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    The concept of fallibility in the thought of Kwasi Wiredu

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    Date
    1990
    Author
    Akodhe, Airo
    Type
    Thesis
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    Abstract
    The present research work seeks to offer a descriptive and analytical treatment of the philosophical concept of fallibilism in the thought of Kwasi Wiredu. The general argument is that Kwasi Wiredu is a fallibilist philosopher and this is what leads him to propound his rather controversial conception of truth as a synonym of opinion. The first chapter is an attempt to carry out a historical survey of the development of fallibilism in philosophical discourse. The same chapter also attempts a sort of a literature review of those contributions made by other fallibilist philosophers together with reactions to Kwasi Wiredu's works within the African Context . The second chapter attempts to put fallibilism in philosophical perspective. It does this by discussing fallibilism in relationship to other philosophical concepts and doctrines e.g. skepticism, pragmatism and empiricism. The third chapter attempts to describe the epistemology of Kwasi Wiredu in terms of its relationship to fallibilism. It isolates the salient points of Wiredu's epistemology It does this by first describing Wiredu's 'philosophical paradoxes' viz. 'truth as opinion' and 'to be is to be known'. The chapter also examines Wiredu's arguments for his claim that his conception of truth as opinion is innocent of subjectivism. Further, it discusses what is considered a 'monistic' conception of truth. Finally it examines Wiredu's arguments for the claim that his conception of truth as opinion does not undermine the the law of Non-contradiction. It is the fourth chapter that attempts to offer a critique of Wiredu's epistemology as presented in the previous chapter. In this chapter, an attempt is made to apply Wiredu's epistemology to man's practical experience. Different criticisms of Wiredu's epistemology are introduced in order to examine the credibility, and plausibility of his ideas. Finally, Wiredu's epistemOlogy is categorized as 'psycho-epistemological' and, is then analysed within the context of this Categorization. The fifth chapter is an evaluation of Wiredu's epistemology. In this chapter, three philosophers are selected for the purpose of a comparative analysis. Further on, the originality and challengable points of Wiredu's epistemology are critically examined. The conclusion is a resume of what have been described and discussed in the whole work. The major ideas in Wiredu's thesis are stressed and the credibility and plausibility of his contribution re-examined
    URI
    http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/165677
    Subject
    THE CONCEPT OF FALLIBILITY IN THE THOUGHT OF KWASI WIREDU
    FALLIBILITY IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
    FALLIBILITY IN WIREDIAN PERSPECTIVES
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