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dc.contributor.authorMurithi, Edward E
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-22T07:00:39Z
dc.date.available2015-12-22T07:00:39Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11295/93967
dc.description.abstractThis study set out to examine CEWARN EWS in addressing the Kenya post - election violence of 2007/08. The study looked at the mandate of CEWARN, their areas of reporting and CEWARN response mechanism. The study asks why the Kenya post - election violence was not averted despite the presence of regional conflict early warning systems. In order to achieve this, the study traced the origin of early warning systems, how the EWS have averted potentially violent conflicts in different parts of the globe, looked at the African Union early warning system and the creation and operationalization of CEWARN. The research focused on three objectives to get a better understanding of how CEWARN addressed the Kenya post - election violence. The first objective was to establish how CEWARN collected the conflict data, how CEWARN analyzed the collected data and, finally, how CEWARN transferred the analytical insight into practice. The study concentrated on the hotspots areas that suffered the greatest brunt of PEV 2007/08 and a sharp focus was placed on Trans-Nzoia, an area that experienced PEV of 2007/08 while covered by CEWARN EWS. The study delved in to the Kenya‘s electoral conflict and more specifically, how Kenya found its self embroiled in the post - election violence of 2007/08 and examined the causes of electoral conflict in the country and the role played by different stake holders in the 2007 electoral process. To achieve its objectives, the study applied both the greed/grievance theory and human need theory. The study used three hypotheses to get a better understanding of how CEWARN mechanism addressed the Kenya post – election violence. The hypotheses stated that CEWARN collected inadequate conflict relevant data, CEWARN analysis painted a picture of a potential electoral violence and CEWARN Early Warning was not acted upon by the response mechanism. The entire three hypotheses were proved to be true by the evidence gathered. The research utilized both primary and secondary data collection methods. The research thus used observation, questionnaires, question guides and interviews as instruments of primary data collection. The study equally utilized secondary sources, like newspapers, journals, books, reports and archival data. The research findings show that CEWARN EWS did little to provide the early warning necessary to prevent the PEV 2007/08. Most of the primary data sources reviewed did not have much on CEWARN involvement/participation in regard to 2007/08.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Nairobien_US
dc.titleAn Evaluation of Igad Conflict Early Warning System in Addressing the Kenya Post - Election Violence, 2007-2008en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US


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