Logic and rationality in legal reasoning

Abstract

This study attempts to show that the positivistic use of logical objectivity epitomized in constrained inference and consequence relations, as a model for rationality is a narrower conception of rationality. The study argues that such a conception only holds, and relatively so, in formal aspects of discourses in science. The study marshals the argument that an absolute exclusion of sentiments and morality from human existence, the implication of the positivistic ideal of rationality, is an arbitrary and unwarranted reductionist undertaking that begs the question as to what rationality is. The postulation of the study is that sentiments and morality are irreducible aspects of human social life and any conception and ascription of rationality to humans must ipso facto take cognizance of these aspects. It thus suffices that contrary to positivistic thinking, the wider and more comprehensive conception of rationality is one which transcends mere logic and includes morality and sentiments in its theoretical construct. The study argues that the positivistic conception, though valid in the light of cognitive dictates and the scientific assumptions of causality and the uniformity of nature, transgresses ontological confines and imperatives. Such a conception is out of line with human nature and the essence of human social life. It can only apply to humans secundum quid but not simplicity because it at best merely epitomizes artificial intelligence. Therefore, the positivistic conception of rationality relatively defines scientific rationality but should not be taken to define rationality in general. Following the positivistic ideal of logical objectivity, legal positivism excludes morality and sentiments from its conception of the law. However, the study attempts to rebut this thinking on grounds that morality and sentiments are irreducible aspects of human social life. If man is a rational being and morality and sentiments are irreducible aspects of man, the absolute exclusion of morality and sentiments from the conception of the law by virtue of their exclusion from the conception of rationality is argued to be invalid, contradictory and reductionist. The study shows that rationality goes beyond mere reasoning or argumentation and is therefore more complex than logic can sufficiently and invariably capture. This is illustrated in legal reasoning where the appropriate decision may demand a deviation from the logical expectation of the relevant legal provisions. Also, in "hard cases", the gray areas of the law, and in case law or precedent, a choice between competing principles is sometimes the desirable basis for judgment. In case law, a choice between competing conclusions depending on the choice of cases to illustrate analogies or disanalogies by the prosecution or the defense characterizes legal adjudication. Such competing principles, arguments and conclusions may rest on grounds of equal logical strength. In this regard, the significance of logic is limited to internal consistency and coherence. This is argued to constitute the intemal standard of rationality. The study however postulates an external standard. It is at this level that morality and sentiments suffice. This level exposes the relative incompleteness and unpredictability of reality which cannot be harmonized with the completeness and predictability assumed by logic. Hence the theoretical and practical limitation of positivism in general and legal positivism in particular. The study postulates a conception of rationality that is argued to be invariably in harmony with ontological reality and comprehensively captures human social life. This is achieved by invoking morality and sentiments where it is relevant and to proportionate extents. It is also achieved by upholding flexibility and openness in reasoning. Such flexibility and openness is argued to reconcile with the relative unpredictability and incompleteness of reality which is transgressed by mere logic. Such flexibility and openness also checks the finitude and fallibility of human prediction and anticipation, which check is not envisioned and thus not envisaged in the positivistic conception of rationality