Crisis of forces reduction in armed forces management: a case of Uganda in post conflict state reconstitution, 1992 - 1995.

Abstract

This study examines the process of management of crisis in forces management in a post conflict situation in Uganda between 1995 and 2005. It examines and analyses policy stakes and decisions, underlying politics of the reduction of armed forces in Uganda from 1991 - 1995. The study is guided by two core questions; to what extent can the crisis in the DRR be attributed to programme design and policy formulation processes or more specifically, its inability to recognize the crisis of the state? How did institutional organizational logic or lack of it inform the resultant crisis of forces reduction? The study contends that when a state is in the process of reconstituting itself, its rationalities are geared towards state building, which may imply an increase in force levels to recapture society. When the said state engages with an external institution for dialogue, the outside party tended to emphasis economic imperatives, disregarding political realities. In this regard, the state will act to comply with the external actor to the extent to which the cost of the policy construct shall and not be in disharmony with her objective and subjective interests. Both primary and secondary data was widely used including text books, academic journals and news papers, supplemented with World Bank and Uganda government documents. For theoretical underpinnings and actual appreciation of reality, academic materials and interviews with actors were conducted. The study recommends that successful armed forces management for stability and development should, by necessity, be a function of a policy design that seeks to respond to internal dynamics of state re-constitution or building, taking into consideration existing political, social, economic, institutional and organizational frameworks to effectively and efficiently manage the DDR process.