RADIO AND HATE SPEECH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF KENYA (2007 PEV) AND THE 1994 RWANDA GENOCIDE

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DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

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DEDICATION

To My father Mr.Charles Ekisa Odera and Mother Fanice Atto. I dedicate this book to my parents who have had significant influence upon my life and Education. First, I acknowledge my Father Charles Ekisa Odera, who laid the first education foundation in my life. I thank him for his financial Support and scholarly advice. Next I recognize my mother Fanice Atto Ekisa for her emotional support and fervent prayers. May the Almighty God Bless you All.

ABSTRACT

In Kenya, the phenomenon of ethnic- related conflicts seem to be frequent. As such, numerous studies have been conducted about the post-election violence but little has been done to identify the role media took in comparison to the Rwandan Genocide. Therefore this study looked into how the media used its agenda setting role to fuel conflict in Kenya and Rwanda. Thus the research problem, Media and Hate Speech: A Comparative study of Kenya (2007 PEV) and the1994 Rwanda Genocide shapes the objectives of the study. While the media may contribute to dialogue and understanding, they can also be a factor in generating social tension through stereotyping and inaccurate reporting. It is evident enough that the media can disseminate hate speech or remarks based on racial or ethnic discrimination. The question is where to draw the line between freedom of expression, hate speech and the right not to be discriminated against. Existing research has shown that the powers of radio in fuelling ethnic tension in ethnically and politically polarized societies derive its power from the verbal indictment of the 'others' legitimacy. This belief is critical in manifesting the relationship of the people around the concepts of ethnic identity. However, there exist a challenge in the promoting ethic and national identity and cases where various media owners have influence on the programs that are to be aired. This was the case during Kenya's 2007-2008 post violent electoral conflict and the 1994 Rwanda's genocide where radio through Frequent Modulation (FM) station played visible role in hate speech changing the landscape of the national political and ethnic conflict processes. This research seeks to evaluate the actual role the radio played in propagating hate speech; to assess the underlying causes of hate speech in the conflict period; and to suggest effective strategies that the radio could employ to mitigate hate speech and instead promote peace and cohesion. The research was guided by the critical race theory (CRT) because it provides a compelling framework by which media concepts and hate speech can be analysed in the extent to which the radio programs dehumanized vulnerable groups by establishing the sameness between two unrelated things or ideas . Phrases used to refer to other ethnic groups form metaphors that are not merely rhetorical but pedestals on which hate flourishes. Data for this study was obtained from secondary sources. This was descriptive contained in notes form. Guided by the objectives and premises of the study, the data was arranged according to the major themes. Findings from this study confirm the involvement of media in exacerbating conflict. Radio in conflicts, i.e Rwanda genocide and Kenya post-election violence, took the leading role because it has a wider listenership compared to television viewership and newspaper readership. At the height of the Conflict in 1994 Rwanda genocide and the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya, the media was distracted from pro-peace analysis in their coverage. Data for this study was obtained from secondary sources. This was descriptive contained in notes form. Guided by the objectives and premises of the study, the data was arranged according to the major themes. The main causes of ethnic conflicts include land, poverty, militia gangs, gun culture, political incitement, racism and ethnic animosity. In multi-ethnic society, all actors should ensure they use a comprehensive approach that appreciates the diversity of cultural world views. After the interpretation and discussion of the data, conclusions were drawn and recommendations for further research given.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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ABBREVIATIONS

KPTJ   The Kenyans for Peace, Truth, and Justice

ODM   Orange Democratic Movement

PNU   Party of National Unity

UN   United Nations

ICC   International Criminal Court

FM   Frequent Modulation

CRT   Critical Resource Theory

PEV   Post-Election Violence

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The concept of hate speech encompasses a multiplicity of situations ranging from the incitement of racial hatred or in other words, hatred directed against persons or groups of persons on the grounds of belonging to a race; incitement to hatred on religious grounds, to which may be equated incitement to hatred on the basis of a distinction between believers and non-believers; incitement to other forms of hatred based on intolerance "expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism" to homophobic speech also falls into what can be considered as a category of hate speech[1]. The European Convention of Human Rights and its Article 10 which guarantees freedom of expression remains the incontrovertible reference point, there are other non-binding texts, treaties and instruments which have been adopted by the Council which reflect the organisation's standards and principles in order to create a balance between combating the hate speech and protecting freedom of expression[2].

The concept of hate speech is aligned to an overarching interplay with the radio medium based on the cultural and social homogenization. Greek social scientists concluded that the original source which makes people susceptible to nationalism, to the authoritarian mentality and, therefore, to hate speech is education. In modern societies the fundamental mechanism of cultural homogenization in the shaping of a collective national identity, is provided by the

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[1] Hintjens, Helen M. 'Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda'. The Journal of Modern African Studies VOL37 NO.2 (1999) pg241-286.
[2] Wanyama F.O. The role of the Presidency in African Conflict P.G Okoth, B.A. Ogoth(ed) Conflict in Contemporary Africa(Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundations, 2000) pg30-43

institution of education[3].   Not all people are able to defend themselves from becoming conditioned to conceptualize the world around them in linguistic images which violate the principles of liberty, equality, solidarity and human dignity[4].

The radio uses the language of a limited vocabulary which permits one to get rid of the ambiguity and the uncertainty in human coexistence and communication. This is achieved through the use of very precise discriminatory and selective vocabulary which tries to legitimize negative thinking about all those who are not {us}, those who are the {others}. Hate speech is limited precisely to such a language to a wide audience, a course facilitated by the radio, ethnic identity, cultural heterogeneity and aspects of radio ownership[5]. This aspects reflects the type of national identity a people develops, the level of cultural, ethnic, religious homogeneity that is cultivated in order for the national "self" to prove its uniqueness in relation and contradistinction to other nations. Research indicate that describing national identity means also describing and evaluating the "others" forms a structural as to why element of a national identity is the existence of the "other"[6]. National identity is shaped through a two-fold process: structuring and differentiating and incorporation and exclusion. National, religious and linguistic stereotypes are among the most visible examples of hate speech that function as means of differentiation and exclusion in the process of national identity formation.

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[3] Bagdikian.B.H. The Media Monopoly (Boston: Beacon Press, 1997) pp. 91-93
[4] Staub, Ervin. 'The Origins of Genocide and Mass Killing: Core Concepts'. In The Genocide Studies Reader, eds. S. Totten and P.R. Bartrop. (New York: Routledge.2009)
[5] Baran Stanley J. and Davis Dennisk, (2006), Mass Communication Theory Foundations, Ferment and Future, 4th edition, Thompson Wadsworth.
[6] Cohen B.C. (1963), The Press and Foreign Policy, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

There is no conventional agreement on the definition of hate speech given that many scholars define it differently. We will rely on definition offered by Kenya's NCIC Act 2008: A person is said to engage in hate speech if that person uses threatening language, insulting word or behavior or displays, publishes or distributes any written material, or visual images with intent to stir up hatred based on race, ethnicity, religion, gender, age, language and nationality (NCIC Act Article 13(1)[7]. However, Benesch a leading researcher at World Policy Institute further categorized hate speech into mild, moderate and dangerous speech. She defined dangerous speech as "speech that catalyzes violence"[8]. For the purpose of this research, the definition of genocide is taken from the Genocide Convention, which defines genocide as "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group". In this way, the Armenian, the Jewish Holocaust and the genocide in Rwanda are the three genocides of that befit the definition[9].

Kenya and Rwanda have bore the brunt of hate speech that culminated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide and 2007/8 Kenyan PEV respectively. The two countries continue to experience latent, subdued bouts of hate crime evidence by mainstream media content analysis and social media posts. In as much as there is calm in Rwanda after the genocide the current calm cannot be mistaken for lasting peace found in a coherent and reconciled nation. In fact there are undertones of ethnic hate and a fermenting crisis that awaits a trigger[10]. According to Hutus in Rwanda, who are largely excluded from RPF government, the present calm is a period for "sharpening machetes" in readiness for next spate of bloodbath. Even today, even though I want to get out of

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[7] Baran Stanley J. and Davis Dennisk, (2006), Mass Communication Theory Foundations, Ferment and Future, 4th edition, Thompson Wadsworth.
[8] Hintjens, Helen M. 'Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda'. The Journal of Modern   African Studies VOL37 NO.2 (1999) pp241-286.
[9] Bagdikian.B.H. The Media Monopoly (Boston: Beacon Press, 1997) pp. 91-93
[10] Staub, Ervin. 'The Origins of Genocide and Mass Killing: Core Concepts'. In The Genocide Studies Reader, eds. S. Totten and P.R. Bartrop. (New York: Routledge.2009)

this place, there are still people who want them to happen again, where we can see the killers walking on the streets every day[11]. There are unremorseful and unapologetic Hutus who wish for repeat of genocide.

However, these are undertones that do not find their way into mainstream media because of autocracy of RPF regime. In Rwanda, it is a crime to ask any random citizen about their ethnicity. It is not the dread of what happens that haunts the ethnicity question but the fact that it might be used again for senseless ethnic cleansing. It is important to point out that the1994 genocide was not the first ethnic cleansing. "In November 1959, a violent incident sparked a Hutu uprising in which hundreds of Tutsi were killed and thousands displaced and forced to flee to neighboring countries. This marked the start of the so- called 'Hutu Peasant Revolution' or 'social revolution' lasting from 1959 to 1961, which signified the end of Tutsi domination and the sharpening of ethnic tensions."[12]

The 1994 was not even the second ethnic massacre: in 1962 after independence new cycle of ethnic conflict and violence continued after independence. Tutsi refugees in Tanzania and Zaire seeking to regain their former positions in Rwanda began organizing and staging attacks on Hutu targets and the Hutu government. It is now obvious why question of ethnicity is irksome in Rwanda and why recurrence of genocide has incessant visitations in the Rwandese mind. Ten such attacks and retaliations happened between 1962 and 1967.Were it not for a tight noose RPF has around the neck of the media, both print and electronic outlets would be awash with hate speech messages.

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[11] Wanyama F.O. The role of the Presidency in African Conflict P.G Okoth, B.A. Ogoth(ed) Conflict in Contemporary Africa(Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundations, 2000) pp30-43

[12] Bourgaut L.M. Mass Media in Sub-Sahara Africa (Indianapolis:Indiana University Press 1995) pp.160-169

The hate is kept alive not by the media as at present but by the activities of over 1.4 million Hutu civilians and former government officials who fled to eastern Congo and continue to attack Tutsis in Rwanda. Clearly, this indicates the eminent possibility of re-emergence of escalating ethnic cleansing in Rwanda. As such, the "machetes are being sharpened" in Eastern Congo Hutu refugee camps even today [13]. In pursuit of justice for survivors, the RPF government established participatory community courts (Gacaca Courts) to try over 100,000 genocide suspects, some of whom have been released provisionally awaiting trial due to huge backlog of cases occasioned by destruction of courts, inadequate judicial personnel among other constraints. The move is criticized by survivors as a form of amnesty.

While the media may contribute to dialogue and understanding, they can also be a factor in generating social tension through stereotyping and inaccurate reporting[14]. It is evident enough that the media can disseminate hate speech or remarks based on racial or ethnic discrimination. Naturally, this is not desirable in an inclusive society, possibly even intolerable. The question is where to draw the line between freedom of expression, hate speech and the right not to be discriminated against.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The powers of radio in fuelling ethnic tension in ethnically and politically polarized societies derive its power from the verbal indictment of the 'others' legitimacy. This belief is critical in manifesting the relationship of the people around the concepts of ethnic identity. However, there exist a challenge in the promoting ethic and national identity and cases where various media

[13] Hintjens, Helen M. 'Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda'. The Journal of Modern African Studies VOL37 NO.2 (1999) pp241-286.
[14] Bagdikian.B.H. The Media Monopoly (Boston: Beacon Press, 1997) pp. 91-93

owners have influence on the programs that are to be aired[15]. This was the case during Kenya's 2007-2008 post violent electoral conflict and the 1994 Rwanda's genocide where radio through Frequent Modulation (FM) station played visible role in hate speech changing the landscape of the national political and ethnic conflict processes[16]. Despite the radio having a mission of peace and reconciliation and being predominant, conflicts, especially ethnic conflicts continue to escalate in various parts of the country due to the power of presenters and broadcasters. This is an indication that probably there is a weakness in the methodology the radio used in covering events of the Kenya's 2007- 2008 post-election violence as well as the Rwanda 1994 genocide.

The media stands accused for the infamous 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya. The media, especially the radio stations, were blamed for fueling the violence through hate messaging and misinformation that led to bloodshed and the displacement of hundreds of people. While the media may contribute to dialogue and understanding, they can also be a factor in generating social tension through stereotyping and inaccurate reporting. It is evident enough that the media can disseminate hate speech or remarks based on racial or ethnic discrimination[17]. Naturally, this is not desirable in an inclusive society, possibly even intolerable. The question is where to draw the line between freedom of expression, hate speech and the right not to be discriminated against. Therefore, this research seeks to establish, the underlying causes of hate speech in the society, evaluate why the media is being used to spread hate speech, identify ways in which the media can be used to effectively promote peace and integration and to identify permanent solutions to hate speech.

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[15] Bourgaut L.M. Mass Media in Sub-Sahara Africa (Indianapolis:Indiana University Press 1995) pg160-169
[16] Hintjens, Helen M. 'Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda'. The Journal of Modern African Studies VOL37 NO.2 (1999) pp.241-286.
[17] Mullen, Gary A. 'Genocide and the Politics of Identity: Rwanda through the lens of Adorno'. (Philosophy Today 2006)50: 170-175.

1.3 Research Objectives

1. To evaluate the actual role the radio played in propagating hate speech.

2. To assess the underlying causes of hate speech in the conflict period.

3. To suggest effective strategies that the radio could employ to mitigate hate speech and instead promote peace and cohesion.

1.4 Hypotheses

1. Uniformity of radio FM objectives affects the process and outcome of peace initiatives by building relationships.

2. Complementary approaches are inevitable in effective peace building initiatives after hate speech at the community level.

3. The process of propagating hate speech is promoted by political tension and ethical identity.

1.5 Justification of the Study

The study has both academic and policy justification. Academically, there lack systematic study of the role of the media in hate speech. Through this study, scholars, actors and policy makers will construct an understanding that is familiar with the media environment as well as what happened in 2007/2008 and Rwanda Genocide. The media stands accused for fueling the 2007 PEV in Kenya and the 1994 Rwanda Genocide. The critiques argue that, through hate messaging and misinformation, the media bears the greatest responsibility for the violence. Much attention was focused on the Media, with the government putting in place strict measures on the media in the subsequent elections. However, it is worth noting that, vernacular radio stations are only

platforms for disgruntled citizens to air the grievances. By the time, the citizen's result to air their grievances, normally, they have sought other ways of addressing their problems but to no avail. Radio, being a medium of mass dissemination, the aggrieved citizens are assured of massive support from the listeners who are in the same situation. The study will fill the gap between the discordant relationship between main stream media, their ethics and the hate speech that is sometimes viral on the social media. Professionalism of the media both in Rwanda and Kenya has been examined in order to understand the landscape in which media practitioners worked under during the conflict in Rwanda and Kenya. Issues in this study may also be helpful in policy formulation in Kenya and other countries across the world. The study elucidates on various interventions geared toward improvement of the laws as well as professionalism of the media.

1.6 Literature Review

1.6.1 Introduction

Conflicts are inevitable in human societies because societies have variations in interests. As such, human beings are essentially egoistic, that is, they toil and struggle to quench their ends[18]. When consensus and mutuality lack, human beings and other animals tend to fight over the available chances and resources, this eventually could lead to conflict which usually turns violent as the case in Kenya and Rwanda. This section addresses aspects of social media influence on conflict, media ownership, ethnic identities as the underlying causes of hate speech and of the policies on hate speech and the media.

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[18]Adedeji, A (1981). Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts. London: Zed Books, p78.

1.6.2 Hate Speech Defined

With regard to media and freedom of expression, Article 33 (1) of the Kenya Constitution guarantees freedom of expression. Article 33 (2) states that "the right to freedom of expression does not extend to propaganda for war; incitement to violence; hate speech; or advocacy of hatred that (i) constitutes ethnic incitement, vilification of others or incitement to cause harm; or (ii) is based on any ground of discrimination specified or contemplated in 27 (4)"[19] . The provision above limits media from propagating hate speech. On the same note, the Kenyan Penal Code section 96 creates an offence of incitement to violence[20]. The offence reads: "Any person who, without lawful excuse, the burden of proof whereof shall lie upon him, utters, prints or publishes any words, or does any act or thing, indicating or implying that it is or might be desirable to do, or omit to do, any act the doing or omission of which is calculated to bring death or physical injury to any person or to any class, community or body of persons or to lead to the damage or destruction of any property; or to prevent or defeat by violence or by other unlawful means the execution or enforcement of any written law or to lead to defiance or disobedience of any such law, or of any lawful authority, is guilty of an offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years [21]".

The National Cohesion and Integration Act (NCIC) in Article 13(1) states that "a person who uses, publishes, displays, directs plays, distributes, information ... which is threatening, abusive or insulting or involves the use of threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour commits

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[19] Nasong'o S.W. Resource Allocation and the Crisis of Political Conflict in Africa: Beyond the Inter-ethnic Hatred Thesis P.G Okoth, B.A. Ogoth (Ed) Conflict in Contemporary Africa (Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundations, 2000) pp.44-53

[20] Scheufele, D.A (2000), Agenda-Setting, Priming and Framing revisited: Another look at Cognitive Effects of Political Communication, Mass Communication and Society.

[21] Stone, Dan. 2004. 'Genocide as transgression'. European Journal of Social Theory Vol7NO.1(2004) pp.45-65.

an offence if such a person intends thereby to stir up ethnic hatred, or having regard to all the circumstances, ethnic hatred is likely to be stirred up". It is from the NCIC Act that Media Guidelines for reporting on hate speech is developed. The media council of Kenya (MCK) has also put in place policies regulate media practice in Kenya. One such policy is the Media Law and Ethics as well as Code of Conduct for the Practice of Journalism in Kenya[22].

1.6.3 Social Nature of Radio and Its Influence on Conflict

The social media platform where listeners can follow the proceedings on the Radio's page is gaining more popularity among the young generation in Kenya and world over. Through the various platforms such as blogs, Facebook, and Twitter the media has been able to pick newsworthy stories for coverage[23]. Such blogs are able to set the agenda on content for media coverage. They say "For salient topics in global affairs, the blogosphere functions as a rare combination of distributed expertise, real-time collective response to breaking news, and public opinion barometer"[24]. It is this platform that has created hate speech among Kenyans during the 2013 elections. The Kenya National Human Rights Commission defines Hate speech as any form of speech that degrades others and promotes hatred and encourages violence against a group on the basis of a criteria including religion, race, colour or ethnicity. It includes speech, publication or broadcast that represents as inherently inferior, or degrades, dehumanizes and demeans a group[25]. Therefore this research seeks to answer, whether or not the effort by the media in Kenya was enough to avert the social media crisis on hate speech.

[22] Destexhe, Alain. 1994-1995. 'The Third Genocide'. Foreign Policy (97): 3-17.
[23] Thompson, Allan (Ed), 2007. The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, London, Pluto Press Unit.
[24] Nasong'o S.W. Resource Allocation and the Crisis of Political Conflict in Africa: Beyond the Inter-ethnic Hatred Thesis P.G Okoth, B.A. Ogoth (Ed) Conflict in Contemporary Africa (Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundations, 2000) pp.44-53
[25] Stone, Dan. 2004. 'Genocide as transgression'. European Journal of Social Theory Vol7NO.1(2004) pp.45-65.

1.6.4 Media Ownership

For media to fulfill its role of providing the public with information, the fourth estate has to be objective, non-partisan, and conduct its business in a manner consistent with media code of conduct and ethics (MCK: Media Code of Conduct and ethics, 2007,3). It is however challenging for media to be owned by a political establishment or politician and still be objective so as to ensure accurate and balanced coverage of political stories[26]. In most cases political ownership of media creates partisanship with disastrous effects. As Henry Maina observes " ...Rwanda presents the most extreme examples of how the relationship between a government, the media and politics can go horribly wrong'[27]. In a situation where a poilitician or political establishment does not own media directly, a businessman, relative, friend, or organization affiliated to a given political party may as well serve the interest of the politician. For instance, the management of RTML had close association of President Habyarimana. "RTML was founded in the 1993 and owned by family members and friends of the president Habyarimana, the station preached an extremist message of Hutu Supremacy. The stations far from being neutral openly advocated the cause of Interahamwe[28]. For the very reasons media was found culpable during the 2007PEV in Kenya. The vernacular radio stations supported the cause of leaders from their respective ethnic communities: Ramogi FM supported Hon. Raila Odinga, Chamge and Kass Fm, Hon. Ruto (affiliate of Raila Odinga) whearas Kameme FM, championed Kibaki's course.

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[26] Scheufele, D.A (2000), Agenda-Setting, Priming and Framing revisited: Another look at Cognitive Effects of Political Communication, Mass Communication and Society.

[27] Iyengar,S. and D.R. Kinder (1987), News that matter: Television and America opinion, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

[28] Destexhe, Alain. 1994-1995. 'The Third Genocide'. Foreign Policy (97): 3-17.

1.6.5 Ethnic Identity and Hate Speech

Ethnic identity forms the underlying causes of hate speech and catalytic causes that spur hate crime. Diversity, race, creed, religion, gender, ethnicity, disability and other social dichotomies have not cited as causes of hate speech. However, the deliberate use of these differences to discriminate, marginalize, intimidate, deride/mock to instill inferiority complex does cause and perpetrate hate speech. When these discriminations are practiced over a period of time, they transform into socio-economic historical injustices that without redress are expressed through violence[29].

In a dangerously polarized society, opposed communities view one another as "enemies within". Exterminating this "enemy within" is framed as a justifiable act of self-defense[30]. That was the case in Rwanda. As Staub observes one condition that gives way to hatred is economic crisi[31]s. During times of a recession, people are inclined to find someone to blame for their misfortune. Tutsi in Rwanda were blamed of initiating the economic crisis in the 1980s, a crisis that resulted plummeting coffee prices, in order for power and dominance to be restored. During times of an economic crisis people try find someone to blame.

Group influence and a perceived "brotherhood" among perpetrators is a catalyst for violence. "Perpetrators bond together as a community with a kind of sacred cause […] in the ritual of genocidal killing"[32]. Being part of something larger and considered is, therefore, provided

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[29] Nasong'o S.W. Resource Allocation and the Crisis of Political Conflict in Africa: Beyond the Inter-ethnic Hatred Thesis P.G Okoth, B.A. Ogoth (Ed) Conflict in Contemporary Africa (Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundations, 2000) pp.44-53

[30] Stone, Dan. 2004. 'Genocide as transgression'. European Journal of Social Theory Vol7NO.1(2004) pp.45-65.

[31] Staub, Ervin. 'The Origins of Genocide and Mass Killing: Core Concepts'. In The Genocide Studies Reader, eds. S. Totten and P.R. Bartrop. (New York: Routledge.2009)

[32] Somerville, K. (2010), Violenece, Hate speech and Vernacular Radio: Online manuscript

through belonging to a group that considers itself justified in its actions. The feeling of belonging is stepped up through doing something severe like the killing of people. Whole communities experience a form of ecstasy while partaking in the killing of others. This was exemplified in Rwanda, where the militia group was called *interahamwe*, which translates to "those who fight together[33]".

1.6.6 Policies on Hate Speech and the Media

There are international and national policies regulating media with specific attention to hate speech. In African countries these laws take time before they are harmonized with existing national law depending on the level of democracy and the willingness of government in power. For some policies against hate speech and discrimination to be aligned with and incorporated into existing national laws, an Act of parliament which takes longer time must be passed and successfully sail through all stages of parliamentary Bills[34]. The postulate is evidenced by the fact that Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide (CPPCG) has existed in 1948, Kenya only passed NCIC Act in 2008 after the PEV. This applies too for a broad range of international policy frameworks including International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1996 and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination (PEPUD) Act, Act No 4 of 2000[35].

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[33] BBCWST, (2008), The Kenya 2007 elections and their Aftermath: The role of Media and Communication.
[34] BBCWST, (2008), The Kenya 2007 elections and their Aftermath: The role of Media and Communication.
[35] Nasong'o S.W. Resource Allocation and the Crisis of Political Conflict in Africa: Beyond the Inter-ethnic Hatred Thesis P.G Okoth, B.A. Ogoth (Ed) Conflict in Contemporary Africa (Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundations, 2000) pp.44-53

The constitution review process in Kenya and the ultimate promulgation of the Kenya constitution 2010 has brought into existence progressive laws to criminalize discrimination. In the regard, the Constitution of Kenya in Article 27 provides for equality and freedom from discrimination. Article 27 (4) it outlaws direct and indirect discrimination against any person on any ground, including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or birth.

Rwanda, on the other hand, also has national laws against hate speech and Genocide. For instance, Article 13 of the Rwandan constitution makes "revisionism, negationism and trivialization of genocide" punishable by law[36]. FRP government also enacted the much criticized Genocide Ideology Law in 2008. Led by President Paul Kagame, Rwandan Government passed Law No. 18/2008, which proscribes the incitement of genocide through ethnic affiliation, among other things. The Genocide law is criticized as an infringement on the media freedom of speech and the people's right to information.[37] The main gap in these national and international policy frameworks lies in enforcement and complete implementation. A clear example is the Kenyan case in which NCIC had suspects of hate crime but did not have prosecutorial powers to mete out justice due unstructured relationship the judiciary.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

The critical race theory (CRT) movement is a collection of activists and scholars interested in studying and transforming the relationship among race, racism, and power. The movement considers many of the same issues that conventional civil rights and ethnic studies discourses

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[36] Bagdikian.B.H. The Media Monopoly (Boston: Beacon Press, 1997) pp.. 91-93
[37] Staub, Ervin. 'The Origins of Genocide and Mass Killing: Core Concepts'. In The Genocide Studies Reader, eds. S. Totten and P.R. Bartrop. (New York: Routledge.2009)

take up, but places them in a broader perspective that includes economics, history, context, group- and self-interest, and even feelings and the unconscious. Unlike traditional civil rights, which embraces incrementalism and step-by-step progress, critical race theory questions the very foundations of the liberal order, including equality theory, legal reasoning, Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional law[38].

Through critical race theory, provides a compelling framework by which media concepts and hate speech can be analyzed in the extent to which the radio programs dehumanized vulnerable groups by establishing the sameness between two unrelated things or ideas[39]. Phrases used to refer to other ethnic groups form metaphors that are not merely rhetorical but pedestals on which hate flourishes. Such metaphors reflects an insight through which coherent organization of experience are modelled to understand another potentially revealing the rhetorical strategies and underlying conceptual systems by which vulnerable groups are understood and perhaps even acted against[40]. Theoretically, critical race theory underscores that violent political rhetoric can produce the same psychological dynamics as violent entertainment[41]. This is the libertarian view which holds that freedom of speech takes precedence over all other rights because all rights depend on the existence of an effective right to dissent. From this view, the harmful effects of hate propaganda are not deemed to be sufficiently grave to justify the imposition of restrictions on freedom of speech.

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[38] Bourgaut L.M. Mass Media in Sub-Sahara Africa (Indianapolis:Indiana University Press 1995) pp.160-169
[39] Mwangiru.M. Conflict in Africa(Nairobi: Centre for Conflict Research, 2006) pp. 1-34
[40] Wanyama F.O. The role of the Presidency in African Conflict P.G Okoth, B.A. Ogoth(ed) Conflict in Contemporary Africa(Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundations, 2000) pp.30-43
[41] Calvert, C. (1997), Hate Speech and its harms: A communicative perspective. Journal of Communication, 47, 4-19.

Through critical race theory, "framing words on the assumption that subtle changes in the wording of the description of a situation might affect how audience interpret this situation[42]. This portends that media coverage can help influence how we think about objects like candidates, events and other issues. As a result, priming refers to impact of news coverage on the weight assigned to specific issues in making political judgments. This means that the media may draw more attention to some aspects of political life like the elections and the aftermath at the expense of others. Iyengar and Kinder demonstrate that "through priming television news (helps) set the terms by which political judgment are reached and political choices made.[43]"

The tenets of critical race theory holds that restrictions on hate-mongering are necessary in order to protect minority groups from pain and suffering and in order to promote inter-group harmony in the society. From the egalitarian view, all persons and groups must be protected equally against the promotion of hatred and against defamatory attacks that deny their right to human dignity[44]. Additionally, hate propaganda has no redeeming social value and is inherently harmful both to target groups and the societal order. Therefore restrictions on freedom of expression explicitly designed to curb the hate-mongering represent reasonable limits. Within the tenets of critical race theory, the media, especially the radio stations, were blamed for fuelling the violence through hate messaging and misinformation that led to bloodshed and the displacement of hundreds of people. However, some governments are you the media as an escape- goat to the underlying causes of hate speech in the society. In 2013 general election in Kenya, the Media ditched its watchdog role and resulted to being the peace ambassadors for fear of: being accused

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[42] Hintjens, Helen M. 'Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda'. The Journal of Modern African Studies VOL37 NO.2 (1999) pp. 241-286.
[43] Mwangiru.M. Conflict in Africa(Nairobi: Centre for Conflict Research, 2006) pp. 1-34
[44] Hintjens, Helen M. 'Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda'. The Journal of Modern African Studies VOL37 NO.2 (1999) pp.241-286.

at the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the repeat of the 2007 PEV[45]. Some Vernacular radio stations, had to pull off air some controversial program or political programs that yielded controversy. They also limited, the number of phone-in programs, in which people expressed the opinions. However, despite all these, there was still hate speech at the grassroots level and behind closed doors. There were incidents of people passing notes threatening other communities.

Critical race theory shows the relevance of hate speech and radio as a medium. Hate propaganda creates the perceptions of hate speech by adding in the emotional response of the target – e.g. either by being fearful and upset or calm[46]. When the target responded to the hate speech and was afraid, e.g. either by bringing charges against the speaker or by changing his or her own behavior at some cost to him or herself, the speech was seen as more offensive and harmful and the speaker was rated to be more accountable than when the target did not respond or was calm[47]. The harm and accountability rating were highest when the target fearfully avoided the speaker and lowest when the target calmly ignored the speaker[48]. A fearful avoidant response was perceived as more offensive and harmful and less appropriate than a calm response of filing a complaint. A calm response involved action that was rated as the most appropriate response to hate speech; more appropriate than running away and doing nothing. When taking the setting into consideration, public speech was generally viewed as more offensive than private speech

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[45] Stone, Dan. 2004. 'Genocide as transgression'. European Journal of Social Theory Vol7NO.1(2004) pp.45-65.
[46] Jamieson, D. W., & Zanna, M. P. (1989). Need for structure in attitude formation and expression.In A. R. Pratkanis, S. J. Breckler, & A. G. Grenwald (Eds.), Attitude structure and function (pp.383-406). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
[47] Mullen, Gary A. 'Genocide and the Politics of Identity: Rwanda through the lens of Adorno'. (Philosophy Today 2006)50: 170-175.
[48] Cross, W. (1991). Shades of Black: Diversity in African American identity. Philadelphia:Temple University Press.

While Critical race theory is centrally concerned with the structures and relations that maintain ethnic inequality, it does not operate to the exclusion or disregard of other forms of injustice. It is recognized that no person has a single, simplistic unitary identity[49]. Intersectionality speaks to an understanding of the complex and multiple ways in which various systems of subordination can come together at the same time[50]. Adopting an intersectional framework allows for the exploration of differences within and between groups taking account of issues such as historical and socio-political context while still maintaining awareness of ethnic inequalities[51].Related to intersectionality is the concept of 'differential racialization which is concerned with the way in which dominant society racializes and gives focus to different minorities groups at different times to suit hegemonic arguments of racial superiority and inferiority.

Critical race theory saw the anomaly and predicted that the search of a new paradigm. This offered new way of thinking in mainly mass communication research and to a less extent in political science, sociology and among social scientists. According to Kuhn, this new agenda setting paradigm offered a fresh thinking on effects of mass media so that "familiar objects are seen in different light[52]."The interpretation of critical race theory by observing that "in choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issues but how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its position…the mass media

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[49] Hintjens, Helen M. 'Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda'. The Journal of Modern   African Studies VOL37 NO.2 (1999) pp.241-286.
[50] Wanyama F.O. The role of the Presidency in African Conflict P.G Okoth, B.A. Ogoth(ed) Conflict in Contemporary Africa(Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundations, 2000) pg30-43
[51] Stone, Dan. 2004. 'Genocide as transgression'. European Journal of Social Theory Vol7NO.1(2004) pp.45-65.
[52] Destexhe, Alain. 1994-1995. 'The Third Genocide'. Foreign Policy (97): 3-17.

may well determine the important issues that is, the media may set 'agenda' of the campaign[53].
Setting the agenda for coverage focuses on changes overtime in the salience of issues on (a) the
media agenda (b) the public agenda and (c) the policy agenda. Proponents of this theory argue
that the media sets the agenda for the society and people always rely on the media for guidance
on issues that are important.21 There are three concepts under critical race theory that will help
the study in uncovering what happened to the media in both the Rwanda Genocide as well as the
Kenya post-election Violence in 2007/2008.

1.8 Research Methodology

The research design used in this research is a descriptive analysis. The method used for the study
was content analysis. This is a natural way of finding out the natural world and understands the
way people interpret it. This was the most appropriate method for the researcher to gain more
detailed information on the reconciliation. The data collection method entails a careful planning
of what the researcher seeks to analysis available research and describe the role of the radio in
the perpetrating conflict in Kenya's 2007-2008 and Rwanda's 1994. This is a method of
collecting information by reviewing past research and literature within the view of subjectivist
approach which applies qualitative methods using a humanistic, interpretivist and
phenomenological approach. This approach relies on data collection from past research in light
of the human perspective and therefore involves collecting feelings, emotions and perceptions
when interpreting phenomenon under study regarding the radio's role in hate speech, conflict and
peacebuilding.

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[53] Iyengar,S. and D.R. Kinder (1987), News that matter: Television and America opinion, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press.

Sampling Design, Research Instruments and Data Collection

For this study, the sampling method used was non-probability purposive sampling. Owing to the nature of the study, past research and case study analysis was used to collect data. Purposive heterogeneity sampling is a method that aims at getting a sample research and case studies with similar characteristics or traits. The past cases and research were between 1992-2013. The selection of this approach in selecting the cases to include in the study was important due to the need to establish the role of radio in hate speech.

Data Analysis Procedures

The method that was used to analyse the collected data was discourse analysis. Critical discourse analysis is the main focus of this data analysis model and it has a focus past language to greater practical conclusions from the collected data. Socially-recognizable identity is the focus of the study as well as the way different people interpret their world. Using the model, it is possible to establish how the people from the target culture translate the influence of their culture or ethnicity to propagate conflicts. Thus, this model of discourse analysis is very appropriate to the analysis of the data collected in the study. This system helped to establish objectives in data. The data for this study will be obtained from secondary sources. The data will be descriptive. Guided by the objectives and premises of the study, the data will be arranged according to the major themes.

Limitation of the Study

The study focuses on the influence of media in fueling conflict and best practices to ensure effective conflict resolution using media in the Rwanda Genocide and Kenya post-election

Violence Case Studies. The research faced challenges that stemmed from ICC cases that are ongoing. The matter is still sensitive for discussion given that two journalists, Joshua Sang and Walter Barasa are facing trial at The Hague based court. Data from some radio stations was be difficult to collect owing to the CCK regulations. Long bureaucratic procedures involve while gathering information from the different Editors, media houses and government bodies. The study relied on the memories of editors, media experts, government representatives and senior journalists to collect data. Memories may fade after a while. In order to counter these challenges the researcher was persistent in collecting data from the various respondents. The study also counter checked information provided by respondents with the already available literature of the Rwanda Genocide and Kenya post-election violence.

1.9. Chapter Outline

Chapter One <u>Introduction</u>

This chapter introduces Hate Speech and Radio: Media and Hate Speech: A Comparative study of Kenya (2007 PEV) and the1994 Rwanda Genocide by first setting the broad context of the research study, the statement of the problem, justification, theoretical framework, literature review, hypotheses and the methodology of the study.

Chapter Two: <u>Hate Speech and Radio: An Overview</u>

This chapter provides the background of hate speech and radio within the conceptual understanding of hate speech, vernacular radio stations, mainstream radio stations, government radio stations and the media regulatory bodies

Chapter Three: <u>Critical Analysis of the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and 2007 PEV in Kenya</u>

This chapter looks at the role of the radio stations in hate messaging around the world. The

chapter highlights case of hate messaging in the radio with the emphasis on the cases in Rwanda and Kenya.

Chapter Four: Comparative analysis of the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and the 2007 PEV in Kenya

The chapter analyses the extent in which radio was used in fuelling the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and the 2007 PEV violence in Kenya, in light of the hypotheses and theoretical framework already stated

Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendation

This chapter provides conclusions of the study, gives recommendations and provides suggestions on areas for further study.

CHAPTER TWO

HATE SPEECH AND RADIO: AN OVERVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the background of hate speech and radio within the conceptual understanding of hate speech, vernacular radio stations, mainstream radio stations, government radio stations and the media regulatory bodies. The chapter builds on the background information on historical understanding of radio and hate speech to review the typologies of the role of the radio in conflict situations in Kenya 2007/2007 post-election violence and Rwanda 1994 genocide.

2.2. The Role of Speech in Violent Conflicts

The most extreme expression of hate crime is genocide and, as noted by Barbara Perry in the chapter '*Hate crime: contexts and consequences*', and quoted by Yiek underscores that in many cases hate crimes have been part of the process[54]. The November 1938 Kristallnacht, a pogrom involving the destruction and looting of Jewish shops and synagogues, and the killing of at least 91 Jews in Germany and Austria, was a particularly striking example, being part of the process of steadily escalating violence that led to the Holocaust[55]. As part of a dynamic of genocide, hate speech will often be a first stage in a process of identifying a community as the 'other' in order to establish violence directed to a specific target as acceptable within a community, it is

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[54] Yieke, Felicia A. 2008. The Discursive Construction of Ethnicity: The Case of the 2007 Kenyan General Election. Paper read at Governing the African Public Sphere, at Yaounde, Cameroun
[55] Calvert, C. (1997), Hate Speech and its harms: A communicative perspective. Journal of Communication, 47, 4-19.

necessary to begin a process of identifying that target as not being protected by the usual social rules of behaviour[56].

In situations of tension involving minorities or indigenous peoples, acts which have a heavy charge of cultural symbolism have the potential to trigger conflict if the underlying preconditions are already there, such as the revocation of language rights for a linguistic minority[57]. Hate crimes can also include desecration of cultural, spiritual or historical heritage. In such cases, the intent may be the same as for attacks on civilians: to identify who are 'insiders' and 'outsiders', and reinforce a cycle of hatred and violence between them[58]. There is a distinction between hate crimes in the lead-up to conflict and war crimes committed against civilians on the basis of their ethnic or religious belonging within a conflict setting[59]. There may be key differences between the two not only in terms of scale – pre-conflict hate crimes may target only one or a small number of people whereas war crimes can include massacres and even genocidal events – but also motivation.

In the pre-conflict scenario, the intent may be to intimidate a section of the population, cowing them into seeing resistance as futile, provoking them into acts of retaliation, or wearing down moral and social inhibitions with regard to violence within the community[60]. Acts committed in a conflict environment, on the other hand, may have a more immediate tactical goal. However, in

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[56] Cowan, G., & Mettrick, J. (2002). The effects of target variables and setting on perceptions of hate speech. Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 32(2), 277-299.

[57] Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1985). The effect of an overheard ethnic slur on evaluations of the target: How to spread a social disease. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 61-72.

[58] Bayne, Sarah. 2008. Post-election Violence in Kenya: An Assessment for the UK Government. London: DFID Kenya-UK Government.

[59] Harnett-Sievers, Axel, and Ralph-Michael Peters. 2008. Kenya's 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks. Africa Spectrum 43 (1):133-144.

[60] Ismail, Jamal Abdi, and James Deane. 2008. The 2007 General Election in Kenya and Its Aftermath: The Role of Local Language Media. The International Journal of Press/Politics 13:319-327.

reality it is likely that these events will be part of a timeline in which it becomes difficult to discern exactly when peace-time ends and conflict begins, and vice versa. The power of language should not be underestimated in a conflict setting. Hate speech and hate crime can be used not just to exacerbate already existing tensions, but even to a certain extent to define how the battle lines are drawn.

In the Central African Republic, for instance, there was no specific history of religious violence in that country; but after militia attacks and atrocities began, the respective communities were increasingly seen by the other side as complicit – hence reciprocated violence became increasingly widespread[61]. Hate-motivated acts of sexual violence committed in conflict as documented in countries including Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Colombia and Nepal illustrate how blurred these lines can be[62]. In some cases it may simply be about cementing in place the mechanics of hatred between both victims and perpetrators. Such acts are intended to increase fear and submission within the targeted community or, alternatively, to provoke a response. They can also have the effect of dehumanizing perpetrators, increasing the cost of choosing not to participate or to withdraw.

For child soldiers who are forced to commit atrocities against civilians, particularly in their own communities, it becomes more difficult for them to conceive of the possibility of defecting and attempting to reintegrate into society[63]. The continuum can also continue in the other direction,

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[61] Yieke, Felicia A. 2008. The Discursive Construction of Ethnicity: The Case of the 2007 Kenyan General Election. Paper read at Governing the African Public Sphere, at Yaounde, Cameroun
[62] Cowan, G., & Mettrick, J. (2002). The effects of target variables and setting on perceptions of hate speech. Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 32(2), 277-299.
[63] Calvert, C. (1997), Hate Speech and its harms: A communicative perspective. Journal of Communication, 47, 4-19.

from conflict to peace-time, with continued incidents of hate crimes in the post-conflict environment – for example, in Northern Ireland or Bosnia and Herzegovina reflecting insufficiently resolved tensions between communities[64]. Because of the fragility of post-conflict settlements, there is a significant risk that hate crimes will tip the situation back into conflict, particularly given that the language of hate speech can remain in currency for years, even decades.

In addition, peace agreements often fail to put in place adequate measures to tackle hate speech and crime, focusing rather on the make-up of political structures and division of material resources[65]. Armed groups, the actors most capable of carrying out hate crimes, may be inadequately disarmed, partly because of the so-called 'security dilemma', a lack of trust on both sides leads armed groups to do everything they can to retain weapons[66].

Hate speech and propaganda occur in all societies, to radically varying degrees. And while the 1948 UN Genocide Convention criminalized "incitement to genocide," discerning precisely when speech rises to that level and the potential danger even of speech that does not rise to that level, as well as how to respond in either case, is fraught with contention[67]. To help address the lack of sufficient research and documentation to discern how and when precisely speech, understood broadly to include print media, radio, television, and new technologies, as well as public speaking, relates to the occurrence of genocidal violence. The Holocaust, political

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[64] Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1985). The effect of an overheard ethnic slur on evaluations of the target: How to spread a social disease. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 61-72.
[65] Bayne, Sarah. 2008. Post-election Violence in Kenya: An Assessment for the UK Government. London: DFID Kenya-UK Government.
[66] Harnett-Sievers, Axel, and Ralph-Michael Peters. 2008. Kenya's 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks. Africa Spectrum 43 (1):133-144.
[67] Kenyan Police Sets Up Center to Monitor Hate Speech. 2007. Daily Nation (Internet Version-WWW), December 2, 2007.

violence and the genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 are among the most studied examples of international criminal prosecutions for propaganda and incitement of mass violence against civilians, but both cases raise as many questions as they answer[68].

2.3 Hate Speech and Targeted Violence

Decades of research and hundreds of studies using complementary methodologies demonstrate a clear causal link between exposure to media violence and interpersonal aggression, from media of all kinds – including video, music, pictures, and text[69]. Violent political rhetoric is also cross-national. For example, in a 2010 British campaign speech in Northern Ireland, soon-to-be Prime Minister David Cameron used the word "fight" 19 times in about 90 seconds, e.g. "We're fighting for people," and "Join us in this fight,"[70] (Cameron 5/4/2010). Even Ghandi used violent metaphors while explicitly swearing off actual violence in his famous "Quit India" speech. Media violence effects work through priming: cues activate aggressive cognitive and emotional structures in memory, making aggressive responses more accessible[71].

Although political speech may not seem as explicit or compelling as most forms of violent entertainment, psychologists have found that violent text is sufficient to promote aggression even when the text is presented subliminally[72]. Theoretically, then, violent political rhetoric can

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[68] Carey, J. W. (1989). Communication as culture: Essays on media and society. New York, NY: Routledge.
[69] Cowan, G., & Mettrick, J. (2002). The effects of target variables and setting on perceptions of hate speech. Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 32(2), 277-299.
[70] Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1985). The effect of an overheard ethnic slur on evaluations of the target: How to spread a social disease. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 61-72.
[71] Jamieson, D. W., & Zanna, M. P. (1989). Need for structure in attitude formation and expression.In A. R. Pratkanis, S. J. Breckler, & A. G. Grenwald (Eds.), Attitude structure and function (pp.383-406). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
[72] Bayne, Sarah. 2008. Post-election Violence in Kenya: An Assessment for the UK Government. London: DFID Kenya-UK Government.

produce the same psychological dynamics as violent entertainment[73]. The libertarian view holds that freedom of speech takes precedence over all other rights because all rights depend on the existence of an effective right to dissent. From this view, the harmful effects of hate propaganda are not deemed to be sufficiently grave to justify the imposition of restrictions on freedom of speech. The opposing egalitarian view, however holds that restrictions on hate-mongering are necessary in order to protect minority groups from pain and suffering and in order to promote inter-group harmony in the society. From the egalitarian view, all persons and groups must be protected equally against the promotion of hatred and against defamatory attacks that deny their right to human dignity. Additionally, hate propaganda has no redeeming social value and is inherently harmful both to target groups and the societal order. Therefore restrictions on freedom of expression explicitly designed to curb the hate-mongering represent reasonable limits.

Previous studies indicate that derogation of members of less empowered groups is seen as more prejudiced than such behaviour directed toward more empowered groups. In a study, it is evident that whether the speech was public or private and the behavioural response of the target (target responds or ignored the speech)[74]. In regards to participant variables, Caucasian men found the speech less offensive and the message sender less accountable. In the public setting with a response occurring, the speech in Rwanda and Kenya situations was perceived as more offensive than when no response occurred[75]. Conversely, in the private setting, no response by the target lead to higher offensiveness rating than when the target responded. In regards to accountability

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[73] Calvert, C. (1997), Hate Speech and its harms: A communicative perspective. Journal of Communication, 47, 4-19.

[74] Harnett-Sievers, Axel, and Ralph-Michael Peters. 2008. Kenya's 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks. Africa Spectrum 43 (1):133-144.

[75] Yieke, Felicia A. 2008. The Discursive Construction of Ethnicity: The Case of the 2007 Kenyan General Election. Paper read at Governing the African Public Sphere, at Yaounde, Cameroun

in the public condition, the speaker was rated more accountable when the speech lead to a behavioural response than when it did not[76]. However, the accountability ratings were not different for response versus no response in the private condition.

Hate propaganda creates the perceptions of hate speech by adding in the emotional response of the target – e.g. either by being fearful and upset or calm[77]. When the target responded to the hate speech and was afraid, e.g. either by bringing charges against the speaker or by changing his or her own behaviour at some cost to him or herself, the speech was seen as more offensive and harmful and the speaker was rated to be more accountable than when the target did not respond or was calm. The harm and accountability rating were highest when the target fearfully avoided the speaker and lowest when the target calmly ignored the speaker[78]. A fearful avoidant response was perceived as more offensive and harmful and less appropriate than a calm response of filing a complaint. A calm response involved action that was rated as the most appropriate response to hate speech; more appropriate than running away and doing nothing. When taking the setting into consideration, public speech was generally viewed as more offensive than private speech[79].

2.4 The Harms of Hate Speech

Previous studies suggested that hate messages cause emotional distress and a restriction on people's personal freedom. Targets have quit jobs, forgone education, changed residences,

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[76] Carey, J. W. (1989). Communication as culture: Essays on media and society. New York, NY: Routledge.

[77] Jamieson, D. W., & Zanna, M. P. (1989). Need for structure in attitude formation and expression.In A. R. Pratkanis, S. J. Breckler, & A. G. Grenwald (Eds.), Attitude structure and function (pp.383-406). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

[78] Cross, W. (1991). Shades of Black: Diversity in African American identity. Philadelphia:Temple University Press.

[79] EU, Election Observation Mission. 2008. Kenya: Final Report General Elections 27 December 2007. European Union.

avoided public places and modified their behaviour[80]. Furthermore, hate messages lead to lower personal self-esteem and a lessened sense of security. Maina Kiai studied the perceptions of targets related to the reception of anti-Semitism and antigay speech. She discovered that hate speech lead to short- and long term consequences which are similar in nature to the effects of other types of traumatic experiences[81]. This implies that the impact of hate speech is attributed to ignorance, repressed hostility and social learning. The motives of hate speech are described as enduring and not situational states. Cowan and Metrick documented the experience of being the target of hate speech in public places by focusing on racist and sexist hate speech. The targets faced a range of experiences involving subtle derogatory speech and the victims were unaware of its occurrence. Such experiences occur regularly and leave targets harmed in significant ways[82]. Racist speech caused targets to reflect on the subordinate social status, to fear their safety and sometimes engage in violent behaviour. Furthermore sexist speech caused women to be uncomfortable and afraid to be in public. Thus, unwanted sexually suggestive speech is an effective mechanism for reinforcing the dominant position of men over women in public.

Carey separated the harms of hate speech into two forms based on the model of transmission and ritual models of communications. The transmission model involves the direct harm of hate speech to the target and ritual model refers to the harm of societal subordination of minorities as a group[83]. Hate speech can also affect the observer of the speech. Political leaders regularly

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[80] Kiai, Maina. Speech, Power, and Violence: Hate Speech and the Political Crisis in Kenya. KNCHR, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. 2007. "Still Behaving Badly": Second Periodic Report of the Election-Monitoring Project. Nairobi: Kenya

[81] Kiai, Maina. Speech, Power, and Violence: Hate Speech and the Political Crisis in Kenya. KNCHR, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. 2007. "Still Behaving Badly": Second Periodic Report of the Election-Monitoring Project. Nairobi: Kenya

[82] Cowan, G., & Mettrick, J. (2002). The effects of target variables and setting on perceptions of hate speech. Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 32(2), 277-299.

[83] Carey, J. W. (1989). Communication as culture: Essays on media and society. New York, NY: Routledge.

mobilize aggressive responses in audiences. Given the important state goal of minimizing aggression in society, the role of political leaders in stoking aggressive responses in citizens may be of some concern. There is a dark irony in this hidden conflict of interests[84]. But whatever positive effects leaders seek when employing violent metaphors, whether support for themselves, for policies, or for political mobilization, are offset by the implications of violent language for political violence support.

Hate speech embodies mild rhetorical devices push some citizens to a level of hostility in which they openly wish physical harm on political leaders, contravening vital norms that enable democratic government to function[85]. Yet, it is difficult to imagine a workable solution for addressing this problem with constitutionally-protected speech, beyond self-restraint by leaders. The evidence here might be sufficient to make political leaders think twice before infusing violent language into speeches and ads, particularly in situations when their audiences are already boiling over with hostility.

The underlying impact of hate speech reflects the ideological neutrality of political violence. Most of the recent concern about violent rhetoric and support for political violence is being voiced by partisans on the ideological left, focused on the words and behavior of the political right[86]. However, American politics has been plagued by violence instigated by all extremes of the ideological spectrum in different political times. The language used in the experimental

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[84] Jamieson, D. W., & Zanna, M. P. (1989). Need for structure in attitude formation and expression. In A. R. Pratkanis, S. J. Breckler, & A. G. Grenwald (Eds.), Attitude structure and function (pp.383-406). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

[85] Chaiken, S., & Eagly, A. H. (1978). Communication modality as a determinant of message persuasiveness and message comprehensibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 605-614.

[86] Dovidio, J., & Gaertner, S. (1998). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The causes, consequences, and challenges of aversive racism. In J.L. Eberhardt & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Confronting racism: The problem and the response (pp. 3-32). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

studies is mild and utterly common. It does not use vivid details of specific violent acts, and the metaphorical targets are public policy problems like unemployment and goals like justice and equal opportunity[87].

Moreover, although not ubiquitous, this type of rhetoric is extremely common. The result mirrors the findings from media violence research in which mild forms of entertainment violence and even subliminal violent text increase interpersonal hostility and aggression in audiences[88]. If mild violent rhetoric increases support for political violence, how does the public respond to more extreme violent rhetoric and to language that specifically targets government and politicians? Media violence research indicates that vivid accounts of graphic violence evoke aggressive behavior more strongly than weaker depictions[89].

2.5 Radio and Hate Speech

Debates about hate speech regularly cover radio presentation have reasonable chance of catalyzing or amplifying violence by one group against another. Political scientists have constructed a model underlying qualitative variables to discern the dangers of speech, offering a useful model for analyzing hate speech case studies[90]. These include the level of a speaker's influence, the grievances or fears of the audience, whether or not the speech act is understood as a call to violence, the social and historical context, and the way in which the speech is

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[87] Rothbart, Daniel, and Tom Bartlett. 2007. Rwandan Radio Broadcasts and Hutu/Tutsi Positioning. In Global Conflict Resolution through Positioning Analysis, edited by F. M. Moghaddam, R. Harre and N. Lee. New York: Springer.
[88] EU, Election Observation Mission. 2008. Kenya: Final Report General Elections 27 December 2007. European Union.
[89] Cross, W. (1991). Shades of Black: Diversity in African American identity. Philadelphia:Temple University Press.
[90] Dovidio, J., & Gaertner, S. (1998). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The causes, consequences, and challenges of aversive racism. In J.L. Eberhardt & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Confronting racism: The problem and the response (pp. 3-32). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

disseminated[91]. Rwanda and Kenya, both countries that have experienced considerable violence in the past two decades, are useful case studies to discern when and how hate speech becomes dangerous speech.

The inflammatory role of the radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (Radio RTLM) in the Rwandan genocide has been widely documented, and offers a definitive example of dangerous speech. "The radio encouraged people to participate because it said 'the enemy is the Tutsi,'" remarked one genocide survivor. "If the radio had not declared things, people would not have gone into the attacks"[92]. Such views have since been backed up by quantitative evidence, showing how hate speech from Radio RTLM increased participation in genocidal violence. In a study on Rwanda, David Yanagizawa-Drott, a political scientist from Harvard, used datasets on genocidal violence from over one thousand villages to discern the impact of radio coverage on participation in violence. His findings are instructive for scholars studying hate speech. In communities that had complete radio coverage, civilian violence increased by sixty-five percent and organized violence by seventy-seven percent. Overall, he estimates that nine percent of genocidal deaths, or the deaths of forty-five thousand Tutsis, can be attributed to violent acts incited by Radio RTLM. This statistic indicates the power of dangerous speech to translate words into actions, the consequences of which can be fatal for those living in violent environments.

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[91] Chaiken, S., & Eagly, A. H. (1978). Communication modality as a determinant of message persuasiveness and message comprehensibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 605-614.

[92] Jamieson, D. W., & Zanna, M. P. (1989). Need for structure in attitude formation and expression.In A. R. Pratkanis, S. J. Breckler, & A. G. Grenwald (Eds.), Attitude structure and function (pp.383-406). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

To prevent dangerous speech, perpetrators must be held accountable – a task that requires concrete proof that speech can be shown to induce violence[93]. There are legal precedents for this, including the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, where prosecutors found members of Radio RTLM guilty of calling "explicitly for the extermination of the Tutsi ethnic group." The International Criminal Court (ICC) is currently dealing with its first case of dangerous speech, involving Kenyan radio broadcaster Joshua Arap Sang. After the widespread post-election violence in 2007 and 2008, Sang was one of four Kenyans called to trial by the ICC for crimes against humanity. A broadcaster for the Kalenjin language radio station Kass, Sang is the only defendant who is not a politician (both the current president Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice-President William Ruto have also been indicted), making his case particularly interesting for scholars concerned with free speech. He was charged with murder, deportation or forcible transfer of a population, and persecution.

Commencing on May 28th, Sang's trial is an important litmus test of the ICC's ability to prove the correlation between speech and violent actions. On many fronts, Sang's case seems to fulfill Benesch's requirements as an example of dangerous speech. As a speaker, he holds considerable clout with the Kalenjin ethnic community. His show reaches a daily Kenyan audience of four and a half million and further listeners in the Kalenjin diaspora. His audience also had particular grievances, as they believed the election had been rigged against Raila Odinga, the candidate supported by most Kalenjin. The manner of Sang's speech is also argued to be a call to arms[94].

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[93] Kruglanski, A. W. (1990). Motivations of judging and knowing: Implications for causal attribution. In E. T. Higgins and R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of Social behaviour (Vol. 2, pp. 333-368). New York: Guilford.

[94] Dovidio, J., & Gaertner, S. (1998). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The causes, consequences, and challenges of aversive racism. In J.L. Eberhardt & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Confronting racism: The problem and the response (pp. 3-32). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

He is linked to statements such as "the war has begun" and "the people of the milk" should "cut the grass," colloquial terms referring to the cattle-raising Kalenjin (Sang's ethnic group) and the agricultural Kikuyu (the ethnic group that was targeted by Sang's supporters). The social-historical context also favoured conflict, as Kenya has experienced violence during every election since 1992, and the Kalenjin and Kikuyu have long-term disputes over land. Finally, the radio is a powerful tool of communication in Kenya, as it is the main media source available in vernacular languages, and is thus more accessible than other forms of media to citizens who are less educated or live in rural areas[95].

Though Sang's case seems to fit the categorization of dangerous speech, the outcome of his trial is far from definite. Unlike the case with RTLM in Rwanda, few transcripts of Kass's radio program during the election exist. According to Human Rights Watch, the hate speech on Kass stemmed largely from guest speakers, not broadcasters, blurring the lines of guilt[96]. Sang is adamant about his innocence, and has drawn on the principle of free speech to defend himself. As quoted in Keith Somerville's Radio Propaganda and the Broadcasting of Hatred (2012), Sang argues that a guilty verdict would have a deleterious effect on free speech: "If they take me to The Hague and I know that I was doing my job professionally, then what are they telling journalists?" The outcome of Sang's trial will likely have a major impact on the freedom of vernacular radio stations in Kenya, and contribute to wider understandings of dangerous speech in violent contexts[97]. Ultimately, more research and debates on discerning the difference between

[95] Chaiken, S., & Eagly, A. H. (1978). Communication modality as a determinant of message persuasiveness and message comprehensibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 605-614.

[96] Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. New York: Pantheon.

[97] Gachigua, Sammy Gakero. 2008. Displays of Might, Glitz, and Deceit: What was the Print Media's Role in Kenya's Volatile 2007 Post-Election Violence. Paper read at Governing the African Public Sphere, at Yaounde, Cameroun.

hate speech and dangerous speech is necessary. Whether in Rwanda, Kenya or other countries that have recently experienced massive violence, clarifying the category of dangerous speech is a vital endeavor[98]. Determining when, why and how speech serves as a springboard to violence remains a challenging yet crucial issue in debates about free speech and efforts to prevent violence.

2.6 Radio as a Tool for Hate Messages

By the virtue that mass media reaches large number of audience makes it the first choice for political propaganda and hate speech. According to tenets of dangerous speech influential medium (mass media) is more likely to catalyze mass violence as opposed to less influential outlets[99]. Through mass media inflammatory public speech rises steadily before outbreaks of mass violence suggesting that it is a precursor or even a prerequisite for violence, which makes sense: groups of killers do not form spontaneously. Benesch notes that in most cases, a few influential speakers using mediums with wider outreach incite people to violence[100].

In 1994 during Rwanda Genocide, RTML referred to Tustis are "cockroaches" and moderate Hutus as "traitors" thus justifying why they deserved to die. In Kenya, Kass FM reffered to Kikuyus in the Rift Valley as "Madoadoa" meaning "dirt" that deserved removal[101]. The spread

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[98] Kruglanski, A. W. (1990). Motivations of judging and knowing: Implications for causal attribution. In E. T. Higgins and R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of Social behaviour (Vol. 2, pp. 333-368). New York: Guilford.

[99] IREC, Independent Review Commission. 2008. Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections held in Kenya on 27 December 2007. Nairobi.

[100] Kruglanski, A. W. (1990). Motivations of judging and knowing: Implications for causal attribution. In E. T. Higgins and R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of Social behaviour (Vol. 2, pp. 333-368). New York: Guilford.

[101] Gachigua, Sammy Gakero. 2008. Displays of Might, Glitz, and Deceit: What was the Print Media's Role in Kenya's Volatile 2007 Post-Election Violence. Paper read at Governing the African Public Sphere, at Yaounde, Cameroun.

and further escalation of violence in both Rwanda and Kenya was facilitated by Radio transmissions. As such, violence spill-over from hotspots to the peripheral areas occurred through media coordination in both cases from the activities of RTML and Kass FM. It is therefore little wonder that media personnel in these two cases were held and tried as suspects and charged with hate crime[102].

In some instances media does not have to refer to a particular ethnic community directly but by use of images and symbolizes the community in question with the object of ridicule and demeaning sarcasm. For instances, Kikuyus would be called hyenas from the famous phrase "the hyenas' have eaten one of their own" after Kenyatta regime assassinated JM Karuiki was also a kikuyu[103]. The hyena here symbolizes greed or avarice. The Kikuyu's would just metion "fish" when referring to Luos whose staple food is fish. "Raila Odinga should know that Nairobi Stock Eachange is not a FISH market" was a demeaning statement made by Hon Amos Kimunya, minister for Finance in 2007(NTV, July 2007)[104].

For media to fulfill its role of providing the public with information, the fourth estate has to be objective, non-partisan, and conduct its business in a manner consistent with media code of conduct and ethics(MCK: Media Code of Conduct and ethics, 2007,3). It is however challenging for media to be owned by a political establishment or politician and still be objective so as to ensure accurate and balanced coverage of political stories. In most cases political ownership of

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[102] Chaiken, S., & Eagly, A. H. (1978). Communication modality as a determinant of message persuasiveness and message comprehensibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 605-614.

[103] Dovidio, J., & Gaertner, S. (1998). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The causes, consequences, and challenges of aversive racism. In J.L. Eberhardt & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Confronting racism: The problem and the response (pp. 3-32). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

[104]Cowan, G., & Hodge, C. (1996). Judgments of hate speech: he effects of target group, Hate Propaganda publicness, and behavioral responses of the target. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 26, 355-374.

media creates partisanship with disastrous effects. As Henry Maina observes "Rwanda presents the most extreme examples of how the relationship between a government, the media and politics can go horribly wrong"[105].

Given the prominence of negative speech in the Kenyan conflict, any analysis of the case requires attention to the relations among speech, power, and violence characterizing the situation, even as it must resist the tendency to assume that hate speech caused the violence[106]. Rather, the precise role played by hate speech is best explored in context. Only through appreciating the contextual specificity of speech in relation to violence in the Kenyan case and others can the implications for prevention, redress, and reconciliation be determined[107]. Responses taken in Rwanda for instance, such as prosecutions for incitement through hate speech or criminalizing the use of ethnic terms, might be less effective in the Kenyan context. Accordingly, my discussion focuses on the role of local context in shaping the effects and implications of hate speech. The circumstances of the 2007 Kenyan election violence and the claims made about the role of hate speech in particular. A subsequent section offers a theoretical approach to speech, power, and violence that emphasizes context as shaping the meaning and implications of speech[108].

In order to even begin to think about prevention of violence through prohibiting hate speech, we need to identify the phenomenon at issue. Hate speech, hateful speech, and negative speech, as

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[105] Leets, L. (1999). A cultural perspective on racist speech harm. Paper presented at the 49th International Communication Association, San Francisco.

[106] Ndungu, Njoki S. 2008. Kenya: The December 2007 Election Crisis. Mediterrean Quarterly 19 (4):111-121.

[107] Gachigua, Sammy Gakero. 2008. Displays of Might, Glitz, and Deceit: What was the Print Media's Role in Kenya's Volatile 2007 Post-Election Violence. Paper read at Governing the African Public Sphere, at Yaounde, Cameroun.

[108] Haddock, G., Zanna, M. P., & Esses, V. M. (1993). The (limited) role of trait-based stereotypes in predicting attitudes toward Native Peoples. Manuscript submitted for publication.

used above, are general terms for epithets, ethnic slurs, insulting language, name-calling, derogatory references, inciteful speech, and many other forms of language that marginalize and denigrate. But defining hate speech precisely is a tricky problem. The same phrase that one might use in a self-deprecating joke can be heard as denigrating when uttered by someone of a different ethnicity[109]. Joking about ethnicity is more common in some societies than others and can take different forms depending on the cultural and linguistic conventions that guide both humor and insult[110].

2.7 Theorizing Hate Speech

To acknowledge that the power of certain utterances varies depending on the context is not a trivial observation. Communications, especially in situations of ethnic, political, class, and gender diversity, are complex and fluid endeavors. In Kenya and elsewhere, language is integral to the construction of these categories and constitutive of relations of identity and difference[111]. The attribution of a negative characteristic to a politician hailing from a particular ethnic group positions oneself (one's own ethnic group, and the politicians from one's group) as possessing more positive traits[112]. Research documents how utterances that urged people from particular ethnic groups to return to their region of origin expressed a "politics of inclusion and exclusion" that related directly to longstanding land disputes and the movement of ethnic groups[113]. Certain references were not newly invented for the election violence but rather resembled statements

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[109] Cowan, G., & Hodge, C. (1996). Judgments of hate speech: he effects of target group, Hate Propaganda publicness, and behavioral responses of the target. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 26, 355-374.
[110] Gould, Jon B. 2005. Speak No Evil: The Triumph of Hate Speech Regulation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[111] Gould, Jon B. 2005. Speak No Evil: The Triumph of Hate Speech Regulation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[112] IREC, Independent Review Commission. 2008. Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections held in Kenya on 27 December 2007. Nairobi.
[113] Leets, L. (1999). A cultural perspective on racist speech harm. Paper presented at the 49th International Communication Association, San Francisco.

made about people from surrounding nations who had entered Kenya as refugees or economic migrants and were no longer welcome. These individuals castigated as were clearly positioned as having no entitlement to Kenyan residence[114]. Using such terms in reference to Kenyan citizens has the effect of suggesting that they too can be disenfranchised from civil rights, land, residence, and even identity as Kenyans. Note here that seemingly ordinary terms such as foreigner and visitor gain hurtful power when used in a context of xenophobia or ethnic mobilization[115].

The mix of competing approaches to major issues like land and the personal rivalries combined with huge economic/social inequality and major grievances among key communities to provide a wealth of combustible material that only needed a spark to ignite substantial conflict[116]. Behind it all was a deep well of frustration, anger and deprivation among poor Kenyans of all communities a well that politicians could draw from to maintain or extend their own ambitions and privileges and damage those of their political opponents. The grievances could be exploited to build votes, intimidate opponents or fight an unwanted election result[117].

The hardening of oppositional perspectives, especially the use of dehumanizing language, presents a moment ripe for intervening to prevent violence. Prior to the Rwandan genocide, extensive radio broadcasts using dehumanized images served to indoctrinate some of those who carried out the violence. Such uses of language offer a key warning sign that the groups might be

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[114] Ismail, Jamal Abdi, and James Deane. 2008. The 2007 General Election in Kenya and Its Aftermath: The Role of Local Language Media. The International Journal of Press/Politics 13:319-327.

[115] National Commission on Human Rights. 2008. On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya's Post-2007 Election Violence. Nairobi: KNHRC, Kenya National Human Rights Commission.

[116] Mute, Lawrence M. 2008. Kenya: Legislation, Hate Speech, and Freedom of Expression. All Africa, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200810240331.html>.

[117] Haddock, G., Zanna, M. P., & Esses, V. M. (1993). The (limited) role of trait-based stereotypes in predicting attitudes toward Native Peoples. Manuscript submitted for publication.

poised for violence[118]. But with respect to Kenya apparently axiological hate speech has a rather shallow history. Strict dualistic oppositions have been relevant in certain moments or contexts, such as the famous rivalries between Kikuyu and Luo or Kalenjin and Kikuyu. However, the multiplicity of groups and a history of cross-cutting alliances has meant that axiological dehumanization has never been sustained on a large scale or over time. Although many uses of negative ethnic speech may not have risen to the legal level of incitement of physical violence, it is important not to underestimate or diminish the "violence" that hateful speech can do to relationships among people. Even in instances where physical violence did not occur, hateful speech likely created deep societal and interpersonal ruptures[119]. These debilitating effects will need to be attended to in the aftermath of the violence, even if the relation between hate speech and violence is not viewed as directly causal.

The instigation of and specific calls for criminal acts, such as genocide, is not likely to be successful unless a climate of violence has first been created by means of hate speech. Such a climate is achieved primarily through the demonization and dehumanization of opponents, which invariably involves a violation of their human dignity through a process of humiliation equivalent to the victim group's expulsion from the human community. Vicious and systematic state-orchestrated hate speech and propaganda must be criminalized, both because they violate human dignity, which in turn is closely connected with an infringement of the victim group's right to life, equality, and nondiscrimination, and because of the inherent danger grounded in hate speech's crucial position on the continuum of destruction. Hate speech is an integral and

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[118] Cowan, G., & Hodge, C. (1996). Judgments of hate speech: he effects of target group, Hate Propaganda publicness, and behavioral responses of the target. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 26, 355-374.
[119] Mwalongo, Rose. 2008. Spreading the `word of hate` in Kenya. Guardian, January 26, 2008.

crucial part of any persecutory process; it plays its part through the psychological conditioning of the perpetrators.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed a historical overview of hate speech and the media from historical perspective. History shows that hate speech typically precedes public incitement to violence and specific criminal acts, including genocide. All are part of and support an organized system of persecution that includes a variety of measures. The chapter has offered the background of hate speech and radio within the conceptual understanding of hate speech, vernacular radio stations, mainstream radio stations, government radio stations and the media regulatory bodies.

CHAPTER THREE

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 1994 RWANDA GENOCIDE AND 2007 PEV IN KENYA

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter provided the background of hate speech and radio within the conceptual understanding of hate speech, vernacular radio stations, mainstream radio stations, government radio stations and the media regulatory bodies. This chapter analyses the role of the radio stations in hate messaging around the world. The chapter highlights case of hate messaging in the radio with the emphasis on the cases in Rwanda and Kenya.

3.2 Media and Conflict in General

Conflict is a never ending phenomenon in modern international relations. Thomas and Lee refer to conflict as: Clashes over economic and political principles that are debated and fought over in the corridors of power in local, national and international arenas, and the real bloody battles in the cause of God and country, nation and ethnic group in the killing fields[120]. In fact in the last ten years, over two million children have died in conflicts, more than one million have been orphaned and more than six million have been disabled or seriously injured[121].

Conflicts exacerbate poverty, displaces a number of households, bring massive human suffering, destroy the environment. A few of the conflicts have attracted the attention of the international community. Despite numerous incidents of conflicts world over, little is understood about the

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[120] Mwalongo, Rose. 2008. Spreading the `word of hate` in Kenya. Guardian, January 26, 2008
[121] Leets, L. (1999). A cultural perspective on racist speech harm. Paper presented at the 49th International Communication Association, San Francisco.

internal triggers of any given conflict. "We still do not know how the instability or ethnic tension that marks many societies can suddenly escalate into organized violence."[122]

Radio often plays a key role in conflict. The media can be part of the conflict by helping increase violence or stay out of the conflict and contribute towards peaceful resolution. Combatants seek to prevent information about their human rights abuses reaching the general public. Political leaders frequently disseminate biased or manipulated information in order to mobilise public support for their conflict goals. In some cases the media, motivated by patriotism, publishes deliberately distorted information. Persistent misinformation is a powerful factor in entrenching feelings of mutual hatred between communities. This increases the obstacles which have to be overcome in peace processes and hinders conflict resolution.[123] Some conflicts have been elevated to the international platform through the media coverage while other conflicts in Africa have gone unnoticed. International Media Support (IMS) observes that African conflicts like the wars in Congo since 1997, Angola's civil war and other conflicts in Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia and Ivory Coast have not been noticed by the International community. The presence of media during conflict can complicate the issues but can also be helpful in resolving the conflict. Instances where the media has been instrumental in conflict resolution include the Serbian situation. Here, a United Kingdom based Independent Television News (ITN) covered the existence of detention camps in Omarska and Trnopolie. This coverage helped support the UN Resolution 770 which allowed all necessary measures in the delivery of humanitarian aid. In 1994, NATO was able to give an ultimatum on the bombardment of the city of Sarajevo

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[122] Kiai, Maina. Speech, Power, and Violence: Hate Speech and the Political Crisis in Kenya. KNCHR, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. 2007. "Still Behaving Badly": Second Periodic Report of the Election-Monitoring Project. Nairobi: Kenya

[123] In A. R. Pratkanis, S. J. Breckler, & A. G. Grenwald (Eds.), Attitude structure and function (pp.383-406). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

following the media coverage of the mortar bomb attack on the market. When covering conflicts media institutions face various constraints posed by governments, military, corporate pressure, and economic interests.

During the Rwandan genocide of 1994, radio was used as a tool to encourage hatred, to dehumanize 'others' and to incite the mass murder or targeted groups. It became infamous - the radio station was nicknamed radio machete. In Kenya in 2007-2008, local radio stations broadcast messages which incited violence, and for twelve years Nazi-controlled radio spewed out a constant stream of racial hatred against Jews, Russians and other Slavs. This set the agenda for genocide and the inhuman treatment of enemy peoples. This book gives a detailed account of the development of propaganda and the way radio transformed the delivery and impact of propaganda, making possible the use of hate broadcasting as a weapon.

The political and media discourses that were part of the Kenyan political process and which were accused by many of playing a major role in the violence reflects the criteria of representation (how social actors, events and institutions are represented within the discourse), framing (how actors and events are contextualized with a discourse, what level of prominence are they given) and assumed meanings. [124] The radio propagated hate speech from the basis that "every single instance of language use reproduces or transforms society and culture, including power relations...discourses are historical and can only be understood in relation to their context".[125]

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[124] Haddock, G., Zanna, M. P., & Esses, V. M. (1993). The (limited) role of trait-based stereotypes in predicting attitudes toward Native Peoples. Manuscript submitted for publication.
[125] Dovidio, J., & Gaertner, S. (1998). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The causes, consequences, and challenges of aversive racism. In J.L. Eberhardt & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Confronting racism: The problem and the response (pp. 3-32). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Of particular relevance will be the extent to which radio stations and the messages they broadcast had the effect of setting an agenda for their listeners over time and especially at periods of heightened tensions and the way in which framed their discourse and represented political/social actors. As Kellow and Steeves wrote in their study of the role of radio in the Rwandan genocide, framing is about selection and salience of content and in times of conflict or potential conflict might include depiction of risk or danger to the audience from others, dramatization of the conflict and inflation of the power or strength of opponents[126]. Events and perceptions are framed and agendas are identified and in this way for those engaging in the broadcasting of hate messages; "a media campaign is a conscious, structured attempt to use media to influence awareness, attitudes or behaviour". [127]

3.3 Radio and Hate Speech in Conflict

Hate speech embodies mild rhetorical devices push some citizens to a level of hostility in which they openly wish physical harm on political leaders, contravening vital norms that enable democratic government to function[128]. Yet, it is difficult to imagine a workable solution for addressing this problem with constitutionally-protected speech, beyond self-restraint by leaders. The evidence here might be sufficient to make political leaders think twice before infusing violent language into speeches and ads, particularly in situations when their audiences are already boiling over with hostility.

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[126] Carey, J. W. (1989). Communication as culture: Essays on media and society. New York, NY: Routledge.
[127] BBCWST, (2008), The Kenya 2007 elections and their Aftermath: The role of Media and Communication.
[128] Chaiken, S., & Eagly, A. H. (1978). Communication modality as a determinant of message persuasiveness and message comprehensibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 605-614.

The underlying impact of hate speech reflects the ideological neutrality of political violence. Most of the recent concern about violent rhetoric and support for political violence is being voiced by partisans on the ideological left, focused on the words and behavior of the political right[129]. However, American politics has been plagued by violence instigated by all extremes of the ideological spectrum in different political times. The language used in the experimental studies is mild and utterly common. It does not use vivid details of specific violent acts, and the metaphorical targets are public policy problems like unemployment and goals like justice and equal opportunity[130].

Moreover, although not ubiquitous, this type of rhetoric is extremely common. The result mirrors the findings from media violence research in which mild forms of entertainment violence and even subliminal violent text increase interpersonal hostility and aggression in audiences[131]. If mild violent rhetoric increases support for political violence, how does the public respond to more extreme violent rhetoric and to language that specifically targets government and politicians? Media violence research indicates that vivid accounts of graphic violence evoke aggressive behavior more strongly than weaker depictions.

Debates about hate speech regularly cover radio presentation have reasonable chance of catalyzing or amplifying violence by one group against another. Political scientists have constructed a model underlying qualitative variables to discern the dangers of speech, offering a

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[129] Dovidio, J., & Gaertner, S. (1998). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The causes, consequences, and challenges of aversive racism. In J.L. Eberhardt & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Confronting racism: The problem and the response (pp. 3-32). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

[130] Rothbart, Daniel, and Tom Bartlett. 2007. Rwandan Radio Broadcasts and Hutu/Tutsi Positioning. In Global Conflict Resolution through Positioning Analysis, edited by F. M. Moghaddam, R. Harre and N. Lee. New York: Springer.

[131] EU, Election Observation Mission. 2008. Kenya: Final Report General Elections 27 December 2007. European Union.

useful model for analyzing hate speech case studies[132]. These include the level of a speaker's influence, the grievances or fears of the audience, whether or not the speech act is understood as a call to violence, the social and historical context, and the way in which the speech is disseminated[133]. Rwanda and Kenya, both countries that have experienced considerable violence in the past two decades, are useful case studies to discern when and how hate speech becomes dangerous speech.

The inflammatory role of the radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (Radio RTLM) in the Rwandan genocide has been widely documented, and offers a definitive example of dangerous speech. "The radio encouraged people to participate because it said 'the enemy is the Tutsi,'" remarked one genocide survivor. "If the radio had not declared things, people would not have gone into the attacks"[134]. Such views have since been backed up by quantitative evidence, showing how hate speech from Radio RTLM increased participation in genocidal violence. In a study on Rwanda, David Yanagizawa-Drott, a political scientist from Harvard, used datasets on genocidal violence from over one thousand villages to discern the impact of radio coverage on participation in violence. His findings are instructive for scholars studying hate speech. In communities that had complete radio coverage, civilian violence increased by sixty-five percent and organized violence by seventy-seven percent. Overall, he estimates that nine percent of genocidal deaths, or the deaths of forty-five thousand Tutsis, can be attributed to violent acts incited by Radio RTLM. This statistic indicates the power of dangerous speech to

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[132] Dovidio, J., & Gaertner, S. (1998). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The causes, consequences, and challenges of aversive racism. In J.L. Eberhardt & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Confronting racism: The problem and the response (pp. 3-32). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

[133] Chaiken, S., & Eagly, A. H. (1978). Communication modality as a determinant of message persuasiveness and message comprehensibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 605-614.

[134] Jamieson, D. W., & Zanna, M. P. (1989). Need for structure in attitude formation and expression. In A. R. Pratkanis, S. J. Breckler, & A. G. Grenwald (Eds.), Attitude structure and function (pp.383-406). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

translate words into actions, the consequences of which can be fatal for those living in violent environments.

3.4 Rwanda Genocide

The Rwanda genocide had the international media caught off guard. Kuperman gives four reasons why the International media failed in reporting the Genocide accurately.[135] First, He says Western reporting "mistook genocide for civil war." This is because there had been continued friction between the government led by majority Hutu and the rebels comprising of Tutsi. The Hutus forcefully took power from the Tutsi in the 1950's. Tutsi fled to neighbouring countries as refugees and so in the next three decades conflict continued to emerge between these two ethnic groups. This is why in 1994, the first reports of violence in Kigali Rwanda were termed as civil war and not genocide in the making. Even experts were slow to acknowledge the events unfolding in Rwanda. "Commander of Belgian peacekeepers stated on April 15 to Paris Radio France International that 'the fighting has…all but stopped.' Not even the rights groups were able to point out the possibility of genocide until April 19."[136]

In addition, the Rwanda Hutu government wanted reports to think that the violence was civil war and not genocide. Secondly, Kuperman observes that "the exodus of reporters was so thorough that it virtually halted Western press coverage." Most foreign national including journalists had left Rwanda in the wake of violence. Coverage of the genocide halted for four

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[135] Bayne, Sarah. 2008. Post-election Violence in Kenya: An Assessment for the UK Government. London: DFID Kenya-UK Government.

[136] Cowan, G., & Mettrick, J. (2002). The effects of target variables and setting on perceptions of hate speech. Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 32(2), pp.277-299

days starting on April 18 1994.[137] This was actually when the genocide reached its climax. Otiti agrees with Kuperman when he says "only a few reporters stayed in Rwanda, and even they had difficulty getting their media houses to see the importance or understand the story as it unfolded. Some of the remaining reporters did not get the truth for lack of informers and language difficulties."[138] Thirdly, there were gross underestimates of the number of casualties and the dead. Kuperman avers that by the second week of the genocide Western media was still quoting the number of dead as 'tens of thousands'. He says "the estimates did not rise to levels that commonly would be considered "genocidal" for a country of 8 million people with 650,000 Tutsi." It was until a few days later that the real figures began to be quoted.

Decades of research and hundreds of studies using complementary methodologies demonstrate a clear causal link between exposure to media violence and interpersonal aggression, from media of all kinds – including video, music, pictures, and text[139]. Violent political rhetoric is also cross-national. For example, in a 2010 British campaign speech in Northern Ireland, soon-to-be Prime Minister David Cameron used the word "fight" 19 times in about 90 seconds, e.g. "We're fighting for people," and "Join us in this fight,"[140] (Cameron 5/4/2010). Even Ghandi used violent metaphors while explicitly swearing off actual violence in his famous "Quit India"

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[137] Destexhe, Alain. 1994-1995. 'The Third Genocide'. Foreign Policy (97): 3-17.

[138] Dovidio, J., & Gaertner, S. (1998). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The causes, consequences, and challenges of aversive racism. In J.L. Eberhardt & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Confronting racism: The problem and the response (pp. 3-32). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

[139] Cowan, G., & Mettrick, J. (2002). The effects of target variables and setting on perceptions of hate speech. Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 32(2), 277-299.

[140] Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1985). The effect of an overheard ethnic slur on evaluations of the target: How to spread a social disease. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 61-72.

speech. Media violence effects work through priming: cues activate aggressive cognitive and emotional structures in memory, making aggressive responses more accessible[141].

Although political speech may not seem as explicit or compelling as most forms of violent entertainment, psychologists have found that violent text is sufficient to promote aggression even when the text is presented subliminally[142]. Theoretically, then, violent political rhetoric can produce the same psychological dynamics as violent entertainment[143]. The libertarian view holds that freedom of speech takes precedence over all other rights because all rights depend on the existence of an effective right to dissent. From this view, the harmful effects of hate propaganda are not deemed to be sufficiently grave to justify the imposition of restrictions on freedom of speech. The opposing egalitarian view, however holds that restrictions on hate-mongering are necessary in order to protect minority groups from pain and suffering and in order to promote inter-group harmony in the society. From the egalitarian view, all persons and groups must be protected equally against the promotion of hatred and against defamatory attacks that deny their right to human dignity. Additionally, hate propaganda has no redeeming social value and is inherently harmful both to target groups and the societal order. Therefore restrictions on freedom of expression explicitly designed to curb the hate-mongering represent reasonable limits.

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[141] Jamieson, D. W., & Zanna, M. P. (1989). Need for structure in attitude formation and expression.In A. R. Pratkanis, S. J. Breckler, & A. G. Grenwald (Eds.), Attitude structure and function (pp.383-406). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
[142] Bayne, Sarah. 2008. Post-election Violence in Kenya: An Assessment for the UK Government. London: DFID Kenya-UK Government.
[143] Calvert, C. (1997), Hate Speech and its harms: A communicative perspective. Journal of Communication, 47, 4-19.

3.5 Radio in Rwanda Genocide

Radio has been an influential tool in fueling conflict especially because it is cheap to acquire a set and also because masses in the rural area tune in for information. April 1994 was a pinnacle in the media's crisis discourse on Rwanda, and the ethnic explanation of Rwanda's conflict is symptomatic of the press's reversion to simplistic depictions of crisis.[144] Before the war, Rwanda had only one station, Radio Rwanda. Listening to radio was often regarded as a way of distraction among the elite as well as the common people. It announced meetings, nominations, appointments and dismissal of government officials. Radio Rwanda remained the government mouth piece until 1992. In the Rwanda Genocide, Radio- Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC) began broadcasting in 1993 and Juvenal Habyarimana was a shareholder among his closes associates and advisers, all of whom were Hutu. Radio sets became cheaper to acquire especially for the illiterate and semi-literate communities in Rwanda. According to Otiti, RTLMC was very different from the lone government station, Radio Rwanda that monopolized the airwaves. RTLMC adopted citizen participation in its programmes that allowed audiences to call-in and make comments or request music as well as send greetings.[145]

RTML had a close relation with the national broadcaster, Radio Rwanda. This is because RTLM was allowed to broadcast on the same frequencies as Radio Rwanda between 8am and 11am, an arrangement that encouraged listeners to see the two as linked.[146] Otiti observes that RTLMC's quest to connect with the audience was not innocent but a deliberate step to prepare it as a

[144] Dovidio, J., & Gaertner, S. (1998). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The causes, consequences, and challenges of aversive racism. In J.L. Eberhardt & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Confronting racism: The problem and the response (pp. 3-32). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

[145] Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1985). The effect of an overheard ethnic slur on evaluations of the target: How to spread a social disease. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 61-72

[146] Harnett-Sievers, Axel, and Ralph-Michael Peters. 2008. Kenya's 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks. Africa Spectrum 43 (1):133-144

weapon. RTLMC propagated the view that Tutsis were cockroaches that had to be killed. The radio further described the way Tutsis should be killed and condemned moderate Hutus who were unwilling to participate in the extermination exercise. Otiti says "the radio used violent language, openly incited violence and directed potential killers to their targets…killers are said to have moved around with a machete in one hand and a small transmitter radio in the other as they swept the neighborhoods." [147] Thompson in an RTLM as probably the most extreme case of media failure. He said Romeo Dallaire was aware of the impact of RTLM but did not have media capacity. As a result most UN missions have their own radio stations to counter the effects of such messages. Thompson advises that media be professional in order to weed out the extreme stations. The Rwanda Case study saw the skilful use of radio to sow seeds of inter-ethnic hatred mainly in the rural areas especially on the unemployed youth. Chalk confirms this position when he avers that "Radio RTLM (Radio-tÈlÈvision libre des mille Collines), a private station of their own… whipped up fear and ethnic hatred more effectively than Radio Rwanda ever had, using dynamic, innovative programming which introduced to Rwanda's airways for the first time a unique cocktail of the liveliest African music and informal talk radio, blended with culturally-coded attacks on Tutsi and their defenders."[148] Radio Rwanda, the government owned station also joined in the campaign after the genocide started. The station referred killing as "work" for the Hutu. Radio stations made statements like "all Hutus owed it to the Community to work hard."

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[147] In A. R. Pratkanis, S. J. Breckler, & A. G. Grenwald (Eds.), Attitude structure and function (pp.383-406). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum

[148] Ismail, Jamal Abdi, and James Deane. 2008. The 2007 General Election in Kenya and Its Aftermath: The Role of Local Language Media. The International Journal of Press/Politics 13:319-327

Research also avers that foreigners against the radio campaigns were also attacked. They were described as enemies and people were directed to get rid of them too. According to Human Rights Watch 1999 Report, Radio Rwanda warned that Hutu leaders in Bugesera were going to be murdered by Tutsi, false information meant to spur the Hutu massacres of Tutsi.[149] Radio Muhabura (Radio Beacon), the official radio of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and unlike the other two radios, Radio Muhabura did not reach Rwandans all over the country but its audience grew steadily in 1992 and 199353. It focused on national identity of both Hutu and Tutsi as well as minimize their differences. This was in contrast to the Hutu power themes of RTLM's broadcasts.[150]

3.6 Kenya Post Election Violence

Some scholars have for a long time viewed Kenya as an icon of peace in the volatile East African region. Kenya's neighbors Uganda, Somalia, South Sudan and Rwanda have from time to time been engaged in civil wars as well as political upheavals. So to scholars that viewed Kenya from this light it was a surprise the 2007/2008 post-election violence occurred. But on the other hand, there are scholars who have been keenly watching the political environment in Kenya and were merely asking when the violence would erupt[151]. Those who argue that violence was bound to occur regardless of the 2007 elections, are of the view that the land dispute, longstanding impunity as well as violation of social-economic rights facilitated the outbreak of violence.

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[149] Harnett-Sievers, Axel, and Ralph-Michael Peters. 2008. Kenya's 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks. Africa Spectrum 43 (1):133-144

[150] Kiai, Maina. Speech, Power, and Violence: Hate Speech and the Political Crisis in Kenya. KNCHR, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. 2007. "Still Behaving Badly": Second Periodic Report of the Election-Monitoring Project. Nairobi: Kenya

[151] Kruglanski, A. W. (1990). Motivations of judging and knowing: Implications for causal attribution. In E. T. Higgins and R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of Social behaviour (Vol. 2, pp. 333-368). New York: Guilford.

These causes are in line with those identified by the Office of the High Commission of Human Rights in 2008 as the causes of the Kenya post-election violence[152].

The aftermath of the violence led to two main problems among other smaller ones. First, More than 1,500 Kenyans were reported killed, 1,133casulties, over 350,000 internally displaced persons, approximately 2,000 refugees, destruction of 117,216 private property and 491 government owned property, around 42,000 houses and many businesses were looted and destroyed, gang rapes, male/female genital mutilation and destruction of the railway line.[153] Secondly, the post-election violence led to factors of production being rendered idle while the country lost millions in the economy. This was demonstrated by the fact that factories went idle, many roads were closed, and food and humanitarian crises became visible. Regionally, other countries suffered too. For instance, in Uganda, Rwanda and the eastern DR Congo, there was interruption of fuel supplies coming from Mombasa port due to lack of transport. By a conservative estimate, the Kenyan economy was losing $30 million a day.

Previous studies suggested that hate messages cause emotional distress and a restriction on people's personal freedom. Targets have quit jobs, forgone education, changed residences, avoided public places and modified their behaviour[154]. Furthermore, hate messages lead to lower personal self-esteem and a lessened sense of security. Maina Kiai studied the perceptions of targets related to the reception of anti-Semitism and antigay speech. She discovered that hate

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[152] Leets, L. (1999). A cultural perspective on racist speech harm. Paper presented at the 49th International Communication Association, San Francisco.

[153] Kruglanski, A. W. (1990). Motivations of judging and knowing: Implications for causal attribution. In E. T. Higgins and R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of Social behaviour (Vol. 2, pp. 333-368). New York: Guilford.

[154] Kiai, Maina. Speech, Power, and Violence: Hate Speech and the Political Crisis in Kenya. KNCHR, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. 2007. "Still Behaving Badly": Second Periodic Report of the Election-Monitoring Project. Nairobi: Kenya

speech lead to short- and long term consequences which are similar in nature to the effects of other types of traumatic experiences[155]. This implies that the impact of hate speech is attributed to ignorance, repressed hostility and social learning. The motives of hate speech are described as enduring and not situational states. Cowan and Metrick documented the experience of being the target of hate speech in public places by focusing on racist and sexist hate speech.[156] The targets faced a range of experiences involving subtle derogatory speech and the victims were unaware of its occurrence. Such experiences occur regularly and leave targets harmed in significant ways[157]. Racist speech caused targets to reflect on the subordinate social status, to fear their safety and sometimes engage in violent behaviour. Furthermore sexist speech caused women to be uncomfortable and afraid to be in public. Thus, unwanted sexually suggestive speech is an effective mechanism for reinforcing the dominant position of men over women in public.[158]

Carey separated the harms of hate speech into two forms based on the model of transmission and ritual models of communications.[159] The transmission model involves the direct harm of hate speech to the target and ritual model refers to the harm of societal subordination of minorities as a group[160]. Hate speech can also affect the observer of the speech. Political leaders regularly mobilize aggressive responses in audiences. Given the important state goal of minimizing aggression in society, the role of political leaders in stoking aggressive responses in citizens may

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[155] Kiai, Maina. Speech, Power, and Violence: Hate Speech and the Political Crisis in Kenya. KNCHR, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. 2007. "Still Behaving Badly": Second Periodic Report of the Election-Monitoring Project. Nairobi: Kenya

[156] Mullen, Gary A. 'Genocide and the Politics of Identity: Rwanda through the lens of Adorno'. (Philosophy Today 2006)50: 170-175

[157] Cowan, G., & Mettrick, J. (2002). The effects of target variables and setting on perceptions of hate speech. Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 32(2), 277-299.

[158] Mullen, Gary A. 'Genocide and the Politics of Identity: Rwanda through the lens of Adorno'. (Philosophy Today 2006)50: 170-175

[159] Mute, Lawrence M. 2008. Kenya: Legislation, Hate Speech, and Freedom of Expression. All Africa, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200810240331.html>.

[160] Carey, J. W. (1989). Communication as culture: Essays on media and society. New York, NY: Routledge.

be of some concern.[161] There is a dark irony in this hidden conflict of interests[162]. But whatever positive effects leaders seek when employing violent metaphors, whether support for themselves, for policies, or for political mobilization, are offset by the implications of violent language for political violence support.

3.7 Radio in Kenya

Radio broadcast programmes were said to propagate hate speech days to the election. Kass FM was found wanting in its broadcast messages. The stations main language of broadcast is Kalenjin, one of the 42 tribes in Kenya. The Waki Commission found that : "a few days [before] the elections Kass FM announced there would be rigging and in some of their open forums encouraged people to use the radio to incite people" Joshua Sang, a journalist with Kass FM is currently facing charges of crimes against humanity in the International Criminal Court (ICC).[163] The station allowed 'strongly derogatory terminology,' with calls for the 'people of the milk' (the Kalenjin) to 'cut the grass' and get rid of the 'weeds' (the Kikuyu).67 "Three days before that vote, the privately-owned radio Kass FM, which broadcasts in Kalenjin, was suspended for inciting violence."[164]

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[161] Nasong'o S.W. Resource Allocation and the Crisis of Political Conflict in Africa: Beyond the Inter-ethnic Hatred Thesis P.G Okoth, B.A. Ogoth (Ed) Conflict in Contemporary Africa (Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundations, 2000) pp44-53

[162] Jamieson, D. W., & Zanna, M. P. (1989). Need for structure in attitude formation and expression.In A. R. Pratkanis, S. J. Breckler, & A. G. Grenwald (Eds.), Attitude structure and function (pp.383-406). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

[163] Nasong'o S.W. Resource Allocation and the Crisis of Political Conflict in Africa: Beyond the Inter-ethnic Hatred Thesis P.G Okoth, B.A. Ogoth (Ed) Conflict in Contemporary Africa (Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundations, 2000) pp44-53

[164] Mute, Lawrence M. 2008. Kenya: Legislation, Hate Speech, and Freedom of Expression. All Africa, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200810240331.html>.

Halakhe in a 2013 Occasional Paper observes that "local radio stations and other vernacular media bore particular responsibility for inciting violence through broadcast that included playing of ethnic war songs."69 The Kriegler Commission found that in 2007 certain media outlets showed a discernible preference for particular candidates.[165] The Waki commission report was also in agreement in the role of media and especially the vernacular radio stations. The report stated that: From the statements given by the public, vernacular stations were most responsible for contributing to a climate of hate, negative ethnicity and incitement to violence. Radio stations mentioned included KASS FM in the rift valley, Kameme FM, Inooro FM and Coro FM, Bahasha FM in Nakuru and Nam Lolwe FM.[166] IRIN identified a number of other stations that broadcast hate speech, including Inooro, Lake Victoria FM and Kameme.[167] "The privately-owned Radio Lake Victoria in Kisumu, which openly backed the opposition, went off the air on 28 December for three days after a mysterious power cut to its transmitter in Kiboswa, 15 kms away…the station resumed broadcasting without further problems, even at the height of the violence."[168] The Kenyan government was also suspicious of vernacular radio stations that were deemed to fuel ethnic hatred. In an interview with Article 19, Wachira Waruru of Royal Media Services admitted that there had been problems that saw the group pull off air some speakers who had gone too far. Royal Media Services is in charge of Ramogi FM and Inooro FM that are subject to this study.

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[165] Mwalongo, Rose. 2008. Spreading the `word of hate` in Kenya. Guardian, January 26, 2008

[166] Mwangiru.M. Conflict in Africa(Nairobi: Centre for Conflict Research, 2006) pp. 1-34

[167] Leets, L. (1999). A cultural perspective on racist speech harm. Paper presented at the 49th International Communication Association, San Francisco

[168] Kiai, Maina. Speech, Power, and Violence: Hate Speech and the Political Crisis in Kenya. KNCHR, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. 2007. "Still Behaving Badly": Second Periodic Report of the Election-Monitoring Project. Nairobi: Kenya

3.8 Conclusion

The transmission model involves the direct harm of hate speech to the target and ritual model refers to the harm of societal subordination of minorities as a group. Hate speech can also affect the observer of the speech. Political leaders regularly mobilize aggressive responses in audiences. Given the important state goal of minimizing aggression in society, the role of political leaders in stoking aggressive responses in citizens may be of some concern. The global geopolitical dynamics (the end of the Cold War and the onset of the political instigated violence for example) and changes in the forms of reconciliation by the church have altered and continue to influence the form, challenges, scope and objectives of peace interventions by Western countries, especially in Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 1994 RWANDA GENOCIDE AND THE 2007 PEV IN KENYA

4.1 Introduction

The study of conflict resolution reveals the mechanisms, methods and conditions that the rivaling parties use in order to resolve their conflict peacefully. Both the media in Rwanda and the media in Kenya allowed hate messages in their coverage[169]. The use of derogative language acted as a warning sign in both conflicts. Hate speech or messages may not always lead to physical violence but in most circumstances it ruptures the society relations among individual or groups that target each other. Such negative effects need to be resolved even after the physical violence has occurred[170]. It has been observed that before the Rwanda Genocide, radio used dehumanizing language to exacerbate the violence. In Kenya, a 50 similar coverage was witnessed. Broadcasts in vernacular fell short of using direct language to call for violence against certain groups. The chapter analyses the extent in which radio was used in fueling the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and the 2007 PEV violence in Kenya, in light of the hypotheses and theoretical framework already stated.

4.2 The Involvement of Radio in Rwanda Genocide and Post-Election Violence

Through critical model, media concepts and hate speech shows the extent to which the radio programs dehumanized vulnerable groups by establishing the sameness between two unrelated

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[169] Dovidio, J., & Gaertner, S. (1998). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The causes, consequences, and challenges of aversive racism. In J.L. Eberhardt & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Confronting racism: The problem and the response (pp. 3-32). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

[170] Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. New York: Pantheon.

things or ideas[171]. Phrases used to refer to other ethnic groups form metaphors that are not merely rhetorical but pedestals on which hate flourishes. Such metaphors reflects an insight through which coherent organization of experience are modelled to understand another potentially revealing the rhetorical strategies and underlying conceptual systems by which vulnerable groups are understood and perhaps even acted against[172].

Theoretically, violent political rhetoric can produce the same psychological dynamics as violent entertainment[173]. This is the libertarian view which holds that freedom of speech takes precedence over all other rights because all rights depend on the existence of an effective right to dissent. From this view, the harmful effects of hate propaganda are not deemed to be sufficiently grave to justify the imposition of restrictions on freedom of speech. It common knowledge and there is consensus among scholars that the radio was directly involved in conflict in Kenya and Rwanda conflict situation. Radio stations were more involved in spreading hate messages compared to other forms of the media like the print and television. The belief among literature is that Radio fanned violence in their programs and the way they covered the violence. Media personalities took community sides while broadcasting[174]. This is because radio has a wider reach of its audience compared to the print and the television. Some respondents believe that the radio stations often the vernacular take sides during politically charged moments like elections, referendum. Some media personalities go out of their way to improve ratings by pleasing their communities. Media houses used coded language to divide people. Unrefined information was

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[171] Mwangiru.M. Conflict in Africa(Nairobi: Centre for Conflict Research, 2006) pg. 1-34
[172] Wanyama F.O. The role of the Presidency in African Conflict P.G Okoth, B.A. Ogoth(ed) Conflict in Contemporary Africa(Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundations, 2000) pg30-43
[173] Calvert, C. (1997), Hate Speech and its harms: A communicative perspective. Journal of Communication, 47, 4-19.
[174] Dovidio, J., & Gaertner, S. (1998). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The causes, consequences, and challenges of aversive racism. In J.L. Eberhardt & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Confronting racism: The problem and the response (pp. 3-32). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

also aired for instance, there were various versions of Raila's controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Muslims.

A Varied perspective shows that it is the Kenyans who used the FM and other radio outlets to cause divisions among the population. This implies that media had a direct role in the genocide. Media experts say that RTLM was instrumental in guiding the militias to places where the targeted were hiding[175]. Presenters encouraged people to call in with details of their whereabouts but it instead acted as a way to direct the militias to such places. For instance Velarie Bemeriki who was later convicted by a Gacaca court, listed names of people she claimed were RPF leaders[176]. Bemeriki called upon her listeners to locate them because they were planning to kill key politicians in Rwanda. With regard to this, it is plausible to note that the media either simply watched as the genocide raged or played an active role in encouraging the mayhem.

4.3 Radio Ownership and Political Influence

The use of radio was seen to take political sides during both conflicts. In Kenya, the radio stations took political sides in their coverage. Media houses were busy showing allegiance to either PNU or ODM. This because a significant number of politicians owned or had a significant shares in the media houses. Political pressure in Kenya took a center stage[177]. It was difficult for the radio broadcast to keep PNU and ODM stories from turning into "us-versus-them." They had imbalanced sources in their coverage. Ownership of stations is a key component in freedom of

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[175] EU, Election Observation Mission. 2008. Kenya: Final Report General Elections 27 December 2007. European Union.

[176] Gachigua, Sammy Gakero. 2008. Displays of Might, Glitz, and Deceit: What was the Print Media's Role in Kenya's Volatile 2007 Post-Election Violence. Paper read at Governing the African Public Sphere, at Yaounde, Cameroun

[177] Gould, Jon B. 2005. Speak No Evil: The Triumph of Hate Speech Regulation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

media. Some politicians cum-media owners are increasingly taking political sides[178]. This has led to media blackouts of their political rivals and when covered the rival is given less airtime compared to those with the same political ideology. Politicians own media houses for commercial reasons but also as a vehicle to political leadership. In Rwanda, RTLM, a private radio station launched by supporters of the then President Juvenal Habyarimana is accused of instigating the final call to kill cockroaches and listing the people to be killed including providing the addresses of such people[179]. Political ownership of RTLM meant that presenters had to conform to the political pressure of the owners.

Despite professional training, some journalists sided with their tribal roots first before acknowledging other tribes within the spectrum of ethnic division. This led to biased reporting of events that unfolded before, during and after the post-election violence. The Kenya situation was dire in comparison to Rwanda. This is because there are 42 tribes in Kenya while there are about three in Rwanda. The journalists sided with their people instead of pushing for a national agenda setting role.[180] Journalists believed that siding with their community offered a protected layer of solidarity. Audiences believed journalists because they reached people emotionally through the various local languages. Some radio stations played war and liberation songs in local languages. In Rwanda, journalists stopped pushing for the national agenda of togetherness and sided with their ethnic group. This was seen in the call by journalists to eliminate the opposing ethnic group[181].

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[178] Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1985). The effect of an overheard ethnic slur on evaluations of the target: How to spread a social disease. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 61-72.

[179] Carey, J. W. (1989). Communication as culture: Essays on media and society. New York, NY: Routledge.

[180] Baran Stanley J. and Davis Dennisk, (2006), Mass Communication Theory Foundations, Ferment and Future, 4th edition, Thompson Wadsworth.

[181] Bourgaut L.M. Mass Media in Sub-Sahara Africa (Indianapolis:Indiana University Press 1995) pp160-169

4.4 Comparing the Hate Messaging

Both the media in Rwanda and the media in Kenya allowed hate messages in their coverage. The use of derogative language acted as a warning sign in both conflicts. Hate speech or messages may not always lead to physical violence but in most circumstances it ruptures the society relations among individual or groups that target each other. Such negative effects need to be resolved even after the physical violence has occurred. It has been observed that before the Rwanda Genocide, radio used dehumanizing language to exacerbate the violence. In Kenya, a 50 similar coverage was witnessed. Broadcasts in vernacular fell short of using direct language to call for violence against certain groups. In both conflicts, the media met some of Susan Benesch's five model of identifying dangerous speech[182]. As a result, the media and specifically radio stations in both Kenya and Rwanda had influential speakers. Radio presenters are known to be influential and can easily sway the decisions of audiences. In fact some audiences believe that whatever is aired on the media is gospel truth.

The radio media in Rwanda was able to create fear on the audiences by using hate messages. It dehumanized one tribe hence the genocide. RTLM created fear that blended with culturally coded attacks on Tutsi. However, in Kenya it is still not clear that the effect on audiences created fear[183]. This is because the ongoing case against Joshua Sang, has not been concluded. But some studies show that targeted communities in certain areas feared for their lives and moved into internally displaced camps. Such is the case with Kalenjins who lived in predominantly Kikuyu areas and vice versa[184].

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[182] Somerville, K. (2010), Violenece, Hate speech and Vernacular Radio: Online manuscript
[183] Thompson, Allan (Ed), 2007. The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, London, Pluto Press Unit
[184] Wanyama F.O. The role of the Presidency in African Conflict P.G Okoth, B.A. Ogoth(ed) Conflict in Contemporary Africa(Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundations, 2000) pp30-43

It is clear that the speech in Rwanda media was understood as a call to violence. This is because RTLM propagated the view that Tutsis were cockroaches that had to be killed. Radio Rwanda also asked the Hutu's to 'work hard' a terminology that set the agenda kill Tutsi's. Kenya on the other hand framed words differently. The media used indirect language to incite the population. For example, Kass FM allowed the use of strongly derogatory terminology,' with calls for the 'people of the milk' (the Kalenjin) to 'cut the grass' and get rid of the 'weeds' (the Kikuyu).[185]

The aspect of social and historical context of the speech in Rwanda was reflected. Both print and broadcast as reflected in the ICTR demonized the Tutsi as having inherently evil equalities. The media also called for extermination of Tutsi as a response to political threat. The Kenya case is yet to be decided by a formal court but numerous studies have shown the inequality of Kikuyu and other Kenyan tribes in post-independence Kenya.[186]

The manner in which the speech was disseminated led to hate messaging. In both Kenya and Rwanda conflict the way of disseminating the speech was derogatory. The Rwanda case is confirmed through the ICTR judgment and sentencing those journalists used derogatory manner in disseminating their speech.[187] In Kenya's case study, Human rights watch believes that the manner of dissemination was through other speakers and not broadcasters. Sang still insists that he is innocent. The only difference between the Kenya and Rwanda case studies is the use of short messages (SMS) to spread hate speech. Text messages through mobile phones were more prevalent in Kenya than in Rwanda mainly because of the evolution of mobile phone technology.

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[185] Yieke, Felicia A. 2008. The Discursive Construction of Ethnicity: The Case of the 2007 Kenyan General Election. Paper read at Governing the African Public Sphere, at Yaounde, Cameroun
[186] Thompson, Allan (Ed), 2007. The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, London, Pluto Press Unit
[187] Somerville, K. (2010), Violenece, Hate speech and Vernacular Radio: Online manuscript,

The use of mobile phones was not wide spread in 1994 Rwanda genocide compared to the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya. The wrong use of technology aggravated the violence in Kenya than it did in Rwanda.[188]

4.5 Ethnicity in Media

Ethnicity was a common thread in media coverage of both Rwanda genocide and the Kenya post-election violence. This has not always been the case for Kenya. This is because during President Daniel Arap Moi's reign both newspapers publications and broadcast houses never mentioned tribes in their coverage. Moi's government did not encourage historical injustices be told along the ethnic lines. Such experiences included colonialism or political marginalisation in post-independence Kenya. Ethnicity in the media was mostly about a comical issue.[189] But in the 1990's 52 the narrative of ethnicity coverage in the media shifted because of the emergence of political clashes along the ethnic lines.

The 1990's was also a time in which government embraced the spirit of multiparty politics. Therefore, powerful leaders sort to divide the nation by gaining access to resources such as media houses among others in order to maintain political clout.[190] The break out of clashes also brought out the blame game on ethnic groups. Observers in Kenya initially thought that the post-election violence was a reaction to the disputed election results that saw President Mwai Kibaki

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[188] Rothbart, Daniel, and Tom Bartlett. 2007. Rwandan Radio Broadcasts and Hutu/Tutsi Positioning. In Global Conflict Resolution through Positioning Analysis, edited by F. M. Moghaddam, R. Harre and N. Lee. New York: Springer

[189] Nasong'o S.W. Resource Allocation and the Crisis of Political Conflict in Africa: Beyond the Inter-ethnic Hatred Thesis P.G Okoth, B.A. Ogoth (Ed) Conflict in Contemporary Africa (Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundations, 2000) pp44-53

[190] Mullen, Gary A. 'Genocide and the Politics of Identity: Rwanda through the lens of Adorno'. (Philosophy Today 2006)50: 170-175

retain his seat. Later, a pattern of violence along ethnic lines resurfaced and that is why it was compared to the Rwanda Genocide by International media.[191]

A sharp contrast of the two conflicts is that the Rwanda attacks seemed more planned and well calculated through the media. There was prior knowledge of how to execute the Tutsi. This is because several studies have shown that there was massive importation and buying and distribution of machetes before the Genocide took place. Kangura, a weekly newspaper in 1993 several months before the 1994 genocide published an article 'a cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly'. This shows that the attacks on Tutsis were hatched earlier.[192] The same cannot be said of the 2007-2008 Kenya post-election violence. Images in the media during the post-election violence showed that perpetrators used anything like pangas, arrows, stones and Buttons (Rungus) in the hot spots. Although there were signs of violence there was no prior knowledge of preparations to attack.[193]

Three media personalities were arrested, prosecuted and convicted in connection with atrocities they committed in Rwanda genocide. Two radio journalists and a newspaper editor were found guilty by the ICTR. "This sentencing highlighted the murderous possibility of mere words. [194] These media personalities were found guilty of the genocide, incitement to commit genocide and crimes against humanity. These personalities were: Ferdinand Nahimana, a founding member of RTLM was handed a life sentence, Hassan Ngeze, owner and editor of newspaper Kangura was

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[191] Jamieson, D. W., & Zanna, M. P. (1989). Need for structure in attitude formation and expression

[192] Iyengar,S. and D.R. Kinder (1987), News that matter: Television and America opinion, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

[193] Ismail, Jamal Abdi, and James Deane. 2008. The 2007 General Election in Kenya and Its Aftermath: The Role of Local Language Media. The International Journal of Press/Politics 13:319-327

[194] Haddock, G., Zanna, M. P., & Esses, V. M. (1993). The (limited) role of trait-based stereotypes in predicting attitudes toward Native Peoples. Manuscript submitted for publication.

sentenced to life imprisonment and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, a founder of RTLM who double as the public affairs director in Rwanda Foreign Affairs Ministry ICTR handed him 35years and later reduced it to 27years[195].

In 2009, another journalist formally with RTLM was sentenced to life imprisonment. Valerie Bemeriki admitted to using networks that asked Hutus to kill Tutsis. Bemeriki was convicted by a Gacaca Court, a traditional concept of village council. The Gacaca had powers to hand down sentences ranging from community service to life in jail. Joshua Sang, is the first journalist to face the International Criminal Court (ICC). Sang was the Head of Operations at Kass Fm during the post-election violence. He is accused of crimes against humanity that include: murder, deportation of forcible transfer of population and persecution.113 His case is still ongoing at The Hague in Netherlands.

4.6 International media coverage of Rwanda and Kenya

Media plays a role in framing stories for its audience. It is able to set the agenda for discussion. In the Rwanda case study, the International media missed out on the genocide because many had been evacuated along with other foreign nationals. Only a few people were left to cover the 53 events that saw more than 800,000 people killed in 100 days.[196] Scholars have criticized the western media for turning a blind eye on the turmoil until it was too late.[197] Initial reports in the West referred the genocide as a humanitarian occurrence. Melissa Wall's analysis on Rwanda makes the observation that the western media concentrated on it being an ethnic conflict without

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[195] Iyengar,S. and D.R. Kinder (1987), News that matter: Television and America opinion, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
[196] Cowan, G., & Mettrick, J. (2002). The effects of target variables and setting on perceptions of hate speech. Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 32(2), pp.277-299.
[197] Destexhe, Alain. 1994-1995. 'The Third Genocide'. Foreign Policy (97): 3-17.

considering political and economic aspects. She found instances where Rwandans were portrayed as either wild animals or passive victims. This according to Wall was an attempt to distance the western audience from the conflict.[198] In contrast, international media was present in the Kenya post-election violence. The level of violence did not necessitate evacuation of foreign nationals. Therefore, the international media was present unlike in the Rwanda case. However, the media coverage was often exaggerated and some began to refer the situation as genocide yet it was not.

4.7 Conclusion

The concept of hate speech encompasses a multiplicity of situations ranging from the incitement of racial hatred or in other words, hatred directed against persons or groups of persons on the grounds of belonging to a race; incitement to hatred on religious grounds, to which may be equated incitement to hatred on the basis of a distinction between believers and non-believers; incitement to other forms of hatred based on intolerance "expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism" to homophobic speech also falls into what can be considered as a category of hate speech.

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[198] Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. New York: Pantheon.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary, conclusion as well as suggested recommendations for implementation on the role of the media particular the radio in instigating ethnic conflict in 1994 Rwanda genocide and 2007-2008 Kenya post-election violence. Recommendations made from the study findings in addition to suggestions for further research.

5.2 Conclusion

From the study, it was evident that there are various roles the media ought to play in a conflict situation. The media ought to guard the trail of misinformation churned through the opposing sides by presenting facts before, during and after the conflict has been resolved. The agenda setting role of the media is the key to finding out how the audiences react to certain messages passed through the media. In these two conflicts, the radio negatively used their role to set the agenda in the beginning of the conflict. Kenyan media later realized their problem and changed to a peaceful campaign in order to woe audiences away from conflict.[199]

The study established that the level of Professionalism among media practitioners is still a problem in Rwanda and Kenya. Although strides to improve professionalism have been taken since the two conflicts, more needs to be done especially on peace journalism. Major similarities

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[199] Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. New York: Pantheon.

and differences of the two conflicts exist[200]. They include: spread of hate message, ethnicity factor took a central role for radio practitioners to divide populations in both countries. Journalists faced prosecution in Rwanda and in Kenya. However, the case of Joshua Arap Sang is still ongoing in The Hague based Court, ICC. The international media coverage of the two conflicts was different. While the International media failed to cover the Rwanda Genocide, they fully covered the Kenyan post-election violence. [201]The international media was accused of exaggerating the post-election violence by portraying that the entire country was under fire while in realty was certain pockets where displacement, death and property destruction took place.

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[200] Dovidio, J., & Gaertner, S. (1998). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The causes, consequences, and challenges of aversive racism. In J.L. Eberhardt & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Confronting racism: The problem and the response (pp. 3-32). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
[201] Chaiken, S., & Eagly, A. H. (1978). Communication modality as a determinant of message persuasiveness and message comprehensibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, pp.605-614.

The concept of hate speech is aligned to an overarching interplay with the radio medium based on the cultural and social homogenization. Greek social scientists concluded that the original source which makes people susceptible to nationalism, to the authoritarian mentality and, therefore, to hate speech is education. In modern societies the fundamental mechanism of cultural homogenization in the shaping of a collective national identity, is provided by the institution of education. Not all people are able to defend themselves from becoming conditioned to conceptualize the world around them in linguistic images which violate the principles of liberty, equality, solidarity and human dignity.

The radio uses the language of a limited vocabulary which permits one to get rid of the ambiguity and the uncertainty in human coexistence and communication. This is achieved through the use of very precise discriminatory and selective vocabulary which tries to legitimize negative thinking about all those who are not {us}, those who are the {others}. Hate speech is limited precisely to such a language to a wide audience, a course facilitated by the radio, ethnic identity, cultural heterogeneity and aspects of radio ownership.[202] This aspects reflects the type of national identity a people develops, the level of cultural, ethnic, religious homogeneity that is cultivated in order for the national "self" to prove its uniqueness in relation and contradistinction to other nations. Research indicate that describing national identity means also describing and evaluating the "others" forms a structural as to why element of a national identity is the existence of the "other". National identity is shaped through a two-fold process: structuring and differentiating and incorporation and exclusion. National, religious and linguistic stereotypes are

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[202] Bayne, Sarah. 2008. Post-election Violence in Kenya: An Assessment for the UK Government. London: DFID Kenya-UK Government.

among the most visible examples of hate speech that function as means of differentiation and exclusion in the process of national identity formation.[203]

Findings from the study showed that Kenya and Rwanda have bore the brunt of hate speech that culminated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide and 2007/8 Kenyan PEV respectively. The two countries continue to experience latent, subdued bouts of hate crime evidence by mainstream media content analysis and social media posts. In as much as there is calm in Rwanda after the genocide the current calm cannot be mistaken for lasting peace found in a coherent and reconciled nation. In fact there are undertones of ethnic hate and a fermenting crisis that awaits a trigger[204]. According to Hutus in Rwanda, who are largely excluded from RPF government, the present calm is a period for "sharpening machetes" in readiness for next spate of bloodbath. Even today, even though I want to get out of this place, there are still people who want them to happen again, where we can see the killers walking on the streets every day[205]. There are unremorseful and unapologetic Hutus who wish for repeat of genocide.

However, the study also established that these are undertones that do not find their way into mainstream media because of autocracy of RPF regime. In Rwanda, it is a crime to ask any random citizen about their ethnicity. It is not the dread of what happens that haunts the ethnicity question but the fact that it might be used again for senseless ethnic cleansing. It is important to point out that the1994 genocide was not the first ethnic cleansing. "In November 1959, a violent

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[203] Gachigua, Sammy Gakero. 2008. Displays of Might, Glitz, and Deceit: What was the Print Media's Role in Kenya's Volatile 2007 Post-Election Violence. Paper read at Governing the African Public Sphere, at Yaounde, Cameroun

[204] Staub, Ervin. 'The Origins of Genocide and Mass Killing: Core Concepts'. In The Genocide Studies Reader, eds. S. Totten and P.R. Bartrop. (New York: Routledge.2009)

[205] Wanyama F.O. The role of the Presidency in African Conflict P.G Okoth, B.A. Ogoth(ed) Conflict in Contemporary Africa(Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundations, 2000) pg30-43

incident sparked a Hutu uprising in which hundreds of Tutsi were killed and thousands displaced and forced to flee to neighbouring countries. This marked the start of the so- called 'Hutu Peasant Revolution' or 'social revolution' lasting from 1959 to 1961, which signified the end of Tutsi domination and the sharpening of ethnic tensions."[206]

The study confirms the involvement of media in exacerbating conflict. Radio in conflicts, i.e Rwanda genocide and Kenya post-election violence, took the leading role because it has a wider listenership compared to television viewership and newspaper readership. At the height of the Conflict in 1994 Rwanda genocide and the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya, the media was distracted from pro-peace analysis in their coverage. Kenya media woke up after a week of murder and property destruction to carry out a message of peace in both print and broadcast. It is therefore up to the media industry to include conflict sensitive coverage as part of the policies that guide their journalists and presenters.

5.3 Recommendation

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations were be made:

There is need for the radio to shape the agenda that appreciate, strengthen and adopt a transformative methods of peacebuilding and reconciliation. Strengthening transformative methods of peacebuilding and reconciliation and justice dispensations mechanism is an important aspect. In so doing it recognizes the culture and social structures that define these communities. This research noted that there is urgent need for a bottom-up approach to societal needs where the radio makes use of existing cultural values and structures to reduce conflicts and

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[206] Harnett-Sievers, Axel, and Ralph-Michael Peters. 2008. Kenya's 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks. Africa Spectrum 43 (1):133-144.

engender peace. Conflict sensitive journalism needs to be included in media studies. Peace journalism calls for conflict resolution which involves responsible, fair and balanced coverage of parties involved in any conflict such as the Rwanda genocide and Kenya post-election violence. Media ownership influence in what is covered and what is blacked out should not be encouraged. Media owners should rise above self to allow fair coverage of opponents. To enhance professionalism, media houses ought to ensure that they acquire well trained professionals as presenters, news anchors and reporters. This will go a long way in ensuring that the media observes professional ethnics.

Inter-community dialogue should be facilitated. The various efforts in the country trying to build a culture of community reconciliation and peaceful existence should be recognized and encouraged. Local language stations have a policy on content on a language that promotes national unity. Have a percentage of programmes that have a national outlook and use a common language like say Kiswahili and Kinyarwanda. Media should ensure proper content development is achieved. There is need to develop content that is relevant to the mass audience and sets the agenda of nationhood as opposed to divisionism. This will enable people make informed decisions. Reforms need to prevent future genocide and post-election related conflicts. The media needs to inculcate systems that would warn of an impending conflict. The media can achieve this by exposing state agents and other leaders who manipulate ethnic grievances to achieve selfish gains.

Political will must be seen in order to allow free expression of opinions, ideas as well as access to information. This is through ensuring that the laws enacted in Rwanda and Kenya enable

journalism flourish. Freedom of expression as stipulated in the Constitution of the two countries must not remain on paper only but ought to be felt in practice. Integrate nationhood in school curriculum. This will go a long way to build inter-ethnic solidarity and unify the nation both in Rwanda and Kenya. Politicians need to delink ethnic undertones in local languages and spread a national outlook. The need address historical injustices on land and economic disparity is paramount in order to enhance harmony.

Universities and other institutions ought to embrace fully fledge peace journalism studies. Most institutions have peace and conflict courses as separate curriculum from peace journalism studies. Incorporating conflict sensitive studies with go a long way to improve coverage of such conflicts as Rwanda genocide and post-election violence in Kenya.

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