The Role of African Standby Force in Securing Africa: Case Study East Africa Standby Force

Abstract

The African continent has continued to experience diverse conflicts from the time the countries gained independence but the number of conflicts grew after the end of the cold war. At this point, after the genocide in Rwanda, Africa realized that the west was not keen to send peacekeeper or resolution experts to the continent. In other words Africa had ceased to be of strategic value to the west. This was what led to a re-evaluation of the utility of the OAU. It was decided at Sirte in Libya in 1998 that the OAU needed to be reorganized. Indeed the institution was reorganized to include a fully-fledged peace and security department with the mandate of managing peace and security in Africa. This led to the creation of structures that would ensure peace and security prevailed on the continent. However, despite the establishment of such mechanisms, Africa has continued to experience conflicts, some of which have become intractable. Africa now seems at the verge of failure to manage its security despite the good intentions envisioned in the African peace and security architecture. The architecture establishes five pillars that should work together to mitigate insecurity and assure the continent viable peace. Among the more prominent pillars are the Peace and Security Council, the panel of the wise, the African Standby Force and the Continental Early Warning System. There is however lack of synergy on the function of the pillars that threaten delivery of the expected peace and security. This study evaluates the role of the African standby Force in securing Africa and concludes that the organ, as currently structured is in danger of failing as an AU instrument for peace enforcement but retains great value as a regional response mechanism. This will however depend on the nature of the relationship between the AU and the RECs/RMs in regard to peace management. It will also depend on the level of development of ACIRC and how far the AUC is willing to support this development. ASF success as a peace enforcement tool will further depend on the availability of funds as well as the political perception that follows military interventions. In this regard, the AU move from non-interference to non-indifference requires robust decision by the member states to cede a level of sovereignty to allow AU authorized interventions that do not have to revert to the problem states. Moreover, the existence of two enforcement mechanisms threatens to derail the entire force intervention initiative. It therefore remains uncertain as to whether the ASF can really play a crucial role in securing the continent. The fact that various regions are busy developing their own capacities for force intervention does not augur well for African collective security effort. It may however evolve into a robust framework where the regional forces collaborate using the various strengths within their capabilities to provide a continent-wide intervention infrastructure, as envisioned in the ASF protocol. This is yet to develop despite the force having been declared fully operational in 2015.