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RISE OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN THE SWAHILI COAST: THE CASE OF KENYAN COAST

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DECLARATION

This is my original work and has not been presented in any other university for any other academic research.

Sign………………..   Date……………..…..

LINDA KIRIINYA
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This Project has been submitted with my approval as university supervisor.

Sign………………..   Date……………..…..

DR. SHAZIA CHAUDHRY

DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to my family for their immense support and especially my Mother Elizabeth Kiriinya and Grandmother Marion Mburugu who have constantly urged me on even when it seemed impossible to continue. God bless you.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia

ASC: Africa Security Council

BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation

CNN: Cable Network News

IEBC: Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission

ISS: Institute for Security Studies

KAULI: Kenya Assembly of Ulama and Imams

KCIU: Kenyan Council of Imams and Ulama

KDF: Kenya Defense Forces

MCET: Muslim Civic Education Trust

MEWA: Muslim Education and Welfare Association

MRC: Mombasa Republican Council

MUHURI: Muslims for Human Rights

MYC: Muslim Youth Center

NAMLEF: National Muslim Leaders Forum

NIS: National Intelligence Service

SUPKEM: Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims

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ABSTRACT

The world is currently experiencing the threat of radical Islam with daunting challenges to governments and policy makers on how to manage the threat. East Africa and particularly the Swahili coast has been home to Islam religion since the 1900s, where followers have practiced the moderate Sufi form of Islam. The past two decades have however witnessed the infiltration of radical forms of Islam in the region. Furthermore, in the post 9/11 conditions and especially with the global war on terror, evidence of Islamic militancy in the region has caused the international community to regard the region as a ‑hotbed of terrorismø Despite the growth of radical political activism in the Swahili coast, available research has failed to examine the factors that contribute towards its rise. Historically, Islam has played a significant role in Swahili coastøs politics and is often drawn upon to provide basis to argue for political and social reforms in a region that perceives itself as largely marginalized by the successive Kenyan Christian governments. Irrespective of their grievances and goals, radical Islamist groups are causing great concern to the government as they cause political instability, they disrupt social harmony, they hamper economic development, endanger regime survival and most of all threaten national security in their wake. Direct economic costs as a result of the security threat in the country include the destruction and degradation of physical capital and infrastructure, lost employment opportunities, and capital flight. Indirect costs include weakened institutions and a fragmented social fabric. This study therefore seeks to examine and understand the factors that contribute to the rise of Islamic radicalism in the target region, It seeks to examine the ideological conditions that facilitate the growth of radical Islamism in the Swahili coast; the internal and external factors that facilitate the rise of radical Islamism at the Kenyan Swahili coast; and examine the threats of terrorism to Kenya. Understanding the motivating factors for Islamic radicalism can help governments and policy makers devise appropriate response mechanisms to alleviate the problem. The study was restricted to the Coastal region of Kenya where the researcher collected both secondary data from published materials, journals, academic papers and periodicals on Islamic activities at the Swahili coast and primary qualitative data through semi-structured interviews. The researcher used snowball and purposive sampling approach where the researcher requested a few interviewees to recommend other people to be interviewed that they already know and that have a higher chance of adding value to the research study. This method relies on the intervieweeøs understanding and general knowledge of area of study, their availability, and their desire to participate in the entire study.[1] The findings supports the root cause model that radicalization arises from external level factors, internal social causes, and individual level factors which have a direct interaction with the level of political socialization of individuals. The study concludes that the government must devise other non-militaristic counter-terrorism/radicalism policies and efforts mostly focused on de-radicalization initiatives, socio-economic reintegration of radical elements, and most importantly entrenching inclusive governance that caters to the needs of all Kenyan citizens.

Key Words: Radicalism, Terrorism, Islamic, Swahili Coast, Kenya

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[1] Saunders, M., Lewis, P. & Thornhill, A (2012).*Research Methods for Business Students,* 6th ed., Harlow, Prentice Hall

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

The bombing of the United States of America embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by Al-Qaeda in 1998, ushered in a new dawn in national and regional security in East Africa, with implications to the world as a whole. More importantly increasing concern across the globe on the continued growth and interaction of transnational and domestic expressions of extremism and terrorist related activities and their link to Islam.[2] Since then, governments and policy makers, across the globe have all come out to express their concerns over Africaøs and indeed the worldøs susceptibility to the new fronts of Islamic militancy.

East Africa in the last two decades have witnessed as explained by Benford and David (2000)[3] a youth bulge, economic crises, uneven industrialization, rapid social changes, swift urbanization, and political regression. More importantly, each of the East African countries continues to experience extensive problems resulting from political, social and economic factors. To top these off, there has also been a consistent rise in sectarian violence in the region and particularly around the Swahili Coast and the North Eastern Kenya region.

The coastal region of Kenya and Tanzania is what is commonly known as the Swahili coast. The growth of radical Islam along the Swahili coast in recent decades has manifested itself in the spread of Salafi and Wahhabi ideologies, and in the emergence of extremist and terrorist groups

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[2] Arkoun, M. (2002). Locating civil society in Islamic context. In Amyn B. Sajoo (second Eds): *Civil in the Muslim World – Contemporary Perspectives, L.B.* Tauris Publishers, and London; Sirriyeh, H. (2006). Muslim radicalism and the challenge of survival. *Journal of Civil wars,* vol. 8 (3), pp.312-331; Abbas, T. (2007). Ethno-Religious Identities and Islamic political radicalism in the UK: A case study. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,* Vol. 27, No. 3, December, 2007, pp. 430-441

[3] Benford, R, D, & David, S. A. (2000). Framing processes and the social movements: An overview and assessment. Annual review of Sociology, Vol. 26(3), pp. 611-900

influenced by these ideologies. The development of radical Islam has been brought about by a number of socio-political factors some of them influenced by the activities in the Muslim world at large and others specific to the East African region. External factors that have had an impact on the Swahili coast include: the effects of the worldwide Islamic revival of the last several decades, the influence of international Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the export of Saudi funds and ideology, the impact of the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the spread of international radical Islamist networks. All of these developments have been exacerbated by the region's geographic and cultural proximity to the Middle East. Internal dynamics that have contributed to the growth of radical Islamism include the growth of domestic Islamist movements; Muslim reaction to perceived threats to Islam, Christian missionary activity in particular; and such political events as the Islamist-military coup in Sudan in 1989, the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, and the onset of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism.[4]

The Kenyan coast is perceived as a rife environment for violent Islamist recruitment and radicalism. The factors that drive radicalism along the Kenyan coast are a host of complex and interrelated issues with religious and ethnic dimensions. Years of perceived political and socio-economic marginalization by successive governments, land disputes involving the purchase of land by elites from outside the region and the rise of religious radicalism by national and regional groups coupled with calls for secessionist produces an environment for conflict which has resulted in the re-current use of violence to achieve political and religious goals.

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[4] Botha, Anneli. (2013). "Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youths to Radicalisation and Extremism." ISS Paper 245, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

It is to be understood that the majority Muslim populations in East Africa and the world are moderate and are opposed to the kind of radical Islam taken up by so called Islamic Jihadi groups. The study focuses on the changing patterns on ways that Muslim communities interact with the state of Kenya. The better part of the last two decades have seen a rise in Islamic groupsø mobilization and activism. The Islamic Party of Kenya formed in 1991 and one of the pioneer Muslim organizations encouraged the Kenyan Muslim community to start getting organized. Activist organizations have gained their motivations from what they perceive as discrimination and marginalization from both socio-economic and political fronts.[5]

More importantly, this has led to the majority of Muslim religious actors, to increase their political activities in order to gain a platform in which to represent their people. Muslim religious activists have used this platform as a claim to give Islam prominence in the public sphere by calling upon Muslim citizens to mobilize and fight for their political and social rights. Haynes (2005)[6] illustrates in his journal article that a new discourse of both opposition and other forms of new political agreements have all come to play a central role in accompanying the politicization of the Muslim identity. Even though we can use a larger context of a global resurgence of Islamic nationalism as indicated in the foregoing sections, to partially understand the rise of Islamic groups, it still remains a rather conventional issue for the current paper. For example, while examining the case of Islamic militant groups in Britain, Kfir (2007)[7] recommended the need to gain a deeper understanding of Islamic behaviors by first extending the momentous local socio-

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[5] Terdman, M. (2007). Factors are facilitating the rise of radical Islamism and terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. *Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the center of Special Studies.*2007
[6] Haynes, J. (2005). Islamic Militancy in East Africa. *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 26(8), pp. 1321-1339
[7] Kfir, I. (2007). Islamic Radicalism in Britain. *Turkish Journal of International Relations,* Vol. 6(6), No. 3&4. Fall & Winter 2007

political and economic changes that have taken place in the country since the 1990s, which have a least link to the process of democratization. Nonetheless, instead of simply reacting to the process of both political and social changes, Benford and David (2000); Carson (2005)[8] perceive majority of Muslim activists as a form of creative and conscious strategic adaptation towards political realities. According to the authors, the activists do this in order to reflect the proactive efforts for them to cause a political and social change in Kenya.

Considered entirely, the activities of Muslim organizations results from the basis of contours and from what Diani (1996)[9] refers to as radicalization movement whose objective is to cause political and social changes in the country. In fact, the recent occurrence of Muslim activism at the Kenyan coast might as well be embryonic. However, it is remaining somewhat distinctive in terms of clear collective objectives and increasing coordination of strategic initiatives. The past study conducted by Arkoun (2002)[10] reveals that both Islamic religious scholars and Imams have shown their efforts to form a composite activist movement whose social engagement centers on entrepreneurial Islamic religious leaders. The grassroots and religious contacts with some of ordinary Muslims, mainly through the mosque, tend to provide legitimacy for the majority of the Muslim leaders to assert their claims that they are speaking on behalf of other Muslims. More importantly, they also use a group of dedicated professions in order to increase their social and professional status in the society. In so doing, they also use Islam to help them gain the fight for social empowerment of entire Muslim community. Apart from the undeniable religious character of the movements, they do not direct their purpose primarily towards Islam. Instead, Islam seems to operate on the platform

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[8] Benford, R, D, & David, S. A. (2000). Framing processes and the social movements: An overview and assessment. Annual review of Sociology, Vol. 26(3), pp. 611-900; Carson, J. (2005). Kenya: The struggle against terrorism. In Robert I. Rotberg: *Battling terrorism in the horn of Africa,* Brooking University Press, Washington, D.C

[9] Diani, M. (1996). Linking mobilization frames and political opportunities: Insights from the regional populism in Italy. *American Sociological review,* Vol. 61 (6), pp. 1053-1069

[10] Arkoun *op. cit*

of presenting political demands and forces to mobilize and form an identity as a common denominator for serving other ends. Despite the growth of radical political activism by Muslim groups, available research has failed to examine the factors that contribute towards its rise. This study therefore seeks to fill the research gap by examining the factors that contribute to the rise of Islamic radicalism at the Swahili coast region. The study will answer the following research questions: What are the ideological conditions that facilitate the growth of radical Islam in the Kenyan Swahili coast? What are the conditions both internal and external that facilitate the rise of radical Islamism at the Kenyan Swahili Coast? What are the threats of terrorism to Kenya?

1.3. Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of this study is to examine the rise of Islamic radicalism in the Kenyan Swahili Coast.

1.3.1. The specific objectives of this study are;

i. To examine the ideological conditions that facilitate the growth of radical Islamism in the Kenyan Swahili coast;

ii. To examine the conditions both internal and external that facilitate the rise of radical Islamism at the Kenyan Swahili coast;

iii. To examine the threats of terrorism to Kenya

1.4. Literature Review

This study's objectives are aimed to help gain insight into why radical Islamic organizations infiltrate and seemingly thrive at the Kenyan coast. Furthermore, it is imperative to understand the continued transformation and mobilization of Muslim groups into radical patterns.

While extending the discussion on this question, this paper will reflect the manner of association of religion and political activities. Despite focusing on the emergence of Muslim militancy groups in East Africa and other regions, the researcher found no research study that examines the rise of Islamic radicalism in the Kenyan Swahili Coast. More importantly, the answers to this questions among others, depends on the research interviews conducted among high-ranking Muslim leaders and activists.

The main objectives of recent scholarly work concerning the Kenyan Muslim community, has largely been focused on the security perspective. Additionally, the post-independence mistrust between the government and the citizens in the country has been used by most scholars to point to the ever existing fear of expression mainly among the Muslim community, essentially current and historical grievances manifest in the kind of radicalism and antagonism directed towards government and security machinery in order to gain socio-political equality. Despite such efforts, all these according to Olivier (2006),[11] has ended up forming some sort of religious-political radicalization at the Kenyan coast. Other scholars (Carson, 2005; Haynes, 2005; Rorenthal 2012)[12] argue in their journal articles that the tendency to view the Muslim political actors in the lenses of either being radicals or moderates, has remained a common aspect among the conventional arrangements that relates to political Islam. Furthermore, the authors reiterates that this view gained strength after 9/11. When considered in the Kenyan context, we cannot nourish this when we base on the fact that apart from the two circumstances that occurred in 1998 and 2002, we have witnessed Kenya increasingly falling into the hands of the radical militia groups. While the attacks

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[11] Olivier, B. (2006). Islamism in East Africa: Gain in strength that may be recent but appears inexorable, in Claude moniquiet: *11 September 2001 – 11. September 2006: Islamic Jihadism and Counter Terrorism Five years after 9/11,* ESISC report

[12] Carson *op. cit.*; Haynes *op. cit.*; Rorenthal, J. (2012). America, Germany, and the Muslim Brotherhood. *Policy Review.* Vol. 3(2), pp. 68-85

have occurred in Nairobi and other parts of the country, this study sought to investigate the rise of such radical groups at the Kenya coast. The reason for selecting the region was informed by the fact that coastal region as explained in the introduction section is used to offer a safe haven for militancy activities, in addition, there is a growing campaign among the radical Muslim clerics at the Coast urging their followers to join their Muslim brothers in the Middle East and the world to fight against secular governments, to defend Islam. Essentially, Haynes (2005); Boussard (2002); Benford and David (2000), contend in their papers that the interest in the Kenyan Muslim activities revolves around the question as to the level and extent that people continue to experience religious and political radicalization. All these according to the studies play a major role in transforming majority of the Kenyan Muslim groups into supporters for either Islamic militancy or terrorism.

The current efforts to understand Islamic extremism at the Kenyan Swahili coast, comes from a wider research agenda of the current study, concerning the general role that religion plays and more particularly, as the central root for the most recent socio-political mobilization. Further, the research objective has contributed in producing several literatures that focus on the continued spread of political Islam exclusively in Middle Eastern countries that experience high dominance of Muslim Jihadi groups. This contrasts with the few scholars that focused on studying Islamic movements in regions such as sub-Saharan and East Africa. Countries in these regions have continued to experience the rise and dominance of Islamic militant groups. In essence, there is still available research work that focuses on the dynamics of Muslim communities at the Kenyan Swahili coast and especially, their continued interaction with the governments, or their influence on political developments in Africa as a whole. Majority of western countries have become cautious since the occurrence of 9/11 attack in the United States of America, creating increasing interest/suspicion of Muslims in Africa and around the world. Arkoun (2002) maintains that most

of these countries now fear that Africa is a safe haven for terrorism activities. However, there is need to point out that beneath the monolithic disguise of radical Islam, there is a much more complex picture that concerns their continued engagement and political activities. Unfortunately, because radicalism or Islamic militancy are used to provide the lenses through which we can approach the issue, much of the conventional studies still experience deficiencies in understanding the politics and nature of Islam within Sub-Saharan Africa. More importantly, a study conducted by Benford and David (2000), assert that majority of these studies fail to emphasize on the political and historical contexts that contribute towards the emergence of Islamic radicalism.

1.4.1 Radicalization and Associated Theories

The growing concern towards the subject of Radicalization among scholars, policy makers and practitioners, has resulted in having varied perceptions without really having a clear definition of radicalization. Failure to have a common definition also results in failing to have a common understanding concerning the processes, the causes, and adaptation strategies for radical groups. For some who focus on this topic, refer to radicalization as the use of violence as an approach to achieve either ideological or political goals, while others prefer to incorporate a mere acceptance to use of undemocratic beliefs, behaviors or actions for certain goals. In fact, the scope to the definition tends to vary greatly depending on the number of properties used. Despite the failure to have a unified definition of radicalization, most of the scholars, practitioners and policy makers to a great extent, prefer picking defining properties from a similar list after which, they use them interchangeably.

As a way of finding some of the common defining properties that concern radicalization, the current study conducted an internet search from different reports, journals and books on

radicalization. The essence of conducting the search was to come up with the minimum connotations and structures that concerns radicalization. This will also help to inform this paper's discussion.

Historically, the fields of political science and history have linked the concept of radicalization to political violence. Concisely, they perceived radicalization as the process that organizations and groups adopt through political violence (Pape, 2006).[13] They considered the application of violence as a õpoliticalö approach to make a statement of claim vis-à-vis the public sphere and with an objective to influence the society or to achieve certain political agendas. This implies that in essence, violence was not just about enrichment or for private gain. Such a basic property to the definition of radicalization has broadened in the last 6-7 years. Nevertheless, it remains the cornerstone to the concept of radicalization. Hence, common to the current definitions of radicalization, they emphasize on the use of political violence together with terrorism in order to achieve ideological or political goals. However, since 1998, the concept of radicalization seems to have taken an increasingly different but specific meaning to the process by which individuals utilize undemocratic means or extremist world perceptions in order to achieve specific political goals.

Table one below presents some of the recently used definitions of radicalization and summaries of some of their corresponding properties. The three definitions come from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) reports regarding radicalization, more in particular, radicalization in Africa. The institution was among the first to apply the language of radicalization and implementation of measures of de-radicalization. These definitions, policies, and reports, have all gained influence

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[13] Pape, R.A. (2006). Suicide terrorism and democracy. What we have learned since 9/11ø, *Policy Analysis,* pp. 582. Cato Institute.

across Africa and more specifically, Kenya following the recent wave of Somalia linked Al-Shabaab extremist group and Mombasa Republican Council membersøactivities in the region. The fourth definition comes from most of the cited reports of AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) which situates the conceptualization of radicalization in Somalia. The fifth definition comes from Africa Security Council (ASC) that helps to steer security policies among African countries. The last two definitions come from the National Intelligence Service (NIS) authorities, Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) service, and Kenyan government respectively.

Looking at the definitions provided in Table one at a glance, we can easily see that almost all the definitions tend to share some similar properties. Despite the similarities, the paper observes that several defining properties and scope tend to vary greatly. Such variations bring about fuzziness and confusion to the definition of radicalization. The second problem of the definitions of radicalization is that several cases formulate their definitions by referring to different concepts such as democratic, terrorism and extremist, which in themselves and whose definitions, still remain contested. For instance, while KDF uses the word extremist to define radicalization, the report fails to define the term. Furthermore, the NIS action plans tend to define radicalization by referring on extremism and states that:

Characteristics such as anti-democratic ideologies, enemy images, division, views, ‒them and usø, intolerance of others, and totalitarian, defines extremism. Besides, we can express extremist ideas through different ways from which, the extremist leads a group or an individual towards adoption of undemocratic and violent approaches in order to achieve political mileage. They use such

approaches to seek ways that they could engage in threats, harassment of different groups of people, or undermine democratic order because of beliefs, sexuality, or skin color (Pape, 2006).[14]

Table 1: Definitions and properties of Radicalization

Source	Definition	Properties
Botha and Abdile (2014: 15)	õthe process of gaining active support or taking an active part to cause changes in the society that ends up to constitute a danger to democracy and legal order, this will involve adoption of undemocratic means or methods that causes harm for the democratic functioning of a societyö	Support Acceptance Undemocratic goal Undemocratic means Violence means
Staun and Veldhuis (2009: 20)	õAn ever increasing failure for legitimacy for part of a democratic society, and where the end results of extremism (radicalism)	Undemocratic goals Directed process Violent means Undemocratic means

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[14] Ibid

	becomes antithesis of democracyö	
Mwangi (2012: 19)	õthe ever growing preparedness to support or strive to cause deeper interventional changes within the society that ends up being odd to the democratic legal order or employing undemocratic meansö	Directed process Violent means Undemocratic means Undemocratic goals Support Acceptance Directed process
Benford and David, 2000: 22	õThe citizens or residents gradually start to adopt political ideology or extremist religious ideology that is hostile to the society. They lead towards legitimization of terrorism as a tool to cause social changes. These ideologies feed and nurture depending on different influences from	Directed process Individual Extremist belief Terrorism Hostile to the society

	the extremists. Furthermore, they also internalize the extreme belief systems as though they are their ownö	
Cussac, 2008: 31	õthe scenario for people to start embracing opinions, ideas, and views that contributes towards different acts of terrorismö	Individual Extremist beliefs Terrorism
Carotenuto and Shadle (2012: 20)	õThe process by which an individual gains acceptance to use violent means or undemocratic means including terrorism with an effort to achieve specific ideological or political goalsö	Directed process Individual Undemocratic Violence means Terrorism
Barhan, 1992: 13	õRadicalization refers to the process by which individuals start to accept extremist methods and ideas and	Directed process Acceptance Support Individual

	possibly supports organized groupsö	Extremist beliefs

It is apparent hereby that this definition involves several other concepts that are not straight forward such as anti-democratic and totalitarian. As indicated in the above table, the most shared indication is that radicalization involves a directed process. Such a process also has a description of an adverb õincreasinglyö, õgraduallyö, or õgrowingö whose assumption is that it follows a linear direction. This involves following a solid path for greater radicalization and not large fluctuations, which in essence, inherently makes the process of radicalization a pleonasm. The common characteristic as the directed aspect of several definitions that refers to radicalization links to what Botha and Abdile (2014) theorize that radicalization tries to unfold through several or less distinct and succeeding stages. The ISS report[15] proposes a four-stage radicalization process. According to the report, the first stage refers to õpre-radicalizationö and refers to the situation before encountering the radical ideology or possessing any radical views of Islam, (Salafist Ideology/extreme interpretation of the teachings of the Koran, whose followers shun moderate practice of Islam, from which an individual lives an ordinary and unremarkable life. The second stage refers to õself-identificationö and begins at the point when an individual starts to receive the teachings in radical/extremist literature and religious interpretation. Furthermore, the author explains that the desire to study these literature comes from the õcognitive openingö triggered by personal problems - social, political and economic. The author refers to the third stage as

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[15] Botha, Anneli. (2013). õAssessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youths to Radicalization and Extremism.ö ISS Paper 245, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.

õindoctrinationö which occurs when an individual starts to intensify the understanding of radical views and literature gained from the later stage concerning radical doctrines/ideology. Unlike the foregoing stage, an individual begins to associate with other like-minded people that have embraced the radical doctrine.

The fourth and final stage refers to õjihadizationö that begins at the level where one has gained more acceptance from those that share same ideologies and goes to the level of accepting the duty given to them to take the roles of jihad. Similarly, Barhan (1992)[16] explains that more knowledge gained by an individual changes their world view and starts to view those that are of a different persuasion as õenemiesö and against Islam, and at this point they are easily co-opted or easily volunteer to carry out violent attacks on targets seen as opposed to the religion of Islam in the name of Jihad, which they see as their solemn duty to Allah. That despite the failure by Benford and David (2000) to report a specific model, it is imperative to note on how the report suggests that almost all radical groups have gone through a similar journey of alienation. While borrowing from the work of Staun and Veldhuis (2009), the authors posit that radical groups begin by going through a crisis of confidence from which, the confidence breaks down between the authorities and the group. After the first process, the group undergoes what the authors refer to as the õlegitimacy conflictö. At this point, the group questions the legitimacy within the existing democratic system. The final process refers to õlegitimacy crisisö. At this level, criticism of the existing system contributes towards dehumanizing of people that are engaged in the system. Furthermore, this also leads towards development of a new morality from which, majority of the members refer to themselves as the combatants that are out to fight evil in the society. The above

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[16] Barhan, J. S. (1992). The rise of and fall of a governance realm in Kenya, in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton (Eds): *Governance and Politics in Africa,* Lynne Rienner Publisher, London

phase models that explain the concept of radicalizations have also come under criticism because of failing to acknowledge that in all cases, an individual might fail to interact with, embrace or study some of the extremist ideologies.

However, the belief that being radicalized does not always translate to being engaged in active terrorism or political violence remains one of the current widely shared defining properties of radicalization. Mwangi (2012)[17] argues that what is important is that an individual accepts to participate or offer support to radical activities. This perception now brings about the aspect for a wider range of people to participate actively through verbal means, financial support to radical groups without necessarily encountering the groups. This scope of radicalism now forms a product with an increased focus on Muslim milieus in Africa and specifically Kenya, has seen individuals engaging in violent terrorism or jihadism, by expressing support for violence especially for Somalia based Al-Shabaab.

In addition to above property of radicalization, table 1 above also reveals that people also define radicalization by using the property of opposition to democracy or anti-democracy. Benford and David (2000) posit that in whatever form radicalization occurs, those that participate in it always become a threat to democracy of any country. Hence, this implies that radicalism does not just imply using or accepting to participate in terrorism or political violence, but that it aims at using undemocratic approaches to achieve undemocratic goals. It leads to a belief that some societal systems might end up being better than the already existing liberal democracy. While it is unclear what õundemocraticö means, Crenshaw (2001)[18] explains that the term refers to radicalization which is a process that involves practices such as encouraging other people to abstain from voting

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[17] Mwangi, I. (2012). Open door for terrorism. *Christian Century*, *129*(22), 26-29.
[18] Crenshaw, M. (2001). The Causes of Terrorism. Comparative Politics, vol. 13, pp. 379-99

exercises. Similarly, Shaykhutdinov and Achilov (2012)[19] explains in his book that undemocratic might as well imply threats and harassment of other groups in the manner that makes their civil and political participation to become complex or problematic. The Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) a Mombasa rights based activist group, for example has had a distinct agenda from that of Al-Shabaab, however their undemocratic activities became apparent during the 2013 general election when the groupøs leaders spread the message among its people against participating in the general election. In fact, the most disturbing scenario occurred when the Kenya security forces reported that majority of the group members were attacking IEBC (Independent election and boundaries commission) officials and clerks while conducting mock elections in Malindi. Linah Benyawa-a standard magazine reporter, pointed out that investigators started to pursue the leads that could help point to MRC conducting their meetings at mosques in Mombasa before conducting their attacks during the Election Day which left 10 police officers dead. Furthermore, the correspondence explained that policemen had to question the groupøs secretary general Hamza Randu concerning the allegations that the group had met at Kwale mosque in order to plan on how they could attack police officers and disrupt voting processes that were to take place on March 4, 2013. Therefore, it seems plausible that the efforts to define radicalization through the lenses of benefiting from undemocratic goals can be viewed as a product of a perceived threat from the MRC to undermine the democratic system of Kenya as an effort to succeed. The focus of such groups towards undemocratic goals and the extremist beliefs, tend to relate to the underlying theory of radicalization.[20] In his journal article, Ibrahim explains that sharing of certain extremist and

[19] Shaykhutdinov, R, & Achilov, D. (2012). State Regulation of Religion and Radicalism in the Post-Communist Muslim Republics. *Problems of Post-Communism,* vol. 60, no. 5, SeptemberóOctober 2013, pp. 17ó33.

[20] Ibrahim, A. (2010). Tackling Muslim radicalization: Lessons from Scotland. *Institute for Social Policy and Understanding.*

radical ideas and not the organizational dynamics, situational escalations, or structural conditions, all forms what drives individuals to participate in undemocratic means or violence activities.

Finally, table 1 above indicates that an individual process is also another increasingly used property that defines radicalization. Traditionally, scholars linked radicalization to either organizations or groups that participated in violence activities. For instance, Crenshaw (2001) uses the underlying theory of radicalization in order to highlight both an intensive interaction and group dynamics as the key driving forces for radicalization. Nevertheless, focus on making radicalization an individualized activity, tends to recommend an alternative perception of radicalization and emphasizes on the changes that happens to individuals as a result of socio-psychological conditions and the so called õcognitive openingsö as one of the basic indicators for radicalization. In this case, therefore, it is imperative to note that an individual becomes radicalized because of ideology-seeking desire and by holding some world views whose challenge comes from personal, political, cultural and economic experiences. Radicalization takes places when an individual depends on several alternatives ideologies, political and religious and comes into contact with people who already hold some radical views. Just as explained by Botha and Abdile (2014), radicalization occurs because of increased demand from individuals who would like to use different radical views in order to satisfy their radical goals. While becoming radical, each process places a responsibility to those involved in radical activities. Hence, this implies that radicalization take place without a cause and in some cases people use violence as legitimate means, however it only takes place in an individualøs mind. The above views tend to disregard application of an objective cause when there is an external pressure.

Overall, the definition of radicalization should be described as a gradual process from which even though it might occur rapidly, it would be difficult to define from where exactly it begins and

where it ends. Instead, it comprises of an individualøs development which would depend on a combination of factors and involve a drastic change in both behaviors and attitudes. In addition, although the threshold between terrorism and radicalization seems vague, it is imperative to emphasize the distinctions that occur among these concepts. The current study will follow the definition given by ISS in defining terrorism. According to ISS, terrorism refers to an intentional action by individuals whose major aim is to cause intimidation to a given population or to compel a certain government or an international body to desist from carrying out any action. Furthermore, it also refers to such acts taken by an individual or an organization to either destroy or destabilize the fundamental social structures, economic, constitutional, or political state of a given country or international organization. Above all, terrorism forms a political tool that despite its success level, an individual or organization uses it in order to cause social and political change in a society. While on the other hand, radicalization refers to the process of causing a transformation which in itself, fails to serve a clear definition of purpose and that even though the participants might use violence, it does not always entail violence. This implies that individuals that resolve to use violent radicalism, adopt a system of belief that promotes violent actions. As noted above, this does not necessarily imply that radicalized individuals or groups have to resort to use of violence. Anneli Botha of ISS, one of the most influential scholars of suicide terrorism, states that õterrorism is a situation where members of a certain community believe in the use of violence as the most useful approach to achieve their goalsö (2014, 13). According to Botha, in most cases, not all radicalized individuals take part in violent activities, most tend to refrain from participating in terrorism activities. Even though terrorism forms the worst possible outcome, it is avoidable. In other words, it should be noted that although an individual who participates in terrorism is termed as a radical, not all radicals are terrorists. The above argument posits that radicalization process can take

different dimensions including violent and non-violent ones. For instance, radicals can still participate in non-violent behaviors without the intention of causing harm, but still remain radical. In essence, radicalization becomes the main prompting cause to commit terrorist activities by individuals of radical religious views and practices, particularly of Islamic affiliation. While these forms of behaviors predict engaging in terrorism, activities, some, do not (Botha, 2014).

This study seeks to analyze both violent as well as non-violent processes of radicalization, which through a system of belief or actual behavior, poses a threat to the Kenyan society. For instance, this might include creation or distribution of radical materials in order to radicalize other individuals. Additionally, the scope will also extend to activities that involve inciting jihad or recruiting individuals to become part of radical organizations. All these will involve actions that have potential disruptive effects to a society. In fact, in 2012, the Mombasa court charged for the first time a member of MRC in Likoni for distributing leaflets alleging that the Coastal region is not a part of Kenya. In the same year, this also became the first trial for the suspected MRC members after the lifting of an earlier proscribed order to the group in 2009. This had come barely two months after the Director for Public Prosecutions Keriako Tobiko-, warned members of MRC against using slogans and chants that could be in violation of the constitution and other laws. For example, Mr. Samuel Gicheru, the Mombasa principle magistrate charged Alfred Bati Chepori for incitement and distribution of leaflets with the words *pwani si Kenya.* In addition, four alleged members of MRC were charged in 2010 in Kilifi for participating in subversive activities that were prejudicial to both security and public order. Prominently, despite the court concluding that the accused incited radical ideologies and attitudes, the court found insufficient evidence that such activities could result in terrorism activities and that MRC was a terrorist group (Oketch, 2012;

Yaa, & Mwaura, 2013).[21] In essence, this helps to illustrate the existing delicate threshold between the radicalization- the transformation that involves a shift in behaviors and attitudes to engage in radicalism, and actual engagement or intention to participate in terrorism activities. Despite consideration by the court that the suspected MRC members were a threat to the society, it could not deduce the likelihood for the group being terrorists.

In summary, therefore, although several studies, scholars, and professionals have developed several definitions of radicalization, they seem to emphasize on the important properties of the process of radicalization. The current study seeks to focus on radicalization in terms of all ideological expression and behaviors that includes distribution of radical literature, persuading individuals to participate in holding of radical views, recruitment, and incitement that pose potential threat to the safety of those living on the Kenyan Swahili Coast. Moreover, the study extends radicalization to activities likely to lead to terrorism.

1.5. Theoretical Framework

This paper adopts social movement theory as an effective central analytical concept to examine not only the solidification and emergence of new forms of Muslim collective behaviors, but also to understand the aspects that contribute towards transformation of Muslim identity. While the primary emphasis of this paper is scoped towards the question of the rise of Islamic radicalism,

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[21] Oketch, W. (October, 2012). Man charged for displaying MRC slogan. Accessed on 1 November, 2014 from http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000067576&pageNo=1; Yaa, E., & Mwaura, M. (2013). MRC suspects charged with four Mombasa police killings. Accessed on 1 November, 204 from http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-110696/mrc-suspects-charged-four-mombasa-police-killings

it would also be interesting to use both political, social and economic perspective to understand their effects to the society.

Social Movement has no definite scholarly consensus since there are a number of competing frameworks in the field and each conceptualize movements differently. Even scholars within the same school of thought define movements differently depending on their particular theoretical design. The field of social movements is divided between two theoretical streams. There is the classical approach which stresses social psychological variables including ideology, deprivation, strain, social construction of reality and structural breakdown. On the other side is resource mobilization with its stress on structural variables including social organization, interest, resources, group conflict, mobilization, tactics and strategies and rational utilitarian logic. However, both social psychological and structural variables are crucial to understanding social movements although they differ over how they should be combined into a comprehensive theory.

This paper will examine various concepts of social movements advanced by the major schools and distinguish between those that differ fundamentally. This will involve the examination of social movements concepts in Marxian, Weberian, collective behavior, mass society, relative deprivation and resource mobilization theories.

Social movement concept according to Karl Marx

Karl Marx was primarily interested in the causes and dynamics of revolutionary movements aimed at dismantling the capitalist system. He argued that movements grow out of basic social and economic relations which establish the bases of power in a society. Thus, he focused attention on how capitalism generates the necessary conditions for a revolutionary reconstitution of capitalist societies. Marx viewed revolutionary movements as both normal, and inevitable under capitalism,

because capitalism contains and generates endemic structural contradictions, which inevitably leads to efforts geared towards structural change through the existence of two classes with mutually exclusive interests. The two classes are the owners of the means of social production/bourgeoisie and the workers/proletariat. The owners of the means of production will employ exploitative measures on the workers in a bid to increase their profits, whereas the workers will as much as possible try to resist this exploitation. These opposed interests produce inherent class antagonisms which culminate into revolutionary conflict between workers (the revolutionary class) and capitalists.[22]

Marx theory calls attention to a number of factors often overlooked by alternative theorists of social movements. For example, he links inequality and other properties of the society to the rise of revolutionary movements. He pointed out the centrality of interests, especially class interests. Thus, he made the case that participation in movements is rational, purposive activity. Marx also emphasized the necessity of internal organization and networking. Finally, by showing how movements are products of the societies in which they arise, Marx showed that revolutionary movements are not abnormal occurrences unconnected to the larger society. Because of its focus on class, however, Marxøs analysis may have limited explanatory power for social movements where other factors play prominent roles.

Social movement concept according to Max Weber

Weberøs view of charismatic authority provides an overview of his conception of charismatic movements. He conceptualized the charismatic movement as a social change force, arguing that õwithin the sphere of its claims, charismatic authority repudiates the past and is in this sense a specifically revolutionary forceö. Furthermore, õin a revolutionary and sovereign manner,

[22] Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1968). Manifests of the Communist Party. Selected Works 1: 31-63.

charismatic domination transforms all values and breaks all traditional and rational normsö. For Weber, the struggle for power and change are the main objectives of charismatic movements. Charismatic movements originate in social systems that are undergoing great stress and are unable to meet the needs of a significant number of people.[23] Charismatic leaders are paramount because their extraordinary personal qualities lead people in stressful situations to treat them as if they possess superhuman powers. The charismatic leader attracts followers because they identify with his divine mission believing that its realization translates into their own well-being. Thus, the leaderø personal magnetism and world view serve as the recruiting force that pulls people into the charismatic community where they establish an emotional and communalistic form of existence. For Weber charismatic movements are non-routine forms of collective action that emerge outside of pre-existing social organizations, norms, and bureaucracies. Such movements are inherently unstable because the pure charismatic element provides them with resources and solidarity only during their early stages. Hence, Weber advanced a life cycle scheme arguing that if charismatic movements are to endure they must routinize their activities because of economic, administrative, and leadership succession problems they inevitably face. When routinization occurs, the charismatic movement establishes a sound organizational base and become integrated into the society.

Weberø analysis calls to attention to: Charismatic leadership; belief systems; social systems undergoing stress; routinization of charismatic authority; and the revolutionary nature of charismatic movements.

Social movement concept according to Collective Behaviorists

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[23] Weber, M. (1968). Economy and Society. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds). New York: Bedminister Press.

Collective behavior theorists view social movements as non-institutionalized social change efforts.[24] Thus, Blumer[25] defined õsocial movements as collective enterprises to establish a new order of life õand maintained that in the beginning, õa social movement is amorphous, poorly organized and without form.ö Lang and Lang[26] defined the social movement as õa large-scale, widespread, and continuing, elementary action in pursuit of an objective that effects and shapes the social order in some fundamental aspect.ö Finally, Turner and Killian[27] define a social movement as õcollectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society or group of which it is a part. As a collectivity a movement is a group with indefinite and shifting membership and with leadership whose position is determined more by the informal response of the members than by formal procedures for legitimizing authority.ö

The õsocial movementö is the unit of analysis in these definitions. Turner wrote, õthe primary focus of interests for students of collective behavior is the social movement as a sociological phenomenon and as a form of collective behavior.ö Therefore, the movement in collective behavior approaches is conceptualized as a phenomenon with its own properties, processes, and internal logic.

In short, collective behaviorists view social movements as non-routine forms of collective action geared toward social change. They cannot be explained by prior social organization, norms, and culture because movements are emergent forms that acquire organization during their life cycles. Once such forms become institutionalized they cease to be objects of inquiry as social movements. The tasks then are to identify the origins of movements; investigate how they give rise to change;

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[24] Jenkins, J, Craig. (1983). Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements. Annual Review of Sociology 9: 527-553.
[25] Blumer, H. (1951). Collective Behavior. Alfred McClug Lee (ed) New Outline of the Principles of Sociology. New York: Barnes and Noble Books.
[26] Lang, K. and Lang, G. (1961). Collective Dynamics. New York: Crowell.
[27] Turner, R. and Killian, L. (1957). Collective Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Second Edition.

analyze the fluid processes, dynamics, life cycles of movements; and group movements into comprehensive classificatory schemes.

Social movement concept according to Mass Society theorists

Mass society theorists view social movements as phenomena which occur when previously unorganized individuals get together to change some part of their social situation.[28] Mass society definitions of movements are not vastly different from those of collective behaviorists. For example, (King, 1956) defines a social movement as õa group venture extending beyond a local community or a single event and involving a systematic effort to inaugurate changes in thought, behavior, and social relationships, and (Toch, 1965) defines a social movement as õan effort by a large number of people to solve collectively a problem they feel they have in common.

Mass society theorists usually emphasize the characteristics of õmass societiesö which make movements possible: cultural confusion, social heterogeneity, weak cultural integration mechanisms, and a lack of attachments to secondary group structures. Thus, they are less likely than collective behaviorists to examine movements directly. Instead, they analyze the properties of societies, specify the õpersonality traitsö and psychological states which those societies produce, and explain how these factors generate movements. Their conception of social movements calls attention to the interface between social structure and personality.

Social movement concept according to Relative Deprivation theorists

Unlike collective behaviorists and mass society theorists, relative deprivation proponents have not focused attention on social movements, per se. Rather, they study episodes of political violence and revolution; thus their interest are more limited than collective behaviorists and mass society theorists.

Gurr, [29] a leading proponent of relative deprivation, states that his research is concerned with political violence ó õall collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors or its

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[28] King, C. (1956). Social Movements in the United States. New York: Random House
[29] Gurr, T. (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

policies such as political turmoil, conspiracy and mutinies.ö Thus, most behaviors discussed in relative deprivation literature qualify as social movement activity. Moreover, theorists using the relative deprivation framework have also analyzed social movements. Because relative deprivation perspectives focus on the genesis of political violence instead of social movements per se, there are two points to keep in mind: relative deprivationists examine the genesis of political violence but do not focus on the dynamics of such violence; and they focus on political violence, while not analyzing other forms of political protest.

Social movement concept according to Resource Mobilization theorists

McCarthy and Zald have formulated an organizational-entrepreneurial model of social movements. In their view, [30] õa social movement is a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and reward distribution of a society.ö This definition excludes both organizational factors and the struggle for power. The definition implies that latent movements are forever present in societies because no society lacks individuals who possess preferences for change. McCarthy and Zald contend that social movements are nothing but preference structures directed towards social change. They state that social movement can serve as one unit of analysis because analysts may investigate who holds the beliefs and how intensely are they held? But different units of analyses are needed to explain open conflict, mobilization, or outcomes of collective action. To understand those issues the unit of analysis shifts to movement organizations, industries, sectors, and entrepreneurs.

Charles Tilly (1973) advances a political process view of movements arguing that collective action derives from a populationøs central political processes. Till defines a social movement as õa sustained series of interactions between national power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly-visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support.ö

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[30] McCarthy, J. and Zald, M. (1977). Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: a Partial Theory. American Journal of Sociology.

For Tilly the focus is sustained interactions rather than the social movement as a phenomenon. He breaks from previous definitions by refusing to treat social movement as the unit of analysis, arguing instead that a movement is not a group that emerges and transforms over time.

Tilly roots the concept of social movement in historical time and space. The social movement is argued to be a nineteenth century creation generated by the nationalization of politics and the rise of special purpose associations. During that century political parties, unions, and other associations became the chief vehicles through which groups struggled for power and institutionalized their interests. Still large groups remained disenfranchised without their interests routinely satisfied through elections and labour management negotiations. Tilly argues that these people constitute social movements and like their institutionalized counterparts, they struggle for national power through special purpose associations. What distinguishes social movements from their institutionalized counterparts is their political situation which causes them to rely heavily on a repertoire of disorderly tactics such as strikes, demonstrations, violence and protest meetings to accomplish political ends.

Nevertheless, social movements and formal political parties are mirror images because both are political actors pursuing power. Both set of actors are propelled by the same political process wherein the social movement is a party with broad aspirations and a unifying belief system and the political party is a tamed, nationalized social movement.

Tilly paints two views of a movement: that of national power structure and that of movement participants. Social movements from the perspective of national power structures are coherent phenomena, they exist so long as they offer a challenge to dominant interests and beliefs. But seen from the bottom up social movements are usually much more fragmented and heterogeneous: shifting factions, temporary alliances, diverse interests, a continuous flux of members and hangers on. The task of the analyst therefore, has three prongs: 1. To investigate the response of power holders to social movements, especially their ability to protect their interests through repression, forming coalitions, bargaining, and cooption; 2. To investigate the dynamics through which movement actors advance their interests by creating the illusion of unity,

mobilizing large numbers of supporters, and making strategic choices; and 3. To combine these two perspectives into a dynamic analysis of collective action.

1.6. Justification of the study

The study argues that the conventional paradigms used to study both Muslim and Islamic societies in Africa, already experiences two deficiencies. The first of such deficiencies is that scholars have only narrowed their study focus on the effects that arise from the destabilization caused by radical Islamic groupsøsocio-political efforts. The second deficiency is that such studies adopt deficient models of explaining the nature, the divergent schools of thought and complexities of Islam and Islamic societies. The above deficiencies arise from a desire to have a unified focus on the significance of political practices of Islam and Islamic groups. More importantly, such a unified focus has also influenced other scholars to consider some inherent characteristics that are found in Islam and those that tend to predispose their political behaviors (Louis, 2012).[31] According to Benford and David (2000), such studies should emphasize on conducting empirical investigations to understand both the ideologies, persuasions and different practices of Muslim groups. Found within the literature that explains the presence of Islamic militant groups in sub-Saharan Africa, studies have exaggerated their assumptions concerning the function that ideas from the Islamic religion have when explaining the new forms of engagements and mobilization through a socio-political platform. More notably, they have imported and introduced new doctrines of reformism from Middle Eastern countries. Kfir (2007) asserts in his journal that studies do this in order to reflect on the interrelations and spread of radical forms of Islam from these groups. Further, they also wish to replace some of the Western liberal models with Islamic political models.

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[31] Louis, B (2012). *Muslim identity and the social change in Sub-Saharan Africa,* Indiana University Press, Bloomington

However, this study sought to adopt social movement theory as an alternative model used by Terdman (2007); Chingøole (2013)[32] to examine the rise of Islamic radicalism at the Kenyan Swahili coast. We can gain a deeper understanding of African Muslim communities, their practice and interactions of the socio-political context by deviating from Islam as a key framework. Further, the approach can also lead to the understanding of historical and social contexts of Islamic radicalization. The main contention that forms the structure and analysis of this study comes from the recently witnessed mobilization of Kenyan Muslims and the youth in particular. This reflects an active response to the ever-changing patterns on how society interacts with the state. The perspective reveals that a new Muslim activism reflects how societal groups come up with creative adaptations.

1.7. Hypothesis

This study tested the following null and alternative hypothesis

H_0: Islamic radicalism at the Swahili coast is not caused by both internal and external factors and conditions.

H_1: Islamic radicalism at the Swahili coast is caused by both internal and external factors and conditions.

1.8. Research Methodology

Any research that seeks to examine either the socio-political or religious dynamics that concerns African Muslim societies, tend to experience scarcity of available qualitative data on the topic. The Kenyan case is not an exception given that the Kenyan Islamic group tends to form a

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[32] Chingøole, S. (2013). The growing of Islamic fundamentalism in Tanzania: Are the rising religious tensions ripping Tanzania apart? *European Peace University,* pp. 1-10

minority population from which few scholars have focused their study. More importantly, we can categorize the already existing literature that focuses on Kenyan Muslims into three different categories. The first category covers scholarly studies that focus on the theological development, intellectual life, indigenous conflicts as well as the local religious practices of Muslim communities in Kenya.[33] The second category involves those dealing with a broader perspective. They tend to focus on a range of aspects such as political, economic, social and even historical perspectives of Muslim groups in Kenya. Another category of studies focuses on pre-colonial and colonial history of Muslims.[34] Other studies looks at the more contemporary aspects that explains patterns of Muslim organizations and how they interact with both politics and the society. Finally, it is imperative to note that in the recent past, Muslims in Kenya have been a target of many international observers in view of Islamic radicalization that locates Kenya as a safe haven for terrorist activities and mobilization. While majority of such past studies seem to offer an important starting point, they all fail to provide important information and sufficient foundation for examining the modern Islamist related activism and practices and some of the patterns and the overall relation to the broader socio-political perspective in Kenya.

The research is based on both primary and secondary sources of information in order to acquire extensive knowledge on radicalization at the Kenyan Swahili coastal region. The study was restricted to the Coastal region of Kenya. The study designed few interview questions to collect information in form of conversations and secondary data was also obtained from published materials, journals, academic papers and periodicals on Islamic activities at the Swahili coast. The

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[33] Cussac, A. (2008). Muslims and Politics in Kenya: The Issue of the Kadhis' Courts in the Constitution Review Process. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, *28*(2), 289-302. Doi: 10.1080/13602000802303227

[34] Prestholdt, J. (2011). Kenya, the United States, and Counterterrorism. *Africa Today*, *57*(4), 3-27. doi:10.2979/africatoday.57.4.3

target sample was influential Muslim clerics and leaders. In total, the interviews covered 10 qualitative semi-structured interviews that had a varying length of interview time taking on average 30 to 40 minutes. All the interviews were designed and administered in English language with the understanding that overall Muslims generally understand English and the fact that English is also an official language spoken by majority of Kenyans. The study collected qualitative data and carried out analysis of the content.

Prior to data collection from the target informants, the researcher had to get contacts from the initial informants by using snowball and purposive sampling approach. Researchers can use snowball as an approach by requesting a few interviewees to recommend other people to be interviewed that they already know and those that have a higher chance of adding value to the research study.[35] Researchers can use purposive sampling approach when they want to come up with their own interviewees. The most appropriate way is to base on the interviewee's understanding and general knowledge of areas of study, their availability, and their desire to participate in the entire study.

Overall, the current study applied snowball approach and collaborated with key Muslim individuals such as the secretary general of the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya - CIPK- Sheikh Yakub Muhamad Dor, a high-ranking Muslim scholar, Chief Kadhi, and Kisauni nominated Member of Parliament, in gaining knowledge and recommendations on who to interview. Application of snowball and purposive sampling helped in leading the researchers to the most prominent Muslim figures to form part of informants and provide important information for the current research. The people contacted to participate in the current study accepted by giving

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[35] Saunders, M., Lewis, P. & Thornhill, A (2012).*Research Methods for Business Students,* 6th ed., Harlow, Prentice Hall

their consent to participate. The informants were composed of leading Muslim activists and the important Muslim organizations such as Kenyan Council of Imams and Ulama (KCIU), Majlis Ulama, and Kenya Assembly of Ulama and Imams (KAULI); social and civil activist organizations such as Muslim Education and Welfare Association (MEWA), Muslim Civic Education Trust (MCET), Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), as well as Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM) and National Muslim Leaders Forum (NAMLEF) as two national umbrella organizations.

The researcher designed interview questions covering three different aspects. The first category of questions asked the informants to explain some of the ideological conditions that facilitate the growth of radical Islam in Kenya. The second category involved review of both internal and external conditions that facilitate the rise of radical Islamism and terrorism at the Kenyan Coast. The third category of interview questions looked at what the Muslim informants thought to be the possible threats of terrorism to Kenya and the role of Arab influence towards facilitating radical Islam in Kenya. Furthermore, this also involved making enquiries concerning the manner in which the Muslims tend to engage and relate with both the state and the society, their perception regarding the role of religious and Islamic doctrines in such a struggle.

The informants that accepted to participate in the interview process remained open and friendly, though some seemed to show some slight resistance and hesitation with the perception that the study might implicate them as members of militant groups such as Al-Shabab. This also came from the fact that the researcher and the assistant were of non-Muslim origin. The identity of the researchers as non-affiliates of governmental organization, assisted in giving a general acceptance. However, some informants perceived the interview as high risk, as the interviewers could have been working with national or international intelligence agencies harboring hostile

objectives. Nevertheless, they gave their consent to answer all the interview questions as they had nothing to hide. The informants must have responded positively following the ethical consideration that the study was not going to collect personal information from them. In order to maintain the aspect of anonymity from the informants, the study encouraged them not to use their real names whenever they found not necessary. Furthermore, the study also required that all informants give their consent after receiving the consent letter explaining the objectives of the study, all the procedures for answering the interview questions and their rights to participate in the interview process.

On the one hand, it became clear that a fraction of the informants considered this as an opportunity to bring about the awareness concerning the activities of Muslims predicaments and suffering as well as the need to present their struggle in the most favorable manner. Besides, this also became an opportunity for spurred wish pass their message to the government on how the government should relate with the extremist and militant groups either from within the coast, and in the country, Somalia or from the wider Africa region. Given the fact that majority of informants developed the interest towards the research perceptions and way of reporting the grievances expressed by the Islamist group, there was high expectation that it would influence how they responded to the interview questions. While on the one hand, the interview questions helped to provide important information concerning the Kenyan Muslim discourse involving subjective perceptions and legitimizing strategies as well as the expectations from some of the leading Muslim representatives.

The study also applied a top-down approach focusing on the leadership level. The approach made it easier to identify leaders as opposed to both unorganized constituents and informal networks. Furthermore, using the leadership level provides the easiest approach for getting

wheeler dealers and opinion leaders whose role have great impact on their constituents. Therefore the study¢s effort is to provide a deeper understanding on Muslim groups and their objectives. This is because majority of those that participate in radical activities tend to have perception of conditions that determine the manner in which they define both their strategies and objectives. In addition, in order to answer all the interview question, the study combines the perceptions of informants with the objectives and the contextualizing approach that links both a social, economic, cultural and political issues.

Because of limitation in time and resources to collect all the required descriptive information, the study draws conclusion based on several limiting factors. One of the limiting factors comes from the above-described top-down approach. While the approach assists in collecting the most relevant data from the informants, it is imperative to note that the approach fails to allow the estimation of how the activist organizations show their popular resonance. The second factor arises from the methodology and geographical bias, whereby the study only focused on the Kenyan Coast and not on other geographical parts such as Nairobi which has experienced cases of terrorism from militant groups. The study considers the region as the center of focus because to some extent, it reveals some characteristic differences from other Muslim groups located in others parts of the country. However, this remains least because of the special historical experiences attached to the Kenyan Coastal strip that borders Kenya and Somalia. The study supports[36] that the Coastal region of Kenya has a strong Islamic history and that presently, it also holds majority of Kenyan Muslim population than other parts of the country furthermore holds the highest office of Muslim religious authority-the office of the Chief kadhi.

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[36] Kresse, K. (2009). Muslim politics in postcolonial Kenya: negotiating knowledge on the double-periphery. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, *15*S76-S94. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9655.2009.01543.x

1.9. Chapter Outline

Chapter one includes literature that introduces the topic of study. Overall, it explains the general perspective of the topic in relation to Africa, East Africa and Kenya. Such a description helps to lay out the broader understanding of aspects that concern the topic of Islam, in relation to radicalism, social, economic and security aspects. It also explains the overall structure of the paper in general in order to capture both the objectives and questions. This includes the scope of study in the introduction, the literature review section, the methodology, the findings, and discussion, and theoretical implications of the study. Furthermore, it also includes limitations of the study and recommendations concerning any future research in a similar area. Chapter two examines the factors that contribute to the rise of Islamic radicalism in the target region. It examines the ideological conditions that facilitate the growth of radical Islamism in the Swahili coast; the internal and external factors that facilitate the rise of radical Islamism at the Kenyan Swahili coast; and examine the threats of terrorism to Kenya. Chapter three looks at the Islamic socio-political endeavors in East Africa while examining securitization of Islam in East Africa. It also focuses on the rise of radicalism at the Swahili coast looking at both homegrown and external factors that have played a role in facilitating its rise. The chapter also focusses on Somalia's state collapse and the emergence of al-Shabaab and its effects on the growth and spread of radicalism at the Swahili coast. Chapter four provides a critical analysis of the study and discusses key findings on the rise of Islamic radicalism in the Kenyan Swahili coast. Chapter five presents the conclusion and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

CAUSES OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN EAST AFRICA

2.0 Introduction

Radicalism activities in Eastern Africa, were first witnessed during the 1998 Al-Qaeda bombing of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2010 Kampala restaurant bombing, and the frequent terrorist attacks in Kenya (North Eastern, Nairobi, and Mombasa). These attacks have all puzzled scholars of terrorism and radicalization. Some scholars argue that majority of radicals tend to have ordinary demographic and psychological profiles while other scholars claim that radicals and especially the terrorists tend to have mental disorder or tend to be psychotic (Shaykhutdinov & Achilov, 2012). Why else would such a hate consumed behavior and attitude take such radical proportions? Birdwell and Briggs (2009)[37] refutes these claims as myth. In general, members of radical groups show no mental signs of either psychopathy or derangement (Ibrahim, 2010).

In addition, an ISS report[38] on demographic profiles of radical Muslims found in Africa, indicates that in general, radical Muslims are not religiously fanatic, or desperate. Additionally it finds that they have not undergone political oppression, or extreme poverty. It is evidenced that majority of radicalized Muslims found in Africa and especially in East Africa, have been born and raised within the universal freedoms of their democratic countries. In fact, Ibrahim (2010) maintains that such groups are always indistinguishable and well integrated into society. The Muslims speak local

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[37] Birdwell, J, & Briggs, R. (2009). *Radicalization among Muslims in the UK.* MICROCON Policy Working Paper 7, Brighton: MICROCON.

[38] Botha, Anneli. (2013). õAssessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youths to Radicalisation and Extremism.ö ISS Paper 245, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.

languages, and have attained their education in their countries and have had a relatively normal upbringing (Ibrahim, 2010). The study conducted by Botha (2013), on Al-Shabaab demographic characteristics in Somalia and other Jihadist groups around the world, revealed that such individuals were mainly from the middle class and had had good education.

Another puzzling notion about the radical Muslim groups is the perception that such groups always seem to legitimize their radical convictions through Islamic nationalism around the world in that their actions are in support of their Muslim brothers who are under attack around the world. Their proponents spreads the message that Islam is under attack in the world and so they urge Muslims to declare Jihad against the secular world. Ibrahim (2010) further explains that radicalization of Muslims occurs in order to object the wrongdoing committed to others in the society rather than themselves. Video messages together with other documents distributed by Al-Shabaab invariably purport Muslims living in East African countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda are living in humiliation and that Islam as a religion is under threat. In essence, therefore, radicalization seems to involve an altruistic component in that, radical Muslims do not have to undergo victimization in order to radicalize or resolve to participate in violent acts as one of the political tools to assist them change the status quo.

Both demographic and psychological ordinaries of radicalized Muslims in East Africa and more specifically along the Kenya coast combined with the perception of frustration and anger, seems to occur as a retaliatory mechanism to several situations that they might not be involved directly. Hence, this raises some complex questions concerning responsible causal factors for radicalization along the Swahili Kenyan Coast. Understanding the causal factors also requires that we review a number of studies that have focused on radicalization and the causes of radicalization in terms of conditions that facilitate the rise of terrorism in other parts of the world, and the threat that such

groups have to the general population. The following section focuses on reviewing literature concerning the causes of radicalization.

2.2. Root Cause model

According to above explanation, it is apparent that indeed, we do not have a single explanation for radicalization. For example, Carson (2005) asserts that the causes of radicalization are abundant. The current study seeks to adopt the root cause model designed by Staun and Veldhuis in 2009 in order to examine the factors that causes rise in radicalization among the Muslims living at the Kenyan Swahili Coast. Staun and Veldhuis categorizes the model using some of the factors that occur most frequently. For instance, root causes remain the key and of which without, radicalization cannot take place. Furthermore, it is also imperative to acknowledge that the model is a framework that assists one to examine the relationship among different variables and the manner in which they try to shape conditions of radicalization. Thisstudy adopts the framework as the starting point to examine the occurrence and the rise of radicalization process among the Islamic groups living at the Kenyan Swahili Coast. It is from this that we can then deduce how descriptive variables associate with either violent or non-violent radicalization activities by the Muslim groups.

Figure 1: Root Cause Model

Source: Staun and Veldhuis (2009)

Figure 1 above illustrates the root cause model that categorizes the causal factors into macro and micro levels and maintains that macro level factors are external preconditions for occurrence of radicalization. However, in order to consider the reasons as to why some individuals radicalize while other do not, we need to examine micro-level factors. Further, the model subdivides the micro level factors into both social factors that explain an individual relation with others in the society, and individual factors that describe how people interpret and perceive their immediate environment. The study reviews several literature under individual causal factor.

2.3. External level factors

2.3.1. Causes

2.3.1.1. Political causes

The political climate whether it is international, national, or local, has an effect on radicalism (Dannreuther, 2012). According to Dannreuther, political level system create an autonomy within their jurisdictions and this may limit political space for its citizens which may in turn determine an individualøs behavior. For example, the article explains that when citizens from autocratic states with limited political space interact with citizens from democratic states where both freedom of religion and speech forms the central aspects of values, citizens that comes from a dictatorship countries start to harbor negative feelings towards their states and particularly the regimes in place and may feel the need to change the status quo.

In essence, the position taken by either individuals or those that belong to a certain organization would have an effect on the society and hence, result in tendencies of radicalization. For example, Staun and Veldhuis (2009) illustrates that poor integration forms one of the prominent sources of radicalization. The recent study conducted by Birdwell and Briggs (2009), has shown that Muslim communities found in Europe are not well integrated. This also relates to the report published by Yaqoob in 2007[39] highlighting cases of discrimination of Muslim individuals. Overall, the target respondents interviewed on whether the government considers them when formulating policies, majority of them sated that the government had sidelined them. Consequently, majority of respondents indicated that public authorities and policy makers failed to consider the needs of

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[39] Yaqoob, S. (2007). British Islamic Political Radicalism. In Abbas, T. (ed.) 2007 *Islamic Political Radicalism: A European Perspective*, Edinburgh University Press, and Edinburgh

Muslims as priority. In addition, the report findings reveals that majority of Muslims felt that they were underrepresented in organizations and other public institutions, which as indicted by the respondents, restrict them from gaining recognition from such institutions. When asked about their perception concerning the availability of institutions that challenge Muslim oppression/discrimination, the report observes that that there are no institutions that challenge discrimination of Muslims. In fact, they revealed that they are hardly given opportunities to participate in public debates and if they are, they are ingenuous. Generally, Birdwell and Briggs (2009) support above findings and cite the case of underrepresentation of Moroccans in Netherlands government institutions.

Similar to the above case of western countries, poor integration of Muslim communities among African countries and more specifically East Africa, implies that socio-political integration of Muslims in public institutions is poor. A series of studies conducted by Birdwell and Briggs (2009) indicates that when people are excluded from certain social groups, they start to develop less pro-social behaviors, prefer engaging in self-defeating behaviors, and demonstrate their frustrations against the target groups that even fall outside the source of their frustration. The authors assume that the need to belong forms the most significant aspect that motivates social interactions.

Although Birdwell and Briggs study subjects experienced exclusion from the group membership, the analysis findings reveal that excluding a group as entities; can in a similar manner instigate both aggressive and negative behaviors and attitudes. The following section about the effect of social identification, seeks to explain that membership to any group forms the most important measure for social behavior. Other studies show that under certain scenarios that it becomes easier for people to experience emotions on behalf of other people. Consequently, this can motivate them to adopt certain actions in defense of a group that may be seen to be under threat. In particular,

people that have stronger association with social groups, any form of a threat to the group, is seen as a common threat and would make members to respond through retaliation. As such, poor integration and a further exclusion of Muslims in East Africa societies might form an important foundation for Islamic radicalization along the Kenyan Swahili coast.

Political occurrences are thought to act as motivators of Muslim fundamentalism beyond just the local or national levels. However, they now include global and international levels (Birdwell and Briggs, 2009). All over the world, select groups of Muslims are of the view that the West is out to fight Islam. For example, CNN points out that in 2005, Al-Zahahiri, the deputy to Osama Bin Laden, accused the West for participating in the new õcrusadeö to fight Muslims. The opinion poll conducted among British Muslims by BBC, found that many of them felt that the war on terror was targeting Islam as a religion (BBC News, 2003). In essence, the conflict happening in the Middle East and the western governments diplomatic positions within these conflicts, perceived as the major contributors to radicalization. Robert Pape together with other scholars in a series of publications contend that (Malik, et al. 2004; Yaqoob, 2007)[40] that terrorist groups found in the Middle East and the west, all adopt strategic decisions that help to coerce the Western democracies to desist from sending their combat forces to Islamic territories.

2.3.1.2. Economic Causes

Several studies have also mentioned in their discussions that economic poverty and deprivation form major contributors to terrorism (Yaqoob, 2007). However, the question that arises at this level is whether there exists a causal relationship. Recent research studies have found that many

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[40] Malik, M. Halstead, M., Bunglawala, Z., & Spalek, B. (2004). *Muslims in the UK: Policies for Engaged Citizens.* Open Society Institute, EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program; Yaqoob *op. cit.*

of radicalized Muslims that come from European countries exist in lower social-economic areas and status of the society, and that it might play a part in radicalization (Shaykhutdinov & Achilov, 2012).

On the one hand, for example, Malik, et al. (2004) posits that the economic situation of a country has a negative relationship on the rise of terrorism or radicalization. The author assert that where there is economic deprivation whether permanently or seasonal, there is a higher likelihood for radical activities and terrorism to increase in the society. The decision by individuals and groups to engage in such activities depends on both constraints and available opportunities. According to the article, terrorism or radical behaviors can become one of the most attractive and rational behavioral alternatives for social groups that see themselves as economically marginalized.

While on the other hand, Carson (2005) refutes such hypothetical claims that economic deprivation presents an opportunity for engaging in terrorism activities. The author goes ahead to analyze the Gaza strip and West Bank public opinion polls to define the category of social groups that seemed to support the need for government to use armed attacked on Israel civilians. Their analytical findings reveal that majority of the people that supported violence against the Israelis, were those with higher educational status. Additionally, when compared to people that were of similar age category, the findings indicate that indeed, Hezbollah participants have a slightly above average educational status.

Despite failure for scholars to agree as to whether there exists a causal association between the poverty level of individuals in a society and radicalization, this study seeks to argue that such an association might fail to be a direct one for the case of Kenyan Muslim living at the Swahili Coast. The indirect association might depend on either individual or social factors. The argument is that

not every individual whose economic status is below the societal average, will radicalize. The findings reveal that there are other factors that contribute to the association between radicalization and economic deprivation. Consequently, several scholars have only focused their studies on the relativity and failed to focus on the absolute deprivation as one of the possible cause to the rise of radicalism. Emphasizing on relative deprivation only tends to give subjective perceptions over those that are unfairly disadvantaged in relation to the target group.

2.3.1.3. Cultural Causes

Muslims around the world are sometimes confronted with stigmatization and discrimination for belonging to their religion. The study conducted by Botha and Abdile (2014) on discrimination among West African Muslims, reveals the evidence that Muslims tend to undergo several different levels of marginalization and discrimination in employment, housing and education. Besides, they also end up being the victims of negative prejudicial attitudes and stereotyping. When experienced, the author points out that such issues tend to have considerable negative impacts on the integration of Muslims.

In addition, modernization and globalization facilitate frequent interaction between different cultures and religions that all coincide with an increased likelihood of intercultural and interethnic conflicts. Modernization and globalization can have cultural as well as economic or political factors or impacts as the two involves both cultural and socioeconomic convergences. Furthermore, global media and particularly western media coverage have also contributed in their manifestation.

Globalization play a primary role in facilitating the continued emergence and spread of transnational ideological movements as well as radical Jihadi coded messages to reach a large

Muslim population spread around the world. Yaqoob (2007) discusses about the global Salafism and outlines the link between the transnational Salafi movement of Muslims and the virtual community using a common Islamic approach. According to the author, Salafi movement now forms one of the fastest growing Islamic movement in the world. It is because of such growth that makes the group have a profound influence on Muslim ideological orientations and Islamic practice throughout the world. The above scenario of growth of radical interpretation of Islam, are all by-products of globalization that helps to denote the growth of virtual and transnational networks that becomes the basis for recruitment into global radical movements. Similarly, Post and Sheffer (2007)[41] points out that this indicates how globalization plays a central role in fuelling the rise of radical elements in the world.

Modernization and globalizations bring to the fore the ongoing conflict through which the West and Islam become confronted as well as how conflict thrives within the Muslim communities. For example, Post and Sheffer postulate that there are some negative aspects associated to both globalization and modernization. That despite the fact they both neutralize economic and social barriers, they also contribute towards spread of western capitalism around the world. The author elegantly refers to such scenario as õMcWorldö. According to the author, the Muslims around the world are now threatened with emancipation, modern advanced technologies, and consumerism. The author further illustrates that globalization somehow plays a role economically depriving the low class society, and globally, continues to threaten events and values that were originally disapproved by Islamic culture and the Quran. As indicated by Post and Sheffer, fundamentalist Islamists have a strong belief that Westernization cannot co-exist with Islam. They are of the

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[41] Post, J. M., & Sheffer, G. (2007). The Risk of Radicalization and Terrorism in U.S. Muslim Communities. *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, *13*(2), 101-112.

impression that, the rate at which westernization is spreading, poses a threat to the Islamic societies across the world.

Carson (2005); Lyman (2004)[42] also contend that growth in Muslim fundamentalism occur as a result of developments within Islam religion. Carson for example, illustrates that Radicalization that occurs within the Muslim societies, has its links with the conflict that results from the radical and moderate movements within the Islam. As indicated by Anneli Botha (2014) a senior researcher on terrorism at ISS, globalization plays a key role in the changing Muslim interactions and spread of Islam across regions, just like other religions. The borders between Africa and specifically Kenya, are becoming considerably superfluous, which according to Botha, results to de-territorialization. In fact, religion continues to disconnect itself from given cultures and territories. Consequently, new communities start to arise from new forms of religious ideology and whose operations are centered on religion. Spread of religion has contributed towards further globalization of Islam and more so, radical Islam. More essentially, such growth depends on adaptive and dynamic sets of norms as well as cultures that do not affiliate with either a country or a particular culture, but rather, adaptability to different environments (Botha, 2014). It is such kind of universal Islam that young individuals both Muslims and non-Muslims find appealing. It offers them a different set of behavioral rules and regulations. Botha adopts this kind of reasoning to extend his hypothesis that modern Islamic fundamentalism gains its roots not only in the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, but also from within Sub-Saharan Africa. This forms an

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[42] Carson *op. cit.;* Lyman, P. (2004). The terrorist threat in Africa, testimony before the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Africa Hearing on ‟Fighting Terrorism in Africa. Retrieved on 30 October, 2014 from http:// www.cfr.org/publication_print.php?id=6912&content=.

interesting paradox that the societies and states that reject radical Islamist movements, remain the same societies and states that play a key role in shaping such movements.

2.3.2. Motivators

2.3.2.1. Recruitment

Recruitment forms an important motivator at a macro (external), social and even at an individual level. Joining radical groups through recruitment implies that an individual gains support and confidence from other members of the group, close relatives, or potential organization. Crenshaw⊘s (2001) assumption is that individuals that are in the process of radicalization or have already radicalized, experience incentives that appeal to them to become members of a radical group, this could therefore indicate that recruitment can only take place during the latter stages of radicalization. The author maintains that in itself, recruitment cannot become capable of igniting any latent radical beliefs or emotions. Hence, recruitment serves the role of increasing the rate of radicalization process but not initiating radicalization.

Even though other potential group members tend to play a central role during the recruitment process, the most common thing at the external level is the top down selection of new recruits. Chingøole (2013) is among the few researchers that mention the possibility that Al-Qaeda leaders get more members for their group from conducting recruitment from Europe to become part of anti-western jihad. The case of a Belgian woman-Muriel Demagauque forms a good illustration on how she detonated a bomb in order to kill the American soldiers. Bjorgo (2008)[43] observes that several men that were under trial in October 2007, tried to recruit her many times while also trying to recruit other people in Belgium. Chingøole (2013) also argues that despite using a bottom-up

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[43] Bjorgo, T. (2008). Causal factors of radicalization. *Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management,* Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific research, Working Package 4

process to become members of jihad groups, it is also essential that a member relates with the members of potential radical movements. Botha (2014) has also established the factors that facilitate individuals to become members of al-Shabaab and MRC group. In his study, he indicates that apart from the relatively limited involvement of parents to recruit the respondents to become member of MRC and especially al-shabaab, siblings also served a key role in introducing the respondents to join the radical groups.

2.3.2.2. Trigger Events

Lyman (2004) discusses by distinguishing between the factors that forms the foundational stage for terrorism for a long-period termed as the root causes or preconditions, and trigger causes or precipitants that comprises of situational factors that comes immediately after terrorism has occurred. The second category of events seems to call upon members to respond by using an opportunity such as participating in politics, contested elections, police brutality, and violence against some of the in-groups. Furthermore, this can also come as a retaliatory action to some controversial speeches made by public government officials, or some of the hostile out-groups. The scandal involving Abu Ghraib forms a case in point to show how angry Muslims reacted violently around the world following the humiliation and abuse of Iraq prisoners by American soldiers. The current study hypothesizes that trigger events such as recruitment are likely to increase Islamic radicalism in the Swahili Kenyan coast.

2.3.3. Internal causes-Social factors

2.3.3.1. Causes

2.3.3.1.1. Social identity

Identifying oneself with certain social groups forms an accurate determinant in formation of social behavior. Lyman (2004) posits that largely, people behave according to their identity and association with certain people or group.

Studies that focus on the topic of social identity, maintain that even though people use self to define their behaviors, group membership takes the greater proportion in defining how people behave. This implies that people only feel good about themselves if at the same time they feel good about the group they associate and identify with (Chingøole, 2013). For instance, Chingøole illustrates that several aspects that people use to identify themselves includes gender, ethnicity, religion, salient sports club that they support. Furthermore, the author observes that the type of factors that helps to form an identity and one that becomes critical will depend on the scenario. When people associate and support a certain sport, such as a football club, their identity as supporters of a particular team in the club then becomes more important than any identity that comes from either religion or national identity.

When considered in terms of radicalization, the role and implication of satisfactory social identity reveals itself through two different ways. The first implication is that identity crisis can have a greater impact to both the behavior and well-being of people. Identity crisis can arise when people starts to experience rejection from the groups that they thought they associate with, or better still, when people become unsure of the group that they can identify with. Malik, et al. (2004) posits in his journal that young Muslims tend to experience the above identity crisis than others because of

conflict in Islamic nations and other cultural aspects of Islam. For example, Phillips (2002)[44] suggests that young Moroccans found in Netherlands tend to feel alienated from the Dutch society especially where there has been intermarriage which ends up causing a hybrid-identity that fails to be either recognized or accepted by the society. Consequently, the youngsters only find satisfactory identity from *ummah* that plays a key role of binding them with other fellow Muslims and from which, their nationality becomes irrelevant to them. In essence, the more time and resources people invest in the group and in their friends, the stronger such identification starts to grow and become.

Phillips (2002) points out that the second important aspect that relates to social identity is the perceived threat likely to affect the group or the capability to react to any threat. According to the author, any threat that compromises social identity, would contribute towards favoritism of in-groups. As supported by Bjorgo (2008), a threat that has the potential of compromising the religious identity of Muslims, has a greater potential of prompting Muslims to withdraw and become stricter with the in-ward-focused community whose obsession comes from its own borders. The authors maintain that such mechanisms in fact, can arise irrespective of reality or perception of a threat.

At the time of occurrence of an identity threat, the expectation is that other identities will fail to become relevant. For instance, Bjorgo (2008) illustrates that for an individual who applies for a job and finds themselves experiencing discrimination just because of their gender, then it would as well become irrelevant by perceiving themselves as either Citizens or Christians. The same

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[44] Phillips, J. (2002). Somalia and al-Qaeda: implications for the war on terrorism, Backgrounder #1526, Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, Retrieved on 30 October, 2014 from http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/BG1526.cfm

reasoning holds for any Muslim. Phillips (2002) explains that social identity approaches indicates that the stronger people identify themselves with the in-group as relevant to them, the more it becomes easier to respond to any identity threat. The study hypothesizes that people that identify themselves strongly with relevant social groups, any perceived stigmatization or discrimination that bases on Islam, will trigger a rise in religious identity as the key indicator of behavior and attitude and hence, could cause radicalization.

2.3.3.1.2. Relative Deprivation

Several scholars contend that relative deprivation can influence collective action among people not personally deprived but resolve to act on behalf of their groups (Birdwell & Briggs, 2009). Gurr (2000)[45] discusses the relativity of deprivation in his publication *Why men rebel*. He refers to relative deprivation as õactors whose perception helps to show discrepancy between their value capabilities and the value expectations and the goodsö (p. 23). More specifically, this shows the discrepancy that occurs between the perceptions of people and what they already believe as their rightful entitlement and what they so believe as the expected outcome. It is from this that causes the perception of deprivation. Irrespective of whether people get to meet their needs, Crenshaw (2001) maintains that people can still experience deprivation. As such, the author maintains that abject poverty does not contribute whatsoever to relative deprivation of the poor. Gurr (2000) suggests that failure to obtain whatever one believes to be their rightful entitlement, could trigger feelings of frustration that ends up as an influence to collective violence. However, relative deprivation should not necessarily be used/seen in reference or comparison to a group. Instead, Gurr explains that an individual, might still use their own present/past conditions to formulate own

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[45] Gurr, T. (2000). *Why men rebel.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

reference point. Furthermore, this also extends to usage of abstract ideas, reference groups as well as the standards articulated by a leader of the group.

In essence, Gurr uses his theory of rising expectation that the feeling of deprivation can be made in comparison to previous fulfillment/state, people's own expectations in comparison to others in the society. According to the author, people who perceive others to have better living standards have higher chances of overestimating the pace at which they need to move in order to achieve an improved status. In essence, this causes a gap between people's reality and their expectations. Gurr points out that frustration becomes a catalyst for the increased likelihood of revolutionary moods and even social unrest. Although the article's theoretical basis is on frustration-aggression, it emphasizes that time forms an important element that generates aggravation and that failure to meet the expectations can influence frustrations to develop from initial satisfaction.

After conducting his study, Gurr provides conscientious insights in terms of psychological and social circumstances likely to facilitate political violence. However, the theory brings out some few weaknesses. The first weakness is that the author adopts an interdisciplinary approach that results in several theories. Consequently, the author's theory shows some form of failure to have a predictive power. Phillips (2002) discredits such a hypothesis that political violence results from dissatisfaction or frustration. Even more importantly, the frustration-aggression hypothesis is insufficient to describe radicalism because of its failure to describe the reason as to why majority of people that experience economical frustration, do not radicalize. Birdwell and Briggs (2009) remain one of the researchers who maintain that terrorists do not necessary come from the social-economically poor strata. According to the author for example, terrorism and radicalism all lack a unilateral and comprehensive explanation. Hence, this implies that neither relative nor absolute deprivation offers a satisfactory description concerning these phenomena. The above statements

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notwithstanding, it is imperative to note that Gurr provides a far-reaching intuition concerning the emergence of political violence from which, one has to consider credibility on the basis that the author is one of the few scholars who addresses the relationship between collective political violence and relative deprivation.

2.3.4. Motivators

2.3.4.1. Recruitment

When considered at the social level, groups that operate as entities find it easier to recruit themselves and participate in violence jihad, for instance, Bjorgo (2008) illustrates how Hamburg Cell as a major group in the õ9/11ö attack in New York, started as a group of friends, who begun engaging in radical activities. In the process, majority of them moved to Afghanistan in order to join al-Qaeda. Consequently, most of the members that were part of Hamburg Cell, are also the ones who took part in õ9/11ö US bombing by al-Qaeda. Botha (2014) study on al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia reveals that majority of the people that become members of al-Shabaab in Somalia, come from different regions of Kenya who travelled to Somalia for radicalization.

2.3.4.2. Trigger Events

Unexpected events can affect personal relationships and networks by manifesting themselves at an external, individual and social level. Studies have found that group discussions regarding public events can play a key role of enhancing radical attitudes among individual members of the group. In addition, events and disturbed group processes that affect peers can trigger radicalization. Initiatives taken by the government to arrest some members of a group or the failure of group members to find sustainable jobs can trigger members to participate in radical violence activities in solidarity.

2.3.5. Individual Level Factors

2.3.5.1. Causes

2.3.5.1.1 Rationality

At an individual level, one might decide to turn to radicalism because of various reasons, some more sensible than others. While some people use ideological motivations to participate in political actions or join a radicalized group, some are only attracted to the adventure and sheer thrill of it. Birdwell and Briggs (2009) add that individuals also find it appropriate to join and attain membership of groups they know that will assist them gain positive identity. The fact that there are no unified psychological profiles that match all radical groups, so are abundant and unique motivations that influence individuals to radicalize. The question then arises at this point as to whether an individual who joins radical groups does so based on rational choice and with full information of the implications of such as choice.

Among the studies that have focused on the rationality for joining radical groups, Crenshaw (1998) remains the most cited source who writes about how people find it rational to join terrorism groups. For example, the author explains in her book that an individualøs decisions to become part of a terrorist group, comes from a rationally formed political choice whose influence depends on strategic and psychological considerations on both benefits and limitations.[46] While rational choices are used by an individual seems to have trouble, Malik, et al. (2004) argues that the rational choice theories fails to account for Yaqoob (2007) proposed collective action problems whose assertion is that individual actors fail to have sufficient motivation to engage in terrorism actions.

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[46] For additional information concerning the explanation of Crenshaw (1998). Deliberations on the causes that contribute towards terrorism, you can check on the book: ‑Exploring the root and trigger causes of terrismø

Again, there is need to emphasize that terrorism is different from radicalization as indicated in the definition of radicalization. For instance, irrespective of how successful terrorism becomes, the perceptions still remains that an individual can adopt terrorism as a tool to achieve ones objectives. While participation in terrorism requires that an individual become active in making conscious decisions, radicalization on the other hand, seems to be a gradual process whose occurrence fails to have a well-defined beginning and end. Hence, radicalization depicts a state of ones state of mind that causes one to experience a shift in both attitudes and behaviors and as such, becomes less functional. Even though rational choice approaches suggested by Malik, et al. (2004) reveal the potential strategic benefits of engaging in terrorism activities, their theories still fails to provide a sufficient explanation of radicalization.

2.3.5.1.2. Personal Experiences

Personal experiences determine how people make daily decisions from which, major life events might contribute towards an increase in radicalization. In fact, some scholars argue that trauma is a key typical precursor for engagement in terrorism and radicalism.

In essence, we can categorize individual experiences into two different categories: emotional versus cognitive experiences. Whereas the latter experience refers to people's thoughts and knowledge that people use to process and understand their immediate environment, the former experience results from unstable, fast and automatic occurrences.

In terms of cognitive experiences, what people already know determines how they believe about the environment around them, which in essence, affects the perception concerning their immediate environment. Consequently, this affects how people respond to any causal factors that occur from either social or external sources. Interpretation of society and religion can thus provide for breeding

grounds for either terrorism or radicalization. However, the paper suggests that in themselves, radical interpretations or radical ideologies of religion might not have a direct link to the causes of radicalization. There is a difference in how people show their susceptibility towards or how they adopt radical ideologies, which sometimes causes them to become vulnerable. Moreover, we tend to assume that generally, people do not start acting violently or spreading hate ideologies without having any basis. This implies that the fact that people respond to radical ideologies becomes a direct indicator for engaging in radicalization activities and not direct causal factors. Instead, acceptance to engage in radical ideologies becomes the outcome of several accumulated causal factors that causes one to find reason for engaging in radical activities. Bjorgo (2008) illustrates that Mohammed murdered Theo van Gogh because he had some earlier attraction towards radical ideologies of Islam after he had come out of prison and the death of his mother. Nevertheless, despite the argument that radicalization occurs when people adhere to radical ideologies, such radical ideologies can only embed themselves in peoplesø mindset and subsequently, become driving factors after radicalization processes.

Birdwell and Briggs provide a somewhat convincing synopsis of psychological theories that explains the occurrence and rise of radical behaviors among individuals. The authors argues that any well-investigated and probable process that involve normative pressure, leadership, and power within a social groups, explains the reason that enable ordinary people to engage in extraordinary behaviors. For example, the author applies cognitive dissonance theory to explain engagement in extraordinary behaviors.

Cognitive dissonance explains a psychological state that occurs when an individualøs usual behavior conflicts with the normal beliefs or attitudes. The most typical response to the distress that results from the above conflict, causes an individual to believe only what they can see.

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Illustratively, the more people find it more appealing to express themselves using radical statements than the normal acceptable means, the more they believe that such statements are correct and accurate. Secondly, people can also show over-justification when responding to cognitive dissonance. Majority of radical people have invested more in the radicalization process because they succeeded to break their immediate social ties such as family relations, in order to join radical groups. Such a decision causes them to believe that their decision was justified/worthy of the sacrifice of their family ties. The author posits that because of cognitive dissonance, majority of radicalized individuals gain more commitment to their new networks and radical perceptions. Indeed, Lyman (2004) observes that there is need to prove that both commitment and faith contributes towards making an individual become a member of a certain religious community, which in itself, signifies that cognitive dissonance plays a key role to emergence, and rise in radicalization among people.

Further, there is a strong believe that emotional experiences also contribute towards the rise of radicalization. For example, Birdwell and Briggs (2009) suggest that when people feel the need to revenge, shameful, and feelings of guilt, they can easily find the reason for participating in suicide terrorism. In addition, Lyman (2004) maintains that some Muslims around the world tend to feel as though they are humiliated. For instance, while making his declaration to engage in jihad war, part of broadcastings made by CNN and Al Jazeera showed how Osama bin Laden explicitly mentioned several times, the term humiliation. He also reiterated that humiliation is even worse than death. Hence, when people assume that those that are humiliated will find the need to search for alternatives that can assist them restore their lost dignity, then such a statement becomes a caution that the essence of perceived humiliation and other closely related experiences, should not be underestimated during the emergence and rise of terrorism.

2.3.5.1.3. Psychological Characteristics

Conventional thinking argues that those that radicalize are crazy, scholars contend that terrorists and radicals exude extraordinary behaviors. Birdwell and Briggs (2009) come to the conclusion that psychological profiling of radical group members, makes it increasingly harder to possible vulnerable groups.

Bjorgo (2008) provides an overview of theories of radical behaviors and formulates several psychological variables that distinguish radicals from the non-radicals and from each other. The author posits that there are culture attributes that causes some individuals to become violent, oppressive, aggressive, or anti-social. It causes individuals to possess higher tendencies to seek identity, vulnerable to influence, anxious, depressed or seek novelty. Bjorgo relates radical groups to non-radicals and notes that radicals lack self-control and are more impulsive.

2.3.5.2. Motivators

2.3.5.2.1. Recruitment

Prisons and mosques are infamous when it comes to facilitation and offering breeding grounds for recruitment into radical Islam. This is despite an increased self-enlisting that affects recruitment at an individual level. For majority of people that would like to search for their identify, the best approach would be by joining terrorist organizations as this plays a key role in allowing them to develop and enhance their own social identity (Malik, et al. 2004). The perception that high levels of solidarity and loyalty occurs within powerful and cohesive terrorist organizations, raises the attractiveness for possible members.

Individuals find it possible to use internet platforms to access radical sites from the comfort of their homes, where they also spread different radical views and opinions through various social

media platforms and chat rooms and other relevant forums. Online platforms provide the ease of registration through a virtual Ummah. Furthermore, such platforms also helps members to reinforce their attitudes by connecting with those that are of like-mind with whom they find easier to interact freely and exchange information with. Hence, an internet platform facilitates members that would not have obtained the chance to engage in radical activities to recruit them. The platform provides an appealing discrete avenue for radical Muslims, women and shy individuals to join radical groups.

2.3.5.2.2. Triggers

At an individual level, trigger events that contribute towards the rise of radicalization are many. Individuals that experience difficulties when it comes to coping with traumatic events such as the death of family or a family member, or friend or a victim of physical violence, might end up responding to such devastation by adopting radical views against a perceived antagonist/enemy. In addition, the author argues that people might also have different personal perceptions concerning external and social triggers that facilitate their engagement in radicalization. An individual that finds a speech delivered by the president or the Member of Parliament, who perceives that the speech is provocative, is likely to respond with aggression or anger than an individual who does not find the speech as offensive. Overall, several trigger events that occurs at an individual level are unique to each individual.

CHAPTER THREE

ISLAMIC SOCIO-POLITICAL ENDEAVORS IN EAST AFRICA

3.0. Securitization of Islam in East Africa

3.0.1. The Swahili Coast

The coastal region of Kenya and Tanzania is what is commonly known as the Swahili coast, a very specific sociocultural area within East Africa where Islam has long been present. Arab traders arrived on the East African coast through the ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam and settled along the coast and intermarried with the locals. These interactions merged their material culture, art, architecture, music, dress, cuisine, and the Swahili language with Arabic and Persian elements culminating in the Swahili culture that is present today. These Arab traders are also believed to have introduced Islam to east Africa during the 13th century (or possibly earlier) and it remained an urban and coastal phenomenon for a long time. Islam along the Swahili Coast became more oriented toward the Middle East and India due to similarities in the regionsø material culture, art, architecture, music, dress, cuisine, etc**.** In 1821, the Omani Arabs established a presence on the East African coast after pushing out the Portuguese, who had controlled the coast and established Mombasa as the economic powerhouse of the region. The Sultanate of Oman moved his capital to Zanzibar and established a commercial empire that spurred the regionøs economic growth. This period also witnessed the growth and expansion of Islam, particularly around Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania. Omani rule was replaced with European rule during the õscramble for Africaö in the late 19th century.

In recent years, the Swahili Coast has experienced a polarization of religious identity issues. In Kenya and Tanzania, the religious environment is complex. Muslims are believed to constitute

between 15 and 33% of the population in Kenya and about 30 - 35% in Tanzania. The majority of Muslims in these two countries live near the coast, in Tanzania, or on the offshore islands of Zanzibarøs Unguja and Pemba, which constituted an independent Muslim sultanate until Zanzibarøs merger with Tanganyika in 1964 to form the present state of Tanzania. About 60 percent of Kenyaøs Muslim population lives in the Coast province, which includes the city of Mombasa.[47] The historical presence of Arabs on the Swahili coast from Islamøs earliest years (and probably before) has instilled a sense of belonging with Arab society. The coastøs affiliation with the Gulf States has imparted a sense of nationalism with Islam and the international Islamic community (ummah).

3.0.1.1. The Rise of Islamic Radicalization along the Swahili Coast

3.0.1.1.1 Islam in East Africa and ideological conditions that facilitate the growth of radical Islamism in the Swahili coast

The Sufi school of thought which is regarded as a popular form of Islam has been predominantly practiced throughout East Africa for centuries. In recent years however, Sufism has come under pressure from Salafis and Wahabis who seek the purification of Islam through a return to the unadulterated practice during the time of the Prophet Muhammad. However although Salafism has established a presence in East Africa, traditional and Sufi practices continue to prevail among the majority Muslim population. Salafi movements across the world differ in that some are strictly religious and apolitical, while others have embraced and influenced modernism in Islam and yet others have embraced a more radical Islamic interpretation and have supported violent and radical groups around the world.[48] The growth of radical Islam along the Swahili coast in recent decades

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[47] Rabasa A. (2009). Radical Islam in East Africa. RAND Corporation
[48] Ibid

therefore, has manifested itself in the spread of these Salafi and Wahhabi ideologies, and in the emergence of extremist and terrorist groups influenced by these ideologies.

3.0.1.1.2. Internal and External Conditions that facilitate the rise of radical Islamism at the Kenyan Swahili coast

The development of radical Islam has been brought about by a number of socio-political factors some of them influenced by the activities in the Muslim world at large and others specific to the East African region. External factors that have had an impact on the Swahili coast include: the effects of the worldwide Islamic revival of the last several decades, the influence of international Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the export of Saudi funds and ideology, the impact of the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the spread of international radical Islamist networks. All of these developments have been exacerbated by the region's geographic and cultural proximity to the Middle East. Internal dynamics that have contributed to the growth of radical Islamism include the growth of domestic Islamist movements; Muslim reaction to perceived threats to Islam, Christian missionary activity in particular; and such political events as the Islamist-military coup in Sudan in 1989, the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, and the onset of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. [49]

The population along the Swahili coast has for decades felt marginalized from economic opportunities and developed grievances regarding land and job opportunities. Land for instance is among the most emotional issues on the Kenyan coast. The Kenyan government's current method of land management is perceived to favor outsiders over locals and is blamed for the coastal communities' poor development record. Problems of land ownership, alienation, and access to the

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[49] Botha, Anneli. (2013). "Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youths to Radicalization and Extremism." ISS Paper 245, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.

coast dates back to colonial times, when British authorities gave the Zanzibar Sultanate control over the ten mile strip of land along the coast. This was followed by massive land grabbing, in which both local and national political elites took part following independence. Subsequent governments irregularly appropriated land according to a very corrupt system that left many residents squatters on their own land. At present, around 80 percent of Kenya's coastal population lacks title deeds to the land on which they live.[50]

Another major problem is the lack of economic opportunities, which particularly affects youth. Youth unemployment and poverty is extremely high. Economic grievances remain potential avenues for violence and conflict in the region. Economic challenges are further exacerbated by the perception that coastal populations have been sidelined, despite the fact that the region is the largest contributor of revenue through the port of Mombasa; Mombasa's vibrant tourism industry; and the region's mineral wealth. Radical groups have capitalized on these socioeconomic grievances to recruit youth groups into militant activities.

Another main driver for youth to adopt more radical ideologies is the discrepancy in levels of education between costal groups and groups coming from the interior. The lack of education and opportunities, particularly for the Muslim population, leaves people ill-equipped to participate in the formal employment market, and with little capacity to benefit from tourism, which is the coastal economy's largest sector. Jobs (especially in the tourism sector) are often given to non-locals with relevant job skills. The economic disenfranchisement and frustration has over the years manifested itself in increasing conflict across the region, secessionist claims in Mombasa, and

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[50] Onditi, Kenneth Otieno. (2014). "Why Coast Province Remains Least Developed despite Being the Second Highest Contributor to the Kenya's GDP." Kenyatta University, Kahawa.

increasing resentment of migrants from inland.[51] Further driving the instability are expectations surrounding the potential of natural resource wealth on the coast and the fear it will again benefit mostly the political elites of the interior.

3.0.1.1.3. Threats of terrorism to Kenya

3.0.1.1.3.1. Somalia Conflict and its Effects on the Swahili Coast

Fragmentation of Somalia, has been the core of regional fragility, as it has had strong negative impact in the neighboring regions especially north eastern Kenya and the coast manifesting through a host to multiple conflict dynamics within the region.[52] When the government of Somalia collapsed in 1991, it created a lawless society where crime and radical ideologies flourished. Lack of state capacity since that time has allowed unrestricted movement of people and goods into and out of Somalia. While many of these people were refugees coming into Kenya, radical elements also came in through Kenyaøs porous borders. Kenyaøs proximity to Somalia and the Middle East has created a safe haven for transnational extremist groups to establish operational bases in the country.[53] It is reported that one of the largest extremist groups was able to extend its reach and establish its bases in East Africa in the early 1990s with a presence in Sudan, Kenya and Somalia.[54] This has been witnessed by several attacks launched in the country including the attacks on the United States embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998 and the 2002 bombing of the Israeli owned Paradise hotel in Mombasa. Somalia, has thus been viewed as the source of extremism in

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[51] Ibid, p. 3.
[52] International Crisis Group. (2012). õKenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization.ö Africa Briefing No. 85. International Crisis Group, Nairobi/Brussels.
[53] Ibid
[54] Lacey, Marc. (2002), December 12. õAfter Attack, Kenya Traces Qaedaøs Trail in East Africa.ö *New York Times*. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/01/world/after-attack-kenya-traces-qaeda-s-trail-in-east-africa.html.

the region. The United Nations (UN) has in the past reported the presence of terrorist cells and training centers in the Kenyaøs coast.

Kenya has long borne the brunt of the civil unrest in Somalia by hosting its refugees and also dealing with such security issues proliferating through the porous borders including small arms, human trafficking, money laundering, piracy and recent escalation of Islamic radicalism and terrorist acts.

3.0.1.1.3.2 Al-Shabaab Influence in the Region

Al-Shabaab, an offshoot of Somaliaøs Islamic Courts Union has successfully managed to recruit and create an extensive following particularly from the youth populations along the Swahili coast who have joined its rank and file. Since the mid-1990s, the Swahili coast has witnessed hundreds of acts of terrorism against foreign as well as local citizens and interests. These acts have accentuated the fear that the largely Muslim coastal areas may further fall under fundamentalist influence and affect the stateøs internal structure and foreign relations, and exacerbate underlying social and ethnic conflicts.

Targeted terrorist attacks and incidents of kidnappings of foreign nationals have increased along the Swahili coast in the recent past. These incidents coupled with the increased threat to security prompted the Kenyan government to intervene by deploying its defense forces into Somalia in October 2011. This move has been used by extremist elements mainly from al-Shabaab group and its proxies in the region as a basis to wage retaliatory attacks in Kenya.[55]

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[55] Aronson, Samuel L. (2013). õKenya and the Global War on Terror: Neglecting History and Geopolitics in Approaches to Counterterrorism.ö *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies* 7 (1 & 2): 24634.

Al-Shabaab, has expanded its reach to the Muslim populations along the Swahili coast aiming to draw sympathizers to its ideological stance. It has managed to recruit members through its proxies, using radical Islamic teaching and mobilizing public grievances with a radical Islamic agenda. Religious arguments are consistently used in the context of recruitment through indoctrination of new followers. Al-Shabaab has a strong impact on the youth because of their age and lack of religious knowledge. Al-Shabaab is seen to offer alternative economic opportunities for the otherwise disenfranchised youth. The group fronts itself as a modern movement offering an opportunity to groups of disillusioned youth with no future prospects. The group is seen to offer more than just money; a way of life that involves a community of like-minded individuals who share the same values; a process that is believed to involve more than just brainwashing.[56] This situation presents a fundamental challenge to the political leadership who have for decades failed to deliver any meaningful opportunities for development for the youth.

3.0.2 The Kenyan Context

The Muslim community is composed of between 15% and 33% of the population, with a significant youth population. 65% of its members are between the ages of 18 and 35. The coastal region which hosts a significant Muslim population is characterized by chronic poverty, under development, scarce resources, low governance, insecurity, marginalization, growing Islamic radicalism and high populations of unemployed youths.[57]

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[56] Marchal, R. (2011). The Rise of a Jihad Movement in a Country at War: Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujaheddin in Somalia. Sciences Po Paris

[57] Botha, Anneli. (2013). õAssessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youths to Radicalisation and Extremism.ö ISS Paper 245, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.

The Kenyan coast is perceived as a rife environment for violent Islamist recruitment and radicalism. The factors that drive radicalism along the Kenyan coast are a host of complex and interrelated issues with religious and ethnic dimensions. Years of perceived political and socio-economic marginalization by successive governments, land disputes involving the purchase of land by elites from outside the region and the rise of religious radicalism by some groups coupled with calls for secessionist produces an environment for conflict which has resulted in the re-current use of violence to achieve political and religious goals.

Al-Shabaab has played a great role in advancing a broader regional strategy in the Swahili coast. It has carried out numerous bomb and grenade attacks on civilian targets in Kenya ever since Kenyaøs military intervention in Somalia in October 2011. In 2012, it established alliance with the Muslim Youth Center - MYC (also referred as Pumwani Muslim Youth) which later changed its name to al-Hijra, meaning New Year, in early 2012. MYC is known to provide funding and support to al-Shabaab through its organization the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee. The MYC allegedly carries out recruitment and training for al-Shabaab recruits in Kenya with a wide reach across the country. It is reported to have recruited about 500 members from the Swahili coast in Kenya and Tanzania. MYC is affiliated to Sheikh Aboud Rogo Mohammed a radical cleric who was shot and killed by unknown people in 2012. He was known to publicly oppose the Kenyan government and support al-Shabaab and Islamic jihad through his sermons at the infamous Masjid Musa mosque in Mombasa. He was reported to have had links with Al-Qaedaøs Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, who was linked to the 1998 U.S. Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. He was also allegedly linked to the plotters of the 2002 bombing of the Israeli-owned Paradise hotel in Mombasa. Rogoøs death and that of other Muslim clerics in Mombasa has sparked protests by their

supporters who blame their deaths on government security officers. These incidences have further exacerbated the already volatile situation at the coast.

Another group agitating for change in the coast is Mombasa Republican Council which was formed in 1990s and was banned in 1999 for calling for secession of Mombasa from the rest of Kenya. MRC membership consists of local Muslim and Christians in the region. In 2008 the group renewed their calls for the secession of the Coastal region in order to ‒liberateø the people of the Coast from marginalization by successive Kenyan governments. Using their uniting slogan, õPwani si Kenyaö (The coast is not part of Kenya), MRC raises inherent grievances on land and economic historical injustices drawing attention to the fact that outsiders dominate the local economy thus feeding the anger of coastal Muslims.

The East African region is perceived to fall outside of an integrated Islamic society[58] and the fact that Africa is now experiencing a surge of economic growth and gaining attention at the global front, we cannot overemphasis the fact that all this is coming at the expense of increased Islamist insurgency and global Islamic militancy which continues to gain ground in the continent.

Since the bombing of the America international trade center on September 11, 2001, both international policy makers and academics have continued to focus their attention on Islam in Africa. Furthermore, the attention also arises from the widespread fear that Africa is quickly gaining notoriety as a breeding ground for the Islamic militancy and terrorist groups. Groups within the loose and ill-defined global terrorist networks appear to be present mostly in African

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[58] Barhan, J. S. (1992). The rise of and fall of a governance realm in Kenya, in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton (Eds): *Governance and Politics in Africa,* Lynne Rienner Publisher, London

countries with substantial Muslim populations, particularly in northeastern Africa and the Sahel, and on the southern side of the Sahara desert. This is also looked at in connection with the rise of Islamic militants in Britain, ethno-religious identities and radicalization of Islamic politics in the United Kingdom, Islamic radicalization in Russia, and the Muslim brotherhood in Germany and America. The same concern arises from the fear that majority of African countries have failed or weak states whose seal and land borders remain porous. Majority of African countries with failed states, have weak dysfunctional structures unable to enforce laws, and thus offering terrorist groups a ground for exploitation. As a result of such concerns, Africa has joined forces to counter terrorism and Islamic militancy through the African Union Counter Terrorism Framework.

The picture portrayed of sub-saharan Africa as being the hotbed of Islamist militancy is however blown out of proportion, and a poorly substantiated claim.[59] With the exception of countries such as Sudan, Somalia, and Northern Nigeria, Islamic militancy still remains a relatively marginal occurrence in African countries. Unfortunately, however, the fact that the current security concerns has come to determine the overall approach concerning the study of Islamic radicalism in Africa, the question regarding the active engagement of Muslims in the state, remains only limited to the question of a possible manifestation of Muslim radicalization. For instance, most of the recent commentary on Islam in African continent, remain alarmist and even superficial. They also focus on exclusive issues of international security such as the links of radicalization of foreign Muslims.

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[59] Boussard, C. (2002). *Civil society and democratization – Conceptual and empirical challenges: Development and democracy – What we have learnt and how*, Routledge, London.; Carson, J. (2005). Kenya: The struggle against terrorism. In Robert I. Rotberg: *Battling terrorism in the horn of Africa,* Brooking University Press, Washington, D.C

CHAPTER FOUR

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

4.1. Introduction

The current chapter presents the analytical findings from the descriptive data collected from the respondents. The study used interviews, and therefore the findings describe the responses transcribed from these interviews. The study does this in order to understand the growth of radicalization at the Kenyan Swahili Coast.

It is important to note that while explaining the motivations of radical Islamists and their activities, majority of informants failed to show a theological validation of radical activists but seemed to refer unequivocally to both socio-economic and political problems. The major grievances that contributed to radical behaviors exhibited by some Muslims were brought forward by these groups. As a result, an additional line of inquiry opened up in the interview process concerning how the informants themselves rationalized and perceived their struggles.

The research survey begun by asking the respondents what they could attribute as the factors that facilitate the rise of radical Islam and terrorism in the Kenyan Swahili coast. This question was used to understand the informantsø perceptions on some of the internal and external factors that facilitate the growth of radicalization at the Kenyan Swahili Coast. The informants provided different causal reasons for both internal and external conditions that seem to facilitate radicalization.

a. The role of peers in radicalization

When asked to identify the factors that contributed towards individuals becoming members of radical groups, responses from informants revealed that friends played a key role in convincing their peers to make decisions to join radical organizations. For instance, one informant stated that:

> *In the recent past we have all witnessed some members of radical groups such as MRC or Al-Shabaab claim that their friends helped them to join the groups with the promise that they would be rewarded when they accomplish their mission.[60]*

The above response mirrors majority of the sentiments from informants on the role of friends as key players in introducing individuals into radical activities. When asked to rate their responses on the scale of 1 to 5 with 1 representing the lowest level and 5 representing the highest level of influence to individuals to belong to radical groups. The fact that majority of informants stated that individuals that joined radical groups testified in regard to peer pressure influences the manner in which interpersonal relationships should be interpreted. This was highly linked with an individual¢s need to belong.

The above responses shed light on the dynamics of a group that draws people from different Kenyan ethnic backgrounds to join it through friends. In addition, becoming part of something bigger than an individual, helps to explain the reason as to why the informants seemed to rate the sense of belonging very high.   In addition, the respondents also placed more emphasis on the sense of belonging when asked to identify some of the groups that individuals identify with. according to the informants, individuals that become members of radical groups also refers to those that live

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[60] Interview with Sheikh Abdilahi Abdi, Chairman of NAMLEF; Sheikh Ali A. El-Maawy, National Chairman KAULI; Abdulghafur El-Busaidy, National Chairman, SUPKEM; Mohamed Hyder, Chairman MCET; Sheikh Abdullatif Shir, Program C0-ordinator KCIU

at the Kenyan coast as õusö when referring to those that belong to the same group. According to the informants, none of the individuals seemed to refer to other Kenyan nationals as õusö. Using the term õusö then also implies than there must be a õthemö group as the opponents. According to the informants, the Kenyan government becomes õthemö. The above findings support the recent study conducted by Botha (2014) to understand the radicalization in Kenyan groups through recruitment of al-Shabaab and MRC. After analysis, the findings revealed that friends served a key role in influencing the respondents decisions to join and become members of either MRC or al-Shabaab radical groups. According to the author, this spoke specifically on the dynamics of an organization that draws members from different ethnic groups. Similarly, Bothaøs research conducted on Kenyan MRC and al-Shabaab members revealed that members of organizations refer to themselves as õusö while they referred to the government as õthemö. the above two statements helps to explains that even though members of these groups are Kenyan citizens, their joining the radical groups through friends makes them separate from the other nationals.

In addition family members play a big role in recruiting members into radical groups. Another factor that was cited is political socialization which helps to shape individualsø social identity vis-à-vis their immediate environment. This also explains the values and the significance of emotions that one attaches on such membership.[61] This is used to explain the development of collective identity which includes õdifferent sets of cultural traits, values, symbols, images, myths, beliefs, and social traits that all helps to define ones identityö. The significance of such collective identity in determining ones psychological makeup helps to:

1. Confirm the membership that one has with the given group within the society

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[61] Interview with Sheikh Muhamad Dor, Secretary General CIPK; Sheikh Khalfan Khamis, Chairman Majlis Ulama; Sheikh Juma Ngao, Senior Chairman SUPKEM

2. Offers unique traits that assists in identifying others that are not members of the group

3. Ensures that members within the social group gets to respect one another

4. Contributes towards an increased self-esteem, self-respect, and offer one with a deeper understanding as to why one it a member of a given group; and

5. Provides an individual with a sense of togetherness with other members and constantly reminds an individual that at all costs, she/he is not alone.

Interviewees noted that other factors that explains the reasons for becoming the members of radical groups included personal reasons and inclinations, forced recruitment by other members, religious and ideological reasons, religious and forced, These findings relate to what majority of interviewees stated that:

Radical preachers deliver long sermons explaining the destiny and the sweetness of engaging in holy war. They also distribute leaflets on Islamic religion and show video recordings on other jihadist groups in the world as well as videos on the effects of the KDF and AMISOM intervention against their brothers in Somalia[62]

b. Religious identity

Kenya is a multi-religious country. Christianity accounts for the largest proportion of 84% with Islam accounting for only about 33%. Since the end of one party rule in Kenya and the seeming opening up of political landscape in 1982, religion started to gain much recognition. Despite the fact that Kenya remains secular nation, Muslim groups have always felt discriminated with

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[62] Interview with Sheikh Abdullatif Shir, Program Co-ordinator, KCIU

perceived inadequate representation within government and other public institutions. In addition, the group has always faced discrimination when applying for passports and national identification cards. For instance, Barhan (1992); Abbas (2007) explain that at the time of applying for the national cards, the requirements demand that Muslims produce an additional document to prove that indeed they are Kenyan citizens. This differs from the Christian applicants who are only required to produce theirs and their parentsø birth certificates.

When asked to state how important religion was in determining the rise of radicalization at the Kenya Swahili coast, the informants indicated the importance of religion on three levels which are Most important, Very important and Important. Some cited different levels of importance at which either radical groups at the coast considered the significance of religion. The respondents felt that religion is often used by radical groups in order to appeal to their targets.[63] Using religion creates a sense of a higher purpose of a particular cause and therefore becomes easy to recruit members if they are convinced that they are fulfilling their religious purpose in life. Leaders of radical groups as well as radical clerics at the coast impress on particularly on the youth that their religion (Islam) is under threat from all around ó the government, the Christians, the western world, and therefore urge them to stand up and defend their religion. This also serves to create hatred between Muslims and Christians.

The findings support a similar study conducted by Botha on the recruitment of Al-shabaab and MRC and their feelings towards other religious groups. Analysis conducted by the author revealed that majority of al-Shabaab members hated other religious groups particularly Christians. Furthermore, the study also wanted to understand the level at which the informants considered the

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[63] Interview with Sheikh Muhamad Dor, Secretary General CIPK; Sheikh Khalfan Khamis, Chairman Majlis Ulama; Sheikh Juma Ngao, Senior Chairman SUPKEM

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threat to their religion. While categorizing the origin of the threat to Islamic religion, majority of the respondents stated that:

> *Islam as a religion, has for a very long time come under threat from the Kenyan government and external enemies from the Western countries[64]*

This response leads to the categorization of government as a threat to religion, an external enemy as well as a combination of others. The intervention by the Kenyan government in Somalia in October 2011 to root out Al-Shabaab elements, create a buffer zone and secure its borders, might also help to explain the increase on the perception of Muslim groups that the government is threat to the religion of Islam. Radical groups, therefore heavily rely on religion for reasons other than just motivation. Majority of respondents were of the opinion that Muslims are treated as second-class citizens compared to members of other religious groups. For instance, they stated that recent events in the country show a rise in the unfair profiling of Muslim youths by the government and its machinery.[65]

c. Socioeconomic Factors

 Many respondents faulted poor socio-economic conditions for the rise of radicalism at the Swahili coast. However when asked if poverty should lead an individual to become radical, respondents failed to attribute directly the link between the poverty conditions and the reasons for radicalization of individuals. However, they explained that both uneven development and subsequent relative

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[64] Interview with Hussein Khalid, Programmes Co-ordinator, MUHURI; Abdulghafur El-Busaidy, National Chairman SUPKEM
[65] Interview with Sheikh Abdilahi Abdi, Chairman of NAMLEF; Sheikh Ali A. El-Maawy, National Chairman KAULI; Abdulghafur El-Busaidy, National Chairman, SUPKEM; Mohamed Hyder, Chairman MCET; Sheikh Abdullatif Shir, Program C0-ordinator KCIU

deprivation seem to have contributed in making individuals to radicalize. The World Bank attempted to explain the relationship between conflict and inequality using the Kenyan example;

High level of inequality can contribute towards latent social conflict, which after some time, can intensify through political struggles in pursuit for a share and control over resources. Inequality in this case might imply that different social groups show different interests and a particular political outcome is used to reconcile these interests. Furthermore, the publication indicates that reconciling might contribute towards reduction of a negative outcome. In essence, this seems to occur when political processes are used to seek an approach to redistribute resources. Facilitating latent social conflicts are major contributors such as linguistic fragmentation, ethnic, social distrust in government institutions, and inequality. All the above factors in turn, affect the ability to respond to social conflict.

The above findings were reiterated by some respondents and also helps to confirm that frustrations experienced from economic circumstances, linked with political and ethnic marginalization which contributes to increase in radicalization among Islamic groups at the Kenyan Swahili coast. It is important to note that though economic deprivation has no direct link to causes of radicalizing, most often than not, extremist groups have played on poverty, unemployment and such like grievances to spread their message and appeal particularly to the youth. Furthermore, there is also inadequate allocation of government resources for such disadvantaged groups.[66]

As a result these radical organizations and Islamic charities come up with safety nets for their communities and offer socio-economic assistance to their own to fill in the gap left by absentee government. By offering this assistance, they touch on core religious values and social justice, thus

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[66] Interview with Sheikh Muhamad Dor, Secretary General CIPK; Sheikh Ali A. El-Maawy, National Chairman KAULI; Ahmed M. Farid, Assistant Programme Officer MUHURI; Sheikh Hamad Muhammad Kasim, Chief Kadhi

contributing to their acceptance and legitimacy among the communities and susceptibility of youth and others to join such organizations.

In addition to socio-economic factors, the study identified lack of or poor education as a significant contributory factor towards relative deprivation. While education might not only play a role of securing a good future, the type of education that an individual receives remains important. It is in the area of education that majority of Muslims and most notably those living at the Kenyan Swahili coast and north Eastern regions, feel most deprived by successive Kenyan governments.

Despite the continued increase in Islamic organizations and charities that often contribute towards coastal communities social and economic development, they continue to feel marginalized by government. It is by basing access to religion, culture and ethnic differences between the economically rich and the poor that economic conditions contribute to the rise of instability and radicalization. Historically, it is evident that the coastal and North Eastern regions which have high numbers of Muslim community are evidently less developed than other regions of Kenya. Such inequality and uneven development results is viewed from a religious discrimination lens, making the issue particularly sensitive. Therefore, it is not about the development accounted for by a certain region, but it is interpreted from an ethnic and religious point of view and later turns into a contentious political issue. Consequent calls for independence and self-determination from the coast remain intertwined in economic, political and religious circumstances that become difficult to separate.

Different factors that plays a key role for measuring underdevelopment includes access to education, per capita income, availability of health services among other important public services and social amenities. As indicated in this study, the Coastal province forms part of the

underdeveloped regions in Kenya. However it is not the only underdeveloped region in Kenya and therefore the claim by the ordinary individuals that the Coast is selectively marginalized by the government remains unfounded. Furthermore, this study established that historically, the coastal region was a key trading route used by Indians and Middle East traders to connect to the mainland thus bringing in a great source of wealth as a result, even though this situation started to change dramatically from the early 1900s.

Since independence, successive governments have failed to undertake concerted development efforts for the Coastal region as a whole, despite the region being a high contributor to the economy through tourism. Additionally, tourism sector has mainly offered job opportunities to mainland people, who are more educated than their coastal counterparts. Domination of the coastal economy by mainland people is cited as a major source of tensions in the region. The region has also received less representation on ministerial positions as well as on allocation of government resources, services and investment. Hence, the region is perceived to lag behind others in socio-economic development.[67]

As indicated in the literature review section, several studies revealed that radicalizations involves both macro factors that occurs at external level and micro factors that involves both social and individual factors. For example, after reviewing literature on the topic, this study adopted the root cause model used by Staun and Veldhuis (2009) to subdivide the external (macro) factors into categories including domestic and international factors. On the other hand, personal or internal interpretations of the external environment results from psychological factors that have a direct interaction with the level of political socialization. In the Root cause model, õthe push factorsö

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[67] Interview with Sheikh Hassan Muhammad Kassim, Chief Kadhi

form part of enabling factors that include the political environment of a country, exclusionary politics, abuse and lack of human rights and civil liberties, economic environment, sociological circumstances such as ethnic and religious discrimination; international factors, perceived injustice, and counter-terrorism operations. Even though a functional understanding of all above conditions contributes towards a rise of radicalization as pointed in the literature review section, it is evident that even without people experiencing pressure from either domestic or individual circumstances, individuals can still engage non-violent extremist activities without participating in violence. The second explanation is that not all people that experience similar circumstances will radicalize or will all that engage in radicalization activities engage in terrorist activities or join terrorist organizations.

Despite the above circumstances, it is upon an individual to choose to become a member of a radical group or join a terrorist group. Furthermore, scholars also point out that individuals can also draw from the ideals and activities organized by the extremist groups. Secondly, it is worth noting that not everyone that experiences similar circumstances ends up engaging in radical activities while at the same time, not everyone that is radicalized will become part of terrorist organizations or participate in violent acts and terrorism.

Despite the above circumstances, individuals are the ones who ultimately make the decision to join terrorist organizations. Ideally, it is important to realize that human behaviors are complex and are influenced by a host of factors. It is apparent also that both religious and economic factors formed the primary causes for individuals joining and engaging in radical groups at the Swahili Coast. The following section presents a discussion to these factors and the political circumstances that cause individuals to radicalize.

d. The threats of terrorism to Kenya

In this context, therefore, the study was able to establish that radical groups and terrorism poses a serious threat to Kenya's security. Majority of the respondents were of the opinion that this has been caused by the failure of successive Kenyan governments in dealing with issues ranging from marginalization of the coastal people, border security, and inequality in the country as well as religious discrimination against the Muslim community. This they argue is what has resulted to the growing discontent and radicalism at the coast. Another factor cited is the events happening around the world and particularly in the Middle East and North of Africa. There seems to be targeted threat to Muslims that has caused them to be opposed to the Western world and their allies, Kenya included. This coupled with the rapid spread of Salafi Islam in the world, there is a call to Muslim nationalism to rebel against the secular governments and destroy the status quo in the world. Kenya has not been spared of this unrest crediting the spark of attacks on targeted locations in major cities. Government response to these attacks has been wanting, Muslim youths have been at the receiving end of the cruelty of the police forces in trying to rid the country of radical elements. Abitrary arrests and killings of suspected individuals only serves to further radicalize and alienate the Muslim communities, posing an even greater threat to the country and its citizens.[68]

Ideological Conditions that Facilitate the Growth of Radical Islam

e. The success of Radical groups infiltration at the Swahili coast

Radical groups at the Swahili coast including al-Shabaab, MRC and Al-Hijra, have transformed themselves from just rag-tag militias, and developed clear objectives for example for the MRC, to

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[68] Interview with Sheikh Muhamad Dor, Secretary General CIPK; Sheikh Ali A. El-Maawy, National Chairman KAULI; Ahmed M. Farid, Assistant Programme Officer MUHURI; Sheikh Hamad Muhammad Kasim, Chief Kadhi

effect secession of the Kenyan Coast from the rest of Kenya. On the other hand, the al-Shabaab militia have continued their attacks in the country with an objective to make Kenya withdraw its defense forces from the Somalia territory. Besides, they also want to force the withdrawal of AMISOM peacekeepers that have succeeded in conquering, controlling and administering most parts of Central and Southern Somalia, thus weakening the Al-shabaab. Even after KDF took full control of their operational activities from Kismayu, Muslim radical groups including al-Shabaab have continued to operate at the Swahili coast with instances reported by the Kenya police of trainings in mosques.

Radical groups have succeeded in their activities for several reasons. In the first instance for example, the radical groups seems to have invested heavily in capabilities to gather intelligence on their targets. They have a deliberate strategic plan for modernizing their planning and operations. Even today, radical groups at the Swahili coast seem to have capabilities that enable them to gather the most accurate intelligence, come up with plans to conduct attacks and ensure they operationalize their plans beyond the coastal regions. For instance, the planning and execution of twin bombings in Kampala in 2010, the day time bombing at Westgate mall in Nairobi on 21 September, 2013, and a further siege on a UN compound in Mogadishu, indicates how radical groups cannot be underestimated and seem to have real capabilities to collect intelligence information and plan and execute attacks successfully.

Secondly, the radical groups make use of intimidation, outright murder, bribery, and coercion in order to collect intelligence information. They force people to cooperate with them and threaten them by instilling fear in them of murder. Such operations remain significant for radical groups when it comes to collecting of important information and planning of attacks on the target regions.

Third, foreigners and especially the Kenyans, play crucial roles in planning and leading operations. Informants revealed that analysts of intelligence consist of educated individuals who also have experiences and connections to foreigners.

These radical groups have also benefitted from the government machinery lack of planning and inadequacy when it comes to anticipating and countering radical activities. They have failed to heed to early warning mechanism that would otherwise help them deal with such plans and the perpetrators before there are executed. Instead, the police have often been found flat-footed in the numerous attacks that have been happening around the country. The police often complain of being ill equipped and lacking the kind of intelligence and armaments that are used by these groups.

Radical groups also benefit heavily from their sympathizers and supporters within and outside the region. It is well documented that most Islamist groups continue to receive funding and training from international Wahabi-Salafi networks to fund and enhance their activities and spread, in the name of propagating purified Islam around the world. These Islamic organizations reportedly also use their resources for the development of mosques, madrasas, and health centers in Tanzania, and to fund studentsø scholarships to study abroad.[69]

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[69] Gatsiounis, Ioannis. (2013). õAfter Al-Shabaab.ö Hudson Institute. http://www.hudson.org/research/9774-after-al-shabaab.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

This study examined the reasons that contribute towards the rise of Islamic radicalism at the Swahili coast by using the Kenyan Coast as a case. The rise of radicalization activities witnessed in the country and more specifically at the Kenyan coast in recent years has helped to explain the development of Islamic mobilization and radicalism that has been witnessed in the past decades. It is evident that there are several macro, micro and individual factors at a social level, which all contribute in facilitating the rise of radicalism by Muslim individuals to engage in terrorism activities. The activist organizations have gained their motivations from what they perceive as discrimination and marginalization from both socio-economic and political fronts. More importantly, this has led to the majority of Muslim religious actors and leaders, to put up a united front to push for better representation and change in treatment of Muslim communities especially at the Swahili coast. Muslim religious activists have used the above foundation to rally Muslims in the country to claim their stake politically and in the public sphere. They have caused a new consciousness to the Islamic identity to take charge and oppose the status quo and fight for their political and social rights.

This study also used the above foundation to show how the both internal and external conditions play a role in the infiltration of radical groups in the Swahili coast. Furthermore, examines the continued transformation and mobilization of Muslim groups towards radical patterns.

The findings presented in this study supports the root cause model which argues that radicalization arises from external level factors, internal social causes, and individual level factors. Several

studies analyzed revealed that radicalization involves both macro factors that occur at external level and micro factors that involve both social and individual factors. This study subdivides the external (macro) factors into categories including domestic and international factors. On the other hand, personal or internal interpretations of the external environment results from psychological factors that have a direct interaction with the level of political socialization. In the root cause model, õthe push factorsö form part of enabling circumstances that include the political environment of a country, political exclusion, abuse and lack of human rights and civil liberties, economic environment, sociological circumstances such as ethnic and religious discrimination; international factors and developments, perceived injustice, and counter-terrorism operations. Majority of informants revealed that friends played key roles in convincing their peers to join radical organizations, which testifies to the extent peer pressure can influence the manner in which interpersonal relationship need to be interpreted.

The study reveals that the government is perceived as a primary threat to the religion of Islam, together with a combination of other factors. The intervention by the Kenyan government in Somalia in October 2011 might also help to explain the increase on the perception by Muslim groups that the government as a major threat to Islam as a religion. Real and perceived socio-economic and political marginalization is used by radical groups to appeal to affected communities and gain legitimacy, however the study did not identify any direct link between poverty and other socio-economic grievances to decisions by individuals to join radical groups. However, the respondents explained that both uneven development and subsequent relative deprivation seem to have contributed in making individuals to radicalize.

A high level of inequality can contribute towards latent social conflict, which manifests over time through political struggle over power and control over resources. The consequent calls for

independence and self-determination of the Coastal part of Kenya remain intertwined in economic, political and religious circumstances that are ultimately difficult to separate.

The government must devise other non-militaristic counter-terrorism/radicalism policies and efforts mostly focused on de-radicalization initiatives, socio-economic reintegration of radical elements, and most importantly entrenching inclusive governance that caters to the needs of all Kenyan citizens.

5.2 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Studies

This study brings out several aspects in the quest to understand the reasons that contributes towards a rise in Islam radicalization at the Kenyan Swahili coast. The first aspect that concerns the current study is the approach used to collect primary and secondary data using interviews and literature review. Despite adopting the two approaches as most effective in collecting data to understand the study area, it is critical to mention some of the limitations and those that future researchers would need to consider when conducting their study in a similar area.

First, the researcher utilized interviews to collect descriptive statistics. Future studies need to collect empirical data which could help in providing more cross sectional data that covers several years and test causality in the variables. The second limitations concerns focusing on Kenyan Swahili coast to in order to understand the reason for the rise of radicalization among the Muslim community. As indicated in discussion section, Kenya has approximately about 33% of Muslim within its population who are found in areas other than the Coast. This would require that any future researchers that would like to understand Muslim related activities consider the rest of the Muslims that live in others regions of the country. The third limitation involves collecting primary descriptive data from most of the Muslim leaders and those that serve in government. While the

study examines that rise of radicalizations among the radical Muslims, there was no access to actual perpetrators of radical and terrorism related activities, due mostly to the danger such contact would pose. Any interpretation conducted on the findings would require that the informants could bias an individual takes caution as the results.

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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. What are the internal and external factors, in your opinion that have contributed to the rise of Islamic radicalism in the Swahili coast?

2. What is the role of religion in the rise of Islamic radicalism in the Swahili coast?

3. What do you perceive as the greatest predicaments facing Muslims in the pursuit of their goals?

4. In your opinion have Muslims been marginalized by successive Kenyan governments?

5. In your opinions do Muslims have the same economic opportunities as non-Muslims in the Swahili coast?

6. On a scale of one to ten what are the real and perceived threats of terrorism in Kenya?