Constructive empiricism

Abstract

This study is an endeavor to understand, explain and critique constructive empiricism, which is an empirical alternative to both logical positivism and scientific realism. Bas C. van Frassen is nearly solely responsible for this position in philosophy of science and presented it in his seminal work The Scientific Image (1980). Against logical positivism, the ~author insists on a literal interpretation of the language of science. Against scientific realism he argues that the central aim of science is empirical adequacy and the belief involved in the acceptance of a scientific theory is belief that the theory fits the observable phenomenon. Constructive empiricism is, therefore, a normative, semantic and epistemological thesis. The normative component is that science aims to be empirically adequate and the semantic component is that scientific theories are semantically literal. The epistemological component is that the belief involved in acceptance of a theory is that it saves the observable phenomena. This study looks at historical development of science and philosophy of science. An attempt is made to see if science has some exclusive methodology and set of rules that make it successful. Constructive empiricism is defined as a philosophical position and its main features are explained and compared to other philosophies of science. It is found that there is a problem with the way 'observables' are defined for empirical adequacy in constructive empiricism. Reasons for van Frassens refusal to accept observation through instruments are brought forward and made clear, using diagrams. Observation of something, confirms its existence, but unobservability does not negate it. It is shown how induction plays an important part in scientific practice. Status of explanation in science is elaborated, by first showing what exactly is scientific explanation and where does it fit in constructive empiricism. It is amply shown that there is a problem with the definition of 'observable' in constructive empiricism. A suggestion is made in this study to redefine observable by introducing the Kantian idea of faculty of understanding. Consequences of redefined I observable' are shown by platonic analogy of cave and a new term - I layers of reality'. Scope and need for further study on the lines of layers of reality are brought out in chapter five.