Probability in Legal reasoning: Its problems in the quest for Justice

Abstract

This is a multi-disciplinary research study. It focuses on the area of philosophy of law. It attempts to examine the nature of probabilistic reasoning and the inherent problems that it occasions in the course of the quest for justice. The upshot of research problem is on the inherent weakness of inductive reasoning being apparently irrational as shown by David Hume. Induction, by relying on past experiences to vindicate and strengthen its conclusions proceeds by claiming that the past will be like the future. This claim, the lifeline of inductive reasoning, is logically irrational. Yet, it is the refined reformulations of inductive reasoning that are employed in legal reasoning and on the basis of their conclusions, court verdicts are deliberated. Therefore, the reasoning process, final court verdict and the consequent total quest for justice by courts become suspect as they are enmeshed In and embedded on the apparent irrationalism of induction. The primary objective of this research study is to investigate and determine the nature and extent to which probability in legal reasoning has occasioned problems in the process of determination and dispensation of justice. The research study has been guided by the principle of natural justice as its theoretical framework. The research methodology utilized involves explication and critical assessment of arguments, concepts and cognate issues and a detailed logical analysis of various court rulings has been done to demonstrate how intricately intertwined and crucial the concept of probability is in reaching court verdicts and in the same strength show its pitfalls. It is paramount to assess the relationship between causation, probability, induction and justice. Therefore, in chapter two, a detailed study exposes how deeply entrenched and inescapable cause-effect principle or causation, inductive reasoning and probabilism are in legal reasoning and more so in the process of fixation of legal responsibility. It has been argued how, why and when the concept of probability is used specifically in demonstrating the causal connection between agency and the harmful outcome. A thematic continuation of chapter two, chapter three presents an exposition of the logical structures-like the principle of evidence inquiry and admissibility, standards of proof, presumption of innocence and probative value and truth-that are employed to gauge and control the excesses of probabilism in the process of legal reasoning. However, in chapter four, it is argued that despite the existence and application of these intellectual gauges and controls against probabilism, glaring logical loopholes exist that renders the judicial reasoning unviable, inaccurate, unfair and grossly unobjective in the course of determination and dispensation of justice. These gauges or controls are flawed, entirely subjective and logically inconsistent in their application, hard to fulfill and allows personal prejudice. This is how probability in legal reasoning contributes to subjectivity in court deliberations and verdicts thus compounding the quest for justice. In the light of the above, it is ornply demonstrated how the concept of probability in legal reasoning occasions problems in the quest for justice. The concept of probability is not absolute and certain in relation to circumstantial facts surrounding what really happened. The inconsistency between certainty and the degree of proof accepted may mean punishing an innocent person or escape from punishment of a guilty person. This is the centrality of miscarriage of justice. In this way, probability has outlived its usefulness and is highly recommended that inter alia, it should be replaced with a more scientific method of reasoning. Principally, to achieve this, the urgent appeal is to philosophers, first, to resolve the quagmire of irrationalism of induction. The principle of natural justice greatly demands a more compelling and intelligible method of reasoning.