major livestock diseases.

The Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) provided for equal opportunity for education by emphasizing that all citizens resident in the Southern region were guaranteed equal opportunity of education, employment, commerce and the practice of any lawful profession. Islamic and Customary Law were recognized as the main sources of Law. All citizens were guaranteed the freedom of movement in and out of the Southern region. The Self-

Government Act empowered the Regional Assembly to legislate on the preservation of public order, internal security, efficient administration and the development of the Southern region. Other provisions included the recognition that Arabic was to be the official language for the Sudan while English was to be the principle language for the Southern region. This was a clear manifestation that the Sudanese had come to terms with their own identity; identity peculiar to them and based on a mixture of diverse cultures and ethnic backgrounds.

The Addis Ababa Agreement also provided for two technical commissions, viz: One to supervise the integration of *Anya nya I* militia forces, and the other to monitor the Cease-fire declared on the afternoon of 3 March 1972 (later named National Unity Day). The latter was to be assisted by external observers although both parties agreed to do without the foreign elements. However, the cease-fire agreement provided for cessation of military operations between the Government and *Anya nya I*. Combat forces were ordered to remain in their respective areas of operational responsibility pending the disarmament process. The cease fire agreement provided for the establishment of a joint cease fire commission for the implementation of matters relating to observation of cease fire itself, repatriation and registration of refugees and other IDPs.[66] Apart from equal representation of the Government and SSLM on the commission, the cease fire provided for inclusion from all countries bordering Southern Sudan as well as representatives of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Council of Churches (WCC), All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and The United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR). Similarly, Amnesty and Judicial arrangements provided for no

[66] In International Law, persons displaced by conflict within state boundaries do not constitute to refugees; but rather to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). IDPs become refugees when they cross international borders.

action or legal proceedings for civil or criminal acts from 18th August 1955 up to 3rd March 1972. This provision was very important as it exempted *Anya nya I* mutineers from prosecution.

2.7 Implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement

Implementation involved the putting the terms of the agreement into operation in such a way as to satisfy conflicting parties that each of them was to perform in good faith the terms provided for in the agreement. Implementation was therefore a mutual expectation. According to Assefa, the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement started on 3rd March 1972 with the ratification of the peace agreement.

First, the Government announced the formation of a joint committee to supervise the process of returning of refugees and *Anya nya I* returnees. The committee comprised of delegates from neighbouring countries, ICRC, WCC, UNHCR embarked on disarming and demobilization programmes.

Second, the Government guaranteed autonomy for a southern region into three provinces under a Regional President appointed by the National President on the recommendation of an elected Southern Regional Assembly. The Regional High Executive Council was responsible for the routine running of Government except in such areas as defence, foreign affairs, currency, finance, economic and social planning and inter-regional concerns.

Third, the Regional Peoples Assembly had initially, sixty (later one hundred) members who were popularly elected within the framework of the single party, the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) which was to be introduced in the South. Further reforms involved the appointment of Abel Alier and

Joseph Lagu as Vice President and Commander of the Sudanese Army in the Southern region respectively. Lagu's fighters comprising 6,000 troops were not regionalized but were merged into the National Army by creating units of joint Northern and Southern troops.[67]

Fourth, the implementation of the Cease-fire and the gradual integration and of the *Anya nya I* into various security branches was the most delicate process. In 1973, a joint military Commission had laid down a joint plan for integration for the next five years. By 1976, 10,603 *Anya nya I* had been absorbed in the National Army while the remaining 7,290 were resettled farmers and wage earners in Government Institutions.[68]

The Addis Ababa Agreement was viewed as an assortment of packaged compromises designed to fit the South into national politics. From Nimeiri's perspective, the agreement was a major step in promoting himself as an acclaimed leader nationally, internationally and in the South itself. It was a unique resolution to Civil War that had never been witnessed in post-colonial Africa.[69]

2.8 The Abrogation the Addis Ababa Agreement

The unmaking of the Addis Ababa Agreement had many reasons. Critical issues that were considered responsible for the abrogation included among others attempts to the Islamization of the South, conflict over oil, disparity on development, ethnicity, sources of finance, the role of the military, constitutionalism and rule of law, and the breadbasket policy.

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[67] For detailed information on this, see, Abel Alier "The Addis Agreement and the *Anya nya I* Integration," in Abel Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured in Southern Sudan*, (Lebanon: Granet Publishing Ltd, 2003), pp.141-202.

[68] Ibid., p. 145.

[69] Woodward P., *Sudan 1898-1989: The Unstable State*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1990), p. 144.

2.8.1 The Doctrine of Two Swords and the Islamization programme

The conflict between North and South is embedded in their perceptual relationship. A dialectical perception means that parties will hardly reach a consensus and usually leads to a zero-sum game.[70] In Islamic and Christian tradition, the idea of two worlds exists. Out of this thought, there exists two distinct worlds and hence territories; one of *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-harb.*[71] Dar al-Islam means a territory of peace where submission to God is observed. According to Islamic doctrine, Dar al-Islam designates all territories in which Muslim authority is recognized and its inhabitants includes Muslims who make up the *umma* (community) as well as members of the tolerated religious communities who collectively live under one Muslim sovereign.[72] There also exist dialectical opinions: *Dar al-harb* is literally a territory of war. It is continuously at war within itself, and it is in a perpetual state of conflict with *Dar al-Islam* (the Islamic state). The conflict would only end when Dar al-harb had been eradicated or converted to Dar al-Islam. Within the context of the Sudan conflict, Sudan has two dialectical worlds. Accordingly, it is a dual State geographically divided into the Muslim political order of the North and non-Muslim political order of the South.[73]

The existence of Muslim North and non-Muslim South was the

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[70] Zartman I. W., "Conflict and Resolution: Cost and Change," in Zartman I. W. ed., *Resolving Regional Conflict: International Perspectives,* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1991), pp. 11-22.

[71] The Idea of Theological Existence of two Worlds is extensively discussed by James Turner Johnson in *The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions* (*University* Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), pp. 45-66.

[72] Ibid., p. 55.

[73] The Idea of a dual society in Sudan is discussed in Mazrui Ali, *The African State as a Political Refugee in Africa Conflict Management: The US Role in Peacekeeping,* United States Institute of Peace Press, (Washington D.C., 1995), pp. 9-25.

cornerstone for the Islamization programme. Intense pressure was brought to bear on Nimeiri to undo the Addis Ababa Agreement because it had allegedly, diluted the Arab-Islamic component of the Sudanese identity and compromised national sovereignty. Hassan Turabi who was Attorney General and later senior Presidential aid had always perceived the south as a major obstacle to the creation of an Islamic state in Sudan. Some Arabs outside Sudan also shared this feeling; for example, when the whole of Africa was hailing the Addis Ababa Agreement, Libya's delegates to an OAU Summit of 1972 viewed the Accord as an alliance against Islamic faith. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood thought that the agreement had clauses against Islam.

Whatever the justification for the introduction of Shari'a laws in 1983, the imposition of Islamic law in the context of a multi-religious and multi-cultural country like Sudan proved to be an act of gross, political, social, even philosophical irresponsibility.[74] Several reasons were against Islamization programme: First, Nimeiri's adaptation of Shari'a was an example of utilitarianism where religion was used as a tool for political manoeuvres. Nimeiri had faulted by imposing an Islamic legal system on a Nation whose one third of its population was non-Muslim. In essence, this was viewed as a denial of fundamental human rights and an abuse to values of human dignity and made a mockery of religious tolerance.

Secondly, the harsh application of Muslim penal code, particularly amputations and floggings for such crimes as petty thefts,

[74] The Implications of the Introduction of Sharia Law is discussed in detail in Mansour Khalid, *The Government They Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan's Political Evolution,* (London: Keagan Paul International Limited, 1990), pp. 360-450.

was unjust and unreasonable. On a different dimension, the Judicial Sources of Law Act dealt mainly with the interpretation of legal texts by judges within the context of Islam. As a result, general legal concepts outside the specific details of Islamic law were still to be interpreted in such a manner as to meet with the requirements of Shari'a. The illustration of intolerability of Shari'a is best exemplified by the case of Taha. Taha was an aged and widely respected leader and a critic of Shari'a laws. In January 1985, he was tried sentenced and swiftly executed for apostasy and for inciting others to subvert the state.[75] The charge of apostasy was inferred through the Judicial Sources of Law Act, which had given the Judges authority to extend the formulation of criminal charges, based on the interpretation of Islamic law.

What slowly emerged was that there was a distinction between embracing Islam out of conviction and being forced into it by state officials. It was clear among the Southerners that Islam did not come to the South through missionary activity but rather through slave trade. As a result, the Southern attitude was therefore overwhelmingly rejectionist.[76] The imposition of Shari'a laws was a clear sign that the issue of identity and culture was unlikely to be resolved by negotiations. The provisions and cognisance of the 1972 Peace Agreement were clearly violated.

[75] Mansour Khalid, "Fractious Dualities and Colonial Muddle 1898-1945," in Mansour Khalid, *War and Peace in Sudan: A tale of Two Countries*, (London: Keagan Paul Limited, 2003), pp. 16-24

[76] Peter Nyot Kok., "The Lies that will not Bind: Conflict and Racial Cleavage in the Sudan," in *Arms and Daggers in the Heart of Africa (eds.)* by Anyang Nyong'o, (Nairobi: Academy Publishers, 1993), pp. 55.

2.8.2 Conflict over Oil

The discovery of oil by the US Company, Chevron in the late 1970s provided hope that the marginalized areas of the Southern Sudan would be alleviated from poverty through oil revenues. By constructing a refinery at Kotsi 500 kilometres North of Bentiu oilfield, it was clear indication that the South would remain at the periphery of economic development. Uneven development then became a cause of active conflict when the Government was seen to be perpetuating poverty in the South. Signs for structural conflict were soon to emerge. As Galtung points out, structural conflict exists in those conditions in which human beings are restricted to realize their full potential. Structural conflict can be seen as merely a stage in the evolution and development of conflict.[77] With the discovery of oil in the South, the Sudanese Government introduced the Regional Government Bill of 1980. It sought to change the borders of the Southern Region as it was laid in the Regional Self Government Act of 1972.[78] The intention was to annex the new oil discoveries. Following a Presidential decree, a new region was carved out between the North and South and named Unity Region. Unity region was home to the new oil fields.[79]

2.8.3 Disparity over development

Uneven development can be a source of conflict. Development philosophy, strategies and priorities reflected the views of the North. Location of projects and schemes became conflictual as it became clear

[77] Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," in *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 3 (1969):167-191.,
[78] Woodward P. *Sudan 1898-1989: The Unstable State,* (London: Lynne Publishers, 1990), p.161.
[79] Ibid. p. 161.

that they had more to do with the consolidation of economic hegemony rather than with economic logic or social justice. More importantly, the rural populations of the South became alienated from the State as poverty became rampant. Indeed, when the first war ended with Regional Government for the South under the 1972 Addis Agreement, development of the South was expected to be obvious. This however, was not the case despite the fact that the Addis Ababa Agreement had specified independent sources of finance in the South.

By 1983, socio-economic disparities between North and the South became a matter of political conflict. In practical terms, a decade of peace had benefited the North alone and the Southerners clearly felt cheated as illustrated by the following glaring development disparities:

First, out of the 23 major agricultural and industrial projects, started in the country after 1972, only the Jonglei Canal was located in the South. In spite of this, the Jonglei project was viewed with suspicion as it was intended to save water for Northern Sudan and Egypt while creating serious ecological problems.

Second, out of the ten major transport communication projects, only one, the Kenya-Sudan road had been given a serious commitment but again, this was shortly grounded with the onset of second Civil War in 1983. The Southern Sudan has had no road project ever since Sudan attained independence.

Third, out of seven power stations, six were located in the North. Failure to implement projects was attributed to the top-down approach to development planning that paid attention neither to the

views of the beneficiaries nor to the socio-cultural environment within which the projects were to be implemented.

On the general economic performance, Sudan was facing serious economic problems. There was a huge balance of payments deficit and the external debt had galloped from $ billion in 1978 to $8 billion in 1983.[80] In such a level of indebtness, Sudan was unable among other things to pay salaries, meet the cost of health and education. Subsequently, the provisions and terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement were forgotten and abrogated. The Government was managing a crisis, rather than implementing the Peace Agreement.

2.8.4 Ethnicity factor

Most ethnic groups, pursue their interests peacefully through established political channels. As Vesna Pesic puts it, when ethnicity is linked with acute social stratification, social uncertainty, a history of conflict and subordination, and fear of what the future might bring, it emerges as one of the major fault lines along which societies fracture.[81] Ethnic conflict is caused by the fear of the future lived through the past.[82]

From a structural and ethnic point of view, Sudan is a regionally dual society divided between the Arabized North and Christian and atheist South. Ethnically, Sudan is a plural society. It has a population

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[80] *Africa Events Journal* Vol. 12 no. 1(January 1986): 78-85.

[80] Kathleen Newland, "Ethnic Conflict and Refugees," in Michael, E., Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security,* (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 161.

[81] These remarks were made by Vesna Pesic to the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) Working Group on "The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict," (October 1, 1994), pp. 1-45.

[82] Ibid. p. 7.

of roughly twenty five million inhabitants distributed among six hundred ethnic groups with some four hundred languages and dialects and a variety of religious traditions.[83] Matters of identity, values and traditions are very sensitive to any attempt to conflict resolution. As a result, one of the barriers to the 1972 Agreement was that Nimeiri fashioned the entire country on the basis of Arab-Islam and African-Christian identity. That is why; the conflict in Sudan has been nearly a zero-sum identity conflict since the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983.[84]

As already mentioned perception plays a key role in determining whether a Peace Agreement will hold. This is so when, ideology based on class, religion or ethnic belief systems forms the basis for understanding the conflict. The parties see different worlds and often define the conflict as one between incommensurable principles.[85] Rothschild asserts that incompatibility does not rule out negotiation but says that sustainability of Peace Agreements depend on the willingness and ability of the parties to change their perceptions.[86] The Islamization programme in 1983 was therefore a clear demonstration of the Sudan Government perceiving the South as ungodly and hence incompatible with the North. Similarly the southerners with strong memories of slavery and perceptions of low status rebuked any emerging evidence of disrespect. They thus viewed the Sudanese

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[83] Ali Mazrui *"The African State as a Political Refugee in Africa Conflict Management, The US Role in Peacekeeping,"* United States Institute of Peace Press, (Washington DC:, 1995), pp. 9-25.
[84] Ibid., p. 17.
[85] Ibid., p. 19.
[86] Donald Rothschild and Alexander Groth, "Pathological Dimensions of Domestic and International Ethnicity," *Political Science Quarterly Vol.* 110, no.1 (1995): 71.

Government imposition of Shari'a law as a confirmation of their second-class status.[87]

Regional autonomy and federation were the outcomes arising from the Southerners feeling of subordination. Indeed, the clamour for political and administrative decentralization played a role in the Sudan conflict before and after the Addis Ababa Agreement. It became clear that the Khartoum Government would not tolerate an autonomous South as was hitherto provided for in the Agreement. Instead, Nimeiri who had previously been the main advocate of political accommodation with the SSLM, backtracked on his commitments and gradually began to dismantle the federal arrangement in order to placate hard-liner Muslim elements within his Government.[88] Subsequently, Nimeiri intervened in Southern elections, changed regional boundaries, re-divided the Southern region, applied Shari'a Law to non-Muslims and ultimately abrogated the Agreement itself in 1983. The revocation of concessions on autonomy heightened tensions and led to the outbreak of the civil war in May 1983.[89] However, the current comprehensive peace agreement seems to work well but it is difficult to project into the future.

2.8.5 Finance

The Addis Ababa Agreement provided that political power was to be shared with a non-Arab minority for the first time. Finances for

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[87] Khalid Mansour, "May 1969: The Compromised Revolution, Euphoria and Promise," in Khalid Mansour, *The Government they Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan's Political Revolution*, (London: Keagan Paul International, 1990), p. 291.

[88] Japheth Ratemo Getugi, *Giving Mediation a Chance: A Critique of the Peace Process in the Southern Sudan Conflict 1972-1995.*, MA Thesis at IDIS, (July 1997), p. 54.

[89] Ibid., p. 55.

the South, though provided for in Article 25 of the Addis Ababa Agreements were not to be disbursed irrespective of the fact that they were provided for by law.[90] The Ministry of Finance ignored the disbursement laws and continued controlling finance. Although the South was given the autonomy to collect funds, it however did not have institutions and structures that would have generated the required levies and taxes.[91] The South had no industrial base and foreign Governments and Multinational Corporations were unwilling to invest in the South. This state of affairs meant that the South, despite paper autonomy was dependent on the North.[92]

2.8.6 The Role of the Military

The Agreement provided that Government military units and those of the *Anya nya I* should be separate for four years but the Army command was anxious to neutralize the *Anya nya I* through absorption.[93] The rank and file of *Anya nya I* were suspicious and afraid. The *Anya nya I* soldiers who surrendered under the Peace Agreement amnesty were executed. This was a violation of the surrender terms of the cease-fire protocol. The retirement of senior officers who would have implemented the integration programme worked against the implementation of the Accord. Similarly, the Government disregarded the one-to-one ratio of Southerners to Northerners in the South and soon, Northern troops had literally

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[90] Abel Alier, *Too many Agreements Dishonoured*, (Lebanon: Oxford University Computing Service, 2003), p. 268.
[91] Ibid., p. 269.
[92] Ibid., p. 269.
[93] Khalid Mansour, *The Government they Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan's Political Revolution*, (London: Keagan Paul International, 1990), p. 148.

invaded the South.[94] The importance of the Military arm in the implementation of the Peace Agreement cannot be underestimated. It was the Military that possessed the tools for coercion. The Military had the means to determine whether the incumbent regime would remain in power or not.[95] As will be seen later, the same Military that brought Nimeiri into power saw him out of power.

2.8.7 Constitutionalism and the rule of law

According to An-Naim,[96] the notion of constitutionalism and the rule of law evolved from the need to limit the powers of Government and safeguard against arbitrary or despotic rule. In the case of Sudan, constitutionalism included not only restrictions on the powers of the state but also positive obligations on the state.[97] Constitutionalism encompassed both what the state did in order to achieve and maintain proper balance between the interests of each party in achieving social justice.[98] The rule of law was an integral part of constitutionalism, emphasizing the requirement that people must be governed by formally enacted laws and not by independent will of persons as in the case of autocratic practices of Nimeiri.[99]

Soon after Nimeiri established himself to a new base for legitimacy, he tabled the 1968 Constitution which had denied women the franchise to vote and had declared Islam the exclusive religion in

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[94] Ibid., p. 148.
[95] Ibid., p. 148 see also, Abel Alier " Security Arrangements for the Post Civil War South" in Abel Alier, *Too many Agreements Dishonoured*, (Lebanon: Oxford University Computing Service, 2003), p. 129.

[96] An-Naim A. A. "Constitutionalism and Islamization in the Sudan." *Africa Today, Vol. 36. nos. 3 and 4*, (1989), pp. 11-28.
[97] Getugi, *Giving Mediation a Chance: A Critique of the Peace Process in the Southern Sudan Conflict 1972-1995.*, p. 52.
[98] Ibid., p. 53.
[99] Ibid., p. 53.

Sudan. The 1968 constitution was the only authentic Sudanese document that was debated and agreed upon by any Constituent Assembly since 1956.[100] A few issues were removed from the 1968 constitution: First, was the issue of religion. The revised constitution recognized other religions and other aspects of spiritual beliefs and guaranteed their followers equal treatment under the revised Constitution. Second, the Constitution prohibited all sorts of religions discrimination and encouraged tolerance. Third, the new Constitution approved decentralization thus embracing the principle of power to the people (grassroots empowerment). As a result, a people's Local Government system was created. Fourth and specifically tailored for the South, the 1972 Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act was enacted. This law gave the Southern region the autonomy for Self-Governance.[101]

A universal franchise was provided for thus enabling women to vote and be represented in national Parliament (Peoples Assembly) and Local Government Councils.[102] The Assembly for example had the right to force the President to submit his policies to a referendum if in its opinion; these policies were against the public interest.[103] These Constitutional changes were short lived since by 1983, Nimeiri among other things had assailed the inviolability of the Addis Ababa Accord and finally abrogated it.[104] Nimeiri had threatened the territorial integrity of the South by dividing and annexing it. In other words, the drastic constitutional amendments were meant to assist Nimeiri

[100]Ibid., p. 54.
[101] Alier, "Security Arrangements for the Post Civil War South," p. 145.
[102] Mansour, *The Government they Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan's Political Revolution*, , pp. 275-281.
[103] Ibid., p. 277.
[104] Ibid., p. 146.

consolidate his political power and were not for genuine transformation.[105]

2.8.8 The Breadbasket Policy

The 1972 Breadbasket Policy was a strategy by the Sudan Government and Gulf States to use petro-dollar funds to invest in agriculture in order to boost food production. The combination of Arab finance, Western aid and technology and the agricultural resourcefulness of Sudan were to contribute to the production of surplus food for export. By mid 1970s, agriculture accounted for 40% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 95% of all export earnings.[106]

The Breadbasket Policy was an externally funded policy and therefore vulnerable to failure and mismanagement. Consequently, the multilateral Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID) was launched in 1977 with a ten-year investment plan to inject $6 billion into the Sudanese economy.[107] High investment projects were also undertaken to boost the economic growth of the Sudan. These included the establishment of sugar factories, manufacturing industries, irrigation schemes, mechanized farming and electrical power production.[108]

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[105] Ibid., p. 147.

[106] Statistical details on Economy and Development are contained in Basic Programmes for Agricultural Development in the Democratic Republic of the Sudan 1976-1985: Summary and Conclusion, *Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development* (AFESD), (Kuwait: 1976), p.17.

[107] Ibid., p. 8.

[108] Ibid., p. 11.

By early 1980's Sudan was facing an economic downturn: there was an over-reliance on foreign imported consumer and manufactured goods. Huge balance of payments deficit and external debts rose from $3 billion in 1978 to $8 billion in 1983.[109] According to World Bank estimates, the debt-service ratio was unsustainable and the Government spent more time appealing for debt relief and re-scheduling. The philosophy and vision for the Breadbasket Policy was to generate wealth to the entire country. However, the South was denied access to foreign funding and infrastructural development. By 1983, socio-economic disparity between the North and South was evident. The Breadbasket Policy did not benefit the South but instead, it was economically alienated finally leading to the abrogation of this Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983.[110]

2.9 Conclusion

The recently ended conflict in Sudan was essentially a political conflict but with several dimensions.[111] In Harold Lasswell's words, the Sudan conflict is a struggle about who gets What, When and How.[112] It was a conflict over access to wealth, political power and it also revolves around social-economic dimensions. The social-economic dimensions of Sudan conflict obtained from looking at the conflict as confrontation between Arab Muslim northerners and African Christian Animist Southerners.[113] It was a conflict

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[109] *Africa Events Journal*, Vol.12, no. 1. (January 1986), p. 12.
[110] Ibid,. p. 28.
[111] Ayoob Mohammed emphasizes the centrality of political conflict/security by asserting that any other security or conflict filters through the political conflict. For details, see for example, Ayoob Mohammed, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and International System*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 41-59.
[112] Harold Lasswell, *Politics: Who gets What, When and How*, (New Haven: University Press, 1932), p.14.
[113] The cleavage between the Islamic Arab North and Christian/Atheist South is variously referred to as the Concept of dualism and two swords respectively. How these relate within the context of Sudan conflict is best illustrated by David and Crocker Chester, *The African State as a Political Refugee* in *African Conflict*

of religious believes and values. Political Economists look at the Sudan conflict as War between Centre and Periphery while Historians saw the Sudan conflict as a colonial legacy of divide and rule in the days of Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule which was characterized by insulating the north from south legally and economically.

The diverse classification of Sudan conflict affirms one hypothetical assertion that the Sudan conflict has been a structural one. Historically, structural disparity between north and south traces back to the era of slave trade. The recruitment of black slaves from the South seriously increased the tension between north and south and also left the South seriously deprived of a key factor of production; human labour. Over the years, the South has been denied quality education, development, health, employment and subjected to religious hegemony and cultural chauvinism.

The policy of Condominium endorsed the concept of shared sovereignty between the Egyptians and the British. The Condominium period saw the enactment of separation laws. The Closed Ordinance of 1920 was, in humanitarian sense, designed to abolish slave trade and prevent the spread of Islam southwards but in the process, it denied development in South Sudan. The policy of absolute exclusion and marginalization of the south from the political, administration and economic life of the country led to early signs of political disunity.

Sudan's violent conflict began in 1955 after several military mutinies in the southern barracks. The mutinies, which cost many lives, were a clear

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Resolution: The US role in Peace Keeping, United States Institute of Peace, (Washington D.C.:, 1995), pp. 35-56 and James Turner Johnson *The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions,* (Pennsylvania: University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), pp.23-37.

demonstration that the South sought to politically and economically secede from the North. The issues of religions, culture and ethnic identity soon became the centrepieces of the Sudan conflict. The first Civil War in Sudan began in 1955 when Southern soldiers crossed to Ethiopia to found an organized armed resistance nicknamed *Anya nya I.* There was widespread discontent in the South as a result of the flawed 1954 elections and subsequent post-independence Sudanization process, which favoured the Arabs.[114]

By 1958, Sudan was a theocratic state under Islamic Laws and a call for federation was constitutionally outlawed. Subsequent Governments never addressed the underlying causes of Sudan conflict and this leading to the growth of *Anya nya I* and the emergence of nationalistic movements, such as the Sudan African National Union (SANU), formed in 1962. SANU's political objective was Self Determination. Behind the Philosophy of self-determination, lay the conviction that given a free choice, the South would opt for separate independence. This option currently motivates the secessionist call by the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). Sudan has had alternate Military and Civilian Governments since independence. None of these Governments attempted to resolve the Southern problem with serious commitments.

When Nimeiri came to power in May 1969, he immediately sought dialogue with the South. The search for permanent peace was achieved when Sudan's first Civil War that had lasted for seventeen years was partially resolved on 3rd March 1972 when the Addis Ababa Peace Accord was ratified by the Government of Sudan and Southern Sudan Liberation Movement

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[114] Douglas H. Johnson "Nationalism, Independence and the First Civil War," in Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, The International African Institute, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2003), pp. 27.

under Joseph Lagu. The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement guaranteed the South a regional autonomy within one united Sudan. The Agreement made the South a distinct political entity with its own High Executive Council (HEC) and Regional Assembly. The Agreement was incorporated into the new Constitution of the Sudan, promulgated in 1973. Although the ratification of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement was a major political milestone in the history of Sudan, it was a short-lived stability. By mid 1983, the ten-year old Peace Agreement was abrogated leading to the second Civil War under *Anya nya I* (now SPLA). The Nairobi Peace Agreement of 9th January, 2005 was an attempt to resolve the conflict in Sudan. Its success will depend on whether the fundamental issues demanded for in the 1972 Peace Agreement will be implemented.[115] This agreement brought together all political parties and was devoid of religious elements. It is thus expected to succeed.

[115] The Historical signing of the Nairobi Peace Agreement at Nyayo Stadium, Nairobi was witnessed on 9th January 2005.The presence of the United States Secretary of State Collin Powell and other African Heads of States was a re-affirmation that the International Community and Regional Governments are committed to Peace in Sudan.

Chapter Three

Mozambique Conflict and the 1992 Peace Agreement

3.1 Introduction

Mozambique, an ethnically and linguistically diverse nation was colonized by Portugal during the 16th and 17th centuries.[1] As a Portuguese colony, Mozambique was a major source of Slaves for European countries and their colonies in the Americas. Mozambique lies along the Indian Ocean and is bordered by Tanzania to the North, Malawi and Zambia to the Northwest, Zimbabwe to the West and Swaziland and South Africa to the Southwest.[2] Mozambique's coastline occupies about one third of the seaboard of Eastern Africa making it economically and geo-strategically important to the Southern African region. In terms of conflict analysis, Mozambique has been a member of the Southern African conflict system, which was characterized by South African destabilization and anti-ideological programmes in the 1980s.

The people of Mozambique generally speak of at least one of eight native languages, which in turn partially define their ethnicity. Mozambique's numerous ethnic sub-groups means that there are no dominant ethnic groups. Consequently, ethnicity has not been a major factor in Mozambique politics.[3] About 50% of Mozambicans follow traditional religious beliefs. Christian and Muslim comprise 30 and 20% of the population respectively.[4] Although Bantu languages are widely spoken, Portuguese is the official language. Most

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[1] Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, (London: Hurst, 1995), p. 5.
[2] Ibid., p. 6.
[3] Ibid., p. 6.
[4] Ibid., p. 7.

of the languages are Bantu in origin. In the North, are the Makonde people straddling across the common border with Tanzania and who later influenced the origins of liberation struggles in Mozambique. The Makua, the largest single linguistic group in the country dominates central Mozambique. In the extreme south, is the Shona-speaking Tonga featuring prominently in the mining industry in South Africa. Mozambique's numerous ethnic sub-groups means that there are no dominant ethnic groups. Consequently, ethnicity has not been a major factor in Mozambique politics. About 50% of Mozambicans follow traditional religious beliefs. Christian and Muslim comprise 30% and 20% of the population respectively. Although Bantu languages are widely spoken, Portuguese is the official language.[5]

Historically, the Portuguese occupied Mozambique as its colony after the Berlin Treaty of 1885. To accomplish their colonial objectives, they fought and subjugated the indigenous tribes and established frontiers in spite of British resistance.[6] In 1926, the Portuguese dictator, Antonio Salazar sought to bring the overseas colonies under Lisbon's closer economic and political control. The 1930 Colonial Control Act provided for the unification of administration in the hands of the state. Accordingly, Mozambique was given the status of a peripheral colony and made a Portuguese overseas province in 1951 with full autonomy from the Metropolis.[7] However, the sustainability of Mozambique as an autonomous colony proved expensive and by 1928, Dr. Antonio Salazar's Government discouraged foreign participation in all its colonies.[8] The status of Mozambique as an appendage of Portugal encouraged African Nationalism and after a decade of guerrilla activity, the FRELIMO was formed on 25th June 1962 in Dar-es-salaam, Tanzania largely

[5] Ibid., p. 7.
[6] Ibid., p. 8.
[7] Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, (London: Sworth Publishers, 1969), pp. 12-37.
[8] Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 11.

composed of expatriate Mozambicans headed by Eduardo Mondlane. FRELIMO was a merger of three Mozambican groups: The Malawi-based Uniao Nacionol Africana de Mocambique Independence (UNAMI) and Rhodesian-based Uniao Democratica National de Mocambique (UDENAMO) and the Tanzanian-based Makonde African National Union (MANU) modelled on both Tanzania African Union (TANU) and Kenya African National Union (KANU). Of these movements, only MANU attempted to work inside Mozambique whose supporters were shot down in 1960, in a similar incident to the South African Sharpsville.[9] This experience showed that the Portuguese were committed to using troops in civil disturbances and proved the futility of pitting unarmed peasants in demonstrations against a ruthless regime. The 1960 killings were soon followed by demonstrations at Muenda town in Northern Mozambique. The demonstrations helped to politicise and radicalise the Makonde people and therefore influencing the way FRELIMO would develop in future.[10]

On 25th September 1964, FRELIMO initiated a Guerrilla War against the Portuguese through a military action in Muenda District in Northern Mozambique. By the end of 1964, FRELIMO scored rapid successes in the North and much of Makonde area in the extreme North of Mozambique, which became FRELIMO territory.[11] In October 1966, FRELIMO's military commander Filipe Magaia was murdered and Samora Machel was appointed in his place. In the meantime, internal conflict within the political leadership of FRELIMO was emerging leading to the murder of Mondlane as FRELIMO's political leader in 1969 and eventually leading to the installation

[9] See *United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, (Department of Public Information), pp. 7-10.
[10] Thomas Henriksen H., *Revolution and Counter-Revolution: Mozambique's War of Independence 1964-1974*, (CN: Westport Greenwood, 1983), pp.111-115.
[11] Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 23.

of Samora Machel as FRELIMO's leader in May 1970.[12] After ten years of sporadic warfare and the military overthrow of Portuguese Government in Lisbon in 1974, the new Government agreed with FRELIMO on a joint rule prior to independence. This was achieved through the signing of Lusaka Accord on 7th September 1974.[13] The Accord handed over power to FRELIMO almost unconditionally. There were no elections, no referendum and nine months of interim period before independence was clearly not sufficient for a harmonious transfer of power. The transitional Government was sworn in on 20th September 1974 and all political activity other than that of FRELIMO was suppressed.[14] However, the Lusaka Accord left many matters unresolved. The position of the settlers and their property received no guarantees; no decisions were made about Portuguese assets and their compensation. Mozambique became fully independent on 25 June 1975 and FRELIMO and outlawed opposition politics. The Government nationalized land, Church properties, professional practices, insurance companies, banks and oil firms.[15]

From the time of its independence, Mozambique enjoyed few periods of peace. The new Government immediately faced external aggression from foreign countries particularly Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.[16] Internally, pockets of RENAMO consolidated itself to form an organized armed resistance. Subsequently, Civil War between FRELIMO Government and RENAMO broke out in 1976 and raged for seventeen years.[17] The War influenced by the geopolitics of the Cold War, caused untold suffering and resulted in tens of thousands of deaths, millions of refugees and massive

[12] Ibid., p. 25.
[13] Ibid., p. 27.
[14] Ibid., p. 30.
[15] Ibid., p. 34.
[16] Ibid., p. 38.
[17] *United Nations and Mozambique* 1992-1995, (Department of Public Information), pp. 7-10.

generation of IDPs.[18] Gradually, RENAMO gained de facto control of wide parts of the country. The conflict significantly destabilized the Government and drained its resources. By the late1980s it was clear that neither side was achieving an outright military victory. What emerged was therefore a complex zero-sum conflict that attracted the attention of the International Community.[19] Amid a deepening humanitarian crisis, the Government and RENAMO began efforts to resolve the stalemate through negotiations, which involved both state and non-state actors. The negotiations resulted in the drafting and signing of the General Peace Agreement in Rome on 4th October 1992.[20] The Peace Agreement was successfully sustained and implemented through the establishment of the ONUMOZ on 15th December 1992. When the last ONUMOZ elements left Mozambique on 15th January 1995, it had overseen a remarkable transformation from the ravages of Civil War to the creation of a democratic Government and the creation of a peaceful environment in which economic production could once again flourish.[21]

The commitments of the state and non-state actors to peace, along with support from the International Community were considered as key factors in helping to sustain the peace process under ONUMOZ. Subsequently, peace was realized not only in Mozambique, but also in the entire Southern African region after thirty years of bitter conflict. The post-conflict Southern African region was transformed from a fragile conflict system into a robust economic block under SADC.[22]

This chapter holistically examines the Mozambique conflict in the context of pre and post-independence Mozambique culminating into the

[18] Ibid., p. 7.
[19] Ibid., p. 11.
[20] Ibid., p. 12.
[21] Ibid., p. 12.
[22] Ibid., p. 13.

signing of the Rome Peace Agreement in October 1992. It examines various stages of the peace processes, endogenous and exogenous variables that contributed to the outcome of the Rome Peace Agreement.

3.2 Origins of FRELIMO

The opposition to colonialism obtained from ideological discontent among an educated stratum of Africans outside Mozambique and on the peasantry grievances in Mozambique. Rural discontents were not allowed legal recourse and were subjected to harsh labour laws and taxation. The massacre at Muenda in Cabo Delgado on 16 June 1960 where 600 Makonde were shot dead during a peaceful demonstration triggered a political radicalization and encouraged armed resistance.[23] The Makonde, a small ethnic group in Northern Mozambique but more numerous in Southern Tanzania, later became the backbone of FRELIMO's fighting force by forming the Makonde African Union (MANU). FRELIMO had both internal and external origins due to the demographical dispersal of the Makonde in Tanzania and Mozambique respectively.[24] Other elements of FRELIMO were formed in Malawi, southern Zimbabwe and Kenya. Accordingly, the first Mozambican nationalist parties in a modern sense were all formed in exile in the 1960s.[25]

FRELIMO was formed in 1962 with only 250 Algerian-trained recruits at Nachingwea training camp inside Mozambique. Rural-based armed hostilities were launched in September 1964.[26] FRELIMO's political mobilization concentrated on the need to overcome the Portuguese colonial

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[23] Brito Luis De, "The Formation of FRELIMO," Ph.D. diss., University of Rome, 1991.
[24] Ibid., p. 33.
[25] Ibid., p. 35.
[26] Margaret Hall and Tom Young, *Confronting the Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence*, (London; Hurst and Co., 1997), p.13.

system by focusing on sensitive issues such as alienation from ancestral land. This was preceded by an intensive guerrilla action and the establishment of bases in sparsely populated rural areas in the North, where the colonial presence and administrative network was thinner and where an early effort was made by FRELIMO to win over traditional chiefs.[27]

Between 1964 and 1968, FRELIMO operations remained confined to Northern Niassa and Cabo Delgado provinces because of the Portuguese defensive strategy of constructing fortified villages in the South. The Portuguese success in blocking FRELIMO's advance southwards was based upon the relative cooperation of the Macua ethnic group with the Portuguese against their historical rivals, the Makonde. Internal conflicts dominated FRELIMO between a Northerner Nkavadane and Southern Mondlane, which led to Mondlane's assassination in February 1969 leading to Machel's appointment as the political and military leader of FRELIMO.[28]

The plan to carry the struggle into the economically significant central Mozambique was realised in 1967 when Mondlane and Machel envisaged Tete province in the West as the bridge for expansion southwards into Manica and Sofala. FRELIMO had the advantage of surprise and foot mobility making it difficult for Portuguese Army to pin them down. On the contrary, the Portuguese counter insurgency strategy was primarily one of containment, based on a network of static garrisons or defensive units backed by mobile reaction force.[29] FRELIMO's main tactic was based on the mine warfare, hit

[27] Munslow Hewitt, *Mozambique: The Revolution and its Origins*, (London: Harlow Printers, 1983), pp. 64-77.
[28] Ibid., p. 66.
[29] Van der Waals W. S., *Portugal's War in Angola*, 1961-1974, (Rivonia: Ashanti press, 1993), pp.78-93

and run operations. For example, landmines were responsible for 50% of Portuguese casualties.[30]

In June 1974, the first negotiations took place between the Portuguese and FRELIMO. The Portuguese wanted a Cease-fire, which FRELIMO refused to grant. By April 1974, FRELIMO Guerrilla Army grew between 9,000 and 11,000 full time fighters inside Mozambique with an equivalent number training on standby.[31] In June 1974, the first negotiations took place between the Portuguese and FRELIMO. The Portuguese wanted a Cease-fire, which FRELIMO refused to grant. As a result, order begun to disintegrate throughout Mozambique. There were numerous attacks on white settlers and on Portuguese property and in August, FRELIMO belatedly called a halt to its military campaign. On 7th September 1974, after a private meeting between senior military officers and FRELIMO, the Lusaka Accord was signed allowing for the rapid and unconditional transfer of power to FRELIMO. Chissano as Prime Minister headed the transitional Government. On 25th June 1975, Mozambique was granted independence with Machel as its first African President.[32]

During its 3rd Party Congress in February 1977, FRELIMO enlisted Soviet Union support and declared itself a one party State under Marxist-Leninism as its official credo. Its appeal lay in providing a political language to account for the past and a vision for the struggle to attain that future.[33] RENAMO was founded in 1976 mainly as a challenge to FRELIMO'S

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[30] Ibid., p. 78.
[31] Ibid., p. 79.
[32] Kenneth Maxwell, *Portugal and Africa: The Last Empire*, (London: Hurst Printers, 1990), pp. 612.
[33] For a detailed analysis on Socialist Ideology in Mozambique, see Margaret Hall and Tom Young 'The Turn to Marxism,' in *Confronting the Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence*, (London; Hurst and Co., 1997), pp. 61-113.

legitimacy as a one party and a Socialist State. FRELIMO had thus lost civic legitimacy.

FRELIMO's decision to impose a radical collectivising and villagization policy alienated the population. FRELIMO was confronted with the need for a model to restructure and regenerate the economy, organize the political system and civil society. Machel organized the rural into Ujamaa-like villages and communal agricultural production.[34] FRELIMO's failure for socialist social engineering led to its being de-legitimised as a political party and a Government.[35] The revolutionary Government was quite fragile and despite its initial legitimate foundation, it could not continue achieving legitimacy, which derived from people and not merely from radical economic social programmes.[36]

3.3 Origins of RENAMO

Some observers believe that RENAMO was established in 1976 by Rhodesian (now Zimbabwe) security forces who sought to monitor the movements of Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) in Mozambique.[37] The Mozambique Communist Government was opposed to the Rhodesian Universal Declaration of Independence (RUDI), which wanted to continue ruling Zimbabwe indefinitely. Rhodesia's initial plans took the form of sponsoring a small group of rebels, dominated by disgruntled

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[34] Ujamaa as an ideology was applied by President Nyerere in Tanzania in the 1970s to model rural structures on the basis of cooperatives and collective production. This model of economic production failed in all aspects as evidenced by Nyerere's own admission before stepping down.

[35] On FRELIMO's Legitimacy assessment, see Barry Schultz, "The Heritage of Revolution and the Struggle for Governmental Legitimacy." in Mozambique in William Zartman, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), pp. 108-123.

[36] Hall and Young "The Turn to Marxism' in *Confronting the Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence*." pp. 79-85.

[37] Cole B., *The Elite: The Story of the Rhodesian Special Services*, (London: St. Martin Press, 1984), pp. 30-45, Martin D. and Johnson P., *Mozambique: To Nkomati and Beyond*, (London: New Haven, 1986), Ch.1., pp.1-17 and Flower K., *Serving Secretly*, (London: Oxford Press, 1987), pp.16-17.

Portuguese who had their property and economic activities nationalized. The Rhodesian Government helped in the creation of a rebel radio station, *Voz da Africa Live* as a propaganda and recruitment media. By 1977, the propaganda activities by rebel radio coupled with recruitment drives amongst the large black Mozambican diaspora in Lisbon and Johannesburg had already produced a steady trickle of recruits for training by the Zimbabwean Central Intelligence Organization (ZCIO).[38]

Amongst the early recruits was a former FRELIMO Commander, Andre Matsangaisa. Matsangaisa was given the leadership of the early elements of a group that came to be known as RENAMO.[39] RENAMO was considered a Rhodesian anti-FRELIMO fifth army column operating in Mozambique. It relied entirely on Rhodesian aid for survival. By late 1977, the mission of RENAMO had been defined: To sabotage, disrupt the Mozambican population and economy, recruit, train more militias to attack FRELIMO and ZANLA bases and gather intelligence for Zimbabwe. With Matsangaisa's death in 1978, RENAMO was plunged into near extinction.[40] However, its leadership was taken over by Dhlakama. Dhlakama's support derived from the Ndau speakers of Central Mozambique and from Orlando Cristina, a white Portuguese, who had become a main link with the growing South African interest in RENAMO and in destabilizing Marxist Mozambique.[41]

The South African support for Mozambican rebels against FRELIMO was not immediately forthcoming during Mozambique's independence in

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[38] Hall and Young, *Confronting the Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence*, p. 80.
[39] The title RENAMO arose from the need to portray the rebel as an autonomous group seeking political liberation. The name was chosen as *Portugalisation* of the rebels as it was also intended to serve the interests of disgruntled former Portuguese farmers and entrepreneurs who had lost their property to FRELIMO Communist Government.
[40] Hall and Young, *Confronting the Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence*, p. 90.
[41] Ibid., p. 93.

1975. An informal understanding between South African Government and the new Mozambique Government tacitly accepted that neither party should aid the other's opposition.[42] This was however, a temporary informal political and military agreement that had reversed by 1978 when there was an increased African National Congress's (ANC) installation in South Africa through Southern Mozambique.

In South Africa, Prime Minister John Vorster had embraced Organization of African Unity (OAU's) doctrine of non-interference with other states' internal affairs.[43] The policy of non-interference radically changed in late 1978 when Prime Minister P.W. Botha and General Malan came to power. A new security re-orientation emerged under the total onslaught strategy.[44] This was a national security destabilization strategy that empowered the military to execute military attacks in unfriendly neighbouring countries that were inclined to socialist ideals. In particular, the onslaught strategy represented the neutralizing of the frontline states through a series of diplomatic, economic and military policies against Mozambique. The destabilization strategy involved activities of economic sabotage, direct attacks on African National Congress bases and general destabilization through proxy warfare.[45]

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[42] Ibid., p. 94.

[43] See for example, Article III of OAU Charter, which declares that member States resolve to respect the Sovereign equality of all states, and agree not to interfere in the Interval affairs of other States and honour each State's Sovereignty and territorial integrity. The three Principles form the basis of the legitimacy of the State. This view has however been challenged by the current African Union Constitutive Act, article 4 (h) which provides for the right to intervene in a member State due to impelling security and political imperatives.

[44] Ibid., p. 95.

[45] Ibid., p. 100; see also, Alex Vines, *Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique*, Centre for Southern African Studies, (London: James Currey Ltd., 1996), pp.17-31.

By Mid 1979, South Africa was already supplying weapons to RENAMO[46]. By 1981, nearly all provinces in Mozambique were affected by insurgency. Two years later, a series of events in the political arena had brought pressure on South Africa to re-assess its strategy towards Mozambique. The growing relationships between Mozambique and United States forced South Africa to reduce its destabilization of Mozambique.[47] The rationale was that the destabilization strategy created regional instability which could have made Mozambique call for Soviet or Cuban intervention to counter the South African threat. South Africa was seen as the Central contributor to the unrest and tension in the Southern African region. After six years of military assistance to RENAMO, there was no military victory in sight for RENAMO.[48] South Africa instead decided to enter into a security dialogue with Mozambique through the Nkomati Accord on non-aggression and good neighbourliness on 16th March 1984. The Nkomati Accord was indeed, the first attempt to Peace Agreement in the Southern Africa Conflict System.[49] South Africa undertook to stop its support for RENAMO while Mozambique agreed to close down military training facilities for ANC. South Africa then proceeded to mediate the first attempt at negotiations between FRELIMO and RENAMO in Pretoria in October 1984. RENAMO made a compromise declaration that it acknowledged Samora Machel as President of Mozambique but demanded for itself, portfolios of Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Finance, Transport, and abolition of one-party State and elimination of Marxist ideology.[50] This peace attempt also collapsed with out any tangible results. While Mozambique largely stood by the commitment it had made at Nkomati, documents captured from RENAMO bases showed that South African Military was continuing to provide support

[46] Ibid., p. 101.
[47] Ibid., p. 102.
[48] Ibid., p. 103.
[49] Ibid., p. 106.
[50] Ibid., p. 106

for the movement by direct airlifts and occasional use of supply lines through Malawi. RENAMO grew rapidly in size and in military effectiveness, which enabled it to destroy the social and economic infrastructure in the countryside.[51]

Between 1980 and 1982, RENAMO's strength increased from less than 1,000 to an estimated 8,000 fighters and its operations spread from the Central Province of Manica and Sofala to Gaza and Inhabane in the South.[52] RENAMO's disruption and destruction of Mozambique's transport and supply facilities and in particular the Beira and Limpopo corridors aroused the concern of Zimbabwe and Malawi which depended on these routes for their foreign trade. In November 1982, Zimbabwe sent more than 10,000 troops to protect the Beira transport corridor.[53] A smaller contingent was sent from Tanzania to patrol the Nacala transport route in the North. Large areas of the countryside soon became dangerous for the movement of military and civilians. The spread of violent conflict disrupted agricultural production and drove many rural dwellers into principal cities of Beira and Maputo. The onset of draught between 1982 and 1984 accelerated a mounting shortage of food and claming thousands of people. Across the country, agricultural and industrial production slumped and the economy went into rapid decline.[54]

RENAMO's decision to take up armed struggle against FRELIMO regime occurred immediately after independence, the Government was characterized with repression, totalitarianism and clampdown on opposition politics. FRELIMO was an elitist and urban-oriented movement that sought

[51] Ibid., p. 107.
[52] Ibid., p. 107
[53] Ibid., p. 109.
[54] Ibid., p. 111.

to destroy traditional sections of Mozambican rural society through Marxist-Leninist social engineering.[55] The legitimacy of RENAMO's resort to armed struggle was largely inspired by ANC's manifesto No.61 which states that "The time comes in life of any nation when there remains only two choices: submit or fight. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future and freedom".[56]

3.4 International Actors in Mozambique Conflict

The International dimension of Mozambique conflict arises from the fact that both FRELIMO and RENAMO were formed in Tanzania and Rhodesia (Now Zimbabwe) respectively. Other regional actors who had influence in Mozambique conflict included Malawi, Kenya, Swaziland and Zambia. International actors included Portugal, West Germany, United States and United Kingdom.

3.4.1 Portugal

Because of its close links with Mozambique from its colonial legacy, Portugal had been a natural destination of individuals, groups and factions that opposed the Mozambique Government as well as a source of political and economic policy in pre-independent Mozambique.[57] The official RENAMO representation in Lisbon started in 1979. Lisbon remained a major politically active location outside Mozambique and South Africa. It was in Lisbon that

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[55] Ibid., p. 113.
[56] "Manifesto of *Umkhonto We Sizwe*," in *Armed Struggle: Strategy and Tactics of the African National Congress (ANC)*, (London: Oxford Printers1988), pp. 20-21.
[57] Vines, *Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique*, p. 33.

RENAMO was internationally publicised through media propaganda.[58] As a former colonizer of Mozambique, Portugal was responsible for the radicalisation of the relationship between Blacks and White Portuguese. The Imperialist Policy of development alienated the natives from their land and from achieving Political and Socio-Economic development. Harsh labour laws, taxation and assimilation strategy were responsible for the structural and violent conflict between Blacks and Whites in Mozambique.[59] The movement of migrants to natal diamond mines in South Africa from 1867 demonstrated that the Portuguese colonial Government was unable to provide high pay and sustainable employment to Mozambicans. Mozambicans sought employment in South Africa to escape poverty, which the Portuguese were unable to eradicate. Labour migration during independent Mozambique dropped significantly due to radical socialist economic programmes, which engaged nearly the entire rural and urban populations.[60]

3.4.2 United States

In the first ten years of Mozambique Independence (1975-1985), there was little need for RENAMO's support in the United States. FRELIMO's closeness to the Soviet Union and its hostile attitude towards the West meant that little aid was given to Mozambique.[61] With a deteriorating economic performance, Mozambique re-assessed its foreign policy and sought to re-orient itself by reducing its dependence on the Soviet Union and become non-aligned. With this shift in International Relations Policy, the United States State

[58] Ibid., p. 35.
[59] Ibid., p. 37.
[60] Ibid., p. 39.
[61] Ibid., pp. 42-50.

Department's relationship with Mozambique Government improved from 1983 onwards.[62] The Nkomati Non-Aggression Pact with South Africa in March 1984 was seen as a vindication of the United States Policy of Constructive Engagement in Southern Africa.[63] In addition, some analysts, mainly in the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA),[64] argued that RENAMO was emerging a winner militarily. The Mozambique Armed Forces were unable to defeat RENAMO, who had night control of much Central Mozambique. RENAMO could launch guerrilla attacks anywhere in the country with surprise and impunity including the outskirts of Maputo.[65]

Having almost achieved military parity with FRELIMO, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) argued for United States' recognition and support for RENAMO insurgency.[66] The CIA argued that RENAMO was the Mozambique equivalent of Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) in Angola, fighting for legitimacy against the repressive communist regime within Soviet ideological block.

President Reagan anti-communist doctrine enabled pre-negotiation[67] attempts in Washington between FRELIMO and RENAMO. The importance of pre-negotiation phase to the outcome

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[62] Ibid., p. 44.
[63] Ibid., p. 46.
[64] DIA was the Military Intelligence Agency of the Southern Defence Forces (SDF). It was responsible for the collection of strategic intelligence for South Africa.
[65] Ibid., p. 49.
[66] Hume Cameron, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. (1994), p.8. Hume provides a good description of FRELIMO's self inflicted problems derived from attempts to impose scientific socialism on an extremely under-developed Third World Country.
[67] Pre-negotiation phase is a preparatory part of a peace process. It involves facilitating two conflicting parties to a negotiating table. The Pre-negotiation phase captures the activities that precede around-the-table negotiations. In diplomatic negotiations, the pre-negotiation phase is the one in which all the preparations are done, agenda formulated and discussed.

of negotiations bas been demonstrated by Chan[68] in his analysis of the Lancaster House negotiations over Zimbabwe. While the United States did not play a high-profile leadership in the Mozambique Peace Process, its role was that of the persuasion by state bureaucrats and private individuals.[69]

3.4.3 Soviet Union

The Soviet Union played a passive role in Mozambique, as it feared overstretching its resources from Angola to Mozambique where South Africa had strong influence against communism.[70] In spite of low-level involvement in Mozambique conflict, the Soviet Union provided economic development blueprints based on centralized economy and radical villagization and nationalisation programmes. Its role was therefore restricted to economic advice rather than military.[71]

3.4.4 United Kingdom

Britain became an increasingly important source of aid to Mozambique in early 80s. The official visit of the Late President Machel in London in 1983 marked the beginning of an improved and increasingly serious relationship between Mozambique and British Governments. The British Government was sceptical on weather

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[68] Stephen Chan, *The Commonwealth in World Politics: A Study of International Action, 1965-1985*, (London: Lester Crook Academic Publishing, 1988), pp. 54-78.

[69] On the role of United States role in African Conflicts during the Cold War, see "Mozambique: Pieces Falling in Place Nicely," in Herman Cohen J., *Intervening in Africa: Super Power Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent*, (New York: St. Martin Press, 2000), pp.181-196.

[70] Vines, *Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique*, pp. 67-69.

[71] Ibid., p. 68.

RENAMO would defeat FRELIMO militarily and hence labelled REMANO as terrorists without vision.[72]

British involvement in Mozambique was most visible in its training of two Battalions of Mozambique Army from 1986. Overt British military assistance to Mozambique was supplemented by the use of Hall and Watts a private, weapons and Procurement Company and Defence System which had links with London-Rhodesia Company (LONRHO). LONRHO was particularly active within Mozambique since the early 1980s.[73] Its ownership of the Beira oil pipeline meant that it had a particular strategic interest in curtailing RENAMO's activities. The British private interest in Mozambique explains its lack of a comprehensive and formal Foreign Policy towards RENAMO.[74] This could be explained by the fact that RENAMO was largely seen as a surrogate of South Africa.

3.4.5 Malawi

Relations between Malawi and FRELIMO had traditionally been tense before and after Mozambique's independence. The root cause of the tense relationship lay in the fact that both parties were at the opposite extremes of the ideological spectrum.[75] Malawi was one of the conservative pro-western countries in Africa while FRELIMO was on the other hand, ideologically committed to Marxism-Leninism. During the liberation struggle for Mozambique independence, Malawi came under great pressure from Lisbon not to give large-scale assistance to

[72] Ibid., p. 50.
[73] Ibid., p.51.
[74] Ibid., p. 53.
[75] Ibid., p. 54.

FRELIMO. It was only in 1973, with mounting FRELIMO success that Malawi began to play a major role as a launch pad for FRELIMO operations into Mozambique.[76]

On the eve of Mozambican independence, the tension between Kamuzu Banda and Machel became more evident. Machel bitterly attacked Malawi for its friendship with Portugal and for supporting anti-FRELIMO groups such as the African National Union of Rhombezia[77] (UNAR). There were truths in these allegations in that, opponents of FRELIMO like Jorge Jardim (who had been Malawian Honorary Consul in Beira) and Orlando Cristina (who had helped train President Banda's Young Pioneers in the early 1970s) had fled to Malawi in the weeks after the 1974 Lisbon Coup. By 1976, tension between Banda and Machel had focused itself on a revival of support in Malawi for opposition groups to FRELIMO.[78]

Soon after independence, Malawi reversed its position on supporting anti-FRELIMO groups. Malawi realized that being a land-locked country and dependent upon Mozambique for its trade, it found illogical to pursue an anti-FRELIMO policy.[79] From 1984, rebel activity in areas adjacent to Malawi-Mozambique border became increasingly common. Malawi became the principal channel for supporting FRELIMO after the Nkomati Accord denied South African assistance to RENAMO. A 1986 summit of Frontline states to condemn Malawi assistance to RENAMO turned fateful when Machel and his ministers were killed in a mysterious aircraft crash inside South

[76] Ibid., pp. 56-57.
[77] *Rhombezia* was the Portuguese name for Rhodesia
[78] Martin D. Johnson, *Mozambique: To Nkomati and Beyond and Destructive Engagement South Africa at War*, (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986), pp. 45-59.
[79] Prior to RENAMO disruption in 1983, 60 % of Malawi's trade transited through Mozambique.

African territory. It was fairly certain that some elements in South Africa and Malawi could have been responsible for the crash, but the motivation for this crime remains obscure to date.[80] In December 1986, a joint security agreement was signed between Malawi and Mozambique. However, in 1990, with around one million Mozambique refugees in Malawi, RENAMO became increasingly unpopular and the Malawi Government was clearly seeking direct dialogue between RENAMO and FRELIMO.[81]

3.4.6 Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe as a land-locked country had a clear stake in Mozambique's Civil War. To retain a minimum of economic autonomy from apartheid South Africa, Zimbabwe depended on the railway, hard surface road and oil pipeline to Mozambican coast at Beira.[82] Because RENAMO was able to attack at will, Zimbabwe had to maintain an expeditionary force of 7,000 troops to defend its vital transportation interests.[83] This was an extremely expensive undertaking, in both budgetary and human resources. Zimbabwe wanted the war to end as soon as possible and therefore, urged FRELIMO regime to prevail upon RENAMO, which was seen as a puppet of apartheid South Africa. The legal basis for Zimbabwean military involvement in Mozambique was the 1981 Zimbabwe-Mozambique Defence Agreement that authorized the deployment of expeditionary troops to safeguard the Beira Corridor.[84]

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[80] "Samora: Why he died," *Mozambique News Agency*, (Maputo), 1986 see also, Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, (London: Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd., 1997), p. 569.
[81] Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 108.
[82] Ibid., p. 99.
[83] Vines, *RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique*, pp. 61-65.
[84] Ibid., p 65.

RENAMO aimed to increase domestic pressure within Zimbabwe for disengagement from the war in Mozambique. After a long and draining liberation struggle, Zimbabweans felt unenthusiastic about being committed to a seemingly endless struggle in Mozambique.[85] With increasing military operational cost and a growing domestic desire to find a negotiated settlement, conditions for negotiations were ripe from 1989 onwards. That also coincided with Zimbabwean military withdrawal from Mozambique in the same period with President Robert Mugabe accepting a mediator role in the RENAMO-FRELIMO conflict.

3.4.7 South Africa

A few days before Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, two South African Dakota aircraft flew RENAMO combatants to South Africa and established a base at Phalaborwa in Northern Transvaal to avoid embarrassing the Zimbabwean Government on RENAMO support.[86] In 1981, a better-equipped and trained RENAMO was sent back to Mozambique to wage war against FRELIMO. South Africans takeover of RENAMO also underscored the onset of Pretoria's new Regional Policy of Destabilization.[87] RENAMO thus became under the service of a foreign master with an interest in the destabilization of Mozambique.

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[85] Ibid., p. 66.

[86] David Hoile, *Mozambique: Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment*, Mozambique Institute, (London: Claridge Press, 1994), p.158.

[87] Ibid., p. 159.

With Samora Machel declaring in 1977 a Marxist-Leninist ideology as an official path for Mozambique, a new regional strategy was inevitable. Consequently, Mozambique was perceived as a communist black regime that would be antagonistic to South Africa. The strategy code-named Total Strategy was a realist response to what was perceived as Soviet's total onslaught in the region.[88] The strategy included political, economic and military measures to prompt Regional States into political and economic collaboration with South Africa. Meanwhile the rise of the former Defence Minister, P.W. Botha to Prime Minister in 1978, Total Strategy became the official policy.[89] The formation of South Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in the 1980 was also seen as a threat to South Africa as SADCC's aim was to reduce economic dependence on South Africa; as Southern Africa's exclusive regional hegemony.

Mozambique soon became a frontline State for three reasons: First, it supported ANC activity and allowed the Movement to infiltrate South Africa. Second, there was an anti-FRELIMO guerrilla Movement in the name of RENAMO, which would be used against the Communist regime to achieve concessions. Third, Mozambique was assigned a key role in the SADCC, serving as the nerve centre for transport and telecommunications. Mozambique ports were central to any strategy of development when it came to hinterland States such as

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[88] Realism is a paradigm in International Relations that accord a State, as a Sovereign entity, the ultimate decision making status in matters of National Security. Its proponent, Hans Morgenthau in *Politics Among Nations* emphasizes political power as the basis of realism. In the context of realism, South Africa perceived real threat from Communist Mozambique by supporting RENAMO. On South Africa's total destabilization strategy in Mozambique, see, Vines, *RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique*, p. 17-18; and Margaret Hall and Tom Young, *Confronting the Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence*, (London; Hurst and Co., 1997), p.124-130.

[89] Vines, *RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique*, p. 18-19.

Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi.[90] With that reality in mind, Railways and Ports that linked SADCC countries to the outside world and not under South African control had to be put out of action. This was effectively accomplished when the railway to Beira and Lobito were destroyed by sabotage in the early 1980s by South African Government.[91]

South African continued to train and supply arms to RENAMO until Fredrick De Klerk was elected President of South Africa in 1989 and initiated negotiations with ANC for majority rule that South Africa stopped arming RENAMO.

3.5 The Role of the Church in Mozambique Conflict

The first Christians to reach Mozambique were Roman Catholics chaplains who accompanied Vasco da Gama's expedition on his way to India in 1498.[92] Christianity was never deeply rooted in Mozambique due to hostility by local tribesmen. However, intense and extensive evangelisation began in Mozambique in 1940's when Portugal's Government under Salazar, signed a Missionary Agreement with the Holy See (Vatican) to establish the first dioceses in Mozambique.[93] Finding Portuguese Catholic Missionaries for service in Africa was practically difficult. The Agreement was therefore an attempt by the Vatican to improve the situation. Catholicism was therefore considered the official policy instrument for civilizing Mozambicans.[94] The

[90] *New York Times*, (December 17, 1989), pp. 24.
[91] For SADCC and the Policy of Destabilization, see "SADCC After Nkomati," *Africa Affairs*, (Pretoria, 1985): 163-181.
[92] Hizkias Assefa and George Wachira, eds., *Peacemaking and Democratization in Africa: Theoretical Perspectives and Church Initiatives*, (Nairobi: East Africa Educational Publishers Ltd., 1996), p. 194.
[93] Ibid., p.194.
[94] Ibid., p 195.

Missionary Accord also provided for the building of Primary Schools, Churches and Seminaries throughout the colony.

In a different dimension, religion added a psychological dimension to RENAMO-FRELIMO conflict. Religion confers identity in a group whether Christian, Muslim or Traditional, it offers explanations for its fate and socio-political programmes.[95] In Mozambique, religion offered hope and a certain measure of security to majority of RENAMO followers. FRELIMO perceived RENAMO with suspicion for clandestine operations. Religion was therefore a determining factor in the relationship between FRELIMO and RENAMO.[96]

Christianity is the professed faith of about 30 per cent of Mozambique population while 20 and 50 percent represent Muslim and indigenous beliefs respectively.[97] During the colonial rule, the only opportunity for blacks to receive education was through being a Christian. This encouraged early African interest in Christianity as well as producing an educated black group. Catholic-educated Mozambicans formed the core of several prolonged struggles against repression.

At independence, Mozambique Government became suspicious of the Catholic Church because of its association with the colonial order during the liberation struggle. The FRELIMO Government criticized Catholic followers as RENAMO collaborators, expelled missionaries and revoked religious freedom and hence making dialogue between the Church and State almost impossible. However, the Pope's visit to Mozambique in 1988 was a major milestone in recognizing RENAMO as a legitimate liberation

[95] Ibid., p. 198.
[96] Vines, *RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique*, pp. 102-110.
[97] Ibid., p. 102.

movement.[98] Thereafter, RENAMO continued to use religion as an instrument for which it could obtain legitimacy and support. On the hand, Protestantism played a passive role in the liberation struggle in Mozambique. However, it remained numerically dominant in the South, the domicile of FRELIMO political elite. The Protestant Churches remained pro-FRELIMO and occasionally denounced RENAMO.[99]

In spite of differences between the Catholic and Protestants in their perception about liberation, the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) promoted unity and cooperation among Mozambique Churches. The CCM played a catalytic role in the negotiations that led to the formal termination of Civil War in 1992.[100] From the day the Nkomati Accord was signed, President Machel allowed the CCM to enter into dialogue with FRELIMO to bolster harmony between the Church and State. Machel's successor, Chissano, reconfirmed the CCM's ability to mediate for a settlement in 1987 in the Mozambique conflict.[101] The Church was a strategic instrument because in FRELIMO's view, using a non-political organization like the Church reinforced the Government's refusal to recognize RENAMO as a political equal.[102]

In 1988, Santo Egidio and Archbishop Goncalves of Beira undertook the first community and Church-led peace initiative. Santo Egidio was a lay Catholic order established in 1968, and which had good contacts with left-wing circles in Italian politics and in the Third World countries. Santo

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[98] Ibid., p.104.
[99] Ibid., p. 106.
[100] On the role of the Church in Mozambique conflict mediation, see Sengulane and Goncalves, "The Demands of God's Faithfulness: A Case Study of Peace Making in Mozambique," in Assefa and Wachira, *Peace Making and Democratisation in Africa: Theoretical Perspectives and Church Initiatives*, pp. 192-205.
[101] On the role of the Church in seeking Peaceful Settlement in Mozambique Conflict, see Vines, *Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique*, pp.103-119.
[102] Ibid., p. 104.

Egidio's involvement in Mozambique dated back to early 1980s when it proved instrumental in arranging several meetings with Italian Communist Party (ICP) and the Mozambican Catholic hierarchy.[103] The aim of the Catholic Church was to persuade the ICP to use its influence over FRELIMO in the hope of getting the Maputo regime to relent in its persecution of the Catholic Church and ultimately return expropriated Church property. The role played by Santo Egidio was complementary to the Catholic Church's repeated calls for peace.[104]

3.6 The initial State-led search for peace

On 16th March 1984, the Mozambican Government made an unsuccessful bid for peace. At the border town of Nkomati, President Machel signed the Nkomati Accord on Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness with South African Prime Minister Botha. In essence, South Africa agreed to terminate its support for RENAMO in return for Mozambique ceasing its support for the ANC.[105]

Complying with the March Agreement, FRELIMO expelled most of the ANC operatives active in Maputo, allowing only ten ANC diplomatic representatives to remain behind. However, by May, it became apparent that RENAMO was still active. The rebels apparently stepped up their operations. Documents captured from RENAMO base at Cana Banana (RENAMO headquarters) by a joint Mozambique-Zimbabwean Military offensive revealed that South Africa's military continued to support

[103] Ibid., p. 105.
[104] Ibid., p. 128.
[105] William Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Africa*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994), p. 184-188.

RENAMO through airlifts, logistical supplies and secure radio communication equipment.[106]

The South African Government for its part denied continued official support for RENAMO and maintained that all it could do was offer an attempt at mediation between the two conflicting parties. Negotiations were eventually initiated between the Mozambican regime and the rebel forces under South African Mediation.[107] FRELIMO demanded a cease-fire before political discussions were dealt with. RENAMO demanded an end to the one-party Marxist-Leninist form of Government. The talks culminated into Pretoria declaration, which provided recognition for the President of the Mozambique and an agreement to a cease-fire. The agreement collapsed with the last minute withdrawal by RENAMO from the talks. RENAMO's own explanation for the failure of the Nkomati rested on FRELIMO's refusal to discuss political issues before agreeing to a cease-fire[108].

RENAMO intensified its military campaign, provisioning itself from local population and replenishing its arms with weaponry captured from Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM). By 1985, RENAMO had opened new fronts in Tete and Zambezia provinces. Mozambique's hard pressed Armed Forces had to rely on the support of Tanzania and Zimbabwean troops in its defensive campaigns in Zambezia, Manica and Sofala provinces.[109] Zimbabwe's Armed Forces, originally deployed to protect the Beira Corridor, were now drawn directly into the escalating Civil War in Mozambique. In August 1985, a joint FAM and Zimbabwean Force conducted a major operation to capture RENAMO's headquarters in

[106] Ibid., p. 185.
[107] Ibid., p. 186.
[108] Ibid., p. 188.
[109] Hall and Young 'The Turn to Marxism,' in *Confronting the Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence*, p. 146.

Gorongosa District in Sofala Province.[110] The RENAMO headquarters changed hands several times in the months that followed confirming the military prowess of RENAMO. On October 1986, Mozambique suffered a major setback when Machel died in an air crash on his way back from a regional summit in Zambia. Chissano, the then Foreign Affairs Minister was appointed President in November.[111]

The conflict in Mozambique reached its peak in 1987 when RENAMO made military gains in Tete, Nampula and Niassa provinces and undertook military operations further south. An attack on the town of Homoine, Inhabane Province on 18th July 1987 killed 400 people.[112] Later in the same year, there were massacres at Manjacaze in Gaza province. By this time, the war had devastated the Mozambican economy and the country had become increasingly dependent on foreign assistance. At this juncture, the Government decided to undertake far reaching economic reforms, abandoning its former Marxist philosophy in favour of political liberalization and a more market-oriented approach. By 1990, the principles of multi-party system and other political reforms had been enshrined in a new Constitution. The Government's reform programmes helped to win further financial and political support from western Governments and kept RENAMO politically isolated. With no resources available, the Government was unable to impose a military solution to the conflict. RENAMO, too, did not have the sustained military capability for an outright military win. With a military stalemate, the possibility of a political solution gradually gained strength.

[110] Ibid., p.145.
[111] Ibid., p. 147.
[112] *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, Department of Public Information, (New York, 1995), p. 11.

Ripe moments for conflict resolution were emerging.[113] By 1987, both RENAMO and FRELIMO had realized that continued fighting could only lead to unacceptable cost and mutual losses.[114]

3.7 The Nairobi Peace Talks

By 1984, the Mozambican Government had recognized that RENAMO's 20,000 strong rebel force could not be defeated by military means alone. Machel's decision to sign the Nkomati Accord was a reflection of such thinking.[115] Although that Agreement finally collapsed, the Mozambican government continued to pursue a dual strategy of military and diplomatic initiatives, which involved top military and State diplomats.[116]

The State thus exercised Track One diplomacy in search for peace.[117] In May and October 1988, The Mozambique Christian Council (CCM) and Catholic representatives made contact with Kenyan Government seeking assistance and facilities for holding a meeting between churchmen and RENAMO. This request was swiftly granted owing to President Moi's willingness to mediate.[118] The compositon of the mediating team comprised of church leaders, FRELIMO ministers and RENAMO representatives.

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[113] The concept of Ripe Moments is discussed in William Zartman I., "Conflict and Resolution: Cost and Change," in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, (CA: Sage Publications, Inc.1991), p.16.

[114] *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, pp. 11-12.

[115] Ibid., p. 10.

[116] Ibid., p. 11.

[117] In the realm of Diplomacy and International Law, State-led efforts to solve political solutions are referred as Track One Diplomacy. As main actors in International Politics, States and International Organizations apply Track One approach to Conflict Management. Where non-State actors such as individuals and private Organizations are involved, the approach is referred to as Track Two Diplomacy. The Mozambique peace process involved both Track One (State) and Track Two Mozambique Christian Council (CCM) and the Community of Sant Egidio in Italy as non-state actors. On Track One and Track Two Conflict Management, see, for example, Makumi Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, (Water-Mark Printers Ltd., 2000),Chapters 11-12.

[118] Vines, *Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique*, pp.124-128.

Consequently, a church-led peace and reconciliation commission to spearhead to RENAMO-FRELIMO talks was launched. Serious Peace talks were held between 8th and 14th August 1989 where FRELIMO issued its 12-point peace agenda while RENAMO gave its 16-point agenda. Issues such as the withdrawal of Zimbabwean and Tanzanian troops were to be agreed upon. RENAMO was also prepared to drop its outright demands for multi-party elections by conceding instead, the adoption of a principle sanctifying people's right of suffrage and cessation of armed struggle.[119] This was a conciliatory gesture to FRELIMO Government. However, the first round of talks stalled with no immediate solution. President Mugabe subsequently flew to Nairobi to join Moi in a desperate attempt to break a stalemate and revive dialogue. The outcome heralded a new stage in the peace process. The two Presidents proposed direct talks between Mozambique Government and RENAMO. Dhlakama welcomed the direct talk proposal by relaxing his demands for immediate adoption of multi partyism and the treatment of RENAMO and FRELIMO as political equals.[120]

As the Nairobi meeting and subsequent Malawi direct talks stalled, the search for common ground between the two parties showed that while both had a strong commitment for peace, they remained highly distrustful of the other and did not accept the others claim to legitimacy.[121] For negotiations to begin again, it became essential to identify neutral and mutually acceptable mediators for peace talks. Lack of impartial mediators and a suitable venue prompted the Italian Religious Community of Sant Egidio[122] to offer Rome as an alternative venue while volunteering itself as a track two mediator.[123]

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[119] Ibid., p. 125.
[120] Ibid., p. 128.
[121] *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995, op. cit.*, p. 15.
[122] The Community of Sant Egidio was founded in Italy in the 1960s to express the social concerns of Catholic followers. It is present in 20 countries and has a worldwide membership of 15,000 composed entirely by volunteers who provide various social services in the community as well as engaging in

3.8 Rome Peace Talks

Following the failure of second peace talks in Malawi, it became clear that Zimbabwe and Kenya had failed as mediators. The Community of Santo Egidio took over the mediation as a neutral non-state actor.[124] The first direct talks between FRELIMO and RENAMO took place from 8th to 10th July 1990. The talks resulted in the adoption of a Joint Communiqué with both sides agreeing to a cease-fire. Although the Communiqué was little more than a statement of intent to start negotiations, the European Community and United States considered it an achievement that was immediately welcomed.[125] By November 1990, the two sides had agreed on Mario Raffaeli, Professor Andrea Riccardi, Don Zuppi and Archishop Jaime Goncalves of Mozambique as their official mediators. The Santo Egidio hosted 12 rounds of peace talks in Rome resulting in seven key protocols. Soon after the opening of formal talks, a partial cease-fire was agreed on 1st December 1990.[126] Under its terms, RENAMO would cease its attacks on the Beira and Limpopo transport corridors in return for an agreement by the Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique to confine their operations to those routes. While this Partial Cease-fire Agreement did not address the conflict, it sought to protect the highly vulnerable transport corridors. The guarantee of access to the corridors was important because it guaranteed delivery of humanitarian relief during 1991/1992 droughts. The agreement also established the precedent of a Joint Verification Commission to monitor the cease-fire.[127]

International Mediation. Its President, Andre Riccardi is Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Rome's La Sapienza University.

[123] On Track One and Track Two mediation, see, Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theories, Process and Institutions of Management*, pp. 120-141.

[124] Hoile, *Mozambique: Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment*, Mozambique Institute, , pp. 75-98.

[125] Ibid., pp. 80- 83.

[126] Ibid., p. 87.

[127] Ibid., p. 90.

The partial cease-fire was however not successful as RENAMO continued to attack transport corridors while Zimbabweans continued operating in Mozambique territory. During 1991, progress towards a more substantial Peace Agreement was slowed by RENAMO's refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the Government.[128] An agenda for full peace negotiations was eventually agreed upon on 28th May 1991 specifying six critical areas requiring agreement: The law on Political Parties, Electoral System, Military Issues, Guarantees, a Cease-fire and a Donors Conference. However, the issue of legitimacy continued to prevent any progress on these issues until agreement was reached at the eighth round of talks on Protocol I which dwelt on the basic principles requiring a commitment to dialogue and collaboration as the only means of achieving a lasting peace for all Mozambicans.[129]

Building on the basic principles in Protocol I, the mediators pursued the formulation of a full Peace Agreement consisting of seven protocols as follows:

3.9 Provisions for the General Peace Agreement

Provisions for the General Peace Agreement are extracted from the actual Peace Agreement which was signed in Rome on 4 October 1992. The peace agreement is a collection of eight protocols covering a wide range of issues which FRELIMO and RENAMO mutually agreed upon.[130]

3.9.1 Protocol I - Basic Operating Principles

Protocol I was the product of the first round of talks. It contained fundamental principles from which a General Peace

[128] Ibid., pp. 95-96.
[129] Ibid., p. 98.
[130] The provisions used in this study are as they appear in the United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995 book released by the Department of Public Information, New York. The Peace Agreement is also available in electronic and hard copies.

Agreement would be build up. Accordingly, FRELIMO and RENAMO became determined to secure dialogue through direct talks as the only means of achieving lasting peace. Both parties agreed to an armistice as the first step in the peace process. RENAMO on its part undertook to refrain from armed combat and instead conducted its political struggle in conformity with the laws in force and within the existing state institutions. Protocol I authorized subsequent protocols to be an integral part of the General Peace Agreement.[131]

A joint verification commission was set to oversee Cease-fire terms as well as monitoring the transport corridors which were to be demilitarised. Protocol I was essentially a confidence-building measure designed to facilitate the sustenance of the peace process.[132]

3.9.2 Protocol 11 – Political Parties

Reforms in Mozambique covered a wide area of legal, political and other related matters; but in substance they clearly amounted to the adoption of a liberal understanding of the State. A persistent issue in the constitutional debate was whether Mozambique would abandon its Marxist-Leninist mode of governance characterized by centralized control, to a more liberal approach, which endorsed multi-partyism.[133] Accordingly, opposition Political Parties were to be constitutionally permitted from November 1990.

Protocol II recognized the Government's authority to register Political Parties, while providing for RENAMO to begin political

[131] *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, p. 106-107.
[132] Ibid., p. 107.
[133] Ibid., p. 107.

activities as a registered party. It emphasized that Political Parties were to be independent, voluntary and free associations that provided for the democratic participation in the exercise of political power.

The Political Parties Act was to determine conditions for the registration and conduct of Political Parties. RENAMO was therefore required to pursue democratic ideals and was to be non-regional, non-tribal, non-separatist, non-racial, non-ethnic and non-religious. The parties agreed to constantly seek dialogue, collaboration and regular consultation.[134]

Closely related to party politics, was a radical reversal of assumptions, which had guided the country since independence and involved the de-linking FRELIMO Party from the structure of power. Representative institutions were to be chosen by elections, in which Political Parties were to compete through secret and periodic vote. The President of Mozambique was to be elected by direct universal suffrage for a five-year term.[135] As a result of Protocol II, the International Community recognized that assisting RENAMO to be a viable partner in the peace process was a condition for successful implementation.[136] The United Nations Special Representative Aldo Ajello conceded that it was necessary to help RENAMO achieve a minimum level of self-sustenance that could allow the implementation of the Peace

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[134] Ibid., p. 107.

[135] Article 204 (1) of the 1975 Marxist-Leninist Constitution stated, 'Until General Elections are held, the President of the Republic of Mozambique shall be the President of FRELIMO party.' this meant that it was impossible to hold free and fair elections under the old Constitution. The December 1990 Constitution addressed issues of multi-party democracy, which was the core business of Protocol 11. For provisions of Protocol 11, see, *United Nations: Mozambique 1992-1995*, Department of Public Information, United Nations, (New York., 1995) Doc. No.12, pp.105-128; and Hoile, *Mozambique: Resistance and freedom: A Case for Reassessment*, Chapter 5, p.158.

[136] Carrie Manning, "Constructing Opposition in Mozambique," *Journal of Southern Africa Studies* 24, no.1 (March 1988), pp.161-19 see also, Donald Rothschild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, (Washington D.C.:, Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 15-19.

Agreement. The International Community socialized RENAMO into rules of democratic competition to make it legitimate and in the process; a $17.5 million fund was established to hold RENAMO transform itself into a Political Party.[137]

The creation of Political Parties was considered an important component in a democratic transition. It was largely viewed that during the Peace Agreement implementation, the viability of Political Parties was to play an additional role of termination of Civil War. Demilitarising RENAMO through the transformation of combatants into a political party was likely to promote war termination and democratisation in post agreement elections.

3.9.3 Protocol 111 - Electoral Law

In nearly all cases of negotiated settlements of civil wars, holding of elections has been designed in peace agreements as one of the mechanisms for ending the transition from war to peace.[138] As a crucial part of a peace process, elections seek to terminate civil war and contribute to sustainable peace building.[139] At the same time, post conflict elections attempt to instil democracy by enshrining new political institutions, rules of procedures and electoral laws in order to meet the moral expectations of constituents and mediators.[140]

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[137] *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, p. 19.

[138] Terrence Lyons, "The Role of Postsettlement Elections," in Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild et al, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, International Peace Academy and the Centre for International Security and Cooperation, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 215-232.

[139] Krishna Kumar, ed., *Post Conflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance*, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 65-98.

[140] Christopher Clapham, "Rwanda: The Perils of Peace Making," *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 2 (1998): 195.

Transitional laws and authority are important guarantees in pre and post peace agreement.[141] Protocol III set for the general principles which guided the drafting of the Electoral Act and any subsequent laws in connection with the conduct of the electoral process prior to 1994. The Elections Electoral Act was to be drafted by the Government in consultation with RENAMO and other political parties. The protocol enshrined basic freedoms associated with democratic rule, along with the free movement of people through the country.

The elections were to take place within one year after the date of signing of the General Peace Agreement. However, the period was to be extended if it was determined that circumstances existed which precluded its observance. Mozambique citizens who were 18 years old were to be allowed to register and vote. The primary purpose of any electoral administrative body is to deliver credible election services to candidates and voters. Accordingly, issues relating to impartiality and independence, efficiency, professionalism and transparency were particularly important in the context of suspicion and mistrust that characterized RENAMO and FRELIMO.[142] To guarantee impartiality, the Electoral Law provided for the establishment of an Electoral Commission whose one third of the members were to be appointed by RENAMO. The commission was to organize and manage post agreement elections and therefore acquiring a dual responsibility of conflict resolution and democratisation. Other duties for the Electoral Commission were to include monitoring the electoral process, settling

[141] Michael Doyle, W., "Strategy and Transitional Authority," in John Stedman, Donald Rothschild et al, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 71.

[142] Peter Harris "Building an Electoral Administration," in Peter Harris and Bein Reilly, eds., *Democracy and Deep Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators*, Handbook Series no.3, Stockholm, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998, p. 310.

of complaints, drafting of regulations governing campaigns, candidature requirements and announcement of results.[143]

The Government was to assist RENAMO in obtaining facilities, accommodation, transport and accommodation to carry out its political activities in all the provincial capitals. With a view to ensuring the highest degree of impartiality in the electoral process, the parties were to invite UN, OAU and private individuals as might be agreed by the Government and RENAMO. The electoral observers were to commence their task from the electoral campaign to the time the Government was to take office.

Enjoined with Protocol III was the issue of refugees, IDPs and their social integration. Peace depends on refugee return and repatriation. Every peace agreement must provide for the safe return and repatriation of refugees. The Government and FRELIMO were required to organize material and psychological assistance to refugees and IDPs. The parties agreed to seek the involvement of UNHCR in the planning and implementation of the refugee return-plan. Refugees and IDPs were to be guaranteed restitution of property and the right to vote. Protocol III was extensively discussed during the ninth and tenth round of talks and was eventually signed on 12th March 1992. Protocol III not only cleared up outstanding differences over Electoral Law but also enshrined basic freedoms associated with democratic rule, along with the free movement of people throughout the territory.[144]

[143] Ibid., p. 300-322.
[144] *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, pp. 109-110.

3.9.4 Protocol IV – Military and general security issues

The protocol on the military and general security was founded on the premise that security remained on of the most important mechanisms for preventing political violence and common crime in many post war settings.[145]

Peace agreements and public security formed the recurring themes of the fourth protocol. Consequently, protocol IV dwelt on the proposed military structure and strengths, general security, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Government and RENAMO forces.[146] The mission of the new Mozambican Defence Force (FADM) was to defend and safeguard Mozambique's sovereignty, independence and territory. During the period between the Cease-fire and the time when the new Government took office, FADM was to be under FADM High Command and responsible for protecting civilians against crime and violence. Additional functions of the FADM was to provide assistance during crisis or emergency situations arising in the country as a result of natural disasters and to provide support for reconstruction and development efforts. The FADM was to be non-partisan, competent, apolitical, professionally trained and made up exclusively of Mozambican citizens drawn from FRELIMO and RENAMO. [147]The composition of FADM was to preclude all forms of racial, ethnic and religious affiliation. The process of forming FADM would begin after the entry into force of the Cease-fire immediately following the inauguration of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) and would be conducted simultaneously with the

[145] Charles T. Call and William Stanley, "Civilian Security," in Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild et al, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, International Peace Academy and the Centre for International Security and Cooperation, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 303-309.
[146] *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, p. 112.
[147] Ibid., p.113.

concentration, disarmament and integration into civilian life of the unabsorbed Government and RENAMO combatants.[148] The Government and RENAMO were to be responsible for contributing troops on equal basis drawn from each side. The political neutrality of FADM would be critical in the transition period and would be mutually guaranteed by the two parties through the CSC. By the time of elections, only FADM would be in full existence and any unintegrated elements would be disbanded.[149]

FRELIMO and RENAMO agreed on a future strength of 30,000 troops under the overall operational supervision of FADM High Command and politically under the Joint Commission for the formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces (CCFADM) and CSC respectively. For ease of administration and operational command, the FADM would be organized into Army Command, Air Force Command, Naval Command and Logistic Command. For details on the structure of the Military, see Annex E.

The withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambican territory was a serious issue in the security agenda. The withdrawal of foreign troops would be initiated following entry into force of the Cease-fire on E-Day.[150] The modalities and time frame for the withdrawal was not to contravene any provision of the Cease-fire Agreement or General Peace Agreement. The Government would submit to the CSC the

[148] Ibid., p. 113.
[149] Ibid., p. 113.
[150] In military operations, the system of relating days and hours to a field operation is assigned alphabetical letters to signify specific activity and timing. E-Day is assigned the day when Cease-fire exercise commences. E-Day + 1 for example signify the first day of a military exercise designated letter E. In the case of Mozambique, the E-Day for Cease-fire was to commence on 15th October 1992, which was to be the ratification day of the General Peace Agreement. For details, see Annex D to Chapter 2 of the *Kenya Armed Forces, Defence Staff College Service Writing Manual*, (19970, Annex 2D-1.

deadlines and plans for implementation of the withdrawal, specifying the exact members of troops present in Mozambican territory and their operational locations. The withdrawal of foreign forces and contingents from Mozambique territory would be monitored and verified by the Cease-fire Commission (CFC). CFC would then inform CSC on the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from the national territory.[151] The mandate of CSC through CFC following the withdrawal of foreign troops, would assume immediate responsibility for ensuring security of strategic routes and adopting measures it deemed necessary. To guarantee security, private and irregular militias were to be disbanded and prohibited from forming new groups. The CFC was to monitor and verify the disbanding of the private and irregular armed groups and collect their weapons and ammunition.[152]

On matters of National Security, the parties agreed that there should be a National Security Service (NSS) which would continue to function during the period between the entry into force of the cease-fire and the time when the new Government takes office in order to ensure that the strategic information required by the State is made available for the purpose of protecting the sovereignty and independence of Mozambique.[153] The de-politicization and restructuring of the police force was intended to enhance efficiency and respect for Human Rights in the post peace agreement police force. The National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL) was established to oversee and investigate policy activity that would it deemed to be out of the legal order.

[151] Ibid., p. 114.
[152] Ibid., p. 116.
[153] Ibid., p. 114.

Another critical issue discussed by protocol IV concerned economic and social reintegration, disarmament and demobilization of soldiers. Effective disarmament and demobilization of warring factions contribute to the security necessary for the successful implementation of a Civil War Peace Agreement. Lack of a security guarantee can affect peace implementation and trigger a reversal to war. The centrality of disarmament in protocol IV arose due to the understanding that a peace agreement that did not address effective disarmament could result in the creation of a new political economy of light weapons which could affect the State and surrounding region through smuggling of guns and subsequent militarization of crime.[154]

The demobilization of FRELIMO and RENAMO involved the reversal of soldiers to civilian status.[155] The Cease-fire Commission would be responsible for the entire demobilization exercise with established Regional and Assembly Area offices. The Cease-fire Commission would among other tasks, ensure registration of troops to be demobilized, issuance of identity cards, collection, registration and custody of weapons, ammunition, explosives, equipment, uniforms, documentation and the issuance of demobilization certificates.[156]

Protocol IV envisaged the following demobilization programme:

E-Day: Installation of the Cease-fire Commission.

E-Day+30: Identification of troops to be demobilized, activation of demobilization structures.

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[154] Fred Tanner, *"Post Conflict Weapons Control: In search of Normative Interactions,"* Paper prepared for International Studies Association (ISA) meeting at Washington. D.C., (February, 1999): 10.
[155] *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, p. 112.
[156] Ibid., p. 116.

E-Day+60: Demobilization of 20% of the total troops to be demobilized.

E-Day+90: Demobilization of 40% of the total troops to be demobilized.

E-Day+120: Demobilization of 60% of the total troops to be demobilized.

E-Day+150: Demobilization of 80% of the total troops to be demobilized.

E-Day+180: End of Demobilization.[157]

The Protocol provided for reintegration of FRELIMO and RENAMO troops into the National Army and in the agricultural economy in the rural society. This was achieved through the establishment of the Reintegration Commission (CORE), which was to operate under the CSC, and would be responsible for demobilization allowances, vocational training and weapons buy-back campaigns in the post-demobilization phase.[158]

3.9.5 Protocol V: Time Table for Electoral Process

Protocol V set out a projected election timetable and specific guarantees for the period from the Cease-fire to the holding of elections. Post conflict elections are critical in the democratisation process.[159] They serve as the first step in democratic consolidation through which new rules of the political game are institutionalised.[160]

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[157] Ibid., p. 116.
[158] Ibid., pp. 116-117.
[159] Terrence Lyons, "The Role of Postsettlement Elections," in Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild *et al*, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, International Peace Academy and the Centre for International Security and Cooperation,(London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 215-232.
[160] Ibid., p. 220.

Protocol V put the Presidential and the Assembly of the Republic (National Assembly) elections one year after the signing of the General Peace Agreement. The Government would draft the Electoral Act in consultation with RENAMO and also establish the National Elections Commission to oversee and draft election rules and procedures.[161] Pursuant to Protocol I, the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) would be established to guarantee the implementation of provisions contained General Peace Agreement, guarantee respect for the timetable specified for the Cease-fire and the holding of the election.

The Government would submit a formal request to the United Nations for its participation in monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, in particular, the Cease-fire and the electoral process while coordinating and making available, food, medicine and all other forms of support necessary at the Assembly and Billeting[162] locations. Public Administration during the period between the entry into force of the Cease-fire and the time when the new Government take office would continue to obey the law in force. The Public Administration would guarantee public tranquillity and stability and seek to ensure maintenance of peace and the creation of the environment required for the holding of fair and free elections.[163]

[161] *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, p. 120

[162] A billet is a private house or accommodation where soldiers live temporarily during War or Demobilisation Phase.

[163] Ibid., p. 121.

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3.9.6 Protocol VI – Cessation of Armed Conflict

The Cessation of Armed Conflict (CAC) is a brief, dynamic and irreversible process of predetermined duration, which was to be implemented throughout the National territory of Mozambique.[164] The implementation of the CAC would be the responsibility of the Government and RENAMO acting within the framework of the Cease-fire Commission. The CCF would be answerable to the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, the organ that would be responsible for the overall political supervision of the Cease-fire. The CAC would consist of Cease-fire, separation of forces, concentration of forces and demobilization.[165]

The Cease-fire shall enter into force on E-Day. E-Day is the day on which the General Peace Agreement will be adopted by the Assembly of the Republic and incorporated into Mozambique Law.[166] As of E-Day, neither party shall carry out any hostile act. Accordingly, neither party should, carry out any attack by Land, Sea or Air, organize patrols or offensive manoeuvres, occupy new positions, lay or prevent mine clearing operations, carry out acts of sabotage or terrorism, acquire or receive lethal military equipment or carry out acts of violence against civilian population, restrict free movement of people and property and carry out military activity which in the opinion of the CCF and the United Nations, might jeopardize the Cease-fire.[167]

[164] Ibid., p.120.
[165] Ibid., p. 120.
[166] Ibid., p. 121.
[167] Ibid., p. 122.

To reduce the risk of incidents, build trust and allow the United Nations to effectively verify commitments assigned by the parties, Government and RENAMO troops shall embark on a tactical withdrawal to pre-determined Assembly and Billeting points which shall be completed by 2400 hrs on E-Day + 5.[168] Withdrawal movements shall be monitored and supervised by United Nations on 24-hour basis. A Military Commander would ensure Cease-fire adherence and administer the concentration of troops in Assembly Areas. The operational timetable for the cease-fire will be as follows:

E-Day: Entry into force of the Cease-fire and beginning of United Nations verification and beginning of the Cessation of Armed Conflict.

E-Day+5: End of tactical withdrawal

E-Day+6: Beginning of the concentration of forces phase.

E-Day+30: End of concentration of forces

E-Day+180: End of demobilization phase and Cessation of Armed Conflict.[169]

3.9.7 Protocol VII and Joint Declaration

Protocol VII recognized the enormous resources required to finance the entire peace process and its subsequent implementation.

[168] Ibid., p. 122.
[169] Ibid., p. 122.

Accordingly, FRELIMO and RENAMO agreed to request the Italian Government to convene a conference on donor countries and organizations to finance among other things, the electoral process, emergency programmes, disarmament and demobilization, reintegration of soldiers, internally displaced persons and refugees. The donor's conference is to be convened not later than E-Day + 30.[170]

3.10 Implementation of the Peace Agreement

The implementation of the Rome Peace Agreement may be used to measure success or failure if certain variables are critically operationalized and analysed. Fen Osler Hampson lists four variables that are associated with Peace Agreements; the ripeness of the conflict as represented by the intrinsic desire of the parties to make peace, the quality of the Peace Agreement itself and particularly if it exhaustively addresses power sharing arrangements.[171] Contrary to success variables, Stedman and Rothschild argue that vague and expedient Peace Agreements, lack of coordination between mediators and implementing agencies, incomplete mandate fulfilment, time factor, limited commitment and the presence of spoilers contribute to the failure of peace agreements.[172]

The implementation of the peace agreement and United Nations mandate was a complex undertaking. Immediately upon signing of the peace agreement on 4th October 1992, the United Nations moved to implement one of the most extensive peacekeeping operations in its history.[173] The United

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[170] Ibid., p. 123.

[171] Fen Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*, U.S. Institute of Peace (Washington D.C., 1996), pp. 47-59.

[172] Stephen John Stedman and Donald Rothchild "Peace Operations: From Short-Term to Long-Term Commitment," in *International Peace Keeping* 3, no.2 (1996), pp. 17-35.

[173] *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, p. 22.

Nations mandate included political, military, electoral and humanitarian objectives and the overall success or failure of its mission would be dependant on parallel progress in each of these sectors.[174] In spite of the presence of the United Nations as a third party security guarantor, FRELIMO and RENAMO were key actors as political power contenders in the conflict.[175] An analysis of the implementation of the Mozambique Peace Agreement looked at the performance of the United Nations, the FRELIMO-RENAMO conflict perception on each other, and the role of non-state actors and international community in the implementation programme. Accordingly, the implementation of the Rome Peace Agreement looked into in the context of the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), demilitarisation, humanitarian assistance, reintegration programme, election and post-election programme.

3.11 Establishment of ONUMOZ

The signing of the General Peace Agreement in Rome on 4th October 1992 marked the formal cessation of seventeen years of Armed Conflict. Following the signing of the agreement, the United Nations was invited to undertake a comprehensive peacekeeping operation that lead to democratic elections in October 1994.[176] The General Peace Agreement called for the United Nations role in monitoring of Cease-fire, providing and coordinating humanitarian assistance and monitoring elections. In order to structure an adequate mechanism to address these responsibilities, an assessment of the scope and magnitude of the United Nations role was needed.[177] Following the submission of the Secretary General's report on developments in Mozambique to the Security Council, the Security Council adopted

[174] Ibid., p. 21.
[175] Ibid., p. 22.
[176] Ibid., p. 23-37 and Document 27: Security Council Resolution Establishing ONUMUZ, p. 23.
[177] Ibid., p. 24.

Resolution 782 of 1992, which established the position of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the creation of 25 Military Observers.[178] Ajello convinced the Government to formally establish the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) the Cease-fire Commission (CCF) the Commission for Reintegration (CORE) and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM).[179]

ONUMOZ was officially launched through United Nations resolution 797 of 1992.[180] The final stage in the creation of the United Nations Mission was the establishment of financial parameters for the operation. The scope of the mission was to allow 7,500 military personnel with an operational budget of $260 million.[181] The Special Representative and a team of 21 Military Observers arrived in Mozambique on E-Day (15th October 1992) when the General Peace Agreement came into force. By May 1993, ONUMOZ force was approaching full strength with 4,721 armed personnel.[182] This was comprised of five Infantry Battalions from Bangladesh, Italy, Uruguay, Botswana and Zambia. The stationing of Italy's ONUMOZ troops along the Beira Corridor allowed for the withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops by 15th April 1993 thus fulfilling a key requirement in the General Peace Agreement. Zimbabwe's withdrawal was followed in June 1993 by the departure of the last Malawian troops from Nacala Corridor, where the Bangladesh troops were now stationed.[183] For ONUMOZ military deployment in Mozambique, see Annex F and G.

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[178] Ibid., p. 24.; and Document 16: Security Council Resolution welcoming the signature of the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, p.130.
[179] Ibid., p. 24.
[180] Ibid., p. 25.
[181] Ibid., p. 25.
[182] Ibid., p. 26.
[183] Ibid., p. 27.

3.12 Demilitarisation

Demobilization was the most difficult and dangerous phase of the ONUMOZ mandate.[184] There was considerable uncertainty about the numbers of troops to be demobilized for security reasons. Both sides were reluctant to give up their best fighting units or assemble their senior officers until the very end of the Assembly and Demobilization process. To prepare for Demobilisation, the role of CFC was of critical importance.[185] In addition to verifying the Cease-fire and arranging for clearance of landmines, the CFC had the central responsibility for establishing procedures for the cantonment, assembly and demobilization of Government and RENAMO soldiers while also setting itineraries for the movement of forces and approved rules of conduct for the Assembly Areas (AAs).[186]

The principal difficulty was reaching an agreement on the final list of AAs because of security issues. However, in spite of security reasons, 34,000 Government and 14,000 RENAMO soldiers had assembled by April 1994.[187] On 15th August 1994, all Assembly Areas were officially closed to new entrants and the 3,723 troops remaining at the Assembly points on that day were quickly demobilized or recruited into newly constituted Mozambican Defence Force. By late November 1994, Demobilization accounted for 78,078 troops.[188] The last component of demilitarisation was the creation of a new National Army. At the time of the Rome Peace Agreement, it was envisaged that the new Army would consist of 30,000 soldiers, equally

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[184] *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, p. 38.
[185] Ibid., p. 38.
[186] Assembly Areas are designed concentration areas of troops before and after forward operations. Assembly areas are required to have adequate cover and concealment, sanitation, well drained soils and sufficiently out of range from combat zones. Assembly areas are transitory grounds to and from operational areas.
[187] *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, p. 40.
[188] Ibid., p. 40 and Document 90: Final report of the Secretary General on ONUMOZ, p. 294.

divided between the Government and RENAMO.[189] The CCFADM was to be the point of contact between the Mozambican parties and the international donor community. By the end of ONUMOZ mandate on 9th December 1994, a total of 11,579 soldiers had enlisted with FADM.[190] Officers from Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM) and RENAMO jointly shared the Command of the FADM. With the establishment of FADM, the military structures of the Government and RENAMO were formally disbanded.

3.13 Humanitarian Assistance

Seventeen years of Civil War (1975-1992) coupled with draughts in 1974; early 1980s and 1992 caused severe human suffering in Mozambique. Amid fears of mass starvation, humanitarian agencies faced the difficulties of providing relief in a war-torn country and ensuring that supplies quickly reached neighbouring countries through Mozambique transport corridors.[191] The decision to establish a humanitarian assistance component to ONUMOZ was supported by Government and RENAMO and accepted by the international community. In July 1992, the joint request of the Government and RENAMO to have the United Nations coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance became an integral part of the final peace agreement. Subsequently, the Security Council's resolution 797 of 1992 endorsed the inclusion of the coordination of humanitarian assistance operations within the overall mandate of ONUMOZ.[192] The advent of peace in 1992 gave humanitarian assistance agencies an unprecedented opportunity to provide emergency aid.

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[189] Vines, *RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique*, p. 41 and p. 294.
[190] Ibid., p. 295.
[191] *United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, pp. 47-54.
[192] Ibid., p. 47.

The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in close cooperation with the Government's Relief Department and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), delivered food on a limited scale to returnees in RENAMO held areas. The humanitarian effort thus contributed significantly to the wider peace process, building lines of communication and helping to foster trust.[193] Operating as the humanitarian component of ONUMOZ, the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) sought complete freedom of movement to deliver humanitarian assistance. Under the terms of the General Peace Agreement, a Donors conference for Mozambique was held in Rome on 15th and 16th December 1992 to address the country's humanitarian requirements and the needs of refugees, the displaced, those in severe distress and demobilized soldiers. Pledges amounting to $450 million were made during and after the conference.[194]

The large-scale resettlement of refugees was another major achievement that provided confidence in the peace process. Between October 1992 and December 1994, approximately 4.3 million Mozambicans resettled voluntarily in different parts of the country, the great majority of them in their original home areas.[195] Of the total number of refugees, 1.6 million were those who returned from camps and exile from neighbouring countries.[196] The repatriation of Mozambican refugees was one of the UNHCR's largest African operations and the subsequent accommodation of returnees into their home areas one of the most significant achievements of ONUMOZ.[197]

[193] Ibid., p. 50.
[194] Ibid., p. 48.
[195] Ibid., p. 48.
[196] Ibid., p. 49.
[197] Ibid., p. 50.

3.14 Re-Integration Programme

Re-integration was the most effective way to break former combatants' ties with their former fighting units. Mozambique's economy was weak and less complex in the 90s making it easy for re-integration process. However, the greater the gap between the combatant's skills and the skills in demand in the labour market, the more difficult it was for the re-integration.[198] Former FRELIMO and RENAMO combatants were at least, semi-literate and had no marketable skills, which made their re-integration into the agricultural sector much easier than in any other technical sector.[199]

It was felt that elections would only take place after full Demobilization and Re-integration. Accordingly, the major function of Commission for Reintegration (CORE) and UNOHAC was planning, organizing and monitoring the economic and social integration of demobilized soldiers. In addition of the six-month's compensation pay they received from the Government, the demobilized soldiers were provided with a further 18-month's pay. They were also entitled to use countrywide information on alternative employment and new occupational skills development programmes. [200] The additional pay and re-settlement programmes were aimed at cushioning the effect of transforming soldiers into civilians and hence safeguarding the stability required for the implementation of the General Peace Agreement. A number of international agencies became involved in the re-settlement and counselling of Mozambique soldiers, particularly child soldiers who fought for RENAMO. A United Kingdom-based NGO, Save the Children Fund (SCF), ICRC and United Nations

[198] Ibid., p. 51.
[199] Ibid., p. 51.
[200] Ibid., p. 51.

Development Programme (UNDP) coordinated re-integration programmes.[201]

3.15 Elections

The final and most critical test of the General Peace Agreement was the electoral process. Although it was envisaged that elections would take place within one year after the signing of the Peace Agreement, it was soon realized that more time was required and hence extending the mandate of ONUMOZ to two years. The prolonging of ONUMOZ mandate was necessitated by the need to ensure that troops from both sides had been Demobilized, Disarmed and Reintegrated.[202] In spite of its narrowly defined role in elections, ONUMOZ found itself increasingly involved in the mechanisms of fostering democracy. Although a number of political parties emerged, the electoral contest was dominated by FRELIMO and RENAMO. However, RENAMO continued to threaten a pullout in an attempt to get new concessions from the Government and also legitimise its claim to financial assistance. Presidential and Legislative elections were held from 27th to 29th October 1994. The extension of voting to a third day (29th October) had become necessary following the withdrawal of RENAMO from the elections only hours before the beginning of the polls, claiming that conditions were not in place to ensure free and fair elections. However, following a concerted international pressure, RENAMO abandoned its boycott in the early hours of 28th October.[203]

The Chairman of the National Electoral Commission announced the official election results on 19th November 1994 with Joaquim Chissano

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[201] Ibid., p. 51.
[202] Vines, *RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique*, p. 159.
[203] Ibid., p.160 see also, *United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, pp. 55-56.

receiving 53.30 percent.[204] In the legislative elections, FRELIMO also secured an overall majority winning 129 seats of 250 seats. A formal coalition of parties called Uniao Democratica (UD) got the remaining 9 seats.[205] Dhlakama subsequently accepted the results of the elections. The inauguration of Chissano on 9th December 1994 marked the expiry of the mandate of ONUMOZ and demonstrated the last hurdle in the implementation of the Rome General Peace Agreement.[206]

3.16 Conclusion

In defiance of oppressive policies and laws, nationalist movements emerged in Mozambique in June 1962 through the formation of FRELIMO. However, the first armed action was launched in Muenda district in northern Mozambique in 1964. This action was met with a retaliatory military force leading to 400 FRELIMO supporters being shot dead in a similar incident to the South African Sharpeville. After five years of sporadic warfare and military overthrow of Portuguese Government in Lisbon, the new Government in Lisbon and FRELIMO signed the Lusaka Agreement on 7th September 1974. The Accord handed over power to FRELIMO unconditionally without resolving many socio-political and economic issues. Mozambique became fully independent on 25th June 1975 and FRELIMO established itself as a one-party Marxist-Leninist state and outlawed opposition politics.

The new Mozambique Government's strong opposition to minority white rule in Rhodesia and Mozambique attracted fierce hostility of the two regimes with the former soon becoming the official sponsor of RENAMO.

[204] Ibid., p. 161.
[205] Ibid., p. 161.
[206] Ibid., p. 161.

RENAMO was composed of northern Mozambicans and disgruntled Portuguese settlers whose property had been nationalised by the Socialist Government. Ideologically, RENAMO was a reactionary force to FRELIMO. The Socialist Communist regime, which was an elitist and urban-oriented movement, sought to destroy traditional structures through Marxist-Leninist social engineering.

The 1984 Nkomati Peace Agreement between South Africa and Mozambique was the first peace initiative. The accord sought to cease hostilities against Mozambique and support for RENAMO. The agreement also sought the closure of ANC bases and training facilities in South Africa. The Nkomati treaty was soon abrogated coupled with an increased violence and countrywide civil war. It soon emerged that a military victory was out of question and a political solution was seen as an alternative. The conflict significantly drained Government resources and threatened millions of rural and urban Mozambicans. Amid a deepening humanitarian crisis in late 1980s, the Government and RENAMO began efforts to resolve the military stalemate and the humanitarian problem. The International Community in form of state and non-state actors got involved in negotiations and mediation, which resulted in the drafting and signing of the General Peace Agreement in Rome on 4th October 1992.

The Peace Agreement was successfully sustained and implemented through the establishment of ONUMOZ on 15th December 1992. The implementation of the Rome Peace Agreement was a complex undertaking, which was undertaken through the establishment of ONUMOZ through United Nations Security Council Resolution 782 of 1992 was critical to the implementation of the agreement.

The most critical test of the General Peace Agreement was the electoral process. With approximately 85 percent of the electorate participating in elections, Chissano was elected President with 53 % of the vote against Dhlakama's 33 %. Despite RENAMO's defeat, the civil war in Mozambique had come to an end. The Mozambique case study represented a situation where cooperation between warring parties and coupled with an external intervention resulted in conflict resolution.

Chapter Four

Critical Analysis of Sudan and Mozambique Peace Agreements

4.1 Introduction

Compared to the formidable scholarly literature dealing with the causes of protracted conflicts and negotiating for peace agreements in civil wars, the literature devoted to the problem of implementing peace agreements is modest.[1] Some of the explanations are that many peace agreements are signed than actually implemented and once signed, the task of implementation becomes overwhelmingly complex and in most cases, fraught with issues like security dilemma; where each side's preparation for potential conflict stimulate the other's fears and create a vicious cycle of conflict escalation.[2]

The other explanation is that potentially important variables such as asymmetrical relationship between parties, presence and effect of spoilers, lack of international and regional support, lack of regional and national security threat, mandate achievement, lack of strategy, coordination, Transitional Authority, Disarmament, Demobilisation and reintegration are unreliable and difficult to measure.[3] More still, no conflicts and implementation strategies are identical in terms of causal factors and geographical location. Each conflict is in all aspects,

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[1] George Downs and Stephen John Stedman, "Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, et al, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, Centre for International Security and Cooperation (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2002), p. 43.

[2] Lake D.A. and Rothschild D., "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," in Michael Brown et al, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, eds., (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2001), pp.126-160.

[3] Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (summer 1997): 340.

historically and geographically different. Consequently, in the absence of a universal and systematic approach for implementation of peace agreements, this study developed a matrix of variables that are considered ideal for management of peace agreements.[4]

The first step in evaluating institutional effectiveness in the management of peace agreement is to develop some reliable and measurable ways to assess implementation success. Traditionally, success has been measured by outcome indicators, each of which measures the extent to which a goal that is considered central to the mission success. Mandate achievement and subsequent objective indicators such as conflict resolution, upholding of human rights, elections, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and refugee repatriation have been used to measure implementation success.[5]

The Sudan and Mozambique conflicts differed in terms of their historical, political and geographical context. The two conflicts were political conflicts broadly revolving around identity, religion, equality, wealth and power-sharing, territorial autonomy, illegitimacy and constitutionalism. Lack of fulfilment of needs also emerged as a fundamental cause of conflict in Sudan and Mozambique. The idea of human needs bridges the gap between international and other forms of conflict. Since all international conflicts have their corresponding domestic sources, the link between international and domestic conflict can

[4] Ibid., 348.
[5] Downs and Stedman, "Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation," pp. 43-107.

be traced to the lack of fulfilment of basic human needs in Sudan and Mozambique respectively.[6]

The conflict and subsequent peace agreements studies in Sudan and Mozambique was analyzed from the structural, human needs and systemic approaches. The three approaches are theoretical tools that helped to study and analyse conflict and peace agreements. The multiplicity of these approaches should therefore not be viewed as conflictual but rather complementary. The broad hypothetical assumption in the study was that failure or success of peace agreements must take into consideration, the structural human needs and systemic dimensions.

Chapter four sought to test whether certain fundamental human needs were necessary ingredients for ending peace agreements, whether systemic factors within the greater Great Lakes and Southern Africa conflict systems influenced the outcome of peace agreements and whether the structure of power sharing in post-conflict Governments determined the success or failure of peace agreements in Sudan and Mozambique respectively.

A critical Analysis of the 1972 Sudan and 1992 Mozambique Peace Agreements concedes that there existed multiple explanations for success or failure of peace agreements. In this chapter, I critically analyze why the 1972 Sudan Peace Agreement failed after ten years of stable peace (1972-1982) and why the 1992 Mozambique Peace Agreement was successful.

[6] The concept of human needs is discussed in Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theories, Process and Institutions of Management*, pp. 24-35. See also, Christopher Mitchell, "Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution: More Basic Questions about Human Needs Theory," in John Burton, *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), pp.149-173.

Accordingly, this study looked into some variables commonly used to assess success or failure of peace agreement: These were analysed as follows:

4.1.1 Universal Variables for analysing Peace Agreements

Cases of peace implementation differ dramatically in terms of the implementation environment and the willingness of international actors to provide necessary resources and troops. Before analyzing variables contributing to the success or failure of peace agreements, this study analyzed variables, which have traditionally been considered universal and important in the management of peace agreements. These variables were:

4.1.1.1 Mandate Achievement

The most common indicator of operational success is the degree to which a Peace Implementation operation achieves the goals that are laid out in the United Nations mandate authorizing the mission.[7] The United Nations mandate is a document that contains all the operational and administrative details of a United Nations mission and obtains its legality from the Security Council resolution. The fact that mandate creation and accomplishment is defined by the United Nations itself makes it endogenous.[8] This endogeneity may seem attractive as it shields itself from external scrutiny and criticism that it represents a goal that

[7] Downs and Stedman, "Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation," p. 55.
[8] Ibid., p. 61.

the agent being evaluated never intended to accomplish in the first place. It makes evaluation the prisoner of ambition, modesty and mediocrity as it becomes possible for an organization to inflate their success by purposely-minimizing performance goals or by pursuing very ambitions goals.[9]

Mandate accomplishment as a measure of success creates comparability problems. What may work in one region may not work in another region thus negating the fallacy of assuming that all implementation strategies and context are the same.[10] Today's peace operations vary substantially in terms of context, history and geography. Additionally, Peace implementation includes a wide array of tasks. The implementation of the 1972 Sudan Peace Agreement required mutual trust and expectation between Nimeiri Government and *Anya nya I*. Each party was required to carry out tasks as provisioned by the terms of the agreement.[11] The Mozambique Peace Agreement required mutual expectation of the Government and RENAMO to implement the specific terms and requirements. The implementation required ONUMOZ and other specialized United Nations agencies in dealing with issues of disarmament, demobilization, and repatriation of refugees, de-

[9] Ibid., p. 65.
[10] Ibid., p. 66.
[11] The Principle of Mutual trust in Peace Agreements is referred to as the *Pacta Sunt Servanda*, which means that each partner to a Peace Agreement must perform its part in good faith. It is on this maxim that parties to Peace Agreements are expected to perform strictly within the terms of the agreement. For details on the principle of *Pacta Sunt Servanda, see for example,* the Vienna Convention on treaties, Art.26. International Law, treaties have been a matter between states. There has been a shift in this view as non-state actors including insurgent groups are now subjects of International law and can therefore enter into treaties. The SPLA and RENAMO are examples of and organizations that legally entered into Peace Agreements.

mining, election monitoring, capacity building and reintegration. On the contrary, the Sudan Agreement did not provide nor envision for a regional or international intervention during the implementation phase of the agreement.

Another limitation associated with difficulties of measurement of success or failure is the ambiguity of the mandate. Ambiguity increases the complexity of the peace operation and the terms of the agreement. In many instances, the outcomes of peace implementation are usually clouded with a fog of uncertainty.[12] For instance it may be difficult to ascertain declared enemy strength, disposition and equipment holding.

The limitations of mandate accomplishment as the sole measure of peace implementation success have led researchers and practitioners to supplement it with other indicators. Duane Bratt for example uses four indicators such as mandate performance, the degree of conflict resolution, whether or not the operation kept conflict from spreading in the region and the extent to which the operation reduced both military and civilian casualties below the rates that existed before the operation begun.[13] This measure of success poses the virtue of being less susceptible than mission mandate to the problem of

[12] Michael Doyle, Ian Johnston et al, "Strategies for Peace: Conclusions and Lessons," in Doyle, Johnston et al eds., *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 388-389.

[13] Duane Bratt, "Assessing Peacekeeping Success," in Michael Pugh, eds., *The UN, Peace and Force*, (New York: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 64-81.

endogeneity. It prevents a mission from being declared a success simply because its mandate required very little, or from even being declared a failure because it failed to achieve overly ambitious goals even if it produced significant benefits. The variables rely less on ambition and more on the tangible accomplishments that dominate estimates of success in most other fields.[14]

It becomes evident that the number of variables and indeed approaches for evaluating peace implementation are varied and each has its own advantages and disadvantages.[15] In a situation where there are many approaches, the best measure of success is one that contains the most complete list of conditions believed to prevent the recurrence of conflict.

According to sixteen case studies done on peace implementation by the International Peace Academy (IPA) the Centre for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and the general literature on policy implementation, there are crucial insights into the conditions under which a peace agreement might succeed or fail.[16] A policy implementation perspective requires that attention be paid to the environment surrounding implementation and recognize that some environments are more conducive to implementation than others.[17] Such a perspective also looks to

[14] Ibid., p. 72.
[15] Ibid., p. 78.
[16] Ibid., p. 80.
[17] Ibid., p. 81.

coalitions that support implementation and their willingness to invest resources.

4.1.1.2 Warring parties

The difficulty of implementation increases when there are more than two warring parties to a conflict.[18] The multiplicity of warring parties makes implementation strategy more difficult and less predictable. The balance of power becomes more fragile and alliances become more fluid. In Mozambique for example, the UN carefully weighed its actions to both FRELIMO and RENAMO and its implication to the general peace agreement. In Sudan, the conflict involved *Anya nya I* and Sudan Government. The UN was however not involved in the implementation of the 1972 Sudan Peace Agreement.

4.1.1.3 Peace Agreements

Peace agreements are commitments agreed upon by more than two parties to carry out specific tasks with the desired end-state of achieving peace. They are endorsed with an understanding that mutual trust will prevail. Consequently, peace agreements usually contain commitments that those in conflict will fulfil or meet certain

[18] Gerardo L. Munck and Chetan Kumar, "Civil Conflicts and the Conditions for Successful International Intervention: A Comparative Study of Cambodia and El Salvador," *Review of International Studies* 21, no.2 (1995): 159-181; and Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peace-building: A theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 94, no.4 (December 2000): 779-801.

conditions from human rights requirements, repatriation of refugees, holding of elections and democratisation reforms, demobilization, disarmament, re-integration, de-mining, peace building and economic recovery programmes.[19]

As an international key actor in conflict management, the United Nations requires that a detailed peace agreement among warring parties be available as a sign of their consent to a mission.[20] This is usually a pre-condition for UN involvement. The UN can delegate authority to a regional or sub-regional organization to intervene. Intervention in the absence of a peace agreement would likely trigger violent opposition by parties who value the pre-intervention status quo.[21] The absence of a peace agreement implies a lack of problem solving and trust among warring parties thus complicating the implementation environment. The availability of a peace agreement presumes the warring parties to have engaged in direct negotiations or consented to mediation as a form of a third party intervention.[22]

4.1.1.4 Number of combatants

At some level, the number of belligerents matter in conflict management.[23] High numbers of soldiers pose greater

[19] Ho-Won Jeong, *Conflict Resolution: Dynamics Process and Structure*, (London: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999), pp. 10-35.
[20] Ibid., p. 17.
[21] Ibid., p. 22.
[22] Ibid., p. 26.
[23] Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael Brown, Ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124.

demands for verification and monitoring and hence a greater potential for cheating on enemy strength, which is crucial in terms of Cease-fire terms, disarmament and demobilization and reintegration.[24] Moreover, many soldiers require more personnel for monitoring. The enemy-own ratio is a critical determinant on the likely emergence of a security dilemma, which under conditions of anarchy, arises when a group seeks to arm itself in order to feel safer.[25]

4.1.1.5 Natural resources

Where warring parties have access to disposable resources such as oil, timber and wildlife, the implementation of peace agreement becomes more difficult. Such resources not only provide monetary resources for continued fighting, they also become a serious factor in the conditionality for peace. oil, illegal elephant tusks and timber trade contributed to the delay in the abrogation and negotiation of peace agreements in Sudan and Mozambique respectively.

4.1.1.6 Neighbouring States and regional power interests

Civil wars rarely take place in relatively stable regions. The relationship between domestic and international source of conflict is important for international relations generally and has profound implications for conflict and its

[24] Ibid., p. 102.
[25] Ibid., p. 105.

management.[26] The internationalisation of conflict arises due to increased interdependence of states, the division of ethnic groups by international borders, the issue of refugees, humanitarian imperatives, media, external allies and supporters.[27]

From the systems theory perspective, the analysis of Sudan and Mozambique conflicts took into account the diversity of actors, factors and transactions. A conflict systems perspective was considered holistic in its approach and recognized and acknowledged that conflicts are indivisible from the whole. The conflict system consists of a complex tessellation of relationships and interactions between states within a regional system.[28] A conflict systems approach entails a shift in levels of analysis from a unitary perception to a systematic basis. The fundamental argument is that international crises and conflicts have their domestic sources.[29] The fact that international conflict has domestic sources makes it analytically impossible to separate the domestic from the international.

From neighboring states point of view, it would follow that the attitude of the surrounding states towards a peace agreement plays a key role. In supporting or undermining the

[26] Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions Management*, pp. 72-85; and John Burton, *Global Conflict: The Domestic Sources of International Crises*, (London: Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, 1984), pp. 34-68.
[27] Peter Wallensteeen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989-96," *Journal of Peace Research* 34, no. 3 (fall 1970):339-358.
[28] On Conflict Systems approach, see Mwagiru, "The Idea of Conflict Systems" in Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions Management*, pp. 72-85.
[29] Burton, *Global Conflict: The Domestic Sources of International Crises*, p. 38.

prospects of peace, spoilers for example have been known to obtain sanctuary and to launch attacks from neighboring states[30]

The external dimension of evaluating peace implementation was considered a relevant variable in this study. Accordingly, a key sign of a commitment was whether powerful states supported intervention and publicly announced that the conflict threatened or formed part of their national interest. The study established that geographical proximity of a civil war to a regional power had a positive correlation with its likely involvement in the peace implementation. Regional actors involved in the Mozambique and Sudan Peace Agreements were Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, South Africa and Uganda and Ethiopia respectively.[31]

4.1.1.7 Resource commitment

The willingness of states to provide adequate financial and material resources for a mission is crucial. Mozambique

[30] On the influence of neighbour rogue states and spoilers in peace agreements, see John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Process," in *International Security* 22 no. 2 (fall 1977):32-36; and Michael Brown eds., *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, (Cambridge: Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 366-414.

[31] In the Mozambique conflict and its subsequent Peace Agreement, it was in the economic and political interest of Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia and South Africa to have a successful implementation of the Rome Peace Agreement as it guaranteed resumption of commercial services through the strategic ports of Maputo, Beira, Nacau and Quelimane. Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia have been experiencing tense diplomatic relations with mutual accusations of support for groups fighting their respective regimes. Sudan accused Uganda of supporting the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) while Uganda accused Sudan of aiding and giving sanctuary to Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Eastern Uganda. Eritrean Nationalist Movements e.g., The Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) received support from Sudan. In return, Ethiopia gave massive support to SPLA in terms of Military and strategic support.

received enormous financial support from the international community to finance demobilization, disarmament, reintegration, humanitarian de-mining and elections. Another aspect of commitment was on soldiers for peacekeeping and monitoring missions which the UN readily provided.

4.1.1.8 Transitional authority

Transitional authority is a critical variable in the assessment of the effectiveness of peace agreements. Accordingly, a transitional authority is needed to facilitate the smooth transition from civil war to a stable government.[32] A transitional authority can be domestic or international. The domestic authority is needed to specify the basis on which the warring parties come to cooperate and accept common rules for deciding conflicts of interest. The international authority is needed in order to permit the entry of foreign military forces and civilian officials into the domestic jurisdiction of the Civil War-torn state.[33]

International authority which intrudes upon the domestic sovereignty of states is established under Chapter VI of the UN charter which dwells on the pacific settlement of disputes through negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlements resort regional agencies or other peaceful means. Chapter VII of the UN

[32] Michael Doyle, "Strategy and Transitional Authority," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, et al, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, Centre for International Security and Cooperation, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2002), pp. 71-86.
[33] Ibid., p. 78.

charter authorises forceful overriding of domestic jurisdiction without consent of the local parties. These forceful interventions derive from Article 42 of the charter, which permits the Security Council to take military action against an aggressor state.

The UN is the quasi-sovereign/legal organization under which auspices a peace implementation programme can be undertaken through the creation of transitional commissions for demobilization, disarmament, reintegration, humanitarian activities, de-mining, cease-fire and election. To succeed, transitional authority needs to accommodate the structure of the conflict, its causes, local capacities, popular elections, power-sharing and impartiality.[34]

The most common transitional authority in most civil wars is an interim Government. Interim governments are by their nature not legitimised by democratic processes but derive their authority from the extent to which they prepare the country for meaningful elections and return power to the winners. Critical and contentious policy decisions relating to the electoral framework, the establishment of economic and legal institutions are made and implemented by a transitional authority.[35] The process through which such policy issues are made shapes the expectations of the conflicting parties and may inspire confidence or ignite fear. Well-designed and supported interim Governments encourage effective post

[34] Ibid., p. 75.
[35] Ibid., p. 75.

settlement elections. The period between the signing of an agreement and an election provide the context for testing and assessing the risks and benefits of cooperation, intentions and cooperation of each party on the basis of joint decision making and collaborative problem solving.[36]

4.1.1.9 Demobilization and Disarmament

As critical variables in the management of peace agreements, demobilization and disarmament must occur concurrently to guarantee necessary security for the successful implementation of a Civil War peace agreement.[37] Demobilization involves deactivating combatants through disbandment of military or militia units. Demobilization helps create an environment for confidence and security building prior to disarmament. Demobilization, reduce the means by which a Civil War is prosecuted and thus preventing its recurrence.[38] Unlike coercive disarmament, cooperative disarmament is commonly associated with peaceful settlements where there has been no clear victor in conflict.[39]

The creation of a stable environment and the removal of the means of Civil War prosecution through disarmament can be particularly difficult in an atmosphere of deep mistrust

[36] Ibid., p. 80.
[37] Joanna Spear, "Disarmament and Demobilization," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, et al, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, Centre for International Security and Cooperation, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2002), pp. 141-176.
[38] Ibid., p. 145.
[39] Ibid., p. 152.
[40] Ibid., p. 155.

that persists even after the signing of a peace agreement. Attempts at disarmament can give rise to security dilemmas that may intensify the conflict in the first place.[40] It is critical that there is adequate verification of the demobilization and disarmament process. Trevor Findlay observes that verification of disarmament determines compliance or non-compliance, serves as a deterrent to cheating, as the parties will be aware that they will be caught and therefore enabling the parties to demonstrate their compliance to each other.[41]

4.1.1.10 Spoilers

Spoilers are leaders or parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, world view and interests and use violence to achieve it.[42] Spoilers are disgruntled followers who see peace as betrayal of key values. The period after a peace agreement is reached is a time of uncertainty and vulnerability for peacemakers who must anticipate violent challenges to peace agreement. Accordingly, the presence of spoilers in the peace process can dramatically influence the direction and outcome of a peace process.[43] Some spoilers have limited goals while others pursue total power. Spoilers can be inside or outside a peace process. An inside spoiler signs a peace agreement, signals a willingness to implement a settlement and yet fails to fulfil

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[40] Ibid., p. 157.
[41] Trevor Findlay, "Post Conflict Demilitarization: The Role of Verification," Department of War Studies, King's College, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1999) pp. 25-39.
[42] On the influence of spoilers in peace agreements in documented case studies, see for example Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," p. 366-414.
[43] Ibid., p. 368.

key obligations to the agreement. Outside spoilers are parties who are excluded from a peace process or who exclude themselves and use violence to attack the peace process. They are irreconcilably opposed to any compromise peace. Several strategies exist for spoiler management.[44] These are inducement or giving the spoiler what it wants, socialization or changing behaviour of the spoiler to adhere to a set of established norms and coercion or punishing spoiler behaviour or reducing the spoiler capacity to destroy the peace process. These strategies are conceptual and international actors have been known to employ one or several of these strategies simultaneously or in sequence.[45]

4.1.2 Measurement of Sudan and Mozambique Peace Agreements

Measurement in social sciences research is closely related to the concept of operational definition.[46] Operationalization of variables in this study specified the operations that indicated the qualitative aspects of peace agreements. A wide range of multifaceted concepts were also used to measure empirical and observable aspects. In the end, the study developed multiple indicators to represent abstract concepts such as Cease-fire.

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[44] Ibid., p. 370.

[45] On the influence and strategies of spoilers in documented case studies, see Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," in Michael Brown et al, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, (Cambridge: Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2001), pp. 366-414.

[46] Frankfort Chave et al, *Research Methods in Social Sciences*, (London: St Martin Press Inc., 1996), pp.155-163; and Russell K. Schutt, *Investigating the Social World: The Process and Practise of Research ed.*, (CA: Pine Forge Press, 1999), pp. 93-99.

The study used nominal and ordinal level of measurements while the unit of analysis remains the state and the belligerent party as primary actors in the drafting and implementation of peace agreements. It focused on the qualitative and quantitative aspects of peace agreements.[47]

4.1.3 The Abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement

The collapse of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was as a result of many factors. President Nimeiri's division of the south into three regions in the Republican Order No.1 of 5th June 1983 was one of the most fundamental efforts to dismantle the agreement. The Republican Order abrogated the whole of the Addis Ababa Agreement and returned powers to the Central Government.[48] It repudiated the Southern Province which had been established under the Self Government Act of 1972. The Republican Order deleted regional languages and English as the principal language of the South. It provided that the use of other languages other than Arabic was conditional on obtaining prior permission from the central Government. Arabic was the only language in the South for official work and the medium of instruction in formal education. The cultural plurality previously addressed in the Addis Ababa agreement was ignored.[49]

[47] Qualitative and quantitative analysis was based on the existing peace agreement documents.
[48] For detailed information on this, see, Abel Alier "The Abrogation of Addis Ababa Agreement," in Abel Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured in Southern Sudan*, (Lebanon: Granet publishing Ltd, 2003), pp. 266-279.
[49] Ibid., p. 266.

4.1.4 Fiscal arrangements

The Addis Ababa Agreement assigned customs dues to the Central Government but left border trade with neighbouring countries as the prerogative of the South. The Republican Order transferred administration of border trade from the regional domain and reassigned it to the Central Government.[50] Indeed, the Agreement had assigned all public income to the regional treasury. The discovery of oil anywhere in the Southern region after 3rd March 1972 ought to have guaranteed income to the South. This was not honoured with the eventual discovery of oil in the South in 1975. The Republican Order restricted revenue to two sources of revenue: First, funds were to be approved from time to time by the Central Government for the benefit of the region. Previous steady allocations were reduced to ad hoc handouts in form of annual loans, budget allocations and donations. Second, funds were to be realised from direct taxes from regional taxes only but not from all business including Central Government business.[51]

The Republican Order left the Southern region without independent and constitutionally secured sources of income. The order disapproved decentralisation in favour of centralized financial and political control. The Central Government did not accept the policy of regional autonomy. With the discovery of oil in 1975, the Government reversed the Regional Self Government Act of 1972 by enacting Regional Government Bill of 1980, which changed the

[50] Ibid., p. 267.
[51] Ibid., p. 268.

borders of the Southern region.[52] Such action confirmed the fears of the Southerners that the main purpose of the Addis Ababa Agreement was not to create an autonomous region but to appease them with the illusion of self-rule while at the same time creating strong ties binding the region into the whole of Sudan through financial control. On the account of finances alone, the Southern Sudan Regional Government grounded into a halt confirming that the agreement was lopsided and not in the mutual interests of both parties to reach a fair accommodation.[53]

4.1.5 Legislature and the Executive

The Peoples' Regional Assembly exercised regional legislation in Southern Region. The Regional Assembly was mandated to legislate for the preservation of public order, internal security, efficient administration and the development of the Southern Sudan in cultural economic and social fields.[54] It was given powers to reject any bill or law, which in its opinion affected the welfare and interests of the citizens of the southern region. The Republican Order cancelled all the legal, privileges and rights accorded to the Southern Region. In 1980, the Regional Government Act divided Northern Sudan into five autonomous regions: Central, Eastern, Northern, Kordofan and Darfur each with its own legislative and Government structures. The Southern Regional Assembly had opposed the division of the Northern Sudan as the Government viewed it as a calculated trick. This came to be true as in October

[52] Ibid., p. 270.
[53] Ibid., p. 273.
[54] Ibid., p. 280.

1981, when the Regional Assembly was dissolved and the re-division plan of the South prepared.[55] In June 1983, Nimeiri decided to unilaterally re-divide the South into Equatoria, Bahr-el-Ghazal and Upper Nile, bringing the south on equal fooling with the North. This was seen as unconstitutional abrogation of the Addis Ababa accord and the provisions of the Southern Self Government Act of 1972.[56] With eight provinces, Sudan had reverted to the colonial configuration of divide and rule.

4.1.6 Oil find

In 1978, The Chevron oil Company struck oil in the northern part of Bahr-el-Ghazal. The discovery of oil became critical factor in Sudan politics and significantly contributed to the intensification the North-South conflict and also to the internationalisation of that conflict.[57] The Addis Ababa Agreement had assigned all revenue realisable from commercial, agricultural, industrial activities and services to the regional treasury; these included profits accruing to the Central Government as a result of exporting products from the Southern region. The discovery of oil contributed to the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the transfer of Southern troops to the North and troops from the North to the oil fields in Bentiu.[58] The financial arrangements of the Addis Ababa Agreement meant that production taxes, business profit tax, income tax and profits realisable from sales of oil would

[55] Ibid., p. 285.
[56] Ibid., p. 287.
[57] Peter Nyot Kok, "The Ties That Will Not Bind: Conflict and Racial Cleavage in the Sudan," in Anyang Nyong'o, *Arms and Daggers in the Heart of Africa*, African Academy of Sciences, (Nairobi: Academy Sciences Publishers, 1993), pp. 33-65.
[58] Ibid., p. 54.

all have gone to the Southern treasury. The Central Government lost vast revenues to the legal regime created by the Addis Ababa Agreement were not legally repealed through a fresh agreement. The Central Government could have requested the Regional Government to accept review of sharing oil revenues as economic circumstances had changed radically since 1972.[59] On the contrary, it opted to adjust provincial boundaries so that oil fields and refineries in the South were physically and geographically located in the North. The current Peace Agreement signed in Nairobi 9th January 2005 has a protocol on oil wealth sharing which is viewed as an extension of the 1972 Peace Agreement.

4.2 Shari'a Law

The Interim period (1972-1977) embraced many socio-economic reforms and programmes. Economic Progress in the South depended on peace and tranquillity; continuity of policies and stable Government, availability of trained manpower and financial resources. While the Government was committed to institutional and capacity building, two events particularly worked against the sustainability of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement.[60]

First, the Black September, an organization working for the Palestinian cause, planned and attacked and killed American diplomats gathered at the residence of a Saudi Ambassador in Khartoum. The attack coincided with the arrival of the Chief Mediator of the Addis Ababa Agreement Emperor Haile Selassie in Juba to mark the first Peace

[59] Ibid., p. 55.
[60] Ibid., p. 57.

Anniversary. This act was perceived to frustrate the fragile Peace Agreement.[61]

Second, in May 1973, the Constituent Assembly debated a draft constitution for the country; Islamic fundamentalists pressured the Government to change the Constitution to accommodate a strong element of Shari'a doctrine.[62] It was proposed that Islam should be the religion of the state; the Head of state was to be a Moslem and a religious head. All legislation was to be in conformity with Islamic Jurisprudence. It seemed clear at this early stage that the proposals were aimed at frustrating the terms of the agreement and replacing it with an Islamic Constitution. The Interim in September 1983, Nimeiri imposed Shari'a throughout the country, eliminating the civil penal code. Some of the provisions of these laws compromised the political, cultural and economic rights of the people. Shari'a law was bitterly resented by secularised Muslims and non-Muslim Southerners.[63] The SPLM denounced the Shari'a, its executions and amputations ordered by religious courts. In addition, traditional islamic punishments were imposed for petty theft, adultery, homicide and apostasy.[64] The introduction of Shari'a law presupposed the creation of an Islamic political economic system and social system. Friday replaced Sunday as a rest and prayer day in the South. The formation of SPLM/SPLA in July 1983 was motivated by the unilateral imposition of Shari'a law. This plunged Sudan into a state of political chaos and anarchy, which included the fall of Nimeiri in April 1985. Under the Addis Ababa Agreement, the Southern Region Assembly

[61] Ibid., p. 59.
[62] Ibid., p. 61.
[63] Ibid., p. 63.
[64] Apostasy is a religious charge for switching from one religion to another or reversal to paganism or animism

could vote to request the President of the Republic to withdraw any bill before the National Assembly, which could potentially affect the welfare, rights or interests of the citizens of the Southern region.[65] It could also request the President to postpone the enactment of any law deemed detrimental to those rights and interests.[66] The Southern region could not have repealed for the Sharia laws after it was legally dissolved in 1981.

4.3 Cease-fire

The Cease-fire agreement was an integral component of the General Peace Agreement and came into force on 3rd March 1972. The cease-fire marked an end to all military operations and all armed actions. All combat forces were to remain in the area under their control. The Government and *Anya nya I* agreed to forbid individual or collective acts of violence and forbid underground activities contrary to public order.[67]

Movement of Government forces and *Anya nya I* outside the areas under their control were to be allowed only if unarmed and authorized by their respective authorities. A Joint Commission was created for the implementation of Cease-fire, integration of *Anya nya I* and repatriation of refugees. Its membership included countries surrounding Southern Sudan as well as representatives of the ICRC, The WCC, AACC and the UNHCR.[68] The Cease-fire plan outlined by the Addis Ababa Agreement lacked detailed and specific instructions pertaining to the actual time the Cease-fire was to take effect. The Cease-fire did not specify details of Assembly Areas on ground; it did not have a projected Cease-fire plan.

[65] Kok, "The Ties That Will Not Bind: Conflict and Racial Cleavage in the Sudan," p. 65.
[66] For the powers accorded to the Southern Region Assembly by the Addis Ababa Agreement, see chapter III articles 14-15 of the Sudan Peace Agreement.
[67] Alier "The Addis Ababa Agreement," in Abel Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured: Southern Sudan*, pp. 151-153.
[68] Ibid., p. 151.

The terms of reference for the Cease-fire Joint Commission were shallow.[69] Other than lacking in military operational detail, the Cease-fire violations were minimal as would have been expected. There were two shooting incidents, one sabotage incident and one explosion incident during the early days of Cease-fire observance.

The Cease-fire period was very vulnerable due to security dilemma. Accordingly, sufficient arrangements were required to safeguard compromise on security. Security safeguard entailed the opening up of the National Army to 12,000 officers and men of which 6000 men would be ex-*Anya nya I* combatants.[70] This was a necessary representation in such a prestigious national institution of power. The recruitment and integration of citizens from the southern region within the People's Armed Forces was to be determined by a Joint Military Commission taking into account the need for initial separate deployment of troops with a view of achieving smooth integration into the National Force.[71]

The other aspect closely related with cease-fire and security was amnesty and other judicial guarantees. The Addis Ababa Agreement contained a general amnesty covering seventeen years of Civil War. No action or legal proceedings were to be instituted against any person in court of law on account of any act committed inside or outside Sudan from 18th August 1955. The indemnity Act was promulgated into law on 3rd March 1972, which was the Peace Agreement ratification day.[72] Over 2,000 detainees and prisoners charged or convicted of crimes associated

[69] Ibid., p. 151.
[70] Ibid., p. 151.
[71] Ibid., p. 152.
[72] Ibid., p. 152.

with Civil War were released.[73] By 1981, Nimeiri had imprisoned 24 Southern Political leaders and soldiers who stood in support of unity and peace agreement thus eroding Government trust.[74]

4.4 National Reconciliation

The Process of the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement was not only Nimeiri's personal and independent design.[75] On one hand, the political forces he had displaced in 1969 became hostile to an agreement that empowered the South. Intense pressure was brought to bear on Nimeiri to abrogate the Addis Ababa Agreement because it had allegedly diluted the Arab-Islamic component of the Sudanese identity and compromised National Security.[76] Nimeiri's opponents operating from Tripoli viewed the agreement as betrayal of Arabism and collusion with World Council of Churches (WCC), Ethiopia and the All Africa Council of Churches (AACC). The conspiracy theory implied a clash between Christianity and Islam[77] The role of the Christian church contributed to the undoing of the 1972 Sudan Peace Agreement. Islamic representatives were not involved during the negotiation and signing of the peace agreement.

Sustained pressure forced President Nimeiri to reach an agreement of national reconciliation with Saddiq al Mahdi, one of the leaders of the

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[73] The amnesty issue was a legal prosecution guarantee against 1955 Torit mutineers. The mutiny rocked military and civilian establishments in the Southern Provinces. The mutiny claimed lives and collateral damage. In the years preceding the Peace Agreement, the Government was not honest in amnesty guarantees.

[74] Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured: Southern Sudan*, p. 153.

[75] Kasfir N., "One full Revolution: The Politics of Sudanese Military Government 1969-1985," in Harbeson J. ed., *The Military in African Politics*, (London: Praeger, 1987), pp.153-164.

[76] Ibid., p. 154.

[77] Ibid., p. 155.

National Islamic Front (NIF) and architecture of 1976 Libyan-backed coup against Nimeiri.[78] Under the terms of this agreement, Nimeiri had undertaken to effect democratisation of some institutions such as the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), to review some aspects of the 1973 National Constitution especially Article 16 which gave Christianity an equal footing with Islam and a review of the Addis Accord which the opposition regarded as a sell out to the people of South.[79] The NIF was particularly opposed to one Sudan, preferring instead to three regions as this provided a greater opportunity for inter-regional conflict.

The Northern opposition opposed a secular constitution, preferring an Islamic constitution, which recommended an Islamic head of state as a religious leader. The Addis Ababa Agreement and the 1972 Self Government Act were seen as potentially capable of providing substantial political power to the South. Northerners demanded two concessions in exchange for providing support to Nimeiri: First, Nimeiri would get full support from the political forces in the North if only he would review and effect substantial changes in the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, which in their view had divided national sovereignty into two (dual sovereignty. Second, issues relating to religion, cultural diversity and equality, powers to check the central Government and the existence of the Southern region as a single sovereign entity had to be challenged in exchange for political support. Third, Nimeiri was to be crowned as the greatest Islamic leader in Sudan's history if he approved and implemented an Islamic constitution.[80] Nimeiri acceded to the Northern opposition pressure, by agreeing to the abrogation of Addis Ababa Accord and endorsing a

[78] Ibid., p. 156.
[79] Ibid., p. 158.
[80] Ibid., p. 164.

national reconciliation policy. He finally confirmed his ambition of Islamising Sudan by imposing Shari'a Laws in 1983.[81]

4.5 Integration

The need for integrating former combatants became very critical if issues of security dilemma were to be sorted out. Integration ensured confidence and trust between belligerents. The agreement provided for integration of the absorbed [82] and old forces[83] in the Southern Command[84] over a period of five years from the time of recruitment.[85] However, before integration between the old and new recruits was carried out, integration among the *Anya nya I* was required. The integration within *Anya nya I* required that some of the troops had to be transferred from one province to another followed by internal transfers within each province.

It was evident in the negotiation stage of the Addis Ababa talks that there would be enormous difficulties in bringing the two forces together. A new cohesive National Army with a common purpose and doctrine of a National Defence was not any easy task given the length of the war and the destruction it had caused. Moreover, the training of the two forces was asymmetrical with the Government forces trained on conventional

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[81] Ibid., p. 165.
[82] Absorbed forces in the context used here refer to the ex *Anya nya I* combatants and civilian recruits who qualified to be employed in the new Armed Forces.
[83] Old forces refer to the old professional soldiers of the Sudan Peoples' Defence Forces who continued to serve in the new Armed Forces.
[84] Southern Command refers to a Southern based Military Command structure, which was physically located in the Southern Region. At the time of the Peace Agreement, the Sudan Armed Forces were based on Northern and Southern Command respectively. The South-North typology was used for ease of Administration and Command.
[85] Abel Alier, "The *Anya nya I* Integration," in Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured: Southern Sudan*, pp. 164-180.

warfare and *Anya nya I* trained on guerrilla warfare. The newly formed National Army needed military re-engineering that reflected a new national outlook.[86]

After recruitment and initial training were completed by middle of 1973 the Joint Military Commission laid down a plan of integration for five years.[87] The integration plan dealt with the re-organization, re-structuring and training. The absorbed forces were expected to acquire administrative and technical skills from the old forces. Training programmes incorporated replacement of arms with new ones, standardization of work procedures and weaponry. By the end of 1976, the absorbed forces were fully armed, equipped and trained according to the standards laid down by the Armed Forces. The Southern Command was fully established under the control and command of the absorbed officers.[88]

The integration process was not a smooth project. It was marred with mutinies, desertions, discrimination and violent acts of suspicion. Equally frustrating in the integration process was the Army's refusal to promote the absorbed officers and give them equal facilities until intervention by the President himself. Discrimination in terms of promotion was considered a serious morale problem, which was responsible for Akobo mutiny in 1975, and Wau desertion in 1976 respectively.

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[86] Ibid., p. 165.
[87] Ibid., p. 168.
[88] Ibid., p. 170.

The *Anya nya I* main pre-occupation was to join the prestigious National Army during the integration process. Joining other pseudo-military institutions such as the Administration, Prisons and Police force was considered inferior. Other opportunities that were offered in the agricultural sector such as farming were shunned. Instead, those who rejected integration incentives opted to go back to the bush and frustrate the integration process. These acts were responsible for the non-sustainability of the Peace Agreement.

In spite of the guarantees given by the Peace Agreement, the *Anya nya I* were reacting to an external environment, as they perceived it. The perception was that of Arab versus African. As Abel Alier puts it, "it was not the type of arrangement the ordinary *Anya nya I* had expected." [89] The *Anya nya I* did not expect to be in the same Army with an enemy they had fought for nearly 30 years. The integration process was therefore expected to last beyond five years and required tremendous emotional adjustments.[90]

4.6 The Role of the Church

The AACC and WCC were part of the informal mediators in the Addis Ababa talks. The Church was viewed by both parties as impartial and possessing the leverage required for a successful mediation. It was argued that the church was a suitable mediator because of its holy vocation and because its core business was one of peace and reconciliation.

[89] Ibid., p. 172.
[90] Ibid., p. 174.

The basis of that argument was essentially religious and not based on the practical aspects of involving the Church in conflict management.[91]

Although the church seemed to have been accepted by both parties as one of the mediators, its status as a non-state actor, its effectiveness diminished at a later stage in the mediation process.[92] Several reasons may have been responsible for church's diminishing effectiveness in the peace talks: First, the Church, as an institution of faith, lacked the necessary conflict management skills. Second, and as Mwagiru puts it, "it is one thing to enter a conflict as a third party and quite another to enter it with knowledge that has been acquired from past experience, research and analysis of the environment and political economy in which the conflict took place."[93]

Third, the Church came late into the Sudan conflict history. Lack of past history in the Sudan conflict contributed to the passive role of the Church. The idea to have a Church as a mediator was agreed upon in 1971, which was viewed by observers and critics as an insufficient period to have studied the conflict.

Lastly, history defines parties and interests to a conflict. It defines the causes of conflict, forms the fundamental basis for understanding conflict and provides a vision of the past and in so doing makes it possible to draw up a vision for the future. This is the fundamental philosophy within which church-mediated peace process ought to be based. The AACC and WCC lacked the conflict history of Sudan and particularly

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[91] Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions Management*, pp. 129-141.
[92] Ibid., p. 138.
[93] Ibid., p. 139.

failed to visualize the centrality of religion as a fundamental value in the conflict.[94] The adoption of Shari'a law in September 1983 was an affirmation that the Church led mediation did not guarantee religious freedom and autonomy. It instead confirmed religious hegemony in Sudan, ten years after the signing of the Peace Agreement.

On the contrary, the Church-led mediation effort in Mozambique enabled the conclusion of the Rome General Peace Agreement in 1992 and successfully bringing seventeen years of Civil War to an end.

4.7 The Implementation of Mozambique Peace Agreement

The Mozambican Civil War lasted for seventeen years with almost one million Mozambicans dead, three million IDPs and nearly eight million faced starvation.[95] On October 2, 1992, FRELIMO and RENAMO signed a peace treaty that ended one of the most brutal and devastating Civil Wars. The Peace Agreement was successfully implemented and sustained. Success of the Peace Agreement was hinged on several critical issues being resolved and meticulous implementation of the Peace Agreement plans and programmes. Several variables were responsible for the successful outcome and implementation of the Peace Agreement.

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[94] Ibid., p. 140.
[95] William Finnegan, *A complicated war: The Harrowing of Mozambique*, (Berkeley: University of California, 1992), p.4.

4.8 Extraneous Variable

Severe droughts in 1984 and 1992 contributed to the urge for RENAMO and FRELIMO to negotiate. The 1992 drought caused severe human suffering in Mozambique and threatened millions. The rural peasantry was the key providers of ration to RENAMO thus guaranteeing them of a continuous and critical logistical support. Amid fears of mass starvation, RENAMO soldiers defected to FRELIMO to avoid starvation. Famine was therefore a contributing factor to the realization that the conflict was becoming costly in terms of human loses and hence the need to negotiate. Continued fighting would have been mutually catastrophic to both parties; an ideal scenarios for zero-sum conflict.[96]

4.9 Military stalemate

A lengthy military stalemate demonstrated to FRELIMO and RENAMO that neither side could win a decisive military victory. The state of affairs moved the conflict from a normal stalemate to a hurting stalemate.[97] Each side perceived that it was unable to win the conflict by itself. Continued conflict would have lasted into an indefinite future with each side still possessing the ability to hurt the other. RENAMO and FRELIMO perceived a moment that would be mutually hurting. A conducive moment slowly emerged which was favourable for negotiation and mediation.

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[96] The *United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, "Achieving Demobilization," pp. 38-46.

[97] The concepts of hurting stalemate and ripe moments are discussed by William Zartman "Introduction: Mediation Theory," in Touval S.; and Zartman I.W. eds., *International Mediation in Theory and Practise*, (Washington: United States Institute for Peace, 1985), p. 22.

Closely related to hurting stalemate is the concept ripe moment. Zartman demonstrates that ripe moments for conflict arise where a situation of deadlock exists and unilateral solutions are blocked and joint solutions become conceivable. [98] The conflict in Mozambique attained its peak in 1987 when FRELIMO and RENAMO realized that continued fighting could only lead to unacceptable cost and mutual losses. The imminent mutual catastrophe coupled with severe droughts in 1984 and 1992 enabled the two parties to realize mutual destruction and hence making negotiation efforts possible.[99] Severe draught caused severe food shortage, which affected both FRELIMO and RENAMO troops during combat. Lack of food was responsible for mass defections and downing of weapons by troops from both sides.

The 1984 Nkomati Accord and subsequent peace talks between FRELIMO and RENAMO were possible due to the reality that military victory was not possible. The Rome-based Christian Community of Sant Egidio observed a ripe moment in the conflict and subsequently hosted twelve rounds of peace talks resulting in the signing of the General Peace Agreement.

A transitional authority was needed in Mozambique in order to facilitate the entry of foreign military forces in its domestic jurisdiction. The external dimension of the Mozambique conflict emerged due to increased concern of regional and international actors in the conflict. The United Nations in Mozambique represented a transitional authority that

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[98] Ibid., p. 24.

[99] The concept of Imminent Mutual Catastrophe (IMC) developed by William Zartman reinforces the concept of hurting stalemate and ripe moments. It is necessary in Conflict Management for two parties to perceive mutual destruction. This realization of a mutual cost and loss can transform conflict from zero-sum to positive-sum outcome.

was charged with the monitoring of Cease-fire, providing and coordinating humanitarian assistance and monitoring of elections. ONUMOZ was established in Mozambique in 1992 through United Nations resolution 797. The scope of the United Nations Mission was to allow 7,500 military personnel to monitor Cease-fire as part of a wider peacekeeping operation.[100] Five infantry battalions were established at Nampula, Tete, Chimoio, Inhambane and Matola.[101] For ONUMOZ infantry battalion deployment, see Annex F.

The establishment of ONUMOZ necessitated the creation of other United Nations subsidiary Commissions and Councils directly concerned with the smooth transition from civil war to a stable post-conflict Government. The United Nations success in Mozambique was due to its ability to accommodate the structure of the conflict, its causes, local capacities comprehensive undertaking of demobilization, disarmament, reintegration, humanitarian, de-mining, Cease-fire and election monitoring programmes.

The United Nations operation in Mozambique stood as testimony to the ability of the international transitional authority vested with quasi-legal sovereign authority to help build the foundation for sustained peace. During its two-year mandate, the United Nations helped to achieve a remarkable political transformation through the supervision of the implementation of the Peace Agreement.[102]

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[100] *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, pp. 23-29.
[101] Ibid., p. 30.
[102] Ibid., pp. 67-69.

4.10 Demobilization and Disarmament

Demobilization and disarmament was the most dangerous and complex phase of the ONUMOZ mandate. Demobilization and disarmament were conducted concurrently in order to guarantee the necessary security to FRELIMO and RENAMO.[103] The supervisory and monitoring commission was the supreme authority that supervised the activities of the CFC, Commission for Reintegration (CORE) and the CCFADM. The United Nations chaired all the operations of the CSC, CCF and CORE while membership included United States, European Community and Mozambique and her regional neighbours.[104]

The Cease-fire Commission was created to verify Cease-fire adherence and violations. It was also charged with the responsibility for demobilization, assembly and cantonment of Government and RENAMO soldiers, setting itineraries for the movement of forces in order to avoid fratricide. Analysing and verifying the accuracy of statistics provided by the parties on troop strength, arms and military equipment was a very difficult exercise due to dishonesty of both parties.

The most important task of the CCF was the operational administration of Cease-fire. The Cease-fire was a cessation of military operations between Government and RENAMO forces. A Cease-fire plan entailed time-specific and irreversible activities, which were to be observed and implemented in strict terms of the Peace Agreement. Cease-fire arrangements were of utmost security priority that it was found necessary

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[103] The *United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, "Achieving Demobilization," pp. 38-46; and Vines, *RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique*, pp. 149-152.
[104] The *United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, "Achieving Demobilization," pp. 38-46.

to dedicate Protocol VI of the General Peace Agreement exclusively to address the cessation of armed conflict, operational timetable for the cease-fire and release of prisoners except for those being held for ordinary crimes.[105]

ONUMOZ carried out and supervised the terms of the cease-fire by disarming and demobilizing and reintegrating about 80,000 former combatants. By January 1994, 9,895 Government soldiers and 6,714 RENAMO troops had been assembled at AAs.[106] By mid April 1994, more than 49,000 soldiers had reported to assembly areas for cantonment of which 34000 were from the government and 14,000 from RENAMO. Post-demobilization verification exercise eliminated the possibility of hiding weapons, which would have worked against the Cease-fire terms.[107] ONUMOZ military observers closely verified the demobilization and disarmament processes while ONUMOZ infantry contingents monitored security along transport corridors, airports, weapons and ammunition depots. Effective demobilization and disarmament provided a peaceful environment, which led to October 1994 elections.

Using Duan Bratt's indicators for measuring success or failure of Peace Agreements, it becomes certain that mandate achievement is a key variable in determining success of Peace Agreement in Mozambique.[108] Consequently, looking at the implementation of the Peace Agreement in the context of demilitarisation, humanitarian assistance, reintegration and

[105] Ibid., p. 36.
[106] Ibid., p. 40.
[107] Ibid., p. 41.
[108] The argument for and against using Mandate achievement as a measure of success or failure of implementation of Peace Agreements is extensively discussed by Duan Bratt. For details, see Duan Bratt "Assessing Peacekeeping Success," in Michael Pugh, eds., *The UN, Peace and Force*, (New York: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 64-81.

election monitoring and supervision, ONUMOZ's mandate was considered a success since all its political and military objectives were met and accomplished in accordance with the ONUMOZ's mandate. ONUMOZ was one of the most effective peacekeeping operations in the history of the United Nation's. It brought peace to Mozambique and contributed directly to political transformation that made Mozambique set a firm course towards peace, democracy and development.[109]

4.11 The Role of the Church

In Mozambique, religion offered hope and a certain measure of security to RENAMO. Although the Catholic Church was initially viewed with suspicion by FRELIMO, it was later accepted as a neutral non-state mediator. Subsequently, the Community of Santo Egidio undertook the church-led peace initiative in 1990 by hosting a series of rounds of peace talks.[110] The Catholic Church was viewed as a strategic instrument for mediation because it constituted 30% of Mozambique population.[111] The Mozambique Christian Council (CCM) in particular promoted unity and cooperation among Mozambique churches. The CCM publicly called for dialogue between Mozambicans caught in armed conflict and eventually succeeded in bringing RENAMO and Government together in Nairobi in 1989.[112] It was on this presumed impartial basis that the Church was able to participate in the peace processes up to the signing of the Peace Agreement. The role played by the Community of Santo Egidio was complimentary to the Catholic Church's relentless

[109] The *United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, "Achieving Demobilization," pp. 38-46.
[110] On the role of the Church in Mozambique conflict mediation, see Sengulane and Goncalves, "The Demands of God's Faithfulness: A Case Study of Peacemaking in Mozambique," pp. 192-197; and Vines, *Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique*, pp.103-119.
[111] Vines, *Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique*, pp.103-119.
[112] Ibid., p. 121.

effort for peace. In the Government's view, the church was the best compromise mediation agency as negotiating with RENAMO would have accorded it an equal status with the Government.[113]

4.12 Political Reform

RENAMO's impetus to armed struggle was centred on political reform and legitimacy. RENAMO wanted some form of multiparty democracy, which required transition from one party state to a multiparty system, and renunciation of Marxist Leninist mode of Government, which had destroyed Mozambican rural society through revolutionary Leninist social engineering.[114] In December 1990, FRELIMO agreed to adopt a new constitution that provided for multi-party elections and new political parties. Multi-party elections were the only way of restoring a legitimate Government. Political reforms included the establishment of an Electoral Commission whose one third of the members were to be selected by RENAMO.[115] The Electoral Commission was a transitional body, which oversaw post-agreement elections.[116]

The Government enacted electoral laws governing election monitoring, electoral process, settling of electoral complaints, campaign rules and procedure for announcing results. Other than assisting RENAMO with facilities and logistical support to carryout its political activities in all provincial capitals, electoral laws ensured basic freedoms and rights to IDPs and refugees. They were guaranteed restitution of

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[113] Ibid., pp. 120-122.
[114] Hall and Young, "The Retreat from Socialism," in Hall and Young, *Confronting the Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence*, pp.189-216.
[115] Ibid., pp. 199-204.
[116] Ibid., p. 197.

property, resettlement and the franchise to vote. RENAMO and the Government had also to agree on dual administration, which protected RENAMO from political obsolescence. This arrangement was not resolved until after a post-election Government was in place.[117]

On the economic front, the Government undertook extensive liberalization programmes including restitution of acquired property to their former owners. Centralized economy was replaced with liberal institutionalism and former socialist economic structures were virtually replaced.[118]

4.13 The Role of Third Party Actors

The Mozambique conflict was a complex one involving several actors and hence multiplicity of interests and values. Third Party actors in Mozambique conflict included regional and international actors.[119] Zimbabwe, South Africa and Malawi were endogenous third parties, to the Mozambican conflict. Malawi remained an ardent supporter of FRELIMO for strategic economic reasons. Zimbabwe's economic survival demanded its support for FRELIMO when it became apparent that a military solution was not tenable.[120] South Africa remained opposed to FRELIMO's Communist rule and continued to support RENAMO. However, with the end of Cold War in 1989, support for

[117] Ibid., pp. 205-212.
[118] Ibid., pp. 217-234.
[119] Vines, "The International Dimension," in Renamo: *From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique* pp. 32-72.
[120] Ibid., p. 56.

ideological battle between Mozambique Marxist Government and RENAMO disappeared, as did their sponsors including South Africa.[121]

By late 1980s, Zimbabwe, Malawi and South Africa openly supported a political settlement of Mozambique conflict, as continued fighting proved mutually expensive to members of the Southern Africa conflict system. Their support for a negotiated settlement provided the required neighbourhood goodwill for an enduring Peace Agreement. International actors played a minimal role in the mediation and implementation of the Peace Agreement. Britain's role for example was restricted to training the Mozambique Defence Forces while the United States played a peripheral mediation role under Reagan's anti-communist doctrine which sought to destabilize communist regimes.[122]

4.14 Security Guarantees

RENAMO could have returned to war before and during negotiations if FRELIMO did not offer credible and enforceable security guarantees. Once the underlying issues was resolved, negotiations were centred on security guarantees that would protect RENAMO once they demobilized and disarmed. Resolving the Mozambique Civil War required much more than simply reaching a bargain and instituting a Cease-fire.[123] The Mozambique civil war required to consolidate

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[121] Ibid., p. 65.
[122] Ibid., p. 50.
[123] Barbara F. Walter, "Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization and Commitments to Peace," in Michael Brown et al, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* eds., (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2001), pp. 415-441.

RENAMO into a new Government capable of accommodating their political interests and build a new national non-partisan National Army.[124]

Theoretically, RENAMO was expected to surrender the northern territory comprising five provinces to a single administration, not necessarily their own. This did not happen and as it became to be practically demonstrated when RENAMO's security concerns became apparent in the first round of negotiations in July 1990 when it made three demands. First, it insisted that a mediator be present during negotiations.[125] This was eventually resolved when the two parties settled for Santo Egidio Community and Italian Government as the official mediators. Second, it demanded that a Cease-fire begin only after the Government had discussed specific military and political reforms. These included an Armed Force comprised of equal strength of Government and RENAMO soldiers, the introduction of multiparty politics through registering and recognizing RENAMO as a political party. Third, it called for extensive United Nations involvement in monitoring, supervision and guaranteeing implementation. RENAMO favoured an elaborate United Nations operation similar to that established in Cambodia in 1992 where comprehensive security guarantees were put in place.[126]

In spite of a near stalemate, several critical issues were resolved. Chissano and Dhlakama reached a consensus that offered RENAMO and FRELIMO both military and territorial security guarantees. The two leaders agreed that Mozambique's new National Army would consist of

[124] Ibid., p. 415.
[125] Ibid., p. 419.
[126] Ibid., p. 423.

15,000 FRELIMO and 15,000 RENAMO soldiers.[127] This was a critical security step in case either party was dishonest. In addition, the Government retained its security forces but were monitored by the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission. Under the new security terms, RENAMO remained in the five Northern provinces it had occupied prior to elections while Government administrators are allowed to establish a presence throughout the country.[128] RENAMO was not forced to relinquish administrative control over home regions before elections. All these measures were taken as a strategy to guarantee security in case one party was dishonest. When these guarantees were agreed upon, Chissano and Dhlakama signed the Rome Accord ending the seventeen years of Civil War. The Mozambique case illustrates how security guarantees can convince two combatants to end Civil War through a negotiated settlement rather than a decisive military victory. This confirmed a hypothetical premise that a successful peace agreement must address security guarantees.[129]

4.15 Commitment to power sharing

Groups that want to end Civil War through negotiations must also relinquish administrative control over acquired territory to a new central Government. In case of RENAMO, it demanded to retain territorial, control of five Northern provinces under its military control, it demanded an equal strength ratio in the new National Defence Forces, and demanded equal status with FRELIMO as an opponent political party.[130]

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[127] Ibid., p. 424.
[128] Ibid., p. 425.
[129] Ibid., p. 426.
[130] Hoile, Mozambique, *Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment*, pp. 102-223.

Elections were held in October 1994 with RENAMO threatening to boycott the elections. Chissano won the Presidency and FRELIMO carried five of the country's ten provinces. RENAMO won a majority in the remaining five provinces. After wining the polls, Chissano refused to form a coalition Government and refused to include Dhlakama in his cabinet despite strong domestic and international pressure to do so.[131]

These actions affirmed RENAMO's imminent feeling of political trickery, vulnerability, political obsolescence and post-agreement exploitation by FRELIMO. Although represented in parliament, RENAMO had little if any official influence in the Government.[132] As expected, RENAMO responded by refusing to relinquish authority in five provinces it had won resulting in a dual administration. RENAMO eventually, opted not to return to war because it had secured sufficient security guarantees for its safety. It can be argued that although power-sharing arrangement is a key variable in determining the durability of peace agreements, lack of it does not necessarily lead to the re-ignition of civil war.[133] What appeared to have held back RENAMO were its physical security guarantees, retention of political territory and autonomy.[134]

A variable matrix was considered to have contributed to the outcome of peace agreements in Sudan and Mozambique. Eight variables were used to analyse conflict and peace agreements in Sudan and Mozambique respectively. The matrix was found necessary as it

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[131] Ibid., p. 10
[132] Walter, "Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization and Commitments to Peace," pp. 432-440.
[133] Ibid., p. 437.
[134] Ibid., pp. 438-440.

conveniently showed how variables directly or indirectly affected the durability of peace agreements in the two case studies.

In order to clearly discern variables and issue areas that contributed to the outcome of peace agreement in Sudan and Mozambique, the following matrix was designed as follows:

Variable matrix: 1972 Sudan Peace Agreement

Variable/Issue Area	Yes/No	Deficiency /Consequence
Fiscal Arrangements	Yes	Deprivation of income soon followed.
Presence of Legislative and Executive Structures	Yes	Denial of political and economic autonomy soon followed.
Oil	Yes	Denial of oil income and annexure of oil fields to the North soon followed.
Sharia Law	Yes	Introduction of Islamic Penal Code led to the outbreak of second Civil War.
Cease-fire plan	Yes	Lacked sufficient details. Fraught with confusion and violation.
Reconciliatory effort	Yes	Reconciliation inclined towards the creation of an Islamic theocratic State.
Demobilisation and Integration plan	Partial	Integration focused on the agricultural sector alone.
Role of Church in Mediation	Yes	Relied on informal Track Two diplomacy. Seen as betrayal of Islamic doctrine.

Source: Matrix constructed by P N Chege

Variable matrix: 1992 Mozambique Peace Agreement

Variable/Issue Area	Yes/No	Deficiency /Consequence
Military stalemate	Yes	Zero-sum outcome. Parties to conflict sought political solution.
Transitional authority (ONUMOZ) and allied commissions present.	Yes	Afforded strategic coordination monitoring, supervision and confidence building.
Demobilization and disarmament and reintegration (DDR)	Yes	Ensured confidence building. Comprehensive Cease-fire plan and interagency coordination.
Role of Church	Yes	Confidence building and leverage. Backed by Rome-based non-state actor.
Political reform	Yes	Multiparty politics. Internal transitional mechanisms. Elevated RENAMO to a political party.
Regional actors	Yes	Supported mediation effort upon realising military stalemate was inevitable.
Security guarantees	Yes	Ensured strategic security guarantees to RENAMO. This was a very critical variable.
Post-election power sharing	No	RENAMO accepted defeat (FRELIMO-129 and RENAMO 112 seats). RENAMO chose peace rather than war despite FRELIMO's refusal to form a coalition government.

Comparative variables that supported the hypothesis that:

Fundamental human needs are necessary ingredients for peace agreements to endure were:

Variable/Issue Area	Sudan	Mozambique
Sharia Law	Applied	Not applied
Reconciliatory effort	Contributed to division between North and South	Brought together RENAMO and FRELIMO

Source: Matrix constructed by P N Chege

Variables that supported the hypothesis that: Systemic factors in a conflict system influence the outcome of peace agreements were as follows:

Variable/Issue Area	Applicable Case Study Area	
Regional actors	**Sudan**	**Mozambique**
	Ethiopia and Uganda	South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania Malawi and Kenya

Source: Matrix constructed by P N Chege

Comparative variables that supported the hypothesis that: power structures in a post-conflict government determine the success of peace agreements were as follows:

Variable/Issue Areas	Applicable Case Study Area	
	Sudan	**Mozambique**
Political reforms programmes	Moderate	Adequate
Explicit power sharing structures	Moderate and temporary	Not adequate

Source: Matrix constructed by P N Chege

Comparative variables/issues areas that influenced the outcome of peace agreements were as follows:

Variable/Issue Area	Applicable Case Study Area	
	Sudan	**Mozambique**
Military stalemate	Not realised	Realised

Transitional authority	No credible international or internal transitional authority	Very elaborate in form of ONUMOZ and its allied Commissions
Role of Church in mediation effort	Effective	Effective
Security guarantees	Not adequate as incidents of violations depicted vagueness in Cease-fire modalities.	Adequate
Demobilization, disarmament and reintegration	Not adequate	Adequate and included lack of employment compensation
Fiscal arrangements	Provided for and later denied	Not applicable
Oil	Did not contribute to income generation to the South	Not applicable
Cease-fire plan	Not elaborate	Elaborate
Reintegration plan	Partially elaborate	Elaborate

Source: Matrix constructed by P N Chege

Chapter Five

Conclusion

Post Cold War Civil Wars in Africa have been fairly complex, violent, protracted and unpredictable. There has been a shift from Inter-state to Intra-state conflict. The most glaring observation in African conflicts has been their tendency to produce unstable peace agreements than those resulting from outright victory. It has been established that negotiated peace agreements have often led to renewed Civil War within five years.[1] Peace treaties are therefore vulnerable and not, as usually assumed, guarantees for perpetual peace. The 1992 Mozambican Peace Agreement was a successful model due to exogenous and endogenous variables. On the contrary, the 1972 Sudan Peace Agreement was regarded as a failure, ten years after it was signed in Addis Ababa; thus affirming the proposition that not all peace agreements are stable and tenable. The reality today is that peace agreements are volatile, unpredictable, and fraught with suspicion, security dilemma and prone to renewed and violent conflict.

Analysts of conflict resolution and Civil Wars in Africa have paid scant attention to the short-term nature of peace agreements at the detriment of stable peace in Africa. The collapse of 1972 Peace Agreement in Sudan brought to question the issue of management and sustainability of negotiated peace agreements in Post Cold War period. The collapse of Sudan Peace Agreement brought to question the irreversible and linear

[1] Roy Licklider and Barbara Walter for example have established that 50% of negotiated settlements led to a renewed warfare within five years. For details, see Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars (1945-1993)," and Walter, "*Negotiating Civil Wars: Why Bargains Fail*," pp. 42-57.

view of conflict resolution. The phenomenon provided the impetus to find out why the Sudan Peace Agreement was abrogated ten years after it was signed. On the contrary, the Mozambique Peace Agreement confirmed that not all peace agreements were bound to fail. Subsequently, failure and success of peace agreements meant that there are certain internal and external variables that influenced the outcome of peace agreements. Lack of studies and the repeated experience of success and failure of peace agreements fuelled an interest in their analysis. The existing gap in knowledge about the dynamics of peace agreements, the fact that the traditional peacekeeping approach has shifted towards a wider approach including preventive diplomacy, peace building and the fact that the contemporary military officer is required to interpret and implement peace agreement contributed to the impetus of this study.

This study tested three hypotheses as follows: first, Fundamental human needs guarantees are necessary ingredients for peace agreements to endure. Second, systemic factors in a conflict system influence the outcome of peace agreements. Finally, the structures of power sharing in a post-conflict Government determine the success of peace agreements.

The outcome of peace agreements was influenced by a multiplicity of variables, some region-specific and others common in both case studies: The 1972 Sudan Peace Agreement was abrogated when Nimeiri Government trampled upon fundamental human needs guarantees. This was evidenced by the introduction of Sharia laws in 1983 turning Sudan into an Islamic state and therefore denying Christians the practise of their religious identity. The political reconciliatory attempts in 1983 between the Government and radical Northerners was a re-affirmation of the

hypothesis that human needs guarantees are necessary ingredients in an enduring peace agreements. This was however only applicable to Sudan where religion continued to play a critical role in their political life.

There was no evidence of the denial of fundamental human needs in Mozambique as the conflict was more inclined to fighting illegitimacy and political reforms. The influence of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Malawi as regional actors contributed to the Mozambique mediation process thereby adding an international, psychological and moral dimension to the peace process. Consequently, it was in the regional actors' strategic interests that the peace agreement worked. Immediate troop withdrawal from Mozambique and cessation of RENAMO were early indicators of a regional support and goodwill to a workable peace agreement. The Mozambique case confirmed the hypothesis that systemic factors can influence the durability and sustainability of peace agreements. On the contrary; the Sudan case rejected the hypothesis.

The internationalisation of the conflict acknowledged the existence of regional pattern of interaction and interdependence. In spite of this interaction, it was only Ethiopia among the members of the Greater Horn of Africa system which played a dismal mediation role in the peace talks. Even so, Emperor Haile Selassie pulled out as track one mediator leaving the talks purely under the direction track two mediators involving individuals and church organizations.

The power sharing structures that were put in place in Mozambique and Sudan included political reforms and the granting of legislative autonomy. Political reforms in Mozambique included the acceptance of

RENAMO as a competitive political party. In addition, Mozambique endorsed parliamentary and presidential elections through a secret ballot thus making the elections process more transparent. In Sudan the granting of the southern region's autonomous legislative and administrative authority in 1972 was revoked in 1981 when the Regional Government was revoked and the region ultimately re-divided into three provinces.

Political reforms in Mozambique seemed to have fostered good relationship between RENAMO and Government, which was needed to pave way for peace. It was only after RENAMO was elevated to a political party, funded and allowed use of physical facilities that the willingness to share power became evident. However, this goodwill was not sustained as FRELIMO refused to share power soon after elections in 1994. In both cases, putting in place power sharing structures did not contribute to the sustenance of peace agreements and hence rejecting the hypothesis that the existence of power structures in a post conflict Government guaranteed the success of peace agreements. Even where peace agreements explicitly provided for power sharing structures as in Sudan's Region Assembly /High Executive Council and multi partyism and RENAMO's elevation to a political party in Mozambique, these provisions were ultimately not honoured.

Cease-fire provisions were critical to belligerent parties as it entailed aspects of Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR). Detailed Cease-fire plans ensured smooth and safe Demobilisation, Disarmament and movement to AAs. Ideally, Cease-fire plan should have comprised Cease-fire itself, Demobilisation, Disarmament and concentration of forces to Assembly Areas. The duration from Cease-fire

to concentration of forces may vary from a few days to several years depending on the level of conflict and the number of NGOs in the theatre of operations. Mozambique had many organisations complementing the UN in its peace implementation effort. In particular, the CSC, the CFC, CORE and the Joint Commission for the formation of CCFADM played a key role in coordinating security with the United Nations. On the contrary, there were no NGOs coordinating refugee return, combatant's demobilization and disarmament in the Sudan. Moreover, the Cease-fire in Sudan was sketchy and lacked in operational detail, which led to four major violations and two mass troop desertions.

The Church played a critical track two-mediation agency in Sudan and Mozambique. The impact of the Church-led mediation contributed to confidence building between FRELIMO and RENAMO, as it was perceived to be an impartial agency with the leverage to impose a will to negotiate. This, however, was not the case in Sudan where the AACC and WCC were associated with Islamic blasphemy and apostasy and hence compelling the Islamic fraternity to pressurise Nimeiri to abrogate the 1972 Peace Agreement.

This study found that success or failure of peace agreements was influenced by a multiplicity of variables; some region-specific and others transcending both case studies. It was not possible to aggregate a single causal factor for peace success or failure in either Sudan or Mozambique. In Sudan for example, the conflict was premised on religion, power and wealth sharing while the Mozambique conflict was all about illegitimacy of FRELIMO Government. It was evident that there is no universal blue print model for a workable peace agreement because as already

mentioned; no conflict in one region can be replicated elsewhere. Nonetheless, there are certain issues that transcend nearly all conflicts, which must, in future, be contemplated before designing a workable peace agreement. These include basic human needs, systemic and structural issues.

From neighboring states point of view, it would follow that the attitude of the surrounding states towards a peace agreement played a key role in influencing the outcome of peace agreements. This study demonstrated that supporting or undermining the prospects of peace, spoilers for example were known to obtain sanctuary and to launch attacks from neighboring states.[135] South Africa, Uganda and Ethiopia were enlisted as practical examples.

The external dimension of evaluating peace implementation was considered a relevant variable in this study. Accordingly, a key sign of a commitment was whether powerful states supported intervention and publicly announced that the conflict threatened or formed part of their national interest. The study established hypothetically that geographical proximity of a civil war to a regional power had a positive correlation with its likely involvement in the peace implementation. Regional actors involved in the Mozambique and Sudan Peace Agreements were Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, South Africa and Uganda and Ethiopia respectively. In the Mozambique conflict and its subsequent peace agreement, it was in the economic and political interest of Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia and South Africa to have a successful implementation of

[135] On the influence of neighbour rogue states and spoilers in peace agreements , see Stedman "Spoiler Problems in Peace Process," in *International Security* 22 no. 2 (fall 1977):32-36; and Brown eds., *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, pp. 366-414.

the Rome Peace Agreement as it guaranteed resumption of commercial services through the strategic ports of Maputo, Beira, Nacau and Quelimane. Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia have been experiencing tense diplomatic relations with mutual accusations of support for groups fighting their respective regimes. Sudan accused Uganda of supporting the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) while Uganda accused Sudan of aiding and giving sanctuary to Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Eastern Uganda. Eritrean Nationalist Movements e.g., The Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) received support from Sudan. In return, Ethiopia gave massive support to SPLA in terms of military and other strategic support

The study provided new insights in the process of analysing and managing peace agreements. Consequently, the existing gap in the knowledge about the implementation and management of peace agreements has been filled. Accordingly, region-specific peace agreement model can be derived based on the general ingredients of a sustainable peace agreement. On a continental level, the study revealed general problems associated with the management of peace agreements which regional agencies like the AU and IGAD may take into consideration before intervening in regional conflicts.

The study derives fundamental elements, which must be addressed in the drafting and negotiation of peace agreements. It provides possible answers as to why some peace agreements have been vulnerable to failure. It ultimately provides a checklist for fundamental issues that need to be addressed in management of peace agreements in Africa.

This study conceded that no conflict is geographically and historically the same. This axiomatic assertion means that conflicts are caused by a multiplicity of factors, some region-specific and others transcending global conflict systems. The multiplicity of factors also suggested that it is possible to isolate measurement variables that transcend in all conflicts and hence recommending their universal application for measuring success or failure of peace agreements.

Despite a comprehensive peace agreement signed between the government of Sudan and SPLA, its sustainability cannot be predicted as there are numerous fundamental issues that remain to be resolved.

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Annex A: Sudan Historical Benchmarks

Historical Benchmark Dates

The complexity of Sudan's political conflict merits historical benchmarks dates in order to portray an easy-to-refer chronology of events. It also enables a quick understanding of the dynamic nature of the Sudan conflict:

1821 - 1885 Formation of the Mahdist State.

1885- 1898 Anglo Egyptian Condominium.

1947 The Juba Conference

1954 First Self-Governing Elections

1955 First Military Mutiny at Torit. First *Anya nya I* elements formed.

1956 Independence.

1958- 1964 Abboud Regime. Christian preaching banned. Friday replaces Sunday as a prayer day. Missionaries in the South expelled.

1965 The Round Table Conference sought to resolve the problem of South Sudan.

1969 Gaafar Nimeiri comes to power and issues his famous political declaration recognising the Cultural diversity of the South.

1971 Delegates from the All Africa Council of churches (AACC) World Council of Churches (WCC), Sudan Government and SSLM met in Addis Ababa for pre-negotiation talks.

1972	Representatives of the Government, and SSLM signed the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement on 27th February 1972. Agreement ratified on 3rd March 1972.
1973	The South is granted a Federal Status through the enactment of the Southern Region Self Government Act.
1975	Oil discovered in Southern Sudan at Bentiu and assumes a central role in Sudan conflict.
1975	First Coup attempt- 5th September 1975.
1976	Second Coup Attempt – 2nd July 1976.
1977	Nimeiri seeks national reconciliation with radical Northerners.
1978	Chevron Oil Company begins oil drilling in southern Sudan.
1983	Re-division of South Sudan into three Provinces into Bahr el Ghazal, Equatorial and Upper Nile.
1983	Introduction of Shari'a Law in September.
1983	SPLA launched. Second civil war starts.

Source: These benchmarks have been consolidated by the author from the research work.

Annex B-Map of Sudan



Source: Area Handbook Series: Sudan: A Country study 1992.

Annex C-Recommendations of the twelve-man committee.

Recommendations of the 12-man Committee held at Khartoum to the chairman of the Round Table Conference on the South June 1966.

His Excellency,

The Prime Minister

1. On the 29th of March 1965' the Round Table Conference on the south resolved that the findings on the 12-man committee which was to dwell on the Constitutional and Administrative Set-Up, "shall be presented to the Conference which shall be called by the Government within three months".
2. On the 30th of March 1965 Sayed Sir El Khatim El Khalifa the then Prime Minister announced to the conference that the Government was pleased to adopt these resolutions and do everything necessary for its success.
3. The Committee was set up nearly 2 months after the conference and for this as well as other good reasons it was not possible to finish the work within the specified period.
4. When your Government took office we had the pleasure of meeting you on the 22nd of July 1965, and you informed us that irrespective of whether we came to an agreement or not you will call for the reconvening of the Conference in November, 1965.
5. On the 15th of January, 1966 we met again together and after expressing your gratitude and appreciation for the stage which the Committee had covered you called upon us to finish the remaining items and declared: "once you come to some conclusions, we can fix a date for the Conference".

6. We now have the pleasure to inform your good self that we have come to the conclusions, which we submitted herewith, so that you may fix a date and kindly pass our report and minutes to the Chairman of the Conference.

Annex D - Report of the Twelve-Man Committee

The following is an extract of a detailed report of the 12-man Committee:

Report of the Twelve-man Committee to the Chairman of the Round

Table Conference on the South

Dear Sir,

1. On the 29th Of March, 1965 the conference resolved to set up this committee,

   a) "To dwell on the issue of Constitutional and Administrative set-up which will protect the special Interest of the South as well as the General Interest of the Sudan".

   b) "To act as a watch Committee on the implementation of the steps and policies agreed upon".

   c) "To plan the normalization of conditions in the South, and consider steps for the lifting of the state of emergency and the establishment of law and order".

2. A special minute of the conference dated 29th march, 1965 stated: "After discussing the terms of reference of the Committee which shall dwell on the Constitutional and Administrative Set-up of the Sudan, it was agreed on the statement as drafted but with this clear understanding by all delegates".

3. We now have the honour to submit tour Report.

4. The Committee held its first meeting on the 27th of May 1965. This was nearly two months after the Conference, and was due to the occupation of the Government and Political Parties in the General Elections.

We held a total of 48 meetings and heard expert witnesses on some subjects.

Chapter 1

Implementation of Resolutions and Normalization of Conditions

5. The first tasks, which the Committee undertook, were under its second and third terms of reference.

Thus in its second meeting it decided to ask the Prime Minister to submit to the Committee a report on the state of security in the South and the Execution of the Round Table Conference Resolutions. Also it was moved that acts of violence being committed in the south should be condemned.

6. On the 9th of June, 1965 P.M. Sir El Khatim El Khalifa attended the meeting of the Committee and presented a report on the state of security and the implementation of the Round Table Conference Resolutions.

The outlines of the report were:

That a Ministerial Committee had been set up to plan and supervise the implementation,

That it had already considered several reports from the concerned ministries on implementation,

That some resolutions were in fact long term policies and were not meant to be carried out immediately,

That the increase of the incidents of violence after the conference was obstructing the implementation of other resolutions.

7. Again on 22nd July the present Prime Minister, Sayeed Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub who had then taken office attended the Committee meeting on its invitation.

His stand was that the Government did start implementation by transferring Southern Officials to the South but those officials regrettably began to instigate policemen and prison warders against the Government and to assist the mutineers. The situation deteriorated and schools and hospitals had to be closed.

Implementation could only be resumed when law and order were established.

8. On the 15th of January, 1966 the Prime Minister attended the Committee's meeting again and reiterated his stand on this point.

9. The normalization of the situation in the South meant in the first place the re-establishment of law and order. If a peaceful solution was to be attained acts of violence had to cease.

But the two approaches to the question of establishing law and order which could not be reconciled during the long discussions of the Conference reasserted themselves again on the Committee: Is the establishment of law and order and a pre-requisite for the implementation of the Resolutions-in whole or part? or is it rather that only through implementing the Resolutions can law and order be established in fact?

The Northern members adopted the first approach and the Southern members the second.

10. There was also a difference of stand on the condemnation of acts of violence.

The Round Table Conference declared the conviction that only through peaceful means can the differences is settled. The members of the Committee were, therefore, unanimous in condemning acts of violence.

But who were the culprits?

Two answers were submitted.

The Northern members submitted that acts of violence by the terrorist organisation, the *Anya nya I*, should be condemned.

The Southern members submitted that violence was being committed not by the *Anya nya I* alone but by the Government's security forces as well. Both were to be condemned.

Although the two submissions were discussed seriously and in detail no common answer could be agreed upon in the end.

11. But the whole experience had its instructive side as well.

However different the approach may be, security, which was the real basis for the normalization of the situation in the South, was primarily the responsibility of the Government and it was now evident that unless the Government adopted an attitude of utmost cooperation it was unlikely that any efforts by the Committee in this respect could bear fruit. And the circumstances were not the most favourable for such an attitude. The Committee, therefore, turned its attention to its first and main term of reference.

Chapter II

The constitutional & Administrative Set-up

12. Although the Round Table Conference could not reach a unanimous resolution on the pattern of Government, which should be adopted, it did resolve that two forms of solution:

Separation and the Present status quo (Centralized Unitary Government) should not be considered by the Committee.

The members were asked to submit to the Committee their proposals on the constitutional and Administrative Set-up, and four Schemes were submitted on behalf of the following four:

1) S.A.N.U.
2) Islamic Chapter Front
3) Southern Front
4) National Unionist Unity

The Umma party decided to adopt the principles enunciated in the National Unionist Party Scheme.

13. Two Schemes were challenged in the Committee as being outside its terms of reference: The Southern Front's Scheme and the Islamic Charter Front Scheme. It was submitted that the first was a separatist scheme and the later no more than the present status quo. The Chairman after considering the submissions entertained both applications and set aside the schemes. The submissions and ruling were given in appendix B (1 to 4).

There after the I.C.F. adopted the principles of the U.N.P Scheme and the S.F. adopted the stand explained in its memorandum dated 26th September 1965 (Appendix c).

14. The Committee found that the Constitutional and Administrative formula which it was trying to workout was of two main parts: the distribution of powers between the Center and the Region and the

relationship between the two and further that its objective would be facilitated if the Distribution of powers was considered first.

Therefore lists containing the powers proposed to remain in the Center and those to be transferred to the region were worked out from the Schemes accepted by the Committee, and the study began.

15. The result was that the Committee was agreed that the following powers should be exercised by the Central Government:

1. National Defence
2. External Affairs
3. Currency
4. Communications and Tele-Communications
5. Foreign Trade
6. Nationality
7. Customs
8. Inter-Regional Trade

Concurrent Powers:

The following powers were to be concurrent between the Centre and the Region in the following manner:

16. Security Forces:

1. The National Legislature shall by enactment, organize the security forces. This will include:
   a) Recruitment and use of the National Police Force which carries out the functions assigned to such forces.
   b) The Recruitment and use of the Local Police Forces.
2. The Head National Executive shall be the ultimate authority as regards the security Forces and can in certain circumstances place any of these forces under his direct command.

Subject to (1) and (2) above the Region shall recruit and use the local police force.

17. Education:

1. The policy of education shall be National and in the hands of the Centre. Policy has been defined to include at least the following: Syllabuses, National planning of Education, definition of standards and qualifications.
2. The administration of education up to the intermediate level should be the responsibility of the Region.
3. And that it should be concurrent in the secondary stage so that the Centre and the Region may each establish such schools and administer them.
4. That Higher Education (post secondary) should be in the hands of the center.

18. Public health:

The Centre should retain:

1. The general Policy and Planning.
2. Education and training of doctors and all other professions attached to the medical profession.
3. Control and supervision of assisted projects.
4. National policy for nutrition.
5. Control over drugs and poisons.
6. Medical research and control of epidemics.
7. Registration of births and deaths.
8. Hospitals: The licensing and the supervision for maintenance of the standards is the province of the Centre- but the administration is concurrent, so that the Centre and the Region may each administer the hospitals established by it:

And the following to be transferred to the Region:

1. Control of Endemic Diseases
2. Environmental health Services.
3. School Health Services.
4. Health Education.
5. Maternity and Child-Welfare Services.
6. Supervision of Markets.
7. Training of village Midwives.
8. Training of Medical Assistants and opening of Dispensaries.

19. Antiquities:

    Both the Centre and the Region may carry out excavations.

20. Labour:

    1. The Centre shall lay down the policy.
    2. The execution of the policy as laid in the legislations should be by the Region.

Regional Powers:

1. Regional and local Government Administration.
2. Regional Public Information.
3. Promotion of Tourism.
4. Museums and Zoos.
5. Exhibitions.
6. Projects: Establishment of local Roads, maintenance of Main Roads – Town & Village planning.
7. Protection of forests crops and pastures – according to national legislation.
8. Protection and development of Animal Resources – according to national legislation.

9. Land utilization and Agricultural Development in accordance with the national plan for development.
10. The study and development of languages and local culture.
11. Commerce and Industry: Local industries, organization of markets, trade licence, formation of cooperative societies.

The Government of the Region

22. The Legislative Machinery:

    Each Region shall have its legislative body in the form of an assembly elected directly on the same conditions as to qualification as that applied to the Central Parliament.

    This assembly exercises its right of enacting Regional Law and supervising the local executive machinery as well as setting down the policy for it.

23. The executive Machinery:

    1. The Legislative Assembly elects the members of the executive Council for the Region.

       These are responsible for the Legislative Council which can dismiss them.

    2. It was agreed that the Head Executive should be among the inhabitants of the Region and that he should be responsible for the Central Agencies and Units in the Region by Delegation from the Centre as well as for the regional Executive Machinery. This is to guarantee coordination and unity of leadership.

       It was also agreed that this necessities that he should be appointed through a joint process. But there was difference over the exact procedure to be followed.

There is a view that the Regional Assembly should offer two candidates and the central Government should choose between them.

The Relationship Between the Central and regional Authorities

24. We had to consider here how to strike a balance between preserving the sovereignty of the National Parliament to protect the vital interest of the Nation and at the same time securing the autonomy of the Regions and protecting them against any persistent and unwarranted interference by the Centre in there spheres of power.

We would like to clarify that when our agreed system of Government is adopted as part of the Constitution, there can no be withdrawal of the regional Powers except by a constitutional amendment with a two thirds majority. Further it is conceded that the Central parliament being sovereign – subject to the constitution – may overrule any regional legislation or take the initiative in legislating within the sphere of the Regional Powers. But in order to protect the Regions against any unwarranted encroachments by the Centre we recommend that:

a) A declaration be written in the constitution to the effect that this sovereignty is granted to parliament:
   1. To protect the vital interest of the country and
   2. To guarantee the co-ordination of Regional Legislations and provide leadership and initiative.

b) Before any such legislation is passed by parliament there must be full consultations with the regions concerned.

The Southern Front representative associated himself with the supremacy of the Central Parliament provided his proposal on the

geographical division was accepted. (for this view please see Paragraph 26 (3) (c) infra).

26. The Regional Geography:

After it has finished with the distribution of powers the relationship between the Centre and the Region and the Committee went on to consider the geographical location of the Regions.

1. The Southern members suggested dividing the country into 4 Regions:
    a) South (constituting the present Southern provinces);
    b) East (constituting Blue Nile and Kassala);
    c) West (constituting Kordofan and Darfur);
    d) North (constituting Khartoum and Northern Province);

    or

    To adopt the present division in the Northern Provinces making six Regions out of them and making the three Southern Provinces in to one Region.
2. The Northern members suggested adopting the present administrative boundaries for the provinces creating nine Regions out of them.
3. The Southern members gave the following reasons:
    a) Any division must start by the North and South as the two Units because of the differences between them in culture, Religion, Language and Race.
    b) The South considers itself as a Unit and the Southern citizens have expressed their wish to remain as a unit and there is nothing in this demand that is detrimental to the public interest. Also our basic duty is to solve the Southern problem and this necessitates giving this fact due

consideration and not treating the south as the other parts of the country where no such problem has arisen or not to the extent of the Southern problem.

c) The guarantees agreed upon for the protection of the autonomy of the regions will not be sufficient unless we enlarge the Regions Geographically so that the public opinion in them will carry such political weight that the Centre shall have to pay that fact due consideration.

In fact this was put as a condition by the representative of the Southern Front for his agreement to the relationship between the Centre and the Region agreed to above.

d) The present Administrative divisions are inherited from the colonial Administration and are based on the tribal system and our duty is to adopt a system that weakens tribalism and so help Sudanese nation building.

4. The Northern members based their view on the following:

a) It is preferable to begin by the present administrative divisions. This facilitates administrative activities, as the main advantage of Regional Government is that it limits administrative Units into smaller areas thus avoiding administering large units from a far Centre. The South from the administrative aspect is too large to be administered from the Regional Capital.

b) It is true that we are primarily interested in the solution of the Southern problem but we must take note of the repercussion of any solution that we propose. In view of the existing claims for regional autonomy any scheme that we develop is bound to serve as an example.

c) In substance the demand of the Southern parties has been for the constitutional set up that would enable local initiative for the advancement of their Region. This, it is submitted, is satisfied whether the 3 Southern Provinces are united or separate.

d) If the South is made into one Region this will perpetuate the sense of confrontation between North and South which we are trying to end through these efforts. As there may some sentimental feelings can be legitimate and beneficial it may be met in this case by allowing any number of regions to pool any of their services.

e) There is no objection to any adjustment of Regional boundaries later on if experience indicates such a change. Both sides maintain their stands on this point.

Chapter III: Miscellaneous

27. Representation of SANU

When the 12-man Committee was set up, the secretariat contacted the parties, which were represented in the Conference, Sayed William Deng was contacted on behalf of SANU and a delegation of three members was formed. When they came to sit on the Committee a problem immediately arose. The Southern Front submitted a telegram from "SANU" in East Africa dismissing William Deng from the party and authorizing the S.F. to represent them in the Committee. Sayed William Deng and his supporters on other hand maintained that they were the legitimate representatives of SANU which since the Round Table Conference has been

exclusively functioning inside the country; there was no other SANU in fact.

The question was which of the two SANUs (inside or outside the country) was entitled to sit on the Committee.

28. After a long discussions a representative of SANU (outside) - Mr. Peter Akol - flew in fro East Africa and appeared before the Committee.

After hearing his case the Committee decided to recognize SANU (inside) as the legitimate party entitled to representation in the Committee. The Southern Front recorded its objection.

Boycott by Some Members

29. On 22nd of July, 1965, the Peoples Democratic Party communicated to the Committee its decision to withdraw from it. The grounds for the decision are given in their memorandum (Appendix D0.

30. And on the 19th of August, 1965, the Sudan Communist Party decided to withdraw from the Committee and demanded the freezing of its activities. The grounds are given in their memorandum (Appendix E).

31. The Committee issued a statement commenting on the withdrawals (Appendix F).

Finance & Development

32. The Committee had the benefit of expert opinion on Finance and Development from Senior Officials in the Ministry of Finance & Economics. The financial arrangements between the Central and Local Government under the Provincial Administration Act 1962 and the Local

33. Government ordinance was considered.

We Recommend That:

1) A Committee of experts be set up to study and recommend the financial arrangements which shall be adopted under our proposed system of Government.
2) A Central Development Commission be set up with regional Sub-Commissions and with a proportional representation of Regions in the Commission.

The Memorandums exchanged between the members of the Committee are provided in Appendix G (1-3).

Educational Policy:

33. The representative of the Southern Front expressed his stand in the following terms:

"I agree that educational policy be national; but there are some regional peculiarities that reflect on education. So it is necessary to give the region the opportunity to plan this side of the policy of education".

Cultural Relations with other Countries:

34. The representative of the Southern Front proposed that the region should have the right to establish cultural relations with other countries independently from the Central Government.

The Northern Parties rejected the proposal.

Home guard (Militia)

35. The Southern Front maintains that each Region should have the right or establish a home Guard (Militia) to assist the security forces.

The Northern Parties rejected the proposal.

Appendix II

Resolutions of the Round Table Conference on the South, Khartoum, March 16-29, 1965

We the delegates of the following political Parties and Organizations:

1. Islamic Charter Front
2. National Unionist Party
3. People's Democratic Party
4. Professional Front
5. Sudanese African National Union (SANU)
6. Sudan Communist Party
7. Southern Front
8. Umma Party

Attending the Round Table Conference on the South meeting in Khartoum at the house of Parliament from march 16-29, 1965, having considered all aspects of the Southern Question, are convinced:

1. That national coalition is imperative, and
2. That the differences in views are not beyond solution, and
3. That only through peaceful means can these differences be settled;

and do hereby resolve;

1. That the following steps be taken by the Government in order to normalize the situation in the South;
    i. The implementation of the agreement between the Governments of Uganda and the Sudan concerning refugees and thereby settling them.
    ii. the Governments of other neighboring countries with a view to reaching similar agreements over refugees.

iii. Resettlement of those inside the country whose homes and property have been destroyed.

iv. To request the government:

a. To alleviate famine in those parts of the South affected thereby;

b. To investigate the inherent cause of famine and floods in the South and take the necessary steps.

v. Retransfer of all Southern schools from the North to the South.

2. That the following lines of policy be adopted:

i. Selection of more Southerners for training as:

a. Police and Prison Officers;

b. Administrators

c. Military Officers

d. Public Health officers and medical Assistants

e. Forest officers;

f. Game and Fisheries Officers

ii. The Southernization of the Administration, Police, Prisons and Information Service whenever qualified Southerners are available. Where they are not available steps should be taken to accelerate their training and promotion.

iii. Equalities of opportunities for employment and equality of wages. There will be no discrimination by reason only of religious beliefs or language or race.

iv. Freedom of religion and freedom of Missionary activity within the laws of the land.

v. Allowing of private persons or bodies to open schools as long as these persons and bodies conform to the laws of the land.

vi. Freedom of movement.

vii. Establishment of a university in the South.

viii. Opening girl's secondary schools and Agricultural School in Malakal.

ix. Re-establishment of Yambio Agricultural School, Juba Training Centre and malakal vetenary Centre.

x. All Southern Schools to be headed by qualified Southerners. Ignorance of Arabic language shall not bar promotion to the post of headmaster.

xi. Finding jobs for the unemployed.

xii. The establishment of national economic Council for economic development with a subsidiary agency for economic development in the South. This will consider the detailed Schemes presented by the team of investigation of 1954 and any other Schemes in all other aspects of development and plan their implementation. The government should also consider the revival of the Azande Scheme.

xiii. Giving priority and facilities to the local population in the exploitation of land.

3. That the delegates who participated in the conference are determined on the rectification of these grievances and the execution of these policies and that they are prepared to go into a peace campaign to tour the south, to pacify and normalize and see to it that they will employ all their resources to end all hostilities in two month's time.

i. That the conference considered some patterns of government for the Sudan and could not reach a unanimous resolution as required by the rules of the Conference.

ii. We have, therefore, appointed a twelve man committee to dwell on the issue of the constitutional and administrative set-up which will protect the special interest of the south as well as the general interest of the Sudan. The Committee shall in addition have the following terms of reference.

a. To act as a watch-committee on the implementation of the steps and policies agreed upon.

b. To plan the normalization of conditions in the south, and consider steps for the lifting of the state of emergency and the establishment of law and order.

iii. The findings of the committee shall be presented to the Conference, which shall be called by the government within three months.

5. We consider that in addition to these achievements the Conference was successful in:

i. Affording an opportunity to political leaders from the North and South, for the first time in six years, to meet in an amicable atmosphere and exchange views on the Southern problem.

ii. Affording an opportunity to the sister African Countries invited to the conference to acquaint themselves with the problem and enlisting their sympathy and support for its solution.

iii. Allying doubts and suspicions between political leaders of North and South and establishing a firm basis for understanding and co-operation.

iv. Providing an opportunity for our people in the South and the North to know the facts and thus appreciate the problem and see it in its true perspective.

We believe that only through such an appreciation can our people forge ahead and utilize their energies and resources in building the future; only through this can our great ideals of peace, love and confidence be a reality.

6. We express deep gratitude:

   i. To the Chairman of the Conference for the skill and impartiality with which he conducted the meetings of the conference, thus contributing to its success.

   ii. To the observers, their Governments and peoples for taking great interest in the affairs of the Sudan and for their ceaseless efforts to see that National conciliation be realized; and for their invaluable contribution to the ultimate success of the Conference.

   iii. To the Secretary General and Secretariat for the devoted and tireless efforts exerted by them before and during the Conference and thus making it a success.

   iv. To the Sudan Government for taking the initiative and adopting a forward policy that resulted in the holding of the conference and for the support, moral and material, which it generously extended.

   Source: Extracted from Abel Alier's book entitled: *Too many Agreements Dishonoured*, (Lebanon: Oxford University Computing Service, 2003), pp.345-361

Annex E-Map of Mozambique

Mozambique



Mozambique's geographical position has made it of vital concern to neighbouring countries, who depend on it for access to the sea. Bringing peace to Mozambique therefore was important for the entire southern Africa region.

Source: The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995

Annex F-Army Structures

COMMAND STRUCTURE



Source: The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995

Annex G-Map showing Military deployment by Sectors in Mozambique

Initial ONUMOZ military deployment along transport corridors, May 1993



Providing security to Mozambique's vital transport corridors was a major factor in determining the initial deployment of ONUMOZ's military component. Deployment commenced in April 1993 and was largely completed within two months.

Source: The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995

Annex H-Map showing Infantry Battalions deployment in Mozambique

ONUMOZ military deployment at time of elections, October 1994



Starting in June 1994, ONUMOZ's military component was redeployed to provide wider coverage in anticipation of the October elections.

Source: The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995