Three traditions of entrepreneurship: A critique and analysis

Abstract

Statistical indications on entrepreneurial practices that violate individual and social good (Curver, 2004; Velasquez, 2002) are astounding both in terms of the prevalence and brazenness. In a number of studies (Hisrich, 2004; Drucker, 1985; Carr, 1968) entrepreneurial practice and violations have been conceived as though they were the same irrespective of social and cultural circumstances. This study set out to derive and systematically present the virtues of entrepreneurship in specific traditions. Secondly, to subject the normative ethics of entrepreneurial practice to philosophical analysis with the aim of detrmining their status vis-a-vis social good. And thirdly, to derive models of entrepreneurial ethics from the discourse of each tradition. Two hypotheses were used in this study: 1) The pnmary virtues of entrepreneurial practice are determined by the social tradition in which they are deployed. 2) The primary virtues of entrepreneurs are in conflict with social good. This thesis uses the heuristic resources of the concept tradition and the auxiliary concepts of practice and narrative in analyzing narratives and biographical accounts of entrepreneurial practice in the liberal, the libertarian, and the communitarian traditions. The analysis of the narratives and biographical accounts for each tradition IS a prolegomena to the presentation of a model of ethical entrepreneurial practice. The following conclusions were the outcome of the study. The practice of entrepreneurship in the liberal tradition is adversely impacted by the plurality of visions, and lack of consensus on the good. Entrepreneurial violation of social good in this tradition is neither accidental nor incidental, but rather intrinsic. The confusion engendered by the plurality of visions, coupled with an atomistic persona lead to a fragmented mode of existence that is mirrored in the use of rationality and its auxiliary virtues in destructive entrepreneurial practices. The libertarian tradition prescribes the priority of rational self-interest, the liberty of the moral agent, and the conviction that the market has an inherent mechanism of fostering rationality, industry, honesty, and greed, and harmonizing these with social good. The preeminence of rationality and greed as virtues of entrepreneurial practice is unique. to this tradition. Moreover, the use of these virtues results in a tendency towards impartiality, and agent-neutrality, which eventuate in the violation of social good. In the case of the communitarian tradition, categories of stakeholders such as workers, customers, and consumers could be unified or inapplicable to entrepreneurial practice in the communitarian tradition. This tradition prescribes communal good asthe primary good of the entrepreneur and devotion as the primary, critical virtue in entrepreneurial practice. Rationality, honesty, and justice are deployed in concord with communal good, which is in tandem with individual good. Nevertheless, violations of social good arise from the fact that communal good is not equivalent to social good. On the overall, the practice of entrepreneurship in all the three traditions are informed by the three principles, namely the Principle of Sufficiency, the Principle of Rational Relevance and the Principle of Appropriate Motivation. Although these are not moral principles, they reflect the constraints that tradition imposes in the practice of entrepreneurship. There is need for systematic, empirical studies of entrepreneurial practice to test our conclusions. Further, there is need for curricula approaches that take cognizance of the appropriate moral elements and not simply the technical virtues.