UN intervention in intra-state conflicts: The case of Somalia (1992-1993)

Abstract

This study examines the UN intervention in Somalia from 1992 to the end of 1993. The main research question addressed is why the UN intervention in Somalia failed. It relies on data from official UN documents and interviews to understand the reasons behind the failure of the intervention. The study hypothesizes that a successful intervention requires the political participation of those involved in the conflict. Attempts by regional organizations to manage conflicts in the post-Cold War era in places like Somalia, former Yugoslavia and Rwanda met with failure. There has therefore been a re-emphasis on the role of global organizations, especially the UN, in containing these wars. In 1992, the UN with the full support of the United States (U.S) went into Somalia with the aim of creating an environment that would ensure that food reached the millions of starving Somali people. The operation started with the UN - sanctioned and US - led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) which was to hand over to the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II). After a critical and extensive review of the intervention, the study concludes with the observation that the UN through UNITAF succeeded in ensuring that food got to the many starving Somalis. However, its lack of focus and impartiality after the killings of the UN troops led to conflict between the organization and Geq,eral Aideed's troops and to the subsequent failure of the operation. The study also observes that th~dictates of national interest of participating countries led to the decisions to intervene and subsequently to withdraw. The failure of the UN intervention in Somalia revealed the limitations of the UN in dealing with intrastate conflicts in light of the fact that it is composed of member States with sometimes-divergent national interests.