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Urban Policy and Performance in Kenya and Tanzania

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OVER the past ten years, African governments have wrestled with the problems of designing and implementing comprehensive rural development policies. In an overwhelmingly rural continent with, for most areas, only a recent history of urbanisation, such an emphasis is understandable. But if African cities are for the most part young, and small by world standards, they are also growing faster than cities in any other major world region. This rapid growth, superimposed on a meagre resource base, will put increasing pressure on planners to devise solutions for the adequate and equitable distribution of urban services. The solutions that emerge, however, will be heavily conditioned by two sets of factors: the immediate demands of urban growth, and the wider political/administrative and social context within which policy-making takes place.

In an effort to explain more clearly how these factors operate in contemporary Africa, this article will compare the formulation and implementation of key urban policies in Kenya and Tanzania from independence until the end of 1973. Because of their importance for lower-income groups, three policy areas – land allocation, housing, and planning – are singled out for more intensive examination in this analysis.

URBAN POLICY AND PERFORMANCE IN KENYA

1. *Policy*

In the first few years after independence, Kenya did little to define an overall urban development policy. The value of private buildings constructed in the main towns – a sensitive indicator of economic growth – fell precipitously from K£8,082,000 in 1959 to K£1,628,000 in 1963, and did not begin to rise appreciably again until 1967.[1] At the same time the urban population was swelling; from 1948 to 1962, census

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[1] Kenya, *Statistical Abstract, 1968* (Nairobi, 1968).

figures showed an average rate of growth of 6·3 per cent per annum. Taking the African population of the two largest towns, Nairobi and Mombasa, the figures were 6·5 per cent and 7·1 per cent respectively, compared with 2·8 per cent for the whole country.[1] Between the 1962 and 1969 censuses, the number of Africans in Nairobi and Mombasa grew at a compound annual rate of 11·1 per cent and 7·6 per cent.[2] These growth rates, in combination with the decline in private building, put tremendous pressure on the Government to deal with housing in a more aggressive manner.

The Government's first response was to call in the experts. A United Nations report published in May 1965 found that the country was experiencing 'a serious housing problem'; moreover, in comparison with accommodation for other races, African housing was of poorer quality and overcrowding was 'extreme'.[3] Machinery to deal with these shortages fell into two categories: regulatory and developmental. On the regulatory side, in 1967 tribunals were set up in the main towns, with powers to control rents on unfurnished dwellings with a 'standard rent' of Shs. 800/-, or less. In theory these tribunals (under a new Rent Control Act) should have been able to regulate all rents in lower- and middle-income housing throughout the country. The developmental response, following a suggestion by the U.N. mission, was to establish in the same year a National Housing Corporation (N.H.C.) with powers to undertake directly housing projects throughout Kenya, as well as to make loans to local authorities who would build themselves. The N.H.C. was to be a more vigorous descendent of the former Central Housing Board, which needed 'to have a new image in playing a rôle which is in keeping with the spirit of the new, independent Kenya'.[4]

The *Development Plan, 1970–1974*, recognising 'an imperative need to accelerate the creation of inexpensive urban housing for the low income groups', went on to stipulate that all government funds given to the N.H.C. would be for houses costing K£1,200 or less. Even at this figure, only 17 per cent of urban households could afford *more* expensive housing. As a gesture to the very lowest-income groups, however, the *Plan* also specified that 33 per cent of the N.H.C. funds allocated would

[1] *Kenya Population Census, 1962*, Vol. III, *African Population* (Nairobi, 1964), pp. 23 and 82.

[2] International Labour Office, *Employment, Incomes and Equality: a strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya* (Geneva, 1972), p. 49 for the Mombasa figure. The Nairobi estimate has been altered to make allowance for boundary changes.

[3] Lawrence Bloomberg and Charles Abrams, *Report of the United Nations Mission to Kenya on Housing* (Nairobi, 1965). Census figures prepared for the Mission showed that, for African urban households in 1962, 70 per cent occupied a single living room, and 49 per cent had three or more persons to the room.

[4] Kenya National Assembly, *Official Report* (Nairobi), Vol. XII, 8 June 1967, col. 773.

TABLE I

Kenya National Housing Corporation: Units Completed and Cost, 1969–72[1]

Year	Site-and-Service Units		Conventional Units		Total Cost K£
	Number	Cost K£	Number	Cost K£	
1969	48	4,000	1,880	2,644,000	2,648,000
1970	169	39,000	2,171	2,442,000	2,481,000
1971	1,465	313,000	1,737	1,902,000	2,215,000
1972	2,100	271,000	2,498	4,425,000	4,696,000
Total	3,782	627,000	8,286	11,413,000	12,040,000

have to be spent on site-and-service schemes: these would provide planned alternatives to the 'large and expanding illegal squatter areas near the urban centres'. In all these efforts, the central Government called for closer co-ordination with local governments (both rural and urban), which 'must...be brought into the national development effort, to assist in the formation and implementation of economic and social plans'. Finally, in addition to planning for the physical growth of Nairobi and Mombasa, it was proposed to take 'positive steps...to decentralize future urban growth' to seven other towns designated as 'major growth centres'.[2] After the publication of the *Plan* no new major urban policy decisions were announced during the period under review.

2. *Performance*

In the first decade of Kenya's independence two main biases appear in the implementation of urban policy: a disproportionate extension of services and benefits to middle- and upper-income groups, and an emphasis on prestige development in Nairobi.

The construction programme of the N.H.C. illustrates the first bias very clearly. As Table 1 shows, the Corporation spent a total of K£11,413,000 on 8,286 conventional housing units from 1969 to 1972, for an overall average cost per unit of K£1,377. Thus, as the *Plan* period was getting underway, the *average* cost of public housing completed was already higher than the *maximum* cost permitted to the N.H.C. in the *Plan* itself. Official income figures for 1968 showed that only about 15 per cent of all urban household heads would be able to purchase or rent housing at this cost.[3]

[1] Source: Ministry of Housing, 1973.
[2] Kenya, *Development Plan, 1970–1974* (Nairobi, 1969), pp. 179, 186, 507–8, and 519.
[3] Ibid. p. 508.

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There is another factor which further narrows the group to whom these benefits accrue. Because rents in Kenya's towns are out of all proportion to the value of the actual dwellings, tenant-purchase houses are seen as an especially lucrative investment. The allocation committees of the municipal councils are the focus of intense political pressures, with the result that strict adherence to 'waiting-list' and 'points' procedures has often been dispensed with. This pattern was duly noted by the Public Accounts Committee in its report on county and municipal councils:

> Another disturbing feature in some of the Councils is that. . . the operation of and dealings in Tenant-Purchase Schemes and building plots have left much to be desired. Plots appear to have been allocated to persons who have then sold or transferred them to other people within one year of allotment, contrary to the terms and conditions of allotment. More than one dwelling-housing plot under different housing schemes appear to have been allocated to councillors and other prominent persons who have in several cases failed to repay their loans regularly.[1]

Conventional housing, of course, is not the whole story. As we have seen above, the *Plan* clearly recognised that, because of costs, those in the lowest-income groups could not afford the payments on conventionally built houses or flats. The alternative suggested was for plots and services to be provided by the authorities, and for people to build their own minimal-standard houses. This approach is strongly favoured by the World Bank,[2] and by the United Nations Centre for Housing, Building, and Planning. But the Government has dragged its feet in this matter: out of a total of K£12,040,000 spent during 1969–72 on all forms of public housing, only K£627,000, or 5 per cent – as compared with the *Plan* target of 33 per cent – was spent on sites and services. The N.H.C. has claimed that such schemes could not work in large towns like Nairobi, because 'the participants had full-time jobs in the city and could spare insufficient time to work on the houses themselves'.[3]

A pattern that appears to be common all over Kenya is for many lower-income plot allottees to 'sell out' to wealthier people who then develop the sites by hiring labour, recouping their capital very quickly in high rents.[4] In addition, it is not uncommon for councillors, council

[1] Kenya, *Report of the Public Accounts Committee on County Councils for the Period, 1969 to 1971, and Municipal Councils for the Period, 1969 to 1971* (Nairobi, 1972), p. 5.

[2] See, for example, World Bank, *Urbanization: sector working paper* (Washington, 1972), pp. 64–5.

[3] National Housing Corporation, *Annual Report, 1972* (Nairobi, 1973), p. 20.

[4] See, for example, Housing Research and Development Unit, University of Nairobi, *Site and Service Schemes: analysis and report* (Nairobi, 1971), p. 85.

officials, and influential national politicians to secure these plots – often allocated to their relatives – which they in turn develop at a profit. In drafting a recent proposal to the World Bank for a large site-and-service project loan, officers of the Planning Department of Nairobi City Council found that it was extremely difficult to set up procedures for the allocation of plots that would be fair, administratively efficient, and insulated from political pressures.[1]

These biases in the implementation of public housing programmes are not compensated for in other directions. Although in principle the rent control machinery applies to all unfurnished dwellings with a monthly rent of Shs. 800/- or less – up to Shs. 1,100/- if furnished – it is not very effective in helping the poor. In squatter areas like Mathare Valley in Nairobi, there have been physical threats against rent control officials. And, indeed, the safeguards are not easily within the reach of most Africans because of complicated procedures, charges, and the advisability of a tenant to hire a lawyer to present his case effectively before the rent tribunal.[2] As for approved housing constructed by the private sector, which is approximately equal in value to all that built by the Government,[3] the majority are expensive houses beyond the reach of both the Rent Restriction Act and lower-income groups.

The typical response to this kind of urban policy bias all over the developing world has been 'squatting' in various forms, and Kenya is no exception. In 1971 a comprehensive report estimated that one-third of Nairobi's population was living in 'uncontrolled and illegal housing'.[4] The largest single area was Mathare Valley, where it was estimated that 53,000 people were living in 1972.[5] In Mombasa, Kenya's second largest town, it is more difficult for the authorities to control residential building since so much land is in private freehold tenure. In 1969 a

[1] The solution arrived at is detailed in Nairobi City Council, Urbanisation Task Force, *Dandora Community Development Project, Site and Service Scheme* (Nairobi, 1973).

[2] This is my interpretation of an interview with the Administrative Officer, Rent Restriction Tribunal, Nairobi, 22 November 1973. For criticisms of the tribunals, see 'Rent Tribunal Needs Power', in *East African Standard* (Nairobi), 10 October 1973; and Y. P. Ghai and J. P. W. B. McAuslan, *Public Law and Political Change in Kenya* (New York, 1970), pp. 289–90.

[3] Ministry of Housing, *Annual Report, 1967–71* (Nairobi, 1972), p. 20.

[4] David Etherton, *Mathare Valley: a case study of uncontrolled housing in Nairobi* (Housing Research and Development Unit, University of Nairobi, 1971), p. 4. The cited figure of 143,313 persons living in various categories of illegal housing is probably based on work done in 1969. The official census of that year showed Nairobi with a total population of 509,286, of which 421,079 were Africans. Since virtually all 'squatters' are Africans, this represents 28 per cent of the total population, or 34 per cent of the African population.

[5] Hunter Morrison, *Mathare Valley Report: a case study in low income housing* (Nairobi City Council, Urban Study Group, 1972), p. 8. Crucial parts of this study are summarised by T. Chana and H. Morrison, 'Housing Systems in the Low Income Sector of Nairobi, Kenya', in *Ekistics* (Athens), XXXIV, 214, September 1973, pp. 214–22.

detailed study estimated that 31 per cent of all residential land was occupied by 'unplanned temporary' housing, and that 47 per cent of the inhabitants of Mombasa – or, some 116,000 of the total population of 247,073 – lived in such housing.[1]

Urban officials in Kenya have tried to regulate squatting in two main ways. The first is through the application of municipal by-laws, which require that all plans for building within the city boundaries be submitted to the local council for approval. The inherited colonial standards demanded buildings that cost much more than lower-income groups could afford. But after 1968 a new set of building (Grade II) by-laws could be applied by local authorities to designated areas, thus permitting much cheaper housing under planned conditions. Still, most new squatter accommodation appears to be below even these standards. Effective controls through by-laws depend essentially on three factors: a vigilant building inspectorate with co-operation from the police and administration; an adequately staffed town planning agency; and the political will to demolish structures which do not meet established standards or planning requirements.

During the colonial period the Government systematically demolished squatter areas within Nairobi, in many cases not even attempting to provide alternative accommodation for those who lost their homes. During the Emergency, from 1952 to 1960, these operations were often tied to the political objectives of screening possible 'subversive' elements – mainly the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru – and controlling immigration to the city. When the Emergency regulations were lifted in early 1960, the flood of Kikuyu migration from areas neighbouring the city swamped the administration. Thousands of Africans began to trade without licences and to build wherever they could find land. After the new central Government consolidated its power during the mid-1960s there were several large demolition and 'clean-up' campaigns aimed at ridding the central area of squatters.

In 1970, a year following National Assembly elections, the City Council of Nairobi, together with the administration and the police, mounted a massive 'clean-up' campaign extending over several months. According to a careful strategy which covered all the major squatter areas, except Mathare Valley and Kibera,[2] Council *askaris* and police arrived at dawn to surprise the people before they left for work, finishing

[1] Kenya, Town Planning Department, *Housing in Mombasa* (Nairobi, 1969), p. 4 and appendix A, section 13.

[2] Kibera is an old settlement in the southern part of Nairobi, where Sudanese ex-soldiers were given grants of land by the army after World War I. It is not visible from the major roads in the city.

their demolition before lunch. Although there was public criticism of this campaign it was supported by the Cabinet,[1] and President Kenyatta later told a Council delegation he did not want Nairobi to turn into a 'shanty-town'.[2] Since then, the City Council has regularly demolished visible 'shanties' along the road reserves, in the central city, and on state and city council land. There is no evidence that the Government's recent decision, 'that slum housing ought not to be demolished unless there is some positive and overriding developmental reason for doing so',[3] has had any effect on the Council's demolition policy.

In spite of the policy of regular demolition, two large areas of sub-standard housing have been left alone: Dagoretti and Mathare. Dagoretti, a peri-urban area that was formerly part of Kiambu District, was represented in Parliament until the 1974 elections by the influential Minister for Foreign Affairs. After Dagoretti was brought into Nairobi in 1964, the people resisted the application of city building by-laws on the grounds that the land was freehold and the regulations were in-appropriate in this semi-rural area. But the City Council has applied Grade II by-laws to Dagoretti and planning control is gradually being extended over the area.

Mathare Valley, on the other hand, was subject to periodic demolition until 1971, when the whole string of villages was 'improved' with roads, street-lighting, water, and sanitary facilities, following an out-break of cholera elsewhere in Nairobi. Although there are still occasional crackdowns on the brewing of illegal *chang'aa*, the City Council does not demolish unless it is called in by the Government when new structures are built. As a result of these policies, the growth of illegal housing in Nairobi has been contained, if by no means completely controlled. But with few services being extended to existing sub-standard areas, the effect is that more and more overcrowding takes place in increasingly unhealthy conditions.

The second dimension of urban policy bias in Kenya is the dispro-portionate share taken by Nairobi in physical development. While, as we have seen, the 1970–74 *Plan* sought to spread development more evenly among other urban 'growth centres', this has not happened. In fact there was a reverse trend. From 1967 to 1971, Nairobi increased its share of the value of new private construction in urban areas from 78·3 per cent of the total to 88·7 per cent, while Mombasa's share declined from 14·7 to 9·8 per cent and that of the 'other main towns'

[1] *East African Standard*, 21 November 1970.
[2] *Nairobi City Council Minutes, 1970–1971* (Nairobi, 1971), pp. 2497–8.
[3] *Republic of Kenya, Sessional Paper on Employment: No. 10 of 1973* (Nairobi, 1973), p. 46.

TABLE 2

Main Towns of Kenya: Population and Earnings, 1968–71[1]

Town	1969 Census Population	1969 Census %	Reported Earnings, 1968 K£000	Reported Earnings, 1968 %	Reported Earnings, 1971 K£000	Reported Earnings, 1971 %
Nairobi	509,286	57·0	73,053	70·0	88,160	71·5
Mombasa	247,073	27·7	18,542	17·8	20,844	16·9
Nakuru	47,151	5·3	4,091	3·9	4,555	3·7
Kisumu	32,431	3·6	3,521	3·4	3,819	3·1
Thika	18,387	2·1	1,317	1·3	1,739	1·4
Eldoret	18,196	2·0	2,165	2·1	2,376	1·9
Nyeri	10,004	1·1	1,254	1·2	1,328	1·1
Kakamega	6,244	0·7	251	0·2	260	0·2
Embu	3,928	0·4	201	0·2	229	0·2
Total	892,700	99·9	104,395	100·1	123,310	100·0

from 7·0 to only 1·5 per cent. Although similar statistics are not available for the public sector, they would probably show the same trend; in any case, public building in Kenya's urban areas represented only 15 per cent of all building in 1971.[2]

A reflection of Nairobi's disproportionate share in national urban development is the slow growth of trade and employment elsewhere. In the case of Kisumu, Kenya's fourth largest town, the recent Africanisation of the central business district has caused such a fall in trade that a local reporter for a major newspaper referred to it as 'a dying town'.[3] Nairobi's share in total earnings, as shown in Table 2, is considerably larger than its share of the total population in the main towns, and moreover the percentage went up from 70·0 to 71·5 between 1968 and 1971, while the corresponding figure for almost every other 'growth centre' fell or remained the same during this period. Meanwhile, Nairobi develops as a centre for international business and tourism; its most recent major building, the Kenyatta Conference Centre, cost the Government K£4 million. When Kenya celebrated her 10th anniversary of independence in December 1973, the capital's imposing skyline was prominently displayed in the press, newsreels, and on television as a symbol of the country's progress.

[1] Sources: Kenya, *Statistical Abstract, 1972* (Nairobi, 1972), p. 223; and *Kenya Population Census, 1969* (Nairobi, 1971), Vol. II, p. 2.

[2] Kenya, *Statistical Abstract, 1972*, p. 124.

[3] Leo Odero Omolo, 'Kisumu: a dying town', in *The Sunday Post* (Nairobi), 23 September 1973.

TABLE 3

Value of Urban Building in Mainland Tanzania, 1960–9[1]

T£000

Residential and Non-Residential	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Government*	1,480	1,430	1,195	1,400	—	—	2,015	1,275	1,295	4,380
Private										
Dar es Salaam	1,510	725	1,370	890	1,160	1,230	1,395	1,310	975	1,335
Other towns	980	845	475	595	695	360	340	920	470	690
Total	3,970	3,000	3,040	2,885	—	—	3,750	3,505	2,740	6,405

* Excludes buildings erected by the National Housing Corporation.

URBAN POLICY AND PERFORMANCE IN TANZANIA

1. *Policy*

Tanzania had until the late 1960s, like Kenya, a patchwork of policies to deal with her growing urban problems. As in many other African countries, private construction in mainland Tanzania fell sharply at independence; although this was more than offset by government investment, as Table 3 shows, it never regained its former level. Meanwhile, the African population was growing rapidly: in Dar es Salaam there had been an average rate of increase of 9 per cent per annum from 1948 to 1957,[2] but this had shot up to 14 per cent between the 1957 and 1967 censuses.[3] High rates of growth, especially for the African (and predominantly lower-income) population, were also notable for a number of other smaller towns.[4]

Until the Arusha Declaration in 1967, Tanzania pursued a building and a land control strategy to alleviate the pressure for urban housing and community services.[5] The building strategy began with the formation in 1962 of the National Housing Corporation, then given a very broad mandate 'for the provision of houses and other buildings in Tanganyika by means of financial assistance and otherwise'.[6] After taking over 4,389 low-cost houses (including 1,690 in Dar es Salaam)

[1] Source: *Statistical Abstract, 1970* (Dar es Salaam, 1972), p. 137.

[2] J. E. G. Sutton, *Dar es Salaam: City, Port and Region*: special issue of *Tanganyika Notes and Records* (Dar es Salaam), 71, 1970, p. 18.

[3] Tanzania, *1967 Population Census* (Dar es Salaam, 1970), Vol. II, p. 164.

[4] See Tanzania, *Recorded Population Changes, 1948–67* (Dar es Salaam, 1968), pp. 13–14.

[5] A useful review of urban development policy in mainland Tanzania is contained in Ministry of Lands, Housing, and Urban Development, *Achievement in Ten Years of Independence* (Dar es Salaam, 1971).

[6] Laws of Tanzania, *National Housing Corporation Act* (Cap. 481).

that had been built by the colonial Government and administered by local authorities, the Corporation made 'a heroic attempt to seriously cope with the housing problem'.[1] The first major programme, concentrating in Dar es Salaam on the initiative of President Nyerere, involved clearing some of the old 'slums' on the periphery of the central business district (in Magomeni especially), and replacing them with new, single-storey houses which were rented out to the previous owners.

During the first *Plan*, from 1964 to 1969, about 70 per cent of the 5,705 'low-cost' houses built by the Corporation came under the Dar es Salaam slum clearance scheme.[2] Although just what constitutes a 'low-cost' house has never been clearly defined either for or by the N.H.C., almost all its efforts have focused on this category of accommodation. During the five-year period, the Corporation received some T£3·47 million from the Government, and was able to raise an additional T£970,000 from the Federal Republic of Germany, which also provided technical aid. The total, T£4·44 million, was only about 25 per cent of the target figure in the *Plan*, most of the shortfall resulting from the failure of the N.H.C. to attract more overseas capital.

The second major approach to urban development throughout the 1960s was the control and allocation of land by the Government. Under a series of Acts beginning in 1963,[3] all freehold land was converted to government leasehold, and the previous owners were now obliged to pay rent. Conditions for development were laid down for the use of all urban land, with the details agreed upon by the Town Planning Division and the Lands Division. The zoning policy of the colonial Government which divided residential urban land into low-, medium-, and high-density areas was continued, but the emphasis in plot allocation and the provision of services was shifted from the former European areas to the more crowded low-income African areas.

In recent years, the Lands Division has prepared for public allocation some 6,000–7,000 plots annually, most of them in high-density urban areas. The bulk of these are given out with year-to-year rights of occupancy. This allows the occupant, upon payment of a 'premium' down and an annual land rent, to build a 'temporary structure' using traditional materials. For more permanent tenure in high-density areas,

[1] The phrase is from Manfred A. Bienefeld and H. H. Binhammer, 'Tanzania Housing Finance and Housing Policy', in John Hutton (ed.), *Urban Challenge in East Africa* (Nairobi, 1972), p. 186.

[2] For an evaluation of this scheme, see Gerhard Grohs, 'Slum Clearance in Dar es Salaam', ibid. pp. 157–76.

[3] This legislation is discussed in detail in *Achievement in Ten Years of Independence*, pp. 14–17; and by R. W. James, *Land Tenure and Policy in Tanzania* (Nairobi, 1971), pp. 93–166.

the occupier must pay out more, and must satisfy higher development conditions, involving in turn significantly greater building expenses. Before any new urban area is laid out for such development, it is the practice in Tanzania to fully compensate the people living there – whether or not they have legal claims – for the value of their crops and buildings. Only after the area has been compensated and cleared for surveying can it be developed. At this point the funds and responsibility for the services that must be provided – water, roads, sewerage or septic tanks, community facilities, etcetera – are shared among a number of different government divisions and parastatal organisations.

The Arusha Declaration proclaimed the primacy of socialist rural development, and so new emphases began to appear in Tanzania's urban policy. The *Second Five-Year Plan, 1969–1974* announced three new directions. First, moves were to be taken to decentralise certain government functions, and to locate new industries, where possible, away from Dar es Salaam. Eight towns throughout the country were selected for 'concentrated urban development' over the *Plan* period.[1] Secondly, in order to minimise the resources devoted to urban development, and to maximise the spread of benefits to all classes, the N.H.C. was to increase its rate of house construction, and at the same time limit itself to a cost range of T£300–550 per unit.[2] Medium-cost houses would be financed either privately, or through the Permanent Housing Finance Corporation at commercial rates of interest. For the bottom end of the income scale, the N.H.C. and the Ministry of Lands, Housing, and Urban Development (formed in 1968 to unite most of the urban specialist divisions) were to develop a programme for the annual provision of some 5,000 site-and-service plots to be equipped with water, drainage, and foundations. The *Plan* projected that the public sector would provide from 35,000 to 40,000 houses and housing sites over the five-year period. For reasons which will be discussed in the next section, nothing close to this figure was achieved.

The next major urban policy initiative came in April 1971 when the Government announced that it was taking over all rented buildings with a value of T£5,000 and over.[3] An Office of the Registrar of Buildings was created to administer the 2,900 properties acquired, whose

[1] These towns were Tanga, Arusha/Moshi, Mwanza, Mtwara, Mbeya, Morogoro, Dodoma, and Tabora. See *Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July 1969–30th June 1974* (Dar es Salaam, 1969), Vol. 1, p. 181.

[2] Ibid. p. 191.

[3] The Acquisition of Buildings Act, 1971 applied to all properties valued at Shs. 100,000/- or renting for Shs. 833/- per month or more. Lists of the buildings and their owners were published in the local newspapers. Because of mistakes, or successful appeals to a tribunal, about 300 of the original total had been returned to their owners by 1973.

estimated value was about T£32·5 million.[1] While this move was justified as a logical outcome of the country's socialism, most of those who lost their buildings were members of the Asian community. In any case, compensation was promised, landlords were permitted to continue to occupy flats where they had been living, and tenants in acquired premises simply sent their monthly cheques to the Registrar of Buildings rather than the former landlord. Arrangements whereby the owners would be compensated were announced in 1973.[2]

But the problem of wealthy urban landlords was just the tip of the iceberg. Already, inter-ministerial discussions had begun in June 1970 over the whole question of a more comprehensive housing policy, and in particular the rents paid by the lower-income groups. While the Rent Restriction Act of 1962, unlike the Kenya legislation, applied a fixed proportion of cost to *all* rents regardless of the actual construction, the work of the Rent Tribunal had been confined mainly to Dar es Salaam and to landlord–tenant disputes over the most expensive dwellings.[3] Government housing and N.H.C.-built accommodation where rents are collected by the Corporation were exempted from the provisions of the Act. In the post-Arusha atmosphere, some felt that government and parastatal officers – in most cases enjoying highly subsidised rents – should be required to pay more in accordance with their incomes.

After a lengthy Cabinet meeting, it was decided in late 1972 to charge all government and parastatal employees occupying public housing according to their incomes. Those earning up to Shs. 750/- per month were to pay 7½ per cent of their gross income in rent; those earning from Shs. 751/- to Shs. 1,500/- were to pay 10 per cent, and those earning over Shs. 1,500/- were to pay 12½ per cent. Although no exact estimate of the costs of this decision was made at the time, it was felt that the upper-income earners, who would pay more rent under the new system, would in effect be subsidising the lower-income earners, who would generally be paying less than before. The net result would be a reduction of revenue for the Government, but more equality in rentals for those officials who had previously had the good fortune to get public housing.

At the same time the Cabinet also decided: (i) to reduce the loan ceiling on public-financed projects from T£3,750 to T£2,000 per house; (ii) to improve selectively the services in existing squatter areas and to upgrade those houses which met minimal standards; and (iii) to

[1] *Achievement in Ten Years of Independence*, p. 54.

[2] *Daily News* (Dar es Salaam), 14 February 1973.

[3] For details of how the Rent Tribunal worked during the 1960s, see *Ripoti ya Mwaka 1967 ya Baraza la Kukariria Kodi za Nyumba* (Dar es Salaam, 1969).

review existing by-laws so as to permit the maximum use of traditional and local building materials. A major institutional change was to set up the Tanzania Housing Bank on 1 January 1973; placed under the Treasury, it will be able to borrow at less than commercial rates, and is expected substantially to affect the finance of low-cost housing in urban areas and *ujamaa* villages.[1] Already in 1973 the Housing Bank was working closely with the newly-created Sites and Services Directorate in the Ministry of Lands, Housing, and Urban Development to provide low-interest 'social loans' for a major sites-and-services programme.

The final, and most dramatic urban policy decision in the period under review was Nyerere's announcement on 1 November 1973 that the capital would be moved from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma, 300 miles to the west. According to a resolution of the National Executive Committee of T.A.N.U., the transfer will take place gradually over 10 years, at an estimated cost of T£185·5 million. After a great deal of debate within the party over the question, only three of the 18 regions opposed the move. In announcing T.A.N.U.'s decision, the President emphasised 'that the transfer of the capital would help stimulate development in the country because of the centrality of the new site'.[2] While it is too early to evaluate the effects of this decision, it was clearly consistent with the overall scheme of administrative decentralisation which the Government had begun in earnest more than a year earlier.[3]

2. *Performance*

The evolution of urban policy in independent Tanzania, especially over the last few years, is an expression of the need to achieve consistency with the dominant ideological current. On paper, the choices have seemed rational and even laudable; but their implementation has often fallen far short of their intentions. While some would point to insufficient ideological training and commitment among leaders and middle-level cadres,[4] a more general reason for the gap in implementation is the severe shortage of human and material resources.[5]

Both the first and second five-year plans expected the N.H.C. to play

[1] Details of the policy decisions outlined in this paragraph can be found in Tanzania, *Hali ya Uchumi wa Taifa Katika Mwaka, 1972–73* [Economic Survey, 1972–73] (Dar es Salaam, 1973), pp. 85–6.

[2] *Daily Nation*, 2 October 1973.

[3] For details of the re-organisation of the central Government in accordance with this scheme, see Julius Nyerere, *Decentralisation* (Dar es Salaam, 1972).

[4] See, for example, Lionel Cliffe and Griffiths Cunningham, 'Ideology, Organisation and the Settlement Experience in Tanzania', in Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul (eds.), *Socialism in Tanzania*, Vol. II, *Policies* (Nairobi, 1973), p. 139.

[5] Here I would agree with the argument of G. K. Helleiner, 'Socialism and Economic Development in Tanzania', in *Journal of Development Studies* (London), VIII, 2, January 1972, pp. 183–204.

a major rôle in providing low-cost urban housing. During the 1964–9 period, however, the Corporation was able to obtain only about 25 per cent of the funds expected; and 70 per cent of the low-cost houses it built in Dar es Salaam were part of a slum clearance scheme which added nothing to the existing stock. Moreover, many former owners of the 'slum' houses rent out some or all of their new rooms, while they have been very lax in paying the fixed rent of T£4–5 per month to the N.H.C. As in many schemes of this type, the reasons are largely economic: before slum clearance, most of the landlords obtained the bulk of their income from renting rooms in traditional houses; but when they were saddled with payments to the Corporation for the new buildings, and could charge no more in rents for the rooms, they could scarcely get by on a much smaller margin of profit. The result is heavy arrears in rent owed to the N.H.C. Among the oldest inhabitants of Dar es Salaam, these people are influential in T.A.N.U., and any attempt by the N.H.C. to divest them of their houses for non-payment of rent might have political repercussions.

While the 1969–74 *Plan* considered that 'the absolute achievement of the National Housing Corporation had been very considerable', it had to admit that the net stock addition of less than 400 units per year 'just touched the fringe of the housing problem'.[1] But even when slum clearance was halted in the late 1960s, the Corporation found it increasingly difficult to obtain funds. While the N.H.C. has built some accommodation for other parastatal organisations, as well as for the middle-income market through loans from the Permanent Housing Finance Corporation – now the Tanzania Housing Bank – the bulk of its work is in low-cost housing, financed directly by annual Treasury grants. These have diminished considerably in the last few years from the high figure of T£1,070,000 during 1970–1 to the relatively minor annual grant of T£125,000 during 1972–3 and 1973–4.

This dimunition in funds for the N.H.C. is a reflection of a number of factors: (i) the Treasury's dissatisfaction over poor financial controls and rent collection; (ii) the Corporation's failure to keep costs low enough (in 1973 the average low-cost house was T£920, whereas the second five-year plan had put a ceiling of T£550); and (iii) new development priorities which have reduced the funds available for urban areas since the second plan was accepted. It is appropriate here to mention that the T.A.N.U. biennial conference in 1971 emphasised the need to develop water, health, and educational facilities in the rural areas. Against a targeted figure of 2,000 houses per year, the N.H.C.

[1] Tanzania, *Second Five-Year Plan*, p. 189.

was able to build only 138 low-cost units throughout the country during 1972–3, or about 7 per cent of its original goal.

In terms of the numbers of plots allocated, the surveyed plot allocation programme of the Lands Division has been much more successful. Thus, in 1971 7,305 new short-term rights of occupancy were issued in urban areas, and in 1972 the figure was 6,331. But this was still far too small to cope with the demand; for Dar es Salaam alone, the waiting list for high-density plots stood at 15,000 by the end of 1972. In spite of direct presidential pressure to speed up allocation, the procedure remained cumbersome and expensive. Money must be paid to compensate squatters and other interests before the land can be cleared for surveying; and once the plots are made available, services (such as roads, water, and schools) are rarely ready, with the result that little controlled building takes place, and squatters often move back to the land.

Similar to the plot allocation programme, but with higher standards of facilities provided, was the site-and-service programme. While the second five-year plan called for 5,000 serviced sites per year, only 795 had been made available by 1973, all of them in a single area of Dar es Salaam. A recent report succinctly describes the problem:

> An experimental project was initiated in 1970 at Kijitonyama in Dar es Salaam. Concrete slabs for 795 foundations were provided by NHC along with some 60 core houses. Average cost of slabs and core houses at shs. 2,350/- plus high standards of infrastructure (approximately shs. 7,000/- per plot) put the project beyond the reach of most low income families. The Government was therefore obliged to heavily subsidize the project in order that low income families could be settled in the plots and still repay loans for building materials.[1]

The Government applied in 1973 to the World Bank for a loan to cover a 5-year programme of 18,250 plots in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, and Mbeya. But as the loan agreement for T£3 was not signed until July 1974, the scheme cannot be considered within the period covered by this study.

In the face of inadequate public programmes to meet their needs, lower-income groups have had little alternative to large-scale 'squatting'.[2] For Dar es Salaam, a comprehensive delineation carried out during 1969 showed 14,720 squatter houses within the statutory planning area (which goes somewhat beyond the legal boundaries of the city).[3]

[1] Ministry of Lands, Housing, and Urban Development, *Sites and Services Project* (Dar es Salaam, 1973), p. 9.

[2] 'Squatters' in Tanzania are those who unlawfully occupy urban land. Since lawful occupation requires a right of occupancy issued by the Lands Division, based on a plot survey, the definition further implies that the squatters have built either on unsurveyed land, or on surveyed land but not within surveyed plot boundaries.

[3] Delineation and counting was done with enlarged air photographs. Since squatter

Using similar methods, another count was carried out during 1972, and this showed 27,981 squatter houses in the same area – an average compound annual increase of 24 per cent over three years. Assuming only a 4 per cent growth in all other residential districts during this period, and on the basis of a small survey of squatter density, it was estimated that in 1972 about 44 per cent of the total population of greater Dar es Salaam lived in squatter areas.[1]

In the light of public recognition that the successful implementation of the 1968 master plan for Dar es Salaam would 'hinge to a large extent on the degree of control exercised over squatters',[2] the efficacy of planning in the capital must be seriously questioned. But as long as low-cost N.H.C. building, plot allocations, and the site-and-service programme do not provide for the net migration to the city, squatting will offer both a necessary and a rational response to the accommodation problem. This is not entirely a bad thing – squatter rents are lower than for conventional houses, and the areas are often conveniently located to places of work – but facilities are genuinely poor, and the environment is often very unhealthy, especially during the rainy season. It is politically impossible to remove the major squatting areas in Tanzania, and to improve them by putting in roads, water, and drainage is a costly and laborious exercise.

When legislation for the compulsory acquisition of buildings was rushed through Parliament in April 1971, the Minister observed that, while the Government had already nationalised big industries, banks, insurance companies, and wholesale and retail trade,

> the opportunity still remains for exploiters to get high rents on large buildings in the cities. This strategy enhances privilege especially in urban areas. This new revolutionary law, if passed by Parliament, will wipe away this opportunity and overthrow privilege and exploitation.[3]

It was not entirely a coincidence that most of these buildings were owned by Asians, since they still dominate the private commercial sector in Tanzania. Although the Acquisition of Buildings Act was not manifestly racist, its implementation resulted in many thousands of Asian families leaving the country; moreover, most private construction firms

houses in Dar es Salaam are almost invariably of a certain type, and are sited in areas without regular road access, it is not difficult to locate and count them. Details of the 1969 exercise are contained in John Leaning, 'Squatter Housing in Dar es Salaam', Ministry of Lands, Housing, and Urban Development, 1972.

[1] For details of the 1972 count, see Richard Stren, 'Urban Squatting in Tanzania', Ministry of Lands, Housing, and Urban Development, 1973, pp. 7–8.

[2] *National Capital Master Plan, Dar es Salaam* (Toronto, 1968), p. 106.

[3] Tanzania, *Majadiliano ya Bunge* [Hansard], *22 April–27 April 1971* (Dar es Salaam, 1971), col. 23. The passage is translated from the original Swahili.

were wiped out, since they had invested their profits in buildings and were using rents for working capital. While no new housing was created, it will be some time before this drop in construction capacity is redressed.

As for the new income-based rental policy announced by the Government in early 1973, it is worth noting that it only applied to public employees living in government, parastatal, or N.H.C. housing. Totally unaffected by the measure are almost all lower-income urban workers, and the bulk of middle-income clerks and administrators who have to find their own housing, often in the squatter areas. Meanwhile, those public servants who came under the new regulations tended to feel they were unfair, since while prices were steadily rising their often modest incomes were not, and the new rents generally meant higher payments.

A final aspect of Tanzanian urban policy that can be evaluated is the strategy of deconcentration outside of Dar es Salaam. As far as I have been able to learn, no administrative machinery was ever set up to influence the siting of new industries in the eight 'growth towns'. Thus, of the approximately 30 major enterprises established in the two years after the inception of the urban decentralisation plan, only ten were outside Dar es Salaam, and seven of these went to Arusha/Moshi: 'only 3 of the 30 industries were shared by the 7 least industrialised growth towns'.[1] The decentralisation of administrative functions has been more successful. Under the new regional development directors appointed in 1972, significant town planning, surveying, and land allocation functions are now undertaken in the regions. While there is a critical shortage of staff at this level, the situation is improving, and annual budgets were drawn up for the financial year 1973–4 by the regions themselves, in co-operation with the Prime Minister's Office. The decision to move the capital to Dodoma will certainly give a further impetus to decentralise.

KENYA AND TANZANIA: A COMPARISON OF URBAN POLICIES

As the foregoing analysis of urban policy and performance has illustrated, there are not only broad similarities but also some crucial differences between these two East African neighbours. While the approaches and problems are shared by many other African countries, the divergencies stem largely from different social and political parameters to the policy process.

[1] Tanzania, *The Economic Survey, 1970–71* (Dar es Salaam, 1971), p. 103.

1. *The Main Areas of Convergence*

In both countries, as we have seen, a disproportionate amount of industrial development has been sited in the capital city, despite official intentions to the contrary. Thus in 1970, Dar es Salaam had 46·0 per cent of the total recorded urban employment in Tanzania, up from 44·2 per cent in the previous year;[1] in 1971, the comparable figure for Nairobi was 55·0 per cent, up from 53·8 per cent a year earlier.[2] The most recent statistics thus show that the employment share of the largest cities is growing. But this dominance is clearly linked to population, a factor which is almost impossible to influence by deliberate governmental policy. According to the most recent census returns, Dar es Salaam in 1967 had 45·2 per cent of the total urban population in towns over 10,000 in Tanzania, while Nairobi had 54·9 per cent of Kenya's urban population. Given the exceptionally high growth rates of these two cities, there is no reason to assume that these proportions are declining.

Both Kenya and Tanzania have officially committed the bulk of public housing funds to low-income groups. But in both countries – though to a much greater extent in Kenya – the efforts of the specialised parastatal organisations in this field have been biased in favour of middle-income groups for conventional housing. Substantial site-and-service programmes failed to materialise in the period under review. The two housing corporations are among the most dynamic in Africa, but their failure to provide adequately for low-income groups is consistent with experience elsewhere on the continent.[3] If Kenya has made some important changes in the direction of relaxing municipal by-laws to permit lower-standard development (Tanzania has not yet amended its 1956 building code), the overall effect of regulatory action – at least in Nairobi – is to preclude low-income groups from conventional, permanent housing, and to heavily bias the provision of services to authorised rather than unauthorised areas. In both Kenya and Tanzania, urban squatters have been growing more rapidly than the population in the authorised, planned areas.

[1] Tanzania, *Survey of Employment and Earnings, 1970* (Dar es Salaam, 1972), p. 37.

[2] Kenya, *Statistical Abstract, 1972*, p. 216.

[3] For Ghana, see *Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Manner of Operation of the State Housing Corporation* (Accra, 1968); and for Western Nigeria, see G. A. Ogunpola, 'The Functioning of a Statutory Corporation: the case of Western Nigeria Housing Corporation, 1958–1966', in *Quarterly Journal of Administration* (Ibadan), IV, 1, October 1969, pp. 31–44. The kind of corruption and mismanagement brought out in these West African case-studies does not, however, appear to apply to Kenya and Tanzania.

2. *The Context of Policy Divergence*

Beneath these broad similarities, a close comparison of urban policies shows some extremely important differences. In general, there has been more innovation in Tanzania in terms of the large number of decisions taken in recent years to alter the distribution of benefits to major groups both within urban and rural areas. These decisions have already been outlined, but the most important include the active development of a national site-and-service programme, the *de facto* recognition of existing squatter settlements coupled with the intention to gradually improve services to them, a new civil servant rental policy related to income, the establishment of the new Tanzania Housing Bank, and the decision to move the capital away from Dar es Salaam to one of the least developed regions.

With one exception, policy in Kenya has tended to consolidate earlier decisions on urban patterns, and no new institutions have been created. The important exception was the enactment of the Local Government Adoptive (Grade II) By-Laws in 1968. What looked like another major exception was the central Government's decision to allocate, beginning in 1968, 50 per cent of the G.P.T. collections from Nairobi and Mombasa for redistribution to poorer local authorities. But there is no evidence that the Treasury actually used the funds for this purpose, and in any case the remissions were stopped in 1971, G.P.T. being abolished altogether in 1974.

Policy innovation, however, is meaningless in the absence of effective implementation. While Tanzania has pushed very far to draw out the urban policy implications of an ideology which stresses rural socialist development, it has paid less attention to strengthening the bureaucratic machinery necessary to carry out the new policies. It is true that local government in Tanzania has a much shorter history than in Kenya; but the local authorities have been much weaker as well.[1] For example, urban and district councils in Tanzania employed 28,971 in 1968, as against 63,100 in Kenya.[2] At the end of 1973, the Dar es Salaam City Council was officially disbanded, its functions being taken over by the Regional Development Director, with three district committees each covering a part of the greater Dar es Salaam area. It is too early to evaluate how this arrangement will work in practice, but well before this decision was taken the City Council had shown itself to be a

[1] An excellent analysis of their strengths and weaknesses is contained in R. G. Penner, *Financing Local Government in Tanzania* (Nairobi, 1970).

[2] Tanzania, *Statistical Abstract, 1970*, p. 174; and Kenya, *Statistical Abstract, 1972*, p. 211.

relatively ineffective organisation. In 1969, for example, for an estimated population of 316,453, the Council spent T£1.525 million,[1] which amounted to an expenditure of Shs. 96/- per person. In the same year the Nairobi City Council spent Shs. 354/- per person (3·7 times as much), and the Mombasa Municipal Council spent Shs. 162/- per person (1·7 times as much). While there have been challenges to their autonomy, municipal councils in Kenya, during the period under review, were much stronger institutions, and undertook significantly more functions on their own than their counterparts in Tanzania.

This weakness of local councils in Tanzania has meant that various central government departments have been responsible for carrying out almost all the recent urban policy decisions. The Dar es Salaam City Council had, for example, only one professional town planner on its staff in 1973. This meant that virtually all the detailed planning for the capital was done in the Ministry of Lands, Housing, and Urban Development; but in 1971 its Town Planning Division had only six professional staff with responsibility for the whole country.[2] By contrast, the Town Planning Department in Kenya had 14 professional staff in 1971, while the Nairobi City Council had in addition at least half that number of town planners. In comparison with Tanzania, a much higher proportion of this staff is now local, on permanent terms of service. The co-ordination of urban development in Kenya has raised problems, but these are less intractable because of the relatively higher level of professional capacity, and because a great deal of the planning and phasing of programmes is worked out within the major councils. In Tanzania, where very little project planning takes place within – or uses the services of – the urban councils, inter- and intra-ministerial conflicts can have a much more serious impact. In Kenya, the stability and continuity of governmental machinery tends to be seen as an end in itself; in Tanzania, institutional structures are often changed to achieve consistency with evolving developmental goals.

While it is valid to characterise Tanzania's overriding objectives as 'socialist rural development', it is not so easy to pithily summarise Kenya's goals of development in a simple shorthand phrase. Side by side with a framework of rather extensive controls over, and government participation in, certain sectors of the economy (for example, agriculture and tourism), there is a vigorous private sector bounded only by the injunction that it Africanise its personnel as rapidly as possible. The varying development emphases lead to a different bias in

[1] Tanzania, *Statistical Abstract, 1970*, pp. 152–3.

[2] *Achievement in Ten Years of Independence*, p. 30.

urban policy, despite common problems of performance. In Tanzania, the bulk of governmental activity and development funds for the urban areas are intended to benefit 'workers' or 'lower-income groups'; at the same time, care is taken that co-operative, socialist activities are promoted, and that the gap between urban workers and rural peasants does not widen.[1] In Kenya, where we have seen how some programmes at least ostensibly aim at the lower-income groups, other schemes – notably the building of municipal markets, loan support for the Africanisation of trade, numerous housing estates built with public funds, the lending policies of the commercial banks – tend to benefit mainly those with property or capital.

These variations in urban policy are related to a number of more general independent differences between the two countries. Foremost among these are political structures and attitudes, and income distribution. Each of these factors will be discussed in turn.

(*a*) *Political structures and attitudes*

The single party in Tanzania is a mass organisation, from the local ten-house cell leaders covering all the urban and most of the rural areas, to an ongoing national headquarters and executive structure. Technical decisions are first passed by the economic committee of the Cabinet after extensive scrutiny by the civil service, but the National Executive Committee of T.A.N.U. meets regularly with the President and most, if not all, important decisions are taken with its sanction. While the party has been concerned about its rôle in implementing development policies,[2] its importance in establishing general strategy and goals is unquestioned.

In Kenya, the ruling party has played virtually no rôle in any major recent policy decision. The headquarters of K.A.N.U. amounts to little more than a few offices; at district level, the branches play

[1] For an important analysis of the income gap between urban and rural areas, see the 'Turner Report', published as *Report to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania on Wages, Incomes and Prices Policy* (Dar es Salaam, 1967). This was discussed at length in Parliament, where the debate can be located in *Majadiliano ya Bunge* [Hansard] *9th July to 26th July 1968* (Dar es Salaam, 1968), cols. 2581–666. A concise statement of the Government's policy on incomes and the rural–urban balance is published in the *Second Five-Year Plan*, pp. 205–7.

[2] For example, paragraph 11 of the *TANU Guidelines, 1971* stated: 'The responsibility of the Party is to lead the masses, and their various institutions, in the effort to safeguard national independence and to advance the liberation of the African. The duty of a socialist party is to guide all activities of the masses. The Government, parastatals, national organisations, etc., are instruments for implementing the Party's policies. Our short history of independence reveals problems that may arise when a Party does not guide its instruments. The time has now come for the Party to take the reins and lead all the people's activities.' The *Guidelines* are translated into English in *The African Review* (Dar es Salaam), 1, 4, April 1972, pp. 1–8.

essentially a nomination rôle at election time. Thus, while the continued vitality of the mass party in Tanzania obliges policy-makers to take the needs of the poorest areas and lowest-income groups into consideration, the same kind of institutional pressures do not exist in Kenya.

The degree to which lower-income urban needs are effectively articulated through the political machinery is partly a reflection of the attitudes and interests of the governing élite. The prevailing attitude towards urban development in Tanzania was well expressed in the 1967 Arusha Declaration, first written in draft by Julius Nyerere, and published in amended form by the T.A.N.U. National Executive Committee:

> We must not forget that people who live in towns can possibly become the exploiters of those who live in the rural areas. All our big hospitals are in towns and they benefit only a small section of the people of Tanzania. Yet if we have built them with loans from outside Tanzania, it is the overseas sale of the peasants' produce which provides the foreign exchange for repayment. Those who do not get the benefit of the hospitals thus carry the major responsibility for paying for them. Tarmac roads, too, are mostly found in towns and are of especial value to the motor-car owners. Yet if we have built those roads with loans, it is again the farmer who produces the goods which will pay for them. What is more, the foreign exchange with which the car was bought also came from the sale of the farmers' produce. Again, electric lights, water pipes, hotels and other aspects of modern development are mostly found in towns. Most of them have been built with loans and most of them do not benefit the farmer directly, although they will be paid for by the foreign exchange earned by the sale of his produce. We should always bear this in mind.[1]

Later in the same document, a 'leadership code' was proposed whereby T.A.N.U. and Government officials were prohibited from owning shares or directorships in any private company, receiving more than a single salary, or owning houses for rent.[2] This code has on the whole been successfully enforced. In effect, it separates the interests of T.A.N.U. and Government officials from specifically urban-based enterprise, since there is no restriction on a leader developing his rural farm, so long as he is not 'associated with the practices of capitalism or feudalism'. This anti-urban bias is in turn partially a reflection of the fact that few, if any, of the top political leaders represent towns or areas adjacent to the capital. If T.A.N.U.'s development as an effective nationalist party, out of associations that 'were essentially rurally based' and 'the

[1] Julius Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism* (Dar es Salaam, 1968), pp. 242–3.
[2] Ibid. p. 249.

resentment of country people against outside interference',[1] is a valid interpretation for the pre-independence period, the Government that T.A.N.U. formed later has been no less rural in its predispositions.

Kenyan political leaders have been less explicit on the rural–urban dichotomy. Besides a formal commitment to rural development in the second five-year plan, there is Kenyatta's frequent 'back to the land' exhortation, with the related implication that urban areas are breeding grounds of immorality and crime. In 1972 a speech by the President was reported as follows:

Vagrants and idlers in Nairobi and other towns throughout Kenya were yesterday reminded by President Kenyatta of his call to 'go back to the land' to help the farming community continue developing the country...'Our country has no place for lazy and idle people', he said...'Those who believe in hanging around Nairobi and other towns must heed my call of "go back to the land". It is only when we have got rid of vagrants and idlers that we can eradicate robbery and thefts', the President said.[2]

Later the same year, the Nairobi Provincial Commissioner justified the demolition of shanties because they 'were harbouring hundreds of criminals':

Many of them are often responsible for pick-pocketing incidents and night-time robberies, he alleged.

The PC warned that the law would not tolerate such activities and war had been declared to deal with such culprits, he said. The shanty dwellers were unwanted as the structures they had were illegal and a danger to the peaceful and law-abiding citizens of the city.

Mr. Mburu said all those living in the shanties had their homes, and even land, back in the reserves but did not wish to stay there. 'The Government, therefore, has no alternative but to take them back to their homes', he said.[3]

Persistence of these attitudes towards squatters and the urban unemployed notwithstanding, the Government has maintained its financial support for urban development. Funds advanced to Kenya's National Housing Corporation have been significantly greater than to its Tanzania counterpart: in 1972, for example, the Kenya Government loaned the N.H.C. K£1·793 million;[4] for the financial year 1972–3, Tanzania's N.H.C. received only T£125,000, or about 7 per

[1] Lionel Cliffe, 'Nationalism and the Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change in Tanganyika during the Colonial Period', in Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul (eds.), *Socialism in Tanzania*, Vol. 1, *Politics* (Nairobi, 1972), p. 22.

[2] *East African Standard*, 28 September 1972.

[3] *Daily Nation*, 1 December 1972.

[4] National Housing Corporation, *Annual Report, 1972*, p. 37.

cent of the Kenya total. A technical reason for this difference is that Treasury funds channelled to Kenya's N.H.C. are loans, repayable at normal intra-governmental borrowing rates; in Tanzania, on the other hand, most of the money allocated to the N.H.C. from the Treasury has been in the form of non-repayable, no-interest grants. Since conventional housing is more likely to support the repayment burden than are schemes for the poorest groups, financial pressures on the Kenya N.H.C. partly explain its bias towards middle- and upper-income accommodation.

At the same time, however, urban local authorities in Kenya have spent at a much higher level than in Tanzania. These differences cannot be explained in terms of dissimilar overall levels of expenditure by the two Governments, since in recent years total recurrent and development expenditures in both countries have been roughly equal. Even the slightly greater urbanisation in Kenya does not account for the differences. Of course, a lot more income is generated in Kenya's cities because of the wealth of the Asian and expatriate communities living there, particularly in Nairobi; but this in itself does not explain why the Government has spent so much more on public housing and other services which benefit the African community.

A major reason, I would submit, is political. Unlike the Tanzanian example, many influential Cabinet ministers (including the President himself) come from areas in the Central Province within commuting distance of the capital. Not only have many of their constituents migrated to Nairobi for work, maintaining their *shambas* and continuing to contribute to family up-keep and self-help projects in their home areas, but many senior politicians themselves have become heavily involved in urban land and business. This involvement, at a somewhat lower level, applies also to civil servants in both central and local government,[1] though it appears to be more prevalent among the Kikuyu who are the majority ethnic group in Nairobi and especially in the adjacent Central Province.[2] Politicians and high-level administrators have invested in land, buildings, and businesses in other Kenya towns as well, though to a much lesser extent than in Nairobi. When this

[1] The influential 'Ndegwa Report' on the public service dealt at some length with the ethics of public servants engaging in business activities, concluding that, subject to certain general provisos (which do not in fact appear to be generally followed), 'there ought in theory to be no objection to the ownership of property or involvement in business by members of the public services to a point where their wealth is augmented perhaps substantially by such activities'. *Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Public Service Structure and Remuneration Commission) 1970–71* (Nairobi, 1971), p. 14.

[2] For a brilliant analysis of urban–rural ties that applies particularly to the Central Province, see Colin Leys, 'Politics in Kenya: the development peasant society', in *British Journal of Political Science* (London), 1, July 1971, pp. 307–37.

TABLE 4

Households by Income Class for Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu, 1968–9[1]

Income (Shs./month)	Number of households	Percentage	Cumulative percentage
0–199	98	8·6	8·6
200–299	179	15·6	24·2
300–399	155	13·5	37·7
400–499	109	9·5	47·2
500–699	163	14·2	61·4
700–999	124	10·8	72·2
1,000–1,399	113	9·9	82·1
1,400–1,999	102	8·9	91·0
Over 2,000	103	9·0	100·0
Total	1,146	100·0	

TABLE 5

Individuals by Income Class for Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Mwanza, and Arusha, 1971[2]

Income (Shs./month)	Number of respondents	Percentage	Cumulative percentage
0–199	654	30·6	30·6
200–299	611	28·6	59·2
300–399	332	15·5	74·7
400–499	121	5·6	80·3
500–749	191	8·9	89·2
750–999	49	2·3	91·5
1,000–1,499	83	3·9	95·4
Over 1,500	99	4·6	100·0
Total	2,140	100·0	

involvement is not direct it may take place through relatives. Government support for a fairly high level of urban services, and in particular for the prestige development of Nairobi, is unlikely to diminish so long as these interests are congruent.

(*b*) *Income distribution*

A second, and complementary dimension which helps to account for

[1] Source: International Labour Office, *Employment, Incomes and Equality* (Geneva, 1972), p. 346.

[2] Source: author's computation of data supplied by Richard Sabot and Manfred A. Bienefeld, *National Urban Mobility and Employment Survey of Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, 1971).

the greater ideological thrust towards lower-income benefits in Tanzania is related to class structure. Without entering into a detailed discussion of the attributes of class in urban African society,[1] suffice it to say that any analysis in depth must take as a starting-point the known data on income distribution. While it is not easy to achieve exact comparability, some survey data fortunately exist for the principal urban areas in both countries. These are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The data for Kenya are based on a household survey during 1968–9, and include all main forms of cash and non-cash income.[2] The data for Tanzania, on the other hand, are based on a random survey of individuals in 1971, and do not include non-cash income. Admittedly, these data are not perfectly comparable: the figures for Kenya refer to households, and include non-cash income, while those for Tanzania refer to all income-earning individuals, and are derived from a survey carried out two years later. The time difference, however, is an advantage on this occasion, since the greater income earned by households in the Kenya sample would be to some extent cancelled by natural increases in individual incomes over two years in Tanzania.

For all the problems implicit in such a comparison, there is a striking difference in income distribution. The bulk of the Tanzanian sample (59·2 per cent) was earning less than Shs. 300/- per month, while only 24·2 per cent of the Kenyan sample was in this income class. At the other extreme, only 8·5 per cent of the Tanzanian urban workers earned Shs. 1,000/- per month or more, in contrast with 27·8 per cent of the Kenyan households sampled. In spite of the lack of a precise comparison, the differences are so great that two conclusions are inescapable: in Tanzania, proportionally speaking, many more workers received low wages, and far fewer had relatively high salaries.

These differences in income distribution are an important parameter on the two urban development programmes. On the one hand, the

[1] An excellent recent collection of articles on class in Africa is Szymon Chodak (ed.), *Social Stratification in Africa*: special issue of *Canadian Journal of African Studies* (Ottawa), VII, 3, 1973.

[2] The I.L.O. report *Employment, Incomes and Equality* relies heavily on this survey, but notes on pp. 75–6 that 'there was serious bias in the sample...The major biases arose through omitting most of the urban shanty areas from the sample frame and through excluding European and Asian households from the sample, thereby also excluding many African household servants, many of whom earn less than 200 shs. a month.' In a more recent synthesis of a number of social surveys, however, the Nairobi Urban Study Group has produced an income distribution table for 1972 that shows a much lower proportion of urban households in the under Shs. 300/- per month class, and a much higher proportion in the highest income category. Even if *all* of these samples are biased, which is difficult to demonstrate, they still represent an income distribution pattern which policy-makers must presume to exist.

greater proportion of middle- and upper-income earners in Kenya (and again, especially Nairobi) put considerable pressures on both local and central government to provide higher standard services and facilities.[1] On the other hand, in the Tanzanian environment, any policy which does not at least attempt to benefit lower-income groups will alienate the Government from the overwhelming majority of the urban population. Quite apart from élite interests and political structure, some of the differences in urban policy in the two countries are undoubtedly a reflection of contrasting class structures.

CONCLUSIONS

In this article I have compared urban policy and performance for the post-independence period ending in 1973. The tendency in Kenya has been to consolidate the pattern begun during the later colonial period, although relatively successful performance has only covered up problems of equity. Policy in Tanzania has moved progressively away from the past, but performance has bogged down because of inadequate resources. These substantially differing approaches are related to broader systemic factors, such as overall socio-economic goals, political structures, and income distribution. If this is not surprising, in view of what we already know about the differences between the two political systems, there are nevertheless some general points to be drawn from this type of comparison.

First, it is obviously not sufficient to characterise policies in a particular African state as, say, 'progressive' or 'consolidative', without taking account of the quality of implementation. If a country is poor, and its bureaucratic resources are limited, to put too much pressure on administrators to effect change is in the end to invite stagnation, and a situation whereby only those with access to the bureaucracy and its agencies will get what they need. Unless performance is improved, this is a danger that always lurks beyond policy innovation in Tanzania. For régimes where policy change has not been radical, and where bureaucratic capacity has been developed to more adequate levels, the problem for policy-makers may be to cope with demands from *all* sections of urban society, and not merely to meet targets or to maintain services in a formal sense. In a rapidly urbanising society where the bulk of the new migrants are in the lower-income groups, Kenya's

[1] For an extensive treatment of upper-income biases in the housing programme of the City Council, see Frederick T. Temple, 'Politics, Planning and Housing Policy in Nairobi', Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston, 1973.

urban bureaucracy will increasingly have to come to terms with the problem of equity.

The second point concerns political constraints. Urban political systems in Africa, with one or two exceptions, are notoriously weak in the sense that contacts between most of the population and the governing institutions and bureaucratic agencies are poorly articulated. Tanzania is somewhat of an exception to this pattern, with the result that urban policy is constrained to focus on lower-income groups; at the same time, the resultant programmes are very costly and difficult to carry out, especially in a country committed to rural development. In Kenya, where the bureaucracy clearly does not operate under the same political constraints, policy has been less innovative, but performance has been more consistent over time. The two countries, then, represent opposite urban policy dilemmas in the interplay between the twin needs for equity and performance.