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ⱱ PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN KENYA //

by

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CHAPTER I - GENERAL AND INTRODUCTORY

Definition of the Problem

In 1938 the Secretary of State for the Colonies announced in
Parliament that the ultimate political goal of Britain's colonial
policy in Africa was self-government within the Commonwealth. This
policy in the postwar[1] period has been implicitly modified to allow
for self-government or independence outside of the Commonwealth. As
a stated ultimate objective of colonial policy it did not represent
an essentially new orientation, but rather was an extension to Tropi-
cal Africa of the political goal implicit in British colonial consti-
tutional development. In nearly all African territories the political
structure of legislative and executive had been established. The
achievement of self-government through the gradual liberalization of
the colonial constitutions was now, however, explicitly recognized
and African political development would clearly follow in its broad
outline the traditionally accepted evolution that the White Dominions
had followed and that Asian territories were pursuing toward self-
government. No one, however, foresaw the rapid social change that was
to occur in Africa in the immediate postwar period and the political
changes and orientation that this would give rise to.

Essentially Britain's postwar colonial policy in Africa,
although now wedded to the ultimate goal of self-government, continued

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1. "Postwar" and "prewar" in this paper, unless otherwise stated,
refer to World War II.

to approach political and social problems within the framework of
its traditional empiricism. That is, political change, constitutional
building and development were considered more in the light of meeting
immediate needs and solving specific problems, than in providing a
definite and directed course of action for the achievement of self-
government. Self-government remained a vague ultimate goal, and its
attainment was not in the foreseeable future. Britain could not or
did not foresee the demands which were to be made by rapidly emerging
nationalist movements. In meeting the demands of West African nation-
alists in the postwar period, British policy abruptly reëvaluated its
prior concepts of slow evolution and rule and adopted a "planned"
policy of achieving self-government within a reasonable, if not a
stated, period of time. This may be explicitly seen in the major
political and constitutional changes which occurred in the Gold Coast
constitution of 1950 and the Nigerian constitution of 1951. The
essential characteristics of this new approach or model colonial
policy are: the rapid transformation of the traditional forms of
colonial Legislative Council into democratically elected Parliaments;
universal sufferage; the introduction of a Ministerial system; an
effort to speed up the process of Africanizing the Administration; the
requirement that British officials regard themselves as servants of
African Ministers, not as members of a Ruling Institution, implying
that control of the Public Service be transferred from the Colonial
Office to the new national Governments; the substitution of the concept
of Local Authority for that of Native Authority; and finally, the

the acceptance of the principle that constitutional reforms are preliminaries to the granting of full independence within the Commonwealth at an early date.[2]

It has been stated that this abandonment of an ad hoc policy in favor of rapid political and social progress toward the policy goal of independence was possible because of the basic consensus of the population and the lack of powerful non-African minorities. However, in Central Africa Britain also accepted a definite policy goal in the creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, where power was not to be transferred to an African majority as in West Africa. Essentially there was devolution of power to a large European minority, although certain safeguards were retained for the protection of African interests. Partnership was to be the definitive principle in European-African relations. The implementation of partnership within the new Federation was, nevertheless, essentially to be controlled by the European group.

Thus it is apparent that Britain has adopted two definitive yet different political goals in Africa, each of which has been controlled in large part by the internal situation of the territories. In West Africa, colonial policy has granted power of decision to African political leadership, while in Central Africa, political authority has been given in large measure to the local European minority.

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2. Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (London, 1956), pp. 40-47.

Contrasted to these two major decisions, Britain has not
adopted specific definitive policy goals for Kenya.[3] The general
goal of self-government is too vague to be meaningful to the different
members of its disparate multi-racial population. The immediate
question that is usually considered is: self-government for whom? To
what racial or ethnic group does the 'self' refer? In West Africa,
it certainly meant Africans and in Central Africa it has meant Europeans.
What accounts for the unwillingness of Britain to define specific and
immediate policies in Kenya? It is believed that an answer to this
problem through analysis of the internal political and social situa-
tion will reveal not only the distinct problems that Kenya poses for
policy, but will suggest that the present policy of traditional
empiricism may not be able to meet the critical problems of this
territory.[4]

Method of Analysis

In analyzing the various internal forces of the Kenya situation
it must be made clear that the ultimate balance of power and authority
rests with Great Britain. It is the metropolitan government which
provides the enormous public capital required for economic development,
as well as the armed forces to put down rebellions and maintain security.

3. In Uganda, however, definite policy statements have guaranteed that
   this territory will develop as an African unitary state, gaining
   political independence within the near future. In the Sudan a situ-
   ation existed similar to that of West Africa. With the added
   impetus of Egyptian pressure the idea of less gradual transfer of
   power and complete independence was accepted by Great Britain.

4. It should be noted, however, that this policy has had major suc-
   cesses at other times and in other territories.

While it is essential to acknowledge the importance of the Imperial factor, this study is primarily concerned with an internal analysis of Kenya. This includes an examination into the power relationships of the three main racial groups in Kenya, a study through time of their respective power positions and the changes in these positions in the postwar period.

A general but adequate definition of political power as used in this paper is that given by Franz Neumann:

> It is social power focused on the state. It involves
> control of other men for the purpose of influencing
> the behavior of the state, its legislative, administra-
> tive and judicial activities...[5]

While this definition is adequate, it must be fitted into the par-ticular power relationships dealt with here, since societies differ in the manner in which political power is distributed within them. The traditional classifications of power structures—monarchy, aristocracy and democracy—are useful as general analytical tools, but the fact is that political structures are not in reality so neatly arranged. One shades off into the other with degrees of difference that cover a political continuum. Any of the points on the continuum may theoreti-cally be magnified for intensive investigation, but the relative utility of such an analysis in a multi-racial and less representative contexture is decreased. In Kenya, for instance, we are dealing with a society that lacks some of the normal requisites associated with

5. "Approaches to the Study of Political Power," Political Science Quarterly, 65 (1950), pp. 161-180, as quoted in V. O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York, 1953), 3rd ed., p. 7.

democratic government, i.e., a general will, enlightened electorate, universal franchise and a vehicle for the expression of public opinion. In the present context, power is understood as the mixture of influences exercised both formally and informally in Kenya and informally in the United Kingdom. For example, a racial group may exercise formal power by sharing in the political structures of government, such as the Legislative Council, Council of Ministers, governmental committees, or local government councils. However, a racial group or a political action community may also possess effective control over other groups and institutions by extra-constitutional means, i.e., activities in labor unions, political organizations like the Nairobi African Congress or the European Electors' Union. Both qualitatively and quantitatively there are gross disparities between Europeans, Africans and Asians in the command of these influences which are the properties of political power in Kenya.

This study of the internal power relationships of Kenya is focused on the issue of political representation because the struggle for power has essentially been one of translating informal political power into a share in the authority of the political structure. Through effective representation a racial group, such as the European settlers, may have a dominant share and influence over the exercise of public policy. It is precisely the importance of this share established through the system of representation (that is, the kind of representation and amount) that makes the focus of political representation paramount in the study of political change in multi-racial territories. The

Indian question during the 1920's, the issue of closer union and European demands for an unofficial majority, the issue of equality of representation in the immediate postwar period, the problems over parity of representation and the Lyttelton constitution were all major events and issues in this struggle for or consolidation of formal representative position.

Kenya has now adopted a multi-racial constitution but the major issue of political representation has not been solved. The three main racial groups appear to differ fundamentally concerning a system of representation which would permit peaceful political advancement and gain the support of all groups. In broad ideological outlines this struggle is between those, like the majority of Europeans, who believe in qualified participation in major decision making and those, represented by African leadership, who have apparently accepted the doctrine of 'one man one vote.' To date British policy has found no acceptable compromise between these two major views. Although the internal situation of Kenya in the prewar period permitted the conduct of a policy of empiricism, such a policy in the postwar period has not been able to meet the increasing demands of the political realities or needs of a definitive political goal. Without a conception of what the nature of future authority will be, each constitutional change gives rise to major controversy and fundamental disagreement. It contributes to instability and to the possibility of anarchy.

CHAPTER II - ANALYSIS OF PRINCIPAL GROUPS

The ethnic differences in Kenya make it a classical example of
a plural society, here defined as "a society comprising two or more
elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without
mingling, in one political unit."[6] The population may be divided
into four major groupings: African, Indian, Arab and European.
Each has numerous subdivisions. It should be noted that the term
"Asian" is generally synonymous with Indians in Kenya, whether they
be Muslims or non-Muslims. Likewise the term "European" has a broad
connotation.[7]

African Grouping. Among the African population there are
23 languages spoken. A brief survey of the different tribes shows
four main types: Hamitic, Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic and Bantu. The
Kikuyu, a Bantu group, and the Luo, a Nilotic group, rank first and
second numerically (19.5 per cent and 14.4 per cent respectively of
the total African population) and are also the two groups that have
been most receptive to European ways and responsive to European
education.[8]

6. J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India, as quoted in Attitude to Africa,
   Penguin Books: 5159, 1951, p. 48.

7. In British Africa a 'European' means, generally, anyone who is
   white. An American in Kenya is a European. Though most of the
   Europeans are British, there are also Poles, Italians, Scandinavians
   and South Africans (who make up 22% of the white population). In
   addition to this, Kenya Egyptians and Palestinian Arabs are called
   Europeans, though Arabs from Arabia are Asian; people from the Sey-
   chelles in the Indian Ocean are European or Asian according to the
   pigment in their skin. John Gunther, Inside Africa (New York, 1955),
   p. 314.

8. Philip Mason, "The Plural Society of Kenya," draft copy of a working
   paper for the 30th Study Session of the International Institute of
   Differing Civilizations, to be given in Lisbon, April 15-18, 1957, p. 1.

The African population has had a minor role in the European-
dominated political, economic and social order. This is manifested by
a limited participation in the formal process of central governmental
authority and lack of informal influence in the social order.
Economically circumscribed by lack of technical skill, education and
capital, the African's participation in the market sector of the
economy is small. The low African wage scale and the poverty of the
reserves help to maintain economic insecurity and limit social mobility
to an educated few. Limited social intercourse and non-assimilation
into the European society prevent access to positions of informal
influence. The color bar has multiplied the frustrations of the elite
by limiting access to positions of prestige and wealth. To assert
himself effectively the African must compete for power in a political
system alien to him with little command of the prerequisites and tech-
niques of the system. In addition, there is extremely little social
and political solidarity among Africans on a territorial-wide level.

Although this appears a static condition, the fact is that the
political and social role of the African is changing. It must be
remembered that the 1923 declaration by the Imperial power that
African interests were to be paramount[9] did not affect the power
structure of Kenya. At the most this declaration was a moral principle
of trusteeship rather than a basis for practical politics. It helped .
to prevent European over-all control and at least gave rise to questions

9. Indians in Kenya: Memorandum (Cmd. 1922) (1923).

of what the developing role of the African should be in the future. Two decades later the goal of racial partnership replaced the early doctrine.

The ability of the African to affect power relationships did not come about until the postwar period; in fact, not until 1944 did the first African Representative sit in the Legislative Council. Although the African wields little actual political power in the exercise of governmental authority, he is able to effect some changes by his potential strength. Prior to 1944 the only African participation was found on the local district council level, which gave him limited participation in matters directly concerned with his rural life. However, the African was able to be heard in England and have attention focused on his position by some representations made from social and political organizations, especially among the Kikuyu. He also found support among certain missionary groups and Europeans who were concerned with justice for the African. In the prewar period, however, the Colonial Office had to be primarily concerned with European demands for self-government and Asian drive for equality of status. It was the European and Asian conflict that was the focus of attention and major policy.

The marked change in the African political position in the postwar period is highlighted by a consistent effort to increase formal unofficial representation in the local and central councils of government. African leadership adopted both legal and non-legal action to achieve this end. The main African demands came to be focused on African parity and the achievement of a common electoral roll.

Presently the African representatives in the Legislative Council are nominated by the Governor from informal district council recommendations. However, provisions for African elections in the Lyttelton constitutional agreement have been enacted. In March 1957 direct African elections for their legislative representatives will take place. Although only approximately 125,000 Africans have been registered instead of the 300,000 to 500,000 estimated to be qualified, this number still exceeds the combined European, Asian and Arab registry of voters by 17,000.[10] While the total number of registered is small, perhaps because of widespread distrust of Government motives, i.e., the electoral rolls will be used for taxation purposes and the use of loyalty tests for the Kikuyu, nonetheless, this electoral roll is the outstanding African political achievement of the postwar period. Though limited in application at first, it will provide a constitutional vehicle for political education and action and will give meaning and sanction to the views of African representatives. At the same time it will no doubt reinforce the communal system of representation, fail to promote inter-racial consensus and more sharply define the struggle for political power.

The grant of this electoral roll to Africans will contribute to the growth and development of African nationalism, which must be recognized as the chief potential source of African power. Perhaps one of the greatest obstacles in the development of nationalism has been

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10. Africa Digest, Vol. IV, No. 4 (January-February, 1957), p. 120.

the small number of educated men who either sought or were able to function as a national elite. African political movements have been unable to overcome an essentially tribal identification. The most significant political movements were Kikuyu in orientation and appeal, using slogans and symbols derived from Kikuyu values, thus having little effectiveness among non-Kikuyu people. The propensity of the Kikuyu to absorb Western civilization has had a deep effect on the people of that tribe.[11] As a result, most of the African political leaders in Kenya have been Kikuyu, who could not work effectively within the cultural setting of other Kenya tribes. This prevented the creation of trans-tribal linkages among emerging indigenous leaders. The movements which did develop tended to become secretive, conspiratorial and insurrectionary, and this negative character prevented the development of an African political society or nation state. The failure of the Labour Government and the Government of Kenya to recognize the changing social situation contributed to this revolutionary rather than constitutional means of altering the distribution of power.

In summary, the African role is changing. The greatest visible political gain has been the attainment of the franchise. The important factor with this group is its potential rather than actual strength.

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11. See Margery Perham, "The Struggle Against Mau Mau," The Times, 23 April 1953: "The Kikuyu suffered most because their region pivoted upon Nairobi and was almost surrounded by European settlement while they became the purveyors of labour." Compare L.S.B. Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu (London, 1953), pp. 57-86 for the impact of European penetration.

Though trans-tribal linkages have not come about in the past, they appear to be developing and assuming the nature of a vehicle of trans-tribal nationalism.

Asian Grouping. As a community the small group of Arabs have played no really effective part in the political life of Kenya.[12] Philip Mason writes of the Arab community:

> With few exceptions they are inclined to look to the Government of Kenya as a protector who will safeguard their remaining rights as a privileged minority, rather than make themselves a place in the world of the future by their own efforts.[13]

The term 'Asian' in Kenya is generally synonymous for Indians, whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims. The largest sector of the Asian community is the Indian group, of which Goans number less than 10,000. There are two groups of Indians with subdivisions among them. The majority of the Muslims are known in Africa as Khojas, i.e., Muslims of the Ismailiya sect, followers of the Aga Khan, heretics in the eyes of other Muslims. On the instructions of the Aga Khan they have given up traditional Indian ways and consider themselves citizens of Kenya, looking to the West for standards of behavior. The non-Muslim Indians comprise two main groups, Sikhs and the politically dominant Hindus. On the whole Indians in Kenya filled a gap in the trading field by bringing goods to sell in African areas away from European contact, thus initiating Africans into a simple mercantile economy.

12. The population figures for the four communities are: African - 5,815,000; Arab - 31,000; European - 52,400; Indian and Goan - 144,100; other - 5,100. These are de facto population estimates for 1955. Colonial Reports, Kenya 1955 (London, 1956) H.M.S.O.
13. Mason, "The Plural Society of Kenya," p. 5.

In the political sphere Asian power has been declining in the postwar period in relation to that of the European and the African. The principal reason for this is the system of communal representation which has limited the Asian's influence in both the central and local government. Membership in councils of government has never been more than half that of Europeans and is now about equal to the African number. The two ministerial posts presently assigned to Asians in the Council of Ministers do not cover significant fields, all important posts going to Europeans.[14]

Asian ideology has been rooted in equal political and social opportunity for all, particularly with Europeans. Asian political power in the 1920's had an important voice in British Imperial politics, but with the granting of independence to India and the abolition of the India Office, access to positions of high authority has been restricted. With India's growing position in the Asian-Arab world, any appeal by Kenya Asians in that direction would confirm European anxiety over their divided loyalties. Attempts at political boycott and alliances with the Africans have failed as measures to enforce the demanded equality with the other immigrant community.

Asians seek to retain their formal influence within the parliamentary system in the face of emerging African power and continued

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14. It is interesting to note that in the present Kenya Council of Ministers the allocations under the Three and a Half Year Plan by Ministerial Portfolios (1954-1957) are as follows: of the two active European Ministers (one being without portfolio) - 36.1% of the total; of the one active Asian Minister (one being without portfolio) - 12.3% of the total; of the one African Minister - 0.5%. These expenditures are based on a three and a half year budget of £23.7 million. Colonial Office List 1956, H.M.S.O., 1955.

European claims of dominance. Racial and religious conflicts promoted by racial isolation have reduced the possibility of substantial and sustained political action. Economic clashes occur, but religion is the basis for organization and within this frame Asian political activity takes place. In large measure disparate religious affiliations prevent a united political front in opposition to European power, despite the drive for such a front by the Kenya Indian Congress and its predecessor. A limited number of positions of prestige are available to Asian leaders in the professions and the commercial community. Competition among these leaders has been keen, and all groups have used their religious influence in support of their political and social aspirations. Both Sikhs and Muslims sought separate representation in the Legislative Council with the Muslims succeeding in 1952.[15] European policies have for the most part fostered more dissension among the Asians than unity. European settlers have not hesitated to exploit these divisions by favoring Muslim minorities against the Hindu majority.

In summary, Asian political power is limited compared to the other communities. After the 1920-23 Indian question effective opposition to European domination ended. With the rise of African leadership and the intransigence of the Europeans, the Asian community is caught in between. It will be this group that will be most weakened by future power shifts.

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15. "The Report of the Committee on Indian Electoral Representation," Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Legislative Council Debates, 13, 14, 18 December 1951, col. 1024-1028, 1075-1094.

European Grouping. The Imperial Government invited European colonization of Kenya shortly after the turn of the century, largely to support the Uganda Railway, which opened in 1901. Lord Delamere, who had visited the highlands of Kenya, urged Britons to take advantage of this valuable land. As a result upper middle class British and a large number of South Africans, affected by the depression following the Boer War, were among the early European settlers. Under the forceful leadership of Delamere the small white group elicited important concessions from the Imperial Government. In 1919 the elective principle was adopted for selecting European unofficials to the Legislative Council. A heated 'Indian question' ensued for the next four years resulting in the establishment of the present form of communal representation. What Professor Dilley calls the 'campaign of commissions' began in 1924.[16] The first was the Parliamentary Commission to East Africa under the chairmanship of the Honorable W. Ormsby-Gore to obtain information for the East Africa (Southborough) Committee, one of two appointed by the Secretary of State to inquire into trusteeship. In 1927 the Hilton Young Commission considered the question of closer union of the East and Central African territories. Its report published in 1929 led to the sending of Sir Samuel Wilson, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Kenya to achieve a plan acceptable to the Europeans, yet fulfilling the major recommendations of the Hilton Young Commission. With the issuance by

16. Marjorie Ruth Dilley, British Policy in Kenya Colony (New York, 1937), p. 18.

the Government of its conclusions on closer union a Joint Select
Committee of Parliament was appointed in November, 1930 to consider
them. After this Lord Moyne was to study finance; Mr. Roger Gibb,
railway rates and finance; the Carter Land Commission, native claims;
and the Bushe Commission to consider judicial organization. The
campaign of commissions suggests at the very least a decade of unrest
in the dominant community at the time, the Europeans.

The world wide depression of the thirties hit Kenya hard.
Despite measures of retrenchment by Government and private citizens
alike, many farmers became insolvent, adding to the general grief
of the settlers. Throughout this period the Kenya Government became
the whipping boy of the European community and efforts toward self-
government were revived during periods of major disagreement. The
Imperial Government, however, was adamant in the 1930's against any
major political change, despite some renewed demands on the part of
European settlers. The income tax struggle of the thirties was used
to establish major settler influence over financial policy in the
Legislative Council, and to obtain a large share of influence in the
Executive Council.

Despite the fact that European colonists are outnumbered by
approximately 170 to 1,[17] they are the dominant group, the one which

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17. British colonial civil servants are included in the demographic
    estimates of the European population. No clear distinction can be
    made between the permanent and non-permanent sectors of the European
    population since some local Europeans are civil servants and others
    are retired British civil servants. The permanent European popula-
    tion is estimated to be 35,000.

wields the greatest power. Two main reasons for their power are:
1) the economic superiority they possess over Asians and Africans; 2)
close cultural links with Great Britain. Considering the cultural
heritage of the European first, it is evident that its basis in British
traditions, values and techniques has given him an advantage in the
pursuit of power within Kenya's formal structure of authority. The
propensity of the British to organize effective political action in
the constitutional process, access to and influence over positions of
authority locally and in Great Britain, the appeal to 'kith and kin'
in the mother country, plus an intimate knowledge of parliamentary
rules--all have contributed to the achievement of European dominance.

The economic superiority of the European in Kenya is due
primarily to his technical skill and education as well as the capital
at his disposal. He is able to use modern methods in organizing the
factors of production and to achieve economies available only to
large scale capital users. These have resulted in a higher standard
of living for the Europeans than for either the Africans or the Asians.
The average white wage is double that of the Indian and several times
higher than the African. Stemming from economic superiority is the
position of European dominance in the internal affairs of Kenya, the
continued reservation of the "White Highlands" and the control of the
largest proportion of commerce, mining and industry. The overflow of
control into the social sphere is evidenced by the color bar in all
phases of Kenya life.

From their initial occupation of the territory Europeans have considered themselves political and social elites, the only group that should, and from their viewpoint could, exercise authority. The pursuit of this ideal by aggressive attempts to control all situations has been the history of racial politics in Kenya. Under the dynamic leadership of Lord Delamere, aided by political victories over the Imperial Government, European belief grew in the feasibility of complete political control. In part this belief was fostered by the ambivalence of British policy, the willingness of successive Governors to consider seriously and act favorably on many European demands. At no time was the possibility of European control positively denied, and they found encouragement in the granting of self-government to Southern Rhodesia in 1923. European self-government was a distinct possibility in their minds. If justification was not found in ability alone it was certainly due as their 'natural right.' Lord Hailey has written that in certain periods European settler interests "have exercised an influence on policy hardly less than that which they might have attained under a fully developed form of responsible government."[18]

The prewar political development of Kenya was characterized by a drive to enlarge European influence; since World War II their efforts have been directed toward consolidating this hard won position. A detailed study of this change will be made in the next chapter.

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18. Lord Hailey, An African Survey (London, 1938), p. 383. See also Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa (Cmd. 3234) (1929), p. 89.

CHAPTER III - GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN DOMINANCE

Two facts are paramount when considering Kenya politics:
1) the ultimate control of all Kenya activities lies in the hands of
the Imperial Government; 2) that Government has stated repeatedly and
officially that eventually Kenya would obtain self-government. As
in many other parts of the British Dependent Empire, the discrepancy
between the men on the spot and Whitehall is in the meaning of the
word eventual, in other words, the timing of what is assured.

European Political Organizations. Professor Dilley points
out that in 1902, before there was a concerted effort to colonize
East Africa, the Colonists' Association was formed to save the high-
lands for white settlement.[19] A year later this Association was
taken over by the Planters' and Farmers' Association, largely to
facilitate marketing. By 1905 its interests were predominantly
political and concerned with all the settlers, and the name was changed
back to the Colonists' Association. With the rapid increase of settle-
ment, district associations sprang up dealing with local interests
and in the main non-political. A certain degree of animosity prevailed
between the small groups and the Colonists' Association until 1910
when Lord Delamere formed the Convention of Associations to unite the
district organizations. The older main body became the Nairobi
Colonists' Association and a member of the new Convention. An

19. Dilley, British Policy in Kenya, p. 36.

Executive Committee provided continuity between the time of the regular bi-annual meetings. Resolutions that were adopted were sent to the Government as the representative view of the settlers and it was customary for Governors and/or officials to attend Convention meetings to answer inquiries. Prior to elective representation to the legislature in 1920, the Convention was the major means of expressing European opinion.

Though the organization lapsed during World War I it was quickly reformed in 1918 with larger and more vocalized interests. A year later at a welcoming dinner for General Edward Northey, the new Governor, held coincidentally with an annual meeting of the Convention, Major Grogan, the then President of the Convention, addressed the group for two hours directing his remarks to the new Governor. He said in effect, after outlining the aims of the Convention, that if the Governor cooperated with them, they would help him; if not, then they would actively oppose him. Up to the time of elected representation Department Heads of the Government not only discussed matters before the Convention but in cases were roundly criticized. After the principle of elected representation was conceded to the Europeans, Elected Members were censured by Convention if they failed to consult them before making decisions. For complete cooperation, they were praised. Thus, Elected European Members were responsible both to their constituencies and to the Convention. Under the guidance of Lord Delamere this organization was an important factor during the 1920's. It gave the impression that a united European front existed,

when actually the small commercial community was not in sympathy with the Convention. Because of their organization they wielded tremendous influence beyond their constitutional position and their numbers. They adhered to the basic tenet of agitation because of its effectiveness; a spontaneous campaign of protest could be organized in a few short weeks.[20]

The Convention operated in much the same way as its successor, the Electors' Union; that is, as an active interest group concerned only with European ambitions. There would have been little reason for its existence if it could not present to the Government the European consensus on particular matters. Three main drives have dominated the workings of both the Convention and the Union: membership, money and issues (not necessarily in order of importance). The Executive of the organization knew that they could only claim true representation if the membership rolls were swelled. The financing of this organization took large sums of money. Deputations to England had to be paid for, a central organization had to be maintained, and a vast communication system kept up. Money came in from members and non-members at a rate indicative of the political temperament of the Colony. When major issues were in the fore, funds were easily available. But at other times, apathy took hold, and only minor financial support could be found.

20. Mr. MacGregor Ross says that the Governors have always been subservient to the Convention. This, he thinks, was partly the result of the vocal ability of the organization which made it easier for the Governor if he agreed with it.... Its unattractive feature has been its abuse of those officials who, in its opinion, thwarted it. He speaks of the Convention as the Colony's "Big Noise." (167 H.C. Debates 5s, 25 July, 1923, col. 521.) as quoted in Dilley, p. 41.

It may be said that neither the Convention nor the Union was entirely representative. At the peak period of settler population and with major issues burning, the total active sustained membership of the Union was never more than 4,000 people. There were open splits at times with the Associated Chambers of Commerce and with the general commercial community. The agricultural group, not the commercial group, were the active supporters of the Convention and the Union.[21]

In the thirties the influence of the Convention of Associations began to decline. The depression crippled the Kenya economy and made active interest in politics secondary to survival. A few issues during this period rallied the Convention and were heard by Government. These dealt primarily with tax and fiscal matters. Perhaps the last important act of the Convention of Associations was the part it played in the fostering of Executive Council reorganization as a compromise for the imposition of an income tax.

With the coming of World War II, political agitation and activity was held in abeyance for the duration. The war period witnessed a great surge in Kenya's economy, and the postwar period brought great numbers of new immigrants. However, Kenya's European population was becoming largely urbanized, and a new type of vigorous organization was felt to be needed. In 1942 a Nyanza Province European Electors' Association was formed; soon most other rural and settled areas began to form

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21. I am again indebted to Dr. Rosberg for allowing me to use material he collected while a Ford Fellow in Kenya. This includes files from 1943 to 1955 containing practically all the minutes of the Electors' Union meetings, plus newspaper reports on Kenya activities during the same period. This information on the Electors' Union is derived primarily from this source.

local organizations. A national organization was lacking. By
October 1943 six Electors' Associations held a conference at Nakuru
to discuss the need for a unified central body. An organizational
committee of the Convention of Electors' Associations held several
meetings to discuss the nature and role of the new territorial
organization. Suggestions were made to make the new group an advisory
body to the European Elected Members Organization, and to attempt
unification with the old Convention of Associations, which was dormant
but still possessed a treasury. Both plans failed. However, at a
convention of Electors on March 24, 1944, attended by representatives
of ten of the eleven European constituencies, a new organization was
formally founded--the European Electors' Union. Among the aims of
the Union at this time were: mobilization of European voting strength;
to act as an advisory body to the European Elected Members; to safe-
guard the White Highlands; to increase white settlement in the colony
by every means; and "to reiterate and press for the right of the
white community in Kenya to be consulted by and associated with Gov-
ernment in their joint responsibility as trustees of Native Africans..."[22]

It is interesting to note that in at least one respect neither
the Convention nor the Union was effective over the years, i.e., in
mobilizing European voting strength. Chronicles of Kenya history
make continuing reference to the apathy of the voters in general
elections, regardless of the period. The 1944 election was no exception.

22. East African Standard, March 24, 1944.

Despite the six year tenure of the Council (extended two years because of the war) and the pre-election discontent, plus the tub-thumping by the Union for a large turnout—there were contests in only four constituencies, resulting in only one defeat. Two new men came to the Legislature—one by contest and one unopposed.[23] Taking into consideration the war, the number of troops who were away, etc., this is not an unusual showing for a Kenya election. The same over-all conditions existed in Northern Rhodesia, but there participation was much higher. This, it would appear, reinforces the idea that settler organizations lived on issues and were unable to maintain sustained interest in Kenya affairs even at election time.

Since the granting of elective representation in 1920, Kenya has always had some sort of European Elected Member group (now known as the European Elected Members' Organization), a loose unofficial association of the Elected Members of the Legislative Council, with one of their own who is designated 'leader.'[24] It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of this organization. Much depended upon the personal leadership of its members—such as Lord Delamere, who dominated it and the Convention of Associations for years. Although clashes between the Elected Members and the Convention of Associations were rare until the postwar period, such clashes were evident from 1945 until 1952. Their clashes have their basis in the unwillingness of Elected Members to be directly responsible to the Electors' Union rather than their individual constituencies. On the whole, however,

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23. *East Africa and Rhodesia*, Vol. 21, No. 1046 (October 5, 1944), p. 105.

24. Not until 1934 did elected Europeans select a Leader and a Whip, agree on general policy and bind votes. Lord Delamere had been Chairman in the past.

Elected Members have always considered it necessary to account for their actions to this organization of public opinion. An agreement was reached at one time whereby the Executive of the Union would act as a secretariat to the European Elected Members' Organization, which bound the two groups closely together.

Perhaps one example may be given to show the effectiveness of the Union and the European Elected Members' Organization when joined together in opposition to the Imperial Government. The matter of closer union of the East African Territories had been under discussion for many years. On November 22, 1945 the Governor issued a statement, after discussions with the Colonial Secretary in London, to the effect that amalgamation of the East African territories was not practical at this time. On December 12, 1945 the Colonial Office issued the document 'Colonial 191' on Inter-territorial Organization in East Africa, for exploratory purposes. It received a violent reaction in Kenya because of the suggestion that a proposed inter-territorial assembly seat members on the basis of racial equality. Ten days after issuance on December 22, 1945 the majority of the Elected Members, through their organization and supported by the Electors' Union, categorically rejected Colonial 191. The balance of European members in the Legislative Council merely rejected aspects of it. The reaction that followed was the high point in effectiveness of the Union judged by the sharp increase in membership, swelling of the treasury and growing opposition to it from the Coast Province and the commercial community in general and the Associated Chambers of Commerce in particular.

Battle of Theories. One of the determinants in the present day evolvement of Kenya was the Indian-European conflict or the Indian question of the early 1920's. A detailed investigation into the Indian question is beyond the scope of this work. However, the main outline of this clash of interests needs to be described. The Indian-European conflict led to other considerations and to a general examination of the relationship of all three racial groups to one another in the political system. Prominent among these considerations were the theories and concepts of paramountcy, trusteeship and dual policy.[25]

In the granting of elective representation to the Kenya Europeans in 1919 no provision had been made for Indian representation. However, in the same year Lord Milner, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, instructed the Governor that the Council should comprise in addition to the eleven European Members, two Indian Members elected communally by the Indian community. This action on the part of Lord Milner brought into political focus the Indian crisis which culminated in 1923. The Indians had behind them the India Office and a resolution of the 1921 Imperial Conference favoring removal of Indian disabilities in the Dominions. An initial attempt at settlement of the matter came when the British Government accepted proposals agreed upon between the Colonial and India Offices. These provided for a

25. The Indian question is well covered in Dilley, British Policy in Kenya, cited earlier. For a thorough study of communalism in Kenya see Carl G. Rosberg Jr., A Study of Communal Representation in Constitutional Systems of the British Commonwealth with Special Reference to Fiji, Kenya and Ceylon (D. Phil. thesis; Oxford University, St. Antony College, 1954) Volume I.

common roll with property or education qualifications so that the

Indian voters would be limited to 10 per cent of the total voters.

In addition there would be complete freedom of Indian immigration.

This was unacceptable to the Europeans, and in the spring of 1923

Lord Delamere headed a delegation to South Africa and the United

Kingdom to present the European case and demands. Though ineffective

in South Africa, the London meetings resulted in an agreement which

allowed eleven European Elected Members as before, but a total of

five Indian Members elected on a communal franchise.[26] The White

Paper which set forth this settlement stated, after reviewing the

history of the problem, that both Indian and European communities

agreed that it was important to safeguard the interest of native

Africans. The White Paper stated that:

> Primarily, Kenya is an African territory, and His
> Majesty's Government think it necessary definitely to
> record that the interests of the natives must be para-
> mount (underscoring the author's) and that if, and when,
> those interests and the interests of the immigrant
> races should conflict, the former should prevail....
> But in the administration of Kenya His Majesty's Govern-
> ment regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf
> of the African population, and they are unable to dele-
> gate or share this trust, the object of which may be
> defined as the protection and advancement of the native
> races.[27]

Among other things the paper precluded any thought of self-government

in the foreseeable future.

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26. _Indians in Kenya, Memorandum_ (Cmd. 1922) (1923), called the
    Devonshire Paper after the then Colonial Secretary.

27. Ibid., p. 9.

From the above declaration stems what has been called the battle of ideologies. In attempting to contain the Indians, the Europeans became more solicitous of African interests than they actually were. Paramountcy carried to its logical conclusions might well have led to the eventual exclusion of Europeans from Kenya. Thus in 1924 when the Report of the East African Commission enunciated the "dual policy" the European community looked upon it more favorably than paramountcy.[28] The Report stated that throughout East Africa the native is regarded as a child, which implies that the Europeans should act as guardians of the African natives. In giving this definition of trusteeship the Report stated that a moral duty and attitude is imposed upon the trustee. There is, however, another kind of trusteeship which the European exercises in tropical Africa:

> As Sir Frederick Lugard has pointed out...we are not
> only trustees for the development and advance in civiliza-
> tion of the Africans, but we are also trustees for the
> world of very rich territories. This means that we have
> a duty to humanity to develop the vast economic resources
> of a great continent. There is no reason to suppose that
> these trusteeships either should or do conflict.[29]

Thus in addition to the usual understanding of trusteeship, i.e., maintenance of peace, security and justice for the natives, was added the concept of the economic development of the indigenous people. In

28. Report of the East Africa Commission, 1925 (Cmd. 2387) (1925), p. 22. Professor Dilley notes that the idea of "dual policy" had been developed in Kenya before that of paramountcy but the term was first used in 1924. It actually arose over the position of the Imperial Government with regard to labor policy. Dilley, pp. 181-186; 234.

29. Report of the East African Commission, p. 22.

this light trusteeship became an integral part of the dual policy,

for if the native was to receive the services the trustee was obliged to

give, he (the native) had to produce enough to provide for these ser-

vices.[30] Dual policy was discussed in various White Papers and by

several Commissions during the balance of the 1920's. In the final

analysis the idea of dual policy gained acceptance over that of

paramountcy.

Allied to dual policy but distinct from it was the concept of

dual trusteeship, i.e., Europeans in Kenya should share with the

Imperial Government the trust for the interests of the natives.

Though never formally expressed prior to the publication of the 1927

White Paper,[31] it was implied in the demand for a European elected

majority in the Legislative Council. Though an elected majority was

not granted until 1948 it was one of the main drives toward ultimate

self-government and is intricately tied up with the political develop-

ment of Kenya. It was inconceivable to the settler that he should

undertake an elected majority without at least sharing in, if not

taking over, trust commitments of the Imperial Government. In this

vein the Europeans were encouraged by the 1927 White Paper,[32] which

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30. This development of the complex concept of 'dual policy' is
    based partly on Rosberg, Study of Communal Representation, 1954.

31. Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa (Cmd. 2904) (1927)

32. There were three official statements of policy in East Africa
    after 1920 which are known as White Papers: Indians in Kenya
    (Cmd. 1922) (1923), previously cited; (Cmd. 2904) (1927), cited
    above; and Memorandum on native policy in East Africa, (Cmd. 3573)
    1930).

recommended that the colonists be associated with the execution of
this trust. Mr. Amery, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies,
favored such an association. But the Hilton Young Commission[33] did
not affirm the principle of dual trusteeship. In 1930 Lord Passfield,
the Labour Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated in Memorandum
on Native Policy in East Africa that the responsibility for trustee-
ship could not be devolved. The abrupt change is due partly to the
Labour Government which was then in office. In the next year Lord
Passfield did not greatly clarify the issue when he told the Joint
Select Committee that he accepted the 1927 White Paper which granted
association in trusteeship to the resident European community. He
said, "There is no departure intended in the White Paper of 1930
from the White Paper of 1923.... I am in a position to say that the
White Paper (1930) does carry out the 1927 White Paper in so far as
it differs from the 1923 White Paper."[34] It is somewhat difficult to
reconcile this statement with the other White Papers. The Joint
Select Committee in 1931 recommended that the responsibility for
trusteeship should be retained by the Imperial Government but it
accepted the principle that non-natives should increasingly be associ-
ated in the discharge of the trust.

33. Named after the chairman of the Commission, it issued the Report
    of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern
    and Central Africa (Cmd. 3234) (1929).

34. Joint Select Committee: Minutes of Evidence, H.C. Paper No. 1956,
    1931, Vol. II.

This appears to be the last official pronouncement on dual trusteeship.[35] The ideal, however, had not been dropped by the Europeans. In the postwar period the European Electors' Union declared it to be their right to "associate with Government in their joint responsibility as trustees of Native Africans."

Having touched on the different problems and theories for action which arose in the 1920's, it is well to note again that they are inextricably tied up with both the demand for an elected European majority and the movement towards a union of East Africa. The White Papers issued at this time and the very 'campaign of commissions' had as their central goal the clarification of Kenya problems. The problems were indeed pressing, or at least made to look so by the vocal European minority. It is doubtful that the Imperial Government and the House of Commons would have given the matter such constant attention unless it was thought to be urgent. It is likely also that the economic depression of the thirties was a welcome political breather in the movement towards European demands. The effectiveness of the Joint Select Committee cannot be overestimated; its most important contribution was that it said nothing new, apparently just what all 'contestants' wished to hear. The exhaustive nature of the Committee's Report left little to be desired in the field of investigation. As for union of East Africa, the Committee said that "this is not the time for taking any far reaching step in the direction of

35. Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, Vol. I, Report (H.C. Paper No. 156) (1931), p. 28. The pertinent references to the House of Commons Papers are found in Rosberg, Study of Communal Representation, Chap. V.

formal union." As mentioned above the Committee recommended that the
responsibility for trusteeship should be retained by the Imperial
Government. Concerning the Kenya Legislative Council the Committee
recommended the maintenance of an official majority and the continu-
ation of the communal basis of representation. In effect East Africa
made no progress in the solution of its difficulties and stood
approximately at the same place it did in January 1927. Professor
Dilley sums up the two principal issues adroitly:

> The Europeans urged closer union in connection with an
> elected majority for themselves in their Legislative
> Council but, when the tables were turned and an elected
> or unofficial majority was considered to be feasible
> only if there were some central authority with power in
> certain fields to maintain Imperial interests, they
> ceased to be interested.[36]

It may be added to the above quote that they ceased to be interested
'pro tem.'

As mentioned before, the income tax struggle of the 1930's
was the signal for renewed demands of European elected majority. It
was in July 1932 that the Imperial Government introduced an income
tax measure and the settlers replied with 'taxation without represen-
tation.' When it was found that the Imperial Government was adamant
in its stand against an unofficial majority, the European community
acted to circumvent the normal channels of political development by
pressing, quite openly, for European control of the Executive branch
of government, in that way establishing themselves securely in a

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36. Dilley, p. 84.

dominant position. The first major step in this direction was taken in August 1945 when Major F. W. Cavendish-Bentinck, a European Elected Member, was made Member for Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Natural Resources, assuming that portfolio in the Executive Council.

In this period Indian claims were predominantly defensive, urging the adoption of the common electoral roll. The African community was dormant. The issue of closer union was more an academic problem by the late 1930's. Each of these factors is further discussed in the following chapter dealing with the postwar period.

CHAPTER IV - POSTWAR KENYA: EUROPEAN CONSOLIDATION

It can be very generally said that the predominant theme in postwar Kenya politics was the institutionalization of the European power position. But like any generalization, this leaves a great deal unsaid. Depending on the definition given to 'postwar period' another unmistakable development was the emergence of limited African leadership. European political power had to be more and more concerned with the emergence of African leadership and the potential represented by incipient African nationalism.

European leadership in the postwar period came to the conclusion that the possibilities of gaining control of the legislature were limited. The possibility of gaining control of the Executive Council offered a fruitful avenue of exploration, but it was vital that the system of parity of representation between European and non-European interests in the Legislative Council be maintained. The issue of parity of representation became a major one and plans for European over-all control in the Executive Council were abandoned, although not forgotten.

Closer Union - The End of a Struggle. The twin issues of closer East African union and European elected majority made up the fabric of Kenya political life from the mid-20's until 1950. If one were to weigh the wordage spilled on these two questions it would probably outbalance all other issues combined. The idea of closer union became significant when Tanganyika came under British control

after the first World War. It was initiated by the Imperial Government and thought to be economically feasible. Although occasional meetings had been held since 1919, the first formal conference of East African Governors took place in Nairobi in 1926. Mr. L. S. Amery, then Colonial Secretary, was actively interested in closer union and spoke of "the ideal of a united East Africa." Lord Delamere originally opposed the idea, but when he sensed its inevitability he tied the essential qualification of an unofficial European majority in the Kenya Legislative Council to any move toward closer union. The matter remained in generally this position until 1945. It had survived the 'campaign of commissions' and the decade of the thirties with little more effected than the recommendation of the Joint Select Committee that there be established a Joint Inter-territorial Secretariat and regular Governors' Conferences. As mentioned earlier, it remained an academic question throughout the 1930's, although in 1934 and 1935 resolutions were passed by Europeans in both territories urging that circumstances had so changed as to render the early union of Kenya and Tanganyika desirable.

During the war years, through the medium of the Governors' Conference and its Secretariat, a large degree of cooperation and common action existed among the three territories, indicating not only the feasibility of union but in some instances providing the instrument to carry out a particular function. In December 1945, as mentioned above, Colonial 191 on Inter-territorial Organization in East Africa was issued 'for discussion only.' It proposed the creation

of an East African High Commission made up of the three Governors
of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, a permanent Secretariat to cor-
relate common inter-territorial services, mainly economic. In
addition an East African Central Assembly was proposed which would
seat nominated members and representatives elected by the unofficial
Members of each Legislature in a ratio of one European, one Indian
and one African. The proposal made explicit the point that if accepted
the political fusion of the territories would not be involved. The
furor caused by the submission of this proposal was discussed above.
Several reasons were given, but the 'categorical rejection' was based
mainly on the proposal of equal representation. The Electors' Union
began an active campaign to oppose the proposal and backed unanimously
the categorical rejection. The proposal was called a frontal assault
on the European position in Kenya, although it was found acceptable
in Indian and African quarters. In contrast to the high degree of
unanimity on rejection, there was very little forthcoming in the way
of counter proposals that all could agree on. It was not until May
of 1946 that alternate proposals of the European Elected Members were
published. The principal suggestion was that a Standing East African
Council be appointed, with a Secretariat, for a period of four years
initially, and that unofficial members of the Council be nominated
by the territorial Governors, not elected. The East Africa and
Rhodesia in an editorial termed the alternate proposals a "negation
of statesmanship."[37] The East African Standard maintained them to

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37. East Africa and Rhodesia, May 30, 1946.

be unworkable, while Mr. S. V. Cooke, Elected Member from the Coast Province said they were "monstrous and fantastic."[38] The alternate proposals caused an open rift between Coast and commercial elements on the one hand and the upland representatives on the other, for there were important economic benefits to be gained by the commercial community through the creation of a High Commission. The commercial community also believed that the agricultural sector of the population had reacted irrationally and could think only in terms of the status quo. A sub-committee of the Electors' Union meanwhile drew up and approved a complicated new constitution that insured European predominance.

In the summer of 1946 Mr. A. Creech-Jones, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, toured East Africa and met with various groups endeavoring to dispel fears and calm the agitation which had arisen. In 1947 revised proposals of the Imperial Government were published.[39] These provided for a Central Legislative Assembly composed of a Speaker, seven ex officio members who would be officers in the High Commission, three nominated official members, one from each territory, and four members appointed from the unofficial side of each Legislature, one each Indian, African and European, while the fourth would be an at-large member representing all the unofficials. Although the European community was generally in favor of the revised proposals it was felt that their position in the Legislative Assembly

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38. East African Standard, May 17, 24, 1946.

39. Inter-territorial Organisation in East Africa, Revised Proposals (Col. No. 210) (1947)

would be jeopardized by an increase in the non-European representation in the Legislative Council. With the Governor's announcement that an unofficial majority might be linked to the revised White Paper, and that the fourth member would be a European, European opinion solidified behind the proposals. Although the Imperial Government denied it, the principle of equal representation had been abandoned. The Indian and African communities were opposed to the revised plan; the East Indian National Congress called the new White Paper "this unhappy surrender" and a victory for the Europeans. The Governor, Sir Philip Mitchell, proposed that the official members of the revised Kenya Legislature should number 15 and the unofficials 22, consisting of 11 Europeans, 5 Indians, 4 Africans and 2 Arabs. There would also be a speaker of the Legislative Council.

African representation was considered at this time as part of the general reorganization of the Council. In early 1947 Mr. B. A. Ohanga, a member of the Luo tribe and a former school master, was appointed to the vacancy created by the resignation of Archdeacon Beecher who had represented African interests since 1943. The Reverend Archdeacon recommended to the Governor that African representation be increased to six, a suggestion strongly endorsed by Mr. Mathu, the African nominated unofficial representative in the Council. After discussions with unofficials in the Legislature the Governor recommended that African representation be increased to 4, one each to represent Nyanza Province; Central Province, including Nairobi; Coast Province; Rift Valley Province and the remainder of the Colony.

Africans would continue to be nominated by the Governor after he is advised by the local native councils.

On April 16, 1947[40] the revised proposals for inter-territorial organization were voted upon in the Kenya Legislature and accepted by a thirty to eight division,[41] all Indian, Arab and African members voting in opposition. On July 28, 1947 the Secretary of State for the Colonies announced in the House of Commons that the inter-territorial organization would come into force on January 1, 1948.[42]

Thus the question that had so long plagued Kenya was settled not in terms of a political union, but merely as a limited administrative one for specific common services. European demands for an elected majority in the Legislative Council prevented the Imperial Government from the creation of the political union of East Africa in 1930. By 1946, political union was not possible because of African fears in Uganda and Tanganyika of European settler control or influence. Something far less than 'closer union' had to be accepted, but even here European unwillingness to accept the principle of equal representation made the Imperial Government make important modifications. It also demonstrated again to Indian and African leadership the dominant role the European settlers had in influencing and in dictating public policy. That is the meaning of this "unhappy surrender."

40. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Legislative Council Debates, 16 April, 1947, col. 26.

41. Ibid., 17 April, col. 97.

42. 441 H.C. Debates 5s, 28 July, 1947, col. 15.

The 1947 High Commission Order in Council, which became effective
on January 1, 1948, provided that the Central Legislative Assembly
should have a life of four years, terminating on December 31, 1951.
During 1951, however, the Legislative Councils of Uganda, Tanganyika
and Kenya passed resolutions moving for a continuance of the Assembly
for an additional four year period "in its existing form and without
change of function." The necessary provision was made in the East
Africa (High Commission) (Amendment) Order in Council, 1951, which
came into operation on 6th December, 1951.[43] Effective December 12,
1956 representation in the Assembly was broadened and strengthened
from 24 to 34. The nominated members were increased from 3 to 6 and
the unofficials from 13 to 20. Two nominated members were appointed
by each territorial Governor.[44]

Parity of Representation - An Irreducible Minimum. There is
little doubt that the heart of Kenya's political problem is the
difficult question of representation. The land question, which looms
large, the color bar, the economic disparity between Europeans and
Africans--all are important in the Kenya picture. Important social
and economic reforms could be undertaken without an immediate challenge
to European dominance in the Legislative Council. However, to maintain
their position of dominance, or "leadership" as Europeans phrase it,
it is vital that there the balance in representation between Europeans

43. Colonial Office, Annual Report on the East Africa High Commission,
    1954 (London: H.M.S.O., 1955), p. 89.

44. The Times, December 6, 1956.

and non-Europeans be maintained. Europeans argue that any increase
in non-European representation without a comparable increase in their
representation would be the first step in the swamping of the European
community. It is for this reason that they have held fast to this
principle, and even in the present Council of Ministers the principle
is acknowledged and accepted. In fact, it accounts in large measure
for the particular type of constitution that Kenya possesses, that
called multi-racial government.

During the postwar period the Indian community was weakened
by internal divisions along religious lines. In 1935 three Indian
electoral areas had been created, two of which were to return two
members to the Legislative Council and the other, one member.
Previously the whole territory had formed one constituency returning
five Indian members. Temporary legislation was introduced in 1948
to reserve two of these seats for the Indian Muslims. This legislation
was reenacted until 1951, when a bill was passed which included a
separate electoral roll for the Indian Muslims to return two of their
own representatives. The main reason for the split was perhaps the
fear on the part of Indian Muslims of being overwhelmed by the numeri-
cally superior Hindu section. The East African Indian National
Congress opposed the move when it was first demanded in 1946. The
Congress feared that Indian political representation would be made
more ineffectual and that this would hinder their demand for a common

Indian or Asian-European franchise.[45] European leadership in general
was not unhappy at the prospect of the Indian split. Although the
Indians posed no great threat, they were constantly pressing for a
common roll and in a very few instances joined with the Africans in
opposing certain legislation. With the separate Muslim roll the
Europeans were able to say that a common roll was impractical because
the Indian community could not even agree among itself.

While the splintering of the Indian community indicates the
unhappy aspects of communal representation, that is, the proliferation
and parallel development rather than unity; balanced representation or
parity demonstrates the acuteness of the problem of political repre-
sentation in a multi-racial society. The problem was not manifested
until 1950 when the Governor announced that the Imperial Government
intended to appoint further African and Indian representatives to the
unofficial side of the Legislature. The campaign by the Europeans
to maintain parity between themselves and the non-Europeans was
motivated by their intent to retain domination or "leadership," as
they preferred to call it, over the affairs of the Colony. Without

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45. Mr. A. B. Patel gave two reasons for the Muslim-Hindu split: "A
large number of voters on the Indian roll did not care to exercise
their votes on the merits of a candidate·and were often influenced
by the caste, religion or section of the candidate concerned.
That was one of the most unfortunate reasons which created diffi-
culties. And as events in India became worse...the candidates
exploited the situation by appealing to the religion, caste or
section of the voters, and unfortunately, most of the voters suc-
cumbed to such appeals." Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Legis-
lative Council Debates, 13 December, 1951, col. 1026. And
Rosberg, Communal Representation, Vol. I, p. 349.

parity, which was their "irreducible minimum," the attempt to secure increasing European influence in the Executive Council (which began in the late 1930's and was progressing well) would be to no avail. European attitudes were based on the common belief that their domination had to continue. But there was little agreement as to the methods to be employed in securing this domination in the face of increasing African demands. In June 1948 the Electors' Union conference passed a resolution declaring the immediate political objective of the European community should be to gain the greatest possible measure of control over their own affairs.[46] In 1950 the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Electors' Union told the conference they must steer a course between the extremists and the Fabians. "While all races in Kenya must work together in accord, the Europeans and especially the British must be the senior partners."[47] In the Kenya Plan the Union stated: "We oppose those who see self-government for the African and by the African as a practicable possibility within any foreseeable future."[48]

Two other related factors should be pointed out here, both of which made the maintenance of parity a necessity to European leadership. The first was the lingering hope held by the European community that a union of East and Central Africa was a definite possibility; the second was the trend of constitutional development in Tanganyika, a trend which would threaten ultimate unity.

46. East African Standard, 25 June, 1948.

47. Ibid., 16 June, 1948.

48. The Electors' Union, The Kenya Plan (Nairobi, 1949). For a criticism of the Plan see East Africa and Rhodesia, 27 October, 1949.

Regarding East and Central African unity, there were some inter-territorial meetings with Northern Rhodesia in the middle 1920's, though problems closer to home prevented any really active interest. Kenya was throughout this courtship the suitor, Northern Rhodesia being somewhat apprehensive at inheriting the multi-racial difficulties of Kenya so long as her own native situation was relatively stable. Concerning the other two Central African territories, Nyasaland was considered almost entirely bush and valueless, while self-governing Southern Rhodesia was clearly not interested. Active interest in East and Central unity came in the late 1940's. The report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Tanganyika in 1949 was viewed in Kenya with antagonism and as a threat to the growing idea of East and Central African union and the concept of European control. In the early part of 1949 the Kenya Electors' Union was invited by Sir Godfrey Huggins, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, to send an observer to the Victoria Falls Conference, which was trying to find a basis for Central African unity. This Conference had little to do with East and Central African union, although it was a great encouragement to the Kenyans who were interested in East and Central African union. Consequently when the Tanganyika Government announced in December 1949 its proposals for the constitutional reform it was a direct challenge to the unionist group in Kenya. These constitutional reforms would upset the whole basis of East and Central African unity. The Electors' Union announced that they proposed to "frustrate with

all the means in their power the proposed constitutional changes in
Tanganyika which may mean the end of British rule in that territory."[49]

Throughout 1950 the matter of East and Central African unity
was pushed by the Electors' Union. That the move was not as strong
as the Union would have one believe is indicated by the precarious
financial position of the Electors' Union at that time and a drive
for membership because of falling interest. Additional meetings were
held between representatives of the East and Central African terri-
tories on a purely informal basis. In early 1952 a meeting was held
between representatives of the Electors' Union and the Tanganyika
European Council. It was stated that Sir Godfrey Huggins would shortly
go to the United Kingdom to press for arrangements for a Central
African Federation and a conference to be held in London during the
summer of 1952. It was thought necessary that the six territories
should agree on a common statement of principles to be presented to
the London conference if union was to be successful at all. There is
no record that such a common statement was presented to the London
Conference. It appears, however, that two factions were involved in
the move for East and Central African unity: the one represented at
the meeting mentioned above and the other, perhaps the dominant,
represented by the Executive Committee of the Electors' Union. The
reason for this is the watered-down statement of policy made in the
Annual Report of the Electors' Union in June 1952. Contrasted to the

49. See the Electors' Union Annual Report 1951-52, pp. 11, 31.

above suggestion this official statement read, under the caption of 'East and Central African Policy,' "The promotion of greater understanding and cooperation between the East and Central and South African Territories and so far as is practicable to act in concert with them."[50] This latter group held that it would be wise to wait and see the outcome of Sir Godfrey's plan for Central African Federation before any further action was taken.

With the advent of the emergency in the fall of 1952 the idea of an East and Central African Federation faded into the background. A proposal was made to the Electors' Union Annual conference in September 1952 stating that the Union should not become preoccupied with East and Central African Federation to the detriment of a strong constitutional position for Kenya. Though this proposal was not formally adopted, the feeling of the Conference seemed to indicate that this was the correct tack to be followed. With the formation of the Central African Federation in 1953 the issue was ended. The Electors' Union 1953 Annual Report closed the issue with the phrase "East and Central African Federation will be under continual observation."[51]

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50. Electors' Union, Annual Report 1951-52, p. 31.

51. The Electors' Union, Annual Report 1952-53, p. 16. The background of this East and Central unity move is taken from the minutes and proceedings of the Electors' Union collected by Dr. Rosberg while in Kenya and on deposit at the African Research and Studies Program of Boston University.

Several observations may be made regarding East and Central African unity, and the question of parity. Initially Sir Godfrey Huggins, though not overly receptive to the move, was sympathetic. This was sufficient encouragement to interested groups in Kenya. When the Central African Federation became a distinct possibility it was obvious that Kenya or East Africa in general would be a detriment with its multi-racial problems and economic poverty. Sir Godfrey, it is known, had a difficult time uniting the three Central territories; there is little evidence to show that he had much interest in East and Central unity at the same time. Perhaps the determining factor in this whole picture is the sentiment in the Colonial Office either for or against the larger federation. Empirically evaluated, the little available evidence seems to indicate that the Colonial Office was opposed to a large multi-racial federation.

Parity became a major issue when in 1950 the Governor announced an impending change in the Legislative Council of Kenya. The European community stood firm on parity because of the inroads the Africans had already made in their constitutional position and as mentioned above any imbalance would thwart both Executive infiltration and the then possibility of East and Central African unity. After visiting Kenya in the spring of 1951 the Secretary of State for the Colonies announced in the House of Commons on May 31, 1951 that no major changes would now be made.[52] He would, however, appoint within twelve months

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52. H.C. Debates, 5s, 31 May, 1951, col. 408.

of the beginning of the next session of the Legislative Council in
May, 1952, a commission representing all the communities of Kenya
with a neutral chairman from outside Kenya to plan constitutional
development. The main proviso was the understanding that ultimate
control was to remain with the Imperial Government. He proposed
interim adjustments, maintaining parity, although personally not
endorsing it, in which African membership would be increased from
4 to 6; Indian from 5 to 6; European from 11 to 14. The official
side would be raised from 16 to 26 to avoid any great disparity.
The latter members would be expected to support Government on a
motion of confidence when called upon to do so, otherwise they were
free to vote in any way they saw fit.

The members of the new Legislative Council took their seats
in June, 1952, after the May General Elections. The unofficial
members numbered 28; 21 were elected (14 Europeans, 6 Asian, 1 Arab)
and 7 were representative members (6 Africans and 1 Arab). The
official side of the Council numbered 26, composed of 8 ex officio,
8 official nominated members and the 10 new nominated official members.
This latter group, the nominated cross-bench members, were made up
of 6 Europeans, 1 Arab, 2 Africans and 1 Indian. The policy of the
Government of Kenya was defined in a detailed statement on May 23,
1952, the cross-bench members assuming their seats on the basis of
this statement.[53]

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53. "Kenya Government Statement of May 23, 1952," reproduced in
Opportunity in Kenya. A Report to the Fabian Colonial Bureau,
Research Series No. 162 (London, 1953), Appendix 4.

In summary it should be noted that the proposed conference of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to take place in 1953 was postponed because of the declaration of the emergency in late 1952. This was unfortunate because major constitutional questions, particularly the problem of representation, would continue to be a source of political conflict in Kenya. The postwar period up to the time of the emergency saw significant changes in Kenya' the creation of a membership system in 1945, European attempts to achieve Executive control, the solidification of the policy of parity of representation along with the failure of an inept attempt to achieve East and Central African unity. African representation was increased in this period while Indian representation was weakened by the split along religious lines. On balance it may be said that the European position was also weakened during this period, shown not only by the lack of unity of purpose but more tangibly by the proliferation of the European community in the period to follow. The Electors' Union's sudden rise in the postwar era was reversed after 1950 and as a political organization suffered the most by the European proliferation. It served a useful purpose, though, as a vehicle for developing and presenting settler opinion. If one single element could be cited as the motivating factor behind European actions in this period it might well be the growing potential of African strength. Merely observing the constitutional scene it would appear that no dramatic change had taken place aside from the increase in African representation; however, the events in the postwar period were rapidly changing the

political environment. European leadership was becoming increasingly aware of the potential represented by incipient African nationalism and the danger of a nationalist movement to their favorable political position in the Colony. Thus by 1952, European opinion began seriously to diverge over methods to meet this challenge.

The nature and importance of this political regrouping of the European community is the main subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER V - POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE EMERGENCY

European Disunity. Though 1952 saw the retirement of Governor
Sir Philip Mitchell and declaration of the emergency on October 21,
it was a relatively inactive year as far as political advancement
was concerned. The Electors' Union heard motions to merge the Union
with the European Elected Members Organization and to have the latter
responsible to the Union. This was more a device to save the falter-
ing Electors' Union than a move from strength. It did, however,
find some active support, for in July 1952 a detailed statement of
policy for a proposed Kenya Party was drawn up with an elaborate
diagram to show the place and function of the organization. It
was not a clandestine move but rather a realization on the part of
a sector of European leadership in the Union that unless the Dela-
mere dream of complete unity within the settler group was maintained
and strengthened there would be no possibility of gaining the needed
control of the elective instruments of government.

A Coordinating Committee of the Electors' Union was set up
early in 1953 to consider further the merger of the Union and the
European Elected Members Organization. Little progress was made in
this direction because the Elected Members were the center of
criticism in the prosecution of the emergency. The majority of the
Union, however, was adamant in turning their organization into a
disciplined political party. Since this was not the view of the total
membership, a splinter group broke with the Union and formed itself

into the Kenya Empire Party under the leadership of Major A. G. Keyser,
a former European Elected Member. This embryonic party took an extreme
position on issues, maintaining the right of Europeans to share in
exercising the trust for the natives and gaining home rule for Kenya
under the European settler group.[54] Toward the latter part of 1953
the Kenya Empire Party attempted a merger with the Kenya Protectionist
Association. During 1953 some of the leaders of the Electors'
Union continued to seek out some way by which the political activities
of the Union could be coordinated with those of the Elected Members.
This group decided upon a common secretariat for the two organizations
and a new name for the Electors' Union. It was to be called the
"Kenya Convention." Their success was to be limited.

In late 1953 the Elected Members issued a set of nine policy
statements that was printed and published some months later.[55] It
was, on the whole, a moderate statement of policy, considering the
gravity of the times. It bore the imprint of the leader of the
European Elected Members, Mr. Michael Blundell, and was generally
interpreted as a rapprochement with the other races rather than a
drive for white domination. The issuance of this policy statement
caused an immediate split, as was expected. The so-called 'die-hards'
withdrew from the Electors' Union to form a new party, the White High-
lands Party. The leaders included Major B. P. Roberts, a Nyanza farmer,

54. See the Institute of Current World Affairs, Letter, Nairobi,
    9-16-53, p. 6

55. The European Elected Members' Organization, A Policy Statement,
    Nairobi, 1953.

who was the chairman of the United Kenya Protection Association, and
Mr. Leo Vigar, a Nairobi contractor and publisher of Comment, a
weekly magazine which expounds his 'Malanist' views. Vigar had been
organizing the Kenya Empire Party. Now both this and Roberts'
party were to merge into the White Highlands Party. The policy of
the Highlands Party was a form of apartheid, a division of Kenya
into white and black territories with a self-governing and separate
Highlands.[56]

The other communities were not silent during this period of
European reorganization. The Kenya Indian Congress issued their
statement of policy in September, generally critical of the European
statement. It reiterated the regular claims of a common roll, no
discrimination and ultimate self-government within the Commonwealth.
A bid was inserted which indicates a new Indian position. It desires
to cooperate with the 'other racial groups' for the benefit of all
races. Instead of opposing European demands outright, this appears
to be a desire to share formal power with the Europeans in exercising
the native trust. The African Unofficial Members' Organization met
in December 1953, and issued a policy statement which was composed
of moderate demands. They emphasized, however, the need for land
adjustment, education and a direct African election. The Central
Sikh Association also met in December and presented demands for
separate Sikh representation on all the Government and local bodies.

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56. Verbatim notes taken in Kenya by Dr. Rosberg, 1954.

In addition the statement pressed for the opportunity for Sikh
youth to serve in the military forces of Kenya and to advance to the
commissioned ranks.

Lyttelton Constitution. The growing disunity among European
leadership after 1952 was caused by the different approaches of
various leaders to the problem of protecting and expanding European
political power. The emergency contributed to this division in
forcing leaders to take definite positions vis-a-vis the Government.
All groups were concerned with the maintenance of European dominance,
but some believed that this objective could be best accomplished by
cooperating with Government by assuming positions of authority in
the Executive. Others, such as the Kenya Empire Party, later merged
into the Federal Independence Party, favored some form of a modified
apartheid policy. Still other leaders regretted the formation of
different European parties and believed that this destruction of
European unity and solidarity would seriously weaken European political
power. Basically, however, the essential division was between those
leaders who believed that the European community could not hold their
power if they continued to act essentially as a parliamentary opposi-
tion group to Government, and those who sought a complete revision of
the Constitution which would grant them over-all control. The former
group had within their ranks the majority of the Elected Members, and
they were concerned with formulating some plan whereby they could
control Executive positions while still not giving up their position

of being direct representatives of their community.

By the end of 1953, it was becoming very clear to Government that some method of associating Europeans with policy had to be found. Government was exposed to serious criticism from European leadership, and Government sought a method by which European leadership could share in the responsibility for its decisions. However, provision had to be made for the representation of other groups. Thus some constitutional arrangements had to be introduced which would grant Europeans important roles of Governmental leadership while at the same time not pass any effective political power to the African or Asian. The answer was found in the Lyttelton Constitution. However, when the Secretary of State for the Colonies visited Kenya in March, 1954, various European groups had plans prepared as to how they believed constitutional reorganization should be undertaken. The proposals of the Secretary of State for the Colonies reviewed these, but proposed something new. That further contributed to the marked divisions of the European population.

In January 1954 a Parliamentary Delegation visited Kenya.[57] The Delegation suggested among other things that the Governor appoint to the Executive Council representatives of all the main races to assume responsibility for appropriate portfolios. On February 18 the Electors' Union recommended to the Governor that a War Cabinet should immediately be formed to take complete charge of the prosecution

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57. Parliamentary Delegation to Kenya (Cmd. 9081) (1954).

of the emergency. In addition an outer Cabinet composed of other
races would handle administrative work concerning their own races.
Several days prior to Mr. Oliver Lyttelton's visit to Kenya, discussions
were carried on at an Electors' Union meeting, outlining what would
be acceptable to the Union should the Colonial Secretary present
definite proposals: no basic constitutional change would be tolerated
until the end of the emergency, a War Council was essential, and any
proposals forthcoming would have to be fully discussed before the
Union in conference and if necessary put to the voters for a test.
Mr. Michael Blundell, leader of the European Elected Members'Organi-
zation, announced at the same meeting that it was lamentable that the
Elected Members were split on the issue of other races in the cabinet.
This split was based predominantly on the unwillingness of some
European Elected Members to have any Indian representatives in
Executive positions. He favored limited cooperation with Asians and
Africans in Government but these two races should not be represented
on any proposed Cabinet. On the day of Mr. Lyttelton's visit the
Union presented an elaborate plan to him, embracing an Inner Cabinet
composed of the Deputy Governor, three Members with portfolios, a
secretariat and three Members without portfolio, all Europeans. The
Colonial Secretary spent several days in the Colony and discussed the
constitutional situation with various groups, indicating that he
would present his proposals to the Elected Members' Organization and
the other racial representatives within three days. On the 9th of March

Mr. Lyttelton gave his proposals in detail to the representatives, stating categorically that he wanted an affirmative or negative answer to his proposals that very day! Despite the argument of the members that they must consider the matter with their constituents, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stood firm. The European and Asian representatives accepted what came to be known as the "Lyttelton Constitution." It altered the political structure of Kenya by the introduction of a Council of Ministers as the principal instrument of Government, even though final authority and responsibility within the territory still rested with the Governor, who in turn is responsible to the Secretary of State for Colonies. The Council of Ministers consists of fourteen members, six of them unofficial. The latter are drawn from the membership of the Legislative Council. Three are elected Europeans, two are elected Asians and one is a nominated African representative.[58]

The Electors' Union in a meeting shortly after acceptance of the Lyttelton plan criticized many points put forth, but in the end

58. Proposals by the Secretary of State for Colonies for a Reconstruction of the Government of Kenya, March 9, 1954. "Provision was also made for not more than five and not less than three Under Secretaries, of whom one would be an Arab and two would be Africans. The Constitution was to be regarded as experimental until the next General Election (September, 1956). If at this election the electorate (European and Asian) return members who are willing to serve as Members of the Government, there will be no further change in the proportions of members of the Legislative Council or the Council of Ministers, either as between the main racial groups or as between Officials and Unofficials, before 1960. The British Government also agreed not to initiate any changes in the communal basis of the franchise until 1960. But if this Constitution proves unworkable, i.e., if members are elected who refuse to accept posts in Government, the Imperial power may revert to the Constitution of 1952 and take other constitutional action that may be necessary." Rosberg, "Struggle for Power in Kenya," p. 4.

endorsed it in principle, terming it a fait accompli and suggesting
endorsement by the European community, cautioning them to watch the
Council carefully and point out its failings where they appear. The
Council of Ministers was formally organized on April 20, 1954 with
mixed reactions in the different sectors of the Kenya population.
Mr. Blundell accepted the plan fully and took it upon himself to
convince the people of its worth. In essence Mr. Blundell became
the unofficial spokesman for Government policy. During the spring
and early summer extremist groups pushed two separate plans, one for
a regional type of government in the highlands and another for a
federal system of government embracing all of Kenya. In early July
the Council of Ministers issued a statement of policy containing
eighteen points, including economic, social and political advancement
for all communities. This was a modest multi-racial document and did
not envisage any radical reforms in Kenya. The spirit of reconcilia-
tion and statesmanship in the document were more important than what
was proposed. The Electors' Union countered two days later with their
own statement of policy. Later the same month Mr. Blundell formed
the United Country Party, devoted to furthering the system of multi-
racial government. The balance of 1954 saw intermittent criticism
and praise for the Council of Ministers. Aside from an abortive
move to re-form the Convention of Associations late in the year,
Kenya appeared to have entered on a new phase of political life.

Despite the improvement of the military situation during 1955, there was little active or forceful "politicking" in Kenya. All communities seemed to have adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward the Council of Ministers, although some extreme elements were pressing their demands and the moderates appeared to be jockeying for position.

The Federal Independence Party opposed the Lyttelton plan and proposed that Kenya be divided into 5 provinces: 1 European, with all cities and major towns; 1 Arab on the Coast; 3 African. There was no objection to the franchise in African provinces. A central legislature would seat Europeans only.[59] Along this same line a suggestion was made by a committee composed of all European political parties that a multi-state federal scheme be enacted in which Kenya and Tanganyika would unite with the Central African Federation. This super state would also be divided into European, Asian and African provinces. The proposed date was 1960. However, this declaration came to nothing, and no responsible leadership took it seriously.

Minor changes were made in the Council of Ministers when in July 1955 Mr. F. W. Cavendish-Bentinck retired and Mr. Blundell moved from Minister without portfolio to Minister for Agriculture. A split occurred in the African representative community over the appointment of the African Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture. When Mr. Ohanga, Minister for Community Development, and Mr. J. Jeremiah, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry for Local Government, refused

59. Africa Digest, Vol. II, No. 7, Jan.-Feb., 1955, pp. 13-16.

to resign, three African unofficials formed a new organization without them. Distinct from this was the Government's granting permission for African political parties to form. These, however, would be restricted to local areas and no national organization would be allowed. Also Government introduced the appointment of tribal chiefs in the urban areas, which seems to imply the continued determination of Government to prevent any unity of action developing among the various tribal groups of Kenya. There had been no African parties since the proscription of the Kenya African Union, a predominantly Kikuyu group.

With the conditions of the emergency continually improving, a greater number of moderate Europeans became aware of the fact that Africans were permanently associated with them in the government of the Colony. This was a slow and crucial development in European thought which would be tested in the 1956 general election. The signs of African participation in all phases of Kenya life were ample. Aside from the formation of political parties and pressure groups, like the Nairobi District African Congress, there was the position of Africans in the Kenya Federation of Labour. African leaders of the labor movement grew in stature in the eyes of all communities when they demonstrated moderation and even cooperation in ending mass strike movements.

The results of the 1956 general election, which was to indicate European reaction to the Lyttelton plan, were initially foreboding.

Eight seats were won by the Independent group which favored modification of the plan; six seats were won by the United Country Party which stood solidly behind the Lyttelton constitution. Extremist groups won no seats, nor did the Capricorn Africa candidates. Added to this picture was the move by African members who withdrew from the Unofficial Members' Organization because of the victory of the Independent group who favor the abolition of Asian and African Ministerial portfolios. Kenya in general was therefore surprised when the European Elected Members announced shortly after the election that they had agreed to discard all group and party affiliations in order to work together to achieve moderate and constructive polities for the country. They simultaneously advised the Governor of the appointment of three unofficial European Ministers. Thus the initial testing period of the Lyttelton constitution resulted in European acceptance. The election showed that a large number of Europeans were agreeable to the association of other races in the principal instrument of government, the Council of Ministers. On October 19, 1956 a joint statement was issued on behalf of the European Elected Members, the Asian Muslim Elected Members, the Arab Elected Member, and the African Representative Members suggesting significant constitutional changes. These unanimous recommendations by the unofficial members of the legislature were warmly welcomed by the Government and immediately accepted by the Secretary of State for Colonies.[60] Basically these changes would

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60. See African World, December, 1956, pp. 23-24.

increase the Council of Ministers from 6 to 8 (one African and one

European) and increase the Legislative Council by four, including

2 Africans. The present make-up of the Legislative Council (Febru-

ary 1957) is shown below:

European:

     President
     Vice President and Speaker
    6 ex officio Ministers
    2 nominated Ministers
    4 unofficial Ministers
  13 nominated Members
  10 elected Members
  37

African:

  2 Ministers
  2 nominated Members
  6 representative Members
 10

Asian:

  2 Ministers
  2 nominated Members
  6 elected Members
 10

Arab:

  1 in Council of Ministers
  1 nominated Member
  1 elected Member
 3

Plus two Corporate Members who may be of any race, yet to be appointed.

The Official Members are the President, Vice-President, 16 Ministers
and 18 Nominated Members. (Although 8 Ministers will be answerable
to the electorate, as Ministers they will rank as officials of the
Government while in office.) The Unofficial Members are the Elected
Representatives and Corporate Members (African Representative Members
will be elected as from March, 1957.[61]

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61. _Africa Digest_, Vol. IV, No. 4, p. 120

CHAPTER VI - SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Postwar political problems in Kenya can clearly be observed in the issues which concern the method and nature of the system of representation. Involved in this problem is the achievement of a balance between majority and minority interests. In contrast with the prewar nature of this problem, when the conflict of interest was essentially between only the European and Asian, the postwar problem has taken on new dimensions in the demands by Africans for an effective role in the central institutions of the Government. Asian political influence has been declining with the increasing political effectiveness of African leadership, and the basic struggle for political power is to be seen in European attempts to consolidate and even expand their present political role and in the African's increasing ability to bring pressure for major political change. Contributing to and conditioning the postwar political situation has been a rapid acceleration in social and economic change and greater willingness on the part of the British Government to provide funds for African development.

The "Lyttelton" constitution, though mainly an extension of the "ministerial system" introduced in 1945, does provide at least a framework for multi-racial participation in the exercise of public policy. These constitutional arrangements represent the need to associate Africans, as well as Europeans, with Government, even though the African's role is limited relative to the European's.

It does not, however, provide a solution to the problems inherent
in communal representation. That system of representation continues
to be the mode of selection of representatives as Ministers, and
the principle of European parity has also been accepted, at least
until 1960, as the method of allocating the number of ministerial
posts each ethnic group will have. Though the Council of Ministers
recognizes the principle of collective responsibility, the system
of communal representation adopted in the selection of Ministers
fails to provide a method of achieving any common territorial
responsible outlook. Actually, the Council functions more like a
coalition, the divisions of which are not a result of party interest,
but dictated by the ethnic considerations and the distribution
and relative power structure of each group.

The Council of Ministers as a principal instrument of
government developed from the increasing influence of the non-
official representatives in the Legislative Council. This increase
in the share of governmental authority has been the result of
European settler pressure for greater responsibility and control
over a period of years. African leadership in the postwar period
has been pressing for greater participation in central government,
and has sought to achieve a major position in government with
possible ultimate complete control. Asian leadership, though
politically weakened by religious divisions, seeks to protect its

legitimate interests in a rapidly changing political situation.
The European leadership group proposes to maintain their present
political role as a very minimum. Their former conflicts with
Great Britain have given way to a system of informal alliances
with the Imperial Government in order to protect their dominant
position in Kenya political life. Moderate Europeans agree that
their dominant position can not be maintained for more than two
decades. Such a position presumes a working and cooperative arrange-
ment with the Imperial Government in which European efforts toward
self-government are abandoned and replaced by European leadership
seeking to uphold British authority in Kenya. In the long run
European leadership must meet the increasing demands for effective
participation. If a Labour Government were to be elected, and
its policy of numerical democracy extended to Kenya, the European
position would be seriously threatened.

The Africans presently desire Imperial control because they
realize they are unable to staff and govern the country alone.
Further, they fear any extension of authority at this time would
only contribute to European political dominance.

African nationalism is a potential source of African political
power and a direct threat to European dominance. Development has
been slow to the present because of the few educated men who sought
or were able to act as a national elite, the essentially tribal
character of political developments, and the negative character of
such movements. With the emergence of a trans-tribal elite made

up of educated leaders of several tribes who have found positions of leadership in trade union movements and the embryonic District African Congresses, the necessity of territorial political cooperation has become apparent, although territory-wide African organizations are not permitted at present. The recent African electoral rolls form a basis for African organization, a vehicle for political education and the legitimate opportunity for use of African numerical strength in the achievement of power. Rapid social and economic change will increase the number of Africans who would be susceptible to mass mobilization by the emerging elite.

Europeans appear to have two courses open to them: allowing the elites access to positions of prestige and a share in parliamentary authority, or barring access and having the elites mobilize the African mass with the possible result of European displacement from his present position of dominance.

Since neither alternative appears to be attractive to the European leadership or the electorate and African demands for constitutional reform are continually resisted, African leadership seems to be exploiting possibilities of African nationalism.

While not attempting to prognosticate, it appears that future political action will be polarized into European-African conflict. The parallel development of the two communities could not be upset by the Asian third force because of its weakness. It is up to the British government to find transitional institutional arrangements which will divert present parallel development into a

channel of peaceful change. The basis of such a political arrangement must be sought in a solution to the difficult issues of representation and franchise.

To work towards a solution, it is doubtful that fundamental progress may be made until the specific goal of the political future of the territory is defined. The apparent polarization of conflict in Kenya brings into question whether a colonial policy of empiricism is adequate to cope with the complex problem of a multi-racial territory, particularly when the forces of change and resistance become increasingly even. As the Royal East Africa Commission argued concerning the need for a definitive economic and social goal for East Africa, one could argue for a defined political goal with a planned procedure by which it can be achieved.

APPENDIX I - LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN KENYA

Formal organization of Local Native Councils began in 1924.
Prior to this a limited authority system was attempted by the Village
Headman's Ordinance of 1902 with subsequent changes in 1908 and the
Native Authority Ordinance of 1912. The Local Native Councils or,
as they are called today, the African District Councils, were a major
step forward. They grew out of native Councils of Elders, a familiar
institution in the chiefless tribes of Kenya. The Local Native
Councils consist of the District Commissioner, the District Officer,
if there is one, and the local appointed chiefs. This latter group
are usually chosen from a list presented to the District Commissioner
by local natives. Local councils are subject to the central govern-
ment through the Minister for Local Government. (See Chart I)
Another link with central government is through the District Com-
missioner, who is under the Provincial Commissioner. The latter is
in charge of one of the six provinces into which Kenya is divided,
and is himself under the Minister for African Affairs.

It should be noted that in Kenya there are two distinct local
government systems: African Local Government and European Local
Government. In African areas there have been Local Native Councils,
or African District Councils, since 1924, as stated above. In the
Highlands, District Councils on which all the members were Europeans
were established in 1928.

Urban Government in Kenya

Municipalities. Nairobi became a city by royal charter in
1950. It is the governmental and financial capital of Kenya and the
rail headquarters for the whole colony. It is the only center in
Kenya that is classified a city. The city of Nairobi and the
municipality of Nakuru are both administered by municipal councils,
and Mombasa, Eldoret, Kisumu and Kitale by municipal boards. Asian
and African members serve on all councils and boards.

Townships and District Councils: Urban areas smaller than a
municipality are townships. They may be administered by (1) a District
Commissioner responsible for the township; or (2) a council of
inhabitants which advises the District Commicsioner, who is not
obliged to follow council suggestions. Only two district councils
remain out of the seven which existed before the introduction of the
county council system. These are the Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu
District Councils.

This functional of administration is shown in Chart I:

                              Governor
                                 |
                        Council of Ministers
                                 |
Minister for   Minister for
African Affairs   Local Government
    |
Provincial   Highlands   African Land Units
Commissioner   (District Councils)   (African District
    | Councils, Location
District   Councils, Chiefs,
Commissioner   Headmen)
    |
                                   Urban Areas
District |
Officer   City Council; Municipal Council
                          Municipal Board;
                          Township - with advisory committee
                          Township - with control by District Comm.

County Councils. Although Chart I illustrates the functional breakdown of Kenya local government it does not consider the actual operation of modern, local government under the County Council system.

It was apparent that the system described in Chart I had many shortcomings. In 1952 an effort was made to fill an important gap in this system, i.e., the European District Councils did not cover as wide an area as the African District Councils; nor did they charge a local rate until 1946. Five county councils are established under the Local Government (County Councils) Ordinance of 1952. These five were for the Nairobi, Nakuru and Naivasha areas in 1953, for Aberdare in 1954, and Nyanza area in 1955. They would correspond roughly to the African District Councils, whose position in the African Reserves would be unaffected; likewise they would be in authority over the District Councils. The six municipalities mentioned above are included in this system of County Council government. Chart II shows the present picture of local government:

```
                        Governor
                           |
                  Council of Ministers
                           |
      ┌────────────────────┴──────────────────────┐
Minister for Af. Aff.                    Minister for Lo. Gov.
      |                                            |
Provincial Commissioner                            |
                    ┌─────────────────┬────────────┴──────┐
              County Council   ← reps.  Municipal.     Af. Land
                    |              to                   Units
         ┌──────────┼───────────────────┐
  Urban Dist. Council   Rural District Council   Township
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
<u>Chart III</u> is a typical County Council arrangement:

All the area enclosed in the large rectangle is controlled by a County Council except for <u>m</u> which represents a municipality; udc represents an Urban District Council; <u>t</u> are townships. The small rectangles divided by broken lines represent four different Rural District Councils, i.e., A, B, C, D.[*]

<u>African District Councils</u>. There are 24 African district councils governed by the provisions of the African District Councils Ordinance of 1950, which replaced earlier legislation. The councils are bodies corporate and have powers similar to other local authorities including: construction and maintenance of roads, public health, housing, animal husbandry, social welfare. Revenues are derived from poll rates on adult male Africans, cesses on agricultural produce, land rents and royalties and fees for services and licenses issued.

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[*]Adapted from Marsh and Kingsnorth, <u>An Introduction to the History of East Africa</u>, listed in the bibliography; and <u>Kenya Colonial Reports 1955</u>, London, H.M.S.O., 1956.

Locational Councils provide scope for local government on a smaller scale within the African district council areas. The members are for the most part elected by the residents in the locations concerned. Since 1955 Locational Councils have a statutory existence which provides them with a legal constitution and powers as local government units, subordinate to the African district council within whose area of jurisdiction they lie.

APPENDIX II — GOVERNMENT OF KENYA, 1957

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                              Secretary of State
                               for the Colonies
                                       │
        ┌──────────────────────────────┤
        │                              │
High Commission                        │
                                       │
3 Governors and                        │
representatives                     Governor
of three races                         │
in the three                           │
territories                            │
                                       │
                                       │
                              Council of Ministers

                                  The Governor
                                  Chief Secretary
                                  Officials
                                  Unofficials
                                  Deals with Policy
                                       │
                                       │
                              Executive Council

                                  Composed of C of M
                                  plus additional
                                  members.  Deals
                                  with draft legis-
                                  lation, etc.
                                       │
                                       │
                              Legislative Council

                                  The Governor
                                  The Speaker
                                  Officials
                                  Unofficials (in majority)
                                  Deals with Law-making
```

APPENDIX III - CHIEF STAGES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA

Period	Non-African Local Gov.	African Local A Government	Central Government
Before the British	none	local tribal custom	none
I.B.E.A.	forts and outposts	local tribal custom	semi-military and commercial
Foreign Office	forts and outposts	local tribal custom	over-all attempt to raise stds
1900	soldiers, settlers and traders form communities; Nairobi has a township committee	local tribal custom	
1902		village headman	Dept. of Agriculture, Forestry, Medical Services, Judicature, etc. had been set up.
1903	township Ordinance	hut tax	

Colonial Office takes over from Foreign Office

Period	Non-African Local Gov.	African Local A Government	Central Government
1905			Executive Council set up
1907			Legislative Council set up
1912		Headman given extended powers	

World War I

APPENDIX III (continued)

Period	Non-African Local Gov.
1918	
1923	
1924	
1927	
1928	Seven District Councils established
1937	
World War II	
1944	
1948	
1952	County Council Ordinance
1954	
1956	
1957	

African Local Government	Central Government
	Two European settlers on Ex. Co. First elections to Legco. Indian on Ex. Co.
	Devonshire White Paper. Member to rep. Af. Int. on Ex. Co.
Local Native Councils set up	
	Indians on Legco.
	Reorg. of Ex. Co.
	First Af. Mem. of Legco.
Af. Dist. Councils	Unofficial majority on Legco. E.A.H.C. established
	Changes in composition of Legco
	Council of Ministers
	Changes in C of M and Legco.
First African direct elections	

APPENDIX IV - TRICHOTOMIC AFRICA

This appendix describes Trichotomic Africa,[*] a relatively
new way of looking at the totality of sub-Saharan Africa and pointing
up the significance of Kenya.

Since the advent of the social scientist in this area has
been relatively recent and the field of work so immense, theories
of studying the territory have been few and ephemeral. This is
especially true in the field of political science. Nevertheless,
considerable thought on the matter of African political development
is emerging in this country. New concepts are being thought out,
tested as well as possible, modified, discarded and in some cases
used as the basis for still newer ideas.

One accepted way of looking at sub-Saharan Africa is in
terms of emerging states. This is an arbitrary classification of
territories. One category unites independent or near independent
units such as Ghana, Liberia, Ethiopia, the Sudan; another category
allows for emerging African states, for example, Nigeria and Uganda;
a third classification is the so-called multi-racial grouping which
includes Kenya, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika. The
bases for dividing the area appear to be the arbitrary political
divisions established in the nineteenth century grab for African

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[*] The idea is that of Dr. Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. of the African Research
Program of Boston University; the appellation is mine. I am indebted
to Dr. Rosberg for discussing this particular aspect with me and
allowing me to use it here. It should, perhaps, be further stated
that this is a new concept in the first stages of development and
has not been refined or tested, nor has it been subjected to the
critical examination of Africanist colleagues.

colonies by leading metropolitan powers. This viewpoint does not consider inter-territorial unity evidenced by similarity of economic, cultural, social or demographic conditions or in a broad sense, geopolitical factors. In using emergent statehood as a basis for analysis, artificial barriers are perpetuated at a time when change in Africa tends toward large political units rather than the continuation and/or proliferation of small units. This is shown by the recent federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, the voluntary union of Togoland with the Gold Coast, the virtual annexation of South-West Africa by the Union of South Africa, and the new greater Somalia movement. The preoccupation with closer union among the three territories of East Africa since 1920, based partly on the idea that they would form a multi-racial bulwark against total African encroachment, was disrupted with the formal announcement that Uganda was to develop as a purely African state under African leadership. The artificially created units cannot survive in tact under the pressure of dynamic change.

Emerging statehood was a useful basis for analysis in the first half of this century, but in the post World War II period change has been so rapid and unpredictable that new concepts for studying sub-Saharan Africa are required. "Trichotomic Africa" is an innovation which looks at the totality of sub-Saharan Africa in an entirely different way by taking into consideration the direction of recent trends in Africa away from territorial entities toward geopolitical blocs which are united not only by cultural, demographic

and political similarities, but also by modern industrial expansion

in an export-oriented economy. The essence of trichotomic Africa

is depicted in the following map. Simply stated, it considers

sub-Saharan Africa as divided into three parts: The northern belt,

which encompasses Uganda, stretches from the Guinea coast on the

west to the Indian Ocean on the east. It is characterized by

limited European settlement and commercial penetration, a distinct

lack of industry, Islamic predominance, rapid political change,

the problems of federalism and emerging independent states under

African control, and trained African leadership which finds a voice

in the Afro-Asian bloc. The southern belt includes the white-

dominated Union of South Africa and Federation of Rhodesia and

Nyasaland plus the other territories shown on the map. In this area

there is limited challenge by the indigenous people to white domi-

nation. Other characteristics of this area are primary extractive

industry, rapidly developing secondary and terciary industrial

growth, a phenomenally high rate of European immigration in an area

with a high capacity for absorption, legal protection of the white

population and limited African contact with a small and circum-

scribed leadership group. It is an area where white supremacy is

reinforcing itself.

The middle section, or inter-tropical Africa, is comprised

of Kenya, Tanganyika and Belgian Congo. The striking element of

these three territories is the degree of Asian and European convergence

AFRICA

Algeria　Libya　Egypt

Tropic of Cancer

French West Africa　Sudan　21　A

French　20

Nigeria　19

6　Equatorial　Ethiopia

5　7　18

Belgian

8　17　Kenya　0°

Congo

Tanganyika

9

Angola　Federation of　10

Rhodesia

and　11

Nyasa-　15

land

South-　12　16

west

Africa　Tropic of Capricorn

Union

of

South　13

Africa　14

1 Rio de Oro
2 Gambia
3 Port. Guinea
4 Sierra Leone
5 Liberia
6 Ghana
7 Cameroons
8 Rio Muni
9 Northern Rhodesia
10 Nyasaland
11 Southern Rhodesia
12 Bechuanaland
13 Swaziland
14 Basutoland
15 Mozambique
16 Madagascar
17 Uganda
18 Somalia
19 British Somaliland
20 French Somaliland
21 Eritrea
22 Tunisia
23 Morocco

0　600

miles

Trichotomic Africa is depicted on this map with
diagonal lines; the northern belt in red; the
southern belt in blue and the middle third or
area of convergence by two-colored cross-hatching.

Line A: The approximate southern extremity of the
Sahara Desert

(3-57 RJS)

and the threat of a potential clash between European and African interests. European authority is presently in power, but the authority pattern is changing, and it may tend toward that of either the north or the south. Kenya is the most critical territory, with a small group of emerging African leaders who look to the north. The white element of Kenya, until recently, sought cooperation and outright union with the south, as pointed out in the body of the thesis. African leadership developed in a large plantation system controlled by the white group; limited cash cropping was the only pattern of African economic development until quite recently. All the elements of a multi-racial society are found in Kenya. Islamic influence, though present, is not really powerful in Kenya when compared to the north, where divisions are predominantly Islamic or non-Islamic. Kenya is an area of open stress and strain compared to the relatively stable southern third, where European power is not presently in jeopardy. Also, self-government is sought in Kenya in the absence of internal political unity. Every change and movement on the constitutional scene appears divisive in the eyes of each of the three main communities.

Historically, Kenya has a tradition of white domination under the relatively liberal British colonial policy. Tanganyika, with its mandate and later trusteeship affiliation was somewhat more restricted. In addition to this is the fact that much of the interior of Tanganyika is uninhabitable by white settlers because of the marginal quality of the soil and the prevalence of Tsetse fly.

Belgian colonial policy in the Congo has stressed the social and economic development of the indigenous population with no provision for political training or thought of eventual political independence. Part of the so-called mass awakening of Africa is the realization that with social and economic security and the emergence of middle class elites, political restiveness is a natural consequence. While Tanganyika and the Congo are important from the viewpoint of potential development, Kenya is presently engaged in a political tug of war where day to day changes may be observed and empirically evaluated. Thus the immediate concern with Kenya.

This whole idea suggests that the hope and dream of East and Central African Federation (which would have united Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika with Nyasaland and the two Rhodesias) is over. The economic backwardness of Kenya, plus its political instability, is too great a liability to the 'solid south.' The conception of Capricorn Africa is not yet recognized in modern middle Africa. The consequence of this is that the Kenya problem must be solved from within. The polarization of the north and the south, combined with the tenuous position of present white leadership, precludes a formal or informal union with the southern bloc. This does not necessarily indicate a black-white, north-south antithesis based on skin color. For instance, there have been basic changes recently in South African policies toward the new African state of Ghana. The apartheid-bent Union is cooperating with African-governed Ghana for economic reasons

in the development of markets and an exchange of technicians. Such measures must be mutually beneficial or else they would not be undertaken. The industrialization of the south and the expansion of its export-oriented economy permits no color bar where practical business is concerned. Not unrelated to this is the rapid and realistic changes in French policy in the direction of more local power and authority within a large French African Union.

Middle Africa, then, has characteristics of both the north and the south, i.e., industrial development, market economy, white plantations, urban development similar to the south, and African political movements which are of concern to the European minority. A middle way must be found for middle Africa.

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ABSTRACT

Great Britain has adopted two definitive yet different
political goals in Africa, each of which has been controlled in
large part by the internal situation of the territories. In West
Africa, colonial policy has granted power of decision to African
political leadership, while in Central Africa, political authority
has been given in large measure to the local European minority.

Contrasted to these two major decisions, Britain has not
adopted specific definitive policy goals for Kenya. The general
goal of self-government is too vague to be meaningful to the different
members of its disparate multi-racial population. The immediate
question is "self-government for whom?" To what racial or ethnic
group does the 'self' refer? In West Africa it certainly meant
Africans and in Central Africa it has meant Europeans. What accounts
for the unwillingness of Britain to define specific and immediate
policies in Kenya? It is believed that an answer to this problem
through analysis of the internal political and social situation
will reveal not only the distinct problems that Kenya poses for
policy, but will suggest that the present policy of traditional
empiricism may not be able to meet the critical problems of this
territory.

The African population has had a minor role in the European-
dominated political, economic and social order in Kenya, as manifested
by a limited participation in the formal process of central government
and lack of informal influence in the social order. Economically

circumscribed by lack of technical skill, education and capital,
the African's participation in the market sector of the economy
is small. The low African wage scale and the poverty of the reserves
help to maintain economic insecurity and limit social mobility to
an educated few. Limited social intercourse and non-assimilation
into the European society prevent access to positions of informal
influence. The color bar has multiplied the frustrations of the
elite by limiting access to positions of prestige and wealth. To
assert himself effectively the African must compete for power in a
political system alien to him with little command of the prerequi-
sites and techniques of the system. In addition, there is extremely
little social and political solidarity among Africans on a territorial-
wide level.

Asian power has been declining in the postwar period in rela-
tion to that of the European and the African. The principal reason
for this is the system of communal representation which has limited
the Asian's influence in both the central and local government.
Membership in councils of government has never been more than half
that of Europeans and is now about equal to the African number. The
two ministerial posts presently assigned to Asians in the Council of
Ministers do not cover significant fields.

From their initial occupation of the territory Europeans have
considered themselves political and social elites, the only group that
should, and from their viewpoint could, exercise authority. With dynamic
leadership and political victories over the Imperial Government,

European belief grew in the feasibility of complete political control, fostered in part by the ambivalence of British policy. Ultimate control of all Kenya activities lies in the hands of the Imperial Government, and that Government has stated repeatedly and officially that Kenya would obtain self-government. But, as in many other parts of the British Dependent Empire, the discrepancy between the men on the spot and Whitehall is in the meaning of the word eventual, in other words, the timing of what is assured.

The predominant theme in postwar Kenya politics was the institutionalization of the European power position, but another unmistakable development was the emergence of limited African leadership. European political power had to be more and more concerned with the emergence of African leadership and the potential represented by incipient African nationalism. European leadership in the postwar period came to the conclusion that the possibilities of gaining control of the legislature were limited. The possibility of gaining control of the Executive Council offered a fruitful avenue of exploration, but it was vital that the system of parity of representation between European and non-European interests in the Legislative Council be maintained. The issue of parity of representation became a major one and plans for European over-all control in the Executive Council were abandoned, although not forgotten. Parity was intricately associated with the issue of closer union of the East African territories.

By the end of the emergency a greater number of moderate
Europeans were becoming aware of the fact that Africans were per-
manently associated with them in the government of the Colony.
The 'Lyttelton' constitution ushered in a multi-racial ministerial
government. The 1956 general elections were to test the European
reception of this multi-racial government.

It appears that future political action will be polarized
into European-African conflict. The parallel development of the
two communities could not be upset by the Asian third force because
of its weakness. It is up to the British government to find transi-
tional institutional arrangements which will divert present parallel
development into a channel of peaceful change. The basis of such a
political arrangement must be sought in a solution to the difficult
issues of representation and franchise.

To work towards a solution, it is doubtful that fundamental
progress may be made until the specific goal of the political
future of the territory is defined. The apparent polarization of
conflict in Kenya brings into question whether a colonial policy of
empiricism is adequate to cope with the complex problem of a multi-
racial territory, particularly when the forces of change and
resistance become increasingly even. As the Royal East Africa
Commission argued concerning the need for a definitive economic and
social goal for East Africa, one could argue for a defined political
goal with a planned procedure by which it can be achieved.