Foreign policy and conflict in Somalia, 1960-1990

Abstract

The study provides an overview of pre-1991 Somali foreign policy and conflict. It examines the extent to which the foreign policies of Somalia, regional states and other key external actors were a contributory factor to armed conflict in Somalia. By doing this, the study explores the theoretical linkages of foreign policy and conflict as it examines the role of foreign policy as a potential driver of conflict in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa. The study answers the question of the extent to which the international and internal conflicts involving Somalia during 1960 to 1990 are a function of foreign policy choices, behaviour, and orientation on the part of Somalia, regional states, and major powers. The theoretical framework for this thesis is derived from the works of Graham Allison as this provides a deeper insight into pre-1991 Somali foreign policy and conflict. The analysis of this framework suggests three different and complementary ways of understanding decision-making during the times of crisis: a 'rational actor' model, an 'organisational process' model, and a 'bureaucratic politics' model. Both primary and secondary sources of data were used to carry out the study. Primary data was collected through unstructured interviews. This study argues that Somali foreign policy, and those of regional states and other key external actors, during the study period, promoted armed conflict in Somalia by accident or design. The study also contends that while Somali foreign policy was a manifestation of its orientation towards a 'Greater Somalia,' other external factors like colonial legacy, Somali nationalism and Cold War politics and rivalry also contributed to the escalation of armed conflict. The study also finds that Somali irredentism had a selective impact, producing both warfare and subsequent skirmishes with Ethiopia but relatively stable relations with Kenya and Djibouti.