Logic and law: the extent of compatibility within philosophical justice

Abstract

An invariant emphasis on the possible prospects (objectivity, efficiency and predictability) of the employment of the logical method in the evaluation of social phenomena implies a state whereby 'logical idealism runs away with some minds' i.e. the logical method when invariantly employed is inimical to the recognition, realization, and appreciation of the human element (the relative unpredictability and the uniqueness of every instantial social event) in reality. This is especially (if not particularly) with regard to the realm of law and the notion of justice. It is important to note however that the focus of the study in this regard has been on law and the concomitant notion of justice. This has been from the point of view of a keen impartial observer with a critical, analytic, and reflective mind (philosophy or philosopher). Since the notion of justice pervades and permeates all aspects of human social relations and social dynamics in general, subsisting and enduring, it is a notion which encapsulates the dynamics involved in human social problems and the redress (even if just attempts to redress) of them. The endeavour of this study has constituted in the evaluation therefore of the applicability of logic in the practice of law. This has been actualized by an explication and analysis of logic (and rationality as a natural human endowment) as a discipline, law and justice as notions, and a reflection on the interrelation of the three (logic, law and justice) in respect of human social life. The activity has led to the conclusion that the applicability of logic in the practice of law can only be appropriately defined in the strict sense by a philosopher. This implies the assertion that though a formally trained lawyer may be seen to be a good legal decision maker (judge, magistrate or lawyer), a lawyer who is also a philosopher would make a better (if not the best) legal decision maker. The prescription and evaluation of appropriate redress for human social order does not only consist in basing inferences and conclusions on past experience and an anticipation and forecasting of the future on the basis of logical possibilities, but rather, an incorporation as well (in the due consideration) of the recognition of the human element in all social dynamics. It is inappropriate to downplay good conscience, insight, and good faith by emphasizing or adopting inductivism and deductivism. Deductivism would work only for a scenario of c1osedness, prediterminism, a complete system, universalism, whereby all possibilities are pre-known and the appropriate redress for them pre-set. lnductivism would only work on the basis of the principle of causality and the principle of the uniformity of nature. However, human social life does not operate on the basis of definite causal relationship. Secondly, every individual social event and/or act is unique in a sense due to the relatively high dynamism that plagues social life.