Constitutional Architecture of Federalism and National Stability: the Case of Somalia 2012 - 2020

Abstract

The study sought to examine the constitutional architecture of federalism and national stability in Somalia. The study's main objective was to assess if the lack of clarity in constitutional procedures of dividing powers between levels of government, if the lack of general consensus among political leaders, and weak judiciary process affect national stability in Somalia. The study was done in Mogadishu, Somalia, and Nairobi, Kenya. The study argues that federalism in Somalia is poorly designed and has substantial limitations; carefully hand-picked warlords and partially elected political elite that threatened to repeat the history of earlier failed initiatives led the negotiations for peace and state formation process alone and carved the federation in a cake-cutting fashion of power-sharing, while the majority of delegates and the actual people who experienced the civil war firsthand were spectators. They heavily focused on power-sharing instead of genuine negotiation for peace and stability first; consequently, this has transformed and facilitated the formation of parallel states with contradicting constitutions on foreign policies, national security, defense, citizenship status, economic development, and other competencies. As an impact, this hinders the national stability in Somalia. The study recommends urgently designing a complete and final federal constitution that clearly defines all political powers and how resources will be shared between all levels of government.